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Marcet & NIcolini 2003 - Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning
Marcet & NIcolini 2003 - Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning
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RecurrentHyperinflations
and Learning
By ALBERTMARCETANDJUANP. NICOLINI*
The goal of this paper is to develop a model prompting, with a concomitant sensitivity of
that accounts for the main features of the hy- outcomes to details of adaptive algorithms."A
perinflations of the 1980's and to study the side contributionof the paperis to show with an
policy recommendationsthat arise from it. The example that,contraryto Sargent's statement,if
model is standard,except for the assumptionof certain rationality requirements are imposed,
quasi-rationallearning.Moder macroeconom- learning models can be useful to understand
ics has been reluctantto use boundedlyrational real-time transitiondynamics.
expectations models to match empirical obser- The long-run relationship between money
vations. It is commonly believed that such mod- and prices is a well-understood phenomenon.
els are not falsifiable and expectations are not The price level and the nominal quantity of
consistent with the model. This view is stated money over real outputhold an almost propor-
clearly in the following quotationfrom Thomas tional relationship so that the inflation rate is
J. Sargent (1993): "... the literature on adaptive essentially equal to the growth rate of money
decision processes seems to me to fall far short supply minus the growthrateof output.Thereis
of providing a secure foundation for a good widespread consensus in the profession that
theory of real-time transitiondynamics. There successfully stopping inflation involves sub-
are problems of arbitrarinessand the need for stantial reductions in money growth rates. On
the other hand, long periods of high money
* Marcet:Departmentof Economics and Business, Uni- growth rates are associated with large seignor-
versitat Pompeu Fabra, C/Ramon Trias Fargas, 23-25,
age collection requiredto finance government
deficits. A simple story abouthyperinflationsis
08005, Barcelona, Spain, CREI, and CEPR (e-mail:
albert.marcet@upf.edu); Nicolini: UniversidadTorcuatoDi often told: when the government is unable to
Tella, C/Miiiones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, Argen- either reduce its fiscal deficit or finance it
tina (e-mail:juanpa@utdt.edu).We thankTony Braun,Jim through the capital market, high seignorage is
Bullard,George Evans, Seppo Honkapohja,Rodi Manuelli,
Ramon Marimon, Tom Sargent, Stacia Sowerby, Harald required and high inflation rates are unavoid-
Uhlig, Neil Wallace, and Carlos Zarazagafor helpful con-
able. This is the logic behind the advice of the
versations and Marcelo Delajara and Ignacio Ponce InternationalMonetaryFund (IMF) to countries
Ocampo for research assistance. Any errors are our own. experiencinghigh inflationrates. Cross-country
Partof this work was done when both authorswere visiting evidence very strongly supportsthis story. Hy-
the FederalReserve Bank of Minneapolis.Most of the work
by Marcet was done when visiting CEMFI, Madrid. Re-
perinflations have occurred in countries with
search supportfrom DGICYT (SpanishMinistryof Science high seignorage, and many countries that suc-
andEducation),CIRIT(Conselleriad'EnsenyamentGenerali- cessfully stopped inflation did so by eliminat-
tat), CREI, the Barcelona Economics Programof CREA, ing the fiscal imbalance that required high
ANCT (Argentina, PICT 98-02-03543), and HCM (Euro-
seignorage.
pean Union) is greatly appreciated.Many of the proofs can
be found in AppendixC, availablefrom the authorsor in the However, this simple story fails when we
working paper version of this article. closely look at time series of inflation and sei-
1476
VOL.93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLINI:RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1477
2
Recent literatureimposing consistency requirementsin
See Sargent (1993), Ramon Marimon (1997), and learningmodels are Evans and Honkapohja(1993); Morde-
George Evans and Seppo Honkapohja (1999, 2001) for cai Kurz (1994); Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine
reviews. (1995); and Cars Hommes and GerhardSorger (1998).
1478 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
Bolivia
I. Evidenceon RecurrentHyperinflations Monthly Illatan Rate (in logs)
0.4
85 86 87 88 89 90 91
1. Recurrence of hyperinflationaryepisodes.
Time series show relatively long periods of FIGURE 1. MONTHLY INFLATION RATE (IN LOGS)
moderate and steady inflation, and a few
short periods of extremely high inflation
rates.
2. Exchange rate rules (ERR) stop hyperinfla- Our summaryof stylized facts should be un-
tions. But often an EER only lowers inflation controverted.3Facts 1 and 2 are clearly shown
temporarily,and new hyperinflationseven- in Figure 1, which presents data on the infla-
tually occur. tionaryexperiences of Argentina,Bolivia, Bra-
3. During a hyperinflation,seignorage and in- zil, and Peru in the 1980's.4 Periods when an
flation are not highly correlated. explicit fixed ERR was in place are indicatedby
4. Average inflation and seignorage are shaded areas. The end of the shading indicates
strongly correlatedacross countries. Hyper- the date in which the ERR was explicitly
inflationsonly occur in countrieswhere sei- abandoned.
gnorage is high on average. Fact 3 has been well documented in the lit-
eratureand it has motivated quite a bit of re-
Facts 2 and 4 can be combined to state the search including, for example, that of Sargent
following observationon monetarypolicy: sta- and Wallace (1987). Hyperinflations did not
bilization plans based on ERR-"heterodox" happentogetherwith high peaks in seignorage;
policy-that do not permanentlyreduceaverage very differentlevels of seignoragewere present
seignorage, may be successful in substantially duringdifferenthyperinflationsin a given coun-
reducing the inflation rate only in the short try and, in some instances, seignorage even
run. Some stabilization plans not only relied decreased while a hyperinflation was taking
on the fixing of the exchange rate but also place.5
permanently reduced the deficit-"orthodox"
policy-and the need for seignorage. It is now
relatively well accepted that this combination
of both orthodox and heterodox ingredients
has been successful at stopping hyperinfla- See Michael Bruno et al. (1988) and (1991).
3
Inflation rates were computed from InternationalFi-
4
tions permanently. To our knowledge, ours is nancial Statistics consumer price indices.
the first economic model that satisfactorily 5 See a
plot of inflationand seignorage for Argentinain
explains the above facts and is consistent with the 1980's in the working paper version of this paper
this policy recommendation. (Marcet and Nicolini, 1998).
VOL.93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLINI:RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1479
nal expectations (RE) predicts that hyperinfla- icism is hyperbolized by the sentence: "Any
tions are less severe in countries with high economic model can match any observationby
seignorage. choosing expectations appropriately";the sec-
The papersof MauriceObstfeld and Kenneth ond criticism is typified by the sentence "Eco-
Rogoff (1983) and Nicolini (1996) maintain nomic agentsdo not make systematicmistakes."
rational expectations and introduce ERR that RE becamethe way to overcomethese criticisms.
goes into effect if inflation goes beyond a cer- In this paper we use a boundedly rational
tain level and, therefore, these papers can be learning model to explain stylized facts, so a
used to address fact 2. Their results show that naturalquestion is: are we slipping into a use of
just the threatof convertibilityeliminates bub- learningmodels that is as objectionableas, say,
ble equilibria altogetherand that the ERR, un- adaptiveexpectations?
der rationalexpectationsequilibria,never takes The term boundedlyrationallearning (which,
place. Thus, once ERR is a credible threatthe in this paper, we use as synonymous with the
rationalexpectationsequilibriumis inconsistent term learning) is used to denote learningmech-
with the existence of hyperinflations.But this anisms that place upper bounds on rationality.
was certainly a credible threat in these coun- For example, agents are assumed not to know
tries, since ERR did take place. the exact economic model or to have bounded
Marcet and Sargent (1989) studied stability memory. But this admits too many models of
of rational expectations equilibria in the SW learning.Indeed,once we rule out RE, anything
model underleast-squareslearning.They found can be a boundedly rational learning scheme
that the low-inflationequilibriumis locally sta- and we could be falling back into old mistakes
ble and the high-inflationequilibriumis always and the "wildernessof irrationality."14
unstable. Taken literally, these results would Our approachis to allow for only small de-
say that bubble equilibriacannot be learned by viations from rationality,both along the transi-
agents. Therefore, none of the above facts is tion and asymptotically. Given an economic
appropriatelymatched if we restrict our atten- model we only admit learning mechanisms
tion to rational expectations equilibriathat are that satisfy certain lower bounds on rational-
stable under learning.13 ity within this model. In Section IV we will
In the next section we propose severalcriteria show how this small departurefrom rational-
to assess models with quasi-rationallearning ity generates equilibria in the model of Sec-
and to addressthe criticisms of learningmodels tion II that are quite different from RE,
commonly found in the literature. precisely in the direction of improving the
match of empirical observations.
Il. Learningand LowerBoundson Rationality We now set up a general framework and
define lower bounds that we place on rational-
Before the "rationalexpectations (RE) revo- ity. Assume that an economic model satisfies
lution," economic agents' expectations were
specified in macroeconomics according to ad (6) x, = g(x,_,,x+ ,, t, ,q)
hoc assumptions; one popular alternative was
"adaptive expectations." We explained in the where g is a function determined by market
introductionthat this was criticized because it equilibriumand agents' behavior,xt containsall
leads to: (i) too many degrees of freedom, (ii) the variables in the economy, xe+I is agents'
irrational expectations, and (iii) expectations expectationof the futurevalue of x, g, is an ex-
that are exogenous to the model. The first crit- ogenous shock, and r is a vector of parameters,
13 Marcet and
Sargent (1989) is a special case of the 14 It might seem that Bayesian learning is a
way out of
present paper when uncertaintyis eliminated, fu is arbi- this dilemma, but the literaturehas described several para-
trarilyhigh, and agents forecast Pi by regressingit on Pi i. doxes and shortcomingsof this approach.See, for example,
These authors noted that if inflation goes beyond the high MargaretM. Bray and David M. Kreps (1987), Marimon
steady state it may enter an unstableregion where inflation (1997), and David Easley and Aldo Rustichini (1999).
tends to grow withoutbound.This featureof the model with '5 Marimon (1997) and Easley and Rustichini (1999)
learningconstitutes the core of the dynamics in the current also arguethat learningcan be used for more thana stability
paper. criterion.
1482 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
To restrictlearning mechanisms so that they Thus, if IC is satisfied, agents are doing al-
generate good forecasts along the transitionwe most as well as possible within the learning
impose the next two lower bounds. mechanism specified after T periods, so that
they are likely to stay with /.
Definition 2 Epsilon-Delta Rationality (EDR): IC is, in general, more restrictive than AR,
The expectationsgiven by (z,f, ,u)satisfy EDR since it requiresthat good forecasts are gener-
for (E, 8, T) in the model (g, r]) if: ated along the transition,not only at the limit.
As in the case of EDR, it only makes sense to
> 1-
',TET 8. study IC in the context of "moderatelyhigh" T.
The first two bounds compare the perfor-
If EDR is satisfied for small E, 8 > 0, agents mance of the learning mechanism used by
are unlikely to switch to another learning agents relative to an external agent who knows
scheme after period T, even if they were told the best prediction that can be computed from
"the whole truth."'8 knowledge of (f, p,, z, g, rq). The bound IC,
It is only interestingto study EDR for "mod- instead, comparesthe learningmechanismwith
erately high" values of T. If T is too low the forecasts that use the same family of mecha-
sample means have no chance to settle down. If nisms f but are allowed to pick alternativepa-
T is large enough and AR is satisfied, EDR is rameter values ,I. This last bound contains
also satisfied. The precise empiricalapplication some of the intuitionof rationalexpectations,in
that the researcherhas in mind should suggest the sense of looking for an approximatefixed
an interestingvalue for T. For example, in our point in which agents' expectations minimize
application below, we choose T = 10 years, the errors within the mechanismf. Notice that
which is the length of the hyperinflationarype- this restrictionwill, in general,imply thatagents
riod in many of the countries studied. under different policy environmentsuse differ-
AR is unambiguouslysatisfied (there is a yes ent learning parametersjt, so that the learning
or no answer), but EDR can only be satisfied in parameterthat satisfies IC is endogenous to the
a quantitativeway, for certain e and 8. model and to governmentpolicy. For example,
The next bound on rationalityrequiresagents in our model, agents in high seignorage coun-
to use learning parameters ,u that are nearly tries (say, Argentina in the 1980's) will use a
optimal within the learning mechanismf. De- differentlearningparameterfrom agents in low
note by At(3,, /j') the forecast producedby the seignorage countries (say, Switzerland). These
learningparameter,u' when all agents are using Definitions can be readily generalized to more
the parameter,u. Formally, complicated models or to objective functions
other than the average predictionerror.
At(IL,' )= Af(t-l(A,W'),xt, W) Imposingthese lower boundson rationalityis
our way of relaxing rationalexpectationswhile
Definition 3 Internal Consistency (IC): Given maintainingthe requirementthat agents do not
(g, 7R),the expectationsgiven by (z,f, ,l) satisfy make mistakes forever. Agents have a certain
IC for (E, T) if amount of forward-lookingcapabilities under
Definitions 2 and 3 but far less than under
T \ rationalexpectations.
(11) E TE |X+- t(P,), XP)l|2
Rational expectations can be interpretedas
i t=1 / imposing extreme versions of the second and
third bounds. Obviously, RE satisfies AR. It
would appearthat requiringEDR for all e, 8 >
-< min E -T i 1
t=Ix - z(P3,(, .'), X)2 + E. 0, and all T is the same as imposing rational
A' Tt=l / expectations, but a careful proof should be
worked out. Also, if the RE equilibrium(REE)
is recursive,if the appropriatestate variablesare
18
Bray and Nathan E. Savin (1986) study whether the
learning model rejects the hypothesis of serially uncorre-
lated predictionerrorsby assumingthat agents run a Durbin '9 Evans and Honkapohja(1993) developed a very sim-
and Watson test. That exercise carries the flavor of EDR. ilar criterionin a different context.
1484 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
20
As usual in models of learning, we make the conve-
22
In this simple model "tracking"is equivalentto adap-
nient assumptionthat the last observationused to formulate tive expectations with a delay. In a more general model
expectationsis dated at t - 1. Includingtoday's inflationin trackingis differentfrom adaptiveexpectations and it gen-
3, would make it even easier for the learning scheme to eratesbetterforecasts.For example, if seignorage is autore-
satisfy the lower bounds and to matchthe stylized facts, and gressive of order 1, expected inflationwould have to depend
it would not change the dynamics of the model. on currentseignorage in order to satisfy any of the lower
21
Chung (1990), Evans and Honkapohja (1993), and bounds on rationality.In that case, trackingwould be fun-
Sargent (1993) also discuss trackingalgorithms. damentallydifferent from adaptive expectations.
VOL.93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLINI:RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1485
Pt- I
= a otherwise.
Pt
(14) = H(3,, 1 -,, d,)
Pt- 1
where24
23
Evans and GareyRamey (1998) also analyze the prop- Equations(12), (13), and (14) define a system of
erties of a learningmechanismthat respondsendogenously stochastic, second-order difference equations.
to the performanceof the predictionswithin the model and Characterizingthe solution analytically is un-
within the realization. feasible since the system is highly nonlinear.
24 Notice that the
second part of this equation, where We now provide some intuition on the be-
ERR will prevail, applies if one of the following (mutually
exclusive) cases occurs:
havior of inflation. Let h(3, d) = H(3, 3, d).
Case (i): 1 - y,t,- 1 < 0, which implies M,_ = 0, so Notice that if t, - ,t_-, then P,/P,_ 1 - h(3t,
the budget constraint of the government is incompatible d), so that the graph of h in Figure 2 provides
with the demand for real balances unless reserves adjust. an approximationto the actual inflation as a
Case (ii): 1 - yl, - d/o < 0 and 1 - y3p,- > 0 so
function of perceived inflation and it can be
only a negative price level clears the market,and
1 - y/3,- used to describe the approximatedynamics of
Case (iii): None of the above and 1- > the model.
1- y,dt,-- 4/
p, such that the market generates a level of inflation The first graph correspondsto a low d,. The
unacceptableto the governmentif reserves do not adjust. low rational expectations equilibrium 1"3E is
1486 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
locally stable under least squares learning.25 a hyperinflationto occur even if inflation has
The horizontalaxis can be split into the inter- been stable for a while. Thus, a country with a
vals S, U, and ERR. high average seignorage tends to have hyperin-
If /, E S, actualinflationis on averagecloser flationary episodes more often, and fact 4 is
to /,E than perceived inflation and the learning consistent with the model.
mechanism pushes perceived inflation towards
/RE. Roughly speaking, S is the stability set of C. AsymptoticRationality(AR)
perceived inflation. On the other hand, if per-
ceived inflation is in U, actual inflation is on To prove convergence to RE and that AR is
averagehigherthan P,, perceivedinflationtends satisfied we need:
to increase and a hyperinflation is likely to
occur. Then, when the set ERR is reached, a ASSUMPTION 1: The support of d, is the
fixed exchange rule is established and inflation interval [K-, K+], where K- > 0, K+ < k.
is sent back to S. The economy may end up in
the unstable set U due to a numberof reasons: ASSUMPTION 2: d, has a continuous density
a few high shocks to seignorage when 1/a, is fd,
and fd(K+) - > 0.
not yet close to zero, initially high perceived
inflation, the second-order dynamics adding Letting S(/3) - E(h(3, d,)), Appendix C
momentumto increasing inflation,etc. [availablefrom the authors,and in the working
If a shock to inflationoccurs agents are likely paperversion of the paper(Marcetand Nicolini,
to switch to tracking and set 1/a, = l/a, per- 1998)] proves that
ceived inflationwill then be more heavily influ-
enced by actualinflationand it is more likely to * S is increasing and convex;
end up in U than under pure OLS. Hyperinfla- * as /u -> oo,S has an asymptoteat 3 = (1 -
tions promptagents to switch to trackingand to K+l)lIy;
pay more attentionto recent observations;this * S has at most two fixed points 3RE, /E;
in turn makes hyperinflationsmore likely to * /iE, 82E are the stationary rational expecta-
occur and predictionswith trackingbetter,thus tions equilibria;
reinforcingthe switch to trackingin periods of * two fixed points exist iffd is close enough to
instability.Only if 1/ao is very small relative to zero;
the variance of inflation and if initial inflation * no fixed point exists iffd is large enough;
startsout in S (and v is large enough), hyperin- * as we consider larger distributionsfor d, (as
flations are impossible. f, shifts to the right) 3R, 32E get closer
This intuitionsuggests that the model is con- together.Therefore,for largerd, the stable set
sistent with stylized fact 1, since a number of S shrinksand/IE} is closerto the unstableset U;
hyperinflationsmay occur in the economy be- * if two fixed points exist, least-squareslearn-
fore it settles down. Also, it is clear thatan ERR ing converges to /3E a.s.
will end each hyperinflationtemporarily,so that
fact 2 is foundin thismodel.Also, once /t is in the PROPOSITION1: In addition to Assumptions
set U, inflationis likely to groweven if seignorage 1-2, assume that average seignorage and its
does not, which is consistentwith fact 3. variance are low enough for two stationary
To analyze fact 4, consider the second graph REE to exist, that ,3 E S (targeted inflation
of Figure 2, for a high d,. Now, the unstableset belongs to the stabilityset) and that a and v are
U is much larger. Furthermore,U is "danger- large enough.26Then1, --> 1E a.s. and Asymp-
ously" close to the rational expectations equi- totic Rationalityobtains.
librium P3E where the economy tends to live,
and it is likely for the model to end up in U and
26
The assumptionon &can be interpretedas saying that
25
This discussion assumes that S(j3) is close to h(3, d,), convergence occurs if the importancegiven to recent news
which is approximatelycorrect if d, is close to its expecta- is never too high. This assumption is needed in order to
tion. The proofs of stability of least-squareslearningand of obtain a lower bound of inflation in the first part of the
the propertiesof S are in an Appendix available from the proof. A lower bound on inflationcan also be obtained for
authorsand in the working paper version of the paper. unrestricteda by changing the model in reasonable ways.
VOL.93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLNI: RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1487
forecasts and AR obtains. Notice that 3,-> 13E forecasting errors whenever a hyperinflation
a.s. and the fact that H is continuous at 13RE happened, since OLS does not weigh recent
imply events more heavily.
D. Internal Consistency(IC)
-
(RE1 =|H(P
pP
Pt- I1 , ,,-2, d)
In Section IV, subsection B, we explained
intuitively why hyperinflationsare more likely
- H(3RE, 13RE,d,)| -0 a.s. to occur with high 1/a. Also, a high value of I/a
is likely to generate better forecasts during a
as t -> oo, where we used the fact that, by hyperinflation.Therefore,there is potential for
definition,PR/p -1 = H( RE, PRE, d). Now IC to be satisfied precisely for the 1/a's that
generate hyperinflations.
IC is the criterionwe use to define equilibria
E, _1
P) IRE in the paper. The variables we have to deter-
mine are the sequences of inflation, expected
inflation, and nominal balances, together with
E. 1,( ) ( .E , .,
= )
--0 a.s. the parametera. Notice that, since a is deter-
mined as part of the equilibrium, the a that
satisfies IC will vary as the process for d,
where 1RE= E(PRE/PtRE1)
is by definition, and changes so that the learning mechanism is en-
convergence follows by Lebesgue-dominated dogenous to governmentpolicy.
convergence and boundedness of inflation.
Therefore,both (t and Et_ (P/P_ l) converge Definition 4: A stochastic process {P,, 3,, M,}
to PRE. This, together with boundedness of together with a is an IC equilibrium for (e, T) if:
prices and 3 implies that
1. Given a, {P,, 3,, M,} satisfy (7), (12), (13),
-2
1 PT
(14) for all t.
~ 2. a satisfies IC for (e, ).27
1T
T P 1t-
P, - 1
Since the dynamics are highly nonlinear,
T characterizinganalytically the equilibrium a's
T1 P P,
- -
I - Et-P-->) 0 a.s. is impossible. We solve the model by simula-
tion and searchnumericallyfor a that satisfy IC
in a way to be describedbelow. This will show
as T -> oo,so that that IC does impose restrictionson the space of
learningparameters,and that the resultingequi-
P libria matchthe stylized facts of the hyperinfla-
t -
-
tionary experiences remarkablywell.
" E. Characterizationof the Solution by
1 P, Simulation
TT
-E ,_ P, ( ---+ >
la.s.
P,_
Pt-
I=I Pt-7.I To generate simulationswe must assign val-
ues to the parametersof the money demand
as T -> oo for any e > 0. equation (y, )) and the distributionof dt. We
choose values (y = 0.4 and 4 = 0.37) in order
Notice that AR imposes very few restrictions to replicate some patterns of the Argentinean
on the learning scheme. In particularAR holds
for many a's. Even if AR is satisfied, agents 27The carefulreaderwill note that we did not impose IC
could be making systematic mistakes; for ex- on the learning parameter v in this definition or in the
ample, in periodswhere a, is updatedaccording simulations we describe below. This was done only for
to OLS, agents could be making very large simplicity.
VOL.93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLINI:RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1489
032
02
0.16
0.1-
0.0 -
FIGURE3. SIMULATION
OF THE(LOG) INFLATION
experience during the 1980's; for details see making it difficult for the model to departfrom
Appendix B. We assume that seignorageis nor- RE, we have chosen values of the average sei-
mally distributed, truncated to have positive gnorage for which a REE exists. In order to
values of seignorage, with mean that varies quantify the relevance of average seignorage
across experiments we perform and o'd = (fact 4), we performedour calculationsfor four
0.01.28 different values: E(dt) = 0.049, 0.047, 0.045,
The parameterv was set equal to 10 percent. and 0.043.
We also assumed that the government estab- First of all, we describe the typical behavior
lished ERR whenever expectations were such of the model. A particularrealization is pre-
that inflation rates would be above 5,000 per- sented in Figure 3. That realization was ob-
cent, so that we set 3u = 50. The ERR is tained with E(dt) = 0.049 and 1/a = 0.2. We
enforced until expected inflation is inside the will show below that this value of the learning
stable set S. parameter satisfies IC. This graph shows the
Since our purpose is to show that a small potential of the model to generate enormous
deviation from rationalexpectations can gener- inflationrates. In the same graph,we also plot-
ate dynamics quite different from and closer to ted two horizontal lines, one at each of the
the data than RE, we choose as initial beliefs stationary deterministic rational expectation
30 = f3RE so that our simulations are biased in equilibria,to show how the model under learn-
favor of looking like RE.29 For the specified ing can generate much higher inflation rates
parameters,the maximum level of average sei- than the rationalexpectations version.
gnorage in the deterministicmodel for which a This graphdisplays some of the stylized facts
REE exists is E(d,) = 0.05. In the spirit of in the learningmodel.30In the first periods, the
28The results for lower values of oa2 were similar. Of 30 The behaviorof the REE in this
economy is clear: for
course, hyperinflationswere then less frequent. the stationary REE, inflation would be i.i.d., fluctuating
29
For example, it would be trivial to generate at least around the horizontal line of IE. For bubble equilibria,
one hyperinflationby choosing 10 > 3RE. inflation would grow towards the horizontalline of BE.
1490 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
inflationrate is close to the low stationaryequi- 1/a' for each 1/a on the grid. Figure 4 shows
librium.When a relativelylarge shock occurs, it the result of these calculations:in the horizontal
drives perceived inflation into the unstable re- axis we plot 1/a, while the vertical axis plots
gion U and a hyperinflation episode starts. I/&'. The intervalof alternativelearningparam-
Eventually, ERR is established and the econ- eters that generate a mean square error within
omy is broughtback into the stable region. If no E = 0.01 of the minimum in each column is
large shocks occur for a long while, 3, would be markedwith a darkarea. An IC equilibriumfor
revised accordingto the OLS rule a, = a,_ 1 + (E, T) = (0.01, 120) is found when the darkarea
1, and the model would converge to the rational cuts the 45 degree line.
expectations equilibrium;however, since aver- Table 1 reportsthe probabilitiesof having n
age seignorageis high for this simulation, 3RE is hyperinflationsin ten years for different values
close to the unstableset (see Figure 2) and it is of average seignorage and for those values of
likely that a new large shock will put the econ- l/a that satisfy the IC criterion.
omy back into the unstable region and a new As Figure 4 shows, for a low value E(d,) =
burst in inflation will occur. Clearly, we have 0.043, only l/a = 0 and 0.1 satisfy the IC
recurrent hyperinflations, stopped by ERR requirement. It turns out that for those two
(facts 1 and 2). Since seignorage is i.i.d., and values the probabilityof a hyperinflationin 120
since the graphshows some periodsof sustained periods is zero. Therefore,if IC is imposed, this
increasesin inflation,it is clear thatthereis little value of average seignorage rules out hyperin-
correlationof inflation and seignorage (fact 3). flations.Since hyperinflationsdo not occur, giv-
In orderto reduce (or eventually eliminate) the ing too much importanceto recent observations
chances of having a new burst,the government does not generategood forecasts, so a low 1/a is
must reduce the amountof seignoragecollected a good choice within the model. If seignorageis
(i.e., an "orthodox"stabilizationplan) in order increased to 0.045, the criterionis satisfied for
to increasethe size of the stable set. This would all values of alpha between 0.5 and zero. As
separatethe two horizontallines, it would place indicated by Table 1, for this average seignor-
3RE far from the unstable set and it would age there are equilibriain which the probability
stabilize the economy permanentlyaround the of experiencing recurrent hyperinflations is
low stationary equilibrium. Establishing ERR high, so that higher alternative a's generate
just before a reduction in average seignorage good forecasts,and the hyperinflationarybehav-
would help stabilize the expectations of agents ior is reinforced.Table 1 and Figure4 show that
more quickly, so there is room for a positive as the mean of seignorage increases, quasi-
effect of a "heterodox"interventionas well. rational learning is consistent with hyperinfla-
To find the learningequilibriumwe look for tions. Furthermore,hyperinflations are more
values of cathat satisfy the lower bound crite- likely when seignorageis high. This documents
rion IC for (E, T) = (0.01, 120). This value of T how fact 4 is present in our model.
is chosen to represent ten years, roughly the This exercise formalizes the sense in which
length of the hyperinflationaryepisodes we are the equilibriawith a given learning mechanism
studying. The value of E is just chosen to be reinforces the use of the mechanism. For in-
"small";it will be clear below how the results stance, when seignorageis 0.49 and l/a = 0.2,
may change if this parameterchanges. an agent using an alternative alpha equal to
To find numerically those values of a that zero, which is the collective behavior that rep-
satisfy IC we proceed as follows: we define a licates the REE, will make largerMSE than the
grid of I/a E [0, 1.2] separatedby intervalsof agent using 1/a = 0.2. The reason is that in
length 0.1. The same grid is used both for 1/a equilibriumthere are many hyperinflations,and
and the alternative learning parameters 1/a' the agent that expects the REE will make bad
considered. We compute the mean squareder- forecasts.
rors in the right side of (11) by Monte Carlo
integration,31and we find the minimum over
Average S . .. ..
0.9
0,S
0.7
0.6 I:
nA
vI-)../
0_4 -~
-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
i.
0.2
0.1
0.0.
I v<T I ns
Yvow I 0nwV i .
07
. .(
I
-1p AR
""a-. 0.9
Av ;=4.5 percent
,i
0,9
0.8
0.7
0-.
0o5
04 --
0.3
__-2__~
0.1 ,
0.0
I % 0.1
V r
-41'"
i
A ?
0.3
w
i 0.4 ~05 I 0.6
.,, , I J n7 I
'ts na
VJ^' YV -
= 4.7 percent
0.9 _.1
0.8 . . .
1:
0.7
0.6
05
0.4
0.3
0...2
0.1 r--'---
Il s
0,0 I -M
m
I 9 -
I I
nnV I n
V-.
n1 U.
uu
I I
ni / nA
V
xT
n(;
N!-?
n.(1
t, .
n(7
V-
I
.
n(
Y V *
not .
x,,'
0.4 -
0.3
0.1
0.0),
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0,4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0
FIGURE4. INTERNAL
CONSISTENCY
Notes: Columnsrepresentpossible values for 1/a actuallyused by agents. Rows depict alternativevalues for 1/&'.Light gray
cells indicate the 45-degree line. Dark gray cells indicate that the value for l/a is efficient. Black cells indicate fixed points
on 1/a.
1492 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
Probabilityof no Probabilityof one Probabilityof two Probabilityof three Probabilityof more than
Alpha hyperinflations hyperinflation hyperinflations hyperinflations three hyperinflations
0.5 0.16 0.34 0.28 0.16 0.06
0.4 0.55 0.34 0.09 0.01 0
0.3 0.90 0.10 0 0 0
0.2 0.99 0.01 0 0 0
0.1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
Probabilityof no Probabilityof one Probabilityof two Probabilityof three Probabilityof more than
Alpha hyperinflations hyperinflation hyperinflations hyperinflations three hyperinflations
0.4 0.09 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.13
0.3 0.45 0.37 0.15 0.03 0
0.2 0.82 0.14 0.04 0 0
0.1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
Probabilityof no Probabilityof one Probabilityof two Probabilityof three Probabilityof more than
Alpha hyperinflations hyperinflation hyperinflations hyperinflations three hyperinflations
0.2 0.23 0.40 0.27 0.09 0.02
0.1 0.73 0.26 0.01 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
rr.eT> ?P(ERRat some t-T) This proves that E(P7+ IP,P)() = co, there-
fore
where ?P(ERRat some t < T) is the probability
that the government implementsERR at some e
-p2
11 + I () P+ i
period t = 1,..., T. 1
(19)
t= l
P-
P,(w) P,
PROOF:
Fix-E,T. We first consider the case that 3u =
oo. Consider a realization o where an ERR is -P,+l(6) +
I
established at some t = O,..., T. Letting t + 1 -Ep)()Pt
-Et + E,,
pt (
Aw)
P, (o)
be thefirst period where this occurs, it has to be
the case that 1 - y,+ l(o) - -dT+ ()/ < 0
and 1 - y(3(o) > 0. Clearly, we can only have because the right-handside is, in fact, infinite.
the first inequality if d 4- (1 - y3i+l())) < So, (19) holds for all realizationswhere there is
K+. Therefore,since inflationis given by equa- one hyperinflationand ir.ET > P [ERRat some
tion (14) and (3t+ , ,3) are known with infor- t T71.
mation available at t, we have that The case of Pf finite but arbitrarilylarge
follows from observing that, with arbitrarily
high probability, the sequences of the case
(18) -(P+ (C) 3 = ooare below a certain bound 1; also, for
arbitrarilyhigh Pu the conditional expectation
e'K+ is arbitrarilyclose to the one with pU infinite,so
that all the inequalities are maintainedwith ar-
K- -
bitrarilyhigh probability.
the policy recommendationsmentioned above: On the practical side, this paper shows that
an exchange rate rule (ERR) may temporarily hyperinflationscan be stopped with a combina-
stop a hyperinflation,but average seignorage tion of heterodox and orthodox policies. We
must be lowered to eliminate hyperinflations have been working on this paper in the second
permanently. half of the 1990's; at that time it might have
The economic fundamentalsof the model are seemed that hyperinflationswere a purely aca-
completely standard except for the use of a demic issue: South Americancountriesseemed
boundedly rational learning rule instead of ra- to have solid fiscal stances and hyperinflations
tional expectations.We show thatif the learning were a thing of the past. Unfortunately, the
rule is restricted to be quasi-rational in the recentevents in Argentinaand the experienceof
sense that it must perform fairly well within some Eastern European countries have lent
the model at hand, the model is falsifiable, some immediate interest to the policy conclu-
and the learning rule driving expectation for- sions of this paper. It still seems importantto
mation is endogenous to government policy. have a solid model that can help judging the
This deviation from rational expectations is reasonabilityof the IMF recommendations.The
attractivebecause it avoids the strong require- methodological contributionof the paper is to
ments on rationality placed by rational expec- show that, with adequateequipment for orien-
tations, and because the fit of the model tation and survival, an expedition into the "wil-
improves dramaticallyeven if the deviation is derness of irrationality"can be quite safe and
small. productive.
APPENDIXA
Households:
To provide some microfoundationsfor the model in Section II, subsection A, we solve a
deterministicsmall open economy version of a standardoverlappinggenerationsmodel.34
Each cohorthas a continuumof agents living two periods.Thereis one type of consumptiongood
in the world. Preferencesare given by (ln cY+ A In c?+ ) where c; is consumptionof young agents
at time t and c?+ is consumptionof old agents at time t + 1. Agents are endowed with (oy, co) units
of consumptionwhen young and old respectively, where oy > (o > 0.
Asset markets:
There are two assets in the economy: domestic and foreign currency. In our hyperinflationary
equilibria,domestic currencywill be return-dominatedby foreign currency.To ensure that money
demandis positive we will impose a cash-in-advanceconstraintfor local currencyon net purchases
of consumption.
for t ' -1. This conditionmakes foreign currencyvalueless for households.Therefore,we can write
the constraintsfor the household as
P,tc = Ptcy + M,
M ? 0.
Household's optimizationimplies
34This Appendix extends the closed economy results of Sargent and Wallace (1987).
VOL. 93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLINI:RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1495
+
= P,tY Pt+l? 9 M,
o?
(Al)
clt
(1 +A)P, ' P,
oYA
(1 +A)
Pt+
P, (1 +A)
ifWoY
w
Pt +
P,
M,
- =0
Cy= Y, otherwise.
Pt
oWA (0?
This gives a microfoundationto equation (1), with ~ = + A and y = ~
ITA co Ak.
Foreign sector:
The world is inhabitedby wholesale firms that can buy and sell goods in any country without
transactioncosts and are not subject to cash-in-advanceconstraints. If we let X, (which can be
negative) be the net numberof units of the consumptiongood bought domestically and sold abroad
by firmj, profits are given by
7J = XP{e, - XP,
where et is the nominal exchange rate and Pf the price of the consumptiongood abroad.Free entry
into the business implies that profits must be zero, therefore
oY + o? = c, + c? + d, + TB,
M, - M,-_ e,
(A3) = d, + (R,- R,_)-.
M, =d,P, + M,_
which togetherwith the money demand(Al) solve for the equilibriumsequences of M, and P,. The
nominal exchange rate is given by equation (A2).
35 Taxes and
governmentdebt are easy to introduceby reinterpretingd, and the endowmentsw: all equationsare consistent
with codenoting endowments net of age-dependent,constant, lump-sum taxes, and with d, being the primarydeficit of the
government. Debt can be introduced, for example, if we assume that government debt is constant (perhaps because the
government is debt constrained)and d, representsinterest payments on debt plus primarydeficit.
1496 THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEW DECEMBER2003
A Fixed ERRRegime.-In this regime the governmentbuys or sells foreign currencyat a given
exchange rate. Given Pf, Pf,, e,_ and a desired level of inflation 13,the exchange rate is
-P{,1
e,- 3e,_l pf
Equation (A2) implies that with this policy the governmentachieves 3 = P/P,_ . The money
demand(Al) determinesthe level of nominalmoney demandconsistent with the nominal exchange
rate target. Given this level of money supply and d,, foreign reserves and, consequently, the trade
balance adjust so as to satisfy (A3). Of course, ERR is only feasible if the constraints on the
governmentasset position is never binding.
We assume that the first regime is used if inflationachieves an acceptablelevel less than PU; the
ERR regime is followed otherwise.
The equilibriumis therefore given by equations (Al), (A2), and (A3) which are deterministic
versions of equations(1) to (4) in the paper.The analogy between this deterministicversion and the
stochastic one in the paper is only exact up to a linear approximation,a usual simplification in
macroeconomicmodels under learning.
B
APPENDIX
In this Appendix we explain the choice of parametervalues for the demandfor money used in the
numericalsolution of Section IV. The money demandequation(1) is linearwith respect to expected
inflation. It is well known, though, that the linear functional form does not perform very well
empirically.However, departingfrom linearitywould make the analysis of the model impossible to
deal with. While we do maintainlinearity, we want to use parametervalues that are not clearly at
odds with the observations.Since we are interestedin the public finance aspect of inflation,we use
observations from empirical Laffer curves to calibrate the two parameters.In particular,as one
empirical implication of our model is that "high" average deficits increase the probability of a
hyperinflation,we need to have a benchmarkto discuss what high means. Thus, a naturalrestriction
to impose on our numbersis that the implied maximum deficit is close to what casual observation
of the data suggests. We also restrictthe inflationrate that maximizes seignoragein our model to be
consistent with the observations.
We use quarterlydataon inflationratesand seignorageas a shareof GNP for Argentinafrom 1980
to 1990 from HidelgortAhumadaet al. (1993) to fit an empiricalLaffer curve. While there is a lot
of dispersion, the maximumfeasible seignorage is around5 percent of GNP, and the inflation rate
that maximizes seignorage is close to 60 percent. These figures are roughly consistent with the
findings in Miguel Kiguel and Pablo A. Neumeyer (1995) and other studies. The parametersof the
money demand y and 4, are uniquely determinedby the two numbersabove. Note that the money
demand function (1) implies a stationaryLaffer curve equal to
(B1) + m
1M= + (1 - y( + 7r))
where m is the real quantity of money and ir is the inflation rate. Thus, the inflation rate that
maximizes seignorage is
1r*= 1-- 1
which, setting Tr*= 60 percent,implies y = 0.4. Using this figurein (B 1), and makingthe maximum
revenue equal to 0.05, we obtain 4 = 0.37.
VOL.93 NO. 5 MARCETAND NICOLINI:RECURRENTHYPERINFLATIONS
AND LEARNING 1497