EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19290 January 11, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MENANDRO CONSTANTINO, Defendant-Appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendant is accused of the crime of arson. The lower court found the crime to have been proven, and sentenced the defendant to twelve
years and one day of cadena temporal, with the accessories provided by law, to indemnify the municipality of Bigaa in the sum of P2,300, and to
pay the costs. The defendant appealed from said judgment and makes six assignments of error, to wit:

1. The trial court erred in not allowing the accused time to read the information on the day of this appearance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

2. The trial court erred in applying to this case article 550, first case, of the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The trial court erred in imposing upon the accused a penalty which is unconstitutional, being excessive, unusual, and
cruel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty as principal of the burning of the school building of Pulongubat,
Bigaa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. The trial court erred in not permitting the defense to make certain questions in the cross-examination which would have shown the lack of
consistency and veracity of the testimony of some witness for the prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. The trial court erred in not permitting the defense to prove certain facts which would have weakened the prosecution.

The trial court did not commit any error in refusing to give the accused the time he applied for to read the information. To what section 19 of
General Order No. 58 refers is to the time to answer the information. Neither did it err in applying article 550 of the Penal Code in this case, in spite
of the fact that the edifice burnt had not been inaugurated, which was to be used as a public school. The evidence shows that said edifice had
already been delivered by the contractor to the municipality of Bigaa. What makes a building public is not its inauguration for the purpose
intended, but the fact of the State or any of its agencies having the title thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We do not find the penalty of cadena temporal imposed by the law (art. 550 of the Penal Code) upon a person convicted of the burning of a public
building to be unconstitutional by reason of being excessive, unusual, and cruel, when the damage caused exceeds 6,250 pesetas. Taking into
consideration the gravity of the crime, which, as observes the illustrious commentator Viada, causes devastation terror, and alarm, and accepting
the considerations made by the trial judge about the grave consequences in the Philippines of the burning of an edifice used as a public school, we
are of the opinion that the penalty provided by the law is not excessive. Neither is it in itself unusual and cruel. (U. S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil., 386.)
chanrobles virtual law library

Turning to the fourth assignment of error, which, according to the appellant, is the principal basis of his defense, we find the evidence to have
established sufficiently and beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the accused as the person who set fire to the public school mentioned in the
information. The record shows that the accused was disgusted with the erection of said building in the barrio of Pulongubat and not in that of
Santol of which he was a resident, or on a place midway between the two barrios; that Eugenio B. Cruz surprised the appellant in the act of setting
fire to said school building, and Feliciano Gonzalez saw him emerge from a side of the edifice when it was already burning; that some footprints
found in the place where the accused was seen on the night in question coincide with one of the feet of the accused, with the circumstance of a
finger being lacking from the footprints as well as from said foot of the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find in the record no sufficient reason for not giving credit to the witness for the prosecution who testified to the facts above stated. Nor is
there sufficient evidence that the accused is a victim of political intrigues, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of fact of the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Among the circumstances that the defense discussed in his oral argument before this court, our attention was specially called to two, namely, the
two piece of bamboo, Exhibits A and B which, it is contended, should have been burnt much more than they are, if not totally, which are alleged to
have been used by the accused for raising the burning wick to the eaves of the school building, the said building having been completely reduced to
ashes; and the footprints which extend to the heel of the foot, which the defense argues cannot be those of a man who is running, the soles of
whose feet do not ordinarily press upon the ground to their full length, but only their anterior parts, the heels being
raised.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the canes Exhibit A and B, their ends exhibit traces of burns. The witnesses for the prosecution do not positively say that these two canes
were not taken out from the eaves after the setting of the fire. The witness Eugenio B. Cruz says that he has not seen anybody take them out. (Fols.
13, st. n.) Even supposing that such canes were left resting upon the eaves of the building, it was not absolutely impossible for them not be burnt
totally or more than said Exhibits A and B are. The school building had a nipa roof and wooden walls; the roof to which fire was set would burn
before the rest, and as the canes were resting on the eaves, they could have fallen to the ground when they lost their support, the flame, if there
was any, extinguished upon their falling, and once on the ground, which was humid, according to the evidence, they could not have been burnt
either by the fire of their own, or by that of the edifice. It is not impossible for these canes not to be entirely dry, being, as can be presumed, the
surplus canes of an edifice that had just been terminated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the footprints, also it was not impossible in the instant case for the full length of the foot of one who was running to be marked on that
ground, which was humid, nor is it impossible for the earth to be loose like that taken out from the excavations of the posts which are usually
spread near then in buildings thus constructed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the last two assignments of error the defense contends that the court below should not have sustained the objection of the fiscal to certain
questions made by defendant's counsel. The question put in the cross-examination to the witness Eugenio B. Cruz was properly disallowed, as
unnecessary, as well as the other one put to Feliciano Gonzalez. As to the question made by the court (fol. 21, st. n.), it does not constitute an
abuse of discretion, nor of authority, it being really, as the Attorney-General says, a question to make the previous one clear, for it leads one to
believe that what was intended to get from witness was the reason why the accused was caused to tread upon the footprints and not whether or
not the accused had seen such fact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the trial court was right in finding the accused guilty of the crime of arson and in imposing upon him the penalty provided by article
550 of the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find, however, no circumstance whatever modifying the penalty, which must, therefore be imposed in its medium
degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the appellant is sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of cadena
temporal, said judgment being affirmed in all other respects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The costs shall be taxed against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22426 May 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PELAGIO CONDEMENA, CASAMERO PATINO, SIMPLICIO ANIEL, RICARIDO CAUSING @
GARIDO, defendants,
SIMPLICIO ANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.

ANGELES, J.:chanrobles virtual law library

Pelagio Condemena, Casamero Patino, Ricarido Causing and Simplicio Aniel were charged with the crime of robbery in band with homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, abuse of superior
strength and dwelling.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After trial, the court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band with homicide without, however, making
a finding on any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, instead it took into consideration the lack of instruction and education
in mitigation of their criminal liability, and sentenced each to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay P6,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the proportionate costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Pending their appeal in this Court, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero Patino withdrew their appeal which was granted in a
resolution of the Court of June 5, 1954. As the record now stands, only Simplicio Aniel remained as the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The evidence for the prosecution has established that on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, Barcelisa Lamoste was sitting by the
side of the cradle of her child facing her husband Fermin Lamoste who was on the yard of the house. Their eldest daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, 14
years old at that time, was at the door of their house together with her younger brothers and sisters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Suddenly, four men arrived at their house. Of these four, Barcelisa Lamoste recognized Pelagio Condemena who had been living in Mambajao,
Villaba, Leyte, for quite a long time as their neighbor. Barcelisa Lamoste did not know the names of the companions of Pelagio Condemena, but she
recognized them by their faces. On the witness stand, Barcelisa Lamoste pointed and identified Pelagio Condemena to be one of the four men who
were in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the date and approximate time of the commission of the crime. In the
words of the trial judge, "Barcelisa Lamoste also unhesitantly and unmistakenly, in open court, pointed to the three companions of Pelagio
Condemena on that fateful day and time above-mentioned who turned out to bear the names of Ricarido Causing @ Garido Casamero Patino and
Simplicio Aniel." (p. 2, Rec.)chanrobles virtual law library

She further testified that Simplicio Aniel and Casamero Patino were armed with guns, and Pelagio Condemena and Ricarido Causing were armed
with bolos when these four men arrived in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon. That upon their arrival, Simplicio
Aniel rushed towards her and pointed the gun, about one foot long, at her face, telling her the following words: "Do not shout. If you shout. I will
kill you." Barcelisa Lamoste, out of fear, did not in fact shout. While Simplicio Aniel was thus pointing the gun at her, the three other men went
directly towards where her husband was. Two of them, Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing, each held the hands of her husband and when
resistance from Fermin Lamoste was already impossible, Pelagio Condemena, with the use of his bolo, stabbed her husband on the right side of the
breast. Upon being hit with the bolo-stab, she heard her husband said: "Dong, why did you stab me when I did not commit any wrong?" After
Fermin Lamoste was stabbed, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero Patino dragged her husband towards the kitchen of the house.
Pelagio Condemena stayed outside while Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing went up the house through the
kitchen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Esmeralda Lamoste, who was at the door of the house together with her young brothers and sisters, saw Ricarido Causing stab her father with a
bolo on the right breast below the nipple. Then Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing approached Simplicio Aniel, at the time still pointing his gun
towards her mother, and demanded from Barcelisa their money. Her mother, out of fear, pointed to Ricarido Causing their trunk. Ricarido Causing
opened the trunk and took the amount of P200.00 from it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Barcelisa Lamoste explained that the money was the proceeds of the sale of their carabao on October 5, 1962, the day previous to the incident.
After taking the money, the four men, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing, Simplicio Aniel and Casamero Patino fled towards the same direction
where they had come from. After they were gone, Barcelisa Lamoste shouted for help. Crispen Bactol was the first person who responded to the
call for help.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Crispin Bactol testified that at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, he saw four men going to the house of Fermin Lamoste. He
recognized Pelagio Condemena to be one of the group. Later on, he heard a woman's voice from the house of Fermin Lamoste calling for help. On
his arrival at the house of Fermin Lamoste in answer to the call for help, he saw Fermin Lamoste dead. He asked Barcelisa Lamoste who were the
persons who killed her husband. Barcelisa Lamoste answered that of the four men, he only knew Pelagio
Condemena.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Jose P. Burgos, municipal judge of Villaba, Leyte, testified that on December 3, 1962, Pelagio Condemena, accompanied by a certain P.C. soldier,
appeared before him and sworn to the truth and veracity of his confession, Exhibit "B", the pertinent portions of which are:

9. Q. - What are the names of your four (4) companions in going to the house of Fermin Lamoste?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - I know their names but I do not know their surnames.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

10. Q. - Who are they and where are they residing at present?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - ... @ Simplicio Aniel, from bo. Oson, ....chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

11. Q. - What arms are you carrying and your companions in going to the house of Fermin Lamoste?chanrobles virtual law library

A - ... @ Simplicio Aniel is carrying a shorten Japanese Rifle, ....

Judge Burgos further testified that on December 11, 1962, in the presence of Felix Arañez, Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte, accused Casamero
Patino appeared before him and sworn to the truth and veracity of his statement. Exhibit "C", its translation is Exhibit "C-1", with the following
pertinent portions:

5. Q. - Why are you detained here, what crime are you charged?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - Because I was with the robbery and to the murder of Fermin Lamoste.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

6. Q. - Do you know the robbers and those who murdered Fermin Lamoste?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - Yes, sir. They ... and Simplicio Aniel.

As evidenced by the medical certificate, Exhibit A and A-1, the victim suffered the following injuries:

1. Incised wound on right hypochondrium 3/6" x � cm. x 1 cm. obliquely directed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. Incised wound in the anterior auxillary line on the right hypochondrium 1-�" from the first wound obliquely directed 3/4" x � cm. up to the
abdominal cavity.

Appellant Simplicio Aniel, in exculpation, interposed the defense of alibi. He presented Benjamin (Benigno) Corpin, a 73-year old man, who testified
that on October 6, 1962, he was in the market fair of Celso Muertigue in Wague, Leyte, selling salted fish. His companion on that date was Simplicio
Aniel whom he hired to help him. The two of them left Considra (or Consuegra), Leyte, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning and returned home to
Considra from the market fair at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. They arrived together in his house at Considra where the two of
them took their meals. Then after that, Simplicio Aniel went to his house. Aniel's house was only about 10 to 15 meters away from his
home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Felix Arañez, Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte, also testified for the defense. He testified that on October 7, 1962, a day after the robbery and the
killing occurred, he went to the house of Fermin Lamoste in Sitio Mambajao, Villaba, Leyte. His purpose was to investigate the incident which was
reported to him by the Barrio Lieutenant of Cagnocot. During his investigation, Barcelisa Lamoste, wife of the deceased, informed him that at about
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, there were unidentified persons who went up their house while she was holding her baby in the
cradle; that Fermin Lamoste was outside the house and when he was brought up the house, he was already stabbed; that one of them pointed his
gun at her; that she was not able to identify the robbers, not even one, because it was already dark; that Barcelisa Lamoste pointed to the two sons
of Segundo Mesa as the persons she suspected to be responsible for the robbery because on the day of the incident, these two went to their house
to buy corn and they promised to come back the following afternoon; that he investigated the two sons of Segundo Mesa but he had to release
them for lack of evidence; that when he further asked Barcelisa Lamoste whether there were other persons who were responsible for the
commission of the crime aside from the two sons of Mesa, she said that she and Pelagio Condemena had a misunderstanding a week before the
crime was committed; that when he found out later on that this Pelagio Condemena did not go inside the house, he abandoned the investigation of
Pelagio Condemena because he had received information that before the commission of the crime, Pelagio Condemena had already abandoned his
house in Mambajao.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the basis of these facts, the question before the Court hinges on whether or not appellant Simplicio Aniel has been sufficiently identified as one
of the four men who participated in the commission of the crime charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The defense argued that the identification in open court made by Barcelisa Lamoste and her daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, should not have been
considered by the that court as a "positive identification" which could sustain the conviction of Simplicio Aniel for the crime charged. It is
contended that the testimony of Barcelisa Lamoste that Simplicio Aniel was the person who pointed the gun at her, while his three other
companions killed her husband and, thereafter, robbed their house, was more than sufficiently contradicted, rebutted and destroyed by the
testimony of Felix Arañez, the Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte, who investigated the crime the day following the commission of the offense; that the
court should have given credence to the testimony of Benjamin Corpin with whom Simplicio Aniel was together on October 6, 1962, from 7:00
o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, selling salted fish in the market fair of Celso Muertigue in Wague, Leyte, at the time the
robbery and killing of Fermin Lamoste took place; that while it may be true that this witness was not able to recall the other dates when he hired
Simplicio Aniel to carry salted fish to Wague, Leyte, aside from October 6, 1962, Benjamin Corpin had given the reason why he particularly
remember the hiring of Simplicio Aniel on that day, because on that same day, he was reminded by his son-in-law who for the first time went
fishing in Gotosan and this being the first time his son-in-law fished in Gotosan, it is not strange that that date made a deep impression in his
memory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The lower court, however, did not believe the testimony of Benjamin Corpin because he was not able to account the whereabout of Simplicio Aniel
after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, the time they returned home to Considra from Wague, Leyte. According to the trial court,
Corpin was sure that they arrived in Consuegra (or Considra), Leyte, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, because Juan Delanta told
them that it was exactly 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when asked by Benjamin Corpin. On cross-examination, however, Corpin admitted that he
treated Simplicio Aniel as his son, because Simplicio Aniel is the nephew of Corpin's son-in-law. He also admitted that he did not remember the
other dates, not even the last time, when he hired Simplicio Aniel to carry his salted fish to Wague, Leyte. Thus, the court who had personally seen
and observed the behavior and manner of the witness while testifying, concluded that his testimony is not worthy of belief because it is tainted
with bias and interest of the witness to obtain a judgment of acquittal. His memory is also faulty. The fact that a person has reached the "twilight of
his age" is not always a guaranty that he would tell the truth, the trial court further added.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the testimony of the chief of police Arañez, We are more impressed into believing that he had attempted to tailor his testimony in
an effort to bolster the validity of the defense of alibi. We are not persuaded to accord credence to the testimony of the chief of police that
Barcelisa Lamoste told him that she was not able to identify the robbers, because he himself swore to the truth of the information after he had
gathered evidence pointing to Simplicio Aniel and his companions as the perpetrators of the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

He declared thus:

Q. - Is it your purpose or intention to impress the Court that you do not believe that Pelagio Condemena, et al., have been charged
falsely?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - No, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q. - What do you mean by that?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - I mean that these persons now who are accused are the ones responsible of the crime committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Q. - That is why you were the one who actually signed the criminal complaint in this case, is that right?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - Yes, sir, when the complaint was amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q. - The incident took place on October 6, 1962 and the filing of the complaint took place on October 24, 1962, can you explain why the filing of the
complaint was delayed?chanrobles virtual law library

A. - Because we were searching for more evidence, and when we were able to gather sufficient evidence, we filed this case. (tsn, pp. 56-57, Pareja).

Well settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is weak where the prosecution witnesses positively identified the accused. To prosper such a
defense, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence and not merely supported by witnesses who bear close ties of relationship to the
accused. The degree of the evidence trust be such as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Barcelisa Lamoste, in the words of the trial judge who had personally seen and observed her behavior and manner of testifying on the witness
stand, "unhesitantly and unmistakenly" pointed to Simplicio Aniel as the person who rushed towards her and pointed his gun, about one foot long,
at her face, warning her at the same time not to shout or else she will be killed. Esmeralda Lamoste substantially corroborated the testimony of her
mother. And Crispin Bactol's testimony has demonstrated a circumstance of strong persuasion when he recognized Condemena and his
companions when they were passing in front of his house. The credibility of their testimony was never successfully impugned by the defense whom
they were cross-examined on the witness stand. No motive was shown by the defense why these witnesses should impute so grave a crime to
Simplicio Aniel who they did not even know before the crime was committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was further bolstered when Pelagio Condemena and Casamero Patino, in their sworn
statements Exhibits "B" and "C", named Simplicio Aniel as one of them in the group when they killed Fermin Lamoste and robbed the house of
P200.00 on October 6, 1962, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated
by other evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual
participation in the commission of the crime. As this Court has said:

While confession of a co-conspirator are not ordinarily admissible as evidence against another co-conspirator, the fact that they implicate the latter
and were made soon after the commission of the crime, is circumstantial evidence to show the probability of their co-conspirator having actually
participated therein. (People vs. Lumahang et al., L-6357, May 7, 1954.)

The commission of the crime was attended by treachery. The act of the accused in suddenly rushing towards the victim, then two of them, each
holding the hands of the victim, and the third of them stabbed the victim, is characterized by treachery insuring the accomplishment of their
purpose without risk to themselves from any defense or retaliation the victim might offer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally proven. Their acts collectively and individually executed have clearly demonstrated the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishments of the same unlawful purpose and objective - to rob the house of Lamoste. Altho the
killing of Fermin Lamoste was accomplished by only three of the intruders without any physical participation thereof by the appellant Simplicio
Aniel, however, as conspiracy has been established, the crime committed is robbery in band, and the homicide was committed on the occasion
thereof, all the members of the band are liable for robbery with homicide (People vs. Evangelista, et al., L-2489, April 12, 1950). And

... any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults
committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same. (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code.)

the appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as principal because the evidence does not show that he had attempted to prevent the assault and the killing
of Fermin Lamoste. (People vs. Garduque, et al., L-10133, July 31, 1958.)chanrobles virtual law library

The information charging appellant Simplicio Aniel, and the three other accused, of the crime of robbery in band with homicide alleged three
aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnity, use of superior strength, and commission of the crime in the dwelling of the offended party. The
lower court, however, after finding all the four accused guilty of the crime charged, did not consider the above aggravating circumstances when it
imposed the penalty, instead took into account lack of instruction and education in mitigation of their liability. In this respect, the trial court was in
error. Existing jurisprudence has settled that lack of instruction and education a mitigating circumstance in the crime of theft or robbery is not
recognized, 1 although it might he under certain situations in cases of homicide. 2 As to the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and superior
strength, the evidence has clearly established the presence thereof in the commission of the crime. Two of the four accused each held the hands of
Fermin Lamoste, who was at the time unarmed, before he was stabbed, while Simplicio Aniel, the appellant herein, guarded the wife, Barcelisa
Lamoste, with the gun pointed at her face, and the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The trial court, therefore, should have
considered dwelling and superior strength as aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Sina-on, L-15631, May 27, 1966.)chanrobles virtual law library

The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, however, cannot be appreciated. The record does not show that the peculiar advantages of nighttime
was purposely sought by the accused in the commission of the deed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As this Court has pointed out:

... in default of any showing or evidence that the peculiar advantages of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused, the fact
that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. It must concur with the intent or design of the offender to
capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by darkness of night. (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964.)

The penalty imposable on persons found guilty of the crime of robbery in band with homicide, under Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that appellant Simplicio Aniel acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, and there is no evidence that said
appellant attempted to prevent the commission of the offense charged, and taking into account the two aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, in the opinion of the writer, the appellant Simplicio Aniel should be
made to suffer the extreme penalty of death. However, in view of the lack of the requisite vote, the sentence imposed on him by the trial court is
hereby affirmed. Costs against said appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131592-93. February 15, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:JPUNO

With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered, not as a
separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance.

In the case at bar, appellant JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms in two (2) separate
Informations, thus:

Criminal Case No. 45708:

"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, armed with a handgun,
with deliberate intent and without justifiable motive, with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and with a decided purpose to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally shoot, hit and wound Rogelio Abawag with the said gun, with which herein accused was then
provided at the time, thereby causing upon said Rogelio Abawag bullet wounds on vital parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."1cräläwvirtualibräry

Criminal Case No. 45709:

"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent and without justifiable motive, have in his possession and control one (1) Homemade .38 caliber revolver without serial number
(and) three (3) live ammunitions without the authority and permit to possess or carry the same.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."2cräläwvirtualibräry

The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site of Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City. On November 14, 1995, at about 8 a.m.,
ROBERTO LUSTICA, a construction worker, was on the last rung of the stairs on the third floor of the Gaisano building when he saw his co-worker
ROGELIO ABAWAG being closely pursued by accused JULIAN CASTILLO, a lead man in the same construction site. During the chase, the accused
pointed a gun at Abawag and shot him. Abawag, then about a half meter away from the accused, fell on his knees beside a pile of hollow
blocks.3cräläwvirtualibräry

FRANKLIN ACASO , a mason working on the third floor of the Gaisano building, heard the first shot. Initially, he did not pay attention to it as he
thought that the sound came from one of their construction equipments. Seconds later, he heard a second shot and a person screaming: "Ouch,
that is enough!" When he looked towards the direction of the sound, he saw the accused in front of Abawag, about a meter away, pointing a .38
caliber revolver at the latter. Abawag was then leaning on a pile of hollow blocks, pleading for mercy. The accused shot Abawag a third time
despite the latter's imploration. The accused then fled, leaving Abawag lifeless.4cräläwvirtualibräry

The management of Gaisano reported the shooting incident to the police authorities who immediately rushed to the scene of the crime. JUN LIM,
alias "Akoy," brother-in-law of the victim and also a construction worker at the Gaisano, volunteered to go with the police and assist them in
locating the accused.

The police, accompanied by Akoy, proceeded to Port San Pedro where they saw the accused on board a vessel bound for Cebu. When they boarded
the vessel, Akoy positively identified the accused to the police as the assailant. The accused attempted to escape when the police identified
themselves but the police caught up with him. Upon inquiry, the accused denied complicity in the killing of Abawag. The police found in his
possession a .38 caliber handmade revolver, three (3) empty shells and three (3) live ammunitions. Further inquiry revealed that the accused
owned the gun but had no license to possess it. The police then took the accused into custody and charged him for the murder of Abawag and for
illegal possession of firearm.5cräläwvirtualibräry

The self-defense theory hoisted by the accused who testified solely for the defense was not given credence by the trial court. Thus, he was
convicted of Homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and of
Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide. The trial court disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused guilty of the crimes of homicide and illegal possession of firearm aggravated by
homicide beyond the shadow of the doubt, he is hereby sentenced as follows:

"1) For the crime of homicide, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum;

"2) For illegal possession of firearm which is aggravated by homicide, he is sentenced to a penalty of death;

"3) To pay the family of his victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

"4) To pay the cost.

"SO ORDERED."6 (emphasis supplied)

On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his conviction for illegal possession of firearm for which he was sentenced to the
supreme penalty of death.

Prefatorily, we stress that although the appellant himself does not refute the findings of the trial court regarding the homicide aspect of the case,
the Court nevertheless made a thorough examination of the entire records of the case, including the appellant's conviction for homicide, based on
the settled principle that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review. Our evaluation leads us to conclude that the trial court's
ruling on the homicide aspect is clearly supported by the records. Thus, we shall concentrate on the appellant's lone assignment of error with
respect to his conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the
penalty for said crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance.7 This amendment has two (2) implications: first, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as only a
single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm) is committed under the law, only one penalty
shall be imposed on the accused.8cräläwvirtualibräry

Prescinding therefrom, and considering that the provisions of the amendatory law are favorable to herein appellant, the new law should be
retroactively applied in the case at bar.9 It was thus error for the trial court to convict the appellant of two (2) separate offenses, i.e., Homicide and
Illegal Possession of Firearms, and punish him separately for each crime. Based on the facts of the case, the crime for which the appellant may be
charged is homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of firearm, the correct denomination for the crime, and not illegal possession of firearm,
aggravated by homicide as ruled by the trial court, as it is the former offense which aggravates the crime of homicide under the amendatory law.

The appellant anchors his present appeal on the assertion that his conviction was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by the prosecution that he
was not licensed to possess the subject firearm. In their Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General joined cause with
the appellant.10cräläwvirtualibräry

We agree.

Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of
establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.11cräläwvirtualibräry

The first element -- the existence of the firearm -- was indubitably established by the prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant
shoot the victim thrice with a .38 caliber revolver.12 Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security guards in the
building after the shooting.13 The same gun was recovered from the appellant and offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof was
adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to possess the firearm. This
negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license or permit should
have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a
licensee of the subject firearm14 or that the type of firearm involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel.15 Indeed, if the
means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party averring said negative fact. As the
Information alleged that the appellant possessed an unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the prosecution
who has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle that an
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.16 Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is aconstituent element of the crime, the onus is upon
the State to prove this negative allegation of non-existence.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered from his possession, his admission
will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to possess the gun. In
People vs. Solayao,18 we expounded on this doctrine, thus:

"x x x (b)y its very nature, an 'admission is the mere acknowledgement of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt.' In other words, it is a statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction.
From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond doubt the commission of the
crime charged.

"Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:

'An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case does not require proof.'

"Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of
the fact of absence or lack of a license." (emphasis supplied)

Additionally, as pointed out by both the appellant and the Solicitor General, the extrajudicial admission was made without the benefit of counsel.
Thus, we hold that the appellant may only be held liable for the crime of simple homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

We come now to the penalty. The crime of homicide is penalized by reclusion temporal.19 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed in its medium period, i.e., from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty
shall be within the range of prision mayor, i.e., from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its
medium period of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant Julian Castillo y Lumayro is found guilty of Homicide. He is sentenced to
imprisonment of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and nine (9) days of
reclusion temporal as maximum. However, the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim in the total
amount of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.6/27/00 3:06 PM
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25354. June 28, 1968.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANO FONTANILLA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

The appellant Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted in the justice of the peace court (now municipal court) of San Fernando, La Union for qualified
seduction. The criminal complaint, signed by the offended woman Fe Castro and filed on February 28, 1961, charged

"That on or about the month of September 1960, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Juan, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with grave abuse of confidence and authority, seduce and have sexual intercourse with the offended party Fe Castro, a domestic in the house of
the said accused, located at Allangigan, San Juan, La Union, the offended party being then a virgin over 12 years but under 18 years of age."cralaw
virtua1aw library

After trial, the court, on November 27, 1962, found that "the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt," and accordingly
sentenced him to "an indeterminate prison term from four (4) months of arresto mayor as maximum to two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional and to pay the costs." The accused was further ordered "to pay the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as moral damages to
the offended party or to her parents."cralaw virtua1aw library

Fontanilla forthwith appealed to the Court of Appeals which subsequently certified the case to us in a resolution dated September 25, 1965, on the
ground that the jurisdiction of the court a quo, inter alia, is in issue.

The following, in paraphrase, are the assigned errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The justice of the peace court of San Fernando, La Union had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case because the alleged offense was
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and at the same time does not fall within the compass of its original jurisdiction;

2. The lower court erred in finding that the accused had sexual intercourse with Fe Castro repeatedly and that he had told her a number of times
that he will separate from his wife Magdalena Copio and will marry her, which was the reason why Fe Castro consented to the sexual intercourse;

3. The lower court erred in relying heavily on the testimony of Fe Castro, considering that her testimony is hazy and self- contradictory;

4. The lower court erred in totally disregarding the evidence adduce by the appellant;

5. The lower court erred in failing to consider in favor of the accused the delay in the filing of the complaint, which delay is not convincingly
explained and which renders the accusation suspicious; and

6. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 in moral damages to the offended party or to her parents.

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that in September, 1960 Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin, was brought by her mother to the house of
the appellant and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a sister of the complaining witness’ mother, to serve as a helper. The Fontanilla spouses had
been married for two years but were childless, although the appellant had grown-up children by his first marriage who were domiciled elsewhere.

Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months from September to shortly before Christmas of December
1960, the accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly, the total number of times she could not recall. She was certain,
however, that the accused consummated the first sexual intercourse with her one night in September, about a week after her arrival, when the
accused intruded into her bedroom, placed himself on top of her and fondled her nipples. She added that he was able to gain access to her room
because the wooden bar used to lock the door did not prevent the said door from being opened when pushed from the outside. She also declared
that prior to this incident, the accused had made amorous overtures and advances toward her. Aside from giving her money, the accused
repeatedly promised to abandon his wife to live with her.

"Q You told us that Mariano Fontanilla had been giving you money. Are there other circumstances that led you to the sexual intercourse?"

"A He told me, ‘Come now let us play. I am going to separate your aunt because I love you more than my wife.’

"Q For how many times had Mariano Fontanilla been promising you this"

"A He was telling me all the time."cralaw virtua1aw library

Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the accused, as she was induced by his promises of
marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her during the day when his wife was away and at night when the
latter was already asleep. Their intimacies lasted for almost three months until her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in flagrante on the
kitchen floor. The following day she returned to her parents, and revealed everything to her mother two days later.

Mariano Fontanilla, testifying in his defense, admitted that Fe Castro actually lived in his house from September to December, 1960, not as a
helper, however, but in consideration of her being a niece of his wife, and was treated as their own child. He vehemently denied having had carnal
knowledge of her, as there was never an occasion during which he could have taken advantage of the chastity of his ward, because at night her
room was locked and during the day he was out in the farm.

"Q When the offended party testified before the Court she stated that the first time you had sexual intercourse with her was a certain night
in September and you said to her ‘You are very beautiful. Come let us play.’ What do you say to this allegation?

"A I did not do that, sir.

"Q How is it possible or will circumstances afford you of getting inside her room and take advantage of her being a woman?
"A No, sir. It cannot be.

"Q Why could it not be that you could enter the room and take advantage of her womanhood?

"A Because the room is locked."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q The offended party further testified in Court that you did the sexual intercourse daily, one in the day time and one in the night time. Will
you mention before this Honorable Court if you can commit sexual intercourse in the day time?

"A That cannot be, sir.

"Q Why could you not possibly do the sexual intercourse in the day time?

"A Because I am in the farm, sir.

"Q Sometimes when you are in the farm, during lunch time Fe Castro would bring your food in the farm?

"A No, sir.

"Q And when you go home to your house in the day time for example you take your lunch. So it is possible for you to have sexual intercourse
with the offended party?

"A No, sir. It is not possible during day time.

"Q Who are your companions in your house in the day time?

"A They wife and also our neighbor who used to come."cralaw virtua1aw library

Fontanilla declared that another reason why it was not possible for him to seduce Fe Castro was that his sexual capabilities had waned considerably
because of old age, as he was already 52 years old at the time of the supposed commission of the crime charged. He admitted that despite the fact
that he had been married for only two years to his second wife, he made love to her only once a week. Under these circumstances, it was
impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with Fe Castro twice daily.

The accused advances the theory that the instant case was filed against him upon the malevolent instigation of one Avelino Gapasin, an uncle of Fe
Castro, who wielded strong influence over her, adding that the complainant herself was envious of his (Fontanilla’s children of the first marriage
who received some salary from their employment. This allegation was indirectly corroborated by a witness for the defense, Mayor Antonio Aquino
of San Juan, La Union, who testified that he endeavored to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay P50 which was due to Fe Castro as her
share in the cultivation of tobacco, but the complaining witness through Avelino Gapasin refused the offer and the latter then insinuated that the
amount of P2,000 should be paid, which sum he believed would be sufficient reparation for "the honor destroyed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Magdalena Copio, 51-year old wife of the accused, corroborated her husband’s statement that they indulged in sexual intercourse only once a
week. She also stated that during the three months that Fe Castro stayed with them, there was no unusual incident or sexual relation between her
husband and her niece. She denied having caught the accused in a compromising situation with the offended party. She also testified that she slept
regularly from 7:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, after which she seldom could go back to sleep, and that she was easily awakened by the slightest noise.
She categorically declared that her husband slept with her in the same bed every night.

For the first time on appeal, Fontanilla challenges the jurisdiction of the court a quo — the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, the capital of
La Union — alleging that it had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case, for two reasons: (1) the crime charged according to the indictment was
committed in San Juan, a municipality outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo; and (2) original jurisdiction over the crime of qualified
seduction belongs exclusively to the court of first instance, and not to the justice of the peace court of the provincial capital.

The appellant’s theory finds no basis in the then governing provisions of the Judiciary Act when the instant action was commenced on February 28,
1961. It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 1 The
pertinent statutory provision then in force was Section 87(c), paragraph 3, of Republic Act 296, as amended by Republic Act 2613, which
unequivocably provided that "Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than — six years or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both . . ." (Emphasis supplied) It
is therefore beyond dispute that under the then existing law all offenses committed within the province, provided that the penalty prescribed did
not exceed prision correccional or a fine not exceeding P3,000 or both, were triable by the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals. Since
the penalty prescribed for qualified seduction under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, the instant case was clearly within the periphery of the concurrent jurisdiction of the court a quo.

It was only on June 22, 1963, more than two years after the institution of the case at bar, that the above-cited provision of the Judiciary Act was
amended by Republic Act 3828. The pertinent provision is now Section 87(c), paragraph 4, which, as amended, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to
try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Republic Act 3828 introduced two significant changes: (1) the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces and of city courts with the courts of first instance has been territorially localized and limited to the proper offenses committed "within
their respective jurisdiction," while previously said courts could take cognizance of the proper offenses committed "within the province;" and (2)
the proper offenses cognizable include those where the pecuniary penalty (fine) does not exceed P6,000, an increase over the previous P3,000
limit.
The first of the above-mentioned changes unmasks the fallacy of the appellant’s theory that even under the then existing provision, the concurrent
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals with the courts of first instance was already confined to their respective
territorial limits. If this were true, then Congress would have had no reason to enact the foregoing amendment which eliminated the phrase
"within the province" and in its place substituted the delimiting phrase "within their respective jurisdictions."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing notwithstanding, the appellant insists that justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals, like the court a quo, have no jurisdiction
over the crime of qualified seduction because of the provisions of Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code by virtue of which the court must, in
addition to the imposition of a prison term (prision correccional minimum to medium in case of qualified seduction) which the accused must suffer,
require him to indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and in every case to
support the offspring. The theory of the appellant is that the imposition of the enumerated civil liabilities increases the punishment, thereby
divesting the justice of the peace courts of the capitals of provinces of jurisdiction and consequently confining original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the offense to courts of first instance.

This contention is obviously untenable because Section 87(c), paragraph 3 [now Sec. 87(c), Paragraph 4] of the Judiciary Act grants the justice of
the peace courts (now municipal courts) of provincial capitals concurrent jurisdiction with courts of first instance over offenses for which the
penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding P3,000 (now
P6,000). This concurrence of jurisdiction is based upon the duration of the imprisonment and/or the amount of the fine imposable, irrespective of
the civil incidents or obligations which may attach to the offense charged. So that any civil liability attaching to the offense concurrently cognizable
by the courts of first instance and the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals can also be imposed by the latter because these have been
conferred jurisdictional parity.

The appellant cites as authority for his theory the case of U.S. v. Bernardo, 2 a seduction case in which this Court, with a slim majority of four
justices (three justices dissented), said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"These obligations imposed upon the culprit ordinarily exceed the amount of the penalty fixed by the law as being within the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace court and comprise, moreover, by virtue of the forced recognition imposed by Article 135 of the Civil Code, the special
determination of the civil status of the offspring which resulted from the crime, consequently, although the said crime of seduction is only
punished by the penalty of arresto mayor, a judgment of conviction cannot be pronounced by a justice of the peace, on account of his lack of
jurisdiction.

"But disregarding the amount of the indemnity, whatever it be, according to the conditions and circumstances of the offended party and of the one
obliged to furnish the same, which amount might be greater than that fixed by law as within the jurisdiction of Justice of the peace courts, the
acknowledgment of the resulting offspring, one of the findings which the sentence must contain, establishes by force of law the civil status of the
child whose acknowledgment is necessarily upon the guilty party; so with much less reason could the crime fall within the jurisdiction of the justice
of the peace court, inasmuch as, in accordance with specific legal provisions, only the judge of the Court of First Instance can make such
pronouncements."cralaw virtua1aw library

As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, however "there is a big difference between the case of U.S. v. Bernardo, supra, and the present
case, in that while the Bernardo case involved the original exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts, the present case touches a
concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts in the capitals of the provinces and Courts of First Instance." Furthermore, "It would be
going, a long way to say that an indemnification or a restitution or a reparation is a fine or an imprisonment under any definition found in the
criminal law of any country. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount of the fine and imprisonment. An indemnification or a
reparation or a restitution is merely an incident of the crime. The jurisdiction of the court is not fixed by the incident but by the nature of the crime
itself. Legally speaking, the nature of the crime is determined by the punishment imposed. . . The jurisdiction of courts of justice of the peace over
crimes being determined exclusively by the amount of the fine and imprisonment imposed by law, that is by the legal nature of the crime, and in no
manner and to no extent whatever by the civil incidents which accrue to the person injured by the commission of said crime, such courts have
jurisdiction of the crime presented in the case at bar, the punishment prescribed by law for such crime being (then) simply arresto mayor. 3

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

The atmosphere of secrecy and privacy which pervades the commission of crimes against chastity, coupled with the consequent dearth or even
absence of witnesses, constrains the courts to rely in no small measure upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining woman whose
testimonial and personal credibility assumes pivotal importance. It is against this situational backdrop that we proceed to discuss the issues of fact
posed by the Appellant.

Fontanilla contends, among others, that the court a quo erred in finding there that there is evidence to show that he had sexual intercourse many
times with the complainant Fe Castro We disagree. After a thorough study of the record, we find that the complainant’s testimony, in direct as well
as in cross-examination, is entitled to essential credence. She declared that Fontanilla had carnal knowledge of her one night in September, 1960 in
the house of the former where she was staying as a maid, and that since then up to December of the same year, Fontanilla had sexual intercourse
with her repeatedly, sometimes at night, sometimes in the daytime, but always when his wife was asleep or away. Significantly, convincing proof of
the first sexual intercourse would suffice to affirm the conviction of the appellant without necessity of proving the subsequent instances of carnal
liaison. The following frank and revealing testimony of the offended woman appears on record:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q When you were with the Fontanillas, do you know if there was anything unusual that took place?
"A He fooled me.
"Q Who fooled you?
"A Mariano Fontanilla.
"Q What do you mean by fooled you?
"A He had sexual intercourse with me."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x
Q When did Mariano Fontanilla start having sexual intercourse with you?
"A One week after my arrival in their house.
"Q For how many times did Mariano Fontanilla have sexual intercourse with you?
"A Very often when I was in their house."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x
"Q For how may times after September?

"A I could not count anymore, sir."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q Do you mean to tell us that he had been having sexual intercourse with you during the three (3) months you stayed with them?

"A Always.

"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Now, usually what time did you have that sexual intercourse?

"A Day and night.

"Q And where did you do sexual intercourse during the day time?

"A When I iron their clothes in their house.

"Q Was there no other person in that house during the day when you have been ironing clothes?

A The wife is not there.

"Q Do they have any children?

"A They have no children?

x x x

"Q When you left the house of Mariano Fontanilla and returned to your house in barrio Allangigan, was it with the consent of Mr. & Mrs.
Mariano Fontanilla?

"A They allowed me to go home.

"Q Why did you go home?

"A I left, sir, because the wife of Mariano Fontanilla discovered what we have been doing."cralaw virtua1aw library

When asked upon cross-examination to narrate the circumstances surrounding the first intercourse, Fe Castro testified thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Now, what were you doing in your room when Mariano Fontanilla first came in?

"A I was already sleeping.

"Q And how were you awakened from your sleep?

"A When I woke up, he was on top of me holding my nipples."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q Can you remember the date of the week when Mariano Fontanilla consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?

"A I don’t remember the date.

"Q Do you remember what time? In the morning or afternoon?

"A Night time.

"Q Do you remember what were the actual words of Mariano Fontanilla when he consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?

"A How beautiful are you, my daughter! I wish I could marry one as beautiful as you. Come let us play.

"Q After he uttered those words, what did he do to you?

"A He was placing his private parts in mine.

"Q Do you mean to say he did not removed your panties first?

"A He removed it,.

"Q Did you offer any objection when he made those acts to you?
"A He told me that ‘If you are going to move, I am going to club you.’

"Q And you never uttered a word of what he is doing?

"A I did not complain anymore because I was afraid."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q Now, it was in the evening of that day when he started caressing you in the kitchen when he had that first sexual intercourse with you, is
that right?

"A Yes, sir, the same night he came to the room."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q This room where you had your intercourse with the accused, was there a lock in the door?

"A There is a piece of wood that is used as a bar but if you push it, it will be opened."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing testimony of the aggrieved woman belies the contention of Fontanilla that there is no evidence showing that he had carnal
knowledge of Fe Castro. Of course no other witness was presented by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of the victim with respect to
the actual act of seduction, nor to the amorous overtures of the accused before the first sexual intercourse, nor to their subsequent carnal acts. But
this is quite understandable because aside from Fontanilla and Fe Castro, there was only one other person in the house of the accused — his wife,
who was either asleep or away when the two indulged in their illicit love-making. As previously intimated, the final verdict would principally hinge
on the testimonial and personal credibility of the complaining witness.

Assailing the credibility of the complainant, Fontanilla contends that Fe Castro had malevolent and ulterior motives for filing this case against him.
He alleged that Fe Castro was envious of his children by his first marriage who had some income. In our view, this is a flimsy rationalization which
the accused, significantly, did not even attempt to substantiate.

Fontanilla also argues that Fe Castro was induced and pressured by her uncle Avelino Gapasin to file the criminal complaint. Testifying on this point,
Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, stated that he tried to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay the complainant P50 as the
latter’s alleged share in the tobacco harvest and that this proposal was refused, however, by Fe Castro, thru Gapasin, on the ground that the
amount offered would not even be sufficient to defray the expenses for the delivery of the child which the victim mistakenly thought she was
conceiving as a result of Fontanilla’s carnal knowledge of her. Aquino also claimed that Gapasin insinuated that any compromise amount must be
equal to the "honor destroyed" and he, Gapasin, suggested P2,000.

The foregoing testimony was presented by the defense to prove its allegation that Fe Castro was pressured into filing the case at bar. Standing
alone, Gapasin’s objection to the proposed compromise does not prove that he induced the victim to denounce Fontanilla in court. On the
contrary, from the actuations of Gapasin it can be inferred that he was just trying to protect the interests of his niece who was offered so meager
an amount as settlement for an offense which caused the latter the irredeemable loss of her virginity. Furthermore, it is on record that prior to the
overtures at settlement, the complaining witness had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union to file charges against Fontanilla.
Aquino himself admitted upon cross-examination that he had requested Fiscal Crisogono Bautista to postpone the filing of the complaint to enable
him to settle the case, and that the proposed compromise was his idea and made upon his own initiative. This admission shows that the filing of
the instant case preceded, and was not due to, the failure of the alleged proposed compromise.

The appellant further contends that the complainant’s testimony does not merit credence because it is hazy and self-contradictory. He argues that
if it is true that he repeatedly promised to marry Fe Castro in order to deceive her into submitting to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly
consent to the continuance of their illicit liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill his promise to marry her? A situation like this,
says the appellant, borders on the incredible and suggests that there was actually no promise of marriage and consequently there was no resultant
carnal relation between him and the complaining woman.

This "unthinkable" situation pointed out by the appellant was quite reasonably explained by the complainant in a frank, albeit embarrassing, reply
contained in her sworn statement (exh. A-1) taken in the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union on January 31, 1961. Upon interrogation, Fe
Castro declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Despite his many promises which he never fulfilled, why did you still continue to have relationship with him?

"A Because I was beginning to like him and enjoy this sexual intercourse."cralaw virtua1aw library

Underscoring the above statement of Fe Castro, Fontanilla claims that it exposes in fact the fabricated nature of the case against him, because for a
woman to continue having sexual relations with a man even after a patent breach of the latter’s promise of marriage, is unthinkable and alien to
human experience. We believe, on the contrary, however, that the said statement of the aggrieved woman does not make her testimony incredible
for it evinces basic honesty and sincerity on her part, even to the extent of admitting something which could conceivably put her to shame and
ridicule.

Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla also claims that there is no evidence on record supporting its veracity. Granting this to be correct, it is
nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a
charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic,
tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable
although fraud or deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. 4 The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen
years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 "is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction . . . even though no deceit
intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the
existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction . . . taking
into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud." 5
It is likewise contended for the appellant that the testimony of the complainant is unbelievable because while she denounced the perverse and
criminal conduct of the accused, in the same breath she described the relation between the accused and his wife as harmonious and cordial. The
alleged inconsistency in this regard is more apparent than real. A man could hide his evil motives and immoral conduct behind a deceptive facade.
And it stands to reason that a husband who has illicit relations with a woman who resides in the same house where he dwells with his wife would
even be over-solicitous with the latter to camouflage his infidelity.

Fontanilla also challenges the credibility of Fe Castro’s account regarding his having been discovered by his wife in the act of sexual intercourse
with the complainant on the kitchen floor. He argues that had such a discovery actually been made, the natural reaction of his wife would have
been to lay hands on both of them (Fe Castro and himself), with the complainant taking the most punishment since women are inherently
possessive and are merciless upon those who attempt to take away their loved ones. Fe Castro did not testify on such a hostile reaction.

We are inclined to believe, however, that women are bound to react differently to the same or similar situations. There is no sufficient reason to
discredit Fe Castro’s testimony that when they were discovered in flagrante by Magdalena Copio, the appellant’s wife and her aunt, the latter
verbally chastised Fontanilla or having "fool(ed) this little girl."cralaw virtua1aw library

The appellant’s wife, then 51 years old and twice married, most probably knew that it was her 52-year old second husband, the herein appellant,
who was at fault and thus spared her 15-year old niece from any punishment.

It is conceded that the testimony of Fe Castro suffers from some inconsistencies; these, however, could be attributed to her minority (she was
barely 16 years old at the time of the trial), lack of education (she had reached only grade III), perceptibly low intelligence, and to the
understandable partiality of a litigant to her cause. On the whole, we find that the complainant’s testimony is credible and convincing.
Furthermore, we believe that no other reason impelled Fe Castro in instituting this case against her very kin, and exposing thereby her sordid
experience to public scrutiny and suffering as a consequence the travail of trial, than to seek justice for herself.

The appellant further claims that the court a quo erred in failing to consider the unexplained delay in the filing of the complaint, which delay
renders the accusation suspicious. It is relevant to note that the accused did not raise this issue before the court a quo. Anent the alleged delay, the
Solicitor General states that it can easily be explained "by the fact that the complainant was not accusing a person who was a total stranger to her
but the husband of her mother’s sister. The attempt of the older people to thresh out their differences and to settle the case amicably had brought
about the said delay." It appears on record that Fe Castro left the house of Fontanilla on December 18, 1960, and two days thereafter she informed
her parents of what Fontanilla had done. Forthwith she and her parents decided to bring the case to court, and on January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had
herself examined in the La Union Provincial Hospital, with the name of Fiscal Bautista appearing in the medical certificate as the requesting officer,
which means that prior to January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal presumably to complain against
Fontanilla. The criminal complaint was filed only on February 23, 1961 because as previously stated, Mayor Aquino had requested Fiscal Bautista to
postpone the filing of the indictment to give the former sufficient time to attempt at an amicable settlement of the case.

We now come to the basic defense set up by Fontanilla, which is a denial of his having had carnal knowledge of Fe Castro whom he admits was
once his ward. His denial is anchored on two grounds: (1) there was no occasion during which he could have violated the chastity of the
complainant because during the night the room of the latter was locked and during the day he was always out in the fields; and (2) at the age of 52,
his sexual potency had considerably waned as proved by the fact that he had sexual intercourse with his own wife only once a week. The Court a
quo did not accord credence to this defense, and we are of the view that in this regard the court did not err.

The complainant testified that the wooden bar which she used to lock the door of her room did not prevent the said door, from being opened
when pushed from the outside. Thus, Fontanilla had easy access at night to Fe Castro’s sleeping quarters. Considering the general make-up of
residential houses in the barrios, we believe that the complainant’s statement is essentially true.

With respect to the appellant’s argument that during the day he had no opportunity of being alone with the complainant, he himself admitted
upon cross-examination that there were times when he would be home earlier than his wife and would ask Fe Castro to serve him food: As there
was no other person in the house during such occasions Fe Castro and Fontanilla naturally would be alone together. The appellant also admitted
that whenever his wife went to market she would be away for two to three hours. He hastened to add, however, that each time his wife left for the
market she advised Fe Castro to stay with their neighbor. Granting that Fe Castro would really go to their neighbor’s place which was only five
meters away from their house, it is not improbable that Fontanilla would call her back once his wife had left. Thus, the very record of the case
belies the defense of the appellant that there was no occasion when he could have violated the chastity of his ward.

The appellant also contends that it was impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with the complainant twice a day, because even
with his wife he made love only once a week. Fontanilla attributed his diminished virility to old age as he was already 52 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime. This declaration was corroborated by his wife, Magdalena Copio, who went to the extent of vouching that two
years after their marriage they did not indulge anymore in sexual relations. We believe, nonetheless, that the appellant’s claim is untenable. In the
first place, the complainant did not say that Fontanilla had her twice a day during the three months that she stayed with him and his wife. When
asked what time they indulged in sexual intercourse, she replied "Day and night." (t.s.n., p. 6) This answer of the complainant cannot be
interpreted to mean that they had sexual intercourse twice daily (one in the daytime and another at night), for said statement was in reply to a
question with respect to the time when they engaged in carnal intercourse and not the frequency of their illicit love making. In the second place,
there is a presumption that an adult male has normal powers of virility and the burden or proving the contrary rests on the party asserting it. 6 We
believe that the declarations of Fontanilla and his wife on the former’s alleged weakening potency are not sufficient to rebut this presumption.
Alfred W. Herzog has cautioned that "one must be very careful not to express the opinion that a man on account of his age is either sterile or
impotent." 7 Hence, a party who claims loss of virility, or waning potency for that matter, must bolster his assertion clinically with the aid of a
competent and expert witness.

On the other hand, the prosecution presented Dr. Magno K. Guerrero, the physician at the La Union Provincial Hospital who examined the victim.
Dr. Guerrero testified that the hymen of Fe Castro showed "incomplete healed lacerations at 9 & 3 o’clock positions on the face of a watch, edges
of which are sharp and easily coaptable." He explained that healed lacerations would suggest that the injury happened six months, more or less,
prior to the date of examination. In the case at bar, since per medical findings the hymen of the complainant showed "incomplete healed
lacerations," then this fact-would indicate that the injury occurred less than six months before February 12, 1961, the date of the medical
examination of Fe Castro. Significantly, said period corresponds to the time when Fe Castro as a helper in the house of the Fontanilla spouses. Upon
cross- examination, Dr. Guerrero testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Dr. Guerrero, you stated that it (the laceration) should last less than six (6) months counting from?

"A From the time I examined."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q Disregarding the history of the patient, from your observation of the patient, how many sexual intercourse could have caused the
lacerations taking into consideration the condition of the hymen?"

"A Several intercourses because the laxity of the vaginal canal and it admits three (3) fingers.

"Q How many intercourses could have caused that?

"A Several. More than ten (10) times."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"Q And those lacerations could be caused ten (10) times or more?

"A Ten times or more.

"Q How many more?

"A Another ten (10) times more."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is clear from the above testimony that Fe Castro had experienced numerous distinct acts of sexual intercourse, a fact which affirms her claim that
the appellant had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly during her three-month stay in his house. There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro, then
a 15-year old single girl, was unchaste prior to her living with the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her virginity before she was seduced by
the appellant must be presumed. Presumption of a woman’s virginity arises whenever it is shown that she is single, and continues until overthrown
by proof to the contrary. 8 This is in accord with the presumption of innocence which "includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a
consequence, of chastity." 9

We are of the considered opinion that the findings of fact reached by the court a quo are substantially correct. This, apart from the rule that "as far
as credibility and veracity of witnesses are concerned, the conclusions of the lower court command great weight and respect, on the ground that
the trustworthiness of witnesses and the merit of the defenses by the accused, are in the peculiar domain of the trial court." 10 In the case at bar,
we see no reason for departing from this doctrine, there being no showing that "some fact or circumstance of great importance to the case has
been overlooked in the records or misapplied or its significance misunderstood by the lower court." 11

The appellant finally contends that the lower court erred in ordering him to pay P500 in moral damages to the offended party or to her parents.
Ironically, this contention is correct in two respects. The first is that the award of P500 in moral damages is inadequate. We have heretofore stated
that the complainant was a virgin, there being no proof to the contrary, and that she was deflowered by the appellant. The loss of her virginity, at
the hands of the appellant, together with the attendant shame and scandal, entitles her, in the view of this Court, to the sum of P2,500 in moral
damages. Her future as a woman is definitely impaired, and the resultant prejudice against her engendered in the male population of the barrio
where she resides cannot be blinked away. The second error of the lower court is in making the award payable to the offended party or to her
parents, which award is, by the very wording of the judgment, in the alternative. Article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides that moral damages
are recoverable by the offended party in the cases of "seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts" and that the "parents of the female
seduced, abducted, raped, or abused . . . may also recover moral damages." (Emphasis supplied) The conviction of the accused suffices as a basis to
adjudge him, in the same action, liable for an award of moral damages, without independent proof thereof, to the victim and her parents, because
the law presumes that not only the woman who was seduced, abducted, raped or abused, but as well her parents, naturally suffer besmirched
reputation, social humiliation, mental anguish, and wounded feelings. In the case at bar, moral damages must be awarded to the offended woman
and her parents, not to either of them, as ordered by the court a quo.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the modification that the appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P2,500 in moral
damages to the offended party and her parents. Costs against the Appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-30713 April 30, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VICTORINO SUMAYO Y BERSEBAL, ET AL., defendants, VICTORINO SUMAYO Y
BERSEBAL, ANTONIO JUANINGO Y PESEBRE, and JESUS SALLAN Y PAZ, defendants and appellants.

PER CURIAM:

The deceased, Domingo Viernes, while driving a taxi-cab "in order to earn extra money for the matriculation of his children", a dutiful father whose
"devotion to his family is a pearl beyond price, a rare virtue that shone with special luster", was stabbed to death on the night of May 24, 1969, in a
robbery hold-up at Donada Street, Pasay City, for the measly sum of P30.00.chanrobles virtual law library

Sergeant Severo Tizo and patrolmen Agustin and Villacorta of the Pasay City Police Department, responding to a call reporting the robbery hold-up
that night, proceeded to the place of the incident at Donada Street, Pasay City, in front of the North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, and there saw the victim lying flat on his back "with blood oozing from the mouth and left lower armpit which was caused by a
stab wound of about four inches in length", and that there was a "Belmas" taxicab painted yellow with left front door widely opened, parked at the
center of the street with a fare of P6.80 registered on its meter.chanrobles virtual law library

A security guard of the Seventh Day Adventist Church by the name of Eduardo de Vera was able to shed some light on the incident when he
narrated in his sworn statement (Exhibit "C") that while on duty as security guard on the night of May 24, 1969, at about 11:45 P.M. in the vicinity
of the North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist at 2059 Donada Street, Pasay City, he heard sounds of people arguing on the
street, so he approached the gate and shouted inquiring what the trouble was; that suddenly three persons emerged from a taxicab and they ran
towards Buendia street; then the driver of the taxicab emerged and told de Vera that he was wounded and requested to be brought to the hospital
but de Vera was at that moment looking at the three persons who ran away; that when de Vera saw the victim wounded at his left side, he fired a
shot to stop the fleeing three persons but they simply increased their speed; that after several minutes a policeman came and called up the
headquarters; that the Metrocom came and also the doctor summoned by de Vera.chanrobles virtual law library

According to the autopsy report (Exhibit "D") of Dr. Ricardo G. Ibarrola, Jr., Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation the cause
of death of the victim was the stab wound at the left side of the chest.chanrobles virtual law library

The accused Victorino Sumayo (alias Batman), Jesus Sallan (alias Boboy), Antonio Juaningo (alias Totoy), and Hubert Villaruz (alias Bert) were
apprehended "thru reliable information of a civic-minded lady who invited Sgt. Severo Tizo to her house and informed him that her brother
overheard the gang of a certain Batman in a drinking spree, talking about the robbery hold-up of a taxi driver committed by them on May 24, 1969,
somewhere at Donada Street, Pasay City". The Pasay City Police Department had knowledge by dossier or tip that the Batman gang included Jose
Sallan, alias Boboy; Genaro Flores, Jr., alias Rock Boy; Antonio Juaningo, alias Totoy; Victorino Sumayo, alias Batman; Hubert Villaruz, alias Bert; and
two others known as Tony and Boy. Policemen went to the hideout of the Batman gang at Callejon San Juan in front of 189 Donada Street (house of
Mrs. Isabel Gallardo) but none of the gangmembers was there at the time. In the afternoon of May 28, 1969, at about 4:00 P.M., Major Juanita
Gusayco, Sr., the Acting Chief of the Secret Service Division of the Pasay City Police Department, informed the policemen that the accused Jesus
Sallan, Victorino Sumayo, Antonio Juaningo and Hubert Villaruz were apprehended and ready for investigation.chanrobles virtual law library

Based on an information charging the four accused together with Genaro Flores, Jr. (not apprehended), John Doe, alias Tony, and Peter Doe, alias
Boy Tramo (accurate Identity unknown), with the crime of "Robbery Hold-Up with Homicide", filed by Special Counsel Manuel G. Garcia with the
conformity of Pasay City Fiscal Gregorio G. Pineda, the four accused, Sallan, Sumayo, Juaningo and Villaruz, were arraigned and they pleaded not
guilty on May 31, 1969.chanrobles virtual law library

After a speedy trial that ended with the case being submitted for decision on June 9, 1969, the Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
(Branch VII) of Pasig, Rizal, found the accused Victorino Sumayo, alias "Batman" and Jesus Sallan, alias "Boboy" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the crime of robbery (hold-up) with homicide, under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and
sentenced each one of them to suffer the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of P12,030.00, jointly and
severally, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. With respect to the accused, Antonio Juaningo, the Court found him guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the same offense as charged in the information and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the offended party in the amount of P12,030.00, jointly and severally with the accused, Victorino Sumayo and Jesus Sallan, and to pay
the costs. As far as the accused, Hubert Villaruz is concerned, based on the evidence on record, the Court entertained doubt as to his guilt for
insufficiency of evidence and acquitted him of the crime of robbery (hold-up) with homicide as charged in the information. Said accused was
ordered released from detention immediately unless detained for some other legal cause.chanrobles virtual law library

Accused Antonio Juaningo was given a penalty of reclusion perpetua based on the trial court's finding that he was only seventeen years of age at
the time he committed the offense. Under paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period, upon a person of over fifteen and under eighteen years of age. The penalty prescribed by law
(Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code) for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua to death.chanrobles virtual law library

This case is now before Us for review because of the death sentence imposed on accused Sumayo and Sallan, and because of the appeal of accused
Juaningo.chanrobles virtual law library

A close scrutiny of the trial court's judgment of conviction readily shows that the court based its approximation of moral certainty on the guilt of
the accused on the assumption that the sworn statements (Exhibits "A", "B", "F", and "G") by the accused Sallan, Sumayo, Juaningo and Villaruz,
respectively, were voluntarily given and not extracted by force or intimidation, as claimed by the accused Sallan, Sumayo and Juaningo. The trial
court was convinced of the credibility of the narration freely given in their extrajudicial confession when it stated that said statements reveal "so
many details in the commission of the crime, details that could have not been known to the police investigators if the same were not voluntarily
given by the said accused." The defense of denial and alibi interposed by the accused Sumayo, Sallan and Juaningo, were considered significantly
deficient to overwhelm the convincingly credible evidence of the prosecution proving their participation in the commission of the crime.

Under these circumstances it becomes imperative for Us to determine in the light of the evidence on record the crucial issue of whether or not the
extrajudicial confessions of the accused (Exhibits "A", "B", "F" and "G") were given voluntarily or extracted from them by force or intimidation, as
they claim in their defense. These extrajudicial confessions were supposed to have been given before Sgt. Severo Tizo of the Pasay City Police Force
(statements of Sallan and Sumayo, pp. 10-14 t.s.n. hearing of June 4, 1969), Patrolman Claro R. Agustin of the Pasay City Police Force (statement of
Juaningo, p. 19 t.s.n. hearing of June 5, 1969), and Detective Conrado Rogaccion of the Pasay City Police Force (statement of Villaruz, p. 30 t.s.n.
hearing of June 5, 1969) on the night of May 28, 1969, and the same statements were supposedly sworn to before Assistant Fiscal Manuel Garcia of
Pasay City on the morning of May 29, 1969. Sergeant Tizo, Patrolman Agustin and Detective Rogaccion testified that the answers to the questions
in the extra-judicial confessions were given voluntarily, and that the investigation took place on the night of May 28, 1969, after the accused were
apprehended and all of them were then at the Police Headquarters of Pasay City. The accused were investigated in one place where there were
many persons present because of other cases (pp. 24 to 25 t.s.n. hearing of June 5, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

When the accused, Victorino Sumayo, testified he claimed that he was forced to sign the extrajudical confession, Exhibit "B", and he was whipped
with rattan but he could not point to any definite person who allegedly maltreated him. The court could not find any signs of maltreatment nor
scars when he was examined by the Judge during his testimony on June 6, 1969 when he was supposed to have been physically maltreated on May
28, 1969 or just a few days before he appeared before the court (pp. 7 and 8, t.s.n. hearing of June 6, 1969). No cases against the policemen who
allegedly maltreated him were even filed (p. 6 t.s.n. hearing of June 6, 1969). He admitted that he signed Exhibit "B" and even if he alleged that he
was forced to sign he could not point to anybody who forced him to do so (p. 11 t.s.n. hearing of June 6, 1969). He even admitted that he answered
voluntarily some of the questions asked him during the investigation (p. 10 t.s.n. hearing of June 6, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

Accused Jesus Sallan also claimed that he was hit at the stomach to compel him to confess but he could not Identify the person who hit him (p. 8
t.s.n. hearing of June 7, 1969). He admitted that he signed Exhibit "A" but claimed "they covered this paper and they just let me sign it (p. 12 t.s.n.
hearing of June 7, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

Likewise, accused Antonio Juaningo claimed that he was compelled to admit his participation in the crime because "they hit me", but could not
Identify the person or persons who hit him (p. 12 t.s.n. hearing of June 9, 1969). He admitted having signed Exhibit "F", but claimed "it was covered
and they forced me to sign it." (p. 13 t.s.n. hearing of June 9, 1969). He could not point to any definite person who allegedly forced him to sign (p.
13 t.s.n. hearing of June 9, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, accused Hubert Villaruz, while admitting that he together with accused Jesus Sallan, Victorino Sumayo, and Antonio Juaningo
were arrested and investigated on May 28, 1969, stated that he voluntarily signed Exhibit "G" and was never maltreated (pp. 28-29 t.s.n. hearing of
June 9, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

The mother of accused Juaningo, Consuelo Juaningo, testified that she and her daughter visited her son Antonio in Jail after he was arrested and
that she saw contusions at the back of her son and "cracked lips" and she was told by her son that he was whipped (pp. 24 to 25 t.s.n. hearing of
June 9, 1969). This witness, however, admitted on cross examination that she once complained to Sergeant Tizo against her son Antonio for
quarelling with her and her daughter while he was drunk (p. 26 t.s.n. hearing of June 9, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

To bolster the contention that accused Sumayo, Sallan and Juaningo were maltreated to force them to admit participation in the crime, the defense
presented as witness Dr. Aurora Padilla Cruz who was ordered by the trial court on June 2,1969, to conduct a physical examination of accused
Sumayo, Sallan and Juaningo. She testified that she examined the three of them and made a report (page 15 of Record, C.C.C-VII-161 Pasay City) on
June 2, 1969, wherein she found on Victorino Sumayo, a contusion on lateral portion of the scapula, left, a contusion of the left arm and a
contusion of the elbow, left arm. No physical injury was found on Jesus Sallan and on Antonio Juaningo. On the contusions found on Sumayo, Dr.
Padilla Cruz testified that the same could have been caused by a blow and these contusions were inflicted a day before she examined Sumayo on
June 2, 1969 (p. 4 t.s.n. hearing of June 9, 1969). If the accused alleged that the maltreatment took place on May 28, 1969, then it is very manifest
that the contusion found by Dr. Cruz on Sumayo as of June 2, 1969, supposed to have been inflicted a day before, or June 1, 1969, could not have
resulted from the alleged maltreatment but from some other cause.chanrobles virtual law library

It is also observed that the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and that the law has been obeyed (Sec. 5, (m)
(ff), Rule 131, Rules of Court) heavily favor the presumed regularity in the execution of the sworn statements Exhibits "A", "B" and "F", signed as
they are by the Assistant Fiscal Manuel Garcia of Pasay City, and each one of them accompanied by the Pasay City Police Department Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report duly accomplished (Exhibits "A-1", "B-3", and "F-1").chanrobles virtual law library

Not one of the accused complained to Assistant Fiscal Manuel Garcia at the time he signed those sworn statements that they were extracted by
force or intimidation from those subscribing to them. There is not a single indication nor evidence of motive on the part of the police investigators
that could have induced them to resort to unlawful means in the method of determining true facts, thereby deviating from normal procedure in
investigation and thus perverting the quest for truth and justice. The candid admission of the accused, Villaruz, who at the time he testified could
not have forseen that he would be acquitted, that he voluntarily signed the statement Exhibit "G" and he was not maltreated, it being clear that
this accused was investigated together with accused Sumayo, Sallan and Juaningo on the same night and in the same place, in the presence of
other people, is the most convincing argument that those statements (Exhibits "A", "B" and "F1") were really signed voluntarily by the
accused.chanrobles virtual law library

We went to great lengths on a thorough scrutiny of available evidence to determine if accused Sumayo, Sallan and Juaningo were maltreated to
make them sign the extrajudicial confessions Exhibits "A", "B" and "F", and there is nothing sufficiently convincing for Us to alter the trial court's
conclusion that the overwhelming evidence indicate voluntariness in the execution of the said sworn statements.

II

Proceeding now from the premise that Exhibits "A", "B" and "F" were voluntarily given, as was also the case with Exhibit "G", We can reconstruct
with some degree of accurate approximation what really happened on the night of May 24, 1969, when the victim was ruthlessly killed and robbed
of the paltry sum of P30.00.chanrobles virtual law library

One fact that is definitely sure is that on the night of May 24, 1969, at about 10:00 o'clock, the accused Victorino Sumayo, Genaro Flores, Jr. (not
apprehended), Jesus Sallan, Antonio Juaningo, Hubert Villaruz (acquitted) were together, drinking beer and later hard liquor (Tanduay rum) within
the vicinity of a barbeque stand at Dapitan Street; then at Suerte Street, San Juan Street, Donada Street (where the crime was committed) and
Buendia Street, all situated in close proximity to each other in Pasay City (Exhibits "A", "B", "F" and "G"; testimonies of accused Sumayo, hearing of
June 6, 1969; accused Sallan, hearing of June 7, 1969; and accused Juaningo, hearing of June 9, 1969).chanrobles virtual law library

The versions of the crime as contained in Exhibits "A", "B" and "F" are as follows:

(1) Exhibit "A" - Accused Sallan stated that after drinking at Suerte Street, accused Sumayo (alias Batman) suggested that they (the group)
commit a "hold-up"; that Sumayo instructed him (Sallan) to call a taxi at the corner of San Juan and Leveriza Streets, Pasay City; that Sumayo
(Batman), Flores Jr. (Rock-boy) (at large), Tony and Boy (John and Peter Doe) rode in the taxi; that accused Villaruz (Bert) (acquitted), accused
Juaningo (Totoy), and Sallan were given instruction to walk to Donada Street and wait for the taxicab they boarded so they could meet at Donada
Street; that at about 11:40 p.m. the taxicab boarded by Batman and his three companions arrived at Donada Street; that Sallan saw the taxicab
stop near a church and he saw Batman (Sumayo) stab the driver who fought back; that Sallan and Juaningo (Totoy) ran towards San Juan Street;
that the five. in the group arrived at San Juan Street near Leveriza Street at the designated place about 4:00 a.m. of May 25, 1969, where Batman
(Sumayo) gave Sallan eleven pesos, five pesos of which the latter kept and six-pesos given to Totoy (Juaningo).chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Exhibit "B" - Accused Sumayo stated that he was with the group but he was not the one who killed since it was accused Genaro Flores, Jr.
(Rock-boy) (at large) who killed the taxi driver; Sumayo Identified the homemade kitchen knife used by Rock-boy (Flores) but said Totoy (Juaningo)
owned the knife which was entrusted to Sumayo by Juaningo; that he did not know Boy and Tony (John and Peter Doe); that the color of the
taxicab they held-up was yellow; that he Identified the victim when he was shown a photograph; that he saw Rock-boy (Flores Jr.) when the latter
stabbed the victim; that Tony got the money from the victim; that they afterwards fled to San Juan Street; and that the group subsequently met at
Suerte Street where Sumayo was given five pesos by Tony.chanrobles virtual law library

(3) Exhibit "F" - Accused Juaningo stated that the "hold-up" took place on Donada Street, near San Juan Street; that accused Sallan was the
one who called the taxi that was held up; after drinking, Boy and Tony (John and Peter Doe) came while they were at the end of Suerte Street,
where Sallan (Boboy), Flores (Rock-boy), and Sumayo (Batman) talked; Sallan called a taxi and Sumayo (Batman), Flores (Rock-boy), Boy and Tony
(John and Peter Doe) boarded the taxi; that after the taxi left, accused Sallan (Boboy) told Juaningo that Batman and his companions will commit a
"hold-up" of the driver in the taxi they rode in and for Sallan and him (Juaningo) to walk towards Donada to help in the robbery; they went to
Donada Street in front of the church and after ten minutes the taxi with Batman and his companions arrived; that Juaningo beard the driver
groaning; that after Batman, Rock-boy, Tony and Boy alighted from the taxi, accused Sallan and Juaningo ran towards San Juan Street; that at about
4:00 a.m. of that morning they saw each other at San Juan Street, near Leveriza where Batman gave Juaningo six pesos; that on said occasion Rock-
boy (Flores) showed the knife with blood telling the group that the driver resisted and that was the reason why Flores stabbed him; that Batman
also told the group that he also stabbed the driver but there was no blood and he did not know if he was able to hit the driver; that when shown
the kitchen knife, he said it was not the knife shown to the group by Rock-boy (Flores) but the knife belonged to Batman; and that after the
stabbing of the victim, Batman, Tony, Boy, and Rock-boy ran towards Buendia.chanrobles virtual law library

The version of accused Hubert Villaruz (acquitted) contained in Exhibit "G" was that on May 29, 1969 he was with accused Juaningo, Sallan, Sumayo
and Flores at Suerte Street, near Leveriza Street, Pasay City but before eleven o'clock the group left and he separated from them. Aside from the
statement contained in Exhibit "A" made by accused Sallan that accused Villaruz was also given instruction by Batman to walk towards Donada
Street, together with accused Sallan and Juaningo to aid in the robbery, a lone version not corroborated by the statements of Sumayo and
Juaningo, there is no evidence indicating accused Villaruz's participation in the crime and the trial court correctly exonerated him.

III

When the accused Victorino Sumayo, Jesus Sallan, and Antonio Juaningo testified for the defense, all of them admitted that on the night of May 24,
1969 they (Antonio Juaningo, Hubert Villaruz, Jesus Sallan, Genaro Flores, Victorino Sumayo) were together at Suerte Street, Pasay City, drinking
beer and hard liquor (Tanduay rum). As alibi, they narrated that after drinking and telling stories they slept and denied that they participated in the
crime.chanrobles virtual law library

Examining the statements (Exhibits "A", "B" and "F") given voluntarily by the accused Sumayo, Sallan and Juaningo about four days after the
commission of the crime We find an amazing consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of facts which according to the trial court
"could have not been known to the poIice investigators if the same were not voluntarily given by the said accused." The narrations contained in the
extrajudicial confessions leave Us no room for doubt that when the group on the night of the incident was already under the influence of liquor,
accused Sumayo (Batman) proposed that they commit "hold-up"; that all agreed and accused Sallan was the one instructed to call a taxi; that they
were armed, the accused Juaningo even claiming in his sworn statement that the kitchen knife (Exhibit "B-1") shown him during the investigation
was not the same knife shown to the group by Rock-boy (Flores) after the stabbing, but said knife belonged to accused Sumayo (Batman). The
question of ownership of the death weapon (whether owned by Juaningo as claimed by Sumayo or by Sumayo as claimed by Juaningo) becomes
immaterial and irrelevant because what appear significant is that at the time the accused agreed to commit robbery they were armed, showing
that they intended to inflict harm on the victim if thwarted in their design to rob. Accused Juaningo could not claim that there was no concerted
plan to rob because the evidence clearly shows, even by his own statement, that they as a group agreed to commit the hold-up and he (Juaningo)
knew at the time that the group was armed, accused Sumayo even pointing to Juaningo as the owner of the death knife (Exhibit "B-1"). This
weapon was recovered from the house of Mrs. Isabel Gallardo (Aling Abeng) known hideout of the Batman gang, and even accused Sumayo
admitted that said weapon was recovered from that place (p. 32 t.s.n. hearing of June 4, 1969; p. 14 t.s.n. hearing of June 6, 1969). All of those who
conspired to commit the crime of robbery, knowing that members of the group were armed for the purpose of attaining their unlawful objective,
should be responsible for the consequences of the criminal act, in this case the death of the victim. As conspirators they cannot afterwards claim
that they planned to rob only and not to kill and that if someone in the group killed in the course of the robbery he alone should be responsible.
Any person with ordinary foresight can forsee that committing robbery with the use of force upon person always entails the danger of injuring or
killing the victim, especially if the conspirators plan to commit, and did commit, their dastardly act while armed and in a group.chanrobles virtual
law library

There is no doubt in Our mind that the agreement to commit the crime took place and not one of the accused did anything to prevent it from being
carried out. Hence all those who conspired must be held liable as principals for the consequence of the offense committed. It is very difficult to
believe accused Juaningo's statement that he was told of the plan to rob the taxicab by accused Sallan only after the group (Sumayo and his
companions) had boarded the taxicab, because he admitted he was with the group on that night since they started drinking and he (Juaningo) even
stated that in the "hold-up" it was the accused Sallan who called the taxicab. The statements in Exhibits "A", "B", and "F" are consistent in many
material details, persistently so if We may say, and they are admissible against the accused on the doctrine of interlocking confessions as
corroborative evidence [People vs. Condemena, G.R. L-22426, May 29, 1968; People vs. Prudente 45 O.G. No. 12, 5587 (1949)].chanrobles virtual
law library

What strikes Us as the most deplorable aspect of this crime, and which characterizes it as one of the utmost depravity and wanton deviltry, is that
the robbery that caused the death of the victim and for the paltry sum of thirty pesos was perpetrated by human beings who were not in dire need
of food or other necessities of life but who could afford to go on a drinking spree and run afoul of the law as if they were having some fun or a form
of relaxation to while away their Idle time. The lower court did not err in stating:

The accused though in their prime youth, have already shown criminal perversity of the highest order. It is clear that it was not necessary for them
to kill the deceased, in order that they may take away his earnings. Yet they went beyond killing the poor earner, confirming their complete
disregard of the value of human life, for mercy or pity is a total stranger to them. By their own misdeeds, they must be denied free association with
society, for what is needed is their complete isolation as a means of self-preservation, before they envelop us in a disaster beyond our capabilities
to overcome.
In the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide herein charged, the same was attended by two aggravating circumstances as against the
accused, Victorino Sumayo and Jesus Sallan. Victorino Sumayo was charged with robbery (snatching) on December 31, 1967, and served a sentence
of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in Criminal Case No. 7700-P, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII, Pasay City. Jesus Sallan
was charged with robbery (hold-up) on August 12, 1967, and served a sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor by order of Judge Pedro J.
Bautista, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City. The two accused abovenamed are, therefore, recidivists because at the time they
were convicted in this case they had been previously convicted by final judgment of another offense embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code (Art. 14, par. 9, Revised Penal Code. See Exh. "E", pages 122-123, original record of c.c.c.-VII-161Pasay City).chanrobles virtual law
library

The crime herein charged was committed at night time which facilitated the commission of the robbery, the same having taken place at around
10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 24, 1969.chanrobles virtual law library

The imposition of the extreme penalty of death under the circumstances of this case is, therefore, fully justified, there being no mitigating
circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library

The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the accused Antonio Juaningo is not in accordance with law. Because of the fact that he was only 17
years at the time he committed the crime, under paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code the proper imposable penalty must be one
degree lower than that prescribed by law in its proper period. The penalty prescribed by law (Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code) for the crime
committed is reclusion perpetua to death (two indivisible penalties). The penalty next lower in degree is reclusion temporal, or 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years (Art. 61, par. 2, Revised Penal Code). Reclusion temporal is a divisible penalty that has three periods (12 years and 1 day to 14 years and
8 months as minimum; 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months as medium; 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years as maximum).
The crime having been committed without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, insofar as Antonio Juaningo is concerned, the penalty in its
medium period must be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (People vs. Sanidad, et als., G.R. No. L-32495, August 13, 1975) the
proper indeterminate penalty for Antonio Juaningo is a minimum of not less than ten (10) years of prision mayor and a maximum of not more than
17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal.chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated as regards the penalty for the accused, Antonio Juaningo, the decision of the trial court imposing the
death penalty and other penalties on Victorino Sumayo y Bersebal and Jesus Sallan y Paz is affirmed.chanrobles virtual law library

Costs against all accused.chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual
law library
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 10672. October 26, 1915. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARMEN IBAÑEZ and PACIFICO MANALILI, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

ARAULLO, J.:

Carmen Ibañez and Pacifico Manalili were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the crime of adultery, on a complaint filed on May
21, 1914, by Felix Alviola, the husband of the first-named. The accused pleaded not guilty and were tried separately. On February 25 of the present
year, 1915, the said Court of First Instance rendered judgment in both cases, finding the defendants guilty of the said crime and sentencing them to
the penalty of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, each to pay one-half of the costs. The defendants appealed and
their counsel assign several errors to the findings of the trial judge on the evidence presented in each of the two cases.

After a minute examination and a very careful review of the evidence we have found nothing to justify us in making and alteration or change in the
said findings on which the trial judge based his judgment.

It was satisfactorily proven that the defendant Carmen Ibañez was the lawful wife of the complaining witness Felix Alviola; that their marriage had
not been dissolved on any of the dates mentioned in the complaint when, according to the evidence, the acts constituting the crime in question
were performed; and that the defendant Pacifico Manalili knew of the said dates that Carmen Ibañez, his codefendant, was the wife of the said
Alviola. It was likewise proven beyond all doubt that, prior to the filing of the complaint, intimate relations of a very suspicious character existed
between Carmen Ibañez and Pacifico Manalili; that on one occasion they were together, alone, seated on a dry river-bed in the shade of the
bamboo trees; that the defendant Pacifico Manalili was accustomed to frequent the home of the spouses Carmen Ibañez and Felix Alviola at times
when the latter was absent; that during such visits the doors and windows of the house were habitually closed; that Carmen Ibañez often absented
herself from her home; that on one of these occasions her husband, watching and following her, saw her in company with Manalili; that the
defendants separated on perceiving Alviola’s presence, each of them going in a different direction; that on meeting his wife Alviola asked her
where she had been; that she replied she had been to the dressmaker’s; that on another occasion Alviola surprised the defendant Manalili going
down the stairs of the conjugal home, and that immediately Manalili hurriedly mounted his bicycle and rode away.

And finally it was proven that twice when Felix Alviola was away from home the defendant Pacifico Manalili and his codefendant Carmen Ibañez,
Alviola’s wife, had sexual intercourse in the said house — once on May 16, 1914, and again a few days afterwards on the morning of the 21st; that
on this last occasion, Alviola, having been notified previously, went to his house accompanied by a policeman and surprised Manalili hiding behind
the kitchen door; that his coaccused Carmen Ibañez was alone in the said house at the time and when her husband asked her whose bicycle it was
that was standing at the door and who was inside the house, the said Carmen concealed and denied the presence therein of the said Manalili, and
that the bicycle turned out to belong to the latter.

The defendants are therefore guilty as principals by direct participation of the crime of adultery provided for and punished by article 433 of the
Penal Code, and the trial judge correctly so held in view of the evidence submitted in each of the aforesaid cases. But account should be taken of
the aggravating circumstance of the crime having been committed in the house of the aggrieved person in spite of the fact that the conjugal home
was the common domicile of Felix Alviola and his wife, Carmen Ibañez; the latter, false to the duty she owed her husband of being faithful to him,
failed, as did the other defendant, to respect the sacredness of this home, and both the defendants injured and committed a grave offense against
the said Felix Alviola, the master of that home. In a similar case the supreme court of Spain laid down the same rule in its decision of July 6, 1885,
saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As the person offended by the crime of adultery is the husband, the aggravating circumstance of committing it in his dwelling cannot be excused
by the fact that the dwelling was also the home of the adulteress; because, aside from the consideration that the stranger to the marriage who
violated the law in that domicile is not a member of the community residing there, the adulates’ liability is morally and legally accentuated by her
lack of respect for the domicile of the offended party, as is implied by her brazen and outrageous consummation of the crime therein."cralaw
virtua1aw library

There being no extenuating circumstance to offset the said aggravating one, the corresponding penalty in its maximum degree should be imposed
upon the defendants, in addition to which the defendant Pacifico Manalili should also be sentenced to the accessory penalties of article 61 of the
Penal Code.

Therefore, with the understanding that the penalty of prision correccional imposed upon each of the defendants shall be one of imprisonment for
four years nine months and eleven days and that the defendant Pacifico Manalili in addition thereto shall be sentenced to the accessory penalties
of suspension from all office and from the right of suffrage during the term of his sentence, we affirm the respective judgments appealed from,
with costs of both instances against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2489. April 12, 1950.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONRADO EVANGELISTA ET AL., Defendants. CONRADO EVANGELISTA and ALEJANDRO
SALAZAR, Appellants.

DECISION

MORAN, C.J. :

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding Conrado Evangelista and Alejandro Salazar guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide under article 294, section 1, of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 18), and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua with all the accessory penalties thereof; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Patrolman Jose R. Antonio in the sum of P2,000, complainant Uy Sang in the sum of P3,000, and complainant Braulio Bulaong in the sum of P1,000;
and to pay their proportionate part of the costs.

On the night of February 14, 1947, Conrado Evangelista, Ruperto Roque, Lazaro Manlulu, Alejandro Salazar and Bino "Doe" agreed to rob on the
following morning any Chinese store which they might find open. At about four o’clock of the following morning, February 15, 1947, as they walked
down Quiricada Street, they saw that the store of Uy Sang at No. 1601 corner of Oroquieta and Quiricada Streets, had just opened and Uy Sang was
alone inside counting pieces of bread. Whereupon, the five armed men entered the store brandishing their firearms and ordered Uy Sang to stay
quiet. Ruperto Roque was left outside as the lookout. After ransacking the sleeping quarters of Uy Sang, the armed men took P1,000 from a
wardrobe which they forced open and P2,000 which they found inside a pillow. Then they went up to the second floor of the same house where
they were met by Braulio Bolaong, landlord of Uy Sang, whom they threatened with their revolvers and from whom they took a diamond ring
valued at P1,000.

At this moment, Patrolman Jose R. Antonio arrived at the store. An exchange of shots ensued and the policeman fell dead while one of the armed
men, Ruperto Roque, was wounded in the abdomen. When a squad of detectives arrived to investigate, they found the lifeless body of Patrolman
Antonio on the floor of the store. Upon being informed that the armed men had fled towards Palomar Extension, the detectives gave chase. There
they came upon a shack where they found Ruperto Roque badly wounded and they arrested Conrado Evangelista whom they saw leaving the
premises.

Conrado Evangelista was brought to the police station where, upon investigation, he gave a signed statement (Exhibit F). Ruperto Roque, who was
brought to the North General Hospital for medical care and confined therein, gave a signed statement on February 19, 1947 (Exhibit G) and died
three days later, on February 22. Alejandro Salazar, who was able to escape on the day of the crime, was arrested by the Military Police in Angeles,
Pampanga, on May 5, 1947, and was turned over to the Manila Police to whom he also gave a signed statement (Exhibit E). Lazaro Manlulu and
Bino "Doe" who also escaped after the robbery, are still at large.

These facts are fully supported by evidence and are not in dispute in this appeal. The question at bar, as conceded by both parties, is the criminal
responsibility of appellants. Appellants allege that there was conspiracy only to commit robbery, not homicide, hence they must be held
responsible only for the robbery. Appellee contends that appellants and their co-defendants conspired together in the perpetration of the robbery
in question, and that on the occasion thereof, Patrolman Jose R. Antonio was shot dead, hence, appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

In accordance with the provisions of law pertinent to this case (articles 294 to 296 of the Revised Penal Code) and established jurisprudence, when
an armed band commits robbery and on the occasion of such robbery a homicide is committed, the crime is robbery with homicide. And the
second paragraph of article 296 provides that "Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be
punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.."

In the instant case, the conspiracy to commit robbery in band and the occurrence of a homicide on the occasion of such robbery have been proven
and even admitted, although there is no showing that appellants and their companions recognized Patrolman Antonio as a policeman when he
arrived at the scene of the robbery. However, the evidence clearly shows, over the mere denial of their counsel, that appellants were present when
the homicide occurred. On the other hand, there is nothing in the records which tend to show that the appellants attempted to prevent the
homicide. This Court, therefore, finds appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide under article 294, section 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. The aggravating circumstances of "nighttime" and "dwelling" have also been proven, and there being no mitigating circumstances to offset
the same, the penalty specified by law must be imposed in its maximum which, in this case, would be death. However, since the required number
of votes for the imposition of the death penalty cannot be had, the penalty of reclusión perpetua must be applied.

For all the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is hereby modified to the extent that the indemnity to the heirs of Patrolman Jose R. Antonio
should be raised to P6,000, and affirmed in all other respects. It is so ordered. Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Judgment modified and indemnity raised.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE, PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y
GERALDE and MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.

FERNAN, J.:

These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the automatic
review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari of said decision, the recourse taken by accused-appellant
Juan Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his fate." 1

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not
Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too,
pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had
replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as
follows:

One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the
Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound
about 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the
incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10,
tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).

At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at
about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak,
where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three companions, one of whom he later Identified as the
appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.

After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after office hours,
accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the office, the two
children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen
knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober,
the former asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].

At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her husband and two children. On her way, she noticed that the
pedestrian gate was wide open with the appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but nobody answered.
Suddenly, she heard of shot coming from the direction of the garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober
walking towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to contact her husband through the intercom. But since the intercom was out of
order, she hurriedly went outside and met appellant Escober who volunteered the information "that he was not hit." [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].

Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on
the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E'
fun of blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash
he kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as their children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she
got one car, while her eldest son drove a second one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the two cars, they were
brought to the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14,
1983].

It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate the incident. And,
since the victims were already brought to the Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he arrived at the hospital at
past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two
separate sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he
proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a police photographer, who arrived to assist him in the
investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5, 1983].

Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E") which the former said was found beside the pool of blood inside
the room where the incident happened. In the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of Vicente Chua were
forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00
was taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant Escober, the security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the written statements of the victims'
parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively). Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic]
(Exhibit "I") the result of his investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations: "Detained the
accused all prima facie case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended. [pp. 13-23, Ibid].

Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily Identified
by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as one of those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of the incident on
December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the
previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit "K") and
that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4]
companions, including the herein two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under
custodial investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit "M") wherein he did not only admit his participation in the
commission of the crime, but also implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal, Police Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as:
Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a certain Peter Doe,
albeit, only the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. 2

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his defense. His testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:

Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising
Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he
reported for work. When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua
did not like to see the guardhouse dirty and also because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it. There was a
janitor but the security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he
was cleaning the guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted
to, and two men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large] entered and one man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober
was not able to talk to Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a gun at Escober and also a knife and they said
they would kill him. He does not know the man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because he Alorte used to be his co-guard at Vising
Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pick- up car inside the garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober.
Alorte and his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte.
Escober does not know the man who was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the courtroom and he pointed to the
person who answered by the name of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing because he, Escober,
was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to get that gun when these four men entered
because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical
Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte did not continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up the office,
they came down and talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able to avoid it and after that, the four
men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pickup and he heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua
at the house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed. So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called
him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he,
together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could not understand him because he
was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car, parked it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the office, he was
bringing his son and placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he called Escober) and came back out,
Escober saw him with his son and placed him at the balcony. The two children who were stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only
two cars at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of
the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave him a directory and
asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15
minutes, the police came and after that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform also arrived. They interviewed
Escober and forced him to go with them to the police precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had not then arrived. When owner
arrived, he called another security guard to guard the Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought Escober to the
precinct to get his statement and there the police was forcing him to adroit he was the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he
told them do not know everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together with Abuyen Alorte inside the garage is not true because
he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was finding (sic) to call
him (Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He
Identified his statement, Exhibit I for the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his. He knows the
police who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober was at the precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic)
October 3, 1983, the date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is found in his Brief as follows:

PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of
Monumento." In the afternoon of 3 December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in
a place near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions whom he introduced all his relatives; after several drinks, he was
requested to join the group to proceed to another place for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a high
gate' because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and
the security guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused Escober as the security guard) opened the door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE
then instructed PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound (TSN, pp.
11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).

PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while waiting he heard the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then
about to enter the premises but he met ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with blood stains in their arms;' that
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he followed them; that in response to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he
stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a taxi and he was brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov.
9, 1983)

PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the Monuments market. No lawyer assisted him during his custodial
investigation despite the fact that he informed the police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was
invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was
presented for his signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many statements thereon are not correct that he nevertheless signed Exh. "M"
because he was already tired and was forced to sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water therapy and he could not endure
the pain, when they gave (him) the electric shock treatment;" and that the portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are those Identified as Exhs.'11-
A and 11-B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately after
the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed
by the prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20,
1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of
pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the
petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS
ACTED "AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING
REASON OF ACCUSED ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-
ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST
BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER
'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984. 5

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.

On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS
DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN-
INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;

THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING
THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND. 6

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to the form and substance of the decision under review.
Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and void for it does not conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the
1973 Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had been transcribed.

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten
notations and insertions. It reads:

The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of Robbery with Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It
alleged, among others, that on or about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation again persons robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No.
24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of said robbery employed personal
violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal wounds directly
causing their immediate deaths, to the damage of their heirs.

Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro
Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence consisted of the testimonies of
the two named accused above and some exhibits, contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.

In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties, the arguments and authorities cited therein, this Court finds
that the material allegations of the above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are
guilty of the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating
circumstances, and attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of the crime, taking advantage of
number and superior strength, treachery, in band, among others, and that the defenses and excuses of the accused are unnatural, incredible,
contradictory and uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing
reason of accused Juan Escober in opening the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of
knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and
volunteering the information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide was
replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the
said compound, and later acting as lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some drinks, not to get drunk
admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve better to commit the crime planned.

WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
amended information, this Court holding firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound under his protection to four men who turn
out to be robbers and murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and meets with said malefactors immediately before the
commission of the offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to exculpate and
excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but succeeded only in insulting this Forum of
Truth with their rediculous (sic) justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in
question, of being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing garbage and being fired at but not getting hit but not knowing
so many vital details a truthful witness would certainly not forget, among others, thus that this court after a total appreciation of all the evidence
on record is convinced that there being apple (sic) circumstances present that could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for the most
heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the
legal punishment provided by Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is DEATH and orders the said accused
further to pay the heirs of their victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the
said heirs, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. 7

Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based ...

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the
Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony
of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or
what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such
findings.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480, reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan
v. Insular Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458:

Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass upon and
determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is impossible to
administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in an action suit, the circumstances of each question raised,
and the nature and condition of the proofs furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by the contending parties
which he finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be
intelligently set forth the legal grounds and considerations proper in his opinion for the due determination of the case.

As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization of the evidence, testimonial or documentary,
upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were
sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial court.

Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-judge to administer justice in this case in the
most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of
stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is what respondent
judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of the testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the
transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered
some delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.

Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and
fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding
which We said:

At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude displayed by the trial court towards a murder case it has tried
as shown by the rendition of a decision, the body of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three typewritten pages, double-spaced
and wide-margined. While brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is not necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in
deciding this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both prosecution
and the defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on record and the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the
court's decision.

This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the decision. The issues raised by the appellant include allegations of
concocted testimony, the nature of a dying declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues raised are quite
serious and they deserved better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the
case should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all
evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render
judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 8
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof,
it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan.
These acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua
behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not
hit. The prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's version of the
incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.

After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his
allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged
mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had
knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a
security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from the premises being guarded persons
who have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew
Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact, even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who
replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the
compound thus:

20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong
pinagguaguardiayahan?

S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong buwan ng Septyembre at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.

21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply. 9

The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We
share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a common experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He
would be the stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with malefactors The least or perhaps the
safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would
live if he were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10

Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to
enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the need for immediate escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the
scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.

That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are further bolstered by the statement made by Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986,
submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement
reads:

FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Alorte.

FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]

FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga
ang utak eh. 11
On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre.
Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay
niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay
DON-DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay
pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an
pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko
na sila at tumakbo na kami ... 12

These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators and therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve
credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even responsive to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by
which it was given lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This statement, together with the statement of
Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E scober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed
at him. That Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere ritual because the same could be
easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual
practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime
charged is indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness.
Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his
extrajudicial confession.

Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he
would want to inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act
by the prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of logic and reason.

The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a
shot, she looked at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a
meter behind.

We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the prosecution
witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave her statement on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So,
soon after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of
better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted in the tragic event.

Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from
inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions
started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime,
and at which point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have
seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who was not walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing
the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua,
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult for her to determine for certain the distance between
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.

Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and
Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were nagmamadali [in a hurry]." 13 This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the
impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the
'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/ Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of
the crime, and tills can be interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.

The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To
hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers, must be shown,
and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. 14

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the
criminal design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime, such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the
gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's
testimony regarding his actuations during the incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved 15 and its corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of
its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 16

Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to
be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two
hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.

We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.

Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the for lowing:

PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA
MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa
ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.

2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at
nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.

3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.

4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.

Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas
ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?

Sagot — Opo.

Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang abogado na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong
sarili?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?

Sagot— Opo.

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.

Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted prefatory
statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The Identical manner by which the police sought to inform Escober and
Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level,
educational background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told,
considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing
more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of
compliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It
gives the impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during the
custodial investigation.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's extrajudicial statement cannot be considered
intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact that it was done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid. 19 Needless to
say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 20

With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which
amounts to an absence of preliminary investigation, should have been raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and
consistent in ruling that:

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance
and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the
proper procedure since the 'absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less
did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity
of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.

... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is
not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate
court. 21

While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the
counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against
Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano
defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having
knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to
cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was
merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty.
Mariano. 23

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to
the scene of crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his
companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers
further demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.
While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of
the two helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also
guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from
confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused- appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115008-09 July 24, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting
him of the two offenses separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the
second crime.1

The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later referred to the Court en banc in view of the problematical issue
of whether to sustain the trial court's judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People vs. Tac-an,2 People vs. Tiozon,3 People vs.
Caling,4 People vs. Jumamoy,5 People vs. Deunida,6 People vs. Tiongco,7 People vs. Fernandez,8 and People vs. Somooc9 or to modify the
judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People vs. Barros, 10 which this Court
(Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.

The informations read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength,
the accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the
opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the
incident of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the
said firearm, hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
deceased.

Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought
for or taken advantage of by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. 11

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, carry and have in his possession, custody
and control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said firearm from
competent authorities which firearm was carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was used by him in committing the crime of
Murder with Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of PD No. 1866. 12

Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and joint hearings were had. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were
SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police of Dauis, Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Gregg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula Matalinis.
The defense presented as witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and the appellant himself.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:

On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist fight occurred
between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the latter was constantly annoying and pestering the former's sister Rosita Iroy (TSN, Crim.
Cases 8178 & 1879, June 8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).

In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco was held in the same place. This benefit dance was attended by Rosita Iroy, Ariel
Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado, Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.

While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the dancing area, Diosdado Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were then
sitting at the plaza (the area where they positioned themselves was duly lighted and was approximately four mete's from the dancing hall), decided
to just watch the activities in the dance hall directly from the plaza.

After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the gate of the dance area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same night, while
facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy, Rosita Iroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from behind. Suddenly,
appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy, hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused Rosita Iroy to spontaneously shout that
appellant shot her brother; while appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.

Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime,
Rosita Iroy went home and relayed to her parents the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of
the preceding paragraphs).

At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting chief of Police Felipe Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula
Matalinis. The police officer made entries in the police blotter regarding the shooting and correspondingly, ordered his men to pick up the
appellant. But they were unable to locate appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).
In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his father Teogenes Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol. There and
then, appellant was pinpointed by Elenito Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were entered in the police
blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993, pp. 4-6).13

The slug was embedded at the midbrain. 14 Diosdado Iroy died of

Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation, secondary to massive intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, 1 cm. left
occipital areas, transecting cerebellum up to midbrain. 15

The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per certifications issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a
duly licensed firearm holder as verified from a consolidated list of licensed firearm holders in the province 16 and was not authorized to carry a
firearm outside his residence. 17

The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected because he was positively identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy.
It summarized his testimony in this wise:

Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases, declared that in the afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in their house. At 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon he went to Tagbilaran City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to solicit passengers. They transported
passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the evening. They then proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan.
Before the arrival of Trans Asia Taiwan they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up two passengers for Graham Avenue
near La Roca Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk
with Saturnino Maglopay who was waiting for his auntie scheduled to arrive abroad MV Cebu City. They were not able to pick up passengers which,
as a consequence, they went home. They had on their way home passengers for the Agors Public Market. They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao
at Bil-isan, Pangalao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed the night. He went home to Mariveles, Dauis,
Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.18

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged and sentenced him accordingly. It appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering that the appellant shot
the victim at the back of the head while the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive portion of the decision dated 30 September 1993 reads
as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the law and to
pay the cost.

In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
punished under Sec. 1 of RA No. 1866 as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence from Seventeen (17) years Four
(4) months and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.

The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain of the back portion of the head of the victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in
favor of the government.

It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from the term of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has not executed a waiver. 19

On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in the decision an award of civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal
Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an order directing the appellant to pay the parents of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of their son and P10,000.00 for funeral expenses. 20 The order was to form an integral part of the decision.

The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.21

The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he contends that the trial court erred

. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND FELIPE
NIGPARANON.

II

. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL AND ALFRED ARANSADO, AND IN DISREGARDING THE
PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA IROY, EDWIN NISTAL, AND
ALFRED ARANZADO.

III

. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND SPO4 FELIPE NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 22

The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the identity of the killer of Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that the killer
was not identified, he attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a
motive "to put him in a bad light" and calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother Diosdado, the victim, boxed him on the night of
25 December 1992 because he allegedly "bothered her." He further asserts that Rosita could not have seen the person who shot Diosdado
considering their respective positions, particularly Rosita who, according to defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area
and ran towards the crime scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the appellant considers it as suppression of evidence when the prosecution
did not present as witnesses Diosdado's companions who were allegedly seated with Diosdado when he was shot.
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that the said witnesses is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case
for arbitrary detention had already been filed against him by the appellant. The appellant further claims of alleged omissions and unexplained
entries in the police blotter.

Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi which, according to him, gained strength because of the lack of evidence on
the identity of the killer. Furthermore, he stresses that his conduct in voluntarily going to the police station after having been informed that he,
among many others, was summoned by the police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of the killing of Diosdado Iroy — specially so if Rosita
Iroy's claim is to be believed that moments after the shooting she shouted that Daniel Quijada shot Diosdado Iroy.

In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the appellant and recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged decision.

After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties, we find this appeal to be absolutely without merit.

The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly persuade. The appellant was the one who was boxed by and
lost to Diosdado Iroy in their fight on the night of 25 December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with human experience that it would be the
appellant who would have forthwith entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No convicting evidence was shown that Rosita had any
reason to falsely implicate the appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.

The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado because, as testified to by defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she
was inside the dancing hall and rushed to her brother only after the latter was shot is equally baseless. The following testimony of Rosita shows
beyond cavil that she saw the assailant:

Q You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing place and you went out, about what time did you get out?

A 11:00 o'clock.

Q And you were standing about two (2) meters from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the incident happened?

A Yes I was standing.

Q And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?

A I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching and getting near going to my brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the process I
saw Daniel Quijada shot my brother Diosdado Iroy. 23

xxx xxx xxx

Q And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado Iroy while he was sitting at the plaza to the dancing place?

A More or less four (4) meters distance.

COURT:

From the dancing hall?

A Yes, your honor.

Q And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted or illuminated?

A Yes, sir.

Q What kind of light illuminated the place?

A I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.

Q Was it an electric light?

A It is electric light coming from a bulb.

Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place located?

A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light from the house.

Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing place was enclosed at that time and there was a gate, an opening?

A Yes, sir.

Q What material was used to enclose the dancing place?

A Bamboo.

Q And how far was the bulb which was placed near the entrance of the dancing place to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?

A Five (5) meters.

Q You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the house, now whose house was that?

A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the family name.
Q Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and Berto an electric light?

A Yes, sir.

Q And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the house of Fe and Berto to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?

A About six (6) meters distance.24

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the dancing place?

A The white bulb.25

The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly declared:

The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored principally in ". . . observing the attitude and deportment of witnesses while
listening to them speak" (People vs. Magaluna, 205, SCRA 266).

thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to
convince the trial court that they were telling the truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators
of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; 26 or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere of the
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yarn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath,
the carriage and mien. 27 The appellant has miserably failed to convince us that we must depart from this rule.

Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence occasioned by the non-presentation as prosecution witnesses any of the
companions of Diosdado who were seated with him when he was shot. In the first place, the said companions could not have seen from their back
the person who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the second place, the testimony of the companions would, at the most, only corroborate that of Rosita
Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion at all that the said companions were not available to the appellant. It is settled that the presumption in Section
3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of the
witness is merely corroborative or where the witness is available to the accused. 28

The alleged improper motive on the part of SPO4 Nigparanon simply because he is a neighbor of the Iroy's remains purely speculative, as no
evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship affected SPO4 Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. 29 As to the alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter, the
same were sufficiently clarified by SPO4 Nigparanon.

The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant consideration. He was positively identified by a credible witness. It is a fundamental
judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 30 Besides, for that defense to prosper it is
not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 31 As testified to by defense witness Julian Bonao, the
Tagbilaran wharf, where the appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine kilometers away from the crime scene and it would take only about
thirty minutes to traverse the distance with the use of a tricycle. 32 It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not have voluntarily proceeded to the police station. This
argument is plain sophistry. The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers such act as a mitigating
circumstance. 33 Moreover, non-flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.34

The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty that the appellant had no license to possess or carry a firearm. The
firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy was unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm
under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used
in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an, 35 and reiterated in People vs. Tiozon, 36 People vs. Caling, 3 7 People vs. Jumamoy, 38
People vs. Deunida, 39 People vs. Tiongco, 40 People vs. Fernandez, 41 and People vs. Somooc, 42 that one who kills another with the use of an
unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal
possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant
guilty of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.

Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an
accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these
are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy will not apply. We observed in Tac-an:

It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and
that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no
prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder
punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the
other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second
jeopardy.

And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicide or murder; however, the killing of a
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm.

In Tiozon, we stated:

It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the
penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a
more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The
rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine
then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to
the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.

In People vs. Doriguez [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional act or element
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is not obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.

In People vs. Bacolod, [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, informations of physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused
pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under
the other.

Since the informations were for separate offense[s] — the first against a person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule or double jeopardy.

In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 can also be separately charged with and convicted of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:

It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as "the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed
Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and declaring Caling guilty
thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms [or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others,
"unlawfully possess any firearm . . (or) ammunition . . ." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary permit and/or license
therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the use of
(such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital
punishment.

The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of a firearm without license. The crime may be denominated
simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of a
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of possession of an unlicensed firearm;
neither is the latter absorbed in the former. There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of . One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which
may be either simple or aggravated, defined and punished respectively by the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD 1866. The other is
homicide or murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the
crime under P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or
murder, is obviously distinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined under the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)

In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills another with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted
and punished for the two separate offenses of violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or murder under
the Revised Penal Code. Thus:

Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of firearms or
ammunition with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, under the second paragraph thereof, the penalty is
increased to death if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It may thus be loosely said that homicide or murder
qualifies the offense because both are circumstances which increase the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is
absorbed in the offense. If these were to be so, an anomalous absurdity would result whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a statutory offense, one which is merely malum prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person with the use
of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) the violation of either
Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to bar the other; stated otherwise, the
rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is punished by a special law while the second — Murder or Homicide — is punished by
the Revised Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991); People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968)]. Considering, however, that
the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution, the proper imposable penalty would be the penalty next lower in degree, or
reclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied)

In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an information for murder and pursuing only the information for
"Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this Court categorically declared:

At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position in withdrawing the information for murder, the offense defined
in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and,
therefore, does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro vs. People, involving the
violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our decisions in
People vs. Tac-an, People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling.

In Somooc, we once more ruled:

The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that document, although both the Information and the decision of the
trial court used the term "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been supposed to connote a "complex
crime" as used in the Revised Penal Code. Such nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no
complex crime of illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The gravamen of the offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a
firearm without a license or authority for such possession. This offense is aggravated and the imposable penalty upgraded if the unlicensed firearm
is shown to have been used in the commission of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The killing of a human
being, whether characterized as homicide or murder, is patently distinct from the act of possession of an unlicensed firearm and is separately
punished under the provision of the Revised Penal Code.

The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June 1995 in People vs. Barros, 43 we set aside that portion of the appealed
decision convicting the appellant of the offense of murder and affirmed that portion convicting him of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form. We therein made the following statement:

[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses [of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form and of murder],
but only that of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and propositions set forth in the separate opinion
of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to which the Members of the Division, the ponente included, subscribe.

The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado referred to therein read as follows:

This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether or not the crime should properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm through the use of which a homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused so situated should be liable only
for the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession of the firearm punished by death under the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and it is on this point that the writer dissents from the holding which would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in
addition to that for the illegal possession of the firearm used to commit the former.

If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense imputable to the accused, the Court has correctly held that to be the simple
possession punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph of Section 1. Where,
complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used to commit homicide or murder, then either of these felonies will convert the erstwhile simple
illegal possession into the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession. In other words, the homicide or murder constitutes the essential element
for integrating into existence the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical
and unjustifiable to use the very same offenses of homicide or murder as integral elements of and to create the said capital offense, and then treat
the former all over again as independent offenses to be separately punished further, with penalties immediately following the death penalty to
boot.

The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive standpoint, virtually of the nature of the so-called, "special complex crimes,"
which should more appropriately be called composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and Article 335. They are neither of the same
legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or
less grave felonies nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another. However, just like the regular complex crimes and
the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses.

On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the conceptual definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but
the Code imposes a single definite penalty therefor it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much less as separate offense, but with only the
single penalty prescribed by law. Thus, even where a single act results in two less grave felonies of serious physical injuries and serious slander by
deed, the offense will not be punished as a delito compuesto under Article 48 but as less serious physical injuries with ignominy under the second
paragraph of Article 265. The serious slander by deed is integrated into and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer separately
punished.

What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative illustration, as well as the discussion on complex and composite crimes, is that when
an offense becomes a component of another, the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus aggravated by the integration of the
other, the former is not to be further separately punished as the majority would want to do with the homicide involved in the case at bar.

With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry is more of a question of classification for purposes of the other provisions of
the Code. The theory in Tac-an that the principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and the killing shall merely be
included in the particulars or, better still, as an element of the principal offense, may be conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes here is actually
source from the very provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 which sought to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the "various laws and
presidential decrees to harmonize their provision" which "must be updated and revised in order to more effectively deter violators" of said laws.

This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlaying the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be
charged is still carnapping, although the penalty therefore is increased when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The
same situation, with escalating punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, wherein the principal crimes still are piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the matter of
destructive arson, the principal offense when, inter alia, death results as a consequences of the commission of any of the acts punished under said
article of the Code.

In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a case of illegal possession of firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or,
conversely, homicide or murder through the illegal possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in the possible application of the
provision on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in the theoretical realm since, taken either way, the penalty for aggravated illegal possession of a
firearm is the single indivisible penalty of death, in which case the provision on recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not
established but either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of recidivism may have some significance in the sense that, for purposes
thereof, the accused was convicted of a crime against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another crime under the same title
of the Code.

Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and the penalty to be imposed when the unlawful killing and the illegal possession
are charged in separate informations, from what has been said the appropriate course of action would be to consolidate the cases and render a
joint decision thereon, imposing a single penalty for aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such possession and the unlawful taking of life shall
have been proved, or for only the proven offense which may be either simple illegal possession, homicide or murder per se. The same procedural
rule and substantive disposition should be adopted if one information for each offense was drawn up and these informations were individually
assigned to different courts or branches of the same court.

Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession separately from the homicide or murder could be susceptible of abuse since it
entails undue concentration of prosecutorial powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was committed with a firearm will
necessarily be known to the police or prosecutorial agencies, the only probable problem being the determination and obtention of evidence to
show that the firearm is unlicensed.

Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without alleging therein that the same was committed by means of an unlicensed
firearm, the case would not fall under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein, but without alleging the lack of a
license therefor as where that fact has not yet been verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if proved in that case, would not affect the
accused either since it is not an aggravating or qualifying circumstance.

Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the prosecution intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder but
the same is inexplicably delayed or is not consolidated with the information for illegal possession, then any conviction that may result from the
former would only be for simple illegal possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and subsequent prosecution for homicide or murder
prospers, the objective of Presidential Decree No. 1866 cannot be achieved since the penalty imposable in that second prosecution will only be for
the unlawful killing and further subject to such modifying circumstances as may be proved.

In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the proposition that the real offense committed by the accused, and for which sole
offense he should be punished, is the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the writer's position that the possible
problems projected herein may be minimized or obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one information or that the trial thereof, if
separately charged, be invariably consolidated for joint decision. Conjointly, this is the course necessarily indicated since only a single composite
crime is actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and dispose thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.

If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 must have to be set aside. He should only suffer the
penalty for the aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.

The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting doctrines applicable to prosecutions for murder or
homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm in instance where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy
deliberation thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida,
Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court
away from a dangerous course which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers through
judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the lawmaker's intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when
an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the case under consideration, Tac-an did not enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine" or a
"speciously camouflaged theory" which "constitutes an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of common
sense."

If Tac-an did in fact enunciated such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for a
convincing number of years, so must the same verdict be made in our decision in People vs. De Gracia, 44 which was promulgated on 6 July 1994.
In the latter case, we held that unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecution for a
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. A distinction between
that situation and the case where an unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder would have no basis at all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative pronouncements:

III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there
was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered
from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.

The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose
active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives
and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.

The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability
of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession
of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under
Article 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised
Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might
conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal
possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.

Missing p. 26

conceptual changes over time," as the concurring and dissenting opinion charges.

The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not because it has become hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has
always been the obstacle to the virtues of change," as the concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly believes
that Tac-an laid down the correct doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an "affront on doctrinal concepts of penal laws and assails even
the ordinary notions of common sense," the blame must not be laid at the doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did in
Tac-an was to apply the law, for there was nothing in that case that warranted an interpretation or the application of the niceties of legal
hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty is a merely to apply the law in such a way that shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation
and that in the course of such application or construction it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation modify,
revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 45

Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code 46 as crimes against persons. They are mala in se because malice or
dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor. 4 7 On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a special
penal law, 48 P.D. No. 1866. It is a malum prohibitum 49 which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his martial law
powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but also because of the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not
eliminating, the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms,
ammunition, and explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy or purpose would be difficult to
achieve. Hence, there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the
possessor. All that is needed is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus possidendi. However, it must be clearly
understood that this animus possidendi is without regard to any other criminal
or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. 50

A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibitum and their distinctions is an exercise in futility.

We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit:

The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally provides for such illegal possession and resultant killing as a single
integrated offense which is punished as such. The majority not only created two offenses by dividing a single offense into two but, worse, it
resorted to the unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by
using a component crime which is also an element of the former.

It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the illegal possession with murder punished with a single penalty have been divided
into two separate offenses of illegal possession and murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a compounded infringement of legislative
powers for this Court to now, as it has done, treat that single offense as specifically described by the law and impose reclusion perpetua therefor
(since the death penalty for that offense is still proscribed), but then proceed further by plucking out therefrom the crime of murder in order to be
able to impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential
murder (or homicide) is an integrated element or integral component since without the accompanying death, the crime would merely be simple
illegal possession of a firearm under the first paragraph of Section 1.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and support a conclusion that it intended to treat "illegal possession and
resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a single and integrated offense" of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not use the clause
as a result or on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. By its unequivocal and explicit language, which we quote
to be clearly understood:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)

the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE USE of an
unlicensed firearm, whose possession is penalized therein. There is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the commission of
homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1, and (b) the commission of homicide or murder with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. In the first, homicide or murder is not the original purpose or primary objective of the offender, but a secondary event or
circumstance either resulting from or perpetrated on the occasion of the commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the second, the
killing, which requires a mens rea is the primary purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an unlicensed firearm.

As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should also apply the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer
Penalties Therefor), the answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the lawmaker clearly intended a single integrated offense or a
special complex offense because the death therein occurs as a result or on the occasion of the commission of the offenses therein penalized or was
not the primary purpose of the offender, unlike in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No. 532 provides:

Sec. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent
court be punished by:

a. Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)

(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:

Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved,
be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a
result or on the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)

and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:

Sec. 3. Penalties. — Violations of this Decree and the rules and regulations mentioned in paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished as
follows:

a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are used: Provided, that if the explosion results (1) in physical injury to person, the
penalty shall be imprisonment from 12 to 20 years, or (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or
death;

b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are used: Provided, that if the use of such substances results
(1) in physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be
imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death; . . . (emphasis supplied)

The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person.
Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in such a way
that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to
aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision
are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code,
is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in
killing a person. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 1 — reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua — to death, seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of the law in
using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the
victim.

Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with death if either crime is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have been the intention of
the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the
penalty for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:

There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information
charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death. . . . The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.

A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a qualifying circumstance. This would not be without precedent. By
analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section provides that
when an offender commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
definition of the crime and the application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.

In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the
firearm so illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with that intent is to impute an absurdity
that would defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such
firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder.

Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting opinion, create two offenses by dividing a single offense into two.
Neither did it resort to the "unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another
offense by using a component crime which is also an element of the former." The majority has always maintained that the killing of a person with
the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form.

What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it
define and punish a single integrated offense and give to the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE
OCCASION OF, a meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent. Worth noting is the rule in statutory
construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation, 51 leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 52

Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single integrated crime or composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain
of integration of the essential elements of one crime to that of another would then be unnecessary in light of the clear language and indubitable
purpose and intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology, the determination of what should be
criminalized, the definition of crimes, and the prescription of penalties are the exclusive prerogatives of the legislature. As its wisdom may dictate,
the legislature may even create from a single act or transaction various offenses for different purposes subject only to the limitations set forth by
the Constitution. This Court cannot dictate upon the legislature to respect the orthodox view concerning a single integrated crime or composite
crimes.

The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for various acts is the rule on double jeopardy. This brings us to the
proposition in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that the majority view offends the constitutional bar against double jeopardy under
the "same-evidence" test enunciated in People vs. Diaz. 53 He then concludes:
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence for the murder in the first charge of aggravated illegal possession of firearm
with murder would be different from the evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder alone. In the second charge, the illegal
possession is not in issue, except peripherally and inconsequentially since it is not an element or modifying circumstance in the second charge,
hence the evidence therefor is immaterial. But, in both prosecutions, the evidence on murder is essential, in the first charge because without it the
crime is only simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge, because murder is the very subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the other
requirements under Section 7, Rule 117 are present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily present and can be validly raised to bar
the second prosecution for murder?

In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary objection to the cases of the other composite crimes for which a single penalty is
imposed, such as the complex, compound and so-called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive of how a person convicted of estafa
through falsification under Article 48 can be validly prosecuted anew for the same offense or either estafa or falsification; or how the accused
convicted of robbery with homicide under Article 294 can be legally charged again with either of the same component crimes of robbery or
homicide; or how the convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can be duly haled before the court again to face
charges of either the same rape or homicide. Why, then, do we now sanction a second prosecution for murder in the cases at bar since the very
same offense was an indispensable component for the other composite offense of illegal possession of firearm with murder? Why would the
objection of non bis in idim as a bar to a second jeopardy lie in the preceding examples and not apply to the cases now before us?

We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double jeopardy is not raised in this case. For another, the so-called "same-
evidence" test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of the first category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which
is covered by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution and which reads as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to the same act. This was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero, 54
from where People vs. Relova 55 quotes the following:

Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said
clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the
same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the
plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging said
offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case.

Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity as
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. 56 The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved. 57

If may be noted that to determine the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America which reads:

[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . .

the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not." 58

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America was brought to the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July
1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter alia:

[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . . .

This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones Law of 29 August 1916. 59 Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones
Law provision was recast with the addition of a provision referring to the same act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof provided as
follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and in Section 21, Article III of the present Constitution.

This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy principle. For undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form
are different from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the
former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's construction of the subject provision would
violate the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.

The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form must, however, be
modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is death. Since Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, must be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol
finding accused-appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty imposed in the first case, as amended by the
Order of 29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty imposed in the second case is changed to Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate
penalty ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Melo, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
[ G.R. No. 19343, January 12, 1923 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN MANUEL ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION
STREET, J.:

This cause has been elevated to the Supreme Court for the purpose of subjecting to review in this tribunal a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, finding the five appellants, to wit, Juan Manuel (1.°), Ildefonso Giron, Pedro Martos, Graciano Saori, and Juan Manuel (2.°), guilty of
the offense of robbery with double homicide, and sentencing each of them to undergo the penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of Valentin Pasamonte and Maria de la Cruz, in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs of the prosecution.
On the night of April 14, 1919, an aged couple, consisting of Valentin Pasamonte and Maria de la Cruz, residents of the barrio of San Antonio, in the
municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan, were foully murdered and robbed in their home by a band of eight miscreants, consisting of the five
appellants and three others, namely, Victoriano Gamboa, Saturnino Aguilar, and Teodoro Estioco, the last three having been used as witnesses for
the prosecution. As soon as the perpetration of this crime was brought to the attention of the authorities, an investigation was set afoot with a
view to the discovery of the identity of the perpetrators, and in the course of this investigation suspicion was directed to a number of individuals
other than those prosecuted in this case; but no credible proof was obtained tending to confirm the suspicions against the first suspects, and the
prosecution against them was dropped.

The first truthful clue leading to the apprehension of the actual malefactors came from one Victoriano Gamboa while in Bilibid Prison under
sentence of death for participation in a similar crime of robbery and murder. In this connection it appears that on the night of March 30, 1920,
Victoriano Gamboa, Ildefonso Giron, and Juan Manuel (2.°), in collaboration with five other individuals not necessary to be here named, attacked
the house of Juan Batalla (2.°), in the municipality of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, for purposes of robbery, in the accomplishment of which crime they killed
four of the inmates. In the prosecution that followed (U. S. vs. Gamboa, R. G. No. 17317, decided March 8, 1922[1]), Ildefonso Giron and Juan
Manuel (2.°) were used as state's witnesses, and the result was the conviction of Victoriano Gamboa and his codefendants. On July 16, 1921,
thereafter, the said Victoriano Gamboa, being under sentence of death for the crime aforesaid, wrote a letter to the provincial commandant of the
Philippine Constabulary, in Lingayen, Pangasinan, in which he revealed the names of the eight persons, including himself, who, according to his
statement, had murdered and robbed Valentin Pasamonte and Maria de la Cruz, in the municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan, in April, 1919.
Acting upon this information, the five appellants were prosecuted in the present cause and, as already stated, sentenced to death, in the Court of
First Instance of said province. In this prosecution three of the gang of eight participants, namely, Victoriano Gamboa, Saturnino Aguilar, and
Teodoro Estioco, were used as witnesses for the prosecution; and the testimony of these, supported by admissions and confessions obtained from
more than one of the appellants, constitutes the proof upon which the conviction was obtained. Juan Manuel (1.°) and Pedro Martos have at no
time admitted their guilt; and as against them the conviction rests exclusively upon the concurrent testimony of the three confederates already
referred to.

According to these witnesses the crime was committed substantially as follows: About two days before the crime was committed, Victoriano
Gamboa and Pedro Martos were in communication with a view to the perpetration of robbery upon a house in the municipality of San Manuel,
Pangasinan, where, it was believed, a considerable sum of money could be obtained. Pursuant to the plan then formed, Pedro Martos proceeded
to other parts of the Province of Pangasinan to bring together the associates necessary to undertake the enterprise, while Victoriano Gamboa
awaited his return. Pedro Martos seems first to have connected himself with Juan Manuel (1.°), Juan Manuel (2.°), and Ildefonso Giron, after which
the four then presented themselves at the home of Saturnino Aguilar, in Umingan, Pangasinan, and invited him to accompany them to the house of
Teodoro Estioco. Saturnino Aguilar responded to the invitation and the party, now consisting of five, repaired to the house of Teodoro Estioco.
Arriving at that place, Teodoro was called out and he likewise joined the party.

As the party proceeded on its way to the point where Victoriano Gamboa awaited them, the information was given out to the effect that the band
was bent upon robbing a house which would be pointed out by Pedro Martos, where they expected to obtain the sum of P1,000. The party passed
through the municipalities of San Quintin and Tayug, arriving at the latter place at 4.30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 14. Crossing the River Agno
at that point, the six found Victoriano Gamboa, in company with Graciano, (Marcelino) Saori, sitting by the side of the road. Victoriano Gamboa,
upon seeing Pedro Martos and his companions, asked them why they have been so slow in coming, to which Pedro Martos replied that they had
come from considerable distance.

The party then proceeded to the municipality of San Manuel; but before arriving there Pedro Martos showed a disposition to withdraw from the
party, saying that he was known in San Manuel; and he evidently feared that he might be recognized in those parts. To this Juan Manuel (2.°) and
Ildefonso Giron replied that they did not know the place and that, being in the company of the others, he (Pedro Martos) should have no fear, and
they added, significantly, that, if anybody should recognize Pedro, "we will kill him." In response to this pressure, Pedro Martos decided to go on,
saying: "Let us be on the way, lest the rising moon catch us before we get to the house." Following upon this, Pedro Martos conducted the party to
the home of Valentin Pasamonte and Maria de la Cruz, in the barrio of San Antonio, of San Manuel, in accordance with their original plan.

Upon arriving at the house, which was low, the aged inmates were found asleep. Juan Manuel (2.°) was the first to enter, followed by others of the
party. The old man (Valentin Pasamonte) was found on the floor in front of the steps leading up into the house; and him Juan Manuel (2.°) struck at
once on the head with a bolo, producing immediate death. Maria de la Cruz, the aged wife, was sleeping in a little room separated somewhat from
the sala where Valentin was slain, and shet was soon awakened by the noise that had been made at the door. Becoming frightened, she began to
scream, and just at the moment when she was attempting to get up, Ildefonso Giron seized her in the breast with one hand and cut her.throat with
a stroke of the bolo, almost severing the head from the body.

After the two inmates of the house had been thus dispatched, the party proceeded to search the interior of the house; and Pedro Martos and
Graciano (Marcelino) Saori carried out a trunk in which valuables were kept. Placing the trunk upon the ground, Ildefonso Giron forced the lock,
and in the trunk was found a small box from which was taken the sum of P240 in paper money. The money thus obtained was distributed among
the men of the party, but apparently in very unequal proportions, as Victoriano Gamboa received only P6; Saturnino Aguilar, P25; and Teodoro
Estioco, P10.

On the next morning, the chief of police of the municipality of San Manuel, having been informed of the occurrence, went to the scene of the
crime, accompanied by three soldiers and the assistant sanitary inspector of the municipality. Upon arriving at the place, they found the body of
Valentin Pasamonte where it had been left by the robbers, near the steps leading into the house. The body exhibited a fatal wound in the head,
made by a bolo. In the sleeping room was found the body of Maria de la Cruz, with the throat cut. Everything about the house was in disorder, and
the trunk which had been rifled was found open on a bench in the yard.

After Juan Manuel (2.°) had been arrested by the sergeant of the Constabulary, Telesforip Peralta, he admitted to the latter, and later in the
presence of Lieutenant Liwanag, that he had formed part of the band which robbed and killed Valentin Pasamonte and Maria de la Cruz. Later he
signed a sworn confession (Exhibit D) before the justice of the peace of Tayug, in which he tells how the crime was consummated. It is not
improbable that this accused was prompted to these admissions by the hope that he might obtain immunity by being used as a witness for the
prosecution, as had happened to him in the prosecution for the quadruple murder and robbery, in which he participated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija. However, it is sufficiently shown that no improper inducements were held out to obtain the confession.

Ildefonso Giron and Graciano (Marcelino) Saori, after being arrested, also admitted in the presence of more than one person that they had formed
part of the band which robbed the house in question and killed its inmates. It may be noted, however, that both Juan Manuel (2.°) and Ildefonso
Giron, who, by the unanimous testimony of the three accusing witnesses, were the respective murderers of Valentin Pasamonte and Maria de la
Cruz, pass the honor of this atrocity to other persons than themselves; and they respectively claim merely to have been participants in the robbery,
without having taken any part in the killing.

Upon examination of the testimony of the three principal witnesses for the prosecution, we are impressed with the directness, clarity, and
consistency of their narrative; and although they all admit their own participation in the crime, and their credibility is subject to criticism on this
account, the corroboration which each gives to the other is so complete and satisfactory that no doubt can enter the mind as to the substantial
truthfulness of their statements. In respect to Victoriano Gamboa, in particular, it should be noted that at the time he testified in court, he was
under sentence of death for another crime of like character; and his testimony is sanctioned by the powerful incentive to truth which is born of the
belief, or fear, of being soon called to accountability by the Almighty. Naturally, the attorneys for the appellants have attacked his testimony as
having been possibly prompted by a desire of vengeance against Ildefonso Giron and Juan Manuel (2.°), on account of the fa ct that their testimony
had convicted him in the case in which he had been sentenced to death. Upon being asked in rebuttal in this case whether he in fact entertained
any resentment against those two persons, he replied very simply that he felt no resentment against them because what they had told in the trial
against him was the truth. Upon the whole we can entertain no doubt whatever as to the guilt of all five of the appellants.

The offense of which the five accused were convicted in the lower court was the complex crime of robbery with homicide, under article 502, in
relation with subsection 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code; and this qualification of the offense is in our opinion in conformity both with the charge
contained in the information and the proof submitted in support of the same. In the estimation of the offense the trial judge rightly took account of
the two aggravating circumstances that the offense was perpetrated in the dwelling house of the injured parties and that the malefactors availed
themselves of darkness in order more securely and conveniently to accomplish their design and as against Juan Manuel (2.°) and Ildefonso Giron,
the additional circumstance of alevosia.

It has been suggested that inasmuch as the two homicides were designedly perpetrated prior to the robbery, and as a preliminary thereto, the case
cannot properly be placed under subsection 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code and it is therefore supposed that the acts which are the subject of
prosecution should be treated as constitutive of separate offenses, namely, double homicide and robbery (or murder and robbery, according to the
relation of the different actors thereto).

As regards Juan Manuel (2.°) and Ildefonso Giron, the point is merely of academic interest, as these two accused are amenable to the death penalty
whether the offense be treated as the complex offense of robbery with homicide, or as separate offenses, since the maximum penalty assignable
to murder is the same as the penalty for the complex offense of robbery with homicide.

As to the other three accused Pedro Martos, Graciano (Marcelino) Saori, and Juan Manuel (1.°) the situation is different, since the circumstance of
alevosia cannot fairly be imputed to them (par. 2 of art. 79, Pen. Code); and the practical result of holding them responsible for the separate
offenses instead of the complex offense would be that they would undergo imprisonment for forty years, under the second paragraph of
subsection 2 of article 88 of the Penal Codet to be made up from the penalties severally incident to each of the two homicides and to the robbery;
and at any rate they would not be amenable to capital punishment.

The importance of the point in both its theoretical and practical aspects makes it proper for us to state the reasons which cause this court to
sustain the view that the proper qualification of the offense is that which treats it as the complex offense of robbery with homicide, accompanied
by aggravating circumstances, and punishably under subsection 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code, and not as homicide (or murder) and robbery, as
above suggested.

Upon this proposition our first observation is that although the authors of the Code have used only the word "homicide" in subsection 1 of article
503 and not "homicide or murder," it is evident that the word "homicide" is there used in a generic sense; and the complex crime therein
contemplated comprehends not only robbery with homicide, in its restricted sense, but also robbery with murder. In other words, an offense is not
taken out of the purview of that article merely because the homicide rises to the atrocity of murder. This proposition seems to be elemental, and it
is not only supported by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain (1 Viada, 4th ed., p. 356), but is in conformity with the practice of this court.

Again, attention may properly be here directed to the rule also elemental in this branch of the law that an offense of the character of that now
under consideration is none the less a complex offense by reason of the fact that double homicide (or murder) is committed instead of a single
homicide (or murder), the number of the victims being immaterial (Viada, 4 Supp., 413).

This brings us to the main point, which is, whether homicide (or murder) immediately followed by robbery is excluded from the purview of
subsection 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code, with the result that criminal acts must be prosecuted and punished as separate offenses and not as a
single complex offense. Upon this question the supreme court of Spain has pointed out what appears to us to be a sound distinction, which is, that
where the original criminal design comprehends robbery in a dwelling, and the homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of said
offense, the crime committed is the complex offense even though the homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable interval of time. On the
other hand, if the original criminal design does not clearly appear to have comprehended robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an
afterthought or as minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not as a single complex
offense (Viada, 5 Supp., 383, citing decision of June 27, 1905).

The doctrine stated in the decision above cited is in our opinion sound; and some of the older cases from the same court, suggesting a contrary
rule, must be considered discredited (3 Viada, 4th ed., 348, 349). The use of the words "with a view to * * * robbery" (con motivo * * * del robo), in
subsection 1 of article 503 of the Penal Code, seems to our mind to permit of no other interpretation. It is the intention of the actor which supplies
the connection between the homicide and the robbery necessary to constitute the complex offense; and if that intention comprehends the
robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may immediately precede instead of follow the robbery in point of time.

What has been said disposes completely, we think, of the proposition that the acts which are the subject of prosecution in this case might be
considered distinct crimes in respect to which the appropriate penalties should be accumulated, in accordance with the practice instituted in this
jurisdiction by the decision of United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260). With still less force could it be argued that the criminal acts of homicide and
robbery committed in this case are punishable under that part of article 89 of the Penal Code which contemplates the situation where one offense
is a necessary means for committing the other; for it cannot be maintained that the murder of the two aged and helpless persons who were the
victims of this outrage was in any wise necessary to the robbery. The robbery could easily have been effected without the commission of the
homicides (sen, Sept. 11, 1878); and indeed the proof indicates that the purpose in the commission of the homicides was not so much to make the
robbery possible as to remove the possibility of the future identification of one of the robbers.

We have thus demonstrated that the proper qualification of the offense which is the subject of prosecution in this case is that of the complex crime
of robbery with homicide, with aggravating circumstances. It results that no error was committed by the trial judge either in the qualification of the
offense or in fixing the penalty attendant thereupon. However, as one of the Justices of this court is not in accord with the majority in regard to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon Pedro Martos, Graciano (Marcelino) Saori, and Juan Manuel (1.°), the sentence of the lower
court, as to these three must, in conformity with the requirements of Act No. 2726, be reduced from death to cadena perpetua, with the
accessories incident thereto; and it being understood that the appealed judgment is modified to this extent, the same is in other respects affirmed,
with proportional costs against the several appellants. The penalty of death imposed upon Juan Manuel (2.°) and Ildefonso Giron will be executed
at a time to be fixed by the trial court and in all respects in accordance with law. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-13283. September 30, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SERAPIO CARUNUNGAN alias PAPONG, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Serapio Carunungan alias Papong, Manuel Buceta, Hospicio Panganiban, Calixto Ferrer, Basilio Salva
and Marcelino Fontila or Fontanilla were charged with the crime of robbery in band with homicide. After trial, they were all found guilty as
principals of the crime of homicide only, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, dwelling and in band. Accordingly each of them was
sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from 8 years and 1 day of prisión mayor, as minimum, to 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusión
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Lorenzo Vivas in the amount of P4,000.00, and to pay the costs.
From this sentence, all the accused except Marcelino Fontila or Fontanilla, appealed to the Court of Appeals.

After the briefs had been filed before that court, Manuel Buceta filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. The motion was subsequently granted and
his appeal dismissed. Thereafter, the appellate court certified the case to us, said court holding that the crime committed was attempted robbery
with homicide, punishable with reclusión temporal in its maximum period to reclusión perpetua, which should be imposed in its maximum period,
or reclusión perpetua, considering the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and in band. After the case had been
docketed in this Court, Serapio Carunungan and Basilio Salva filed separate motions to withdraw their respective appeal, it being alleged that they
were satisfied with the sentence of the trial court and were willing to serve the same. In separate resolutions, this Court granted their motions and
dismissed their appeals.

The present case is therefore now before us solely on the appeal of the other accused, namely, Calixto Ferrer and Hospicio Panganiban.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at about 11 o’clock in the evening of April 3, 1946, Pablo Abellera was on his way home, after paying
court to a girl in barrio Dilao, Balayan, Batangas, when he met a group of about ten persons. In the group were the six accused Serapio Carunungan,
Manuel Buceta, Hospicio Panganiban, Calixto Ferrer, Basilio Salva, Marcelino Fontila, and another Felipe Mendoza, all of whom he recognized,
because he had seen and met them before in cockpits and in tupadas. He saw that Carunungan, Buceta, Ferrer and Salva were each carrying a short
firearm, while Panganiban and Fontila each had a rifle. Abellera walked with them for about half a kilometer. As he did so, he fell into a
conversation with Felipe Mendoza, who told him that he and his companions were on their way to the house of Lorenzo Vivas in barrio Cumba,
Lian, Batangas, to extort or elicit some money (magdidilihensiya). After that conversation, Abellera walked home while the group went on their
way.

At about midnight of that same day (April 3, 1946)7 Lorenzo Vivas, his son Hermogenes and daughter-in-law Francisca Mendoza were awakened by
the presence below their house of appellants and their companions, who asked for some water to drink. Three of the group, namely, Serapio
Carunungan, Manuel Buceta and Felipe Mendoza, went up, forced open the door and entered the house. Lorenzo Vivas, who got hold of his own
firearm, confronted the trio and asked why they were roaming around at that ungodly hour of the night. Felipe Mendoza replied that they were
guerrillas being processed. Hermogenes Vivas stood up and started for the door, but Felipe Mendoza blocked his way. At that instant, the intruders
cocked their firearms and Carunungan ordered the inmates of the house not to make any false move and to bring out their money. All of a sudden,
the intruders started firing at Lorenzo Vivas, who fought back and returned the fire. When the smoke of gunfire cleared, Lorenzo Vivas was found
dead on the floor in the pool of his own blood. Also found dead was Felipe Mendoza. Manuel Buceta fled. Carunungan, who sustained a wound in
the right chest, was also able to escape. The spouses Hermogenes Vivas and Francisca Mendoza came out unscathed because they laid flat on their
bellies as soon as the shooting started. The said spouses were able to recognize the three who went up their house, the whole house being then
lighted up from a bright lamp locally known as farol de combate.

On the following morning, several officials from the town repaired to the Vivas house. There they found the dead bodies of Lorenzo Vivas and
Felipe Mendoza. They also retrieved empty .45 caliber shells inside the house and carbine shells on the ground outside. A post mortem
examination showed that Lorenzo Vivas received four gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal.

Intensive sleuthing by the PC and local police brought about the arrest of six of the culprits, the accused Serapio Carunungan, Manuel Buceta,
Hospicio Panganiban, Basilio Salva, Calixto Ferrer and Marcelino Fontila. During their investigation Carunungan, Salva, Ferrer and Fontila made
extrajudicial statements. In his statement, Serapio Carunungan admitted, among other things, that at about midnight of April 3, 1946 he and his co-
accused went to the house of Lorenzo Vivas in barrio Cumba, Lian, Batangas for the purpose of extorting money; that they were all armed at the
time; that he together with Felipe Mendoza and one Francisco Panganiban entered the house; that shooting broke inside the house and on that
occasion he received a gunshot wound in the right chest (See Exhibit C). Calixto Ferrer and Basilio Salva, on their part, declared that they were with
the accused on the night of the incident; that they went with them because they were invited to go serenading; that when they arrived at barrio
Cumba, Serapio Carunungan and some others went up and entered the house of Lorenzo Vivas, while they remained outside; that once inside, they
heard gunfire and they fled (See Exhibits D & E). Marcelino Fontila declared in his statement that on the night of the incident he met the accused
and their companions who asked him to join them; that he was not able to refuse, because he saw that they were all armed; that he was provided
with a carbine; that when they were near the house of Lorenzo Vivas, he heard that their purpose was to rob the same; that Buceta, Carunungan
and Mendoza entered the house; and that when he heard several shots coming from the house, he fled without firing any single shot (See Exhibit
F).

Panganiban and Buceta, on the other hand, were not persuaded and refused to give any statement.

At the trial, Carunungan, Salva, Ferrer and Fontila repudiated their extrajudicial statements and claimed that the same were obtained through
force, violence, intimidation, threats and promise of immunity and leniency. They also set up the defense of alibi, each claiming that he was at
some other place at the time the offense was committed.

Not giving credence to the claim that the statements (Exhibits C, D, E & F), were not freely and voluntarily executed by the respective declarants,
and observing that the defense of alibi "is buttressed upon testimonial evidence of a shaky nature which came from the lips of interested
witnesses", the trial court found the accused, including herein appellants, guilty as principals, conspiracy having been established.

After going over the record, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the lower court. Aside from the quoted observation of the trial
court, alibi as a defense is the weakest and easiest to concoct. In the case before us, the alibi set up by appellants cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of prosecution witness Pablo Abellera who identified them as members of the armed gang consisting of some ten persons who planned
the robbery. That appellants were at the scene of the crime is evident from the statement of appellant Calixto Ferrer himself, as well as those of
other accused (Exhibits C, D & F) who did not appeal or who have withdrawn their appeal. These statements, as found both by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, were freely and voluntarily executed by the respective declarants. This finding is amply supported by the evidence and for
this reason, we hold that said statements are admissible against appellants, and more particularly for the purpose of proving conspiracy.

From the events leading to and the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, it may logically be inferred that there was a common
design, understanding and agreement among appellants and their co-accused to rob the house of Lorenzo Vivas with the use of force if required.
Witness Pablo Abellera testified that at about 11 o’clock on the night of April 3, 1946 he met and recognized appellants among a group of persons.
They were all armed. Felipe Mendoza, a member of the group, revealed that their purpose was to rob the house of Lorenzo Vivas. The extrajudicial
statements of appellant Calixto Ferrer himself and the other accused establish the fact that appellants were with their co-accused on the night of
April 3, 1946. Upon arrival at the house of Lorenzo Vivas, Accused Carunungan, Buceta and Mendoza went up the house, while the rest, including
appellants, posted themselves downstairs. Inside the house, Carunungan demanded the inmates to bring out their money. However, he became
trigger-happy and started the shooting.

In this connection, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the crime committed is attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. The demand made by Serapio Carunungan to the inmates of the house to bring out their money
constitutes an overt act leading to the commission of the robbery. If the robbery was not committed, it was because of armed resistance.

The killing in this case was apparently an offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery. Simply because appellants did not take part in the killing, it
cannot be argued that they are not equally responsible therefor. Settled is the rule that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals in the crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide. (People v. Morados, 70 Phil., 558; People v. De la Cruz, 88 Phil., 29.) In the case at bar appellants’ armed presence
unquestionably gave encouragement and a sense of security to those who went up the house. It may also be assumed that they were there to lend
assistance in case of necessity. Their possession of firearms is consistent with their guilt. And, the presence of empty carbine shells downstairs is
indicative of the fact that they too fired shots and actively participated in the commission of the offense. They are, therefore, guilty as principals of
the crime of attempted robbery with homicide. By reason of the conspiracy, the act of each conspirator is the act of all. (People v. Evangelista, 86
Phil., 112; 47 Off. Gaz., [12] 3857; People v. Binsol, 100 Phil., 713; 53 Off. Gaz. [10] 3045.)

Appellants assail the credibility of Pablo Abellera as a "concocted witness" whose name does not even appear in the list of witnesses for the
prosecution. The non-appearance of his name in the list of witnesses, however, is of no importance. There is no intimation that at the time the
amended information was filed, his name was already known to the prosecuting officers. And at the start of the trial, the prosecution could ill-
afford to reveal his name since he was threatened not to testify (People v. Palacio, 108 Phil., 220; 58 Off. Gaz., [24] 4498). Appellants also allege
that Abellera had an ax to grind against Serapio Carunungan, but assuming this to be true, we do not think it is sufficient motive for him to railroad
all the other accused, against whom he had no quarrel or misunderstanding. According to the Court of Appeals, he "is not the type of man capable
of wearing falsehoods."cralaw virtua1aw library

The crime committed as already stated is attempted robbery with homicide as defined in Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes a
penalty ranging from reclusión temporal in its maximum period to reclusión perpetua. As the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime, dwelling and in band, without any mitigating circumstances to offset them, the penalty must be assessed in its maximum period, or
reclusión perpetua. In keeping with established jurisprudence, the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of deceased Lorenzo Vivas fixed at P4,000.00
by the trial court should also be increased to P6,000.00.

Modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-11166. April 17, 1959.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENIO OLAES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Defendant-appellant Eugenio Olaes, together with Cosme Isip and Bienvenido Dayuta, who where then at large and five other men, unidentified
and also at large, were accused of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. Olaes was the only one who stood trial, after which he was found guilty of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide and sentenced as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the accused Eugenio Olaes is hereby declared guilty of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide defined and penalized in
Article 294, Case No. 1, Revised Penal Code. Although the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and in band, in view
of the attitude of the Chief Executive on death penalty, the accused is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of Maria
Argame in the sum of P6,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. In the service of his sentence, the
accused should be credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by him since January 24, 1955."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Because of the penalty imposed, the appeal of Olaes was taken directly to this Court.

The facts in this case as established by the evidence and found by the trial court are the following: Between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. of November 9,
1954, Bus No. 64 of the Laguna Transportation Company, driven by one Feliciano Limosnero, with one conductor, left the town plaza of Biñan,
Laguna, bound for Manila. Among the passengers were Mariano Inobio, a resident of Bo. Almanza, Las Piñas, Rizal, Maria Argame and Elena Loyola.
When the bus reached the curve in Bo. Almanza, Las Piñas, a man later identified by passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip, holding a rifle or carbine,
suddenly appeared on the right side of the road and signalled the bus to stop. Limosnero, taking him for a prospective passenger, applied his
brakers and slowed down, but before the vehicle could come to a complete stop, seven other men, also carrying guns, such as, garands or carbines,
emerged from the left side of the road. Isip shouted, "Para, pasok!" The appearance of these armed men on both sides of the road must have
affected the equanimity of Limosnero on the wheel, and he must have the forgotten to press the clutch with his foot, resulting in the engine
stalling or stopping. Probably convinced that the eight men were not passengers but were bent on holding-up the bus and robbing the passengers,
Limosnero started the engine and sped away from the place despite the shouts of the men on both sides of the road for him to stop. Those men
immediately commenced firing at the bus which was riddled with bullets.

One of the shots grazed the head of Limosnero. Another shot hit passenger Maria Argame on the back, the slug penetrating the abdominal wall and
entering the abdominal cavity. Still another shot struck passenger Elena Loyola on the shoulder, fracturing her right clavicle. When the bus was out
of range of the guns of the eight men on the road and they had ceased firing, passenger Inobio on rising from his prone position in the bus, saw
driver Limosnero’s wound on the head, which was bleeding profusely, the blood dimming his vision, and so he took over the wheel. On reaching
Zapote, an inspector of the Laguna Transportation Company took over the wheel from Inobio and drove the bus straight to the Las Piñas Municipal
Building where the incident and shooting was reported to the police. Thereafter, the same bus, with a police officer, drove straight to Manila and to
the Philippine General Hospital. Maria Argame was pronounced dead on arrival. The fracture of the right clavicle of Elena Loyola necessitated an
operation, which was performed, and she was confined in the hospital for about twenty days, after which she was discharged, though she was not
completely recovered, to continue treatment at home. The expert testimony on her condition is that if she had not been given prompt medical
attention, she would have died from her wound, Driver Limosnero was treated at the same hospital for his head would and was released, but
treatment was continued by the bus company for about a month.

During the trial, passenger Inobio, star witness for the Government, told the court that he clearly identified the person standing on the right side of
the road, who signalled the bus to stop and who cried out "Para pasok!" as Cosme Isip. Inobio also said that among the seven ammend men who
emerged from the left side of the road and who fired at the bus when it sped away, he saw and clearly identified defendant-appellant Olaes,
because he is a barriomate, both of them being residents of Bo. Almanza, Las Piñas, and that Olaes was then carrying a gun, either a garand or
carbine.

Appellant Olaes at the trial insisted that he was not in the group of men that supposedly tried to hold up the bus, much less was he seen by Inobio
because in the course of the investigation made by the municipal police and the Philippine Constabulary, on two occasions when he was present,
and while Inobio was making statement to the authorities, Inobio never mentioned his name much less pointed to him. the evidence, however,
shows that the failure of Inobio to point to appellant as one of the supposed hold-uppers and who stopped the bus was because of fear of reprisal,
believing that Olaes was a dangerous character. Appellant also tried to establish a motive or reason for Inobio’s accusing him. We quote with favor
the pertinent portions of the decision of the trial court on this point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"He (Olaes) further averred that a policeman from Las Piñas investigated the holdup at 7:30 o clock in the morning of November 9; that during the
questioning of Inobio, Inobio never implicated him, although he was present for some twenty minutes; that at around 1:00 p.m. while on his way
home, he met a PC team investigating the crime headed by then Lt. Ver, whom he led to the house of Mariano Inobio; that in the course of the
questioning of Inobio which lasted for about half an hour, Inobio never made mention of his (accused’s) name and told the PC that he did not
recognize the persons who attempted to waylay the bus and hod-up its passengers. When asked for a possible motive why Inobio should testify
against him the way he did, the accused narrated that in May, 1954, he tried to pacify and separate Inobio and Dayuta who were quarreling; that as
Inobio struggled against him, he encircled Inobio’s neck with the arm; that Inobio resented this and accused him of siding with Dayuta; that shortly,
Inobio left muttering, "Your day of reckoning will come; you will pay for this" ; that from that time on, he and Inobio had strained relations.

"x x x

"Much stress is laid on Inobio’s failure to pinpoint Olaes during the investigation conducted by Lt. Ver of the PC at 2:00 p.m., November 9, 1954.
But as explained by Inobio, he did not point to Olaes who was there present as he was afraid of reprisal against himself and members of his family.
Indeed, two hours later, and feeling secure in the municipal building, he revealed the names of Eugenio Olaes, Bienvenido Dayuta and Cosme Isip
to the chief of police of Las Piñas.

"Moreover, PC Capt. Ver testifying on rebuttal declared that when he questioned Inobio in his house, in the presence of Olaes, Inobio appeared
nervous; that he took him upstairs and during the interrogation, a PC detachment commander investigating the same offense came and advised
him (Ver) that Inobio already revealed to him that morning that Olaes was among the hold-uppers; that at this juncture, Inobio informed him (Ver)
that that man was his guide and companion who remained downstairs; that when they looked at the place where they had left Olaes, the latter
was nowhere to be found, having slipped away unnoticed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Defendant-appellant also interposed the defense of alibi. We also reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court on this point.

"The defense of alibi must be clearly and satisfactorily proven (People v. Limbo, 49 Phil., 94). The testimony of the accused that he slept in the
house of his father or brother on the night of November 8 does not preclude the possibility that he woke up at, say 3:00 or 4:00 o’clock in the early
morning of the next day and joined the band of armed men who at 4:30 were frustrated in their nefarious plan to waylay the bus and rob its
passengers, considering the fact that the houses of his father and brother are situated in the same barrio where the crime was committed (see
People v. Palamos, 49 Phil., 601). Moreover, the father and/or brother of the accused were available to him at all times to testify in his behalf and
corroborate his alibi that he slept in his house that night. This was not done and plausible explanation given why these corroborative witnesses
were not presented (People v. Pili, 52 Phil., 965)."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful study of the case, we fully agree with the trial court that defendant Eugenio Olaes is guilty. However, it will be remembered that the
charge against him was for attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. Under this charge, as the Solicitor General well said, he may
not be convicted of consummated robbery with homicide as the trial court did. Moreover, we agree with the prosecution that inasmuch as no
overtacts pointing to robbery or even an attempt thereof have been established, the killing of one passenger and the wounding of two others
should be considered as plain murder, frustrated murder, and physical injuries respectively.

The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and in band, there being more than three armed men in the group of
malefactors, attended the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of in band may be considered to qualify the act of killing of
Maria as murder, and the wounding of Elena as frustrated murder. The evidence for the defense was to the effect that appellant surrendered to
the authorities when he found out that he was wanted by the constabulary. This was not refuted by the prosecution and so, it can be regarded as a
fact. This mitigating circumstance will compensate the other aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The penalty for murder which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum degree to death, should therefore be imposed in its medium period, namely reclusion perpetua, so that in the result, we
agree with the trial court as to the penalty imposed by it.

However, we disagree with the lower court as to the reason given by it in imposing the penalty in its medium degree, namely, that "although the
crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and in band, in view of the attitude of the Chief Executive on death penalty",
the accused was sentenced only to life imprisonment. Without attempting, even desiring to ascertain the veracity or trueness of the alleged
attitude of the Chief Executive on the application of the death penalty, the courts of the land will interpret and apply the laws as they find them on
the statute books, regardless of the manner their judgments are executed and implemented by the executive department. By doing so. the courts
will have complied with their solemn duty to administer justice. Until the Legislature sees fit to repeal or modify the imposition of the extreme
penalty, the courts will continue to impose the same when the facts and circumstances in a case warrant.

For the crime of frustrated murder, appellant is hereby sentenced to not less than six (6) years of prision correccional and not more than fourteen
(14) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law.

As to the physical injuries, the evidence shows that the period within which the injuries on the head of Limosnero were treated was less than 30
days, for which reason, the offense as to him should be considered as less serious physical injuries. For this, appellant is hereby sentenced to three
(3) months of arresto mayor.

In view of the foregoing, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 97920. January 20, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENRIQUE RAMIREZ y ANTONIO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Rape is a savage and bestial attack that violates a woman's person in the most grievous and odious way imaginable. This abomination revolts this
Court no end. Perpetrators of this outrage are a depraved and evil who must be brought to the crucible of justice. In the present appeal, the
offender repeatedly ravished and violated his own helpless stepdaughter of tender years. He deserves the severest penalty provided under the
laws at the time of its commission.

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 20 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLIX,2 in Criminal Case No. 89-7180-2-
SCC, finding appellant guilty of rape.

The Complainant3 against appellant reads as follows:

"That on or about the second week of March, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by poking a bladed weapon at her, ordering her to undress and at the same
time threatening to kill her and her family should she resist or report the matter, and thereafter have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant, a girl 13 years of age, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The Complainant was treated as the Information after the City Prosecutor affixed imprimatur thereto. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge.4 After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty of rape beyond unreasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the
Decision5 reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused ENRIQUE RAMIREZ guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, for the crime of
"Rape" defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on the said Accused the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and hereby condemns him to pay to Maribel Soriano the amount of P30,000.00 as and by
way of moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of suit.

The period during which the Accused was detained during the pendency of this case shall be credited to him provided that he agreed in writing to
abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts

According to the Prosecution

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

"Maribel Soriano, a 13 year old lass, naive and unschooled, is the eldest daughter of Angelita De Guzman and Alfredo Soriano. Since July 1975,
Angelita and Alfredo lived together as man and wife, without the benefit of marriage, at Labores Street, Pandacan, Manila. Aside from Maribel,
they had other children: Alfredo, Jr., 10 years old and Mila, the youngest (TSN, September 11, 1989, pp. 10 & 13; pp. 18-19),

As fate would have it, Maribel did not grow up under the constant care and guidance of her mother Angelita. Since the tender age of 2 years, she
has been staying with her paternal grandmother, Juanita Soriano, at Zamora Extension, Pandacan, Manila. Ostensibly, Maribel's mother gave her
up to her mother-in-law, Juanita Soriano, because the latter kept bothering her and her husband, Alfredo (Ibid., pp. 7-8).

As the life story of Maribel unfolds, the four-year relationship of her father and mother was turning sour and was growing worse and worse
everyday. It was the usual case of a daughter-in-law and a mother-in-law fighting for the attention of a husband and son. This animosity was
heightened by the fact that prior to his death, Alfredo was abandoned by Angelita sometime in 1979 to live with another man, herein appellant
Enrique Ramirez. Her reason was simple: Alfredo was a 'Mama's Boy'. She claimed that he did not want to separate from his mother and usually
gave his earnings to his mother, Juanita Soriano (Ibid., pp. 13-14).

The sudden death of Alfredo Soriano on April 22, 1982 however did not improve the relationship between his wife Angelita de Guzman and his
mother, Juanita Soriano. As a matter of fact, the demise of Alfredo Soriano, exacerbated the ongoing feud between his mother and his wife.

In any event, Angelita de Guzman cohabited with appellant Enrique Ramirez, a casual laborer and a member of the notorious Sigue-Sigue
Commando Gang (Ibid., pp. 6 & 12). At that time, appellant Ramirez was already separated from his lawful wife, Christine Somera, by whom he had
a child (TSN, September 21, 1989, pp. 33-35).

Since 1979, appellant Ramirez and Angelita de Guzman stayed and lived in a one-room shanty, a place one can hardly. call a house, in a squatter's
area in Tondo, Manila. As described by Maribel Soriano, the one-storey room has two windows: one facing the street across which was the house
of Ate Laki, and the other window facing the river (TSN, July 12, 1994, p. 6; see also TSN, August 2, 1994, pp. 27 & 43).

In December 1988, when Maribel turned 13 years of age, her mother Angelita fetched Maribel from the house of her mother-in-law, Juanita
Soriano, Maribel's paternal grand- mother. Angelita took Maribel to spend vacation in her house in Tondo, Manila where Angelita resides with her
live-in partner, Enrique Ramirez, appellant herein. After the Christmas season, Maribel went back to her paternal grandmother's house in Pandacan
(TSN, September 11, 1989, pp. 15-23).

xxx xxx xxx

By then, appellant Ramirez and Angelita de Guzman already had four (4) children namely: Enrique, Jr. (Botchoy), 8 years old; Erwin, 6 years old,
Erlinda (Inday), 4 years old and Nio, about 2 to 3 years old. Appellant was then working as a casual laborer for his brother, Rudy Ramirez, in the
latter's construction work along Pavia Street, Tondo, Manila, only about 3 alleys away from the house of appellant Ramirez at Fajardo Street, Tondo
(ibid., p. 43-B). Because of the proximity of the house from his place of work, appellant was allowed by his brother to eat his lunch at home and to
have some days-off. On the other hand, Angelita de Guzman who finished Grade 6 only, earned a living by selling pails, pans and basins, traveling as
far as Marikina and Montalban, from. 8 o'clock in the morning up to 5 o'clock in the afternoon.6

The offended party was violated several times by appellant during that holiday season as follows:

"One day, shortly before Christmas, in 1988, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the Accused arrived home. Angelita de Guzman was not in their
house at the time. Maribel Soriano and the Accused, and the latter's four (4) children were inside the house at the time. The Accused ordered his
children to leave the house and, once the children were out of the house, the Accused closed the door and the windows of the house, took out his
'29 balisong' and poked the same to Maribel Soriano. The Accused, thereupon, ordered Maribel Soriano to undress. Afraid of her life, Maribel
Soriano did as ordered. The Accused also ordered Maricel Soriano to lie down on the floor, she did. The Accused, thereupon, went on top of
Maribel Soriano, kissed her on her cheeks and lips and mashed her breast to boot. The Accused warned Maribel Soriano not to tell the police
authorities and her mother about the incident otherwise he will kill all of them. The Accused, thereafter, inserted his private organ into her
privated (sic) parts and had sexual intercourse with Maribel Soriano. After the Accused was through he then dressed up. The Accused warned
Maribel Soriano anew not to reveal the incident to the police authorities and her mother. Since then, almost everyday the Accused had sexual
intercourse with Maribel Soriano (Exhibits 'E' and 'E-1"). After New Year, Juanita Soriano took Maribel Soriano to her house where Maribel Soriano
stayed until March 15, 1989, when Angelita de Guzman took Maribel Soriano anew because she wanted Maribel Soriano to study. Maribel Soriano
did not divulge to her grandmother what the Accused did to her."7

Subsequently, the appellant again took advantage of and raped the offended party as follows:

"In the second week of March 1989, at about 3:45 p.m., Maribel was in appellant's house in Tondo together with Alfredo, Jr., her 10 year old
brother and her stepbrothers, stepsister and her stepfather, appellant Ramirez. At that time, her mother Angelita de Guzman, was out selling her
wares (TSN, July 12, 1989, pp. 3 and 5; see also TSN, August 8, 1989, p. 27).

Appellant then ordered the children to look for Botchoy, his eldest son, saying in the vernacular: 'Labas kayo, hanapin si Botchoy.' (TSN, July 12,
1989, p. 10) Upon hearing appellant telling the other children to look for Botchoy, Maribel volunteered to help look for the latter. However,
appellant told her to stay put, so it was only Maribel's younger stepsister Inday and her stepbrother Erwin who searched for Botchoy, who was
reportedly watching TV in the house of another relative somewhere within the vicinity (TSN, August 2, 1989, pp. 29- 32).

Maribel, who was wearing a white T-shirt and a maong shorts, was then seated on the floor near the window while appellant in brown-colored
shorts was lying on the floor (TSN, July 12, 1989, p. 9). As soon- as the children left the shanty, appellant Ramirez closed the door and locked it. He
also closed the window facing outside house (TSN, August 2, 1989, p. 39 & pp. 42-43). A few minutes later, Maribel saw appellant already naked.
With a fan knife ('veinte nueve' balisong) in his right hand poked at the right chest of Maribel, appellant ordered her to undress. Appellant Ramirez
then started kissing Maribel and afterwards got on top of her and ravished her on the floor of the shanty (TSN, August 2, 1989, pp. 2-8). It was at
this point when Maribel saw her brother pretending to be asleep (Ibid., p. 29; see also TSN, July 12, 1989, p. 7 and TSN, September 21, 1989, p. 61).

He warned Maribel not to complain to the police because he would kill her and her family. After consummating his lustful desires on Maribel and
reiterating his threat, appellant stepped out of the shanty. Likewise, Maribel went out of the house to fetch water and afterwards cooked rice for
dinner (TSN, AUGUST 2, 1989, pp. 8-10).

When Maribel got out of the shanty, she was approached by a female neighbor, Ate Laki. Ate Laki whispered to Maribel that through a hole on the
wall of the shanty, she (Ate Laki ) saw the appellant on top of Maribel. This notwithstanding, Maribel just kept her mouth shut (TSN, August 99,
1989, pp. 7-9).

The following morning, Maribel approached her mother, Angelita, to report the dastardly act of appellant Ramirez. She was with Alfredo, Jr. who
told their mother, thus: 'Nanay, akala mo sina Ate nakita ko nagpapatungan ' Instead of getting mad at her common-law-husband, Angelita
surprisingly slapped Maribel and defended appellant (TSN, September 21, 1989, pp. 50 & 61).

Angered by their mother's reaction, Maribel and her younger brother Alfredo Soriano, Jr. decided to go to the police station, with the help of a man
and a woman, both unidentified. however, they got lost along the way.

Subsequently thereafter, Maribel finally found her way to the police station, this time with her paternal grandmother, Juanita Soriano (TSN, August
9, 1989, pp. 9-10). In the Police Station, she narrated her sexual ordeal with her stepfather, appellant Ramirez, to police investigator Pat. Rodolfo
Estrebel. After a lengthy investigation, she was asked to sign her sworn statement (Exh. 'E') assisted by her grandmother, Juanita Soriano.
Afterwards, she was also asked to sign the Complaint with Criminal Case No. 89-71802 for Rape (Exh. 'F') against Enrique Ramirez y Antonio.

On March 15, 1989 Maribel was examined at the NBI by Dr. Valentin Bemales, Medico-Legal Officer. Dr. Bernales thereafter summarized his
findings in his Report Living Case No. MG-89-185 (Exh. 'A') 8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 21, 1989, police from the Western Police Department went to the house of the appellant to invite the latter for questioning. They were
met instead by Angelita de Guzman who fetched her common-law husband, appellant Ramirez, from the construction site where he was working.
As soon as the appellant arrived, the policemen then asked him to go with them to the police station for investigation. At the police station, he was
properly identified by Maribel Soriano as the person who sexually abused her. On Basis of a 'Booking. Sheet and Arrest Report' (Exh. 'B') which,
together with an endorsement letter (Exh. 'D') of Capt. Cresencio Cabasal, was forwarded to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings."

The findings of Dr. Valentin Bernales as stated in his report9 are as follows:

"GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMlNATION:

Height: 138 0 cms. Weight: 36.8 kgs.

Normally developed, fairly developed, conscious, coherent, cooperative ambulatory subject.

Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light brown, 2.5 cm. in diameter. Nipples, light brown, slightly protruding, 0.3 cm. in diameter.

No extragenital physical injury noted.

GENITAL EXAMlNATION:

Pubic hairs, fully grown, scanty. Labia Majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibule, pinkish. Hymen, originally annular, tall,
thick, with an old-healed complete laceration at 2:00 o'clock position corresponding to the face of a watch, edges of which are rounded, non-
coaptable, base, retracted. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube, 2.8 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, moderately tight. Rugosities, moderately prominent.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.

2. old-healed Hymenal laceration present."

Version of the Defense

In the main, the defense is one of denial and alibi. The defense's version is as follows:

"Evidence for the defense shows that during the month of March 1989, accused-appellant was employed as a construction worker at Pavia, Tondo.
During the said month he left home before 8:00 o'clock A.M. daily and returned home at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, Angelita
de Guzman, Maribel's mother, was always at home as it was her schedule when accused-appellant was working. She went out to sell her wares
only when appellant stayed home. Under this set-up, it was quite impossible for the alleged rape upon Maribel to have ever taken place.

Enrique Ramirez denied having anything to do with the raping of Maribel, whom he treated as his very own daughter. There was ill motive on the
part of Juanita Soriano and Maribel Soriano in filing the rape charge. Juanita nurtured a long standing grudge against Angelita de Guzman and the
accused-appellant as Angelita left (Alfredo) Soriano, (Sr.) and preferred to live-in with Enrique Ramirez, Maribel likewise harbored ill-feelings
towards appellant and filed the rape case in retaliation for appellant's having hit her on the head when she failed to return home when she was
sent on an errand. Maribel's defloration should rather be attributed to the well known fact that she is a flirt as per the admission of her close
relatives and she usually spent her idle time outside the house and at a beer garden in the neighborhood." 10
The Error Assigned

Appellant posits the sole error that allegedly:

"The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt."11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As the Court sees it, the crux of this case is the credibility of Maribel Soriano's testimony and the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution's total
evidence.

The appellant based his assigned error on the following arguments: 1. " x x x. (t)he prosecution's failure to present (Alfredo) Soriano, Jr. and Ate
Laki as witnesses during the trial, when both allegedly were eyewitnesses to the supposed sexual assault committed upon Maribel Soriano. by
herein appellant, gives raise to the presumption that the testimonies of these two persons were evidently suppressed as these would be damaging
to the complainant's case. x x x" 12 (2.) the "(e)xistence of ill-motive on the part of complainant's paternal grandmother, Juanita Soriano was amply
shown by defense evidence which remains unrebutted. Juanita merely utilized her grandchild Maribel, who likewise resented the appellant, in
order to exact vengeance from the appellant and Angelita de Guzman." 13 and (3.) "x x x (i)n the instant case, as the evidence of the prosecution is
not sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, he must therefore be acquitted." 14

The Court's Ruling

Credibility of the Witness

In deciding this appeal, the Court notes certain guiding principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit:

"(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove the charge;

(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should
be scrutinized with great caution; and

(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense."15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The general rule in assessing credibility of. witnesses is well-settled: "the trial court's evaluation as to the credibility of witnesses is viewed as
correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses'
demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if
such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be
respected." 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After a thorough scrutiny of this case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the court a quo giving full credence to the testimony of Maribel
Soriano and convicting accused-appellant Enrique Ramirez of rape. We reiterate that, "when an alleged victim of rape says that she was violated,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof." 17

In this case, Maribel Soriano was unequivocal and unswerving in charging the accused-appellant with rape. Her account of the rape was
straightforward, detailed, consistent on all material points and convincing both in her sworn statement and. testimony. The relevant portion of her
sworn statement18 is as follows:

"07 T: Bakit ka naman naririto sa aming opisina at nagbibigay ng salaysay:

S: Irereklamo ko po iyong step father ko dahil ni-rape po niya ako.

08 T Kailan ka ni-rape ng step father mo kung natatandaan mo, anong oras at saang lugar?

S: Marami na pong beses niya akong ni-rape, pero ang natatandaan ko, and. huli niyang ginawa sa akin ay nuong nakaraan pong linggo, Huwebes
po,.Ito lang pong Marso 1989, duon niya ako ni-rape sa bahay namin 'sa Tondo sa squatters area, sa Dalerena St., Fajardo, Tondo, Manila,
kadalasan kung gahasain po ako ng step father ko ay tanghali at gabi kung wala po ang nanay ko sa amin at nanonood po ng T.V. sa kapitbahay.

09 T Isalaysay mo nga sa akin kung papaano ka nire-rape ng iyong step father?

S Ano po iyon, nuong isang taon po iyon nuong, hindi ko na matandaan and petsa pero magpapasko po nuon ng una niya akong nirape, dumating
po.ang step father ko bandang ala-una ng tanghali, tapos pinalabas po niya yung mga bata sa loob ng bahay namin at sinarado niya yung pintuan ng
bahay namin at bintana ng bahay namin, tapos po ay inilabas niya iyong beinte nueve niya (balisong at tinutukan niya ako, at sabi niya ay huwag
daw po akong magsusumbong sa nanay ko at sa pulis, kundi ay papatayin niya kaming lahat. Tapos po ay pinaghubad niya po ako n g damit ko at
panty at naghubad din po siya at pinahiga niya ako sa sahig at pinatungan niya ako. x x x (graphical description of act of rape omitted) at pinagbihis
na niya ako ng damit at pinagbantaan niya akong muli na papatayin daw niya kaming lahat pag nagsumbong ako sa Nanay ko at sa mga Pulis. At
simula nuon ay halos araw araw ay nire-rape niya ako, at ang huli nga po ay nuong nakaraang linggo po nitong Marso 1989, at dahil hindi ko na po
matiis and ginagawa 'niya sa akin ay tumakas po ako sa amin at nagsumbong na po ako sa Pulis, tapos po ay pumunta po ako sa Lola ko at
ipinagtapat ko ang ginagawa sa akin ng step-father.

ko."

10 T: Iligid mo nga ang iyong mga paningin.sa loob' ng opisinang ito, narinto ba ang taong iyong sinasabing nang-rape sa iyo ng maraming beses?

S: Nandito po siya, ayan po ang step-father ko. (Declarant pointing to the person of ENRIQUE RAMIREZ y ANTONIO, 34 years old, laborer x x x)"
The salient portion of her testimony is as follows:

"FISCAL FORMOSO: Where were you on the second week of March, 1989?

WITNESS: I was in the house, sir. 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL FORMOSO: While there on that time and date, was there any usual incident that took place.

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: And what was that?

WITNESS: Ni raped po ako.

FISCAL FORMOSO: Who raped you?

WITNESS: That person there, sir.

INTERPRETER: The witness pointed to a person, when asked of his name he stated Enrique Ramirez.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL FORMOSO: How was the accused able to do this rape against you?

WITNESS He kissed me and then he laid on top of me, sir. 20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL FORMOSO: Before the accused laid on top of your (sic), did he ever utter any word?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: What were those?.

WITNESS: He told me not to complain to the police because if I will do so, he will kill me and all of us, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: When he uttered those words, was he holding anything?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: What was that?

WITNESS: He was holding a viente nueve, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: How big is that knife?

WITNESS: About four inches in length, sir.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL FORMOSO: And what did you do after you were asked to remove your clothing and while the knife was being poked in your neck?

WITNESS: He lay on top of me, sir. 'Pinatungan niya ako.'

FISCAL FORMOSO: You stated that you were asked by the accused to remove your clothes. What did you do? Were you able to remove your
clothes?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: What else did you remove after removing your clothes?

WITNESS: My panty, sir.

FlSCAL FORMOSO: After removing your panty, what did you do after that?

WITNESS: He lay on top of me, sir

FISCAL FORMOSO: What exactly in the place did he lie on top of you? Was it on,the bed, on the floor or what?

WITNESS: It was on the floor, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO: When the accused lay on top of you, what did he do after that?

WITNESS: 'Pinasok niya ang ari', sir. He inserted his organ. and after that he made a movement, sir.

INTERPRETER: Witness is demonstrating by moving her buttocks forward, backward.

FISCAL FORMOSO: You stated that the accused there inserted his sex organ Where did he insert that?

WITNESS: He inserted that sex organ in my private part, sir.x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL FORMOSO: And what did you (feel) while the accused here inserted his sex organ in your sex organ at the same time swinging his body
forward and backward?

WITNESS: I felt pain, sir. 'Masakit po'.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL FORMOSO: Did you notice anything in your sex. organ or on your thighs?

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS: A white substance, sir, I just do not know what was that."22

We deem it highly unlikely that Maribel "x x x with all her childhood naivet and innocence would make up stories against appellant x x x"23 And
"considering that the victim was of tender years and not exposed to the ways of the world, it is most improbable that she would impute a crime as
serious as rape to any man if it were not true."24 It is a truism that "no woman especially one who is of tender age would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely
by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished."25

Furthermore; even appellant's own testimony shows that Maribel was just an innocent child who could not have been capable of weaving such an
intricate web of deceit as the one the appellant would have this Court believe she did:

"WITNESS: "My wife and I, Your Honor, we have been talking about Maribel and my wife told me also to extend patience to this Maribel because
this Maribel has a thinking of the child 'isip bata' x x x "26

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

In fine, this Court finds that Maribel's testimony is replete with spontaneity and directness so overwhelming as to be impervious to a mere denial
by the accused. "It is a well settled, rule that an affirmative testimony is far stronger than, a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from
the, mouth of a credible witness x x x"27

Accused-appellant argues that the non-presentation of Alfredo Soriano Jr. and Ate Laki signifies a willful suppression of their testimonies as the
same would have been adverse presented in court. We are not persuaded. Their additional testimonies are not needed because "(t)ruth is
established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies"28 and "the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape if
credible is sufficient to sustain a conviction."29 It is axiomatic that "witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered."30 For "after all, there is no law
which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except when the law so expressly requires."31 The pronouncement of
this Court in People vs. Martinez through Mr. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa aptly elucidates on this point:

"Over the years, certain principles have been laid down in decisions involving the analysis and assessment of evidence in cases of rape; and, having
been so often invoked and applied, have become so familiar and prosaic as to seem platitudinous. Such propositions as that rape is not normally
perpetrated in the presence of third persons; hence, in prosecutions therefor, the only evidence, against the accused is usually the testimony of the
offended woman herself, her sole testimony being sufficient for conviction if it rings true and is otherwise credible x x x "32

No False Accusation of Rape

The allegation of appellant Ramirez that the complaint against him was false and made only because complainant Maribel Soriano was instigated
and used by her paternal grandmother Juanita Soriano as an instrument of revenge against Ramirez is bereft of merit. The Court observes that
Maribel was raised and cared for by her grandmother Juanita Soriano from infancy to her early teens and was therefore a "grandma's girl."
Naturally, it is only to be expected that Juanita would have for her grandchild Maribel all the love and protectiveness of a true parent. Hence, it
would be very unlikely for Juanita to subject Maribel to the indignities of executing her sworn statement at the police station before a male police
officer, examination of her private parts by a male doctor at the National Bureau of Investigation and the embarrassment of having to answer very
personal and embarrassing questions at a public trial, all just to spite Ramirez. Thus, this allegation of the appellant is disregarded by the Court. We
have held that "(i)t is unnatural for a parent to use her off spring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment
and even stigma. No mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter the physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution
just to assuage her own hurt feelings."33

Based on the foregoing discussion, our conscience rests easy upon the moral certainty that accused-appellant Enrique Ramirez is indeed guilty of
rape.

Moral and Exemplary Damages

The trial court correctly awarded moral and exemplary damages to the victim. An award of moral damages for rape is mandated by Art. 2219 in
relation to Art. 2217 both of the Civil Code. We appreciate the presence of alternative or aggravating circumstance of relationship in this case, as
"the relationship of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to that of ascendant and descendant."
34 Thus, the award of exemplary damages is likewise proper.35 Moreover, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, apart from moral and
exemplary damages, should have been awarded by the trial court.36

One last point. The evidence points to several counts of rape committed by the accused against his stepdaughter. However, we could not impose
multiple penalties because the Complaint charged, only one count. In the future, prosecutors and the police are enjoined to file as many
complaints/information as the evidence in their hands may warrant so that as many separate penalties could be imposed by courts.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Enriquez Ramirez y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own stepdaughter Maribel Soriano and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that he shall indemnify the victim in the amount of eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) broken down
as follows: fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity; plus thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 46973, November 19, 1940 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SLLVERIO MORADOS ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION
LAUREL, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, sentencing the defendants-appellants, Silverio Morados, Felipe Moral,
and Benjamin Mendoza, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Lucio Enriquez in the sum of
P2,000 and F100 each to Rufino Aro and Ceferino Ricasata, as indemnity for the time in which the latter two were not able to engage in their
customary work, and to pay three-fourths of the costs.

On the night of March 15,1939, while Ceferino Ricasata, Rufino Aro and Lucio Enriquez were sleeping in the tetter's hut in the sitio of Pasong Tabla,
barrio of Bagbag, municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, a place where they had been treshing palay, several malefactors suddenly assaulted
them. Ricasata who was awakened by the blows being inflicted upon his companions, tried to flee from the hut, but his dash for salvage was
frustrated when hardly had he gone out the hut one of the ruffians shot him hitting him in the right thigh as a result of which he fell at a certain
distance from the hut. His companions were beaten to unconsciousness.

The following is a reproduction of the medico-legal report regarding the injuries sustained by the victims:
"Lucio Enriquez suffered the multiple injuries stated in the medico-legal necropsy report, Exhibit A, and died the following day of 'meningeal
hemorrhage secondary to fracture of the skull as a result of external violence' (see Exhibit E, p. 67, rec). Said injuries were caused by a solid blunt
instrument, according to the opinion of Dr. Rosalino Reyes, who performed the autopsy (p. 3, t. s. n., first set).

"Ceferino Ricasata sustained the following: 'wound, gunshot, multiple, thigh, right and glands penis; foreign body, lead shot, thigh and penis,
secondary' (see Exhibit F, p. 68 rec). He stayed for about one month in the hospital (p. 13, t. s. n. second set).

"Likewise Rufino Aro suffered multiple injuries, to wit: 'wound, lacerated, eyebrow, left, lips, upper and lower; fracture, multiple, jaw, lower;
contusion, severe with hematoma, molar, left; X-ray-fractures lower jaw (see Exhibit G, p. 69, rec). He stayed in the hospital for about one month
(p. 6, t. s. n., second set)."
The evidence shows that through an agreement made betwee them, Felipe Moral who had a paltik (a homemade gun) and a flashlight, together
with Silverio Morados, were to go to the hut to watch the inmates, while Benjamin Mendoza who had also a paltik and Florentino de los Reyes
were to take away the carabaos (pp. 2-8, 12, 22-24, t s. n., first set). They all did their part of this agreement: Morados and Moral effected their
entrance into the hut, inflicting injuries upon Aro and killing Enriquez. While De los Reyes and Mendoza were untying the carabaos, the former
heard the scream: "Naku agawin ang buhay ko!" (Oh! save my life!), which was interrupted by a pistol shot. Fearing that the shot might summon
help, the malefactors escape without taking the carabaos, although one of them had already been untied. The motive for the killing was robbery of
the four carabaos which were tied near the hut, three of which belonged to the deceased (Lucio Enriquez), and the fourth, to one Turi. Because the
principal witness for the prosecution, Floretino de los Reyes, was one of the authors of the daring assault, we have not neglected to scrutinize his
testimony. We find his version, however, corroborated by Catalino Amis who was the driver of the carretela hired by the herein accused that
brought them to the barrio of Zambal (Noveleta, Cavite) where they alighted and proceeded to the place of the occurrence. It also appears that the
herein appellants confessed their participation in the commission of the offense to Major Gaspar Baylon, provincial commander of Cavite, and
Lieutenant Alcantara. Furthermore, Mendoza took Moral's flashlight, Exhibit C, from his (Mendoza's) house and stated that it was the one used in
the commission of the crime (p. 35, t. s. n., first set). Counsel for the defense challenges the version given by De los Reyes, but we are of the
opinion that the trial court did not err in giving due weight to his testimony.

The respective defense interposed by the accused converge into one of alibi, but "oral evidence of alibi is so easily manufactured and usually so
unreliable that it can rarely be given credence." (People vs. Badilla et al., 48 Phil., 718).

Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is
committed the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the
homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code."

It is argued that Benjamin Mendoza did not enter the hut and did not take part in the assault, and he should only have been found guilty of
attempted theft of large cattle. This contention is without merit. In U. S. vs. Landasan et al. (35 Phil., 359, 369), we observed that "neither the
divisibility of this crime (robbery with homicide) into two crimes, nor the divisibility of the liability of the criminals who took part is allowable." And
in U. S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil., 1, and People vs. Bautista, 49 Phil., 389, 396, we held that "whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide." It has not been shown that Mendoza endeavored to prevent the homicide.

The Solicitor-General recommends the imposition of death penalty in view of the fact that the filing of Lucio Enriquez was qualified by treachery
and attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling. For lack of unanimity, however, the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in all respects, with costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-10398. June 30, 1960.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, v. ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON, MELCHOR LAO and RICARDO SERRANO,
Defendants. ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON and RICARDO SERRANO, defendants and appellants.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Adriano Dagundong, Melchor Lao, Federico Bulaon, Ricardo Serrano and Joseph Ebrada were charged with
the crime of frustrated robbery in band with homicide. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the court ordered Ebrada discharged from the
information in order that he could be utilized as a state witness.

After due trial with respect to the rest of the accused, the court found all the defendants, except Dagundong, guilty of frustrated robbery with
homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior strength, and commission of the crime with the aid of a motor
vehicle, without any mitigating circumstance, and sentenced each of the three defendants, Melchor Lao, Federico Bulaon and Ricardo Serrano to
reclusión perpetua; found Adriano Dagundong guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, in band,
abuse of superior strength and commission of the offense with the aid of a motor vehicle, without any mitigating circumstance, and sentenced him
to death; and also sentenced all of the four accused to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Mamey Lake Hewell in the amount of
P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the accessories of law, and to pay the costs.

All four accused appealed, but Melchor Lao subsequently withdrew his appeal. So, this is with respect only to the appeal of accused Adriano
Dagundong, Ricardo Serrano and Federico Bulaon.

The following facts are not in dispute: On October 7, 1950, Alice Lake, more popularly known as movie actress Anita Linda, lived at No. 13 Pasong
Tamo, Makati, Rizal, together with her son, her sister Mrs. Mamey Lake Hewell, and the latter’s children, Josephine, Patricia, Johnny and Helen. At
about 7 p.m. of said date, Alice, who was then in her bedroom, requested her niece Josephine, then 12 years old, to get her a glass of milk from the
kitchen. As Josephine entered the kitchen, she suddenly came face to face with a man holding a gun. This gunman was small in stature, fairly built
and was wearing a checkered shirt with long sleeves, dark colored pants, gloves and army shoes. On his head he had a balangot hat, and over his
face a black mask with two holes for the eyes. Instinctively, Josephine screamed. The gunman told her to keep silent and to return to the sala. With
the gun held against her back, the gunman followed her into the sala, where they found Patricia. The gunman motioned Patricia to come nearer to
Josephine.

At this time, Alice and her sister, Mrs. Hewell, startled by Josephine’s scream, rushed out of the their respective bedrooms. When they reached the
sala they came upon Josephine and Patricia, and the gunman who had his gun stuck at Josephine’s back. As Mrs. Hewell knelt before the gunman
and pleaded for her daughters, saying: "Maawa po kayo, huwag po", Patricia and Josephine ran to their aunt Alice. Without compunction, the
gunman levelled his gun straight at Mrs. Hewell’s face.

Meanwhile, Alice, together with her nieces, had fled into her bedroom. Shortly thereafter, several shots, not less than five, were heard coming
from the sala. Alice and the children screamed. Alice wanted to go out to help her sister, but the two girls prevented her by locking the bedroom
door. A moment later, they heard someone knock on and then kick the door to Alice’s bedroom. Then complete silence. After some minutes, Alice
heard the noise of a jeep moving away and going towards Sta. Ana. Feeling certain that the malefactors had left for good, Alice shouted for help.
Her outcries were heard by the driver of a passing taxicab, who lost no time in bringing the Makati police to the scene.

Upon entering the sala, the police came upon Mrs. Hewell’s bullet-ridden body lying on the floor. In the course of their investigation, the policemen
came across three .45 caliber empty shells about a meter from where Mrs. Hewell lay, and four other empty shells outside the premises. They also
discovered five slugs, three of which were extracted from the wall leading to Alice’s bedroom, and about two meters from Mrs. Hewell’s feet, and
the remaining two from the wooden cabinet which stood between the doors leading to the sala and the kitchen. On entering Mrs. Hewell’s
bedroom, the police found that it had been ransacked. After the removal of Mrs. Hewell’s corpse, Alice went into her sister’s bedroom and found it
in the same condition as the policemen had found it, but she did not notice anything missing therefrom.

According to Dr. Enrique de los Santos, Chief, NBI, Medico Legal Division, who performed the necropsy on the body of Mrs. Hewell, she sustained 5
penetrating gunshot wounds, three of which were located on the right and left chest, and the other two on the back; that said wounds were
produced by .45 caliber bullets; that the bullets hit the liver, lungs, and pancreas of the deceased; and that death was due to shock. The
prosecution established by means of the testimony of Joseph Ebrada, one of the original accused but who was discharged in order to be a
prosecution witness, that: On October 5, 1950, Melchor Lao went to see Ebrada in his place in Cavite, in order to borrow the jeep which Ebrada had
in turn borrowed from a certain Terio Manimbao of Malagasang, Imus, Cavite. The jeep bore a PI plate number. At Lao’s invitation, Ebrada went
with him. They were then joined by appellants Dagundong and Serrano in going to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal. There, Lao and
appellants Serrano and Dagundong visited Pablo Rabaton, an inmate. After thirty minutes they left and proceeded to Makati, Rizal. Along the way,
appellant Dagundong stated that they must raise money with which to bail out Rabaton, and if necessary to commit robbery in order to do so.
Ebrada, Lao and appellant Serrano agreed to this proposal.

At about 7 in the evening of October 7, 1950, Lao went to see Ebrada in his house in Guadalupe, Makati, Rizal, in order to borrow again the jeep. At
Lao’s behest, Ebrada drove the jeep to Olympia. There they picked up appellants Bulaon, Dagundong and Serrano. The jeep then proceeded to
Buendia, Makati, Rizal. The jeep stopped some distance from the house of Alice Lake. Leaving Lao in the jeep, appellants and Ebrada, all of them
armed, alighted and walked along the creek up to the stone wall behind the house. They then stepped over the wall which was about two feet
high. Once inside the premises, appellant Dagundong instructed Ebrada to stand guard near the window on the left side of the house, and
appellant Serrano on the right side. Dagundong and Bulaon then entered the house through the kitchen. After two minutes, Ebrada heard a shot
coming from the house, whereupon, a .45 caliber pistol in hand, he rushed inside, passing through the kitchen door. Upon reaching the sala, he saw
a woman sprawled on the floor. Dagundong and Bulaon came out of the room adjoining the sala. The former was holding a .45 caliber army pistol.
In order to stop the screaming of the two little girls, Ebrada fired twice at the wall. Immediately after, Ebrada and his companions ran towards the
waiting jeep and fled from the scene. On the way to Olympia, the three appellants got off. The jeep proceeded to Cavite City where Lao dropped
off Ebrada then drove to Malagasang, and upon arrival there returned the jeep to its owner.

Rejection of Ebrada’s testimony is urged upon us by appellants on three grounds, to wit: (1) he had been improperly discharged from the
information; (2) his testimony comes from a polluted source; and (3) he incurred many inconsistencies.
Appellants Serrano and Bulaon claim that Ebrada’s discharge violates the provisions of Section 9, Rule 115, Rules of Court, more particularly
paragraph 5 thereof, because Ebrada has twice been convicted of robbery. Whether or not he was improperly discharged is of no moment in
determining his credibility. The provisions of Section 9, Rule 115, Rules of Court, are aimed at preventing the unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion
from the information of persons guilty of the crime charged, but it has no bearing on the admissibility of their testimony or their competency as
witnesses (People v. Castañeda, 63 Phil., 480). The rule merely lays down the requisites which should control the court in the exercise of its
discretion in discharging accused persons in order that they may be used as witnesses against their co-accused, so we must search elsewhere for
the rules governing the competency, admissibility, relevancy and probative value of the testimony of these witnesses when it is offered in
evidence, after they have been discharged by the court to become prosecution witnesses. (U. S. v. Abanzado, 37 Phil., 658).

To a large extent, identification of the culprits depended on Ebrada. Appellants maintain that because he is confessedly one of the perpetrators of
the crime, he does not merit credence. Having come from a polluted source, his testimony, naturally, was subject to the gravest suspicion, but a
meticulous review of the evidence convinced us of Ebrada’s reliability.

Before the filing of the criminal information, Ebrada had executed a sworn written statement before Lt. Ver and in the presence of Provincial Fiscal
Nicanor Nicolas, wherein he admitted his complicity in the crime and he named the three appellants herein and also Melchor Lao as his
companions in the commission thereof (Exhibit L). Lao also made a verified statement on the same date and before the same officials, wherein he
likewise admitted his participation in the robbery (Exhibit K). Ebrada’s testimony in court was but a more detailed reiteration of what he stated in
his sworn statement. His testimony finds corroboration in Lao’s statement which relates a version of the crime similar to that narrated by Ebrada.

It is alleged, however, that Lao’s extrajudicial confession is admissible only against himself but not against appellants herein. The rule is that a
statement made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirators after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such statement (Section 12, Rule 123, Rules of Court). As to the existence of the conspiracy, we have
Ebrada’s testimony that two days prior to the commission of the crime, he, Lao and appellants Dagundong and Serrano agreed on committing the
robbery and that on the very day thereof, the four of them, joined this time by appellant Bulaon, carried into execution their criminal plot. The
conspiracy having been proven, Exhibit K is therefore admissible in evidence even as against appellants.

No ill motive on Ebrada’s part has been adduced to prove that he had testified falsely against appellants. Furthermore, his testimony bears the
earmarks of truth in that it is replete with details which could have been known only to one who was actually present during the commission of the
crime. He knew the description of the malefactor who was first in entering the victim’s house, the very gunman who had intimidated Josephine
Hewell, Patricia Hewell and Alice Lake, and had aimed his gun at Mrs. Hewell’s face. According to Ebrada, said gunman was a little over 5 feet, 2
inches tall and fairly built; and that he had a black mask covering his face, a balangot hat on his head and wore fatigue pants and army shoes. This
description tallies perfectly with that given by Alice Lake and Josephine Hewell, both of whom had seen the gunman at close range, and therefore
were in a position to remember his appearance. Alice Lake, however, had added that the gunman also wore a long sleeved shirt and on his hands
he had gloves, while Josephine Hewel had specified that the gunman wore a checkered shirt with long sleeves. The height and build of the gunman,
as described by Alice Lake and her niece, coincides with that of appellant Dagundong, so there can be no doubt as to the veracity of Ebrada’s
statement that he was the gunman who had first entered the victim’s house.

Ebrada testified that right after he heard the sound of the first shot coming from the house he rushed into the sala; and that he then fired two
shots directed at the wall in order to stop the screaming of the girls. Proof of this is that in the course of their investigation, the Makati police found
in the sala of the victim’s house, five slugs, three of which were embedded on the wall leading to Alice Lake’s bedroom.

Mrs. Hewell’s fatal wounds were produced by .45 caliber bullets. According to Ebrada, Dagundong was armed with a .45 caliber army pistol; and
that after they left the house of Alice Lake and while they were on their way back to Olympia, appellant Dagundong handed his pistol to Lao and
ordered him to dispose of it. This was confirmed by Lao in his statement (Exhibit K). As a matter of fact, Lao was charged with illegal possession of
firearms for having been caught with the very same pistol in his possession (Exhibits J and J-1).

The alleged inconsistencies in Ebrada’s testimony are merely superficial. It is true, as alleged by appellants, that he did not know about the plan to
commit robbery in the house of Alice Lake. He knew that they were going to commit robbery, but at the time appellant Dagundong first apprised
him of the criminal plan, the intended victim was not specified.

Appellant Dagundong’s counsel appears confused as to the time and day that Lao borrowed Manimbao’s jeep from Ebrada. This may be due to the
fact that Lao borrowed the jeep twice, once, in the afternoon of October 5, 1950, in order to go to the national penitentiary in Muntinglupa; and
the second time, in the evening of October 7, 1950, when they used the same jeep in committing the crime. Eleuterio Manimbao, owner of the
jeep, testified that when the crime was committed, his jeep was in Ebrada’s possession, having been borrowed by the latter.

Appellants argue that Ebrada committed an inconsistency when he declared that he heard one shot, when the fact was that there was more than
one shot fired. What Ebrada stated was that upon hearing the first shot, he immediately ran inside the house. The succeeding shots were fired
while he was running towards the sala, passing through the kitchen.

Another contention of appellants is that there is a contradiction between the testimony of Ebrada and that of Alice Lake respecting the time the
crime was committed. We do not find such a discrepancy in their statements as would inescapably lead to the conclusion that either was lying. In
fact they corroborate each other that the crime must have taken place between 7 and 8 in the evening of October 7, 1950.

The lower court which had the chance of observing Ebrada’s deportment on the witness stand, after a painstaking scrutiny of his testimony, arrived
at the conclusion that he deserved credence. We find no ground for reversing it findings.

Appellant Dagundong brands as incredible Alice Lake’s statement that after she and her nieces had locked themselves in Alice’s room, somebody
knocked on and then kicked the door. We find nothing unbelievable in this. One of the malefactors wanted to enter Alice’s bedroom and ransack it
for valuables (as was done in Mrs. Hewell’s bedroom), and upon finding it locked expressed his frustration by kicking the door. Contrary to
appellant Dagundong’s claim, Alice Lake was positive that there was more than one culprit. She saw only one of the malefactors but she heard
outside her window the voices of the other robbers.

Attempt was made by appellants to show that Ebrada and Lao agreed to admit their guilt and incriminate appellants by making their respective
statements, so they can claim the monetary reward allegedly offered by Alice Lake. But there is not a shred of evidence proving that Alice Lake had
offered a reward to anybody. She denied having put up a reward, or even of talking with either Ebrada or Lao. It was not shown that such offer of
reward appeared in the newspapers. Besides, if Ebrada and Lao just wanted to collect such alleged reward, all they had to do was to confess to the
crime, without need of implicating appellants.
In view of the strong evidence establishing appellants’ complicity, their respective alibis must necessarily be rejected as vain attempts calculated to
evade criminal responsibility. The defense sought to prove that from the middle of September to about a week before Christmas, 1950, appellant
Serrano was in Pulilan, Bulacan, harvesting palay. But his alibi failed to impress us. He could not say who was the overseer or the owner of the land
he helped harvest; nor could he state how much rice he received as his share in the harvest. Appellant Dagundong’s alibi is that from 3 in the
afternoon of October 7, 1950 up to 5 in the morning of October 8, 1950, he was playing "44" at a gambling house located beside the Sta. Ana
racetrack. But his witnesses had no reason to particularly remember October 7, 1950, and to distinguish it from the other days when he also played
the game in the same place, it appearing that during the month of October, 1950, he played there almost everyday. Besides, according to one of
the witnesses for Dagundong, the game of "44" is not played continuously for the players may leave for lengths of time. In view of this, and
considering the nearness of the place to the house of Alice Lake, we believe that appellant Dagundong was one of the robbers. Appellant Bulaon
claims that from October 1 to 10, 1950 he was in Santol, Guiguinto, Bulacan, "smoking" mango trees. But considering that Bulacan is not very far
from Makati and that there is a great facility of transportation, Bulaon could easily have been in the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.

After judgment in this case was promulgated, a motion for new trial was presented, based on the alleged retraction of Joseph Ebrada and the
affidavit of Pablo Rabaton to the effect that appellants never visited him in Muntinglupa; and that he and Melchor Lao were the ones who
concocted the idea of opening the case of Mamey Lake Hewell so they could claim the big reward being offered by Alice Lake for the solution of her
sister’s death. Citing the case of People v. Castelo, 97 Phil., 398; 51 Off. Gaz. [8] 4043), appellants argue that the lower court should have granted
their motion in view of Ebrada’s retraction. The cited case is authority for the rule that a motion for new trial may be granted when it is made to
appear that there is no evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction other than the testimony of the recanting witness. But appellants’
conviction does not entirely depend on Ebrada’s testimony, but is supported by other evidence of record which we have already mentioned.
Retractions of witnesses cannot be made the basis of new trial (People v. Olfindo, 47 Phil., 1; People v. Follantes, 64 Phil., 527), unless conviction of
the accused rests solely on the testimony of the retracting witnesses (U.S. v. Decir, 26 Phil., 503). And the latter is not the case herein. Furthermore,
the affidavits of Ebrada and Rabaton cannot be deemed newly discovered evidence, for with the use of reasonable diligence, appellants could
easily have obtained and presented such evidence during the trial. Indeed, during the cross-examination of Ebrada, the defense tried hard to make
him admit that appellants were innocent of the charge, but Ebrada stuck to his declaration that appellants were participants in the crime. Also,
appellants knew that Pablo Rabaton was confined in the New Bilibid Prisons and could have presented him in court during the trial, but they did
not do so. The lower court was correct in denying the motion for new trial.

We agree with the lower court that appellants Bulaon and Serrano are guilty of the crime of frustrated robbery with homicide, under Article 297,
Revised Penal Code, in relation with Article 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 12 inasmuch as it has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that they had conspired to commit the robbery; and that they actually took part in the commission thereof, appellant Serrano by
standing guard outside the victim’s house while appellant Bulaon accompanied appellant Dagundong inside the house and helped him ransack the
victim’s room.

We believe, however, that the lower court erred in finding appellant Dagundong guilty of murder. It was established that it was he who had fired
the fatal shots at Mrs. Hewell. But though the slaying was attended by treachery, his crime was not murder. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1,
Article 294, Revised Penal Code, is used in its generic sense and the offense defined therein comprehends not only robbery with homicide in its
limited sense, but also robbery with murder. So, an offense is not taken out of the purview of this article merely because the homicide "rises to the
atrocity of murder" (People v. Manuel, Et Al., 44 Phil., 333). And the same definition must be given to the term as it is used in Article 297, Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes frustrated robbery with homicide.

Wherefore, we find appellant Dagundong guilty of frustrated robbery with homicide and sentence him to life imprisonment. Thus modified, the
appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L. and Barrera, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA, accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and FRANCO
BRILLANTES, defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, which
convicted them of robbery with homicide, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the sum of six
thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of fighting cocks (Criminal Case
No. 11082).

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come from Fort
San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde Building on J.
M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested to bring
them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his way home.

Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So,
Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.

Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla, Suyo
and Brillantes alighted from the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the plaza. After an
interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.

Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the city) on the
same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.

It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the extreme
left. Next to him on his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.

While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road
Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had fired a
warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan approached
the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.

Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened
Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city. Jaranilla kept on firing
towards Jabatan.

Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to
tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to come
down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that he decided to come
down. His uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He recounted the incident to a
police investigator.

Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before midnight
of January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao. As he neared his
residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford pickup truck parked about
fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying roosters. He immediately repaired to
the police station at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just witnessed. The two policemen requested him to
take them in his car to the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival thereat, the men and the truck were not there
anymore.

Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen left the
car and crossed the runway which was a shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his car around in order to return to
Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated. A few moments
later, Patrolman Castro came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded. Patrolman
Castro and Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital. Trespeces learned later that Jabatan was dead.

Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of Patrolman
Jabatan. He found:

(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.

(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right, perforating the left
upper lobe of the lungs through and through, bitting the left pulmonary artery and was recovered at the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity
was full of blood.

Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.

Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that the
door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground. Upon investigation
he found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood with nipa roofing.
Each coop had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his house, about two meters therefrom.

Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of detectives came to his house together with the police
photographer who took pictures of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he was summoned
to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as one of the six
roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop (Exh. B).

Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle,
nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness. Hence, the case
was dismissed as to him.

On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the presentation of its evidence, Jaranilla
escaped from the provincial jail. The record does not show that he has been apprehended.

The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court. They
signed at the bottom of the last page of the decision.

There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).

However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not been
promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of defendants Suyo
and Brillantes will be considered.

In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery and
that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that Jaranilla
was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the taking of roosters
was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was already consummated
when Jabatan was killed.

After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the truck and who shot policeman, this Court finds that the trial
court did not err in giving credence to Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.

The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had the
obligation to return it to his sister in the same condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo and
when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.

The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck because
he (Gorriceta) was drunk then that circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being supposedly intoxicated,
Gorriceta would have been dozing when Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have thought of killing Jabatan in his
inebriated state. He would not have been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first shot hit Jabatan. So, the one who shot
him must have been a sober person like Jaranilla.

Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would have the
motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently, the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck appears to be plausible.

Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of Baylon's
house violence against or intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked.

Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada), public
building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the meaning of article 301
of the Revised Penal Code.

Having shown the inapplicability of Articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.—Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those
mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:

1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.

2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.

3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.

4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken.

5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open
elsewhere.

xxx xxx xxx

In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original reads:
ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.—El robo cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los
comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, ... . (Tomo 26, Leyes Publicas 479).

The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term which may be confounded with the expression "uninhabited
place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different from the term lugar no
habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.

One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency, where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building (casa
habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. (See Albert,
Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition, p. 688).

Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches therefrom, the
crime was theft and not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People vs. Adorno, CA 40 O. G.
567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member of this Court). *

In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not
being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five circumstances
enumerated in article 302.

The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299
(meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and safekeeping
of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing of a strip of
cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force within the meaning of article
512, now article 302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).

The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain that a railroad employee who, by force, opens a sealed
or locked receptacle deposited in a freight car, does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is neither a house nor a
building within the meaning of article 302 which corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article 302 refers to houses or
buildings which, while not actually inhabited, are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of article 302. The stealing of hogs
from a pig sty is theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to habitable buildings. (Guevara, Revised Penal Code,
1939 Edition, pages 555-6, citing II Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court dated March 2,
1886 and April 25, 1887). **

As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1) Baylon's coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about five yards
long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a person of average
height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A person cannot be
accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that compartment. The taking was effected by
forcibly opening the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.

Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were
animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a
single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes
of theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13, 1894 and 36 C. J. 799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil.
320; People vs. Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).

Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally
sought the cover of night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 647, 660;
People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).

Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the information.
They admitted their previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).

The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3], Revised
Penal Code). That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present (Art. 64[3], Revised Penal
Code).

Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No.
4103).

With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the
malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The treacherous
mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738; People
vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).

The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing
should be characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with homicide. The two
offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil. 390).

The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They
conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the scene of the
crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by Gorriceta.

The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the thief
carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S vs. Adiao, 38
Phil. 754).
It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the fruits of
the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the circumstance that
they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything when Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled his revolver which he
did not fire (47, 53-55 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a co-principal thereof.

Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking the witness stand to refute the testimony of Gorriceta,
Jaranilla escaped from jail. That circumstance is an admission of guilt.

The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim was killed on the occasion when the accused took his chickens
under the house. It is distinguishable from the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both cited by the
Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. As already noted, theft,
not robbery, was committed in this case.

The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a member of
the band was not a part of the common plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable for robbery with
homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.

There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As already
stated, no robbery with homicide was committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any responsibility for Jabatan's
death. Their complicity in the homicide committed by Jaranilla has not been established.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed. They
are acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.

As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a) each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the
complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.

As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an agent of authority, trial court should render a new judgment
consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution).

So ordered.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133347 October 15, 2008
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,*
respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the Joint Resolution1 dated May 2, 1997 of then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto in OMB-0-94-1109, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners against private respondents, and the Order2 denying their motion
for reconsideration.

This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in Philippine history, i.e., the declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand Marcos and
the simultaneous sequestration of not a few private corporations, including one of the petitioners herein, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-
CBN).

On April 18 and 26, 1994, petitioners Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto Almeda, all surnamed Lopez, as officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN, executed
separate complaint-affidavits charging private respondents Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V. Gonzalez, and Salvador (Buddy) Tan
with the following crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution of Deeds by Means of Violence or Intimidation;
(b) Article 315 paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308 - Theft; (d) Article 302 - Robbery; (e) Article 312 - Occupation of Real Property or
Usurpation of Real Rights in Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other Deceits.

Individual petitioners' complaint-affidavits3 uniformly narrated the following facts:

1. The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972, just before midnight, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast
Center in Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, and informed the officers and personnel thereat of the seizure and closure of the premises by virtue of Letter
of Instruction (LOI) No. 1 issued by President Marcos ordering the closure of all radio and television stations in the country.

2. LOI No. 1 authorized the Secretary of National Defense to "take over or control, or cause the taking over and control of all x x x newspapers,
magazines, radio and television facilities and all other media of communications" throughout the country. Consequently, a total of seven (7)
television stations owned and operated by ABS-CBN were closed down by the government.4

3. When it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a permit to re-open, ABS-CBN on October 31, 1972, terminated the services of
all its employees, giving each employee his/her retirement benefits. Corollary thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then
president of ABS-CBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,5 of their desire to sell ABS-CBN to the government. In that
same month, however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained at Fort Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape
therefrom on September 30, 1977.

4. Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos government did not materialize, ABS-CBN started negotiations with then
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, who expressed his desire and intention to acquire the former. However, the negotiations with
Kokoy Romualdez in 1973 likewise did not result in the sale and re-opening of ABS-CBN.

5. On June 6, 1973, the television and radio stations of Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) on Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City were consumed by fire.
KBS was the umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group of broadcasting companies, including Radio Philippines Network (RPN),6 which operated
TV Channel 9, the only television station allowed to continue operating during the early years of the martial law regime. Respondent Benedicto,
then Philippine Ambassador to Japan, managed, controlled, and was one of the principal stockholders of RPN.

6. On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, who at that time was Chairperson of the Board of Directors (BOD) of ABS-CBN, were in
Bacolod. Benedicto constituted Montelibano as his emissary to the Lopezes, relaying his plan to temporarily use ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in
Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such period of time as may be necessary to rebuild KBS' burned studios.

7. On June 8, 1973, Montelibano met with other officers and executives of ABS-CBN, including herein petitioners Oscar and Augusto Lopez,
informing them of Benedicto's request. Oscar and Augusto, and the rest of the ABS-CBN management team, strongly opposed the request.
Eventually, however, when Montelibano mentioned that Malacañang and Romualdez had cleared said request, the possibility of a government-
ordered confiscation of ABS-CBN, and not least of all, the possible release of Eugenio Lopez, Jr., petitioners Oscar and Augusto, as with the rest of
ABS-CBN's executives, acquiesced to Benedicto's request.

8. Thus, at noontime on the same day, representatives of KBS headed by Jose Montalvo arrived at the Meralco Building to finalize the proposed
arrangement with ABS-CBN. The transaction between ABS-CBN and KBS is evidenced by a letter-agreement dated June 8, 1973, which reads in
relevant part:

This is to confirm the agreement arrived at between RPN and ABS-CBN to the following effect:

1. Commencing on the date hereof, ABS-CBN hereby conveys to RPN by way of lease its TV and radio equipment (excluding TV channels and radio
frequencies) and its premises at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City (collectively called the "leased facilities") listed in the
schedule attached hereto and marked as Annex "A".

2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable compensation for the use of the leased facilities. The amount of the rental shall be
determined after a discussion with Ambassador Roberto Benedicto.

3. The term of this lease shall commence on the date hereof and continue for such reasonable time as may be normally necessary for the
rehabilitation of RPN's facilities unless an earlier period may be fixed by RPN and ABS-CBN after discussion with Ambassador Benedicto.
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and damages to such
facilities.

xxxx

6. Upon termination of this lease, RPN shall return the possession of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN and vacate the same without the need of
notice or demand.

7. ABS-CBN, through its Chairman, Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, shall have the right to select and designate the personnel (not to exceed 20 at any one
time) to maintain and operate all specialized TV and radio equipment.

xxxx

10. ABS-CBN shall have the right to enter the Broadcast Center at any reasonable time during the term of this lease for the purpose of determining
compliance by RPN of the terms hereof.

xxxx

12. RPN shall not, without the prior written consent of ABS-CBN, sub-lease the leased facilities or any part thereof nor shall any part be removed
from the premises except the equipment, which are intended for operation the Broadcast Center in due course of operations.

9. Meanwhile, it appears that the parties were hard pressed to negotiate and fix the monthly rental rate. Several attempts by Oscar to set up a
meeting with Benedicto for the fixing of the monthly rentals proved unsuccessful.

10. After more than four months of trying, a meeting between Oscar and Benedicto finally materialized on October 31, 1973. At that meeting, the
discussion not only covered fixing of reasonable rentals for the lease of the ABS-CBN studios, but likewise included the possibility of an outright
sale.

11. Thereafter, the discussions and negotiations stopped as none of the petitioners were able to meet anew with Benedicto who had supposedly
referred the matter to "people above" and the "man on top."

12. Frustrated, then Senator Lorenzo Tañada, as counsel for ABS-CBN, in May 1976, wrote Benedicto demanding vacation of the ABS-CBN
Broadcast Center and payment of back rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN studios and facilities.

13. In response, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, on behalf of Benedicto, met with Senator Tañada in June 1976. Another meeting took place
between the parties' respective counsels which included respondent Gonzales, another counsel for Benedicto. Despite these meetings, no
agreement was reached between Benedicto and ABS-CBN. On the whole, from June 8, 1973, the time KBS occupied the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon
City, no rental was paid by the former to the latter.

14. In the years following until the Marcos government was toppled in 1986, the ABS-CBN stations were transferred to the National Media
Production Center (NMPC) headed by Gregorio Cendaña of the Ministry of Information. Starting in January 1980, KBS, on a staggered basis,
transferred possession, control and management of ABS-CBN's provincial television stations to NMPC. Some of the radio stations of ABS-CBN were
turned over to the government's Bureau of Broadcast, while some were retained by KBS thru the Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and
Radio Philippines Network (RPN).

15. Parenthetically, during a military inventory in 1979-1980, and a visit by ABS-CBN executives at ABS-CBN's radio transmitting stations in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, headed by petitioner Augusto, on August 13, 1984, ABS-CBN properties and massive equipment were found to be missing. In
addition, the musical records and radio dramas accumulated by ABS-CBN in a span of twenty-five (25) years and stored in its library were now
gone.

16. In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN through Senator Tañada, returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV
stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.

As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed their respective counter-affidavits,7 with Benedicto adopting that of
Gonzales', denying petitioners' charges, and averring that:

1. The execution of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement was a free and voluntary act of ABS-CBN which agreed thereto fully expecting remuneration
in the form of rentals, thus:

2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable compensation for the use of the lease facilities. The amount of the rental shall be
determined after a discussion with Ambassador Roberto Benedicto.

2. In that regard, respondent Gonzales, counsel for KBS, RPN and Benedicto, participated in the negotiations and was present at three (3) meetings
for the fixing of rentals. Also in attendance were former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, specially engaged to represent RPN and Benedicto, and
Senator Tañada and petitioner Augusto for ABS-CBN.

3. Initially, the discussions centered on the possible formulas for the fixing of rentals. Later on, however, before an agreement on the rental rate
could be reached, the discussions shifted to the possibility of an outright sale. The discussions on the sale were expanded as various creditors of
ABS-CBN had made and presented claims before respondent Garcia, then Comptroller of KBS-RPN.

4. However, the discussions were discontinued when then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile reminded KBS of the sequestered status
of ABS-CBN facilities such that arrangements undertaken for the use and lease thereof should be taken up with the government.8

5. Meanwhile, in July 1974, Secretary Ponce Enrile authorized KBS, acting on behalf of BBC, to make use of the ABS-CBN provincial stations which
were not covered by the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. The authorization was granted in connection with the increased undertakings assigned by
the Department of National Defense (DND) to KBS, specifically, for the government's mass-media developmental peace and order nationwide
campaign.
7. Thereafter, in October 1977, RPN vacated the ABS-CBN studios and turned over the properties to George Viduya, the general manager of the
government station GTV-4. Viduya continued operations of GTV-4 at the ABS-CBN properties, after which, the properties were all delivered in 1979
to the NMPC headed by Cendaña. The provincial stations were delivered and turned over on a staggered basis, with the DZRI station in Dagupan
handed over in 1979. The successive transfer of all ABS-CBN studios and stations, in Quezon City and the provinces, were covered by receipts which
were collated by the law firm of respondent Gonzales retained by KBS for that purpose.

8. The use of the ABS-CBN studios involved only three (3) juridical entities, RPN, ABS-CBN and the government. The charges leveled by petitioners
in their complaint-affidavits merely point to civil liability as specified in the letter-agreement itself:

4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and damages to such
facilities.

On the whole, the allegations of petitioners do not support the elements of the crimes charged.

9. Lastly, respondents invoke the grant of absolute immunity to Benedicto as part of the Compromise Agreement in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
34 which states:

The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to
Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and employees of the corporations above mentioned, who are included in past, present and future
cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for
acts, omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal law, including but not limited to Republic Act
No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement.

Expectedly, the petitioners in their joint reply-affidavit refuted respondents' counter-affidavits. Contrary to respondents' allegations, petitioners
reiterated Benedicto's over-all ploy, in conspiracy with the other respondents who were officers of KBS and/or RPN, to use and occupy ABS-CBN
properties without paying compensation therefor. Petitioners maintain that respondents' grand scheme was to take-over ABS-CBN, albeit
ostensibly covered by the letter-lease agreement, giving the take over a semblance of legality.

Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the herein assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To
the Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the various felonies charged:

1. The Letter-Agreement of June 8, 1973 belie any illegal take-over of the ABS-CBN complex.

While the Lopezes are now complaining that the letter-agreement was virtually forced unto them thru intimidation, hence, the vitiated consent of
Mr. Montelibano, there is nothing however which the complainants adduced to prove this allegation except their threadbare allegations of threats.
On the contrary, it appears that the Lopezes blessed the letter-agreement hoping that their financial difficulties with respect to the affairs of the
ABS-CBN and their problem concerning the continued detention of Eugenio Lopez, Jr. by the military, would at least be mitigated. x x x

It is thus clear that the ABS-CBN complex was freely leased by Montelibano upon consultation with the Lopezes who entertained some ulterior
motives of their own which they expect would result from the agreement, either directly or indirectly. Of course, the Lopezes may not have
realized some of these expectations (i.e., the rentals, the release of Eugenio, Jr. from detention) but this does not change the fact that the parties'
consent to the contract appears to have been freely given. Perforce, the complaint under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines
must fail.

2. Other TV and radio stations were taken over pursuant to LOI 1-A, hence no violations of Art. 312, 302 and 308 of RPC.

To the alleged violation of Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the respondents contended that their use of ABS-CBN's facilities other than those
included in the lease-agreement, was in fact with the authority of the then Department of National Defense (DND). There is no denying that all of
the ABS-CBN properties including the provincial ones are under sequestration pursuant to Presidential Letter of Instruction No. 1-A, issued on
September 28, 1972. It was under the strength of this Presidential Letter of Instruction that KBS-RPN was authorized to enter, occupy and operate
the facilities of ABS-CBN. This was also confirmed by DND Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile in his letter to RPN dated June 26, 1976. Unmistakably, KBS-
RPN's possession of the ABS-CBN's property other than those in the ABS-CBN complex is primarily anchored on the authority pursuant to LOI 1-A.
With this apparent authority, this investigation can not see in any which way how the respondents could have illegally taken over the properties of
the [petitioners], particularly those in the province; there is therefore no convincing proof to support a charge under Article 312 of the Revised
Penal Code. It may come to mind that "occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property" under Article 312 requires as one of its
elements the presence of violence against or intimidation of persons as a means in securing real property or rights belonging to another. Plainly,
this element is not shown. The complainants may have felt intimidated by the sequestration order, but it is in the nature of such Order to be
coercive. It was an act flowing from the martial law powers of then President Marcos.

3. No unlawful taking as to justify charges for Robbery or Theft.

Robbery and Theft under Articles 302 and 308 of the Revised Penal Code were also attributed by the [petitioners] against the respondents. From
the records, it is clear that KBS-RPN has juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties subject of this complaint; a right which can be validly set-up
even against ABS-CBN itself. It can be recalled that KBS-RPN was authorized to enter, occupy and operate ABS-CBN facilities by virtue of the
authority granted by the President, pursuant to LOI No. 1-A. Aside, the Broadcast Center itself was covered by the lease-agreement. Under these
situations, there is obviously no basis to charge the respondents for robbery and theft; for these penal offense require as an element the act of
unlawful taking or asportation. Asportation is simply poles apart from the juridical possession which KBS-RPN enjoyed over the properties.

4. No deceit was employed to gain possession of the Broadcast Center and the provincial TV and radio stations.

In the prosecution for estafa under [Articles 315, paragraphs 2(a), 3(a) and 318] of the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that the element of
deceit, consisting in the false statement of fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or, at least simultaneously with, the delivery
of the thing by the complainants, it being essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only
motive which induces the complainants to part with the thing. If there be no such prior or simultaneous false statement or fraudulent
representation, any subsequent act of the respondent, however fraudulent or suspicious it may appear, can not serve as basis for the prosecution
of these crimes.
[From petitioners' complaint-affidavits], it is very clear that the late Alfredo Montelibano was the one who talked with Roberto Benedicto,
preparatory to the signing of the lease-agreement. As the complainants did not identify exactly which constitute the deceitful act (or the
intimidation) which could have induced the Lopezes into accepting the lease agreement, in most probability, the occurrences which vitiated their
consent happened during this preliminary discussion. Noticeably however, it is not Alfredo Montelibano, the one who supposedly talked with
Benedicto, who is testifying on the alleged "veiled threat" or deceits, if there are. Precisely, because he is already dead.

x x x [I]t is submitted that the Lopezes can not now testify on something which are not derived from their own personal perception. The bottomline
is that what they are now trying to adduce, pertaining to the alleged deceits [or intimidation] attending the negotiation of the lease agreement are
purely hearsay. This is a matter which only Alfredo Montelibano could testify competently.9

The Ombudsman saw no need to discuss the defenses of prescription and immunity from suit raised by the respondents given his dismissal of the
complaint-affidavits on the merits. However, in a subsequent Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution, the
Ombudsman lifted the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel's ratiocination for dismissing the complaint-affidavits, thus:

Incidentally, RPN has been identified as among the corporation in which respondent Benedicto has substantial interests. In fact, it was one of the
subject matters of the Compromise Agreement reached by the government and respondent Benedicto in Sandiganbayan Civil Case no. 34.

In that Compromise Agreement, for and in consideration of respondent Benedicto's cession of equities, and assignment of his rights and interest in
corporations therein listed, among them RPN, the government extended "absolute immunity" to Benedicto, including officers of his corporations as
therein mentioned, "such that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts or omissions committed prior to
February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal law, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the
acquisition of any asset treated or included in this Agreement."

In effect, the People of the Philippines as the offended party in criminal cases has waived its right to proceed criminally against Benedicto, et. al.,
for whatever crime they may have committed relative to, among others, the alleged plunder of ABS-CBN properties. Again, whatever liability that
remains thereabout on respondents' part is perforce only civil in nature.10

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution and Order.

Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto, in compliance
with Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the Court of their clients' demise. Ben edicto's counsel filed a Notice of
Death (With Prayer for Dismissal)12 moving that Benedicto be dropped as respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending criminal
cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the party accused."

Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent, citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals13 which held that "civil liability of the accused
survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations."

Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his
criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:14

1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.

Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is stripped
of merit.

To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute respondents for
various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a)
waives the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action,16 is not
applicable.

In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the death of the accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against him,
regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of
obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded on other sources of
obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a
different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action.

Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,18 taking cognizance of respondent Benedicto's death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that
the latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.

Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in People v. Bayotas19 by filing a separate civil action to enforce a claim
against the estate of respondent Benedicto.20 The claim against the estate of Benedicto is based on contract-the June 8, 1973 letter- agreement-in
consonance with Section 5,21 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents Benedicto and Tan as parties herein is in order.

We now come to the core issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint against the
respondents. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.

We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient."22 The raison d 'etre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate it from the long tentacles of
officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the
execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public
officers.23

In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto,24 we dwelt on the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis that the Office has
been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989). This discretion is all but free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the Office is insulated from any outside
pressure and improper influence.

Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may
thus conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance. Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss
the complaint should it be found insufficient in form or substance.

Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman's powers, and
respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of
the integrity of public service.

The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo v. Ombudsman:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman
but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private complainants.25

From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested
by the Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except when the
exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.26 In this
regard, petitioners utterly failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion.

Apart from a blanket and general charge that remaining respondents herein, Gonzales and Garcia, are officers of KBS/RPN and/or alter egos of
Benedicto, petitioners' complaint-affidavits are bereft of sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that crimes have been committed and
the respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.27 Certainly, the Ombudsman did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint-affidavits.

From the entirety of the records, it is beyond cavil that petitioners seek to attach criminal liability to an unequivocally civil undertaking gone awry.
As pointed out by the Ombudsman, although the petitioners may not have realized their expectations in entering into the June 8, 1973 letter-
agreement, such does not render their consent thereto defective.

The execution and validity of this letter-agreement is connected with respondents' culpability for the felonies charged as these include the element
of whether they had juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties. Essentially, petitioners claim they did not freely give their consent to the letter-
agreement. However, on more than one occasion, petitioners have invoked the letter-agreement's provisions, and made claims thereunder.

First, petitioners met and discussed with respondents the fixing of the rental rate for the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City as provided in paragraph
2 of the letter-lease agreement. Next, petitioners' counsel wrote a demand letter to respondents for the payment of rentals for the latter's
occupation and use of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letter-agreement. Last and most importantly, petitioners have made a claim against the
estate of Benedicto based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement.

This action of petitioners clearly evinces their ratification of the letter-agreement. As previously discussed, the civil liability of respondents
Benedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein was extinguished upon their death. But other civil liabilities founded on other
sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be prosecuted either against the estate of the deceased if based on contract,28
or against the executors and administrators of the deceased's estate if based on quasi-delict.29
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of martial law and the toppling of the Marcos government, and advanced
the validity of the letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in the same breath, aver that respondents'
actuations in the execution of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-agreement was more ostensible than real and to
insist on the prosecution of respondents for felonies supposedly committed in connection with this ubiquitous letter-agreement.30

In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the allegations of petitioners against respondents are civil in nature, bereft
of criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing petitioners' complaint-affidavits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as private respondents
without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective estates. The assailed Joint Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman
in OMB-0-94-1109 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40512 March 3, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERFECTO TAYAG and ATANASIO MORALES, defendants-appellants.

DIAZ, J.:

The defendants and appellants Perfecto Tayag and Atanasio Morales were convicted of attempted robbery in an inhabited house, located at No.
325-A San Marcelino Street, Manila, having, on the night of September 12, 1933, attempted to enter the said house with intent to rob, according to
the allegations of the information, by means of force and by using a bolo and a screw driver to force one of the doors thereof, which were then
closed and barred.

The court, which tried the case against the said two appellants, imposed upon Perfecto Tayag, the penalty of four years and two months of prision
correccional plus the additional penalty of six years and two months of prision correccional plus also an additional penalty of ten years, he being
likewise a habitual delinquent with a greater number of former convictions. From this sentence, the defendants appealed.

The facts disclosed by the evidence of the prosecution, which are certainly overwhelming and leave no room for doubt, are: that a little after two
o'clock on the morning of September 12, 1933, the said two appellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go Cuay's store,
which also served as his dwelling, located, as aforestated, at No. 325-A San Marcelino Street, of the City of Manila. Believing that they were
unnoticed, they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the tools — bolo and screw driver — which they then carried and which,
of course, were not the proper means for that purpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of the door and upon becoming
aware that the inhabitants of the store had been awakened, they tried to escape but policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that
time had been watching them, detained and placed them under arrest. The said policemen found the bolo, Exhibit A, in the possession of the
appellant Perfecto Tayag, and the screw driver, Exhibit B, in the possession of the other appellant Atanasio Morales.

In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay there were, at that time, a little more than P40 in cash, which represented the proceeds of his sales the
day before, and merchandise valued at around P1,000. However, there is absolutely nothing of record to show that the said appellants' intention
on that occasion was to commit robbery, or that they somehow knew that they would find money amounting to P40 therein. In every criminal
proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by means of competent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere
inferences, however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains, as in this case, a sufficient indication of the existence of an
intention different from that of committing robbery. It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that had the appellants succeeded in
entering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay, they would have carried away all the goods therein, because they would not have been able to do
so by themselves, not having any vehicle at their disposal.

The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of attempted trespass to dwelling, as defined in article 280, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, that is, trespass committed by means of violence. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 8, 1899, Viada, Fourth
Supplement, p. 399; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 10, 1900, Id., p. 401; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 5,
1890, Hidalgo, Penal Code, vol. 2, p. 512.)1ªvvphi1.ne+

The documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, consisting of Exhibits C, D and E, which are the records of criminal cases No. 38880,
38924 and 38923, does not show that the appellants are habitual delinquents. The most that the said documents disclose is that at about the same
time, the appellants committed the crimes of theft with which they were charged therein, and therefore the 10th aggravating circumstance, that is,
previous convictions, should be taken into consideration against them. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity should likewise be considered
against the said appellants.

Wherefore, and taking into consideration that the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for trespass to dwelling by means of violence
in article 280, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (from one month and one day to four
months), the penalty imposed upon the appellants is hereby modified by sentencing them, each to three months and one day of arresto mayor,
with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances, without prejudice to their being
credited with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. So ordered.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19290 January 11, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MENANDRO CONSTANTINO, Defendant-Appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendant is accused of the crime of arson. The lower court found the crime to have been proven, and sentenced the defendant to twelve
years and one day of cadena temporal, with the accessories provided by law, to indemnify the municipality of Bigaa in the sum of P2,300, and to
pay the costs. The defendant appealed from said judgment and makes six assignments of error, to wit:

1. The trial court erred in not allowing the accused time to read the information on the day of this appearance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

2. The trial court erred in applying to this case article 550, first case, of the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The trial court erred in imposing upon the accused a penalty which is unconstitutional, being excessive, unusual, and
cruel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty as principal of the burning of the school building of Pulongubat,
Bigaa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. The trial court erred in not permitting the defense to make certain questions in the cross-examination which would have shown the lack of
consistency and veracity of the testimony of some witness for the prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. The trial court erred in not permitting the defense to prove certain facts which would have weakened the prosecution.

The trial court did not commit any error in refusing to give the accused the time he applied for to read the information. To what section 19 of
General Order No. 58 refers is to the time to answer the information. Neither did it err in applying article 550 of the Penal Code in this case, in spite
of the fact that the edifice burnt had not been inaugurated, which was to be used as a public school. The evidence shows that said edifice had
already been delivered by the contractor to the municipality of Bigaa. What makes a building public is not its inauguration for the purpose
intended, but the fact of the State or any of its agencies having the title thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We do not find the penalty of cadena temporal imposed by the law (art. 550 of the Penal Code) upon a person convicted of the burning of a public
building to be unconstitutional by reason of being excessive, unusual, and cruel, when the damage caused exceeds 6,250 pesetas. Taking into
consideration the gravity of the crime, which, as observes the illustrious commentator Viada, causes devastation terror, and alarm, and accepting
the considerations made by the trial judge about the grave consequences in the Philippines of the burning of an edifice used as a public school, we
are of the opinion that the penalty provided by the law is not excessive. Neither is it in itself unusual and cruel. (U. S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil., 386.)
chanrobles virtual law library

Turning to the fourth assignment of error, which, according to the appellant, is the principal basis of his defense, we find the evidence to have
established sufficiently and beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the accused as the person who set fire to the public school mentioned in the
information. The record shows that the accused was disgusted with the erection of said building in the barrio of Pulongubat and not in that of
Santol of which he was a resident, or on a place midway between the two barrios; that Eugenio B. Cruz surprised the appellant in the act of setting
fire to said school building, and Feliciano Gonzalez saw him emerge from a side of the edifice when it was already burning; that some footprints
found in the place where the accused was seen on the night in question coincide with one of the feet of the accused, with the circumstance of a
finger being lacking from the footprints as well as from said foot of the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find in the record no sufficient reason for not giving credit to the witness for the prosecution who testified to the facts above stated. Nor is
there sufficient evidence that the accused is a victim of political intrigues, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of fact of the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Among the circumstances that the defense discussed in his oral argument before this court, our attention was specially called to two, namely, the
two piece of bamboo, Exhibits A and B which, it is contended, should have been burnt much more than they are, if not totally, which are alleged to
have been used by the accused for raising the burning wick to the eaves of the school building, the said building having been completely reduced to
ashes; and the footprints which extend to the heel of the foot, which the defense argues cannot be those of a man who is running, the soles of
whose feet do not ordinarily press upon the ground to their full length, but only their anterior parts, the heels being
raised.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the canes Exhibit A and B, their ends exhibit traces of burns. The witnesses for the prosecution do not positively say that these two canes
were not taken out from the eaves after the setting of the fire. The witness Eugenio B. Cruz says that he has not seen anybody take them out. (Fols.
13, st. n.) Even supposing that such canes were left resting upon the eaves of the building, it was not absolutely impossible for them not be burnt
totally or more than said Exhibits A and B are. The school building had a nipa roof and wooden walls; the roof to which fire was set would burn
before the rest, and as the canes were resting on the eaves, they could have fallen to the ground when they lost their support, the flame, if there
was any, extinguished upon their falling, and once on the ground, which was humid, according to the evidence, they could not have been burnt
either by the fire of their own, or by that of the edifice. It is not impossible for these canes not to be entirely dry, being, as can be presumed, the
surplus canes of an edifice that had just been terminated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the footprints, also it was not impossible in the instant case for the full length of the foot of one who was running to be marked on that
ground, which was humid, nor is it impossible for the earth to be loose like that taken out from the excavations of the posts which are usually
spread near then in buildings thus constructed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the last two assignments of error the defense contends that the court below should not have sustained the objection of the fiscal to certain
questions made by defendant's counsel. The question put in the cross-examination to the witness Eugenio B. Cruz was properly disallowed, as
unnecessary, as well as the other one put to Feliciano Gonzalez. As to the question made by the court (fol. 21, st. n.), it does not constitute an
abuse of discretion, nor of authority, it being really, as the Attorney-General says, a question to make the previous one clear, for it leads one to
believe that what was intended to get from witness was the reason why the accused was caused to tread upon the footprints and not whether or
not the accused had seen such fact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the trial court was right in finding the accused guilty of the crime of arson and in imposing upon him the penalty provided by article
550 of the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find, however, no circumstance whatever modifying the penalty, which must, therefore be imposed in its medium
degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the appellant is sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of cadena
temporal, said judgment being affirmed in all other respects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The costs shall be taxed against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12875. October 26, 1917. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEOPOLDO ACACIO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The accused broke into the high school of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, by breaking a shell in a window and opening the window. He took from the building
two microscopes (and possibly books), valued at P121.27, the property of the Government of the Philippine Islands. The witnesses for the
prosecution clearly established these facts. The accused made various improbable and shifting statements in defense. For instance, he admitted
having a microscope in he possession, but claimed he had bought it in the house of his aunt on November 10, 1916, from Mariano Agbayani, who
died on December 3, 1916. Rebuttal evidence for the prosecution showed that Mariano Agbayani was bedfast, was absolutely unable to leave the
house on November 10, 1916, and had nothing in his possession resembling a microscope. One by one all of the questions, raised by the appellant
and relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, could similarly be resolved.

Counsel alleges that the trial court erred in taking into consideration the confession of the defendant. Indeed the defendants has proved himself to
be a faithful apostle of Ananias. The Attorney-General lists nine conflicting confessions and statements of the defendant. Because of such
contradiction, counsel ingeniously argues that the court should not consider the confession-and should acquit the defendant. If a confession could
be rejected on such ground, all the would be necessary in any case to dispense with a damaging confession would be for the accused to tell another
story out of harmony with the preceding one. The rule is that a variation in the declarations of a witness is not always sufficient to discredit his
testimony. (U.S. v. Brioner [1914], 28 Phil., 367.) Conflicting confessions by an accused would have, of course, the further effect of leading a court
to put little or no faith in his testimony in defense.

The facts fall under article 508, next to the last paragraph, in connection with No. 2 of the same article, of the Penal Code. As the trial court took
into account neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the sentence imposed is in accord with the law. Therefore, judgment sentencing
defendant and appellant to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of presidio correctional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and
the costs, is affirmed, with the addition of the return of the two microscopes in question to the Government of the Philippine Island, or to
indemnify the Government in the amount of P121.27, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.

Arrellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44370 January 11, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CO CHO (alias NGO CO, GO CO, TAN HUA), defendant-appellant.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

The accused appeals from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila sentencing him, for the crime of theft of articles and
money amounting to P33.50 belonging to Hong Liong, to the penalty of from four months and one day of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two
years and four months or prision correccional, as the maximum, with the costs.

Hong Liong lived with other Chinese, among them Tee Chuang Tian, in house No. 621, Magdalena Street, Manila On the night of August 21, 1935,
Hong Liong and his companions slept with the windows open and the door locked at dawn of said date, Tee Chuang Tian, having noted that the
door was open, awoke his companions. Hong Liong noted that his pants, where he had placed his watch valued at P28, and a wallet containing P3
in bills and two sweepstakes tickets which he had in his coat, had disappeared. Hong Liong later found his pants, minus the watch, under the house,
and the wallet, minus the bills and the sweepstakes tickets, under the bed.

At that same dawn, policeman Danganan, then on duty the streets of Manila, having seen the accused in a suspicious attitude, coming out of
several houses, placed him under arrest, finding a watch, four one-peso bills and small change amounting to P1.25 in his possession. After having
been submitted to an investigation in the police station, the accused admitted that he stole the watch found in his possession and the bills
amounting to P3 from the house No. 621, Magdalena Street, by passing through the window of the water closet. While the investigation was in
progress, notice that a robbery had been committed in the house No. 621, Magdalena Street, was received in said police station.

There is no doubt that it was the accused who stole the watch, bills and sweepstakes tickets belonging to Hong Liong in the house where the latter
lived. The information filed against the accused is for the crime of robbery. The court, however, found that the crime committed is theft and
imposed the penalty corresponding thereto upon the accused.

After having examined the evidence, this court is of the opinion that the crime committed is robbery as charged in the information, the accused
having entered the house through the window which is not intended for entrance, as admitted by him in the police station. Such must have been
the case because the door was locked from with and it could not have been opened from the outside to enable entrance through it without
violence. Hong Liong testified that before he went to sleep he told Tee Chuang Tian to lock the door. Tee Chuang Tian testified that he really locked
the door before he went to sleep that night. This shows that the accused entered the house through one of the open windows, as admitted by him.
Furthermore, there is evidence that there were finger prints noted on one of the windows. That the door might have been opened from within by
one of the residents of the house, thus permitting the accused to enter through it, is a mere possibility which cannot be accepted as a fact without
affirmative evidence to that effect.

These facts constitute the crime of robbery defined and punished in article 299, paragraph (a), subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code, it having
been committed without arms and the value of the articles taken being less than P250. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the presence of
which is admitted by the accused, should be taken into consideration.

Wherefore, modifying the appealed judgment, the appellant is sentenced, pursuant to the provision above cited, to the penalty of from one year,
as the minimum, to three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, as the maximum, with the costs. So ordered.

Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Recto, JJ., concur.

[GR No. 39408, October 31, 1933]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AGAPITO FERNANDEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
VICKERS, J .:

The defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with the crime of robbery in an inhabited house, committed as follows:
"The undersigned accuses Agapito Fernandez, aka Epifanio Victa, aka Luis Cuadrante, aka Juan Marasigan, of the crime of theft, provided for and
punished in article 293 in relation to article 299 No. 2 and (b) 1 of the Criminal Code Revised, committed as follows:

"That on or about the night of January 5, 1933, in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the defendant Agapito Fernandez, aka Epifanio Victa, aka Luis Cuadrante, alias Juan Marasigan, voluntarily, illegally and criminally entered
the store of the Chinese Uy Chio Song, alias Uy Chay Hing, using force on things, that is, I lift the door leaf to the south of said Chinese Uy Chio Song
store , aliasOops Chay Hing, inhabited by this, and then was introduced into the store and then through the use of a false Have opened the drawer
of a table where the amount of P1,963.74 was then stored and once opened, with ammo of profit seized said amount of P1,963.74 consisting of
banknotes of P50; from to P20; of P10; of P5; of P2; and of P1 and a banknote of $ 20 belonging to someone else and against the will of its owner
the aforementioned Chinese Uy Chay Song, alias Uy Chay Hing, having seized the following from the accused: a banknote of P50; a dollar billof $ 20;
six banknotes from to P10; seven tickets to P5; eight tickets to P2; 5 tickets to P1; 9 Silver coins of a P1; one of P0.50; 12 from to P0.20; 4 of a P0.10
and four of a P0.05 totaling P218.50 in total, to the detriment of the aforementioned Uy Chay Song.

"That the accused is a habitual offender according to the provisions of Law No. 3397 and recidivist because, prior to this date, that is, on March 6,
1918, February 26, 1919, he has already been charged and sentenced in two causes for the crime of theft in the Court of Peace of Calapan,
Mindoro; in the Court of First Instance of Batangas for robbery and theft on August 23, 1922; for theft in the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, on
March 24, 1924 and for theft in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, June 25, 1932. "

Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Felix Samson found the defendant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to suffer eight years of prison
major , to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,963.74, to suffer an additional penalty of thirteen years, one month, and eleven days of
temporary seclusion for being a habitual delinquent, and to pay the costs.

The defendant appealed to this court. His attorney de officio concurred in the findings of the trial judge, and advised the defendant to withdraw his
appeal, but the defendant refused to follow this advice. Defendant's attorney then filed a motion, among he set forth the facts of the case and
discussed them, and prayed that he be relieved from filing a brief for the appellant. Thereupon this court ordered the Solicitor-General to file the
brief for the Government.

It appears from the evidence that Uy Chay Hing was doing business as a merchant in the municipality of Iguig, Cagayan Province, and that he slept
in the same building. On the morning of January 6, 1933, I found that one of the doors of the store which I had closed the night before was open
and also three drawers in a showcase. These three drawers contained P100 in small coins. The drawers were not locked. The money had
disappeared. Before retiring the night before Uy Chay Hing had counted and placed in the drawer of a table in the room where he was accustomed
to sleep the sum of P1,963.74 consisting of bank notes and coins. I have locked this drawer and left the key in a pocket of his trousers. Next
morning Uy Chay Hing found that this drawer had been opened with his key and that the money had disappeared. Among the bank notes placed in
this drawer there was one for $ 20. Uy Chay Hing had made a note of the number of this American bank note in a memorandum book, and when I
reported to the authorities that his store had been robbed he gave the number of this twenty-dollar bank note.

The defendant had been in the offended party's store for an hour on the night of January 5th. Next day he was seen in Tuguegarao buying goods in
the store of an Indian merchant, and from there he went to Aparri. He was arrested and searched in pursuance of a search warrant, and the sum of
P218.50 consisting of bank notes and coins was found in his possession, and among this money was the twenty-dollar bank note which had been
stolen from Uy Chay Hing . The defendant denied any participation in the crime in question, and attempted to show that the money found in his
possession had been won by him by playing monte, but it clearly appears that this defense of the accused was a mere fabrication, and it was rightly
rejected by the trial judge. As P218.50 or a part of the stolen money was found in the possession of the defendant, and as he was unable to give
any satisfactory explanation as to how he came into possession of it, the trial court was justified in finding that he had stolen not only the sum
found in his possession, but the total sum lost by Uy Chay Hing amounting to P2,063.74.

It appears that the defendant entered the store of Uy Chay Hing by prying the door out of the groove in which the lower extremity of it was placed,
and then pushing it inward. Signs of the instrument used by the defendant were found on the door. As we have already stated, the three drawers
containing a total of P100 were not locked, and the other drawer containing P1,963.74 was locked, but it was opened by the defendant with the
key which the offended party had left in the room. The question then is whether the crime committed by the defendant under those circumstances
was robbery or theft.

The defendant opened the drawer containing most of the money by making use of the owner's key which the defendant had stolen, but the
defendant had already entered the house when he stole this key, and the fact that he opened the money drawer by using this stolen key did not
convert the crime into robbery.

Did the prying open of the door in the manner hereinabove indicated convert the taking of the money into robbery?

Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code reads, as follows:

"Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship . Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an
inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period to temporary
seclusion in its minimum period, of the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if

"( a ) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the following means:

"1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;

"2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;

"3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools;

"4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority;

"Or if,

"( b ) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

"1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;

"2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery.

"When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.

"The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos.

"When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in
the two next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.

"If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship, the
penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed."

The accused was charged with a violation of ( a ) 2 and ( b ) 1 of article 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

( b ) 1 refers to the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle within the house, and does
not relate to the means made use of in entering the house. It is not applicable in the present case.

The Spanish text of ( a ) 2 is as follows: "By breaking wall, ceiling or floor, or broken door or window." The words "door or window fracture" clearly
mean "the breaking of a door or window", and imply more than the mere forcing open of a door or window. If the defendant had forced open a
window and entered in that way, he would of course be guilty of robbery because of having entered the house through an opening not intended
for entrance; but in the case at bar the defendant entered by forcing open the door by means of some instrument. It was neither alleged nor
proved that the door was broken. The accused did not enter the store by any of the means specified in article 299, and we are therefore of the
opinion that the crime committed by him was theft.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nocturnity were present in the commission of the crime. It being alleged and proved that the
defendant was a habitual delinquent, his prior convictions should not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the principal penalty. The
penalty applicable to the defendant is therefore the maximum degree of correctional prison in its minimum and medium periods, and the defense
is sentenced to suffer four years and two months of correctional prison, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,845.24, the value of
the money not recovered, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay
the costs, and to suffer the additional penalty of thirteen years, one month, and eleven days of temporary detention for being a habitual
delinquent, as imposed by the trial court. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos , and Butte, JJ ., Concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 11952 September 25, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NICOLAS MACAMAY, Defendant-Appellant.

STREET, J.:

The question of fact in this case is whether the defendant Nicolas Macamay was a participant in a robbery committed on the night of May 5, 1915,
in the house of Juan Mar, in the municipality of Catarman, Province of Misamis. The robbery was perpetrated by an armed band or more than
three men;' and assuming the truth of the evidence which implicated the accused the band consisted of seven. Six were brought to trial in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis and convicted; but in the present case only four were tried together, the other two having been
granted a separate trial. From a judgment of conviction rendered in this case the defendant Macamay has appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that at about 10 o'clock at night, at the time and place mentioned, armed men entered the house of Juan Mar, and with threats and
menaces ordered the inmates to give up their money. Aquilina Mar, a sister of Juan Mar, was required to produce the keys to certain trunks in the
sala. These were opened and searched, but no valuables were found in them. Three of the robbers then repaired to the bedroom of Juan Mar,
leaving three of their companion on guard in the sala. In the bedroom a trunk or receptacle was discovered which, upon being opened with a key,
likewise obtained from Aquilina Mar, as found to contain P2,500 in money, which was taken by the robber. They also carried away a few articles of
personal property, worth about P5. In these acts one of the principal parts was taken by a man who was sufficiently identified at the trial as
Lorenzo Tinampay. At the time of the robbery his face was blackened, probably with charcoal, but otherwise none of the participants were
disguised.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The main evidence connecting the defendant Nicolas Macamay with the crime consist in the testimony of Nicolas Ranollo and Benigno Madria,
each of whom admitted his own capacity in the crime. Their story is substantially to the following effect: About two days before the perpetration of
the robbery Simeon Ventusal and Lorenzo Tinampay, being in a barrio somewhat remote from the scene of the robbery, there induced Benigno
Madria and Francisco Bacleon to join them on the pretense that they were going over into a neighboring barrio to gamble. The party then
proceeded to the home of Nicolas Macamay, the defendant, where they arrived at about 10 o'clock on the night of May 4. Here they were
entertained until the next night. Here also they were joined by Basilio, whose surname was not ascertained; and here Macamay and Ranollo, who
had been employed by him a few days before as a laborer, identified themselves with the enterprise. After supper the party of seven left the house
of Macamay and had proceeded but a short way then they were halted and told by Simeon Ventusal that the real purpose of the expedition was to
rob the house of Juan Mar, who lived some 2 kilometers away. When this revelation was made Madria and Ranollo desired to abandon the party,
so they claim but were forced by threats to stay with the band. Nicolas Macamay, who had come along in the rear of the party, then produced
arms which were distributed among the seven. There was one rifle, which was given to Madria; and each of the others was supplied with a cutting
weapon of some kind, such as a barong, bolo, sword, or dagger. The band then proceeded to the house of Juan Mar and on approaching found it
necessary to wait awhile in a coconut grove until a serenader should go away. After his departure the band approached the house, and after
Nicolas Macamay and Basilio had been posted downstairs as a guard, the other five went upstairs with the results already
stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon leaving the place of the robbery the party returned to the home of Macamay and obtaining a light repaired a short distance away where the
money was divided in the early hours of the morning. Only the silver coin, amounting to a few hundred pesos, was here divided among all the
members of the band; and some P1,700 in bills was reserved by the three leaders from this division - a circumstance which probably led to
dissatisfaction among the others.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Nicolas Macamay was a man of some substance and prior to this affair his conduct appears not to have been subject to criticism. His family was
distantly related to that of Mar, but they do not seem to have been on a footing of intimacy. Macamay denied participation in the robbery and
attempted, in an unconvincing way, to prove an alibi. He admits that about the middle of April four members of the band had visited him seeking
for work, and that on May 5, 1915, five members of the band again appeared on the same errand. They took dinner, and according to Macamay's
statement left in the early afternoon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The testimony of the witnesses Ranollo and Madria is corroborated by the testimony of Francisco Bacleon which was given in the court under the
following circumstances: Bacleon was one of the four who were tried in this case, and not being represented by a lawyer, was asked by the court if
he had any witnesses whom he wished to call. He responded that he had not. The court then told him he had a right to testify if he wished to do so,
but that he could not be required to give evidence against himself. The witness said he wished to testify, and having taken the stand, told a story in
all material respects the same as that told by Ranollo and Madria. This testimony was introduced after the defense for Macamay had rested.
Macamay and his counsel were present in court and had an opportunity to cross-examine Bacleon, but failed to do so. This testimony was not a
part of the evidence introduced by the Government; but we know of no rule under which it could be excluded from the consideration of the court
in this case. The defendants were jointly accused, were tried together, and the testimony lawfully given at the trial by any of them was competent
evidence against his companions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The statements made by these three witnesses as to the connection of Nicolas Macamay with this robbery are credible and reasonable and in our
opinion must be accepted as true, even without any weighty corroborative proof. However, we think that the admitted fact that this party was
entertained at Macamay's house just before the robbery occurred is an important circumstance against him; and the statements of the witnesses
mentioned relative to what occurred in the house of Juan Mar are fully corroborated by the testimony of the inmates of the
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a careful examination of the record we reach the conclusion that Macamay's complicity is shown with all the certainty which the law requires;
and we think that the trial court committed no error in finding him guilty. No motive appears why the witnesses who testified against Macamay
should have desired to implicate him, if he was innocent, and certainly there was no lack of others on whom to put the blame. We think it is
evidently a case where these witnesses realized that lies would not serve any purpose, and animated doubtless by the hope of leniency they
decided to make a full and true statement of the entire transaction. We here have a case where four men were tried together. Three successively
took the stand and, admitting their own guilt, testified that the fourth was a member of the band. The proof clearly shows that this band was
composed of seven men, of whom three, namely, Ventusal, Tinampay, and Macamay were what might be called strong characters, while these
three implicating witnesses were of weaker metal. They were evidently drawn into the robbery by the influence which was exerted over them by
the others, and were discriminated against in the division of the spoils. At the trial they yielded to the natural impulse to put the chief blame upon
the principal authors of the crime. If courts did not have the courage to declare an accused person guilty upon evidence such as that which is
produced against Nicolas Macamay in this case, their judgments would reflect the mere whims and the caprices of particular judges; and the
administration of justice would become a farce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Our examination of the record in this case was primarily made with a desire to accede, if possible, to the recommendation of acquittal contained in
the brief from the office of the Attorney-General; but our conclusion is that this recommendation cannot properly be
followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the court below the defendants were all sentenced to twelve years and one day, cadena temporal. This sentence was based on article 508 of the
Penal Code, it being assumed by the court that the case fell under subsection 3 of that article, as the trunk from which the money was taken was
opened with a key obtained from the owner by force and intimidation. This is the opinion of the court constituted the use of false keys (see art.
516) and brought the case under subsection 3 of article 508. It should be noted, however, that the use of false keys mentioned in subsection 3 has
reference to the mode of entering the house and not to the method of opening a trunk in the house. In the present case the robbers came in
through the door, and article 508 was inapplicable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime committed in the present case is that of robbery en cuadrilla, with violence or intimidation against the person, with the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the injured person; and it should be punished in conformity with
subsection 5 of article 503, in relation with articles 504 and 505. (U. S. vs. Gutierrez, 14 Phil. Rep., 388; U. S. vs. De los Santos, 12 Phil. Rep., 622; U.
S. vs. Gamboa, 11 Phil. Rep., 39; U. S. vs. Quijano, 11 Phil. Rep., 368; U. S. vs. Sol, 9 Phil. Rep., 265; U. S. vs. Callotes, 2 Phil. Rep., 16.) chanrobles
virtual law library

The defendants therefore should have been sentenced to ten years, presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties specified in article 57 of the Penal
Code. With this modification the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-4018. November 18, 1907. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEMETRIO SALUDO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

The robbery of which the defendant is herein accused consisted in his taking the sum of P526 by employing force against personal property — that
is, by breaking open a trunk containing the said amount, by means of a bolo which he found in the house, where he lived as a servant of the owner
of the money, he being the only other person living there.

On the day that the robbery was discovered the defendant left the house and the town and only upon receiving word that the relative who had
recommended him for the position was under arrest did he appear in the justice’s court.

That court, on the hearing of the case, considered the proofs presented at the trial sufficient to demonstrate the commission of the crime and the
responsibility of the defendant therefor. As to this view of the court below we can find no error of fact nor of law, inasmuch as it does not conflict
with the result of the proceedings had nor with the true principles of justice.

But there is certainly an error in the qualification of the crime. The trial court regarded the robbery in question as one within the meaning of article
508, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, by reason of which, and taking into account the presence of certain aggravating circumstances of abuse of
trust and confidence surrounding the case, sentenced the defendant to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal, to indemnify the
complaining witness in the sum stolen, and to pay the cost of the suit.

Although the trunk containing the money was broken open with a cutting and dangerous weapon, there is no reason why the defendant should be
classified with "Those who should with arms rob an inhabited house . . . by breaking open a locked coffer," who are amenable to paragraph 1,
article 508, subparagraph 4, of the Penal Code; subparagraph 2 [5] is the only one applicable in this case and prescribes: "If the malefactors should
not carry arms and the extent of the robbery should exceed 1,250 pesetas, the penalty next lower shall be imposed," taking into consideration the
wording of the aforementioned subparagraph 4, with reference to breaking open a locked coffer, etc.

Hence the only penalty applicable to the defendant in this cause is the one next lower to that prescribed in paragraph 1 and applied in the
judgment below.

The Attorney-General, in moving that the penalty imposed in the lower court be modified to conform to the conclusions of law above stated, he
also asked that the costs in this instance be remitted in consideration of the fact that the appeal taken by the defendant is not wholly groundless, in
view of the excessive penalty imposed.

We therefore sentence Demetrio Saludo to six years and one day of presidio mayor and the accessory penalties, and the remainder of the sentence
below is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance de oficio. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18044. April 30, 1963.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMBROSIA VALLE, defendant, ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., bondsman-appellant.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila directing the confiscation of a bond.

Accused of estafa in Criminal Case No. D-091007 of the Municipal Court of Manila, Ambrosia Valle secured her provisional release by filing a bail
bond subscribed by herein appellant, the Alto Surety & Insurance Company, in the sum of P800.00. Subsequently convicted by said court and
sentenced accordingly, Ambrosia Valle appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila and filed an appeal bond in the sum of P500.00 posted by
appellant herein. In this bond, appellant undertook that Ambrosia Valle would "appear and answer the charge above-mentioned in whatever court
it may be tried," and would "at all times hold herself amenable to the orders and processes of the court," as well as "pay such fine as the appellate
court may direct," or "surrender her in the execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render," or "in case the cause is remanded for a
new trial," she would appear in the court to which it may be so remanded and submit her to the orders and processes thereof, or, if she fails to
perform any of these conditions, that appellant "would pay to the Republic of the Philippines the sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) Philippine
Currency."cralaw virtua1aw library

After due trial, later on, in the Court of First Instance, the same ordered appellant to produce the person of the accused for the promulgation of the
decision on September 14, 1959. On that date, Ambrosia Valle appeared before the court, which promulgated its decision, convicting her as
charged and sentencing her to 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P180.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs. The court, likewise, ordered her to appear on September 29, the last day to appeal from said
decision, in order to perfect her appeal, if she wanted to do so, and file her appeal bond, and appellant was notified accordingly, on September 15,
1959. Although somewhat late, the accused appeared before the court in the morning of September 29 and asked that she be given up to the
afternoon thereof to file her notice of appeal and appeal bond. The court granted this request and warned her to come back in the afternoon but
she did not do so. Hence, on October 1, 1959, the court issued the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Accused not having filed notice of appeal nor appeal bond and not having surrendered for execution of judgment, bail bond confiscated; let
warrant of arrest issue; execution postponed until she is arrested."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the same date, the court ordered defendant’s arrest, copy of which was received by appellant on October 3, 1959. On October 14, appellant
surrendered the accused to the trial court, which forthwith committed her to prison. The next day appellant filed a motion to lift the order of
confiscation of its bond and for the cancellation thereof, but this motion was denied in an order dated October 17, 1959. On October 22, 1959,
appellant filed notice of appeal from said orders dated October 1 and 17, 1959 to the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the latter forwarded the
records of the case to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law are involved in the appeal. Indeed, appellant maintains that
the lower court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1.." . . in postponing or in not immediately executing its judgment of conviction after the promulgation or reading thereof on September 14, 1959.

2.." . . in releasing the accused after the promulgation of its judgment of conviction without the appellant’s knowledge or consent.

3.." . . in confiscating the appellant’s bail bond after having produced the accused on the date of promulgation and/or execution of its judgment
(September 14, 1959) and on another subsequent date (September 29, 1959).

4.." . . in denying the appellant’s motion to lift the order confiscating its bail bond and to cancel the same."cralaw virtua1aw library

The first assignment of error has nothing to do with the propriety or validity of the order of confiscation of the bond. Moreover, since the
defendant was entitled to appeal, the lower court had the discretion to postpone, until the last day for the perfection of such appeal, the
determination of the question whether it should or should not order defendant’s detention or the execution of the decision of conviction.

With respect to the other alleged errors assigned by appellant, it should be noted that its liability, under the bond, continued until after the
accused had been surrendered and the court had ordered the cancellation of said bond. Thus, in People v. Lorredo (50 Phil., 218), it was
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Moreover, one of the conditions of the bond subscribed by the appellants is that if the accused is convicted, he will render himself amenable to
the judgment as well as to the execution thereof. After notification of the judgment, the accused had fifteen days within which to perfect his
appeal, and it is only after the expiration of the said fifteen days, without the accused having made use of his right, that the said judgment becomes
final. (Sec. 47, General Orders No. 58). Neither the fact, then, that the court granted the accused ten days within which to comply with the
judgment, nor the fact that his attorney guaranteed said compliance, relieves his sureties from their liability in case of non-compliance with said
judgment, because, as we have already seen, in order to be relieved from the obligation contracted by them by virtue of their bond, a judicial order
relieving them of their liability is necessary."cralaw virtua1aw library

Inasmuch, however, as the person of the accused was surrendered to the lower court shortly after the appellant’s bond had been ordered
confiscated and the arrest of the accused had been decreed, the question arises as 10 whether appellant’s liability under said bond should be
reduced or not. We do not think it should be, for this is a matter left to the sound discretion of the lower court, and its action thereon should not
be disturbed because appellant had misrepresented thereto, in its motion to lift the confiscation of the appeal bond, that the court had, on
September 29, 1959, granted the accused two days within which to file his notice of appeal and appeal bond, which is not true.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L. and Dizon, JJ., took no part.