TC – 13R

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2018

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

Dr. R.M. Swain & Ors.

(PETITIONERS)
v.

Union of Indica
(RESPONDENT)

WITH
W.P. (PIL) No. ___/2017
W.P. No. ___/2018
W.P. (PIL) No. ___/2018

PETITIONS INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 READ WITH ART. 139A

OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................................... 9

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................... 11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... 12

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................ 14

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS FILED ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA OR NOT? .............................................. 14

1. THAT THE PIL FILED BY DR. RAM SWAIN IS NOT MAINTAINABLE. ........................... 14

2. THAT THE PETITION FILED BY MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI IS NOT MAINTAINABLE. .... 15

3. THAT THE PIL FILED BY THE MPS OF WRONGRACE PARTY IS NOT MAINTAINABLE. 16

II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN

IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO 19(2) VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INDICA? ........................................................ 17

1. THAT THE IMPUGNED LAWS ARE NOT ARBITRARY AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONCEPT OF EQUALITY .................................................................................................... 18

2. THAT THE OPPUGNED LAWS DO NOT SMACK OF THE ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES
AND DO NOT VIOLATE THE SECULAR PRINCIPLES OF INDICA. ......................................... 20

3. THAT THE AMENDED LAWS DO NOT VIOLATE THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDICA. ................................................................................................ 21

III. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT

SERVES THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL
OF COMMUNAL POLITICS? ........................................................................................ 22

IV. WHETHER THE PROTECTION UNDER THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTEND TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI? .................. 24

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V. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF REFUSING TO

ENTERTAIN THE MOTION ON TWO OCASSIONS AND NOT TAKING
COGNIZANCE ON WRITTEN COMPLAINT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDICA? ............................................................................................................................. 25

1. THAT ARTICLE 118 AND 122 OF THE INDICAN CONSTITUTION IS A

BAR……………………………………………………………………………………..25

2. THAT THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF REFUSING TO ENTERTAIN THE MOTIONS

AND NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE ON WRITTEN COMPLAINT IS NOT ILLEGAL AND
UNWARRANTED. ................................................................................................................ 26

3. THAT THE IMPUGNED ACT OF THE SPEAKER IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO JUDICIAL

REVIEW IN A PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA. ........ 27

PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 29

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

¶ Paragraph

AIR All India Reporter

AP Andhra Pradesh

Art. Article

Bd. Board

Co. Company

Commr. Commissioner

Corpn. Corporation

C.T.O. Commercial Tax Officer

ed. Edition

Hon’ble Honourable

H.P. Himachal Pradesh

I.T.I Industrial Training Institute

Ltd. Limited

Mad Madras

M.P. Madhya Pradesh

MPs Members of Parliament

Ors. Others

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PIL Public Interest Litigation

Ry. Railway

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR. Supreme Court Reports

UN United Nations

UOI Union of India

Uttar Uttaranchal

v. Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. INDIAN CASES

1. Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangha (Ry.) v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCR. 185
...................................................................................................................................... 15
2. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports, AIR 1974 SC 1539 ...... 12, 25
3. Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1533 ......................................... 16
4. Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 1124 ......................... 11, 13, 25
5. Bhoruka Power Corpn. v. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 P&H 245............................... 17
6. Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 ........................... 13
7. Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O., AIR 1971 SC 870 ...................................................... 13, 25
8. Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 ................................................. 17
9. Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715 ... 11,
13
10. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 ................... 12, 25
11. Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijayakumar, (1995) 4 SCC 520 .................................... 17
12. India Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580
................................................................................................................................ 13, 25
13. Indo-Swiss Synthetic Gum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1997 Mad 41 ................................................................................................................ 17
14. Ishan Pandit v. State of H.P., AIR 1999 HP 1 ............................................................. 17
15. Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 .................. 17
16. Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 2366................................................... 17
17. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.................................................. 15, 19
18. M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., AIR 1998 SC 145 ............................................. 16
19. M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna (II) (1961) 1 SCR. 96 ................................................. 23
20. Manoj H. Mishra v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 313 .............................................. 21
21. Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748. ....................................... 13
22. Northern Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 764 ................................. 12, 25
23. Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur, AIR 1993 SC 1440 ................... 17
24. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420 .................................................... 17
25. Prakash Pani v. Speaker of Uttaranchal Assembly, AIR 2002 Uttar 11 ...................... 23
26. Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 1 ...................... 23, 24, 25

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27. Shri V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora (1959) 1 SCR. 426 ............................................ 16
28. State of A.P. v. Mc. Dowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1627 ............................................. 20
29. State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar (1952) 1 SCR. 889 ....................... 23
30. State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta AIR 1952 SC 12 ........................................... 11
31. State of Punjab v. Khan Chand., AIR 1974 SC 543 .................................................... 20
32. State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 453 .. 13
33. Suraj Mall v. I.T.I Commr., AIR 1954 SC 545 ........................................................... 17
34. Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1................................. 12, 18
35. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355 ............................... 16
36. Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622 ............................................... 13
37. Union of India v. R. Sarangapani, AIR 2000 SC 2163 ................................................ 16
38. Union of India v. Ram Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1998 SC 783 ......................................... 17

II. FOREIGN CASES

1. Mogoun v. Illinois Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1808, Supreme Court of the United States). 16

III. JOURNALS/ ARTICLES

1. Anviti Chaturvedi, Parliament and the Judiciary, PRS Legislative Research (2016)..
...................................................................................................................................... 21

IV. BOOKS

1. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India Volume 1, 986 (Hon’ble
Mr. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R.
Manohar, 8th ed., 2008). .............................................................................................. 17

2. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India Volume 2, 1389 (Hon’ble
Mr. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R.
Manohar, 8th ed., 2008) ............................................................................................... 17
3. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India Volume 4, 5484 (Hon’ble
Mr. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R.
Manohar, 8th ed., 2008). ........................................................................................ 24, 26
4. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India Volume 4, 439 (4th ed., 1991) ................ 16

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V. STATUTES REFERRED

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.

2. The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014.
3. Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, 2014.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent humbly submit that the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica
has been invoked under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indica by the Petitioners.
Article 32 of the Constitution of Indica reads as follows:
“(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 )
and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause ( 2 ).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.”

The Respondent submit that the petitions filed before the Supreme Court of Indica and High
Court of Dehri have been clubbed by the Supreme Court of Indica under Article 139A of the
Constitution of Indica.

Article 139A of the Constitution of Indica reads as follows:

“(1) Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are
pending before the Supreme Court and one or more High Courts or before two or more
High Courts and the Supreme Court is satisfied on its own motion or an application
made by the Attorney General of India or by a party to any such case that such
questions are substantial questions of general importance, the Supreme Court may
withdraw the case or cases pending before the High Court or the High Courts and
dispose of all the cases itself: Provided that the Supreme Court may after determining
the said questions of law return any case so withdrawn together with a copy of its
judgment on such questions to the High Court from which the case has been
withdrawn, and the High Court shall on receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the case
in conformity with such judgment;
(2) The Supreme Court may, if it deems it expedient so to do for the ends of justice,
transfer any case, appeal or other proceedings pending before any High Court to any
other High Court.”

The Respondents have appeared before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica in
response to the petitions filed by the Petitioners.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Constitutional Background Of Indica

The Constitution of Indica establishes Indica as a multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-cultural

and secular country. It encompasses the values of Human Dignity and Equality, its fundamental
ideology being “equality among all” in general, and “equality among equals” in particular.
Though, the Constitution provides for ‘equality of gender’, Indica has been a male-dominated
state. Being a member of the U.N., Indica has vowed to abide by and implement the mandate
of all International Human Rights Instruments. The constitutional, legal and policy framework
of the Republic of Indica is in pari materia to the Republic of India.

Emergence of 33% reservation and Article 19(2) amendment in Indica

According to U.N. rankings, the representation of women in the Indican Parliament was very
low in comparison to males. To build Indican society on the principle of real equality, women
activists demanded that at least 33% seats in both Houses of the Parliament be reserved
exclusively for women by enacting a law. The major section of the community desired Indica
to be a Hindu state and believed women to be “incapable and irresolute”. In the year 2006,
“Rashtriya Janta Party”, the ruling party of Indica, even after showing reluctance, suddenly
decided to pass the law providing 33% reservation. The main allegation against this law by the
society was that it will empower only elite class women belonging to rich and aristocratic class,
who wanted to establish their dominance in Indica. In the year 2015, the women-laden
parliament, by an amendment inserted a proviso to Article 19(2) of the Constitution stating
“Provided that in case of women, reasonable restrictions can only be imposed on the grounds
of immorality, public order and friendly relations with foreign states.” This law was being used
as a political tool by the women members of “Rashtriya Janta Party” in the Parliament to deliver
venomous and hate speeches against minority community.

PIL filed by Dr. R. M. Swain in High Court of Dehri

Dr. R.M. Swain, a member of the orthodox male-dominated society of Indica filed a PIL in the
High Court of Dehri, on December 27th, 2017 to declare the reservation as unconstitutional
alleging that the law was anti-religious and against the concept of equality. This matter is still
sub judice.

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Petition filed by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari in Supreme Court of Indica

On 26th December 2017, Mrs Fatima Ghansari, a member of the Lower House introduced a
motion alleging that the reservation law was becoming a tool of communal politics and was
used to covert Indica into a Hindu state. The orthodox religious men were using women to rig
Indica towards religious extremism and intolerance through the proviso inserted by the
amendment to Article 19(2). According to her, the ruling party in collusion with large media
houses were carrying out “Hindu” agenda which she apprised the house about through a sting
operation called “Zebra Post”. A written complaint was made to the speaker about her
accusations. However, the motion was defeated. But she continued her resentment against this
law in the Summer Session of the Parliament on 1st May, 2018 wherein the Speaker refused to
entertain it. On the same night she was threatened of dire consequences if she continues with
her resentment. Appropriate action was taken by the authorities and when the speaker was
informed about the threat, her security was increased. But since no action was taken, she filed
a petition in the Supreme Court for declaring the reservation law as unconstitutional on grounds
of it becoming a tool of communal politics since riots were taking place in Indica because of
the hate speeches delivered by women members of the party. She also prayed that the
amendment to Article 19(2) be declared unconstitutional as it violates the basic structure of the
Constitution. She had played a role of “Whistle Blower” due to which she feared her life and
prayed for adequate security against the ruling party.

PIL filed by MPs of Wrongrace party in Supreme Court of Indica

On 28th February 2018, Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. Mannat Raichandani,
were arrested for spying and providing vital state information to Indica’s enemy nation. In
addition, MPs of the “Wrongrace Party” alleged that the reservation law was using women to
divide Indica and blamed foreign powers for the same. The Speaker out-rightly rejected the
motion introduced by the MPs for repealing this law. Due to this, the MPs filed a PIL in the
Supreme Court of Indica alleging that the law serves the motive of the enemy nation and
therefore, should be declared unconstitutional.

Petitions clubbed under Article 139A of the Constitution of Indica

“Rashtriya Janta Party” opposes all the allegations in the frivolous petitions filed above,
praying that the amendment and reservation law be held constitutional. Under Article 139A of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court of Indica has clubbed all the aforesaid petitions.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS FILED ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA OR NOT?

II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN

THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO 19(2) VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INDICA?

III. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES

THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF
COMMUNAL POLITICS?

IV. WHETHER THE PROTECTION UNDER THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTEND TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?

V. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF REFUSING TO ENTERTAIN

THE MOTION ON TWO OCASSIONS AND NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE ON
WRITTEN COMPLAINT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE.

It is humbly submitted that the instant petitions are not maintainable before the Hon’ble Court
as firstly, the PIL filed by Dr. Ram Swain before the Hon’ble High Court is not maintainable
under Art. 226 as the state has performed its constitutional duty embodied upon them under
Art. 245(1) along with Art. 246(1) of the Constitution. The State has also been deputed by the
epigraph of Art. 15(3) of the constitution to make special provision for women and children.
Thus, there has been no infringement of fundamental or any of the legal rights. Secondly, the
writ petition filed before this Hon’ble Court by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is not maintainable as
she has no locus standi as none of her fundamental rights has been vindicated. Thirdly, the PIL
filed before this Hon’ble Court by MPs of Wrongrace Party is not maintainable as there is no
infringement of Fundamental Rights and moreover, such infringement cannot be founded on
remote of speculative grounds. Also, it is only alleged that foreign powers are behind the
passing of this law and that too by the party itself and contextually, per se there is no violation
of fundamental rights by such impugned action.

II. THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE

PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO 19(2) DO NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INDICA.

The law providing for 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and the proviso added to
Article 19(2) through an amendment are not violative of the constitutional principles of
Indica. Firstly, the impugned laws are not violative of the concept of equality enshrined under
Article 14 of the Constitution and are not arbitrary as they have been founded on the basis of
an intelligible differentia. Secondly, these laws are not against the principle of secularism as
they were enacted to protect the rights and interests of women in Indica and not to propagate
any religious agenda or the interests any of any particular religion. Thirdly, the laws were
enacted keeping in mind the best interests of every citizen in Indica. They are not against the
principles of equality and secularism. Therefore, the constitutional validity of the laws should
be upheld.

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III. A LAW CANNOT BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE

MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF COMMUNAL
POLITICS.

A law cannot be struck down on the ground that it serves to the motive of any foreign power
or has become a tool of communal politics because firstly, law cannot be struck down on mere
allegations, which is so to serving the motive of enemy state in the given case. Secondly, no
fundamental right of any individual has been violated in the instant case, which acts as a ground
for striking down of any law. Thirdly, the impugned laws of providing 33% reservation for
women in Parliament and the amendment to Article 19(2) are within the purview of legislative
competence, and thus cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.

IV. MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY PROTECTION UNDER

THE WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014.

Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is not entitled to seek any protection under the Whistle Blowers
Protection Act, 2014 because, firstly, her revelations affect the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign State, and lead to disruption in public order. Secondly, her allegations
fall under the provisions of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 as to information that is
restricted from being disclosed. Thirdly, thus her actions and revelations are against the
mandate of the act, and thereby she is not entitled to seek protection for the same.

V. THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF REFUSING TO ENTERTAIN THE

MOTION AND NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE OF WRITTEN COMPLAINT IS NOT
SUSCEPTIBLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.

The act of the speaker to refuse to entertain the motion is well within his purview and the legal
rights conferred to him and thus, it is not susceptible to judicial review under Article 32 of
Constitution of Indica. Firstly, the rules framed under Art. 118 have no mandatory character,
thus by reason of Art. 122, post, they are regarded as directory, so their violation would be a
mere irregularity in the procedure, having no remedy in courts. Secondly, the actions of the
Speaker are not illegal as he acted in consonance to the Rule 186 and 187 of the Rules and
Procedure of Lok Sabha. Thirdly, prima facie facts do not highlight for any violation of the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the constitution because there have been reasonable
grounds for rejecting the motion, and not dedicating the matter of complaint to parliamentary
committee.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS FILED ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA OR NOT?
(¶1) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the petitions in the form of
PIL filed by Dr. Ram Swain under Art. 226, the Petition filed by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari
under Art. 32 and the PIL filed by MPs of Wrongrace Party under Art. 32 of the
Constitution are not maintainable before the Court of Law. The petitioner lacks the
essential ingredients to maintain the matter before the apex Court. Though the Hon’ble
Court has clubbed the matters, yet certain issues regarding maintainability of the case
must be highlighted before this Court to prevent any miscarriage of justice.

1. THAT THE PIL FILED BY DR. RAM SWAIN IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

(¶2) The Respondent humbly submits that the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Art. 226 can be invoked only when the aggrieved party has a fundamental
right or a legal right and that it has been infringed 1. The petitioners are
contending on grounds of violations of right conferred by Part III of the
constitution. Thus, where there is no infringement of Fundamental Right or scope
for enforcement of any Fundamental Right, the writ petition is not maintainable
on the fragile ground2. In the instant matter, no Fundamental Right has been
infringed as the petitioner is claiming, rather the legislature has performed its
constitutional duty embodied upon them under Art. 245(1) along with Art.
246(1) of the Constitution. The State has also been deputed by the epigraph of
Art. 15(3) of the constitution to make special provision for women and children.
Moreover, infringement of Fundamental Right cannot be founded on remote of
speculative grounds3. There is no such action which infringes or poses a threat
to Fundamental Right of the citizens. Rather, the petitioner has an orthodox
mindset and could not bear this dominance of women and their interference in
affairs of men4. As coherent as it is, it is a frivolous petition. Therefore, it is

1
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta AIR 1952 SC 12.
2
Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715.
3
Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 1124.
4
Moot proposition, ¶13.

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humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the present case is not
maintainable and it should be dismissed.

2. THAT THE PETITION FILED BY MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI IS NOT

MAINTAINABLE.
(¶3) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the petition beseeching
for declaring reservation law and amendment to Art. 19(2) of the Constitution as
unconstitutional and for providing protection under Whistle Blower Protection
Act, 2014 is not maintainable before the court.
(¶4) No action lies in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 unless there is an
infringement of a Fundamental Right5, as the Supreme Court has previously
emphasized that the violation of Fundamental Right is the sine qua non of the
exercise of the right conferred by Art. 32.6 For invoking Art.32, there must be a
clear breach of fundamental right not involving disputed questions of law or
fact7. Per se the reservation law and the new proviso inserted in 19(2) has made
Mrs. Ghansari as the beneficiary of the particular laws. Succinctly it can be posed
that none of her fundamental rights per se is being violated by such law. Also,
it is to be noted that the Supreme court can strike down a law only if there is a
clear constitutional violation and not merely because of its falling into disuse or
because the perception of society has changed regarding legitimacy of purpose
and need of the law in question8. Also, her plea for providing protection under
Whistle Blower Protection Act, 2014 doesn’t have the potential grounds to
showcase the violation of any of her fundamental rights. In fact, on receiving her
complaint the Speaker in turn, increased her security9. Now her threat to life has
already been guarded and violation of Art. 21 per se can’t be pleaded.
(¶5) In addition to this, a person acquires a locus standi, when he has to have a
personal or individual right which has been violated or threatened to be
violated10. Since, no right of petitioner has been infringed, he has no locus standi
before the Court.

5
Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports, AIR 1974 SC 1539.
6
Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344.
7
Northern Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 764.
8
Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1.
9
Moot proposition, ¶16.
10
Calcutta Gas Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044.

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(¶6) This Hon’ble Court has itself imposed a self-restraint in its own wisdom on
the exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 32 where the party invoking the
jurisdiction has an effective adequate alternative remedy in the form of Art. 226
of the Constitution, although this Rule is a Rule of convenience and discretion
rather than a Rule of law11. But, where writ petition is challenging the
Constitutional validity of any provision, then the petitioner should file writ
petition before High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution12. Moreover, in
order to invoke the jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution to approach this
Court directly, it has to be shown by the petitioner as to why the High Court has
not been approached, could not be approached or it is futile to approach the High
Court. Unless satisfactory reasons are indicated in this regard, filing of petition
in such matters directly under Art. 32 of the Constitution is to be discouraged13.
(¶7) Hence, in light of the cogently laid arguments and facts broached, it is
submitted that the petition submitted before this Hon’ble Court is not
maintainable and thus should be rejected.

3. THAT THE PIL FILED BY THE MPS OF WRONGRACE PARTY IS

NOT MAINTAINABLE.
(¶8) It is well settled principle that Supreme Court can’t determine an issue not
involving fundamental right14. No question other than relating to a Fundamental
Right will be determined in a proceeding under Art. 3215. Thus, where there is
no infringement of Fundamental Right or scope for enforcement of any
Fundamental Right, the writ petition is not maintainable on the fragile ground16.
Moreover, infringement of Fundamental Right cannot be founded on remote of
speculative grounds17. The Wrongrace party being motivated by its political
agenda and in the guise of public interest has approached this court. It is only
alleged that foreign powers are behind the passing of this law. And contextually,
per se there is no violation of fundamental rights by such impugned action. The
grounds raised by the petitioner is fragile and also not in the interest of public. It

11
Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748.
12
State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 453.
13
Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622.
14
India Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580.
15
Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O., AIR 1971 SC 870.
16
Supra 2.
17
Supra 3.

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is to be duly noted that the MPs of Wrongrace Party are relying on the
unprecedented event of 28th February, 201818. There was alleged involvement of
foreign powers behind the enactment of this law and the motive was to divide
Indica by using women as a tool19. But merely on such alleged frivolous grounds
without any propellent proof, and assuming in itself that something hypothetical
would happen in future, doesn’t amount for a PIL to be maintainable. Also, the
docket of safeguarding the integrity of country and assuring its security from
foreign powers is bestowed as an inherent obligation in the State. It should be
unanimously assumed and presumed that the State is diligent enough in
performing its duty. The three arrested ladies aren’t affiliated to any political
party. The impugned law which has been passed is a result of reflective thought
process. Hence, in light of the facts highlighted, expostulated thesis and
vehement arguments raised, the petition is not maintainable in this court.

II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN

IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO 19(2) VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INDICA?
(¶9) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the amended laws do not
violate the constitutional provisions of the State of Indica. The basic principle of social
justice as enunciated by Rawls is: “All social primary goods—Liberty and opportunity,
income and wealth, and the basis of self-respect are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any or all these goods is to the advantage of the last favoured.”
One of the essential elements of this conception of social justice is what he calls the
principle of redress: “This is the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress;
and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities
are somehow to be compensated for.” Society must, therefore, treat more favourably
those with fewer native assets and those born into less favourable social positions.20 In
the present case, we are concerned with the right of an individual to equal opportunity
on one hand and preferential treatment to an individual belonging to a backward class
in order to bring about an equal level-playing field in the matter of public employment.
Therefore, in the present case, we are concerned with conflicting claims within the

18
Moot proposition, ¶19.
19
Moot proposition, ¶20.
20
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangha (Ry.) v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCR. 185.

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concept of “justice, social, economic and political”, which concept exists both in Part
III and Part IV of the constitution. The concept of “public employment” unlike the right
to property is socialistic and therefore, falls within the Preamble to the constitution.
Therefore, the concept of “equality of opportunity” in public employment concerns an
individual, whether that individual belongs to the general category or backward class.21
“The rule of equality permits many inequalities. And necessarily so. In a classification
for government purposes, there cannot be any exact exclusion or inclusion of persons
and things.”22

1. THAT THE IMPUGNED LAWS ARE NOT ARBITRARY AND NOT

VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY.
(¶10) According to the doctrine of classification, equal protection of the laws
must mean the protection of equal laws for all persons similarly situated. To
separate persons similarly situated from those who are not we must
‘discriminate’, that is, act on the basis of differences between persons, or,
observe distinctions carefully between persons who are and persons who are not,
similarly situated.23 “Permissible classification” must satisfy two conditions- a)
it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and b) the
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question, so that the object by itself cannot be the basis of
classification. A law based on a permissible classification, fulfils the guarantee
of the equal protection of the laws and is valid.24 In the present case, the
classification is permissible as it satisfies both the conditions, first, it is formed
on an intelligible differentia as women were never considered to be equal to men.
Since ancient times Indica had been a patriarchal society where men hold the
power and women are largely excluded from it. Women are considered to be
incapable and irresolute and hence, accurate, judicious and timely decisions were
unexpected from them in exigent circumstances. Secondly, the differentia had a

21
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
22
Mogoun v. Illinois Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1808, Supreme Court of the United States).
23
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India Volume 4, 439 (4th ed., 1991).
24
Supra 21.

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rational nexus to the object of the legislations i.e. empowerment and proper
representation of women in the society to bring them to an equal level with men.
(¶11) Equality before law means that among equals the law should be equal and
should be equally administered and the likes should be treated alike. Equality
before law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated as
though they are the same.25 The question of discrimination, if any, can arise only
or between persons who are similarly, if not identically situated.26 Conferment
of special benefits or protection of rights to a particular group of citizens for
rational reasons is envisaged under article 14 and it is implicit in the concept of
equality.27 Article 14 has inbuilt flexibility and it also permits different treatment
to unequal’s as it only prohibits discrimination amongst the equals.28 Paradoxical
as it may seem, the concept of equality permits rational or discriminating
discrimination.29
(¶12) The special provisions for women and children in Article 15(3) or for the
backward classes in Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) cannot be challenged on the ground
that they violate the rule of equality enunciated in Art 14. 30 It was held that if
there is a discrimination in favour of a particular sex, that discrimination would
be permissible provided “it is not only on ground of sex”, or in other words the
classification on the ground of sex is permissible provided that the classification
is the result of other considerations besides the fact that the persons belonging to
that class are of a particular sex.31 The reservation made in the present case was
not only on the basis of sex, but it was done with the intention to protect women
from the burden of patriarchal society and to protect their rights. Making special
provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the state was held
as an integral part pf Art 15(3) and the said power is not whittled down in any
manner by art 16. Reservation of 30% for women was therefore held to be
valid.32

25
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1533.
26
Union of India v. R. Sarangapani, AIR 2000 SC 2163.
27
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
28
M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., AIR 1998 SC 145.
29
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India Volume 2, 1389 (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R. Manohar, 8th ed., 2008).
30
Shri V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora (1959) 1 SCR. 426.
31
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India Volume 1, 986 (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R. Manohar, 8th ed., 2008).
32
Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijayakumar, (1995) 4 SCC 520.

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(¶13) It was held that equality postulates not merely legal equality but also real
equality. It is a positive act and to make equality, a reality state is under an
obligation to undertake affirmative action. It was further reiterated that though
equal protection clause prohibits the state from making unreasonable
discrimination in providing preferences and facilities for any section of the
people, nevertheless it requires the state to afford substantially equal opportunity
to those placed unequally.33 It is necessary to take into account de-facto
inequalities which exist in the society and to take affirmative action by way of
giving preference to the socially and economically disadvantaged persons or
inflicting handicaps on those more advantageously placed in order to bring about
real equality.34 The members of the minority community opposed these laws
because according to them men and women can never be equal. Some factions
of people from the majority community also agreed with them. Real inequalities
existed in the State of Indica where representation of women was substantially
very low.
(¶14) When a law is challenged as offending against equality, the question for
determination by the Court is not whether it has resulted in inequality, but
whether there is some difference which bears a just and reasonable relation to
the object of the legislation.35 The right of equality of treatment applies only to
equals and not unequals.36

2. THAT THE OPPUGNED LAWS DO NOT SMACK OF THE ULTERIOR

RELIGIOUS MOTIVES AND DO NOT VIOLATE THE SECULAR
PRINCIPLES OF INDICA.
(¶15) The law providing for 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and
the amendment to Art.19(2) were enacted for the purpose of proper
representation of women candidates in the legislature of the country so as to
frame laws keeping in mind the inferior status of women in Indica. The freedom

33
Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
34
See Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 2366;
Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697.
35
Suraj Mall v. I.T.I Commr., AIR 1954 SC 545.
36
See Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur, AIR 1993 SC 1440; Indo-Swiss Synthetic Gum
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1997 Mad 41; Ishan Pandit v. State of H.P., AIR
1999 HP 1; Bhoruka Power Corpn. v. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 P&H 245; Union of India v. Ram Gopal
Agarwal, AIR 1998 SC 783.

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of speech and expression given to women under Art.19(2) will help them raise
their voices against the discrimination inflicted upon them since ages. These laws
were neither enacted for propagating any religious agenda, nor do they promote
the interests of any particular religion. They were enacted to protect the rights
and interests of women in Indica.
(¶16) If these laws were used by some members to propagate their religious
agenda, those particular people can be prosecuted under the penal provisions of
the country but only because it is abused by few members does not mean that it
is a bad law. It was held in Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation37, that the
Supreme Court can strike down a law only if there is a clear constitutional
violation and not merely because of its falling into abuse or because the
perception of society has changed regarding legitimacy of purpose and need of
the law in question.
(¶17) The allegations put forward by Ms. Fatima Ghansari like the law providing
33% reservation was becoming a tool in the hands of the ruling party which was
being used to achieve their own hidden agenda and that behind the mask of
women, orthodox religious men were going against the minority community to
rig the state towards extremism and intolerance, were not based on any
substantial proof. Ms. Fatima when apprised the house about the sting operation
which reveals that the members of the ruling party in collusion with media
houses were carrying on “Hindu” agenda, there was no inquiry made in this
respect. These were mere allegations without any reasonable proof.

3. THAT THE AMENDED LAWS DO NOT VIOLATE THE BASIC

STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.
(¶18) It was held in the case of M Nagaraj v Union of India38 that “In the matter
of application of the principle of basic structure, twin tests have to be satisfied,
namely the ‘width test’ and the test of ‘identity’.” The boundaries of the “width”
of power, namely (1) the ceiling limit of 50% (quantitative limitation), (2) the
principle of creamy layer (qualitative exclusion), (3) the compelling reasons,
namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and, (4) overall

37
Supra 8.
38
Supra 21.

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administrative efficiency are not annihilated by the impugned amendments. The

reservation was only 33% which was within the prescribed limits, there was no
backwardness or inadequacy of representation of women as about 11% of the
representation in the Parliament was by women which can be due to other factors
like family pressure or illiteracy. After these amendments, the overall efficiency
was rather increased. Therefore, these laws were enacted keeping in mind the
best interests of every person in Indica.
(¶19) Secondly, applying the test of “identity”, there was no alteration in the
existing structure of the Constitution by the impugned amendments. “Equity,
justice and efficiency are the limitations on the mode of the exercise of power by
the State. None of these limitations have been removed by the impugned
amendments. None of the axioms like secularism, federalism etc. which are
overarching principles have been violated by the constitutional amendments.
There is no violation of the basic structure of the constitution by any of the
amendments.” These amendments are curative by nature. They are enacted as a
remedy for the past historical discriminations against a particular class of
citizens.
(¶20) Thirdly, every discretionary power is not necessarily discriminatory. The
principle of equality is not violated merely due to the conferment of discretionary
power. It is violated by arbitrary exercise by those on whom it is conferred. This
is the theory of guided power.39

III. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT

SERVES THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A
TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?
(¶21) The Judiciary adjudicates disputes and administers justice under law. In addition,
the higher judiciary (Supreme Court and High Courts) act as the custodian of the
Constitution because it is responsible for its interpretation and enforcement. The higher
judiciary is also conferred with the powers to strike down laws of Parliament and
actions of the Executive as invalid, if they violate the Constitution, thereby enunciating

39
Supra 21.

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the principle of judicial review.40 For example, a law may be declared as invalid if it
violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A law may also be
declared invalid if its subject-matter is outside Parliament’s area of competence for e.g.
a central law on police may be invalid because police falls within the state legislatures’
domain. However, grounds for striking down an act are only two, lack of legislative
competence and violation of fundamental rights or constitutional provision.41
(¶22) The Court can strike down a statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy
for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or
classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and
uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable to discriminate between persons
or things similarly situated and that, therefore the discrimination is inherent in statute
itself. In such a case, the Court will strike down both the law as well as the executive
action under such law.42
(¶23) In the present case, the laws were introduced with the purpose of empowering
women in Indica and mere deviations from its purpose cannot become a ground for
striking down the provisions altogether. Although, Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini
Paul and Mrs. Mannat Raichandani were instrumental forces behind the passing of the
reservation law, they do not fall within the purview of ‘public servants’ or the legislative
law-making process. Therefore, the arrest of these women and allegations against them
by the intelligence agency are separate from the State and due to their actions, doubts
cannot be raised against the Legislature which never had the intent to provide a scope
for these provisions to be abused but enacted these laws to safeguard the interests of
women in the society. Thus, the enactment and implementation of these laws was well
within the competence of the legislature.
(¶24) The other ground for declaring a law unconstitutional is whether it violates any
fundamental rights of the citizens of the country. The legislature passes and enacts laws
by keeping in mind the interests of all the communities and sections of society, as the
Republic of Indica is a multi-religious, multi-cultural and secular country.43 In the
instant matter, the laws that were enacted were in furtherance of providing freedom and

40
Anviti Chaturvedi, Parliament and the Judiciary, PRS Legislative Research (29/11/2016), available at
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Conference%202016/Parliament%20and%20Judiciary.pdf, last seen on
29/08/18.
41
State of A.P. v. Mc. Dowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1627.
42
State of Punjab v. Khan Chand., AIR 1974 SC 543.
43
Moot proposition, ¶2.

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representation to the women in Indican society. The objective of the Parliament was
never to favour any particular religion as the laws ware framed keeping in mind the
foundations of Indican Constitution which are based on the overarching principle of
secularism where every person has the right to profess and propagate the religion of his
choice, thereby not infringing any fundamental rights of the citizens of the country.
Thus, laws cannot be struck down altogether because these provisions support the
women in Indica and not any specific religion, thus cannot be held to be acting as a tool
of communal politics.

IV. WHETHER THE PROTECTION UNDER THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTEND TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
(¶25) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the protection as provided
under The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 does not extend to Mrs. Fatima
Ghansari.
(¶26) Every informer cannot automatically be said to be a bonafide “whistleblower” as
his honesty, integrity and motivation should leave little or no room for doubt.44 It is
not enough that such person is from the same organisation and privy to some
information, not available to the general public. It should not be incidental or be by
product for an action taken for some ulterior or selfish motive or merely to seek
publicity.45
(¶27) Herein, in the instant case, Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is contending that she is playing
the role of a “whistleblower” as she has pointed out the hidden agenda of the ruling
party46 of converting Indica into a “Hindu” state. The law regarding 33% reservation
for women in the Parliament and the amendment to Art. 19(2) were enacted and passed
for increasing women representation and say, without being discriminatory towards a
particular religion. Being from the minority community, she alleged this for her own
selfish motives and for gaining publicity, thus, her disclosures including the revelations
about the sting operation were done for her own personal gains and not for the benefit
of public at large. One of the basic requirements of a person being accepted as a
“whistleblower” that his primary motive for the activity should be in furtherance of
public good.

44
Manoj H. Mishra v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 313.
45
Ibid.
46
Moot Proposition, ¶18.

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(¶28) Also, the Act as passed by the Parliament lays down certain restrictions as to the
cases in which the individuals are restricted from disclosing various aspects, falling
under which any of the categories, they are not protected under the said act. Any
information that is likely to affect the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order or incitement
to an offence, involving the disclosure of proceedings of the Cabinet of the Union
Government or any Committee of the Cabinet,47 is restricted from being disclosed and
any person disclosing any information pertaining to such matters would not be covered
under the purview of the said Act. Any individual, whether an internal or external
whistleblower, would thus not be protected under the said act, if the disclosure falls
under any of the above specified categories, per se.
(¶29) Thus, in the said matter, Ms. Fatima Ghansari would not be protected under the
provisions of the said Act as the given case is violative of the Section 8 of the Act,
whereby her revelations involve disclosure relating to the restricted subject matters
pertaining to the proceedings of the Lok Sabha, which falls under the purview of being
a Cabinet of the Union Government.

V. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF REFUSING TO

ENTERTAIN THE MOTION ON TWO OCASSIONS AND NOT TAKING
COGNIZANCE ON WRITTEN COMPLAINT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A PROCEEDING UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?

(¶30) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the oppugned action of the
speaker is not susceptible to judicial review under Article 32 of the Constitution of
Indica and the speaker acted in consonance with the rules and procedure.

1. THAT ARTICLE 118 AND 122 OF THE INDICAN CONSTITUTION IS

A BAR.
(¶31) The proviso of Article 118(1) states that “Each House of Parliament may
make rules for regulations, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, its
procedure and the conduct of its business.” But the Rules framed under Art. 118
have no mandatory character. They are more in the nature of code of

47
S. 8, The Whistle blowers Protection Act, 2014.

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instructions48. So far as the courts are concerned, by reason of Art. 122, post,
they are regarded as directory, so their violation would be a mere irregularity in
the procedure, for which there is no remedy in the courts 49. The courts are not
entitled to question the validity of any proceeding in parliament on the ground of
irregularity of procedure50. Article 122(1) makes a provision which is relevant.
It lays down that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called
in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure51. Article
122(2) confers immunity on the officers and members of Parliament in whom
powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or
conduct of the business or for maintaining order in Parliament from being subject
to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those
powers52. Mere non-compliance with the rules of procedure cannot be a ground
for issuing a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution.53

2. THAT THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF REFUSING TO

ENTERTAIN THE MOTIONS AND NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE ON
WRITTEN COMPLAINT IS NOT ILLEGAL AND UNWARRANTED.
(¶32) It is to be duly noted that the powers to regulate Procedure and Conduct of
Business of the House of the People vests in the Speaker of the House54. Also,
by virtue of Art 118(1), Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok
Sabha has been enacted and is revised from time to time.
(¶33) The incumbent fact leading to such refusal of motion by the speaker is that
it related to a matter which is under adjudication by a court of law. The unfolding
event of 27th December, 201755 wherein a PIL was filed by Dr. Ram Swain, to
declare reservation as unconstitutional, is still sub judice. The motion urging to
declare reservation as unconstitutional was raised sub sequentially on 1st May,

48
Prakash Pani v. Speaker of Uttaranchal Assembly, AIR 2002 Uttar 11.
49
State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar (1952) 1 SCR. 889.
50
M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna (II) (1961) 1 SCR. 96.
51
Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 1.
52
Ibid.
53
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India Volume 4, 5484 (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R. Manohar, 8th ed., 2008).
54
Supra 51.
55
Moot Proposition, ¶13.

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201856 by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari and on 10th May, 201857 by MPs of Wrongrace
Party.
(¶34) Rule 186 (viii)58 read along with Rule 18759 states that the any motion will
not be admissible by the speaker if it relates to any matter which is under
adjudication by a court of law having jurisdiction in any part of India. The motion
raised herein was sub judice in the court of law. The speaker acted in conformity
of the Rules of Lok Sabha and refused to entertain the motion. The decision of
the speaker was a bona fide one. Otherwise, if the speaker would have had
allowed the motion, he would have acted ultra vires.
(¶35) It is also not a plausible ground to making it necessary to formulate a
committee on receiving any formal complaint. The credibility of the sting
operation can’t be adjudged by the speaker and merely on grounds of speculation
and alleged remarks, the Speaker can’t form a committee to probe into the matter.
The Speaker is a man of diligence, apprehended by the law to regulate the smooth
functioning of the house. Moreover, guided by his assiduity and given his
satisfaction in accepting the complaint, he is not bound by law to form a
committee on every other matter. The complainant may proceed with other
remedial recourse.

3. THAT THE IMPUGNED ACT OF THE SPEAKER IS NOT

SUSCEPTIBLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A PROCEEDING UNDER
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA.
(¶36) No action lies in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 unless there is an
infringement of a Fundamental Right60, as the Supreme Court has previously
emphasized that the violation of Fundamental Right is the sine qua non of the
exercise of the right conferred by Art. 32.61 For invoking Art.32, there must be a
clear breach of fundamental right not involving disputed questions of law or

56
Moot proposition, ¶15.
57
Moot Proposition, ¶20.
58
Rule 186(viii), Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, 2014.
59
Rule 187, Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, 2014.
60
Supra 5.
61
Supra 6.

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fact62. Per se it is crystal clear that the Speaker acted in consonance with the rules
and procedure of Lok Sabha, diligently giving a fair decision.
(¶37) Prima facie facts does not highlight for any violation of the fundamental
rights conferred by Part III of the constitution. There have been reasonable
grounds for rejecting the motion, so Art 14 also can’t be invoked. Also, it is a
well settled principle that Supreme Court can’t determine an issue not involving
fundamental right63. No question other than relating to a Fundamental Right will
be determined in a proceeding under Art. 3264. Moreover, infringement of
Fundamental Right cannot be founded on remote of speculative grounds65.
(¶38) Resonating with the principles of Art. 122, mere non-compliance with the
rules of procedure cannot be a ground for issuing a writ under Art. 32 of the
Constitution66. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the Constitution
guarantees the right to a Constitutional remedy and relates only to the
enforcement of the right conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a
question of enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not
apply67. As, there has been no violation of fundamental rights and if can be
claimed, though not evidently, there is only procedural irregularity, so the
impugned act of the speaker is not susceptible to judicial review in a proceeding
under article 32 of the Constitution of Indica.

62
Supra 7.
63
Supra 14.
64
Supra 15.
65
Supra 3.
66
Supra 53.
67
Supra 51.

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PRAYER

In the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced the
Counsel for the Respondents respectfully request the Hon’ble Court to find and declare:

1. That the aforesaid petitions are not maintainable before this Hon’ble Court;

2. That the impugned laws do not violate the constitutional principles of Indica including the
concept of Equality, Secularism and Basic Structure;

3. That disrupting communal harmony and catering to the interest of enemy state cannot be
valid grounds for striking down a law;

4. That Mrs. Fatima Ghansari does not fall within the purview of The Whistle Blowers
Protection Act, 2014;

5. That the actions of the Speaker is not susceptible to judicial review.

And to:

1) dismiss the writ of mandamus prayed by the petitioner;

2) uphold the validity of the law providing for 33% reservation for women in the Parliament
as well as the amendment to Article 19(2);

3) declare that the actions of the Speaker were valid and licit.

And pass such other order or orders as the Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of justice,
equity and good conscience.

All of which is humbly prayed.

Sd/-

Counsel for the Respondent

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