Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AFGHANISTAN

Author(s): Zubeida Hasan
Source: Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 17, No. 1 (First Quarter, 1964), pp. 48-57
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
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 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AFGHANISTAN

The foreignpolicy of Afghanistanmay be summedup in the following

two statements:
". . . Afghanistan'straditionalpolicy is the safeguardingof its national
independencethroughnon-alignment,friendshipand co-operationwith all
countries."1

willcontinueto supportthedemandforPakhtoonistan. . ."2

"Afghanistan
These objectivesof theAfghanforeignpolicy are derived fromprimarily
threeimportantfactors,viz., geo-politics,economicneeds and racial structure.

It was due to its strategiclocationthatthis small CentralAsian kingdom

(250,000sq. milesand population13,000,000)gainedpoliticalimportancein the
nineteenthcentury.It becamethe scene of diplomatictusslesand violentstrife
betweenthetwogreatest empiresof thetime- theBritishand theRussian. Today,
the same patterncontinues,as Afghanistantries to steer an uneasycourse of
politicaland economicneutrality betweentheEast and theWest.Of thethreenon-
Communiststateson the strategicsouthernbordersof theSovietUnion which
has withit a 1,250milescommonboundary,Afghanistanalone is non-aligned.
This factis of vitalimportance.Wedgedin betweenPakistanand Iran, both of
whichare membersof Cento,Afghanistan is theonlybarrierstatebetweenthe
UnitedStates'military allyPakistan and thehighlydiversified industrial
complex
newlyestablishedin SovietCentralAsia. This complexcentresroundcitiessuch
as Tashkent,Samarkand,Leninabad,Stalinabadand Fergana.3 Apartfromthe
securityaspectsin thecold wartheSovietUnion also fearsthatAfghanterritory
mightbe used to inciteracial troublesin Soviet Turkestanwhichborderson
Afghanistan. The Soviet regimestill remembers the Basmachmovementof the
1920's, in which use was made of the adjacent Afghanterritory, inhabitedby
Tadzik, Uzbek, Turkmen and other Turkic people, for organisingrising in
Turkestan.A serious threatto the Soviet regimein Turkestancould arise if
Afghanterritory were to be available for activitiesagainst the Soviet Union.
ConsequentlyAfghanistan occupiesan importantpositionin Sovietpolicy.
*Joint communique issuedon7 September1963attheconclusion of KingZahirShah's
visittotheUSA,AsianRecorder , NewDelhi,8-14October 1963,p. 5447.
2Dr. Yusuf'spolicy statementon 14March1963,Ibid.,7-13May1963,p. 5181.
3P. G. Franck, Afghanistan BetweenEastand West , Washington, NationalFlanning
I960,p. 9.
Association,
48

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 49

On the otherhand the WesternPowers fearthat completeeconomicand

political dominationof that countryby the Soviet Union would jeopardise
theirpositionin the Middle East. Believingthat Afghanistanlies in the path
of the Russian pressuretowardthe sea, and on the traditionalinvasionroute
to India, the WesternPowers are convincedthat the Soviet Union's ultimate
objective is to take over Afghanistanand then drive throughtowards the
ArabianSea, thusdividingthe CENTO allies- Pakistan and iran.1 Thus the
strategicimportanceof Afghanistanhas renderedit the object of competition
betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union. This has directlymoulded
Afghanpolicytowardsthetwo powers.

Economically,Afghanistanis facedwiththreebasic requirements - a trade

outletto the sea, trade and aid for economic development.Afghanistanis a
landlockedstate withprimitivemeans of communications.It has no railroads
of any significance and it is only now that roads are beingdeveloped.Afghan
tradecan pass throughthreeoverlandroutes,viz., throughPakistan,Iran and
the Soviet Union. The route fromAfghanistanthroughthe Khyber Pass to
the port of Karachi in Pakistanis the most naturaland best developedtrade
routeforAfghanistan.However,Afghanistanhas not utilizedthis route fully
due to its political differences with Pakistan. The need for alternativetransit
arrangements has been a factorin mouldingAfghanpolicytowardsits northern
neighbour.Thus in 1950 when the Pak-Afghanborder was closed for three
months,Afghanistanconcluded a trade agreementwith the USSR. It was
not practicalto use the overland route throughIran which is long, tortuous
and expensive.Again in 1955 the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderwas sealed for
fivemonthson account of the Pakhtunistandispute. This time Afghanistan
negotiateda transitagreementwiththe Soviet Union whichgave Afghanistan
the rightof duty freetransitof goods throughSoviet territory.2 Though in
1958, Pakistanand Afghanistanconcludeda transitagreement, closingof
the
the border in September1961 made Afghanistanentirelydependenton the
Soviet Union fortransitfacilities, and thetraderouteran fromKushka, Kelif,
Tashguzarand Kyzyl-Kalato the Black Sea and the Baltic ports. During the
twentymonthsthat the Pak-Afghanborder was closed in 1961-63,the trade
routes,throughIran and Pakistanwere used only once to clear United States
aid goods destinedfor Afghanistan. In January1962 Afghanistanand Iran
concluded a transitagreementin order to allow American goods to go to
i J. S. Roucek,"The Geopolitics of Afghanistan",UnitedAsia,Bombay, Vol. XI,
No. 6, 1959,p. 512.
2R.K. Ramazani, "AfghanistanandtheUSSR , TheMiddleEast Journal,Washington,
Spring 1958,pp.146and148-9

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 50

Afghanistan.1 By a special agreementPakistanopened its borderwithAfghan-

istan in January1962 for eightweeksto clear Americangoods whichhad ac-
cumulatedat Peshawar.2This showstheimportanceof theneed forAfghanistan
of an overlandrouteand therolethatthisneedhas playedin shapingits policies.
Thus at the Geneva Conferenceon the Law of the Sea in 1958, Afghanistan
joined theSovietUnion and thirteenothernationsto sponsora joint resolution
demandingforcoastlesscountriesan absoluterightacrosscoastal states.3

Foreigntradehas been a vital necessityfor Afganistanever since the

countryhas been a national entity.Afghanistan has fewnatural resourcesand
so it depends for most of its consumergoods,exceptfood, and forall its pro-
ducergoods on imports.Its chiefexports,Karakul furand agricultural products,
provideforthe muchneededimportsand theyformthe main sourceof capital
in the country.As Afghanistan'sforeignpolicyis partlygovernedby its trade
requirements, thetrendin Afghantradeis a pointerto theorientationof Afghan
policy. Whilethe UnitedStates' sharein theAfghantradeis about 12 per cent
thatof theSovietUnion is about 33 percent.More than50 percentof Afghan-
istan's trade is with the Communistbloc.4 Apart fromthe volume of trade
anotherdetermining factoris the natureof the commoditiesin whichtradeis
carriedon. Thus the Soviet Union exertsa growingcontrolon Afghanistan's
foreigntradeas the latteris mostlydependenton the formerforits petroleum
needs, gasoline, diesel fuel and keroseneare productswhich Afghanistanis
as yet unable to produce for itself,and whichmust be importedto keep the
country'seconomyrunning.Gasoline, whichconstitutes71 per centof Afghan
petroleumimport,was previouslysuppliedbyPakistanforautomobilefueland
by the Soviet Union foraviationfuel.However,due to frictionwithPakistan,
the Soviet Union has establisheditselfas the supplierof halfof Afghanistan's
needs of petroleum productsupon whichthe countryrelies exclusivelyfor
its entire mechanical transport, for its diesel-electricgeneratorsand for
muchurban and all rurallightingin the formof kerosenelamps. In orderto
consolidateits positionas the main petroleumsupplier,the Soviet Union has
constructedstorage facilitiesat Mazar-e-Sharif,threeadditional depots and
a large tank farmin Kabul. The Russians have also built a riverportfor the
transportation of oil at Kyzyl-Kala,and, by improvingthe road to Kandahar,
they have decreased SouthernAfghanistan'sdependenceon Pakistanforits oil
1AsianRecorder 1962,p. 4407.
, op.cit.,5-11February
2Ibid.,5-11 March1962,p. 4459.
3Franck, op.cit, p 76.
4 TheBritishSurvey , London.The BritishSocietyforInternational
Understanding,
October 1960,p. 3.

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 51

requirements.1Soviet-Afghan tradehas been facilitatedby geographicalproxi-

mity,the in
difficulties transportfromothercountriesand the easy termsof
tradeofferedby the SovietUnion.

The need of aid foreconomicdevelopmenthas been anotherdetermining

factorin Afghanforeignpolicy.The Afghansrealize that theirunder develop-
ment,which in the 18tb and 19th centurieswas the price theypaid for an
insulatedindependence,is a disadvantagein themodernworld. Afghanistanis
surroundedby countries,which thoughnot economicallywell advanced, are
takingrapidstridesin economicand social development.Situatedin themiddle
of thesedynamicforces^Afghanistan can no longeraccepttheroleof an isolated
power and the Afghanleaders have expressedtheirdesire to force the pace
of national economicand social developmentas rapidlyas possible.2 The first
and Second Five-YearPlans wereintroducedin 1956 and 1961 respectively. To
meettheirforeignexchangerequirements, bothplans dependheavilyon foreign
sources.Hence Afghanistan's relationswithothercountriesare largelyinfluenced
by its need for foreigncapital throughaid and creditsand in particularits
policytowardsthe big powersis determinedlargelyby that need. The United
Stateswas the firstin thisfield,a contracthavingbeen signedby Afghanistan
withMorrison-KnudsonCo. as earlyas 1946 to develop the Helmand Valley.
The United StatesExport-Import Bank approveda $21 millioncreditforthis
projectin 1950 and a second loan of $18.5 millionin 1954. It was in 1956
thatICA firstextendeddevelopment assistanceof $15.3 million.This was forthe
of
development airtransport3. Laterin 1960,1961, 1962 and 1963it gave credits
of $4.9 million,$4 million,$38 millionand $2 millionrespectively.4

Althoughthe Soviet Union enteredthis fieldlater,the amount of the aid

it has givenfar exceeds the Americansum. In 1954 the Soviet Union gave a
creditof $3.5 millionto financetheconstruction of grainelevators,mechanized
flourmills and a bread baking plant. The same year the Soviet Union sanc-
tioned $1.2 millionand $2 millionfor the constructionof gasoline pipelines
and forstreetpaving. However,it was in 1955 that creditof $100 millionfor
agricultural and industrialprojectswas announced.Later Soviet creditsinclude
a $15 millionloan in 1957 foroil prospectingand drilling,a $80 millionloan
i A. A. Michel,"ForeignTradeand ForeignPolicyin Afghanistan", MiddleEastern
NewYork,January
Affairs, 1961,pp.10-12.
2Dr. Yusuf'sPolicyStatement on 17 March1963,AsianRecorder , op. cit.,23-29April
1963,p. 5157.
3 Franck,op.cit.,pp.36-47.
*AsianRecorder , op.cit.,9-15July1962,p. 4669 30July- 5 August1963,p. 5327.

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 52

for highwayconstructionin 1959,1 and a $350 millionloan for the Second

Plan period of 1962-67.2 "While the United States had supplied $178 million
between1954and 1963,theSovietUnion gave $515 millionin thesame period.3
The Soviet Union also meetsnearly70 per cent of Afghanistan'sforeignex-
changerequirement. These figuresexplainthe pro-Sovietorientationof Afghan
foreignpolicy.Apart fromthe size of the aid the Soviet Union won the good-
willoftheAfghansbygoinginforprojectswhichtheAfghansfeltwereimportant,
while the United States refusedto undertakea numberof projects on the
groundthat theywere uneconomical.Soviet aid has been used for the con-
structionof grain mills,bakeries,concreteplants, oil storagedepots, a glass
plant, an automobilerepairplantand powerstations.The Russians have done
much to improvecommunicationsby buildinga heavy transportroad across
theSalanag Pass, a highwaybetweenKushka-Herat-Kandahar(to be completed
in 1964) and a riverport at Kyzyl-Kala.4 Most Westernobservers,however,
believethatthe Soviet Union is improvingcommunicationsin Afghanistanso
thatit mayhave easy access to thePakistanborder.5

Anotherimportantfactorin Afghanistan's foreignpolicyis theethnological

diversityof its population.Located on the main routefromWesternto Eastern
Asia, Afghanistan has been affected by themigrationof races. Broadlyspeaking
thereare threemain races in Afghanistan - the Pathans or trueAfghansin the
east and south,the Turkictribesin the north,and the Persianspeakingtribes
in the west.The Pathans constitutethe largestracial group and are estimated
to be 50 or 60 per cent of the population.6However,the importantfeatueis
that most of the ethnicgroupsfound in Afghanistanare also to be found in
neighbouring countriese.g., thereare Tadziks, Uzbeks and Kirghizin Afghan-
istanas well as in the SovietUnion, similarlythereare about 7 millionPathans
in Pakistantoo.7 The Pathans are the major group in Afghanistan.From that
factstemswhatis reallyan aspect of the expansionistambitionsof the ruling
group in that countrynamely the demand for Pakhtunistanor a separate
Pathanstate. The boundaries of this state have never been definedby its
proponents.But thishas becomean importantfactorin Afghanforeignpolicy.
1T. Davletshin, "SovietCultural and Economic Penetration
in Afghanistan", Bulletin,
fortheStudy
Institute oftheUSSR,Munich, September1962,pp.5-6.
2AsianRecorder 9-15
, op.cit., July 1962,p. 4669.
3 US NewsandWorld , 27 May1963,pp.50-53.
Report
4Davletshin, loc.cit.
*D. N. Wiiber, "Afghanistan: A Neutral
inOrbit?", UnitedAsia,op.cit.,p. 518.
б Afghanistan,London, Afghan BureauofInformation,n.d.,p. 59.
7D. N. Wiiber(Ed.) Afghanistan, New Haven,HumanRelationsAreaFiles,1956,
pp.58-60.

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 53

The keystoneof Afghanistan'sforeignpolicyis non-alignment. This policy

has been importantfor Afghanistanfromtwo points of view- securityand
economicdevelopment.Afghanistanhas always had a strategicsignificance for
thebig Powers,and itstraditionalpolicyhas beento counterbalancethepressures
of one powerby the influenceof the other.Hence the effortof Afghanistanto
ward offforeigndominationby cultivatingboth the rival powers.Furthermore
the AfghanGovernmentaims at improvingthe economic conditionand the
livingstandardsof the people. For this it is necessaryto obtain foreignaid,
which,if Afghanistanremainsnon-aligned,can be had fromall sources.

However,objection has been levelled against Afghanistanthat it is pro-

Sovietin its policy.The main contentionwhichis advancedis thatAfghanistan
has acceptedmilitaryaid fromthe Soviet bloc, and it is orientedtowardsthe
Soviet Union in its trade and development.This orientationin Afghanpolicy
is on account of the Soviet Union's proximitydue to whichit can exertmore
pressureon Afghanistan.Besides,the Soviet Union has timeand again, come
out openlyin favourof Afghanistanin the Pakhtunistanissue.1 On the other
hand,theUnitedStateshas supportedPakistan'sstand,muchto theannoyance
of Afghanistan2.In 1956 two yearsafterAmericanmilitaryaid was firstgiven
to Pakistan, Afghanistanaccepted Soviet arms aid. Afghanistanreceived a
$25 millioncreditfromthe Soviet Union and Czechoslovakiaforthe purchase
of armsand othermilitaryequipments.It was estimatedthatby 1961 Afghan-
istan had 60 MIG-17 Jetsequipped with radar, 12 to 24 Ilyushianaircraft
and a 60,000strongarmy,whichincludedan armoureddivisionwith134 tanks,
two motorizedinfantry brigadesand artillerywith 152 Soviet guns. The Soviet
Union providestrainingto Afghanofficers and it is buildingmilitaryairfields
in Afghanistan.3

It is true that on the diplomaticlevel, Afghanistanhas enjoyed closer

relationswith the Soviet Union. Since 1955 therehas been an exchange of
visitsbypoliticiansand leadersfrombothcountries.On theotherhand veryfew
1In 1955Mr.Khrushchev andMarshal Bulganin on their visitto Afghanistansupported
theAfghan pointofview.TntheSoviet-Afghan jointcommunique issuedinMarch1960
during Mr.Khrushchev's visitto Kabulit was stated". . . thetwosidesexchanged
viewsonthedestiny ofthePushtu peopleandexpressed their agreementthattheapplica-
tionoftheprincipleof self-determination ... forsettlingthisissuewouldbereasonable
wayofeasingtension . . ." BritishSurvey,op.cit.,p. 22.
2In thecommunique issuedat theconclusion oftheSEATO Councilmeeting in March
1956,itwasstated". . . themembers oftheCouncilseverally declared thattheirGovern-
mentsrecognizedthatthesovereignty ofPakistan extends up to theDurandLine,the
international
boundary between PakistanandAfghanistan . . ." AsianRecorder, op.cit.,
10-16March1956,p. 728.
3Dev Murarka, "Contemporary Afghanistan," Eastern World , London,June1961,p. 18.

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 54

visitshave been exchangedbetweenthe leadersof Afghanistan and the United

States.1It was onlyin September1963thatKing Zahir Shah visitedthe United
States. This visit was precededby an officialvisit by the King to the Soviet
Union in 1962,and it was followedby an officialvisitof the Soviet President,
Mr. Brezhnev,to Afghanistan in October 1963.
However,it is in its relationswithChina that Afghanistanhas manifested
a tendencyto followa policyindependentof the Soviet Union. By promoting
friendlyrelationswith China, Afghanistanhopes to balance Soviet influence,
relationsbetweenthetwoCommunistPowersbeingstraineddue to an ideological
conflict.DiplomaticrelationsbetweenAfghanistanand China wereestablished
in 1955.Since thentherehave been growingcontactsbetweenthetwo countries.
In 1957 PremierChou En-Lai visitedKabul and the same year PremierDaud
wentto China. In 1959 ForeignMinisterNairnvisitedCanton. In 1961a Sino-
AfghanTreatyof Friendshipand Non-Aggressionwas signed.The lateststep
has been the conclusionof a boundarytreatyin 1963. The significance of this_
is great in view of the fact that China has a borderconflictwith India and
the SovietUnion has in thatconflictextendedits supportto India.
Anotherobjectiveof Afghanforeignpolicyis the promotionof friendship
withthe Muslim States.2As religionis the main bond of unityin the country
itself,its leadershave triedto carve out a place forAfghanistanin the Muslim
world. In the earlieryears Afghanistanhad close relationswith the Muslim
Middle East. Thus in 1937 it joined Iran, Iraq, and Turkeyin the Saadabad
Pact. In recentyearsAfghanistanhas shown no interestin regionalalliances,
instead its effortshave been directedtowardsimprovingrelations,especially
withIran. Althoughthe Helmand Riverwaterdisputehas not yetbeen settled,
relationsbetweenIran and Afghanistanhave been cordial, so much so that
Iran has successfullymediatedbetweenAfghanistan and Pakistan.

The controversyover Pakistan has been an important elementin

Afghanistan'sforeignpolicy. Afghanistanclaims that the Pashto-speaking
people livingin the area betweenthe Durand Line and the Indus should be
1The mostimportant leadersto exchange visitsbetween Afghanistan and theSoviet
Unionwere:Mr. Khrushchev & Mr. Bulganinin 1955,Mr. Mikoyan(Deputy
Chairman of USSR Councilof Ministers) in 1956,Mr.Voroshilov (Chairman ofthe
Presidium oftheSupreme Soviet)in 1958,Mr.Khrushchev (Chairman of theUSSR
Councilof Ministers) in 1960,the Education Ministerof theUSSR in 1961and
PresidentBrezhnev in October1963.Mohammed Daud(Prime MinisterofAfghanistan)
in1956and1959,King ZahirShahin1957and1962,Foreign Minister Mohammed
Nairnin 1958-59. Thesumtotalofexchange of visitsbetween
Afghanistan and the
United Statessince1955is: Mohammed Daud in1958,President Eisenhower in 1959
andKingZahirShahin 1963.
2Dr. YusuPspolicystatement of 17 March1963,AsianRecorder , op: cit.,23-29April
1963,p. 5157.

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 55

giventhe rightof self-determination, on what basis and forwhatpurpose,that

has never been made clear. In puttingforththis claim the Afghanshave
challengedthe validityof the Durand Line, on the groundsthat the treaty
delimitingthe boundary was signed in 1893 by Afghanistanunder British
pressure,so that when the BritishleftIndia the treatylapsed automatically.1
The Afghansinsistthatthis territory previouslyformeda part of Afghanistan
under Ahmad Shah Durrani which was exactlytwo hundredyears ago. But
theyignorethe fact that ever since it was negotiatedthe Durand Line was
universallyrecognizedas the boundarybetweenthe two countries.To justify
intervening in whatis Pakistan'sinternalaffairAfghanistanarguesthatseveral
millionof the tribesmenare nomads migratingin springand autumnbetween
the mountainsand plains withoutregardto any political allegiances.2 This
of courseis no argument.As forthereferendum heldin theNorthWestFrontier
Provincein 1947,it is arguedthatit was a "sham and a trick"forthe people
werenot giventhe powerto opt forcompleteindependenceor formergerwith
Afghanistan.3 On the contraryPakistan'sstand is thatthe Durand Line is the
internationally recognizedboundary,and Pakistan has inheritedBritishrights
underinternationallaw. Furthermore the AfghanGovernment had reiteratedits
acceptanceof the Durand Line in subsequenttreatiesin 1905, 1921 and 1930.
Afghanistan cannotclaim or claim self-determination forthenorth-west portion
of Pakistan on the basis that it was a part of Afghanistan,for before 1747
whenAhmad Shah foundedthe AfghanKingdom,therewas no such state,the
territoriesbeing divided broadlybetweenthe Safavi Empire of Iran and the
Mughal Empire of India. When the AfghanEmpire was foundedthe north-
westof India was a part of it foronly 50 yearsafterwhichit was handed over
to the Sikhs and throughthemit came to the British.Afghanmaps show the
extentof Pakhtunistanas extendingfromBaluchistanin the south to Chitral
and Gilgitin thenorth4,mostof whichis not eveninhabitedbyPathans.In the
referendum conductedin 1947,99 percentof thosewho votedwerein favourof
Pakistan. In this referendum the percentageof voterswho voted was higher
than it was in any electionheld in the provinces.As forthe Tribal Areas they
werenot directlyadministeredterritories and wereregulatedby Special Agree-
mentswhichlapsed undertheIndependenceAct of 1947. This Act providedfor
the partitioning of the BritishIndian Empireand the creationof two sovereign
1"TheAfghanistan Case",TheEgyptian andPolitical
Economic Review
, Cairo,October
1955,p. 11.
2H. F. Armstrong, "Northof the Khyber," , NewYork,July1956,
ForeignAffairs
pp.611-612.
3 "TheAfghanistan Case",op.cit.,p. 12.
4 AfghanBureauofinformation, op.cit.,pp. 14-15.

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 56

states,India and Pakistan,and the choice had to be betweenthetwo of them.

Never beforehad the Afghanrulersput forwardthe demand forPakhtunistan.
But thesetribesvoluntarilyacceded to Pakistanand a numberof Jirgaswere
held in whichthetribessworeallegianceto Pakistan.
The impact of this policy on Afghanistanis great. Due to this dispute
Pakistan-Afghanistan relationsdeterioratedto theirlowestlevel in 1955 arid
1961.This affected Afghanistan'stransittradeand its relationswiththe United
States. A numberof reasons have been adduced as to why Afghanistanhas
pursuedthispolicy.Some observersbelievethatthe Afghanclaim to Pakhtun-
istan is for purelyinternalfactors.The presentrulersbelong to the Yahya
Khel familyof theDurraniswhichruledover Peshawarduringthe Sikh period.
"It is notto be forgotten
thatthepresentrulingfamilyare thedirectdescendants
of the Peshawar Sardars; ». . The lureof Peshawaris a passion deep in their
hearts."1 Furthermore, by bringingmorePathansundertheirswaythe Afghan
rulersmay hope to strengthen the Pashto-speakingelement,forat presentthe
nationallanguagein Afghanistanis reallyPersian, thoughPashto has official
paritywithPersian.2Anothermeansof consolidatingtheroyalfamily'sposition
in Afghanistanis by retainingSoviet support.The Soviet Union has not tried
a policyof forceor subversionin Afghanistan and has showncompleterespect
forthe politicalstructureof the country.3In factthe Soviet Governmenthas
workedthroughthe Afghanruler,and the Soviet economic and militaryaid
has helpedto keep thepresentdynastyin power.
It is openlyallegedin manyresponsiblequartersthatIndia has instigated
Afghanistan.There is no doubt about the fact that India's relations with
Pakistanhave not been cordial, while Indo-Afghanrelationshave been con-
sistentlyfriendly.There have been frequentcontactsat the highestlevel and
tradeties have been close. The belief,thatIndia has a say in the Pakhtunistan
issue, grewmainlydue to the fact that it was the Indian National Congress,
which with the co-operationof Abdul GhaffarKhan's Khudai Khidmatgar
movementadvancedtheclaimforautonomyforthe Pathans.Even now spokes-
men for Pakhtunistanare allowed to publish periodicalsfromBombay and
New Delhi.4 Althoughit now remains to be seen how close Indo-Afghan
relationswill be afterthe conclusionof the Sino-Afghanboundarytreatyin
viewofthefactthatIndia and China are themselves involvedin a borderdispute.
»O. Caroe,ThePathans, 550B.C.- A.D. 1957,London,Macmillan & Co. Ltd.,1958,
p. 435.
2Arnold Toynbee, "Pakistan's
policyintheTribalAreas",ThePakistanSociety'sBulletin,
London, No. 15,Summer 1961,p. 28.
3Franck, op.cit.,p. 10.
*K. Fraser-Tytler, London,
Afghanistan, Oxford Press,1953,p. 314.
University

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 57

Therehas been a recentshiftin AfghanpolicytowardsPakistan.In March

1963 was announcedthe resignationof the AfghanPremier,MohammedDaud,
who had stronglyadvocated the Pakhtunistancause duringhis nine and a
halfyearsof rule. Dr. MohammadYusuf became the new PrimeMinister,and
Afghanpropagandawas toned down leadingto conditionsmore conduciveto
goodwill. Hence Iranian mediation,which had failed earlier, was resumed,
culminatingin the TeheranAgreementin May 1963. By this agreementdiplo-
matic and trade relationsbetweenAfghanistanand Pakistan were restored.
However,the Pakhtunistanissue has not been disposed off,but thereis hope
that an atmosphereof good understanding, friendshipand mutual trustwill
be created1.Alreadytrade relationsbetweenthe two countrieshave been re-
sumedand the Afghanpresshas toned down its attackson Pakistan. Further-
more this rapprochementwith Pakistan has helped Afghanistanto use the
UnitedStatesas a counterweightto Sovietinfluence.

Afghanistanhas successfullyimplementedits foreignpolicy objectives,

except in the case of Pakhtunistan.It is to be hoped that the AfghanGov-
ernmentshall realize in due course that the futureof the Pathans lies, as it
has always lain, with the people of theIndus Valley2. Already the Pakistan
Governmenthas done much for the economic and social developmentof the
tribalareas3. Besides,the AfghanGovernmentshould not overlookthe impli-
cations of the Pakhtunistanclaim. If the Pathans are to be giventhe rightof
self-determination, theAfghansshouldaccept the Pakistanisuggestionthatany
plebisciteon the futureof the Pathansshould includetheseon the Afghanistan
side of theborder.If thePathansare to be giventhe rightof self-determination
on the ethnicand linguisticbases, then the same rightshould apply to the
Turkmen,Uzbek and Tadzik areas in Afghanistan.This would mean that the
2^ millionTurkmens,Uzbeks and Tadziks in Afghanistan4would unite with
their 11£ millioncounterpartsin the Soviet Union.5 The solution generally
suggestedis thatAfghanistan and Pakistanmay enterinto some kind of union.
It maynotbe possibleto implement thisimmediately due to practicaldifficulties.
However,in the meanwhileit would be beneficialfor both the countriesto
co-operatewith each other and enter into some agreementsregardingtheir
economicand foreignpolicies.
Zubeida Hasan
1"Documents", Pakistan Horizon . Karachi,2ndQuarter 1963,d. 191.
2Caroe,op.cit.,p. 437.
3 SeeDevelopmentintheNorthern andFrontierRegions of West andTribal
Pakistan Areas
of WestPakistan, Government ofPakistan,D.F.P.,1963.
4 "The MuslimRepublics of theUSSR",Journal of theRoyalCentral AsianSociety
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London,January 1959,p. 5.
5EricDowntown, "SovietCentral Asia",Ibid.,April1955,p. 129.

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