Effectivity of Laws:

TANADA vs TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 24 April 1985

PONENTE:

ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government

officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. The
petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern (Sec.
6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). The petitioners are also invoking that for
laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be published in the Official Gazette.

The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on

the ground that petitioners have no legal standing to carry out such petition since
they are not personally and directly prejudiced by the non-publication of the
issuances in question. Respondents also contended that the publication in the
Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which provide their own affectivity
date. Since the issuances in question contain the date of effectivity, publication is
not necessary.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to carry out
the instant petition

2. WON publication is necessary for laws which have its own effectivity
date.

HELD:

The Court recognizes a private citizen’s legal personality since the right
sought to be enforced by the petitioners is a public right recognized by the
Constitution.

The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:
 “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would

be no adequate notice to the general public of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conducts as citizens. It would render injustice to punish
or burden a citizen for the transgression of law which he had no notice.

It is the respondent officials’ duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the

people to be informed on matters of public concern. Thus, the publication of all
presidential issuances of “public nature” or of general applicability” is mandated
by law. Unless so published, laws shall have no binding force or effect.

Publication of Supreme Court Decisions

DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
PONENTE:

CORTES, J.

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and

destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents
resulting in injuries. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to
do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day
of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in HabulayasvsJapzon.
Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-
publication in the Official Gazette.

Petitioner contends that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should
not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the said
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject CA decision was
promulgated.
 Respondent avers that there is no law requiring the publication of SC
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their effectivity.

ISSUE:

WON SC decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding.

RULING:

NO. There is no law requiring the publication of SC decisions in the Official

Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
SC decisions particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of SC decisions and in such publications as
the SCRA and law journals.

PITC vs. Angeles

G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
PONENTE:

TORRES, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner issued an Administrative Order which provides that

applications to the PITC for importation from China must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to China carried out
by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an
amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for,
or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Desiring to make importations from China, private respondents Remington

and Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under
Philippine laws, individually applied for authority to import from China with the
petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for
importers, and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their
importations from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to
China.

Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit

export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import
applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that
the latter were both barred from importing goods from China.

Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus,

with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against PITC. The court ruled that PITC’s authority to
process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations has already been repealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the A.O. issued by the Petitioner is valid without complying with
Publication Requirements?

HELD:

No. Although the Petitioner was legally empowered to issue Administrative

Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. This does not imply,
however, that the subject A.O. is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power
because the petitioner failed to publish the said order in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation.

The questioned A.O., legally, until it is published, is invalid within the

context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which states that Laws shall take effect fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise
provided. The fact that the amendments to A.O. were filed with, and published by
the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the
defect related to the effectivity of the A.O. The A.O. under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is
to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Mun. Govt of Coron vs. Cariño

G.R. No. L-65894 September 24, 1987

FACTS:

Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the municipality of Coron, Palawan,

seeking the authority to demolish the structures built by private respondents alongside
the rock causeway of the petitioner’s wharf. The hearings were scheduled, but the
respondents continued postponing them. The court then set the final dates of the hearing,
allowing no further postponements, on March 20, 21, and 22, 1979. The respondents still
did not appear, and their absence was taken as a waiver of their rights to cross-examine
the witnesses and to present evidence. The court then rendered a decision to allow the
municipality to demolish the respondents’ structures.

The respondents appealed but failed to submit the required 40 copies of their
record on appeal even after the appellate court granted an extension of 60 days. Because
of this, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the respondents’ appeal. On September 27,
1982, the resolution dismissing the appeal has become final and executory.

On January 11, 1983, Section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court was promulgated,
implementing the provisions of B.P. 29, providing that the filing of a record on appeal
shall be dispensed with. Thus, on April 12, 1983, the respondents asked the appellate
court to recall the records of the case from the court of origin.

ISSUE:

Can the law have retroactive effect on the case despite the court’s decision being
final and executory?

RULING:

No. To revive or recall a case with a decision that has become final and
executory would be an injustice to those whose favor the case has been decided. As
provided in Alday v. Camilon, “Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.” When the judgment becomes final, the favored party is entitled as
a matter of right to the execution of the judgment.

BUYCO vs. PNB

G.R. No. L-14406 June 30, 1961

FACTS:

Buyco offered to pay PNB, to which he is indebted from the deficit of his crop
loan, with his backpay acknowledgment certificate. However, PNB answered that
since their motion for reconsideration is still pending before the SC in another case
(Florentino) they cannot grant Buyco's request just yet.

SC denied PNB's MR in Florentino so Buyco wrote PNB reiterating his request

to pay the obligation with said certificate. PNB again denied the same in view of
the amendment of its charter on June 16, 1956

Buyco asked for reconsideration but PNB's legal department insisted that
despite the SC decision, PNB could not accept the certificate because of the
amendment of its Charter heretofore mentioned.

ISSUE:
 WON R.A. 1576 nullify the right of the petitioner to pay his obligation with
his backpay certificate.

RULING:

PNB, in Florentino, was declared authorized to accept backpay

acknowledgment certificate as payment of obligation of any holder thereof. That
Although Florentino was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four (4) days after
Buyco’s request, it is nevertheless obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956,
the right to have his certificate applied for the payment of his obligation with the
PNB already existed by virtue of R.A. 897, which was merely construed and
clarified by this Court in the Florentino case.

A vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or

interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy.

Considering the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case, we agree

with the lower court that the appellant herein had impliedly admitted the right of
the petitioner to apply his backpay certificate in payment of his obligation.

This notwithstanding, whether implied or expressed the admission by the

appellant of appellee's right, has already lost momentum or importance because
the law on the matter on April 25, 1956, when the offer to pay the obligation with
the certificate was made, or the law before the amendatory Act of June 16, 1956,
was that the PNB is compelled to receive the backpay certificate.

R.A. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor
such may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon
approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present
case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made.
The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be
in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.

Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws

Is Art. 5 of the New Civil Code applicable?

NO. Since the prohibitive amendment of the appellant's charter should not
be given retroactive effect; and that the law, at the time appellee made his offer,
allowed, in fact compelled, the respondent bank to accept the appellee's certificate.
The above provision finds no application herein.

\
 CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

PONENTE:

CONCEPCION, J.

FACTS:

Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished

his law studies up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During
all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant Law College,
he was awarded scholarship grants and his semestral tuition fees were returned
to him after ends of the semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's law college and
enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the
Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university.
He applied to take the bar examination in which he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. The defendant refused until after he
had paid back the P1,033 87, noting the contract that he signed which stated that
in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his
right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the
equivalent of the scholarship cash and followed by Memorandum No. 38 that the
Director of Private Schools issued.

ISSUE:

WON the said stipulations in the contract between Cui and the respondent
university are valid

RULING:

The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September

10, 1951, is a direct violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The
contract was contrary to sound policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in
Memorandum No.38, s. 1949 is sound policy. When students are given full or
partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and
earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered
merely to attract and keep students in a school.
 SEA COMMERCIAL vs. CA
G.R. No. 122823 November 25, 1999
FACTS:
In this petition for review by certiorari, SEA Commercial Company, Inc.
(SEACOM), a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing
agricultural machinery, products, and equipment, assails the CA decision
affirming in toto the decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 5 in favor of Jamandre
Industries, Inc. (JII) et al., SEACOM’s appointed exclusive dealer in the City and
Province of Iloilo, as per dealership agreement entered by both on September 20,
1966.
Jamandre, one of the respondents herein, executed a suretyship agreement
binding himself jointly and severally with JII to pay for all obligations of JII to
SEACOM. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the
territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive
basis. In the course of the business relationship arising from the dealership
agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries,
and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorney’s
fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for
damages representing unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System
Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power
tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted
to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of
farmers to be financed by said corporation, which JII allegedly made known to
petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith,
went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units of said
tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-five thousand four
hundred fifteen and 61/100 pesos (P85,415.61).
Both courts invoke, as basis for their decision, Article 19 of the Civil Code
which reads as follows:

"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.”

ISSUE:
WON SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as
regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC.

HELD:
YES. By appointing JII as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM
recognized the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said
equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell
SEACOM’s products, in its area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to
the exclusion of other places, to send its men to Manila for training on repair,
servicing, and installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with
other personnel and vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of the
dealership. After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted to
promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JII’s
expense conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service and
parts) by FSDC, SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a
lower price, placing itself in direct competition with its own dealer. The actuations
of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.

UNITED AIRLINES VS. CA

G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines,

through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets
for himself, his wife and his minor son. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as
planned; they used the 1st coupon. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional
coupons each for himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in
Washington Dulles Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets,
the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words “CHECK-IN REQUIRED,” for a United Airlines flight. However, the
Fontanillas were not able to board said flight because allegedly, they did not have
assigned seat numbers.

ISSUE:

WON the United Airlines committed a breach of contract in bad faith.

HELD:

No. Anice to Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45
a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen
punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the
evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted
a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words
"Check-In Required." Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number.
If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why
then were they not assigned seat numbers? Absent any showing that Linda was
so motivated, we do not buy into private respondents’ claim that Linda
intentionally deceived him, and made him the laughing stock among the
passengers. Hence, as correctly observed by the trial court:
 Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly
required in their boarding passes, is they very reason why they were
not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being
denied boarding.

Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that
private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not
defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Notably, the
appellate court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales which
states:

250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.

A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight shall

not be eligible for denied board compensation if:

a. The passenger does not comply with the carrier’s contract of carriage or
tariff provisions regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and
acceptability for transformation.

The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United
States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the
contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were
purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were
"rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of
the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

FACTS:

Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros Morada as a Flight

Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Morada went to a disco with fellow crew members Thamer & Allah, both
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. In which
Allah left on some pretext. Thamer attempted to rape Morada but she was rescued
by hotel personnel when they heard her cries for help. Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an accomplice.
 Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer and its base
manager tried to negotiate the immediate release of the detained crew members
with Jakarta police.

Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Thamer and Allah

were deported and, eventually, again put in service by SAUDIA. But Morada was
transferred to Manila.

One and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to see SAUDIA’s Chief
Legal Officer. But instead, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked
to sign a blank document, which turned out to be a notice to her to appear in court.
Monada returned to Manila.

The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s legal officer to court, the judge
rendered a decision against her sentencing her to five months imprisonment and
to 286 lashes. Apparently, she was tried by the court which found her guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.

After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help from Philippine Embassy

during the appeal. Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her. SAUDIA
fired her without notice.

Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, with the RTC of
QC. SAUDIA filed Omnibus Motion to Dismiss which raised the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction, among others which was denied

ISSUE:

Whether RTC of QC has jurisdiction to hear and try the case

HELD:

YES. The RTC of QC has jurisdiction and Philippine law should govern. Its
jurisdiction has basis on Sec. 1 of RA 7691 and Rules of Court on venue. Pragmatic
considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it
best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the
case, it would be forcing Morada to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections.
That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

By filing a complaint, Morada has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction

of the court. By filing several motions and praying for reliefs (such as dismissal),
SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
 SPS. PUERTO vs. CA
G.R. No. 138210 June 6, 2002

FACTS:

The petitioners obtained from the private respondents a loan in the amount
of Php200,000 payable within one year from the date of execution thereof in 1972.
As a form of security, they executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage – in favor of
the private respondents - covering a house and lot they bought. The contract did
not stipulate any interest but it provided that if petitioners then failed to pay the
principal loan, the private respondents were authorized to immediately foreclose
the mortgaged property.
The petitioners did fail to pay Php200,000 at the date of maturity of the
loan so their property was foreclosed, and the title transferred to the private
respondents. The petitioners, however, continued to live in the house - after
entering into a “lease contract” with the private respondents – until 1976.
The petitioners were still not able to pay the “rent” for the succeeding
months allegedly because of the usurious demands of the private respondents.
This led them to filing an action against the private respondents to nullify the
Deed before a trial court on the grounds of the Deed being usurious for having
Php50,000 of the Php200,000 loaned to them, as interest. Their petition was
dismissed so they filed an appeal, which reversed the decision of the trial court.
As a response to this, the private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was granted by the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners, once again, filed for a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the aforementioned court. The case at hand is a petition for
certiorari regarding the CA decision to affirm the initial decision of the trial court
and deny the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners. The court ruled
that the CA’s initial decision to declare the Real Estate Mortgage contract null and
the foreclosure invalid is to be reinstated.

ISSUE(S):
1. WON the contract between the parties – a loan secured by a deed of real
estate mortgage – violated the Usury Law (Act No. 2655, as amended by
P.D. 116) -- YES

RATIO:
At the time of the questioned transaction, Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D.
116, known as the Usury Law, was in full force and effect. It is elementary that
the laws in force at the time the contract was made generally govern the effectivity
of its provision. Usury may be defined as contracting for or receiving something in
excess of the amount allowed by law for the forbearance of money, goods or things
in action. The Usury Law prescribed that the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, where such loan or renewal or
forbearance is secured in whole or in part by a mortgage upon real estate the title
to which is duly registered, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of
interest, shall be 12% per annum. Any amount of interest paid or stipulated to be
paid in excess of that fixed by law is considered usurious, therefore unlawful.

The Php50,000 interest is clearly in excess of that which the law allows.
Thus, the payment of interest is void.
Ordinary human experience tells us that as between the debtor and the
creditor, the former stands on more perilous ground than the latter, and the two
do not stand on equal footing. It is this inequality that deprives the debtor of any
bargaining leverage.
In a simple loan with a stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the
debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract, is not illegal.
The illegality lies only in the stipulated interest. Being separable, only the latter
should be deemed void.
Going into the matter of the validity of the foreclosure, we find the
foreclosure invalid as it stemmed from the enforcement of a usurious mortgage
contract. This is in line with our ruling in Delgado vs. Alonso Duque Valgona.

DIAZ-SALGADO vs. ANSON

G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

FACTS:

Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter,

Maria Luisa and she was wed to Gasto Maya. Severina had an older daughter to
a previous relationship, Jo Ann Diaz and she was also married to Gerard Salgado.
The marriage of Luis and Severina was solemnized on December 28, 1966, prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code and was celebrated without valid marriage
license. The law in effect at the time of celebration is the Civil Code. Luis and
Severina acquired several real properties during their marriage. Without
knowledge and consent of Luis, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of sale
transferring then properties in favor of Jo Ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa
executed a deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina
adjudicating herself as the sole heir.

Due to these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds
against Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya. According to him, since there was no
marriage settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. And he
was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance
as a compulsory heir of Severina.

Jo Ann countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis
and their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple
which they both acknowledge and formally terminated through Partition
Agreement. Luis went to the US and married one Teresita. Due to the partition
Agreement, without court intervention, both spouses claim that the properties
herewith are separate and exclusive to Severina.

Trial ensued and Luis gave testimony and presented certified true copy of
marriage contract (without marriage license indicated). Spouses Salgado and
Spouses Maya filed demurrer to evidence which was later denied. RTC decided in
favor of Luis, holding his marriage with Severina valid. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not marriage between Severina and Luis is valid even without
Marriage License.

RULING:

NO, Marriage between Luis and Severina is not valid. Since the marriage
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine validity is the Civil Code. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code. Since the said marriage did not fall
under marriages of exceptional character, the absence of such license renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).

Binding Effect of Judgments

ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON

GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

FACTS:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens

who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed
her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate
improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of
stock in A/G Interiors.

Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon.

Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his
adopted daughter.

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was

admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey
and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition
were granted.

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also

filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes
property allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof to their three
children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of
Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

ISSUE:

WON the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the

circumstances.

HELD:

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to

the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by
a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment
in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate

may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar,
the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s

estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

In relation to Art. 15 of the Civil Code and the Nationality Rule

DACASIN vs. DACASIN
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

FACTS:
 Petitioner, Herald Dacasin, an American citizen filed the case for review,
the dismissal of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement
for their daughter, Stephanie, whose sole custody was awarded to the respondent,
a Filipino citizen, before Illinois court for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner sued respondent in RTC Makati to enforce the agreement
(contract) executed by the parties in Manila that modified the terms of the post-
divorce decree from sole custody of their daughter to joint custody, alleging the
respondent’s retention of sole custody.

The respondent sought for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction
because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce decree even after
the respondent undertook the relinquishment of the Illinois court’s jurisdiction to
the Philippine courts. Hence, the agreement both parties executed is void. The
RTC dismissed the case

The petitioner sought reconsideration. His contention is that the divorce

decree sought by the respondent in Illinois court is void. Hence, the post-foreign
divorce decree is also void citing the Nationality Rule under Art. 15 of the Civil
Code. The RTC denied the motion. Hence, this case.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the RTC has the jurisdiction over the case.
 Whether or not the Agreement (contract) executed in Manila is valid.

RULING:

The RTC has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the
Agreement which is Void. However, factual and equity considerations militate
against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to
settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

The RTC has jurisdiction. Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the
terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

The agreement is void. At the time the parties executed the Agreement on
28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September
1995). This is in contrary to law as stated in Art. 213 of the Civil Code; and
(2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the
United States because of the divorce decree. Based on Art. 15 or the Nationality
Rule, petitioner cannot rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because
the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse. Only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Call for the Remand of the Case. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime
under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child
custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.

Nationality Principle – Divorce

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

PONENTE:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private

respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong.
Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two
children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private
respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner ordered to render accounting of
the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action
is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The
denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

Petitioner avers that Respondent is estopped from laying claim on the

alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property.

Respondent argues that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
RULING:

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of

the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by
his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.

GLOBE MACKAY vs. CA

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

PONENTE:

CORTES, J.:

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

FACTS:

Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the

engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss
of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo
T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert
Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one
suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work
after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take
a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and
initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator.
Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative
results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police
Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s
Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias,
but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners

in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.
Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor
of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages,
thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

HELD:

Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right
that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter
must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his
(Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as
well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty;
and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All
these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt
without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

WILD VALLEY vs CA
FACTS:

Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela

to load iron ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official
pilot of Venezuela) was designated to navigate the vessel through the Orinoco
River.
 The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot
when the vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was
underway.

The vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were
just a result of the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced
vibrations which led to the vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River,
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.

As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley

Shipping) was unable to sail out that day. For this reason, Wild Valley commenced
an action for damages.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not fault can be attributed to the master (captain) of Philippine

Roxas for the grounding of said vessel.

2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.

HELD:

1. NO.

There being no contractual obligation, the master was only required to give
ordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1173 of the New Civil Code. In the
case, the master exercised due diligence when the vessel sailed only after the main
engine, machine rise and other auxiliaries were checked and found to be in good
running condition and when the master left a competent officer - the pilot who is
experienced in navigating the Orinoco River.

Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a

master of a vessel and its pilot. The law is explicit in saying that the master
remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board.
He remains in control despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge
of the vessel. It is NOT required of him to be on bridge while the vessel is being
navigated by a pilot.

Furthermore, the Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel

necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of
every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. Admitting his limited
knowledge of the River, Captain Colon deemed it best to rely on the knowledge
and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.

The pilot should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and
which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the river and his decision to
plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, he is
negligent and liable for the grounding.
2. NO. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are:

-accident was of such character as to warrant inference that it would not have
happened except for defendant's negligence

-accident must have been caused by an agency/instrumentality within the

exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of

-accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.

There was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master to the
pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, requisites 1 and 2 (negligence and
control) are not present in the following situation.

QUIAMBAO vs. OSORIO

G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

PONENTE:

FERNAN, J.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No.

2526 of the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No Costs. SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner
through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner
raised in his affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an
administrative case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the
same parties and involving the same piece of land.

In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private

Respondent over the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot.
Petitioner argue that the administrative case was determinative of private
respondents right toe eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial
question which bars a judicial action until after its termination.

The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the

Petitioner’s affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First
Instance. Private Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no
Prejudicial Question.

The Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the
CFI praying that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be
dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter
exclusively.

The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the
ejectment case to be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied
for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the administrative case between the private parties involving the
lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which
would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

RULING:

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case

the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4
SCRA 510 (1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial
Question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions
are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related
that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal
action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is
alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5,

Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:

 the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal action
 the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the

possibility of the Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which will
terminate or suspend Private Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner, the SC gave
the lower court a piece of advice which became the basis for deciding the case.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial
court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner’s right of possession being upheld in
the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but
the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a
sheer exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound

discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second
action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action
are settled the second action should be stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving two [2] court
actions, the existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the
parties as well as the need to resolve the parties right of possession before the
ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule’s analogous
application to the case at bar.

Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA 502, provides another

analogous situation. I

n sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental ordering
the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document against
several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the
civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document
shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefore its own action on
administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by us in abeyance, thus:
“As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by
respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs.
Santiago Catane, etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the
Cebu CFI, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has
finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such
decision.”(SC minute resolution April 27, 1962 in Adm Case No. 77, Richard
Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial
question to an administrative case. We see no reason why the reverse may not be
so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.

The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.

 Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the petition attest to the
wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel
for petitioner, it was stated that he intervenor Land Authority which later became
the Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a decision in the
administrative case affirming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell issued in favor
of the private respondent. With this development, the folly of allowing the
ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.

ARAÑES vs. OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

PONENTE:

PUNO, J.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of

the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with

gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador
Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage
license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application
of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on
January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also
appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the

documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset
the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement
of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered
from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they
will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple
that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE:
 Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.

HELD:

The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is

limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary
to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage”.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without

the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did
not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

PONENTE:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the

Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-
639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
They had 3 children— Babyline Niñal, Ingrid Niñal, Archie Niñal and Pepito
Niñal Jr.—the petitioners. Due to a shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985. 1 year and 8 months later on December 11, 1986, Pepito
and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage licence. They instituted
an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting
from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19,
1997. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of
marriage license.

ISSUES:

WON the second marriage of Pepito was void.

WON the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepito’s marriage even after his death.

RULING:

1. Yes, the second marriage of Pepito was void for absence of marriage licence.

2. Yes, the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepito’s marriage. The marriage will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts upon mere proof of facts even after the latter’s death.

Even though Pepito and Norma instituted an affidavit and claimed that
they cohabit for at least 5 years, the marriage would not be valid because from the
time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito and his first wife may had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-
year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence,
his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source
of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20

cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial
court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a

suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never
be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity
is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared
by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born
to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

RB MICHAEL PRESS vs. GALIT

G.R. No. 153510 February 13, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset

machine operator, whose work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mondays
to Saturdays, and he was paid PhP230 a day. During his employment, Galit was
tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117 minutes, and was absent without
leave for a total of nine and a half days.

On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render overtime service

in order to comply with a job order deadline, but he refused to do so. The following
day, respondent reported for work but petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and
to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a copy of an Office
Memorandum was served on him.

On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from employment. The

employer, through petitioner Escobia, gave him his two-day salary and a
termination letter averring that Galit was dismissed due to the following offenses:
(1) habitual and excessive tardiness; (2) commission of discourteous acts and
disrespectful conduct when addressing superiors; (3) failure to render overtime
work despite instruction to do so; and (4) insubordination, that is, willful
disobedience of, defiance to, or disregard of company authority..

Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money

claims before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

ISSUES:

(1) WON there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondent, and
whether due process was observed in the dismissal process;
(2) WON respondent is entitled to backwages and other benefits despite his refusal
to be reinstated.
RULING:

Respondent's tardiness cannot be considered condoned by petitioners

Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of initiative, diligence,

and discipline to come to work on time everyday exhibit the employee's deportment
towards work. Habitual and excessive tardiness is inimical to the general
productivity and business of the employer. This is especially true when the
tardiness and/or absenteeism occurred frequently and repeatedly within an
extensive period of time.

The mere fact that the numerous infractions of respondent have not been
immediately subjected to sanctions cannot be interpreted as condonation of the
offenses or waiver of the company to enforce company rules. A waiver is a
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal right
or privilege. It has been ruled that "a waiver to be valid and effective must be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention
of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him." Hence, the
management prerogative to discipline employees and impose punishment is a
legal right which cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.

Thus it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial evidence to

demonstrate condonation or waiver on the part of management to forego the
exercise of its right to impose sanctions for breach of company rules.

In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to show waiver
or condonation on the part of petitioners.

Insubordination or willful disobedience

For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements
must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must
have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to
the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioners' order for

respondent to render overtime service to meet a production deadline complies with
the second requisite. Art. 89 of the Labor Code empowers the employer to legally
compel his employees to perform overtime work against their will to prevent
serious loss or damage when there is urgent work to be performed on machines,
installations, or equipment.

In the present case, petitioners' business is a printing press whose

production schedule is sometimes flexible and varying. It is only reasonable that
workers are sometimes asked to render overtime work in order to meet production
deadlines.
 The issue now is, whether respondent's refusal or failure to render overtime
work was willful; that is, whether such refusal or failure was characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude. In Lakpue Drug Inc. v. Belga, willfulness was
described as "characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering
the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination." The fact that
respondent refused to provide overtime work despite his knowledge that there is
a production deadline that needs to be met, and that without him, the offset
machine operator, no further printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse
mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness.

After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that respondent unjustifiably

refused to render overtime work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his
offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a difficult
employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final straw that broke the
camel's back, and, with his gross and habitual tardiness and absences, would merit
dismissal from service.

Due process: twin notice and hearing requirement

A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by petitioners leads us to

conclude that they only paid lip service to the due process requirements.

The undue haste in effecting respondent's termination shows that the

termination process was a mere simulation — the required notices were given, a
hearing was even scheduled and held, but respondent was not really given a real
opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that petitioners had already decided
to dismiss respondent from service, even before the first notice had been given.

Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that there
was merely a general description of the claimed offenses of respondent. The
hearing was immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999 — the day
respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any opportunity
at all to consult a union official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.

SICAD VS. CA
Donation Mortis Causa

The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the
intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its
execution.

FACTS:

Capiz, Dec 1979:

 Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of her heart, drew
up a Deed in favor of her darling grandkids Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them
Valderramas. The deed bore the title ―Deed of Donation Intervivos.”

Thereafter, Aurora’s able secretary presented the Deed to the Registrar for
the purpose of canceling the original title and obtaining a transfer certificate of
title in favor of the three donees.

A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached the donees;
Aurora retained the document and maintained possession of the property for ten
years after the transfer.

The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land to spouses
Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Simultaneously with alienation, Aurora issued a Deed
of Revocation of Donation. She asserted that the donation took the nature of mortis
causa and was therefore revocable anytime. She further averred that the same
failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore was nullity.

Aurora’s grandchildren found their grandma’s reversal vexing. They

insisted that the Deed was one intervivos and therefore irrevocable. The RTC
adjudicated and found for the grandchildren.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Donation took the nature of one inter vivos

HELD:
No. The donation is mortis causa.
The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the
donation to take effect within her lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation
take effect 10 years after her death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale
of the property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to possess the
property as well as the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed of
donation. Fourth, she retained the certificate of title and subsequently alienated
it in favor of the Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of ownership.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained
by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the
circumstances attendant upon its execution.

The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it stipulated ―that
all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive
benefit and disposal of the donor, during her lifetime; and that, without the
knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed
of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible.
 A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds form the
donee that right to dispose of the donated property during the donor’s lifetime is
in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa ― the right of disposition is
not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.

Because of Aurora’s actions, nothing was transferred by the deed of

donation in question to her grandchildren. They did not get possession of the
property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other
right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the
right to dispose of the property – this would accrue to them only after ten years
from Aurora’s death. Moreover, they never saw what the certificate of title looked
like.

These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the donation in

question was a donation mortis causa, envisioning a transfer of ownership only
after the donor knocks on Heaven’s door.

DONATO V. LUNA
April 15, 1988

FACTS:

On September 28, 1979, respondent Paz B. Abayan filed before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for the declaration of nullity
of marriage with petitioner Donato. Abayan contends that she had no idea
that Donato has been married prior to the contracted marriage. Donato on the
other hand interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and
undue influence were employed by Abayan to obtain petitioner’s consent on the
marriage. Petitioner subsequently filed for the suspension of the proceedings of
the said case contending that civil case filed for the nullity of his marriage with
respondent raises a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided
before the criminal case can proceed. Hon. Artemon D. Luna on the other hand
ruled otherwise directing the proceedings in the criminal case to proceed as
scheduled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not criminal case proceedings should be suspended in view of

the prejudicial question raised by the filed civil case.

RULING:

A prejudicial question is defined to be one in which resolution is a logical

antecedent of the issue involved in the said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The requisites of a prejudicial question was not
obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. The
records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage, he had been living with
private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner’s averments that his consent was obtained
through force and undue influence is belled by the fact that both petitioner and
private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage for more than five
years before the subsequent marriage was contracted. As such, the petition
was dismissed for lack of merit.

ZAPANTA vs. MONTESA

G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962

PONENTE:

DIZON, J.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted.

Without costs.

FACTS:

Upon complaint filed by respondent Yco, an information for Bigamy was

filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the CFI of Bulacan
alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and
without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with
said complainant.

Petitioner filed in the CFI of Pampanga a civil case against Yco for the
annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation.
Respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied.

Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to suspend proceedings therein, on the

ground that the determination of the issue involved in the annulment case was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as well as petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of
not guilty, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition..

ISSUE:

WON the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second
marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy.
RULING:

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a

case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon). The
prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before
the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People
vs. Aragon). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question
for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's
consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is
obvious that his act was involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant
in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide
such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first
be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply
the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is
void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and
intimidation.

SANTOS vs CA
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

PONENTE:

VITUG, J.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The
two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter,
by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel
Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple quarrelled over a number of things aside from
the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade

her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did.
Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under
AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with but all his efforts
were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her
being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE:

Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the

Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,

and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived
prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
 Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate,
in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

PONENTE:

TORRES, JR., J.:

DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects
and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

FACTS:

Private respondent Gina Lao and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at
the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina’s expectations that the
newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his
back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night,
second, third and fourth night.

From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same
room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming
was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically
found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual
contact was ever made and according to him every time he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her
private parts she always removed his hands.

ISSUE:

Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with

petitioner a psychological incapacity?

HELD:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his

or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self
is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it
is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy
is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

MARCOS vs. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

PONENTE:

PANGANIBAN, J.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED,

except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua
non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.

FACTS:

Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married

twice and had five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the
respondent left the military service in 1987. Consequently, due to the respondent’s
failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and the
respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992, they were
already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage
assailing Art. 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity
had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.

Issues:

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent

by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological

incapacity.

Held:

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,

may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and
may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to
the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing
that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability and for her failure
to observe the guidelines as outlined in Republic v. CA and Molina.

GARCIA-RECIO vs RECIO
366 SCRA 4372 2 October 2002

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, their marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree,
issued by an Australian Family Court.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia in Cabanatuan

City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. Their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996,
in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground

of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she only learned of Rederick’s marriage
with Editha Samson in November 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether the divorce decree submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as

evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolve him of
bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce

decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is
a naturalized Australian. However, it does not prove respondent’s legal capacity
to marry petitioner. The decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country
where it will be used.

A document may be proven as an official record of a foreign country by either:

1. an official publication;
2. attested by the officer having legal custody of the document;

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

3. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or

consular officer stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and
4. authenticated by the seal of his office

The Court ordered the RTC to remand trial in the purpose of submitting
evidence that Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994, otherwise
declare the marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy for having established
two subsisting marriages.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
FACTS:

Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical exchange
student. He later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to
Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents.

The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She
filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening
her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and
drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live
with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he
never proposed marriage, neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s
parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the
latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent
prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for
damages.

HELD:

Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court

held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent
to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In
that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led
Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive
ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid
for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts
in disregard of the laws of the country.
 BELLIS vs. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

PONENTE:

BENGZON, J.P.,

DISPOSITIVE:

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States." By his first wife, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children; by his second wife, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children.

Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives.

Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted
to probate in the CFI of Manila.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests.

After having submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition", the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children.

Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUES:

Whether it is the Texas law or Philippine law that should apply on the
decedent’s testacy

RULING:

Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and

the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this
that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would
not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent was a citizen of Texas and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the said testacy.

AZNAR vs GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule

PONENTE:

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:

Edward Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California,

where he resided (and consequently was considered a California citizen) for a
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his
residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California.
In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as her only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the
Supreme Court had been declared another acknowledged natural daughter of his).

Counsel for the acknowledged natural daughter Helen Claims that under
Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under
California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine law. Upon the other hand, counsel for the child Maria Lucy contends
that inasmuch as it is clear that under Art. 16 par.2 of our Civil Code, the national
law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal
law of California on the matter, that under California law there are no compulsory
heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him
in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under California law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the
property to Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:

What law should govern? Philippine law or California law?

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined
in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
 However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition
of personal property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee

that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a

citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State
of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile,
which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of
its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American
law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens,
one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
 It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there
is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of
the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article
16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention cannot be
sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law

mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of
the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent
is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case
at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because
the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially
as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of

California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California,
not by the internal law of California.