Domingo vs CA same.
With this, the said person is freed from being charged
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976,
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had
been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit
of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home
from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and
had been disposing some of her properties which is
administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad
insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration
should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for
purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith
that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the
with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final
judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer
for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their
properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them.
Republic v. CA and Molina Case Digest
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April
1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early
stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend
time with his friends and squandering his money with them,
from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a
week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three
years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of
two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals
and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
Issue:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be
construed as psychological incapacity
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of
Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how
he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct
in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the
marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the
present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to
be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect”
in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing
of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities”
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time
of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must
be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same
code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation
made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set
aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
___________________________________________________
Leouel Santos vs CA
Leouel Santos vs. CA
GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995
FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in
Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial
court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The
couple lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was
named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will
quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of
Julia’s parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s
pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she
called her husband and promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never
did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no
avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of
Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than
5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to
every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________________________________________________
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano Case Digest
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times
but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned
from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
Issue: Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount
to psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented
fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s
act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was
no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of
abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens
to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should
apply to any person regardless of nationality.
___________________________________________________
Choa vs. Choa Case Digest
Choa vs. Choa
G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002
Facts: Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent,
were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two
children were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a
complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also
filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The
case went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence.
However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence.
RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground
that petitioner must controvert the established quantum
evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the case to CA after
the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial
of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her
defense must present evidence.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her
evidence despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the
annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological
incapacity.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence
against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding
of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of
charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These charges included Complaints for perjury, false
testimony, concubinage and deportation.
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not
in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her
as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The
evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the
cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to
establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity.
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely
shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other.
There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union.
___________________________________________________
Antonio vs Reyes Case Digest
Antonio vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts: Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his
marriage to Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void.
He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family
Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to
the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type
of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s
persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should
be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that
respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached
the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to
suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s
evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing
abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial
court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and
void.
Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent
were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner
into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the
part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according
to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand
and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would
similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected
to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the
expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity
was curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence,
however, the court is sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner.
___________________________________________________
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After
the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of
defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same thing happened until
their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went
with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the
defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or
sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May
1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but
no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of
this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of
the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here
in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming
Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not
want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very
much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming
Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable
of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36
of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
___________________________________________________
Te vs Te
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It
was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena
proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’
home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage
license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and
stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay
at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they
have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better
for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for
the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latter’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, and allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to
live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of
others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering;
she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats
of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
__________________________________________________
 Morigo vs People of the Philippines Case Digest
Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio
Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990,
Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the
court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned
in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even
with his defense of good faith.
Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract
on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court
is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under
the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that
petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack
of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
___________________________________________________
 Wiegel vs Sempio-Dy
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia
was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then
filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the
ground of latter’s former marriage. Having been allegedly
force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was
married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely
voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
Karl, she is still validly married to her first
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is
void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the
prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration before he can
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded
void under the law.
___________________________________________________
Terre vs Terre
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo,
her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced
Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of
public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They
got married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothy’s
status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina
Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment
of minor and bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is
null and void.
HELD:
Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering
that Merlito is her first cousin thereby against public
policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the
nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage
with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40
states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be
invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
___________________________________________________
 Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971
and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a
declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null
and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of
their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which
they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision
regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property
in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to
stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based
on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family.
People vs Aragon
People vs. Aragon
100 Phil 1033
FACTS:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his
marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical
marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is
in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted
between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol
to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on
suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment
of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While
she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with
Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
HELD:
The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second
wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the
death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot
prosper.
 Mercado vs Tan
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva
in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in
1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed
bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The
decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing
the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without
first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy
case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without the
judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge.
Republic vs Nolasco
Republic vs. Nolasco
220 SCRA 20
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British,
in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco
in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in
Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another
contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received
a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been
born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut
short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by
securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote
several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all
returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of
presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that
his wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet
were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief
that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even
secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he
did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his
wife.
Lukban vs Republic
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933
and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been
heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the
parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She
believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for
more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she
desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on
any liability under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of
presumptive death before she can remarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration
of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code
prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have
the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking
of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate
of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,
the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,
that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Armas vs Calisterio
Armas vs. Calisterio
GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the
respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel
of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William
Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a
trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance
of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958
without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’
presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed
a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and
that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly
bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her
after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void
due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was
solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time
was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took
effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself
limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil
Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not
essential before contracting marriage where at least 7
consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to
remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and
therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Republic vs CA
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005
FACTS:
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January
1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told
her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for
her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan
checked if she went to her parents’ house but was not there and
even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-
law’s house and learned that Lea had been to their house but
left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay
Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi
driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the
malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the
local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also
reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a
petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife.
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead.
HELD:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-
founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his
spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the
Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of
Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also
failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It
could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from
his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that
Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and
seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea
but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition in RTC.
 Valdez vs Republic
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She
gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly
because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita
and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go
back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any
word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and
they agreed to separate and executed a document to that
effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never
heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead,
petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s
application for naturalization in US was denied because
petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in
March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is
valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s
death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and
not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence
is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry
Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
Anaya vs Palaroan
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in
1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in
1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force
and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s
counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being
negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior
to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of
such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is
a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does
not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an
annulment of marriage.
 hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially
Aquino vs Delizo since she was “naturally plump” or fat. It is only on the
Aquino vs. Delizo 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s
109 Phil 21 abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
FACTS:
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the new trial and decision complained is set aside.
ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her
marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the
fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in
April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to
a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent
the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino
testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear
nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of

marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged

by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of
marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is
Jimenez vs Canizares
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment
of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that
the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the
time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave
the conjugal home two nights and one day after the
marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife
but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to
submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical
certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to
comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part
and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only

the testimony of the husband.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did

not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim
cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact
that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not
readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination
unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not
charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a
witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to
trial court.