Deconstruction and Reconstruction:

An Application of Communicative Action to Student Tardiness

A Term Paper
Presented to the Faculty of
The Department of Philosophy
School of Arts and Sciences
University of San Carlos
Cebu City, Philippines

___________________________________________

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for

the course Philosophy 647: Jurgen Habermas
Master of Arts in Philosophy

Submitted by: Ryan Vincent F. Alisaca

MA-Philo

December 6, 2019
Abstract:
In the past, tardiness was easily remedied. Teachers, after all, were in full control of
disciplinary actions towards their students. Discipline back then was rigid and strict. One can
actually see the authoritative nature of such actions. Students were easily given corporal
punishments. In higher levels of education, grades were held at stake in students’ misdemeanor
and tardiness. As an instructor of Cebu Aeronautical Technical School, I have observed that first
year college students seem to follow this trend. Of course, negative and positive reinforcements
applied to grades are still being done today. However, a specific change of mind-set is being
observed here. Perhaps this has to do with the plurality of our times. Our times demand tolerance
and a lot of adjustments from people who are deemed different from each other. Indeed, a Marxist
reading of traditional methods of education would create a struggle between two assigned classes:
the teacher and the students. In a Derridean jump, this authoritative nature of teachers can be
reduced to an instance of Logocentrism, a Logocentrism which must be deconstructed. Thus we
have the tardy student who wants simply to extend his sleeping time, and the teacher who is
continuously perplexed as to the methods to be used in this situation.
I assert that in order to help halt the negative effects of the aforementioned deconstruction,
Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action can be applied. The Theory of Communicative
Action can be seen as a reconstruction of the already deconstructed pedagogical systems in our
education, perhaps not towards the traditional forms of it, but to a better and more rational form of
the system.

The Deconstruction of Authority

What is deemed to be rational is the superior concept. Perhaps rationality and irrationality

are not the only tension-filled concepts in the past. Indeed, systems which were orderly, capable

of being conceived precisely, and intelligible were to be preferred as opposed to chaotic and

disordered systems. The more a thing or concept resembles order and rationality, the more it is

deemed as good, better, and superior. This is actually an application of the structuralist though to

general systems. All systems will always have an internal order to them, a specific
systematization.1 Here is indeed a touch of authority: the authority of rationality. The authority of

reason. Order, that is, a manifestation of reason and rationality, is to be at the center of all systems.

It is to be prioritized, to be help in esteem, to be deemed superior. Perhaps this is an obvious

observation, something which we easily take for granted.

Jacques Derrida, however, takes a closer look at this system of thought. This rationality-

centered attitude in systems are labelled by Derrida as Logocentrism. Derrida’s deconstruction of

Logocentrism has its basis on his assertion on the fact of it (i.e. Logocentrism) being a mere

instance of historical relativism.2 Logocentrism is to be criticized precisely because it is a

relativism, that is, that it might not hold true for all time or space. And yet, the force of its

imposition is repressive and oppressive.

An instance of Logocentrism can be found in the thought of structuralism. In the thought

of Fernand de Saussure, language was governed internally by rules and syntaxes. These rules can

be viewed as the authority controlling how we should employ language. 3 Derrida, however, begs

to differ. Indeed to differ as in Derrida’s concept of the differance. The ‘differance’ is a deliberate

misspelling of the word difference. This deliberate misspelling is a gesture which symbolizes a

transgression, a revolution against a tradition, an authority.4 For Saussure, what allows us to

understand language is the network of differences which exist across a network of signs, a relation

which exists not in the meaning of words, but in how they are perceived. 5 For Derrida, however,

1
Stuart Sim, “Postmodernism and Philosophy” in The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Stuart
Sim (London: Routledge, 2001), 4.
2
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1997), 2.
3
Sim, “Postmodernism and Philosophy”, ibid.
4
Derrida, “Differance,” Bullettin de la Societe francaise de Philosophie 62 (1968): 254,
http://eclass.uth.gr/eclass/modules/document/file.php/MHXD236/Derrida-Differance.pdf
5
Ibid., 257
the differences are not actually constitutive of the systematization of words. It is precisely because

of these differences that words have ambiguities in their meaning and signification. 6 This

ambiguity of meaning and signification is what Derrida wishes to demonstrate in his deliberate

misspelling (‘differance’). In French, both words ‘difference’ and ‘differance’ are pronounced in

the same way so that the ambiguity of the word is heightened when listening only to the spoken

words.

At this point, Derrida deconstructs two concepts at once. First, Derrida shows us that

meaning cannot really be decided on a specific set on syntaxes which are deemed absolute.

Language here is actually ambiguous and not so systematic. Second, Derrida deconstructs here the

‘logos’, the perceived rationality of the spoken word, and thus too the superiority of the spoken

word over the written word.

From the first deconstructed concept, we may be able to infer that systems which claim

total consistency, total order, and total systematizations might have the tendency to be inconsistent

at some point. Authorities, in this case, can never be viewed with absolute domination and power.

From the second deconstructed concept, we may be able to infer that concepts which claim

to be universal and objective may not only be inconsistent, but also cause unnecessary repression

and oppression. For Derrida, speech has always been viewed as more rational and truer than

writing. This is because of its proximity to reason. It is produced directly from the rationality of

man. Spoken words are representations of thoughts.7 This, however, oppresses the concept of

writing. Since we have viewed writing as something inferior, we have in the process, also neglected

6
Sim, “Postmodernism and Philosophy”, 5.
7
Derrida, Of Grammatology, 11.
further reflection upon its concept.8 The demonstration of the deconstruction of the superiority of

speech over writing lies precisely in the ‘differance’. As ‘difference, and ‘differance’ are

pronounced in the same manner in French, they cannot be understood in speech. Speech is

therefore incomplete, in need of a supplement. Therefore, in order for us to make sense of

‘differance’, it is inevitable that we must refer to the written word since the difference in the signs

can only be seen in writing.

This deconstruction of order and authority are first manifested in language. They, however,

have social and political ramifications. In this case, deconstruction is applied in the student and

teacher relationship. Indeed we are led to the question, just how much authority is the teacher able

to exercise over the students? Just how much are the students limited in their activities? Is it truly

just to refrain students from getting the amount of sleeping time that they need? Or must we really

still insist on punctuality and discipline.

To clarify, I am not suggesting that post modernism is an infection that we need to

overcome. Deconstruction does not necessarily destroy traditional values. The point that I would

like to emphasize is that a description if today’s social and political attitudes as manifested by

human beings (students in this case) can be appropriated in the thoughts of postmodernism. The

phenomenon can also be understood vice-versa: thoughts in postmodernism can be appropriated

in the social and political conditions of man.

If such an appropriation is possible with deconstruction, perhaps we can find another

appropriation, one that looks as the brighter side, in the reconstruction of a healthy relationship

between student and teacher in the Theory of Communicative action of Jurgen Habermas.

8
Ibid., 43
The Theory of Communicative Action

Perhaps a renewed understanding of reason in necessary. In traditional conceptions, reason

was superior to passions. It ought master and overcome the whims of bodily desires. We are thus

given the definition of man: rational animal. However, seeing as rationality is being emphasized

here, we cannot help but see the social ramifications of this understanding. Schools of the modern

times, for example, valued calculative and mathematical knowledge over kinesthetic ones. The

effect is the lack of further appreciation in sports in some areas of the world. Thus, such a

conception of rationality is in some ways an instance of Logocentrism. And yet, even as all of

those who are writing against reason are trying to liberate their readers from Logocentrism, they

still using reason as their primary means for thinking, communicating, arguing, and writing for

emancipation from reason. In this, sense, is now the notion of trying to emancipate one’s self from

Logocentrism absurd and contradictory?

In those cases, perhaps there is a new conception of reason. Reason and rationality is

actually core concept in Habermas’ philosophy. However, this is no longer the logocentric reason,

the rationality that oppresses. Habermas does not define reason in terms of objective concepts or

instrumental terms. Instead, reason is something pragmatically understood, something which

ultimately can be used to give us the good life, in a word: emancipatory. 9 It is in this new

conception of reason that we can try to find a consensus in our given problem, that of the

relationship between student and teacher.

9
Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (London: MIT Press, 1985), 272-273.
 As already mentioned, reason here is being defined in a pragmatic sense. Hence, in the

Darwinian sense, rationality, in a way, is to be exercised in view of one’s best interest for one’s

self. Thus, out from that rationality is a language which, ideally, must serve our understanding of

each other. In this regard, language must be used as an appropriate means of communication. Here,

we are not only concerned with communication as the exchange of information among interactive

subjects. Reason, here, is to be viewed as something which allows a community, a group of people,

and a society to exist, that is, that these interactions must have the goal of coordination so that

participants in the communicative discourse are able to meet their desired ends.10

Moreover, language is not only for the allowance of an effective means towards desired

ends. This teleological aspect of language indicates the pragmatic nature of reason. The effects,

however, is not limited to coordination. Indeed, Habermas is quick to remind us that his model for

communicative action does not equate communication with action. The concept of action, for

Habermas, is that which constitutes any teleology in communication.11 So that action as teleology

produces other effects, and not communication. It is important to point this out because we might

be inclined to think of language and communication as the sole formatting factors of identity in a

social group.

Habermas gives us the example of religious events and liturgies which are held in order to

give honor to the presence of the sacred. Now, all variations in liturgical celebrations are

superficial. They merely introduce to us a mind-set, a consensus. At the heart of the action of

celebration is the understanding of a certain shared-identity.12 So that action here has the effect of

10
Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of
Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beason Press, 1981), 101.
11
Ibid.
12
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist
Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 53.
establishing identity, giving participants in a communication a sense of belongingness, a kind of

social unity, a specific kind of consensus.

Thus, in this limited exposition of Communicative Action, I am able to draw out some

concepts which might be useful in our reconstruction of the student-teacher relation. (i) Reason is

viewed as emancipatory, useful is purposive discourse. (ii) This purposive discourse or

communication is teleological and pragmatic in that it aims to seek consensus and coordinate

participants in communication. (iii) The coordination on the language of the participants should

allow them to achieve their desired ends –this is the concept of action. (iv) Action effects a

revelation of a shared identity among the participants of the communication process.

Conclusion: Reconstruction

A tension is seen most of time between students and teachers. Students are subject to the

whims and caprices of their teachers, always at the mercy of their red ballpens. This gap, this

separation is precisely what creates a binary opposition between learners and teachers. Very

similar to speech and writing (and this allusion is perfect because teachers traditionally lecture and

give speeches, while students are generally expected to take down notes, to write), the student-

teacher relation creates a privileging of one concept and oppression of the other. The teachers are

seen as oppressors, terrors. The students feel the oppression.

As we have already exposed, reason must be viewed as emancipatory instead of

oppressive. Thus, education should be an emancipatory force. This contention has already been

asserted by numerous philosophers. It is, therefore, necessary for us to make this assertion more
concrete, more acclimatized to the real world. This is problematic because if we understand the

relationship between students and teachers as a binary opposition, then education itself loses its

emancipatory nature. The place for developing emancipatory rationality is actually just another

instance of Logocentrism.

Thus, we must renew our understanding, not just of reason, but also the idea of being

teachers, students, and the relation between them. We start by positing that reason, indeed, must

emancipate. This has been done, and has been said a lot of times now. We must therefore proceed

from simply conceiving reason as emancipatory to conceiving emancipation as something which

is, pragmatically speaking, necessary for rational creatures, that is, emancipation must be at the

end of teleological action. Emancipation must be an end which rational creatures must desire. Now

the participants in question, that is, the teacher and the learner, are obviously rational. Here then

is the core of our problem: the binary opposition is created because students are seen as less

rational, that is, in need to someone to cure of them of their ignorance, as opposed to the highly

educated, brilliant, and rational teachers. In other words, students are viewed as possessing an

insufficient amount of rationality. This deficiency of rationality creates the opposition. Since

teachers are more rational, they have nothing to learn from their students, and since students are

less rational, they have much to learn from their teacher.

I do not deny that teachers are indeed out there to cure ignorance, nor do I say that students

are being oppressed when they are called ignorant. It is simple that our juxtaposition of less

rationality and more rationality creates the kind of mentality which I have earlier described as

regards the relation between student and teacher. Now, following the deconstruction of

Logocentrism, the superiority of reason, we are now at a dead end.

 How, then, should we reconstruct the paradigm for the student-teacher relation. Let us take

note of our renewed understanding of reason: emancipatory. If it is emancipatory, it should not

yield binary oppositions, that is, more rationality and less rationality should not be the guiding

concepts here. Both the learner and the teacher must be considered equally rational, equally a

participant in a specific discourse, a lifeworld. Thus we have met (i), we have emancipated both

the teacher and the learner from the traditional binary opposition. We must now try to see how

both the teacher and the learner can seek consensus. Having rid ourselves of the opposition, the

privileging, it is now appropriate to predicated both ignorance and knowledge equally on both the

learner and the teacher. The consensus, therefore, is this: each of them have a lot to learn from

each other. Hence, the teleology behind the communication between students and teachers should

result in the emancipation of both (student and teacher) from ignorance. That should now cover

(ii) and (iii). Finally, this action, this emancipation from ignorance, should reveal a shared identity

which both the learner and the teacher share: both are at once learners and teachers. In other words

the identity is pedagogical both for the learner and the teacher. In short, the teacher is actually also

a learner, and the learner is actually also a teacher. Such, then, is the identity of the participants if

the communicative action. Thus (iv) is covered.

Application to student tardiness

In my teaching experience in the first semester of Cebu Aeronautical Technical School

(CATS), I have had students who were constantly late. The experience was challenging as I have

always viewed my students as ignorant, and need of a lot of my lectures. Indeed, I did my exams

in such a way that it would be difficult for a student to pass without attending a lot of my sessions.

The tardiness, however, did not stop. Soon, I found myself trying harder not so much to teach and
give students the opportunity to learn, but to give the tardy students a hard time. “They have a lot

to learn from me,” I said to myself.

The final grading period came, and many of those tardy students were set to receive failing

marks. I thought to myself that perhaps this has been unfair to them since I have not actually heard

their side of the story. I was the one who established the rules without asking for their opinion or

suggestion. Thus, there was only oppression, and not consensus. Seeing as I have not sought

consensus first, I was implying that my words in the class were absolute, after all I am the teacher.

I am more rational, more educated. Was I too arrogant to think of that? Yes I was. Here, it dawned

to me that I also had a lot to learn from my students. Indeed, I learned a lot from them even as I

was still starting to teach. Having realized that, I decided to give them a second chance: I decided

to give them removal exams. The exams, however, were not academic. I had to talk to them face

to face and I would listen their respective reasons why they were always late. There, they told me

about their struggles as working students. Some of them come from poor families and have to work

at night in order to pay for the school bills. Some of them had family problems and are unable to

concentrate on school. And while I did find unjustifiable reasons from a few of them, it was

nevertheless a learning experience for me. There are a lot more things in a person’s life than just

grades and attendance. The application of communicative action in that respect was an eye-opener.

Indeed, I am a teacher. Rational as I am, I too should also be learning.

 Bibliography

Derrida, Jacques. “Difference.” Bullettin de la Societe francaise de Philosophie 62 (1968): 253-

278. http://eclass.uth.gr/eclass/modules/document/file.php/MHXD236/Derrida-
Differance.pdf

________. Of Grammatology, Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The John

Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Habermas, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization
of Society, Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beason Press, 1981.

________. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.

McCarthy, Thomas. The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. London: MIT Press, 1985.

Sim, Stuart. “Postmodernism and Philosophy” in The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism,

edited by Stuart Sim. London: Routledge, 2001. 3-14.