PSBCHOLOGICRL UURRFRRE BRRnCH

I I4&jkl!i 4B
T h i s book was p r o d u c e d in i t s e n t i r e t y on t h e m o b i l e
e q u i p m e n t of t h e 5 t h M o b i l e R a d i o B r o a d c a s t i n g Company.
 • # #>

In these pages an o u t l i n e is p r e ­
sented of the f u n c t i o n s of t h e
Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies
as part of a PWB Combat Team. The
d e s c r i p t i o n of operations,methods
and t h e o r i e s o f f e r s a key t o t h e
c u r r e n t A l l i e d propaganda concept
and technique in the e n t i r e f i e l d
of psychological warfare.
M a t e r i a l is drawn l a r g e l y f r o m
lectures received by the Fourth and
Ftfthi Mob i Te compan fes dur ing t h e i r
t r a i n i n g course. This is augmented
by p r i n c i p l e s a r r i v e d a t on t h e
basis of d i s c u s s i o n s , and, in the
technical s e c t i o n s , by i n t e r v i e w s
with o f f i c e r s of the companies.
The b o o k l e t i s i n t e n d e d as a
guide f o r o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men
who have received t r a i n i n g in com­
bat probaQandia. I t ^ i s not a manual
giilla
f^^n&^^i
^ ^ n ^ ^ i u|ej u|ej, i^anid
i^anid isis r restricted
estricted
"to te'ifibirf's^;;:of W o ' b f i e R a d i o B r o a d ­
casti ng Compan ies.
 Page

INTR ODUCTI ON I

DEFINITIONS 6

RULES OF PROPAGANDA 7

PWB TABOOS 10

PWB ORDERS I ¥

MORALE OF THE GERMAN SOLDIER 17

GERMAN PROPAGANDA 20

COMBAT TEAM IN THE FIELD (CHART) 23

THE D-SECTION 25

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERROGATION 27

THE PWB POLL 30

A REA INVEST I GAT I ON 31

MONITORING 35

RADIO NEWS AND FEATURES 41

THE FRONTPOST 51

LEAFLETS 59

POSTERS 66

L OUDSPEAKERS 71

THE LIAISON TEAM 73

THE PWB SHOP 75

THE RADIO SECTION 80

THE PRINTING SECTION 84

APPEND IX 89

t tiH'WM

inTROoucTion
The goal of psychological w a r f a r e is the same as t h a t of
any other branch of the armed f o r c e s : t o b r i n g about the
destruction of the enemy. This new type of warfare - waged
on an unprecedented s c a l e by both s i d e s in the present
c o n f l i c t - a c t u a l l y is an a s s a u l t on the mind of the enemy.
I t s weapons are the c o n t r o l l e d dissemination of news, f a c t s ,
and ideas. The struggle under way in t h i s domain between the
United Nations and t h e i r enemies is g a i n i n g in i n t e n s i t y
hourly w i t h thousands of s k i l l e d w r i t e r s , a r t i s t s , p l a y ­
w r i g h t s , and t e c h n i c i a n s involved on both s i d e s . Aided by
r a d i o , a i r p l a n e s , v a s t press f a c i l i t i e s , motion p i c t u r e s ,
and other media of propaganda d i s s e m i n a t i o n , the impact of
t h i s warfare today is f e l t throughout the w o r l d .
This p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e f a l l s g e n e r a l l y i n t o two
categories: s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l . They can be respectively
compared to d i f f u s e d and concentrated f i r e . In g e n e r a l , s t r a ­
t e g i c propaganda is intended f o r l a r g e groups of p e o p l e ,
disseminated over wide t e r r i t o r i e s , b r a c k e t i n g m i l i t a r y
personnel, the enemy's home f r o n t , populations under his and
our c o n t r o l , and neutral c o u n t r i e s . Most of t h i s propaganda
is directed from the c a p i t a l s of the w o r l d .

Tactical propaganda is customarily aimed a t s p e c i f i c units

in the actual f i e l d of operations and d i r e c t e d from the com­
bat zone. Although the media used a r e l a r g e l y the same ­
r a d i o , press, l e a f l e t s , and posters - i t s e f f o r t is beamed
on the enemy s o l d i e r in the f r o n t l i n e . I t s immediate pur­
pose, at present, is to make the s o l d i e r lay down h i s arms
and surre.n.d£rJpdiyjd^ua 11 y• ! . t s . j j I t i m a t e aim is t o d i s r u p t
the o r ^ i t ^ a i l Q h ^frithe^f\em|^aVS"|' T n ' s is t h e t y p e of
p s y c h o l j ) | i c ^ i ^ r | | | e ; % p e ^ ^ i ( f ^ | l a g e d by the PWB Combat
Teams, ^WQ*^'w^'r^'1sfe^'S^ F l^d.*iik:5i^ f o l l o w i n g pages.

Equipped w i t h mobile r a d i o t r a n s m i t t i n g and r e c e i v i n g

equipment, p r i n t i n g t r u c k s , l o u d s p e a k e r s , and o t h e r ma­
t e r i a l , these teams are able t o move ai)o r a p i d l y in the
f i e l d . They are in a p o s i t i o n ;
| ;£akey | i a t e advantage
d
of informat ion|g|^fle^ t>^ tt$eiti in i t o r s and p r i s ­
oner of war \w <ect propaganda t o
the enemy.

The PWB Combat Team's c o m p o s i t i o n is r a t h e r e l a s t i c ,

grouping both American and B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y personnel and a
number of c i v i l i a n s of both c o u n t r i e s .

Although the great improvements in t a c t i c a l propaganda em­

bodied in these teams are a recent development, t h i s type of
p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e is by no means new. I t appeared f o r
the f i r s t time in the h i s t o r y of the American Army a t Bunker
H i l l . There h a n d b i l l s , i n v i t i n g the enemy t o surrender, were
d i s t r i b u t e d by the army of George Washington. In World War I
both sides used psychological warfare e f f e c t i v e l y . In World
War I I , i t has been brought i n t o play on an extensive scale
since the beginning of h o s t i l i t i e s . The Germans have been
among i t s foremost exponents, s k i l l f u l l y u t i l i z i n g t a c t i c a l
propaganda t o a i d t h e i r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and a v a s t
s t r a t e g i c propaganda campaign,launched when the H i t l e r i t e s
came t o power in 1933. I t was the Germans who, in the days
of the "phoneywar," coined the c l a s s i c phrase, "The English
w i l l f i g h t t o t h e last Frenchman," and b l a r e d i t through
loudspeakers across No Man's Land t o French troops holding
the Magi not L i n e .

In World War I I , the Psychological Warfare Branch of the

U.S.Army has grown w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y r a p i d i t y . During the
Lybian campaign a handful of B r i t i s h and American o f f i c e r s
made a f i r s t attempt to break the morale of the German A f r i k a
Korps by means of l e a f l e t s . W h i l e B r i t i s h propaganda had
before t h a t time made an a t t e m p t to undermine the morale of
the German p e o p l e , the f i r s t g r e a t success f o r the A l l i e s
was scored when B r i t i s h and American e x p e r t s j o i n e d forces
in the days of Tobruk. The Tunisian campaign e s t a b l i s h e d PWB
as orve of the most important s u p p o r t i n g weapons of modern
w a r f a r e . I t did not take long for PWB, under B r i g a d i e r Gen­
e r a l M c C l u r e , t o overcome o p p o s i t i o n from w i t h i n both the
American and B r i t i s h armies. %}& J

In T u n i s i a / f o r the f i r s i t i m e , an e n t i r e German regiment

surrendered*to,, a w r i t t e n appeal - making i t c l e a r , even to
the most u n b e l i e v i n g , t h a f p ' s f ^ i ^ o g ica 1 w a r f a r e can save
the l i v e s of our f i g h t i n g men. I t was during t h a t time t h a t
a young B r i t i s h o f f i c e r , Captain O ' N e i l l , invented a t e c h ­
nique by which l e a f l e t s could be d i s t r i b u t e d over enemy lines
by a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s w i t h i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n c i d e n c e of loss
through burning. This method r e v o l u t i o n i z e d the dissemination
of combat propaganda and is used by PWB Combat Teams r e g ­
u l a r l y to d i s t r i b u t e l e a f l e t s and the weekly German-language
newspaper, Frontpost, in b a t t l e areas.
When the S i c i l i a n campaign s t a r t e d , several hundred spec­
i a l i s t s were a l r e a d y a t work f i g h t i n g the enemy w i t h l e a f ­
l e t s , l o n g - r a n g e and f r o n t b r o a d c a s t s , l o u d s p e a k e r s , and
posters of a l l k i n d s . PWB was o f f i c i a l l y recognized as the
only combined British-American o r g a n i z a t i o n conducting s t r a ­
t e g i c and t a c t i c a l propaganda.

One success f o l l o w e d another. L e a f l e t appeals showered on

the garrisons of the islands of P a n t e l l e r i a and Lampedusa in
the M e d i t e r r a n e a n played a major r o l e in the s u r r e n d e r of
those f o r t r e s s e s . S u b s e q u e n t l y , in S i c i l y , thousands of
Germans and I t a l i a n s , carrying PWB l e a f l e t s and safe-conduct
passes, l a i d down t h e i r arms.

PWB l e a f l e t teams, d i r e c t e d by Major Blankenhorn, who had

gained e x p e r i e n c e in t h i s type of w a r f a r e in World War I ,
a l s o played a major r o l e in the invasion of I t a l y p r o p e r .
S p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d PWB prisoner of war i n t e r r o g a t o r s landed
^0 minutes a f t e r the f i r s t wave of combat t r o o p s h i t t h e
beaches of Salerno and shortly t h e r e a f t e r were g r i l l i n g Ger­
man prisoners.

By the end of 19^3 the PWB o r g a n i z a t i o n o p e r a t i n g w i t h the

F i f t h Army was recognized as a s t a f f s e c t i o n of the General
S t a f f . General Mark W.Clark himself wrote a surrender appeal
dropped over N aples and l a t e r issued the f o l l o w i n g memoran-
dum:

I
 HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AHKY

APO 464 U.S. ARMY

5 April, 1944

SUWTCT : Combat Propaganda

TO : All Concerned

1. Combat propaganda it a comparatively new

weapon of war and, as such, it has little precedent

to follow. Moreover, propaganda ip an intangible. It

cannot "be -weighed or measured; nor can itE results

be evaluated T?ith a.uy considerable degree of precision.

2. But that it can be eifee tire has now been

estaDlJshed by actual field experience. The following

excerpts taken from field reports in the Italian

campaign are part of that experience. They display

nothing spectacular and G O not provide basic for

pretentious claims; hence they should create no

falte illusions,

3. But they do Ehov that properly ueed,

propaganda does weaken the enemy's morale; does make

him give up more easily; does cause him to fire

fever bullets at our troops; and on occasion, does

perEuade nim to croee the lines and quit the fight

altogether. This report, in brief, reemc to indicate

that propaganda heipc to shorten the war and to save

Allied lives.

4. That ie why the Filth Army will continue

ta use it.

(•1S*«4) MASK «. C L A M

HARK •'. CLAKK

Lieutenant General, U.3.A.

Command ing

 Not only in I tirryfw^y'igjqjj* (in P r i n c e , the Psychological

Warfare Branch is a working wef^oM From D-day o n , A l l i e d
a i r forces and a r t i l l e r y have dropped l e a f l e t s as w e l l as
s h e l l s , pounding enemy morale, spurring the resistance move­
ments. And, w i t h the United Nations ground f o r c e s , PWB Com­
bat Teams are moving forward through the c o u n t r y s i d e , the
c i t i e s and towns of northern and southern Europe. When the
f i n a l breach is made in "Festung D e u t s c h l a n d , " PWB prop­
aganda w i l l have formed part of the wedge and PV/B personnel
w i l l have as much r i g h t of proud entry i n t o Germany as the
men of any other service.

EDWARD A . CASKEY
Major, Signal Corps

•Major Caskey commanded the 1st M. R. B. Co., which was the experimental
psychological warfare u n i t , from I t s activation on April 19th, 1943, u n t i l
March Zoth, 1944.
 EFinirions
PROPAGANDA is a c a l c u l a t e d e f f o r t t o c r e a t e d e s i r e d r e ­
a c t i o n s or o p i n i o n s through the c o n t r o l l e d dissemination of
f a c t s and ideas, and through a c t i o n s .

TACTICAL PROPAGANDA is addressed to a s m a l l , d i s t i n c t group

and pursues a s h o r t range (immediate) o b j e c t i v e .
STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA is addressed t o large groups of people
and pursues long range o b j e c t i v e s .
We d i s t i n g u i s h between WHITE and BLACK propaganda,, When the
o r i g i n is d i s c l o s e d , the propaganda is w h i t e . When the o r i g i n
is not d i s c l o s e d , the propaganda is black, i . e . ,
a. P o s i n g as an enemy s t a t i o n .
b. P o s i n g as a s t a t i o n b e h i n d t h e enemy lines.
c. i m i t a t i o n of enemy m a t e r i a l .
Actual s t a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g behind enemy l i n e s and posters
d i s t r i b u t e d t h e r e , even i f i d e n t i f i e d , a r e a l s o c l a s s i f i e d
as black.

AIMS OF COMBAT PROPAGANDA

In g e n e r a l , we aim t o destroy ENEMY MORALE and DISLOCATE
enemy t r o o p s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , in accordance w i t h the lowering
of t h e i r morale:
1. I n d i v i d u a l s may be induced to surrender.
2. I n d i v i d u a l s may be induced to d e s e r t .
3 . Groups may be induced t o surrender.
4 . Groups may be induced to d e s e r t .
 ULES OF PROPRGHnDH

PWB propaganda is based f u n d a m e n t a l l y on the success of our

m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . PWB propaganda t h e n becomes a propaganda of
l o g i c , of p r o v i n g t o the enemy t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n is untenable
by the communication of d e p r e s s i n g f a c t s . Our success in low­
e r i n g enemy morale and e f f e c t i n g h i s d i s l o c a t i o n is dependent
upon t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h o s e f a c t s . PWB's c o n s i s t e n t p r i n -
c i p l e of propaganda, t h e r e f o r e , is the TRUTH.

These " t r u t h s " are not d i s i n t e r e s t e d . By t h e selection and

omission of f a c t s , our propaganda must e x p l o i t t h e enemy's
l o v e s , f e a r s , p r i d e s , and antagonisms (see page 17) w i t h i n the
given mi 1 i t a r y s i t u a t i o n . Our main method o f propaganda is
the INTENSIFICATION OF EXISTING FEELINGS.
Under t h e p r i n c i p l e of TRUTH and our method of u s i n g i t ,
PWB has l a i d down s e v e r a l permanent and semi-permanent r u l e s
t o be observed:
1. OUR STRENGTH i s t o be e m p h a s i z e d . T h i s i n c l u d e s b a t t l e
s t r e n g t h , p r o d u c t i o n s u p e r i o r i t y . E s p e c i a l l y use s t a t e m e n t s
by German l e a d e r s on A l l i e d s u p e r i o r i t y i n numbers, m a t e r ­
i e l , weapons.
2. SECRET WEAPONS should be exposed t o q u e s t i o n . Why a r e n ' t
they being u s e d , what has been t h e e f f e c t o f : t h e Luftpress­
bombe, Goliath, Tankhund, Do-Geraet, Radiotiomben, Schlitten­
geschuetz, Schlangenkopf, Mudrider.
3 . NO PROMISES, HO PROPHECIES are t o be u s e d , e x c e p t t h a t
we w i l l w i n t h e war . Unf ul f i M e d p r e d i c t i o n s expose us t o
r i d i c n l e , tnakinq whatever e l s e we say q u e s t i o n a b l e .

P.W.PRIVILEGES, however, are g i v e n . We p r o m i s e :

a . immediate removal from the b a t t l e zone.
b. Same food as A l l i e d s o l d i e r s .
Same h o s p i t a l care as A l l i e d s o l d i e r s .
P.W.'s can w r i t e f o u r l e t t e r s and t h r e e p o s t ­
cards a month.
 e . Payment
f . V o l u n t a r y t r a i n i n g c o u r s e s ,
g. Return t o Germany as soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r

t h e w a r .

5 . P.W. camp c o n d i t i o n s s h o u l d be d e s c r i b e d . See appendix

page
6 . DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY FEELINGS c r e a t e s a f e e l i n g of a n t a g ­
o n i s m . Give f a c t s not f e e l i n g s .
5* HONOR o f t h e German s o l d i e r is n o t t o be impugned. We
s t r e s s t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of h i s p l i g h t .
8 . NO DIRECT SURRENDER APPEALS a r e t o be u s e d . D o n ' t s a y :
" S u r r e n d e r ! " , "Give u p ! " , "Lay down your arms!" Surrender is
t o be i m p l i e d a s t h e o n l y r e a s o n a b l e t h i n g t o d o .
9 . NO R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y is t o be c h a r g e d t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l
f o r t h e s u r r e n d e r of h i s comrades or t h e f u t u r e of h i s c o u n ­
t r y ; we do n o t w i s h t o c o m p l i c a t e h i s reasons f o r s u r r e n d e r .
1 0 . KNOWLEDGE i n d e t a i l of t h e Germans and e s p e c i a l l y of
t h e p a r t i c u l a r groups being addressed is i m p r e s s i v e .
I K GERMAN CHARACTERISTICS must not be overs iwpl i f i e d , i . e . ,
stereotypes l i k e beer, sausages, junkers, are detrimental t o
c l e a r a n a l y s i s of t h e German mind.
1 2 . GERMAN LEADERSHIP is t o be d i s c r e d i t e d as much as p o s ­
s i b l e . E x e r c i s e care in a t t a c k i n g h i g h ; p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y

l e a d e r s ; a t t a c k t h o s e a l r e a d y in bad or l o w e r i n g r e p u t e :

i , e . , Goebbels.

1 3 . OFFICERS-ENLISTED MEN r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be e x p l o i t e d :

i . e . , o f f i c e r l e a d e r s h i p in t h e r e a r , s a d i s m , Ritterkreuz-
Halsschmerzen.
1 1 . FOREIGNERS-VOLKSDEUTSCHE r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be e x p l o i t e d .
A u s t r i a n s d o n o t l i k e Germans, Y u g o s l a v s and P o l e s l e s s s o .
F o r e i g n e r s f e e l t h e y a r e b e i n g s a c r i f i c e d f o r Germany. Other
army d i f f e r e n c e s ought t o be s t r e s s e d : i . e . , Vlehrmacht Beamte
w i t h R e g u l a r Army. Waffen-SS and C o n s c r i p t i o n a r m y .
1 5 . A D M I N I S T R A T I V E PROBLEMS o f t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f German
d e f e n s e s s h o u l d be e m p h a s i z e d as b e i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f ­
f i c u l t . German l e a d e r s w i l l f i n d i t a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e t o
m a i n t a i n an o v e r - a l l d e f e n s e w i t h t h e A l l i e s h a v i n g t h e i n ­
i t i a t i v e on s e v e r a l f r o n t s . ^ ^?« it
16. SUFFERING WOMEN AND C H I L D ^ H ^ ^ ^ n o ^ e f e r r e d t o . "Bomb­
ing o f i n n o c e n t women $nd,eh' i4*dr^V'* 4 " s t i m u l a t e s m o r a l e . The
purpose of bombings is the reduction of military objectives

and war industr ies.

17. NO ATROCITY STORIES will be used except under specific

order. Goebbels stimulates morale by injecting fear of our

retaliation in his propaganda. "Strength through fear."

STYLE

1. ACCOUNTS of i n c i d e n t s must be c o m p l e t e . With a s h i f t i n g

audience we cannot expect any previous knowledge.
2. CLARITY AND PRECISION are a b s o l u t e l y necessary. Answer:
What? Where? When? How? Who? Why? You are addressing men on
a b a t t l e f i e l d , w i t h l i m i t e d t i m e and p a t i e n c e . Use simple
language.
3 . IMPATIENCE in f o r c i n g t h e enemy's hand s e t s up a r e ­
a c t i o n of d e n i a l . I t a l s o implies t h a t our p o s i t i o n is not
s e c u r e . Except in an u l t i m a t u m we do not rush t h e enemy.
1 . CLICHES AND SLOGANS are t o be used only in e x c e p t i o n a l
cases. Slogans remind the German s o l d i e r of Goebbels, whom
he l o a t h e s ; a l s o are i n e f f i c i e n t because r e p e t i t i o n becomes
i n e f f e c t i v e w i t h a changing audience. C l i c h e s , i . e . , nDu hast
die Wahl;" "ein zweites Stalingrad,"'have become meaningless
through r e p e t i t i o n .
5. OVERFAMILIARITY is c o m p l e t e l y t a b o o . One i s n ' t chummy
w i t h t h e enemy. Use s l a n g o n l y i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c a s e s :
a. Where showing knowledge of a p a r t i c u l a r u n i t
b. Where nicknames show knowledge.
c . Where army slang becomes o f f i c i a l : i . e . , Arie, Flak,etc.
(Use q u o t a t i o n marks in "a" and " b " )
6 . JOKES c u r r e n t and known in the German u n i t may be used
We d o n ' t make up any new ones. The e n t i r e s t o r y must be r e ­
peated - no knowledge can be presumed.
 F r o m time t o t i m e , P W B issues t a b o o s ,

p r o h i b i t ions of certain P r o p a g a n d a l i n e s ,

p h r a s e s a n d w o r d s . T h e s e a r e d i r e c t e d not only a g a i n s t

m i s t a k e s in t e r m i n o l o g y b u t a l s o a r e in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h g e n e ­
ral a n d s p e c i f i c A l l i e d p o l i t i c a l lines« C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y

may only be t e m p o r a r y .

S o m e of t h e s e t a b o o s h a v e s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r a d i o

b r o a d c a s t , l e a f l e t s , Frontpost, e t c . , a n d will be found in a

d i s c u s s i o n of t h o s e t o p i c s . F o l l o w i n g , h o w e v e r , a r e indicated

the t a b o o s f o r a l l p r o p a g a n d a f o r m s . T h i s list m u s t b e kept

u p - t o - d a t e *

GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL.,.

OONT'S DO'S

Amer ica United States, U . S . , U.S.A.,

Amerika die Vereinigten Staaten,
Chicago, 1 1 1 i n o i s Chicago, U . S . ; a 11 Amer ican
c i t i e s , except New York and
Washington, D.C , a r e i dent i -
t i e d as be i ng in t h e U . S . ,
and t h e S t a t e is o m i t t e d .

England Great B r i t a i n , United King­

dom, B r i t i s h I s l e s ; t h e term
England designates the geo­
graphical e n t i t y .
Europe ( e x c l u d i n g C o n t i n e n t a l Europe, Festland
Great D^ i t a i n ) Europa.

10
Festung

lillJ
Eurofyi"; over r a d i o ,
may b e indicated
b y ton<

Government in Ex i le Government in London, in

C a i r o , etc.

He i mat Deutschland
Kontinent Europa Festland Eftropa
Soviet Russia, U.S.S.R.;
R ussia Russia, Russian, and Russians
may b e u s e d f o r v a r i e t y i n
s t y l e , b u t t h e word S o v i e t
must appear a t l e a s t once
in t h e item.

Russian Ambassador
Soviet Ambassador

Russian Army
S o v i e t . A r m y , Red Army

Bolshev ik
Communist

Vereinigte Nationen
Vereinte Nationen

"Berl in" was bombed-

Designate s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y
i n s t a l l a t i o n s ir< t h e bombing
of any c i t y , i . e . , f a c t o r i e s ,
e t c . , a t " B e r l i n " were bombed.
T h i s a p p l i e s t o t a r g e t s in
Germany and even more in Ger­
m a n - o c c u p i e d c o u n t r i e s . You
can say, " A l l i e d bombers were
over B e r l i n l a s t n i g h t . "

Endsieg Sieg; Endsieg i m p l i e s German*;

victory,
Fliegerhorst Flugfeld; terms c o n t r i v e d
or p o p u l a r i z e d by the Nazis
are not t o be used.
!
Der Fuehrer Hit ier, tR&AchsRanzler; in
$ ^ r; a t e g i c m a t e r i a l also
XNegsuerbrecher, Ver/uenrer.
Gefangenscha Jriegsgefanpenschaft
Guerr i l l a s r ror*>wTrFre ihe itskaempf er
in small independent groups,
otherwise Armies, Yugoslavian
Army, e t c . Enemy snipers a r e
Heckenschuetzen or g u e r r i l l a s .

Invasion (of occupied Liberation

, . territories)
Soldat
Letzte Nachrichten Neueste Nachrichten
M i l e s , yards, e t c . K i l o m e t e r s , m e t e r s , e t c . ; the
m e t r i c system is t o be used.

React ionar ies Do n o t u s e ; c o n s e r v a t i v e s

must not be a l i e n a t e d .

c. PROPAGANDA APPROACHES

V e r s a i l l e s - 1918: German r e a c t i o n t o the peace reached a t

the end of t h e l a s t war is s t i l l strong and t h e i r propaganda
l i n e s t i m u l a t e s morale of d e s p e r a t i o n by p a r a l l e l i n g V e r ­
s a i l l e s and 1918 with A l l i e d aims in t h i s war.

I n d i a : I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n in the B r i t i s h Empire is not t o be

m e n t i o n e d , e x c e p t where t h e news is so important as t o be
nown everywhere, i . e . , Ghandi. Treat only m i l i t a r i l y .

B a t t l e of B r i t a i n : B r i t a i n ' s r e s i s t a n c e would tend t o set

an example t o Germany in the present a i r war.

United N a t i o n s : C o n f l i 6 t s , r e l i g i o u s and p o l i t i c a l , a r e ,
of course, unmentionable except when they are well-known and
a f a v o r a b l e s e t t l e m e n t has been reached. Post-war planning
s t o r i e s must be e s p e c i a l l y a u t h o r i z e d .
* United S t a t e s : A l l s t o r i e s of domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s are t o
be k i l l e d ; i . e . , labor d i s p u t e s , n a t u r a l c a l a m i t i e s (floods
and f i r e s ) , pol j t i c s . <0mr e j ^ t iqns j a y . >f, | a n d led affirm­
a t i v e l y . The fur(daii^^V';>gHe. 1 A>n%;>* *;l} Candidates on the
vigorous prosecution of t h e war must be r e i t e r a t e d .
 In p a r t i c u l a r , a 11 r e f e r e n c e d t o h o l l y w o o d and g a n g s t e r s
a r e t o be o m i t t e d . T h i s w o u l d c o n f i r m t h e German p r o p a g a n d a
l i n e c o n c e r n i n g American d e g e n e r a c y .
A e r i a l A c e s : Do n o t use s t o r i e s s h o w i n g s c o r e s o f Allied
a c e s . German a c e s , a r e c r e d i t e d w i t h a much a r e a t e r number
of " k i l l s " .
Refugees and J e w s : Do n o t g i v e news o f German r e f u g e e s or
Jews as i n d i v i d u a l s or g r o u p s .
A t r o c i t y S t o r i e s : No a t r o c i t y s t o r y may be used w i t h o u t
s p e c i a l r e l e a s e f r o m t h e C h i e f of S t a f f of t h e Army c o n c e r n ­
e d . I n t e r r o g a t i o n s about a t r o c i t i e s must be a u t h o r i z e d by t h e
t h e a t r e commander.

13
 In May 1944, PWB headquarters issued the f o l l o w i n g set of
o r d e r s . Just as previous o r d e r s , issued more or less f r e ­
quently according t o need, these are designed t o meet spe­
c i f i c propaganda s i t u a t i o n s on s p e c i f i c f r o n t s . Sometimes
these orders e s t a b l i s h new p r i n c i p l e s or simply emphasize old
p r i n c i p l e s in a d e f i n i t e a r e a . More o f t e n , however, these
orders have a s h o r t e r d u r a t i o n of a p p l i c a t i o n . According t o
the immediacy of the news and the progress of our f o r c e s ,
they may s h o r t l y be n u l l i f i e d or replaced.

RECENT PWB ORDERS

(May 1944)
A . GERMANY
I . HITLER. H i t l e r is 'taboo'
in t a c t i c a l propaganda, out
may now be attacked on the
s t r a t e g i c level .
2. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
Stress the d i f f i c u l t i e s
of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f a c i n g
the German High Command and
leaders. The job is beyond
c a p a c i t i e s . Because t h e
A l l i e s have the i n i t i a t i v e ,
German d e f e n s e s must be
prepared on a l l p o s s i b l e
fronts.
3 . GERMAN PROPH^ClEY. Re­
c a l l German prophecies in
T u n i s i a , t h a t in f u t u r e
o p e r a t i o n s inner l i n e s
of communications w i l l
be enjoyed.
•+. QUOTATIONS. Quote Ger­
mans on Al 1 ied s u p e r i o r i t i e s
5. GERMAN AIR STRENGTH.
Point out t h a t German a i r
s t r e n g t h in t h e East is
s m a l l . Also point out t h a t
German communiques o m i t
t h e i r f i g h t e r losses.
6. STATEMENTS, Rommel said,
"We do not want t o t a k e
c o v e r i n t h e * A t l a n t ic
W a l l ' . " Lt^Gen.Dittmar,
•j.the German Commentator,
\ s a i d f "N © Qferman s h o u l d
use t h e t e r m ' F e s t u n g
Europa 1 . " We w i l l t h e r e ­
fore emphasize these terms.
7. HATRED. Stress tne hat-
red of the people of occ­
up ied c o u n t r i es
 8 . WAR
man p o l i c e are war c r i m i n -
a l s . However, l e t them
believe that t h i s pertains
to t h e i r future actions
o n l y , but never s t a t e t h i s
def i n i t e l y .
9. 'STRENGTH THROUGH FEAR'
' S t r e n g t h through fear con-
t i n u e s t o be t h e German
l i n e of propaganda. Russian
communiques on German f o r c -
ed labor t o be o m i t t e d .
«. WfOMEN. Women work as
%ms "f o r e ' 9 n w o r k e r s .
P a r t i c u l a r l y peasant women
a r e e x p l o i t e d and r e s e n t
i t . They f e e l t h a t t h e
w e i g h t of t h e war i s on
their shoulders.
I I . FORTIFICATIONS. Do not
say t h a t German f o r t i f i c ­
a t i o n s do not mean much. We
w i l l want t o have a c h i e v e d
something.

B. AUSTRIA
I . GENERAL. A u s t r ia t o be
stressed more s t r o n g l y than
ever (up t o 89% a n t i - N a z i ) .
Increasing signs of r e v o l t .
A l s o s t r e s s A u s t r i a ' s cap-
a c i t y t o l i v e as an indep­
endent s t a t e . We w i l l say
t h a t A u s t r i a is not s e l f ­
s u f f i c i e n t , b u t t h a t does
not mean t h a t i t c a n n o t
e x i s t as a s t a t e . O t h e r
s t a t e s w i l l be in a s i m i l a r
(complementary) p o s i t i o n .
C. ITALY
1 . GOVERNMENT. Our p o l i c y
towards the B a d o g l i o g o v ­
ernment remains unchanged.
The B a d o g l i o g o v e r n m e n t
w i l l be judged by r e s u l t s .
2 . F I G H T I N G U N I T S . No
large I t a l i a n u n i t s ( o v e r
200 men) have, a t any t i m e ,
appeared a t t h e f r o n t on
the German s i d e . The I t a l ­
ian 1st D i v i s i o n i s t r a v ­
e l l i n g through Germany on a
tour !

D. RUSSIA
I . FURTHER ACTION. Do not
r e f e r t o f u t u r e a c t i o n on
the Russian f r o n t .
2 .\ SEVASTOPOL. Stress t h a t
Sevastopol should have been
evacuated. ("Useless sac­
r i f i c e " 1ine).

E.
I . UNDERGROUND. The Under­
ground in France are not t o
be t r e a t e d as v o l u n t e e r s ,
but as s o l d i e r s . They have
t h e r i g h t t o r e c r u i t new
members. N a t i o n a l insur­
r e c t i o n d o e s n o t have t o
b r e a k o u t in a l l p a r t s o f
t h e c o u n t r y a t t h e same
t ime.
2. ALLIED FRIENDSHIP.
Stress A l l i e d f r iendship
w : t h F r a n c e . Emphasize t h e
c o o p e r a t i o n between France
and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in
A f r i c a n and I t a l i a n camp-
a igns .
3. PEOPLE OF FRANCE. Urge
the p e o p l e of France t o
leave the towns f o r the
country.
1 . PASSIVE RESISTANCE. En­
courage p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e
in f a c t o r i e s , e t c .
5. HOARDING. Encourage t h e
s t o r a g e of n o n - p e r i s h a b l e
foods.
6. FIGHT OF UNDERGROUND.
We r e c o g n i z e t h e f i g h t o f
t h e U n d e r g r o u n d and t h e y
have our c o n f i d e n c e .
7 . SHELLING OF TOWNS. R e ­
c a l l t o t h e m how French
towns were s h e l l e d by t h e
French a r t i l l e r y in the 1st
World War as an a b s o l u t e
tactical necessity.
16
If* >t
FRANCE
8. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.
E f f e c t i v e c l a n d e s t i n e ac­
t i v i t i e s a r e p o s s i b l e as
i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . We do
want s a b o t a g e and h e r o i s m
S t r e s s the p r a c t i c a l bene­
f i t s r e s u l t ing from heroism.
9. FORCED LABOR. R e g i s t r a ­
t i o n of men over ^5 y e a r s !
of age in France i n d i c a t e s
t h a t t h e y t o o may be used
f o r f o r c e d l a b o r . Germans
need a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , bank
clerks, etc.
10. FRENCH M I L I T I A . French
m i l i t i a (ca 1 led pol i c e ,
garde m o b i l e , e t c . ) w i l l be
t r e a t e d as w a r - c r i m i n a l s
( a l l except t r a f f i c c o n t r o l
p e r s o n n e l ) . Vichy govern­
ment is p r i m a r i l y h e l d r e ­
s p o n s i b l e , but i n d i v i d u a l s
w i l l be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r crimes c o m m i t t e d under
orders.
I I . SABOTEURS. B u i I d up
s a b o t e u r s and show i m p o r ­
t a n c e o f s u p p l y l i n e s by
t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n example,
where s u p p l y l i n e s were
also cut although by
o t h e r means. ..,, i
 LE OF THE GERmfln SOLDIER

fijf knowledge of German morale and the conditions a f f e c t i n g

jjit provide the foundations for PWB r u l i n g s and d i r e c t i v e s on
;
our propaganda. More d i r e c t l y , they provide the basis for our
a t t a c k s on enemy morale through l e a f l e t s , p o s t e r s , and pam­
p h l e t s , as well as through the Frontpost and our broadcasts.

GENERAL
I t has been found that 75% of German PW's interrogated
think that Germany has lost the war.
Reasons:
1. Large number of military reverses, in direct contra­
diction to the prophecies and promises 6f German leaders.

2. Length of the war.

3 . American production (admiration for Technik is p r o ­

found) .
%. Local numerical s u p e r i o r i t i e s of the A l l i e s , i.e.,Ar­
t i l l e r y , Air Force.
Nevertheless German f i g h t i n g morale is high.
Reasons:

1. Fear of A l l i e d r e t a l i a t i o n . Memories of I 9 ! 8 , r e i n ­
forced by German propaganda successes in c r e a t i n g widespread
f e a r of A l l i e d p r o j e c t s of mass s t e r i l i z a t i o n and f o r c e d
labor in the jungles of B r a z i l .
2. Fear of^the subjugated populations, "Bad conscience."
:
t. iB -. * •'
3 . Hope t o d i v i d e the A l 1 i e s ; based on "Anglo-American
s u s p i c i o n of the USSR," " B r i t i s h f e a r s of American postwaf
d o m i n a t i o n , " "American d i s t a s t e f o r c o l o n i a l imperialism,* 1
ate.
^. F a i t h in German " s e c r e t weapons."
5 . Disc i p l i n e .

IT
 are
These gene^r&M 4|
i m p o r t a n c e To" u s . they are the b a s i s of
°^
c u r r e n t German
propaganda and also of our own.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING GERMAN MORALE

a . FOOD. S t i l l good and v i c e than t h e i r own, which

p l e n t i f u l , yet often served t h e y r e s e n t b i t t e r l y .

cold and a t n i g h t , due to a

g . GREEN TROOPS. Setbacks

badly b a t t e r e d t r a n s p o r t ­
have r e s u l t e d f r o m m i x i n g

a t i o n system.
green and ex per ienced t r o o p s .

b . EQ U I PMENT. L a c k of N e w s o l d i e r s have less t r a i n ­

transport f a c i l i t i e s p r o ­ i n g , and now r e c e i v e t h e i r

duces local shortages even basic t r a i n i n g d i r e c t l y b e ­

where goods are st i 11 a v a i l ­ h ind t h e f r o n t 1 i n e e .

a b l e ; general shortage of h . PAY. Pay is l o w . The

soapand l e a t h e r ; radios are German p r i v a t e earns $ 0 . 1 7

i n f e r i o r ; boots a r e d i s ­ d a i l y . His f a m i l y r e c e i v e s

a p p e a r i n g e x c e p t on t h e $ 1 0 . 0 0 a month plus 1-5% o f

Russian f r o n t . h i s f o r m e r c i v i l i a n s a l a r y

c. MA I L . Ma i1 is handled paid by h i s c i v i l i a n employ­

y/ery e f f i c i e n t l y ; has t r a n s ­ e r . However, c e r t a i n E l i t e

port p r i o r i t y over food and t r o o p s r e c e i v e h i g h e r p a y .

is p r a c t i c a l l y uncensored. For e x a m p l e , t h e SS t r o o p s

e a r n f r o m $ 2 5 . 0 0 t o $30.00

d. FURLOUGHS. Regular f u r ­ a month. 15% a d d i t i o n a l pay

loughs, every s i x months, on t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .

are being maintained a t a l l

costs. In add i t i o n , "Bomben­ i . "PX" ITEMS. C i g a r e t t e

beschaedigten Urlaub" are s i t u a t i o n bad: {Sultana)

g iven o u t . I 940: 8 c i g a r e t t e s d a i l y
e . WOUNDED . E x c e l l e n t t r e a t ­ 1942: 5 cigarettes daily
ment i n t h e f i e l d h o s p i t a l s , 1944: 3 cigarettes daily
but s h o r t a g e of d o c t o r s and 1 b o t t l e of beer a day
good b a n d a g e s . S u f f i c i e n t 1 p i e c e of soap and 1 c o n ­
m e d i c i n e , b u t l a c k of b i s ­ t a iner of t o o t h p a s t e a month.
muth (used i n t h e t r e a t m e n t k. PROMOTIONS. Only a f t e r

of d y s e n t e r y ) . ».­ six months o f f r o n t - l i n e

d ut y: "Frontbewaehrungsze i t."

f . STRENGTH. ^ " 1. MEDALS. Not always award­

strength is common. Notice­ ed f o r a c t u a l m e r i t . O f f ­
a b l e man-power s h o r t a g e i c e r s ' e f f o r t s t o get the
f o r c e s t r o o p s t o serve in Ritterkreuz o f t e n at the
another branch of the s e r ­ e x p e n s e o f e n l i s t e d men.

18
 m. BOMBINGS. R e s e n t m e n t
a g a i n s t bombings l e s s e n e d
by e d u c a t i o n f o r a d m i r a t i o n
of f o r c e . Bombings impaired
soldiers' relations with
the home f r o n t . "Heroes" a t
the f r o n t are no longer im­
pressive, since c i v i l i a n s
f e e l t h e y c a r r y an e q u a l
burden.
n . FORE IGNERS . German
soldiers resent foreign
workers a t home, and t h e i r
love a f f a i r s w i t h wives and
s w e e t h e a r t s , w h i l e the s o l ­
diers die at the f r ont.
" W e ' l l have enemies a t home
in case of c o l l a p s e . " Num­
ber o f i m p o r t e d w o r k e r s
increasing s t e a d i l y .
o . LUFTWAFFE. N o t i c e a b l e
antagonism towards the once
f a m e d German a i r f o r c e .
Increased h a t r e d of Goering f
( c a l l e d "Meyer" or " T i n g e l ­
mann").
p. OFFICERS-NONCOMS. Non­
commissioned o f f i c e r s o f t e n
p e r f o r m t h e d u t i e s of o f f ­
icers at the f r o n t , only
t o be r e l i e v e d a f t e r t h e
b a t t l e . R e s u l t , resentment
by n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f ­
icers .
q. FOREIGN SOLDIERS. Poles
are d e s p i s e d . I t a l i a n s are
despised and a l s o f e a r e d as
potential snipers, eto.
i a n s | f e e 1 t h a t they;
V
**i . IS' ;/ dig •­
are being s a c r i f i c e d . A l ­
ways d i s t i n g u i s h between
Reichsdeutsche and Volks­
deutsche.
r. SN I PERS a r e f e a r e d .
s . P.W.CAMPS. F r e n c h and
Russian camps a r e d r e a d e d .
t. EXPENDITURE OF MEN.
"Die Allierten opfern Ma­
terial urn Soldaten zu ret-
ten. Die Deutschen Opfern
Soldaten urn Material zu
ret ten. "
u. SOVIET RUSSIA. There is
great f e a r of Soviet R u s s i a .
"Tiere und Untermenschen. "
F e e l i n g t h a t "we must keep
f i g h t i n g . " There is hope t o
d i v i d e the A l l i e s and p e r ­
haps e n l i s t Anglo-Americans
in the f i g h t a g a i n s t R u s s i a .
S t r e s s our s o l i d a r i t y w i t h
R u s s i a and emphasize t h a t
we a r e p o w e r s o f o r d e r .
v . UNKEPT PROMISES. German
leaders made many promises,
most u n k e p t . A letdown r e ­
s u l t e d . Hatred of Goebbels
i ntens i f i e d .
w. TRANSPORTATION. V e ­
h i c l e s a r e good b u t t o o
f e w , o f v a r i o u s makes and
n a r d t o r e p l a c e . Gas i s
g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e , but
o n l y a f t e r much r e d - t a p l e
x . AGE. Number of s o l d i e r s
under 18 and over 35 years
of age is i n c r e a s i n g .
j
19
CERfllRn P R O P R G R R D R . . .

German propaganda is g e n e r a l l y d i r e c t e d to us or to t h e i r
own"home f r o n t ."We do not answer the propaganda d i r e c t e d to
us, t h a t i s , c a r r y on the "war cf monitors." We do, however,
attempt t o show t h a i Goebbels is s p i t t i n g into the wind, t o
r e f u t e his promises and prophecies made to the German people
and t o German s o l d i e r s . Moreover, we use"home f r o n t " prop­
aganda as a key t o German morale g e n e r a l l y and along s p e c i ­
fic fronts.

PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA

1. German propagandists do not consider i t expedient t o a d ­

here to the t r u t h . They have always favored the sharper short
term e f f e c t of l i e s , and in t h e i r present position they can­
not a f f o r d t o t e l l the t r u t h .
2. T h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e s c o n s i s t e n t l y underestimate
the enemy. Reports r e f l e c t wishful t h i n k i n g , since o f f i c e r s
fear t o t e l l t h e i r superiors unpleasant t r u t h s .
3. German propaganda l i n e s change, irrespective of c o n s i s t ­
ency, e . g . , no invasion—unsuccessful i n v a s i o n — p a r t l y suc­
eessful i n v a s i o n . M i l i t a r y objectives always become unimpor­
t a n t when they f a l l into A l l i e d hands. There was no Gustav
1ine, no H i t l e r 1 i n e .
4. Slogans and c l i c h e s are widely used.
5. German leaders r e a d i l y prophesy. This turned out t o be
one of t h e i r outstanding psychological f a i l u r e s .
6 . Hatred is the foundation of "German propaganc|a.
 ANALYSIS OF PR
WAR A I M S . . .
A. "Germany is f i g h t i ng
f o r her n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e .
No war aims are o f f e r e d by
the A l l i e s s i n c e they have
none. ' U n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n ­
d e r 1 means extinction
of Germany."
INVASION...
A. "Germany i s l o o k i n g
f o r w a r d t o t h e i n v a s i o n . "
I t w i l l give them a chance
f o r dec is ive act i o n .
B. "The A l l i e s are f o r c e d
t o invade the c o n t i n e n t . "
Roosev e 1 t n e e d s
personally, for p o l i t i c a l
reasons.
C h u r c h i l l needs
personally, for p o l i t i c a l
reasons.
" S t a l i n asks f o r i t . "
Morale in t h e democra­
c i e s is so l o w , t h a t some­
t h i n g has t o be done.
"The War in the P a c i f i c
is going b a d l y . "
C. "The 1 and ing w i11 be
s u c c e s s f u l , but w i l l not
g a i n d e p t h . " The t h e o r y of
defense in depth is pub­
1 ic ized
D. The home f r o n t is being
prepared by lose of the term:
"Festung Deutschland. "Festr
ung Europa'l s t i l l exists^
f o r the t r o o p s which are
expected t o defend i t .
DA LINES. (MAY I9UU)
AERIAL WARFARE...
A . "A 11ied o b j e c t i v e is
to t e r r o r i z e civilians
(women and c h i l d r e n ) . I f i t
is not m a l i c e , i t is c r i m ­
i n a l i n e f f ic i e n c y . I t i s
done t o avoid the i n v a s i o n .
B. The L u f t w a f f e is played
down. A i r power is n o t so
i m p o r t a n t a f t e r a l l . The
importance o f I n f a n t r y is
is b u i l t u p . The " k l e i n e
Landser" is i d o l i z e d .
C. "Revenge w i l l be t a k e n . "
(Rache ist suess.J "Only
it ^ out of 80 m i l l i o n Germans
l i v e in B e r l i n . 8 out of HO
m i 1 1 i on B r i t i s h e r s 1 i v e
it in London."
RUSSIA AND I T A L Y . . .
"Defensive v i c t o r i e s "
are b e i n g a c h i e v e d t h e r e .
"The mere g a i n of t e r r i t o r y
is of no a d v a n t a g e t o t h e
A l l i e s . " The importance of
c i t i e s about t o f a l l is a l ­
ways c a r e f u l l y p l a y e d down
( S e v a s t o p o l ) . The t a c t i c a l
value of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s is
played down, s i n c e we a r e
a b o u t t o c o n q u e r some o f
them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e
iWesjtwalJ i s a " 1 i v i n g "
j f o r t i f i c a t i o n , as c o n ­
i t r a s t e d w i t h t h e Magi n o t
L i n e , wh ich was dead.
"German Armies are with­
21
drawing i n t a c t , but i n f l i c t
heavy losses on the a t t a c k ­
e r s . " Thereby t h e ma
j e c t i v e of w a r f a r e
destr uct ion of t h e enemy
a r m y , i s ach i e v e d Corn­
manders of d e f e a t e d troops
are d e c o r a t e d f o r the ir
"defensive v i c t o r i e s
SECRET WEAPONS
achievement. "Everything is
"Dreadful s u r p r i s e s are
in s t o r e f o r t h e A l l i e s . "
Only r e c e n t l y , and f o r the
the f i r s t t i m e , German s o l ­
diers expressed doubt as t o
t h e i r e x i s t e n c e and e f f i ­
cacy.
PACIFIC WAR...
The war i n t h e Pac i f ic
is not popular, since Ger­
mans believe the U.S. would
not be a t war i f t h e J a p ­
anese had not a t t a c k e d .
ALLIED UNITY...
Nothing is l e f t u n t r i e d
to divide the Un i ted Nations.
World b o l s h e v i s m , postwar
domination of E u r o p e , un­
defined war aims. "The U.S.
was made to f i g h t f o r B r i t ­
ish I m p e r i a l i s m . " " G r e a t
B r i t a i n w i l l lose t h e war
whether the A l l i e s win or
not, since England w i l l be
crushed between the super ior
manpower o f t h e U n i t e d
States and Russ i a . "
UNITED STATES...
"Gangsters r u l e America"
(Murder, I n c . , the Chicago
Piano, e t c . ) .
22
Hollywood "Am­
r
ivol ous,
_ ts t o the
lasT grandmother."
Wall S t r e e t . "Money-mad
h i g h f i n a n c e and J e w i s h
p o l i t i c i a n s r u l e the coun­
try."
B l u f f i n g instead of r e a l
promised, but promises are
not kept." {Die"14 Punkte." )
"Americans have no c u l ­
t u r e " - - the W i I d West.
"The U . S . is r idden by
cold and heat waves, dev­
astated by f l o o d s . "
"American p r o d u c t i o n is
no r e a l a c h i e v e m e n t . More
must be produced since i t
is of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y . "
("erzeugt am laufenden
Band.")
"Americans are unable t o
solve t h e i r s o c i a l prob­
lems." (Only H i t l e r can do
t h a t . ) Therefore continuous
labor troubles I s t r i k e s , un­
employment.
Racial problems. Work on
Negroes through Japs. Ger­
many w i l l l i b e r a t e the two
colored peoples.
"Germans have created a l l
t h a t is good in the U . S . )
(Harrisburg, P a . )
"The American s o l d i e r is
soft and c a n ' t l i v e without
l u x u r y . " T h e r e f o r e super­
i o r i t y of American e q u i p ­
ment is no a c h i e v e m e n t ,
s i n c e our s o l d i e r s would
not f i g h t without a r t i l l e r y
superiority, e t c .
 L
1H[ C 0 H I l # # f t f f l # l i r t 4 FIELD

The accompanying c h a r t is designed to g i v e the reader a

p i c t u r e of the manner in which the PWB Combat Team operates
in the zone of o p e r a t i o n s . In a c t u a l i t y , distances between
the v a r i o u s team components, m i l i t a r y h e a d q u a r t e r s , a i r
f i e l d s , towns, and the l i k e , vary c o n s i d e r a b l y . The inset
chart in the upper left-hand corner gives an approximate idea
of what the distances may be. The team's work a l s o includes
propaganda addressed to c i v i l i a n s in the rear zone. This can­
not be i l l u s t r a t e d on t h i s c h a r t .

1. Army Headquarters, location of Combat Team H.Q., O-Sec­

t i o n H.Q., Frontpost teams.
la. Fixed radio s t a t i o n communication.
2 . Army prisoner e n c l o s u r e , where team's interrogators
gather material for D-Section r e p o r t s .
3 . M o n i t o r ' s t r u c k of the PWB team. In t h i s l i s t e n i n g
post, news from a l l over the world is picked up f o r
the use of the team and h i g h - r a n k i n g army o f f i c e r s .
4 . Beachhead a r e a . I n t e r r o g a t o r s of the PWB Combat Team
often land with the f i r s t wave t o s t a r t i n t e r r o g a t i o n
of war pr isoners.
5. A i r p o r t . Planes are used for dissemination of leaflets
and other propaganda.
6. Motion picture house in town near zone. PWB teams con­
t r o l motion pictures in towns taken from the enemy.
7 . P r i n t i n g shop in the same town. Such p r i n t i n g shops
are taken over t o aid in p r i n t i n g work wherever pos­
s i D l e . The team a l s o has a complete p r i n t i n g t r u c k
which can function independently.
8. Radio announcers' t r u c k .
9. Radio tower%31
10. RaiIroad'station!
11. Corps Headquarters and prisoner enclosure - interro­
gat ion­

23
12 D i v i s i o n Headquarters and prisoner enclosure - i n t e r ­
rogation. j! S!
13 Regimental Headquarters andjpr ison^r encJ^sl^ilJI
Regimental a r t i 1 l e r y * f ir TngisKel l s V o n t a i n ing Frontpost
and other propaganda m a t e r i a l .
15 16, 1 7 . Loudspeakers used by PWB Combat Team t o address
d i r e c t s u r r e n d e r appeals t o German t r o o p s . U s u a l l y
placed about 800 yards from the enemy l i n e s .
18 Enemy t e r r i t o r y . Area which is p r i n c i p a l t a r g e t of PWB
Combat Team's a c t i v i t y . Special patrols also d i s t r i b u t e
"black propaganda", l e a f l e t s and posters in t h i s zone.
 f SlLfiL INL^J

THE D- S E C T I O D . . . .

S* i . / a ' • ' ' • '•-;>• £••'£ •-•.. V;.,, fc'i *'-J 5 j JS?

25
 The O - S e c t i o n is t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s e c t i o n of t h e Combat
Team, i t c o l l e c t s , e v a l u a t e s , i n t e r p r e t s , and disseminates
i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o enemy morale and m a i n t a i n s a con­
t i n u o u s check on the e f f e c t of the Team's propaganda.
A l l the i n t e l l i g e n c e obtained is incorporated into D-Section
r e p o r t s . A r e p o r t i s r e n d e r e d w e e k l y , a c o n s o l i d a t e d one
monthly, and s p e c i a l r e p o r t s whenever circumstances w a r r a n t .
An o u t l i n e of t h e D-Section r e p o r t w i l l be found in the ap­
pendix. I t presents a convenient arrangement of the contents,
and may serve as a check l i s t of the s p e c i f i c subjects which
must be c o v e r e d . I t is on these r e p o r t s t h a t the l e a f l e t ,
p o s t e r , Frontpost, and r a d i o teams are p r i m a r i l y dependent for
the m a t e r i a l they use in t h e i r propaganda a c t i v i t i e s . Copies
of the r e p o r t s go t o Combat Team Headquarters and t o higher
echelons.
The D-Section obtains information from the f o l l o w i n g sources:
I . P.W. I n t e r r o g a t i o n (page 2 7 )
2 . P.W. P o l l (page 5 0 )
3 . Area I n v e s t i g a t i o n ( i n t e r v i e w of C i v i 1 i a n s ) ( page 31 )
4 . A n a l y s i s of Enemy Mail and Other Documents
5 . Reports from Higher Echelon D-Sections
6 . (r-2 Reports
7 . A-2 Reports
8 . Reports from T a c t i c a l M i l i t a r y Interrogators
9 . Reports from Agents behind the Lines

! 0 . Reports
Report s from OSS and OWI

0 . 8 . Reports
12. Voluntary Reports from C i v i l i a n s

26
 i|lERRQ6ATI-QN|0F ENLISTED MEN
of the information used^in'ffc^rcal psychological warfare
is d e r i v e d from the i n t e r r o g a t i o n of prisoners of war. The
primary o b j e c t i v e of such i n t e r r o g a t i o n s is to determine the
present s t a t e of mind (morale) of the enemy. Hence the i n d i ­
vidual i n t e r r o g a t i o n must aim t o discover what the prisoner
thought BEFORE his capture or surrender.

TECHNIQUE OF INTERROGATION
T I M E . . . For the purpose of psychological i n t e r r o g a t i o n , i t
has been found most expedient to i n t e r v i e w p r i s o n e r s on the
d i v i s i o n l e v e l . G e n e r a l l y , prisoners of war are shipped from
d i v i s i o n t o army cage 12 - 2M- hours a f t e r c a p t u r e . Experience
has shown t h a t the best time for interrogation is 5 - 10 hours
a f t e r capture. The prisoner then r e f l e c t s most a c c u r a t e l y the
morale of his not yet captured comrades. Later on he develops
a P. W. morale.
PLACE... The place of i n t e r r o g a t i o n should be made t o look
as impressive as p o s s i b l e . Every e f f o r t should be made to
create at least the semblance of an o f f i c e , by the appropriate
use of a desk or t a b l e , c h a i r s , maps, c h a r t s , and p i c t u r e s .
Cigarettes should be kept at hand (see below).
INTERROGATOR... The i n t e r r o g a t o r must command r e s p e c t . He
should be clean-shaven and n e a t l y dressed. Headgear w i l l be
worn when the prisoner enters and leaves. (The German s o l d i e r
is not f a m i l i a r with salutes rendered while uncovered.)
PROCEDURE... The taking of notes during i n t e r r o g a t i o n depends
on the i n d i v i d u a l P.W.'s psychology. Some w i l l f e e l more im­
p o r t a n t when t h e i r statements are r e c o r d e d ; o t h e r s w i l l be
suspicious. In any event, the basic d a t a , name, r a n k , s e r i a l
number, and u n i t , w i l l be r e c o r d e d on a c a r d as soon as
obtained.
" D i v e r s i o n s " , e . g . , o f f e r i n g the p r i s o n e r a c h a i r or a
c i g a r e t t e in o r d e r t o put him a t ease or t o c o n c e a l the
i n t e r r o g a t o r ' s i n t e r e s t in a v i t a l q u e s t i o n w i l l be used
sparingly and without prejudice to the i n t e r r o g a t o r ' s d i g n i t y .
These " f a v o r s " must be TIMED c o r r e c t l y and should never be
extended art the beginning^ot^an interview.
• ' * • ? • • . * . . •

Interrogate t h e "easiest" prisoners f i r s t , i . e . , Poles,

Yugoslavs," then Germans; e n l i s t e d men, noncommissioned o f f i ­
c e r s , then o f f i c e r s . The knowledge gained w i l l f a c i l i t a t e

27
 ft

•fa

the questioning of further ;pr.isQnerj& from fhe same units.

Members of the Waffen-SS are to be treated 1 ike any other

soldiers. Pretend you do not know the difference.

The form of address is Gefreiter Mueller, Herr Feldwebel

(from Feldwebel up, the Herr followed by the rank must defi­
nitely be used) . All German P.W.'s are addressed in the Sie

form.

Be patient. No prisoner is uninteresting. We must know the

attitude of the average German soldier. Moreover, the dullest

prisoner may reveal a choice item of information at the end of

a long interview.

Make no promises. Do not "propagandize" the prisoner. We do

not want to distort his answers.

In evaluating the information obtained from a P.W., excessive

caution is not called for. The German army, in its spirit of

aggressiveness, has neglected to make its soldiers security-

conscious. As a rule, German prisoners will talk rather freely

and, by and large, will tell the truth. Statements involving

the prisoner's own judgement, of course, should be more care­

fully weighed. German prisoners tend to overestimate the

morale in their own ranks.

First ask for the Soldbuch. If you have already obtained

the Soldbuch, you may use the information contained therein

to impress the P.W. with your knowledge. Be careful to get

the right book. Next, ask for name, rank, and serial number

(even if you have these data from the Soldbuch or other

source). If you already know, you may, instead of asking, tell

him casua'ly while writing the information down on the card.

At this point it i s well to determine whether the prisoner

is "tough" or "easy" in order to conduct the further question­

ing accordingly. A good question to this end is: "How long do

you think you are going to be a P.W.?" A "tough" prisoner will

usually give a defiant answer, such a s , "Until the war is

over". If he answers, "I don't know", he is likely to prove an

"easy" prisoner, and you may follow by asking: "Do you think

you will be sent back to Germany right after the war?" If his

answer is yes, h ^ b e l ieves in German victory; if no, he has

admitted by impl feat ion his belief that Germany will lose, the

war. A good metho4 of "warming up" a "tough" prisoner is to

ask him how he wa§ captured because it affords him an oppor­

tunity for self-just ification. For an "easy" prisoner, simple

28
"warming up" q u e s t i o n s such as "What p a r t o f Germany a r e you
from?" or "How o l d a r e you?" a r e a d e q u a t e .

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERROGATION OF OFFICERS

l . / e r r o g a t i o n of o f f i c e r s o b v i o u s l y r e q u i r e s g r e a t e r c a r e
and s u b t l e t y than t h a t of e n l i s t e d men.
P e r s o n a l q u e s t i o n s and "chumminess" s h o u l d be s t r i c t l y
a v o i d e d . O f f i c e r s s h o u l d be i n t e r r o g a t e d in t h e p r e s e n c e of
an American o f f i c e r . They a r e o f f e r e d a seat a t t h e b e g i n n i n g
of t h e i n t e r v i e w . The non-commissioned i n t e r r o g a t o r i s r e ­
q u i r e d t o s a l u t e t h e enemy o f f i c e r f i r s t .
O f f i c e r s a r e s e c u r i t y - c o n s c i o u s t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they w i l l
not g i v e up s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . A good a p p r o a c h ,
t h e r e f o r e , is f i r s t t o ask a few m i l i t a r y q u e s t i o n s t o which
you know t h e a n s w e r s . T h i s w i l l g i v e t h e p r i s o n e r t h e s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n of r e f u s a l . You w i l l then supply t h e answers y o u r s e l f ,
t h e r e b y showing your knowledge and e a s i n g h i s mind on t h e
p o i n t o f m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y . (By t h e same t o k e n , m i l i t a r y
questions t o which you do not know t h e answer must be a v o i d e d .
Even a f t e r r e f u s i n g t o answer, t h e o f f i c e r w i l l f e e l t h a t t h i s
m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n is t h e r e a l o b j e c t i v e o f your i n t e r r o ­
g a t i o n , and he w i l l remain r e c a l c i t r a n t t h r o u g h o u t t h e i n t e r ­
v i e w . ) From t h i s p o i n t o n , t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n may t u r n t o t h e
not s t r i c t l y " m i l i t a r y " s u b j e c t s you a r e r e a l l y i n t e r e s t e d
in and t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f which German o f f i c e r s r a r e l y a p p ­
reciate.

SUGGESTED APPROACHES
1 . " A r e you g o i n g t o w i n t h e w a r ? " A n s w e r : " Y e s . " ( T h i s
is one q u e s t i o n he wants t o a n s w e r . ) "Then can you e x p l a i n why
75% o f your men t e l l me you have a l r e a d y l o s t ? " A n s w e r : " I
know n o t h i n g a b o u t t h a t . " T h e n : " I t h o u g h t t h e German Array
c o n s i d e r e d morale i m p o r t a n t . You, as an o f f i c e r , . . . "
2 . "Are *r U BerufsoffizierV
3 . Men with one or two medals like to talk about them.

29
 THE PUIB
Regular sampiing of opinion among prisoners-of-war is a task
of t h e D-Section f which makes a monthly " G a l l u p P o l l " a t
p r i s o n ^ages on Army l e v e l . The p o l l is a m o r a l e - t e s t i n g
d e v i c e a u k . l i a r y t o other r e p o r t s . The morale estimate can­
not be based upon i t s f i n d i n g s a l o n e .
Because, in g e n e r a l , prisoners a t the Army l e v e l cage are
not as occupied as p r i s o n e r s in permanent p r i s o n e r - o f - w a r
camps, they cooperate w e l l . The monotony of cage l i f e can be
r e l i e v e d by a we 11-presented poll of t h i s t y p e .
PROCEDURE
Prisoners should be separated into groups of about f i f t y .
Each group should then be given a s h o r t pep t a l k —"you are
going t o have a l i t t l e fun—you are going t o be allowed t o
v o t e " . While they a r e being handed i n d i v i d u a l "yes-no" ques­
t i o n n a i r e s , t h e y should be t o l d t h a t they are not r e q u i r e d
t o r e v e a l t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s . Prisoners are not t o be allowed
t o compare or discuss answers. (VoLksdeutsche must be excluded
from p a r t i c i p a t i o n , unless t h e i r opinions are p a r t i c u l a r l y
des i r e d . )
Upon completion of the X " t e s t " , the prisoners should drop
t h e i r papers i n t o a " b a l l o t " box. I f they b e l i e v e t h a t any
d e v i c e e x i s t s t o check t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t i e s , they
should be convinced t h a t such is not the case.
A l i s t of t y p i c a l questions used in previous P o l l s and a
s u g g e s t e d f o r m o f t h e P.W. P o l l r e p o r t w i l l be found in
the Appendix.

30
31

 •'•
f!
. . . . .PWB's |)|rfF»|sehh area i n v e s t i g a t ion? is (I ) t o d e t e r ­
mine t h e g e n e r a ^ ^ t i t i ^ d e o f ; t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f o c c u p i e d or
l i b e r a t e d t e r r feSm fei? <(2§ ^ © " e x p l o r e a l l I n f o r m a t i o n about
p e r s o n a l i t i e s a f f e c t i n g public opinion.
I n v e s t i g a t o r s must c o n c e r n t h e m s e l v e s w i t h p u b l i c morale
b e f o r e our o c c u p a t i o n and how i t changes after A l l i e d troops
have e s t a b l i s h e d t h e m s e l v e s . To r e l i e v e m i l i t a r y personnel of
c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s connected p r i m a r i l y w i t h o c c u p a t i o n ( e . g . ,
p u b l i c a t i o n o f newspaper f o r l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n ) , we must d i s ­
cover in t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e t i m e the r e l i a b l e c i v i l i a n s in
t h e a r e a . I t i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y , f o r our w o r k , t o i s o l a t e
enemy s y m p a t h i z e r s d e a l i n g w i t h p u b l i c o p i n i o n in t h e a r e a .

METHODS AND SOURCES OF INVESTIGATION...

1 . General Observation.
2 . R e l i a b l e p e o p l e , i . e . , persons on enemy b l a c k l i s t s

or p o l i c e f i l e s ; p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s . ( W a r n i n g :

p a t r i o t i c , r e l i a b l e p e r s o n s have a t e n d e n c y t o

o v e r e s t i m a t e t h e good w i l l of t h e i r c o m p a t r i o t s . )

3 . Poster t e a m s . W h i l e p u t t i n g up p o s t e r s , v a l u a b l e

e s t i m a t e s o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n can be s e c u r e d f r o m

t h e r e a c t i o n o f c r o w d s . Care must be t a k e n not t o

r e v e a l knowledge of language a t such t i m e s .

i*. E x a m i n i n g newspapers of the p e r i o d prior t o our

occupat i o n .

5 . Possession of r a d i o s g e n e r a l l y indicates people

who were i n good s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e N a z i s .

6 . Conversations with well-informed p e o p l e , e . g . ,

c a f e owners, p r i e s t s , e t c .

PERSONALITIES1 INVESTIGATION...

IN GERMANY.

I., Braunes Haus - for l i s t s of party members, etc.

2. Restaurants, other gathering places.

OTHER IXIS COUNTRIES. £ "^
I Gt-man Consulate - for 1isis of s collaborationists, etc
2. Public gathering places*

32
 OCCUPIED

1. German Kommandantur, Feidt KommaWantur, party organ­

ization headquarters.

2. Police headquarters, Town Hall, etc.

3. Newspaper buildings.

^. Organization headquarters.

5. Courthouse files (more reliable than police files,

which are more readily falsified.)

6. Notary offices (particularly in France).

Reports on Area Investigations should contain the following

elements:

INTRODUCTION...

When, where, who, manner, and sources of the investigation.

AREA DESCRIPTION...

Concise economic, s o c i a l , geographic summary.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS...
ATTITUDE TO ALLIES...
Comparison of a t t i t u d e s before and a f t e r A l l i e d occupation
must be s t r e s s e d ; also d i f f e r e n c e s d i n a t t i t u d e toward Great
B r i t a i n and U. S. Give examples.
ATTITUDE TO OUR GOVERNMENT AND/OR ARMY...
Give examples.
ATTITUDE TO OTHER ALLIED NATIONS, e s p e c i a l l y USSR...
G ive examples.
ATTITUDE TO THE ENEMY...
Both before and a f t e r A l l i e d occupation. Give examples
in great d e t a i 1 .
PERSONALITIES...
Only those A l l i e d , enemy, and doubtful p e r s o n a l i t i e s con­
nected with publ ic opinion. Numerous denunciations, i n e v i t a b l y
r e c e i v e d , must be checked c a r e f u l l y by i n v e s t i g a t o r s .
STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION...
Covers press, r a d i o , movie and general f i e l d s . Discuss in
d e t a i l material o f f e r e d public both before and a f t e r A l l i e d
occupation, and public r e a c t i o n s .

33
RES I STANCE
1 . I n f l u e n c e and s i z e i n ion c o n c e r n e d . (In­
c l u d e a c t i v i t y of c h i l d r e n ) .
2 . I n f l u e n c e and s i z e in c o u n t r y concerned.
3 . Reasons f o r c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i f a n y , i . e . , discuss dis­
c r e p a n c i e s b e t w e e n " i " and " 2 " a b o v e .
H. Organ i z a t i o n .
5 . Personal i t ies .
6 . R e c o r d o f p e r f o r m a n c e b e f o r e and a f t e r Al 1 ied o c c u p a t i o n .
INCIDENTS...
Between l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n , f r i e n d l y and enemy.
NEEDS, NECESSITIES, AND QUESTIONS OF LOCAL POPULATION...
I . G e n e r a l .
2. Public o p i n i o n , press, r a d i o , movies, etc.
^ ~ R A L ANALYSIS OF S I T U A T I O N . . .
In d e t a i 1 =
SUGGESTIONS. . .
For p r o p a g a n d a ( o n l y ) and f o r the a r r e s t or surveillance
of c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l i t i e s .