(Nijhoff International Philosophy Series) Stanislaw Lesniewski - S. J. Surma Et Al. (Eds.) - Collected Works. 1, 2-Springer (1991)

Stanislaw Lesniewski: Collected Works
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General Editor: JAN T. J. SRZEDNICKI

Editor for volumes on Applying Philosophy: ROBERTO POLI
Editor for volumes on Logic and Applying Logic: STANISLAW J. SURMA
Editor for volumes on Contributions to Philosophy: JAN T. J. SRZEDNICKI
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University, New Zealancl)
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
IJ
L&S
Stanislaw Lesniewski U. T
o~ ~
Collected works
Volume I
Edited by
Stanislaw J. Surma
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
Jan T. Srzednicki
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
and
D.I. Barnett
Flinders University of South Australia, Australia
With an Annotated Bibliography by

V. Frederick Rickey
__,,~-~-~- __!Jg_ixJingQreen _State U,niversity, Ohio, U.S.A.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Lesniewski. Stanislaw, 1886-1939.
[Selections. English. 1991]
Collected works I Stanislaw Lesniewski ; edited ·by Stanislaw J.
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, Dene I. Barnett ; with an annotated
bibliography by V. Frederick Rickey.
p. cm. -- (Nijhoff international philosophy series ; v. 44)
Translated from the Polish.
Inclui3es bibliographical references <p. land index.
ISBN 0-7923-1512-X
1. •ogic, Symbolic and mathematical. I. Surma, Stanislaw J.
II. Srzednicki, Jan T. S. III. Barnett, Dene. IV. Title.
V. Series.
84691.L442E5 1991
199' .438--dc20 91-36441
ISBN 0-7923-1512-X
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propositions
(translated by S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
An Attempt at a Proof of the Ontological Principle of Con-
tradiction (translated by S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik) .. . . 20
The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded
Middle (translated by S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik)....... 47
Is All Truth Only True Eternally or Is It Also True With-
out a Beginning (translated by S. J. Surma
and J. Wojcik)............................................. 86
Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves,
Subordinated to Itself? (translated by S. J. Surma
and J. Wojcik) ............................................. 115
~-~~·"-""'"" - Foundations of the General Theory of Sets. I (translated by
D. I. Barnett) .............................................. 129
On the Foundations of Mathematics (translated by
D. I. Barnett) .............................................. 174
On Functions Whose Fields, with Respect to These Func-
tions are Groups (translated by M. P. 0 'Neil) ........... 383
On Functions Whose Fields, with Respect to These Func-
tions, are Abelian Groups (translated by M. P. O'Nei0 ... 399
Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics (translated by M. P. O'Neil ................ 410
On the Foundations of Ontology
(translated by M. P. O'Neil) 606
.
VI Table of Contents
On Definitions in the So-Called Theory of Deduction

(translated by E. C. Luschei) ......................... ,, .. . 629
Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of My Article:
'Grundziige eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der
Mathematik' (translated by W. Teichmann
and S. McCal0 ............................................. 649
An Anhotated Lesniewski Bibliography
(by V. F. Rickey) .......................................... 711
Index ........................................................... 787
INTRODUCTION
Stanislaw Lesniewski was born on the 30th of March, 1886 in Ser-

pukhovo n~ar the town of Ivanovo-Vosniesiensk somewhere near
Moscow as the only son of Isydor Lesniewski, a locally employed
Polish railway engineer. He attended grammar school (classical
division) in Siberia, at Irkutsk where his father was building a
railway. He obtained his matriculation in 1904 together with four
other Polish students. As a schoolboy he was quick to accept
principles and intolerant of exceptions.
He spent at least some of his student days in Munich where he
attended lectures by Hans Cornelius. Then he came to Lw6w to do
his doctorate under Kazimierz Twardowski, the leading philoso-
pher of the time. He obtained his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1912.
While in Lwow Lesniewski was also studying mathematics under
Jozef Puzyna and Waclaw Sierpinski (the latter appointed Pro-
fessor in 1910).
During the last years before World War I Lesniewski tried to
~· the principle of the excluded middle, using analytical
methods to criticize the language in which the foundations of logic
were expressed. Later, however, he abandoned the idea, proba-
bly, under the influence of an appendix to Jan Lukasiewicz's 'On
the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle' published in Polish in
Krakow in 1910. This appendix contained Lukasiewicz's general
theory of objects. The method of presentation used in the ap-
pendix was formal, and somewhat similar to that of Louis Coutu-
rat 's 'L'algebre de la logique', 1905. That marked the beginning
of Lesniewski's enthusiastic interest in modern formal logic and,
in particular, in Russell's antinomy he learned from Lukasiewicz
and was preoccupied for the next eleven years. Although this
was a turning point for. Lesniewski from philosophy to mathemat-
ical logic and the foundations of mathematics, yet for a few more
Vlll Introduction
years he continued to be reluctant to adopt the mathematical

method.
Between 1911 and 1914 Le8niewski published seven papers.
They are as follows:
'A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propositions',
1911, ip Polish,
'A~ Attempt at a Proof of the Ontological Principle of Con-
tradiction', 1912, in Polish,
'Logical Studies', 1913, a Russian translation of the two above
mentioned papers,
'Is All Truth Only True Eternally or is It Also True Without
a Beginning', 1913, in Polish,
'The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Mid-
dle', 1913, in Polish,
'Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves Sub-
ordinated to Itself', 1914, in Polish,
'The Theory of Sets on the 'Philosophical Foundations' of
B. Bernstein. Review', 1914, in Polish,
Later Lesniewski repudiated all these early writings as imma-
ture and unsound. However, the papers show a definite tendency
of thought which can be interpreted as leading naturally towards
th~ igeas~of Mereology. Other interesting points of these papers
include:
1. some refreshing arguments against the existence of univer-
sals,
2. criticism of conventionalism,
3. the first outline of the distinction between language and
metalanguage,
4. a comprehensive conception of semantic categories later
opposed to Russell's theory of types, and
5. the first analysis of the notion of a set in the so-called col-
lective sense later developed within the system of Mereology
and applied to Russell's antinomy.
Between 1911 and 1915 Lesniewski presented seven papers to
the Warsaw Psychological Society. They dealt with the problems
Introduction
.IX
of existence; contradictory objects; truth; paradoxes of logic and
mathematics; and some aspects of the foundations of set theory.
In one of these papers Lesniewski presented for the first time his
theory of classes later renamed Mereology.
It was with the idea of Mereology in mind that Le8niewski
left for Ru.ssi~ to spend the years of wartime there. He lived in
Moscow fr~m 1915 until 1918. There he taught mathematics in
a Polish grammar school (Mrs. Jakubowski's pension). While in
Moscow Lesniewski read a number of papers at meetings of vari-
ous Polish groups and institutions. The list of the titles of these
papers includes:
The problem of a non-contradictory set theory;
Antinomies of formal theories and language;
Basic problems of contemporary philosophy;
Philosophical foundations of Marxism.
Wadaw Sierpinski, who was also in Moscow, remembers
Le8niewski's activities during this period.
It was during this period that Lesniewski formulated and pub-
lished in Polish the first outline of the formal system of Mereology,
under the title:
'Foundations of the General Theory of Sets', 1916.
This publication can be seen as forming a bridge between
Lesniewski's early and later writings.
After the war Le8niewski returned to the recently liberated
Poland. Already acquainted with mathematical logic yet having
never had a formal training in advanced mathematics he joined a
group of young mathematicians concentrating on the foundations
of mathematics. This group was led by Zygmunt Janiszewski a
gifted mathematician soon to die who with Stefan Mazurkiewicz
was the co-founder of the Polish School of Mathematics. Before
long Lesniewski was given a position at the University of Warsaw
where he served as a professor of philosophy of mathematics from
1919 until his death on the 13th of May, 1939.
x Introduction
A great period in mathematical logic and the foundations of

mathematics had thus begun. A new journal, Fundamenta ~fath-
ematicae, commenced publication in July 1920 and this date may
be considered as the date of birth of the Polish School of Mathe-
matics. Lesniewski was a member of the editorial board of Fun-
.
damenta from the very beginning until 1928 when he resigned for
personal11 reasons.
Lesniewski's importance grew. With Jan Lukasiewicz he
founded what in the course of time became known as the War-
saw School of Logic. A large group of students gathered around
Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz. It included Alfred Tarski; Adolf
Lindenbaum; Boleslaw Sobocinski; Mordchaj Wajsberg; Mo-
jzesz Presburger; and later Jerzy Slupecki; Stanislaw Jaskowski;
Czeslaw Lejewski; Wadaw Sadowski; Janina Hossiason; Henryk
Hiz, and others. Tarski soon joined Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz
as one of the leaders.
In 1927 Lesniewski published the first paper of a long series
consisting altogether of twelve publications. This was:
'On the Foundations of Mathematics', published in Polish in
instalments between 1927-1931, in which he developed Mereology,
first attempted in the earlier mentioned 1916 paper. The series
~~!l:~]s_!~, oL~he following papers:
'Introduction', 1927,
'I. On Certain Questions Concerning the Meaning of 'Logistic'
Theorems', 1927,
'II. On Russell's 'Antinomy' Concerning 'The Class of Classes
Which Are Not Elements of Themselves'', 1927,
'III. On Different Ways of Understanding the Words 'Class'
and 'Set'' 1927
'IV. On ' the ''Foundations of the General Theory of Sets. I.'',
1928,
'V. Further Theorems and Definitions of the 'General Theory
of Sets' from the Period up to 1920 Inclusive', 1929,
'VI. Axiomatization of the 'General Theory of Sets' from the
Year 1918', 1930,
Introduction XI
.
'VIL Axiomatization of the 'General Theory of Sets' from the
Year 1920', 1930,
'VIII. On Certain Conditions Established by Kuratowski and
Tarski, Necessary and Sufficient for P to be the Class of a',
1930,
.. 'IX. Further Theorems of the 'General Theory of Sets' from
the Years 1921-1923', 1930,
"
'X. Axiomatization of the 'General Theory of Sets' from the
Year 1921', 1931,
'XL On 'Singular' Propositions of the Type 'A E b' ', 1931.
This is Lesniewski's most important publication, but he was
active also in other fields and published a number of papers. In
the meantime he published in German two papers on group the-
ory:
'On Function; Whose Fields, vVith Respect to These Func-
tions, are Groups', 1929,
'On Functions \Vhose Fields, \Vith Respect to These Func-
tions, are Abelian Groups', 1929,
in which group theory and Abelian group theory he provides one-
axiom bases for both. The next Lesniewski's paper, published
in German, contains a complete description of his most general
logical system, Protothetic,
-·~~....., ..... · · · · · · . 'Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of Math-
ematics, §1-§11', 1929.

In 1930 Lesniewski published, in German, his
'On the Foundations of Ontology'.
In 1931 Lesniewski published in German a paper on defini-
tions:
'On Definitions in the So-Called Theory of Deduction'
which includes a rule of the introduction of definitions as well as
Lesniewski's well-known terminological explanations. In 1938 he
published, also in German,
'Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of my Article:
Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of Mathe-
. '
mat 1cs.
..
XII Introduction
Comprising a resume of his series 'On the Foundations of Math-

ematics' followed by his and his pupils' new results in the area.
As well as
'Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of Math-
ematics. §12',
the last paper in the series 'On the foundations of mathematics'
contai~ing more than four hundred protothetical theorems derived
-
from a previously developed system of axioms.
Lesniewski published most of his papers in Polish and a few in
German. They have long been difficult to obtain, making a col-
lected edition desirable. The present volume omits two publica-
tions: 'Logical Studies' and the review of B. Berstein's paper.
For Lesniewski his publications were not the only way of pub-
licising his new system of the foundations of mathematics. He
attached great importance to his university lectures and he lec-
tured almost entirely about his own work. The following lecture
courses were delivered by Lesniewski at the University of Warsaw
between 1919 and 1939:
'Foundations of the Theory of Classes', delivered during the
academic year 1919-1920. The contents of this course was influ-
enced by discussions with Leon Chwistek. Here for the first time
Lesniews~i used symbolism which he considered as simpler and
more precise than colloquial language.
'Foundations of Arithmetic', delivered in 1920-1921. In this
course Lesniewski presented a number of systematic and detailed
observations and results in Ontology.
'Axio1natic Foundations of Science', 1920-21.
'Foundations of Three-Dimensional Euclidean Geometry in
the Light of the New Theory of Classes', 1921-24.
'Foundations of Logistic', 1921-27.
'Foundations of Ontology', 1925-27.
'Axiom Systems for Group Theory', 1926-29.
'Theoretical Arithmetic', 1926-27.
'Introduction to Mathematics', 1927-28.
'The Problem of the Prin1itive Terms in the Foundations of
Arithmetic', 1928-29.
Introduction Xlll
'Elementary Outline of Ontology', 1929-32.

'Directives of Logistics and Ontology', 1929-31.
'On the Foundations of the So-Called Theory of Deduction',
1930-31.
'Chosen Topics from the Foundations of Logistics', 1930-
32. •"
'From the Foundations of Protothetic', 1932-34.
'Chosen" Topics Concerning the Axiom Systems of Geometry',
1932-33.
'Arithmetic of Real Numbers', 1933-34.
'Fundamental Problems of Mathematical Logic', 1934-35.
'Antinomies of Deductive Sciences', 1934-35.
'Introduction to Deductive Sciences', 1936-37.
'Propositional Calculus', 1936-37.
'On the So-Called Many-Valued Logics', 1936-37.
'Antinomies of Semantics', 1936-38.
'Traditional 'Formal Logic' and Traditional 'Set Theory' on
the Ground of Ontology', 1937-38.
'Basic Publications in the So-Called Many-Valued Logic',
1937-38.
'An Outline of Protothetic', 1938-39.
'An Outline of Ontology', 1937-38.
'Axi~m Systems for Mereology', 1937-39.
Apart from the lecture courses Lesniewski also conducted several
seminar series. These include:
'On the Foundations of Mathematics', 1919-20, 1930-32,
1936-38.
'On Cantor's Set Theory', 1919-21. Here Lesniewski dis-
cussed the problem of the axiomatization of the copula 'is' as
in the expression 'A is b' and made his first observations on On-
tology.
'On Zermelo's 'Untersuchungen ueber die Grundlagen der
Mengenlehre' ', 1920-21.
'Philosophy of Mathematics', 1938-39.
.
XIV Introduction
Between 1918 and 1927 Lesniewski read several papers.

Two of them, 'On Certain Theorem from the Theory of Re-
lations' (1918), and 'On the Grades of Grammatical Func-
tions' (1921) were presented to the Logic Section of the Warsaw
Philosophical Institute. The second paper put forth was the the-
ory of semantic categories as opposed to Russell's logical types.
The fir~t outline of Ontology, another of Lesniewski's system was
• in two further papers both under the same title 'On
presented
the Foundations of Ontology'. The first presented to the War-
saw Psychological Society in 1921 and the second to the Warsaw
Scientific Society in 1930. He also gave two lectures: 'On the
Foundations of Ontology', and 'On the Foundations of Logistic'
to the Logic Section of the Second Polish Philosophical Congress
held in Lw6w in September, 1927.
Lesniewski's new system of the foundations of mathematics
consists of three parts called: Protothetic; Ontology; and Mere-
ology.
Mereology was developed between 1914 and first presented in
written form in 1916. Then it was redeveloped in the new series
1927-1931. Broadly speaking Mereology may be understood as a
theory of the part-whole relation.
The starting point for the development of Ontology was 1919.
As a formal system, logically presupposed by_Mereology, it was
constructed in 1920. It first became known through Lesniewski's
university lectures circulated in copies, and was fully presented in
written form only in 1930. Quite a few details concerning the ori-
gin and character of Ontology, were previously scattered in other
writings. Broadly speaking Ontology is a theory of the copula 'is'.
It comprises the theory of predicates, of classes, and of relations,
including the theory of identity.
Protothetic as the most general of Lesniewski's systems, pre-
supposed by Ontology, was begun in 1921 although its idea dates
back to Lesniewski's early writings in 1912-1914. It was axiom-
atized in 1929, resumed afterwards in 1938. Broadly speaking,
Protothetic is the logic of propositional forms with quantifiers
binding propositional and functional variables.
Introduction xv
For Lesniewski there was no need to introduce the usual first

order predicate logic since it can be proved that Ontology contains
not only the first order but even w-order predicate logic without
assuming additional axioms or rules of inference.
Stanislaw Lesniewski was one of the co-founders of the Pol-
ish School o} Logic and an author of a new and wholly origi-
nal syste~ of the foundations of logic and mathematics. He was
also the fo~erunner and originator of many ideas included as a
matter of course in modern text-books of logic and foundations
of mathematics. Although Lesniewski played a considerable role
during the period of development of modern mathematical logic
and of the foundations of mathematics, his systems are not as well
known as they deserve to be and the fact remains that his systems
are not generally accepted as a tool in the foundational practice.
Nevertheless, they have greatly influenced the very philosophy of
mathematics.
In the course of time Lesniewski's work was continued, used
and interpreted while his original texts were ahnost unobtainable.
Naturally enough, terms were translated and interpreted in vari-
ous ways. There arose different ideas of Lesniewski's orthodoxy.
His conceptions were followed in different ways, sometimes under
the impression that this or that way is the true interpretation of
---,~~-~--,----,-- ideas. -
We present this volume to the reader in hope that it may
contribute towards a better knowledge and understanding of
Lesniewski's work in logic, mathematics and philosophy.
We are indebted to many individuals and institutions for their
help. Among those who gave us their counsel and assistance are
Professors: John T. Canty from California State University, San
Jose; Michael P. O'Neill from Kansas State University, Manhat-
tan; V. Frederick Rickey from Bowling Green State University,
Bowling Green, Ohio, and Thomas W. Scharlie from University
of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana. During the preparation of
this volume for publication we were supported by the following
institutions: The Australian Research Grants Commission; The
Flinders University, South Australia; The Jagiellonian University
XVI
. Introduction
of Cracow, Poland, and The University of Melbourne, Victoria,

Australia.
The way leading to the publication of this book was rather
long. The first typescript was delivered in 1978. But there were
long delays often beyond anybody's control. The Editors of the
volume wish to express thanks to the untiring efforts of the pub-
lishers. without which the present publication would not have sue-
ceeded." The main publishing house of Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers deserves the main credit for bringing the work to completion.
Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, D. Reidel, and Martinus Nijhoff,
all made significant contributions. Many individuals, too many
to mention all by name, have unstintingly given of their time and
energy to help. Not all of them are at the moment associated
with the project or the publisher. We could not omit to mention:
Mr. Z. Gebethner and Mrs. Z. Osek of PWN; Mr. Blake E. Vance
and Mrs Wanda B. Beran of D. Reidel; Mr. Th. M. D. Kluck
of Martinus Nijhoff; Mrs. Elisabeth Erdmann-Visser of Kluwer.
Special thanks should go to Mr. Alexander Schimmelpenninck of
Kluwer who was coordinating the efforts for many years, till its
completion.
The organization and coordination of the process of typo-
graphic designing and of T.EX typesetting is due to the Polish
. firm 'ALEPH - Editorial Services' of Warsaw. The typesetting
itself has been done by that firm's collaborator Mr. Marek Rycko,
a reliable and creative TEX expert; he was assisted by -Miss Alicja
Zienkiewicz who with an unusual care accomplished her task of
computer typing.
The Editors
A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE ANALYSIS OF EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS
§ 1. TJ;ie expression 'existential proposition' refers to those

propositions whose predicates (including copulas) contain the pos-
itive or negative forms of the verbs: 'be', 'exist' or their synonyms.
Existential propositions can be exemplified by the following: 'peo-
ple exist', 'God exists', 'square circles do not exist', etc.
Remark 1. I adopt this definition of the expression 'existen-
tial proposition' as the point of departure for the analysis of exis-
tential propositions. This definition, naturally, remains the same
throughout the analysis in order to preserve terminological unifor-
mity. The analysis of existential propositions is then an analysis
of propositions which possess properties connoted 1 by the expres-
sion 'existential proposition' in its above meaning. It is neither an
analysis of the expression 'existential proposition' nor an analysis
of the meaning of that expression since neither the former nor
the latter possesses properties connoted by the expression 'exis-
tentlai proposition'. Thus, the analysis of existential propositions
can only result in various views concerning existential proposi-
tions but not concerning the expression 'existential proposition'
or its meaning. Hence it follows that investigations of existential
propositions cannot in logic lead to this or another definition of
the expression 'existential proposition'. The analysis which I am
going to pursue cannot therefore lead to a change in the definition
from which I have started.
The foregoing remark explains why I have defined the expres-
sion 'existential proposition' prior to the analysis of existential
1 In the terminology of J. St. Mill.

2 Stanislaw Lesniewski
propositions - a.ga.inst the recommendations of Cornelius who set-

tles a similar problem in the analysis of existential judgments in
the following manner: the analysis of existential judgments can
be preceded only by a temporary delimitation of the sense of the
expression 'existential judgment' whilst its exhaustive definition
can originate only towards the end of the analysis of existential
judgm(ints themselves. 2
Remark 2. The expression 'existential proposition' is or is not
synonymous with the expression 'existential judgment' as used
in various terminologies, that is: both these expressions connote
identical or different properties. If the expression 'existential judg-
ment' connotes properties the same as those connoted by the ex-
pression 'existential proposition', then the analysis of existential
propositions is an analysis of existential judgments. If, however,
the expression 'existential judgrnent' connotes properties different
from those connoted by the expression 'existential proposition',
then the analysis of existential propositions may have no bearing
whatever on existential judgments. Thus, e.g., the present analy-
sis of existential propositions is not an analysis of existential judg-
ments if the expression 'existential judgment' denotes the 'logical
content' of an existential proposition, for the expression 'logical
content of a.n existential proposition' does not connote properties
connoted by the expression 'existential proposition'.
§ 2. Just as a.11 other propositions a.re either analytic or syn-
thetic, so are existential propositions. I use the expression 'ana-
lytic proposition' to denote propositions which, being of the form
of propositions with positive copulas, contain no predicates which
connote properties that are not connoted by the subject. I use the
2Ha.ns Cornelius, Versuch einer Theorie der Existenzialurteile, Munich,

1834 or 1894, p. 5. I could not use this interesting work to a larger extent
because it does not deal especially with propositions of language with which
I am primarily concerned here, but with "alle diejenigen Erkenntnisse und
Aussagen ... welche in irgend einer Weise <las Dasein eines denkbaren Inhaltes
betreffen" (p. 6).
Existential Propositions 3
expression 'synthetic proposition' to denote those propositions

which, being of the form of propositions with positive copulas,
contain predicates which connote also such properties that are
not connoted by the subject. Thus, e.g., the propositions: 'man
has two hands', 'an orphan does not have a mother' are analytic,
if we use the word 'man' in the sense of 'mammal with two hands
and two leg~', and the word 'orphan' in the sense of 'human being
that has neither father nor mother'; it is because the properties
connoted by the predicates of the propositions with positive cop-
ulas - 'man is what has two hands' and 'an orphan is what does
not have a mother' - that is the properties of having two hands
and not having a mother - are connoted by the subjects: 'man'
and 'orphan'. The propositions: '1nan creates God in his own
likeness' or 'an orphan never knows a caress in his life', on the
other hand, are synthetic because the properties connoted by the
predicates of the propositions with positive copulas: 'man is what
creates God to his own likeness' and 'an orphan is what does not
know a caress in its life', that is the properties of creating God to
one's own likeness and of not knowing a caress in one's life, are
not connoted by the subjects.
§ 3.. All positive existential propositions are analytic.
I use the expression 'positive existential proposition' to de-
note those existential propositions which, being of the form of
propositions with positive copulas, contain predicates in the pos-
itive forms of the verbs 'be' and 'exist', or in forms which are
their synonyms (to these belong, e.g., the forms that are dou-
bly, quadruply etc. negative in relation to the verbs mentioned
above). Thus, e.g., the propositions: 'people exist', 'God does not
not exist' are positive existential propositions because the forms
of predicates of propositions with positive copulas: 'people are
existing' and 'God is not not existing' are positive in the former
proposition, synonymous in relation to the appropriate positive
form (that is doubly negative) - in the latter.
Consequently, the thought which I formulated at the begin-

ning of this section can after this explanation be expressed in the
following manner: if the predicate of an existential proposition
- the proposition having been formulated as one with a positive
copula - contains positive forms of the verbs 'be', 'exist' or forms
synonymous in relation to these, then it does not connote such
prope~ties as are not connoted by the subject of the existential
proposition in question.
The predicate of every positive existential proposition which
has been formulated as a proposition with a positive copula, does
not connote anything (except for the eventual property of number
- being greater than one - if the predicate is plural); if, then, we
formulate any positive existential proposition, e.g., 'people exist'
or 'God does not not exist', as a proposition with a positive cop-
ula, the predicate of the newly created proposition 'people are
existing', that is 'existing', will connote solely the property of
number greater than one. 3 On the other hand, the predicate of
the newly created proposition 'God is not not existing' (synony-
mous with 'God is existing'), that is 'not not existing' (synony-
mous with 'existing'), will not connote such properties as are not
connoted by the subject of the positive existential proposition in
question. Any positive existential proposition is thus analytic be-
cause, having the form of a proposition with a positive copula, it
contains a predicate that does not connote properties which are
not connoted by the subject.
Remark 1. I have said that the predicate of a positive existen-
tial proposition which has been brought to the form of a proposi-
tion with a positive copula, does not connote anything, except -
at most - the property of being greater than one. I maintain this
because such a predicate is synonymous with the words 'being'
or 'beings' which connote nothing else, even though they denote
3 In Polish, the form 'sq istniejqcy' (are existing) refers only to a num-
ber greater than one, more specifically to the third person plural of nouns.
(Translators' note)
('denotation' as used by Mill) everything. This view conflicts with

J.S. Mill's theory which says the word 'being' connotes the prop-
erty of existing. I consider Mill's theory wrong because, should
the word 'being' really connote the property of existing, we could
define that word as 'that which has the property of existing', or in
other word~, as a 'being which has the property of existing' (since
the definiti~m must indicate not only differentiae specificae, but
also the genus); this would, then, give rise to an inevitable re-
gressus in infinitum. The word 'being' cannot be in fact defined
at all; the statement that this word does not connote anything is
fully in keeping with this fact.
Remark 2. I did not linger, in Remark 1, on the meaning of
the word 'existence' employed by J.S. Mill; I did so because the
assignment of some kind of meaning to that word cannot in any
way influence the results of my reasoning. Independently of the
meaning of the word 'existence' the word 'being' cannot connote
the property denoted by the former word as that would, in every
case, lead to the above indicated regressus in infinitum.
Remark 3. J.S. Mill says that not all names have connota-
tionp: to those which have no connotations belong, according to
"--~--,-~~····--·-·-'-'-L ......... , proper names such as, e.g., Paul, Caesar4 on the one hand,
and some of the names of attributes 5 on the other. If this were
4 John Stuart Mill, System der deductiven und ind~ctiven Logic, Gomperz's
translation. I. Leipzig 1872, pp. 16 and 17.
[Here and elsewhere we retain the reference to the translation rather than
the original in order to indicate the actual text used by Le8niewski.] (Editor's
note) .
5 Ibid., p. 16. Husserl, interpreting the relevant section of Mill's work
in question and also citing page 16, maintains that Mill thinks that no
names of attributes have connotation (Edmund Husserl, Logische Unter-
suchungen, II, Halle 1901, p. 58.) Contrary to Husserl, I include among
the names that according to Mill have no connotation only some of the
names of attributes, since on the page indicated in Mill's work one can find
the following passage: "Selbst abstrakte Namen kann man, obgleich sie nur
die Namen von Attributen sind, in einigen Fallen mit Recht als mitbezeich-
nend ansehen; denn auch den Attributen selbst kann man Attribute beilegen,
really so, one could foresee certain difficulties in regarding as an-

alytic those positive existential propositions whose subjects are
just such names without connotation. Yet even the names which
I have mentioned, and which according to Mill have no conno-
tation, in my opinion, have connotation; proper names connote
the prpp•erty of possessing a name which sounds like the given
proper.,name, whereas the names of attributes regarded by Mill
as lacking connotation, connote either the property of possessing
such names, or the property of complete identity 6 with entities
which bear such names. Thus, e.g., the name 'Paul' connotes the
property of having the name 'Paul', the name 'redness' connotes
the property of complete identity with some definite beings which
bear the name 'redness'. Instead of 'Paul' we can then say: 'a
being which has the name 'Paul'', instead of 'redness' - 'a being
which is completely identical with beings that bear the name 'red-
ness''. Hence the conclusion that positive existential propositions
whose subjects are proper names or names of attributes, regarded
by Mill as lacking connotation, can be accepted as analytic as
easily as all other propositions which contain predicates that do
not connote properties not connoted by their subjects.
Remark 4. In relation to Remark 3 I shall touch here upon
·Hus.serl's thesis 7 that one proper name, e.g., 'Socrates', can name
various objects only because it is equivocal, just as names such
as 'redness'; I do not think this is the case - these names would
be equivocal only if, while denoting various objects, they also
connoted different properties. In fact the word 'Socrates', while
denoting different objects, connotes always one property, that is
the property of bearing the name "Socrates". Likewise, the word
'redness', while it denotes different (at least numerically) objects,
und ein Wort, das Attribute bezeichnet, kann ein Attribute dieser Attribute
mitbezeichnen".
6 As understood by Herbert Spencer; cf. the polemics. between Mill and
Spencer in Husserl's interpretation: Logische Untersuchungen, II, pp. 116-
119.
7
Ibid., p. 48.
connotes always the one characteristic of complete identity with

entities bearing the name 'redness'.
Remark 5. In connection with Remarks 3 and 4 it can be ob-
~er"\red here that, besides positive existential propositions, other
analytic propositions whose subjects are proper names are possi-
ble. E.g., 'Paul bears the name 'Paul''.
Remark-6. The above classification of propositions into ana-
lytic and synthetic does not coincide with Locke's classification of
propositions into essential and accidental on that plane on which
Mill interprets Locke's classification and regards it as parallel with
that of Kant's: analytic-synthetic. According to Mill's interpreta-
tion, Locke calls essential such propositions whose predicates are
contained implicitly or explicitly in the meanings of the subjects,
and accidental such propositions whose predicates are not con-
tained in the meaning of the subject. In view of Mill's assertion
that the meanings of expressions are contained not in what they
denote but in what they connote, Locke's distinction could be put
in the following way: propositions whose predicates connote only
those properties which are connoted by the subjects are essential,
while the propositions whose predicates connote not only such
are __(iccig~ntal. The classification which I have adopted
does not coincide with the above since it includes also such propo-
sitions as are not included in Locke's classification as interpreted
by Mill; thus, e.g., the proposition 'Paris exists' does not fall un-
der any heading in Locke's classification because that proposition
- in other words 'Paris is a being', - contains a predicate which
does not connote anything, so that we can neither say that it con-
notes only such properties which are connoted by the subject, nor
that it connotes not only such properties. Whereas according to
the classification which I accept, the proposition 'Paris exists' is
analytic, just as any positive existential propositions, because the
predicate of an equivalent proposition 'Paris is a being' does not
connote anything and thereby does not connote properties which
are not connoted by the subject 'Paris'. (Thus the difference be-
tween Locke's essential propositions as interpreted by Mill and
analytic propositions as understood by me - as can be seen from
the afore-mentioned example - is that the former are qualified
positively, and the latter negatively.)
The above classification would also differ from that of Locke
and Mi11 should our opinion be that the meaning of expressions
lies not in what they connote, but in what they denote - in other
words, in those objects which are symbolized by the appropri-
ate expressions. The essentiality or accidentality of propositions
in Locke-Mill's classification would then depend on the objects
symbolized by the subject: two propositions containing subjects
symbolizing the same object and containing identical predicates
would either be both essential or both accidental. Such would
be, e.g., the propositions 'Napoleon bears the name 'Napoleon' ',
and 'The victor from Jena bears the name 'Napoleon''; however,
in my classification the former of these propositions is analytic
and the latter synthetic because the predicate of the proposi-
tion 'Napoleon is the one bearing the name 'Napoleon'', that
is 'bearing the name 'Napoleon' ' - connotes only the property of
bearing the name 'Napoleon' connoted by the subject 'Napoleon';
whereas the predicate of the proposition 'The victor from Jena
is the one bearing the name 'Napoleon'', that is 'bearing the
name 'Napoleon' ', connotes the property of bearing the name
'Napoleon' which is not connoted by the subject 'the victor from
Jena'. 8
The above classification would neither, by the same token,
coincide with all classifications of propositions into analytic and
synthetic according to Kant, were such classification (as happens
with Mill) interpreted by analogy to Locke-Mill's classification of
propositions into essential and accidental.
8 Cf. E. Husserl,
Logische Untersuchungen, II, pp. 47 and 48, and
K. Twa.rdowski, Zur Lehre von Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen,
Vienna 1894, p. 14.
Remark 1. One hears, from time to time, of 'natural' and

'artificial' methods of classification. People who use this form
of expression do not usually limit themselves in characterizing
particular methods of classification, to the inclusion of these de-
scriptively to either of the above categories; they usually combine
such a descriptive characterization of methods of classification
with the t~leological element of valuation, and they value 'nat-
•
ural' classifications higher than 'artificial' ones. The origins of
the above characterizations of methods of classification, and the
positive or negative estimations which accompany these charac-
terizations, can vary immensely from case to case.
Some such cases are determined by various linguistic habits
and traditions, others - by more or less well thought out and jus-
tified views concerning the problems of theoretical usefulness.
The classification of propositions into analytic and synthetic
which I have carried out in Section 2 can be, in view of at least one
of its consequences, characterized and regarded by some as 'artifi-
cial'. Such an 'objection' can in the first place originate from the
fact that one of the two classification labels, i.e., that of analytic
propositions, comprises two 'very' or 'too' heterogenous groups
of propositions: (1) propositions whose predicates connote any
~but not those connoted by the subjects, and (2) propo-
sitions whose predicates do not connote the properties connoted
by the subjects only because they do not connote any features.
l\1erging these two groups of propositions under the common
heading of analytic propositions may provoke in the people who
talk of 'natural' and 'artificial' classifications a more or less intense
sensation of a theoretical 'dissonance'.
I do not consider it my task to tone down all such dissonances
if they arise solely from deeply rooted emotional impulses result-
ing from some linguistic habits; yet I cannot miss the opportunity
to provide my classification of propositions with a 'safety valve'
against objections supported by arguments of theoretical useless-
ness of my classification.
I consider, as the touchstone of theoretical usefulness of a

classification, the possibility of constructing propositions or sci-
entific theories concerning all the objects (and only these objects)
which are included under the respective headings of the classifi-
cation. 9
In.apPlying this test to the analysis of the theoretical useful-
ness of11 my above classification, I ask whether one can construct
on this basis any theoretically important propositions, concerning
all the objects (and only these objects) which are included under
every heading of the classification. The answer to this question is
positive: theoretical propositions concerning analytic propositions
(and only these propositions), and theoretical propositions con-
cerning all synthetic propositions (and only these propositions)
can be constructed. Examples: (1) 'All analytic propositions (and
only these propositions) contain no such information about the
objects symbolized by the subjects, that could not ?e deduced
from the meaning of the subjects'; (2) 'All synthetic propositions
(and only these propositions) contain such information about the
objects symbolized by the subjects, that cannot be deduced from
the meaning of the subjects'. This possibility- delineated by the
criterion indicated above - answers the objection that the classi-
fication of propositions into analytic and synthetic is purposeless,
and therefore 'artificial'.
§ 4. Negative existential propositions, except for propositions
whose subjects connote the property of non-existence, are syn-
thetic.
I use the expression 'negative existential proposition' to de-
note those existential propositions which, while having the form
of propositions with positive copulas, contain as predicates neg-
ative forms of the verbs to 'be' and to 'exist' or forms which are
synonymous with these (as, e.g., forms which are treble, quintu-
ple negatives with relation to the above-mentioned verbs). Thus,
9 Cf. Leon Petrazycki, An Introduction to the Study of Law and Morality.
Psychology of Emotions (in Russian) Petersburg 1905.
e.g., the propositions 'non-existent people do not exist', 'a square

circle does not exist' - are negative existential propositions be-
cause the forms of predicates of the propositions with positive
copulas 'non-existent people are not existing' and 'a square circle
is not existing' are in both propositions negated.
Thus the thought which I have formulated at the beginning of
this section.,,can, after this explanation, be presented in the follow-
ing form: if the predicate of an existential proposition which con-
tains a subject that does not connote the feature of non-existence
- after formulating that proposition as one with a positive cop-
ula - contains a positive form of the verbs to 'be', to 'exist' or a
form synonymous with this, then it connotes something over and
above the characteristics which is connoted by the subject of the
existential proposition in question.
The predicate of every negative existential proposition which
has been brought to the form of a proposition with a positive
copula, connotes the property of non-existence. If, then, we put
any negative existential propositions which contain subjects that
do not connote the property of non-existence, e.g., 'people do not
exist' or 'a square circle does not exist', as propositions with pos-
itive copulas - the predicates of the newly created propositions:
'
-""~~-·~-····-·"·peop 1e are non-ex1stmg . le'is non-ex1stmg
. . ' an d' a square circ . . ',h t at
is '(is) non-existing', will connote the property of non-existence.
This being so, they connote not only the properties which are con-
noted by the subjects. Therefore all negative existential proposi-
tions which contain subjects that do not connote the property of
non-existence, are synthetic propositions.
The remaining negative existential propositions are analytic
because, should we bring them to the state of propositions with
positive copulas, their predicates will connote only such proper-
ties as are connoted by the subjects. Thus, e.g., the proposition
'non-existent people do not exist' is an analytic negative existen-
tial proposition because, having formulated it as a proposition
with a positive copula; we arrive at the proposition 'non-existent
people are non-existing' whose predicate '(are) non-existing' does
not connote any properties but those that are connoted by the
subject 'non-existent people'.
§ 5. All negative existential propositions are contradictory.
I. Synthetic existential propositions are contradictory be-
cause their predicates, when these propositions are formulated
as propositions with positive copulas, connote the property of
non-exi~tence and are thereby synonymous with the expressions:
'non-being', 'non-beings' which are in contradiction to the subject
of every proposition. This contradiction can best be observed by
analysing the definition of a subject: defining the subject we can
always bring it to the form 'being' (or its synonym) 'which pos-
sesses the properties: A, B, C, D, etc.' (the properties may differ
with every particular case). Thus the object symbolized by the
subject of every proposition, liable also to representation by the
symbol 'being' (or its synonym), 'possessing the properties A, B,
C, D, etc.', cannot by the same token be formulated by the use
of the verbal symbol 'non-being' which is contradictory to the
symbol 'being'. Let us consider a few examples: suppose we have
some propositions whose subjects are, e.g., the expressions 'man',
'God', 'a square circle'. Let us analyse the definitions of these
~xpr~s~iQ!lS in order to see in what sense we have employed the
subjects 'man', 'God', 'a square circle' in the respective propo-
sitions. vVe learn that we have employed the word 'man' in the
sense of 'a mammal with two hands and two legs', in other words
'a being possessing the properties A, B, C, D, etc. (the aggregate
of properties which constitute a mammal's differentias specificas
in relation to the class 'being'), two hands and two legs'; the word
'God' - in the sense of 'the supreme and most perfect spirit, the
creator of heaven and earth', in other words 'a being possessing
properties A, B, C, D, etc. (the aggregate of properties which
constitute the differentias specificas of a spirit in relation to the
class 'being'), the property of superiority and perfection higher
than that of all other beings possessing the same properties A, B,
C, D, etc. and the properties (in this case 'relations' in J.S. Mill's
sense) of the creator of heaven and earth'; the expression 'a square
circle' - in the sense of 'a circle possessing the properties A, B, C,
D, -etc. (the aggregate of properties which constitute the diffe1-
entias of a circle in relation to the class 'being') and the property
of squareness'. And so on with every subject. Thus in every case,
applying t~e predicate 'non-being' or its synonym to the subject
produces an. irremovable contradiction.
II. The analytic negative propositions are contradictory be-
cause their subjects contain a contradiction: they represent, as
all subjects do, some specific beings while connoting the feature
of non-existence which contradicts the word 'being'.
Thus both the propositions 'people do not exist' and 'non-
existent people do not exist' are contradictory: the former be-
cause the predicate of a proposition with a positive copula 'people
are non-existent', that is 'non-existent', connotes the property of
non-existence which contradicts the subject 'people' - or 'beings
which possess the properties A, B, C, D, etc. (the aggregate of
properties which constitute the mammal's differentias specificas
in relation to the class 'being'), two arms and two legs'; the lat-
ter because its subject, that is 'non-existent people', symbolizes
some specific beings while connoting the property of non-existence
---~--,~- --which-contradicts the word 'being'.
Rema1k. I have stated above that one can, defining the sub-
ject of a proposition, bring it to the form: ' 'being' (or its syn-
onym) which possesses the features A, B, C, D, etc.'. I have
been using the word 'existing' as one of the synonyms of the word
'being'. This means that, defining the subject of a proposition,
I can express it in the following form: existing, possessing the
properties A, B, C, D, etc. . It might therefore occur to someone
that defining the word 'X' as 'existing, possessing the proper-
ties A, B, C, D, etc.', I am prejudging that, as it is custom-
ary to say, 'X exists'. As I shall try to prove in Section 7, the
proposition which adequately represents the sense that one usu-
ally inadequately symbolizes by the proposition 'X exists', is the
proposition 'some being is the object X'. Defining the word 'X' as
'existing, possessing the properties A, B, C, D, etc.', I am by no
means judging that 'some being is the object X', or inadequately
speaking, that 'X exists'.
§ 6.• Negative existential propositions cannot be true because,
as I have already tried to prove, they are all contradictory. Thus
e.g., t1:ie proposition 'a square circle does not exist' is not true.
Remark. It appears to me that above argumentation makes it
possible to state in a proper way the theory of propositions which
is constructed on the premises defended by some exponents of
Franz Brentano's so-called 'Austrian school'. The theory says that
all propositions can be, without changing their meaning, reduced
to existential propositions; 10 that they symbolize the existence
or non-existence of something; the existence or non-existence of
the object symbolized by the subject - in the case of existential
propositions in the narrower sense; the existence or non-existence
of the object represented by the subject and possessing properties
connoted by the predicate - in the case of propositions which are
generally considered non-existential. Thus e.g., the proposition
'man exists' would, according to this theory, represent the exis-
tence of man while the proposition 'a man is ill' would represent
the existence of an ill ma.n. 11 Were it really so, if any sentence
could indeed be reduced to an existential proposition, we would
have to draw - in view of what I have said at the beginning of this
section - the absurd conclusion that no proposition containing a
negative copula can be true. Thus e.g., the proposition 'Paris is
not situated in China' could not be true under these conditions
because it would be equivalent to the proposition 'a Paris situated
in China does not exist' which cannot be true being a negative
IO Dr F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Staridpunkte, Volume I,

Leipzig 1874, pp. 288 - 289.
11 Ibid., p. 283.
existential proposition and, as such, contradictory. Paris, how-

ever, is indeed not situated in China; therefore the proposition
'Paris is not situated in China' must be true. The latter proposi-
tion, being true, cannot be equivalent to the false proposition 'a
Paris situated in China does not exist' and consequently the the-
ory which s~ys that all propositions can be reduced to existential
propositions, is refuted.
§ 1. The idea expressed in the preceding section contradicts
current opinions concerning existential propositions: the possi-
bility of constructing both positive and negative, true existential
propositions is commonly accepted. Thus e.g., both the proposi-
tion 'people exist' and the proposition 'square circles do not exist'
are considered true.
I have taken pains to demonstrate the groundlessness of this
common attitude towards existential propositions, all that re-
mains for me to do·is to cast some light on the probable origin of
such a widespread error.
This origin consists, in my opinion, in the fact that the form
of existential propositions is commonly used to represent ver-
bally some contents whose adequate verbal symbols would be non-
'"--·~~····§Xist~11tiaLpropositions. Since these non-existential propositions,
adequately symbolizing given contents, can be either true or false
irrespective of their being positive or negative, this property is also
attributed to existential propositions representing given contents
although these propositions are not adequate symbols of these
contents. Thus e.g., the forms of existential propositions 'people
exist', 'a square circle does not exist' are commonly applied to
represent verbally such contents whose adequate verbal symbols
would be non-existential propositions: 'some beings are people''
'no being is a square circle'. The former of these propositions is
positive, the latter - negative; they are, nonetheless, both true
and consequently the existential propositions 'people .exist' and
a square circle does not exist' are considered true although they
are attempts to represent contents whose sole adequate symbols
are the propositions 'some beings are people' and 'no being is a
square circle'.
Examples of adequate symbolization of various contents which
a.re generally inadequately represented by various types of exis-
tential propositions:
Inadeq·uate existential proposi- The corresponding non-
tions.; existential propositions
adequately representing the
contents inadequately repre-
sented by the propositions in
the first column:
Only objects A exist. All beings are objects A.
Objects A exist. Some beings are objects A.
Object A exists. One (a certain etc.) being is
object A.
Objects A do not exist.
} No being is the object Jl.
Object A does not exist.
Remark. I have discussed, in this section, the adequate and

inadequate representation of various contents by rneans of various
propositions. An obvious question might therefore arise, what is
my criterion of adequacy or inadequacy of the representation of
given contents in a proposition. The answer to this question con-
cerns not only existential propositions, which are my special in-
terest here, but all propositions in general and therefore it belongs
to the general theory of propositions. In a monographic essay on
existential propositions I can only devote a few comments to the
problem.
The symbolic functions of complex linguistic constructions,
e.g., propositions, depends on the symbolic functions of the el-
ements of these constructions, that is individual words, and on
their mutual relationship. In the unplanned process of develop-
ment of language, the symbolic function of propositions can de-
pend in some particular cases on identical symbolic functions and
on identical relationship between specific words - in quite differ-

ent ways. The planned construction of complex linguistic forms
cannot, for representing various contents in the system of theo-
retical propositions, be confined within the possible results of the
unplanned evolution of language. Such construction calls for the
formation qf tertain general conventional-normative schemas to
embody the.,dependence of the symbolic functions of propositions
on the symbolic functions of their elements, and on the mutual re-
lationship between these elements. To ascertain whether the given
content has been represented adequately or inadequately in a
proposition, one has to analyse individually how the speaker's rep-
resentational intentions relate to the above-mentioned schemas.
These schemas should indicate in what way the symbolic function
of a proposition should be conditioned by the symbolic functions
of the particular words and by their mutual relationship. To ex-
press this dependence I have adopted the following normative
schema: every proposition is to represent the possessing, by the
object represented by the subject, of the properties connoted by
the predicate. My assertion that the given proposition does not
adequately represent the given contents is always based on the fact
that the possession by an object represented by the subject of a
;"~"-~~~proposition of certain properties connoted by the predicate does
not imply the same content that the speaker intended to repre-
sent. If, on the other hand, I say that some content is adequately
represented only in propositions of a certain specified kind, I mean
that only by formulating propositions of such kind the possession
by the object, represented by the subject, of properties connoted
by the predicate - is the very content that the speaker intended to
represent. The semiotic analysis of the adequacy or inadequacy
of certain propositions in relation to the contents which they rep-
resent is then ultimately based on a phenomenological analysis of
the speaker's representational intentions.
§ 8. The inadequacy of verbal representations of some con-

tents is not, as -vve all know, an isolated phenon1enon. Besides
various accidental inadequacies of representation in different fields

of knowledge, inadequacies that cannot be included in general
schemata - there can be observed certain 'typical', constantly re-
current inadequacies. Cases of suppositio materialis should suffice
as examples of such 'typical' symbolic inadequacies. In these cases
the prQposition whose subject is to represent some linguistic ex-
pressiop, represents in reality the object of which the given linguis-
tic expression is a symbol. Thus, e.g., in the proposition 'Paris is
a proper name' the subject 'Paris' represents adequately the city
of Paris, whilst it is not the city of Paris that is the proper name
(the city of Paris is a city, not a name), but the word 'Paris' which
is the linguistic symbol of the city of Paris. The actual content
which we want to express here would be adequately represented
by the proposition 'the word 'Paris' is a proper name'.
The inadequacies of verbal representation need not hinder the
development of research; quite often these inadequacies are used
deliberately (e. g., for the sake of brevity or vividness of presen ta-
t ion). They may, however, hinder research when, e.g., inadequate
symbols of certain contents are mistakenly regarded as adequate.
In such cases whole series of fundamentally false theories may
grow out of inadequate representation; such theories can be ex-
emplified by, say, the frequent opinion that definitions are ana-
lytic propositions about the objects represented by the subject,
which exhaust the whole contents of the subject. This opinion
feeds profusely on the inadequacy of representation, in this case
based on the fact that instead of formulating a proposition about
the expression we are going to define, we formulate a proposition
about the object of which the expression in question can only be
a symbol. Inadequacy will be best shown on an example: when
we want to define the word 'man', instead of saying 'the word
'man' denotes ('notation' in J.S. Mill) a mammal with two arms
and two legs' - we say 'man is a mammal with two arms and
two legs'. Thus instead of a proposition about the word 'man',
we obtain a proposition about man, that is the object symbolized
by the word 'man'. Strictly speaking, the proposition 'man is a
mammal with two hands and two legs' can be formulated to ad-
equately represent the content which it is intended to represent
only when the definition of the word 'man', the subject of this
proposition, already exists - just like the definition of any other
word used in a proposition. This proposition cannot be therefore
considered .eqt1ivalent to the proposition 'the word 'man' denotes
a mammal "with two hands and two legs' which is a definition,
adequately representing an entirely different content. This ade-
quacy of representation then gives rise to various abortive theories
of definitions; some of them assume that definitions are proposi-
tions about objects represented by words, others - that they are
propositions about the so called concepts of these objects. Yet
another theory claims that definitions are no propositions at all,
etc, etc.; all this derives, to a large extent, from the fact that
the contents of definitions are not represented precisely in ade-
quate propositions whose subjects are symbols of the symbols of
objects, that is symbols of words and not symbols of the objects
themselves or their so called concepts.
The representation of various contents in existential proposi-
tions which are inadequate to these contents, accounts for one of
the inadequacies that are both 'typical' in the above sense, and
L~-..~"~'"~ ,harmful: harmful in that out of such inadequacies of which we are
not aware there grow (just as in the example with definitions) var-
ious mistaken theories of propositions, e.g., the above-mentioned
theory based on the insights of the 'Austrian schools' (Brentano's)
quoted in the note to the preceding section.
The task of the theory propositions is not, naturally, to rid
language of those accepted inadequacies of verbal representation
but the bringing about, if I may so express myself, of the planes
and directions of these inadequacies. Such awareness would pre-
vent the construction of various theories based on such inadequate
representations of certain contents, to wit of various theories aris-
ing inevitably from treating the respective linguistic symbols as
if they were adequate.
AN ATTEMPT AT A PROOF
OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE
OF CONTRADICTION
Introduction. The purpose of this study is to state and jus-

tify several ideas concerning the well-known principle known by
scholars as the 'principle of contradiction'. I have based these
reflections upon Jan Lukasiewicz's study On Aristotle's Principle
of Contradiction published last year by the Cracow Academy of
Sciences. 1 Lukasiewicz's study generated my own views on the
principle of contradiction and it is these views that I am going to
present here. Thus, my bias towards comparing my own results
with those of Lukasiewicz should become more apparent; it is to
him that I am most indebted for achieving results of my own.
These are quite incompatible, in most cases, with the theoretical
theses defended by Lukasiewicz and therefore the sections of my
work devoted to the analysis of this distinguished scholar's opin-
ions are of a clearly polemic nature. The reader, however, should
not be misled by this into the erroneous conviction that I am ig-
noring the theoretical merits of Lukasiewicz's work which I have
always considered one of the most interesting and original among
the 'philosophical' works I am familiar with. Re1narks critical of
his work merely manifest that it was under Lukasiewicz's influence
that I became one of the first to make his wish co1ne true. This
was expressed by Lukasiewicz in the introduction to his book:
"If... I can create... out of an untouchable and untouched, and
1 Jan Lukasiewicz, [1910b] 0 zasadzie sprzecznosci u Arystotelesa.

Studium krytyczne {On Aristotle's Principle of Contradiction. A Critical
Study), Cracow 1910. Available only in Polish.
Principle of Contradiction 21
thus a dead, question a live problem of no mean consequence,

then the purpose of this work will be fully accomplished". 2
§ 1. I employ the expression 'ontological principle of contra-

diction' - in conformity with Lukasiewicz 3 - to denote the follow-
ing propositiqn: 'no object can both possess and not possess one
and the same property'.
§ 2. With various kinds of reasoning it is sometimes conve-
nient to substitute one proposition for another, the propositions
being synonymous. I find it suitable for my purposes to substi-
tute in such a manner the above formulation of the ontological
principle of contradiction; I shall adopt the following form: 'every
object is unable to both possess and not possess one and the same
property'.
Remark 1. I employ the expression 'synonymous proposi-
tions' to denote such propositions as - after formulating theµi
as categorical propositions with positive copulas and predicates
in the nominative case - possess adequate subjects and synony-
mous predicates. I employ the expression 'adequate subjects' to
denote such subjects as do not denote different (if only numeri-
1 cally) objects and do not connote different properties. 4 I employ
.-~.---~-·······th-~ ~xp~ession 'synonymous predicates' to denote such predicates
as connote identical properties. Thus, if I use the word '1nan' to
denote a being possessed of the property of mortality, then the two
following propositions are synonymous: 'every man is mortal' and
'every mammal with two hands and two legs is a being possessed
of the property of mortality'. These propositions are synony1nous
because their subjects - 'man' and 'mammal with two hands and
two legs' - are adequate, that is, they do not denote different
objects nor connote different properties, and their predicates -
2
Ibid., p. 8.
3 Ibid., pp. 10 and 38.
4 Cf. Sections 5 and 6.
'mortal' and 'a being·possessed of the property of mortality' - are

synonymous, that is they connote identical properties.
Remark 2. Lukasiewicz claims 5 that the propositions 'Aristo-
tle was the founder of logic' and 'The Stagirite was the founder
of logic' are synonymous; I think that this claim is false. These
two prop~sitions are not synonymous because they do not have
adequate subjects; their subjects - 'Aristotle' and 'The Stagirite'
- are not adequate because they connote different properties: the
word 'Aristotle', e.g., connotes the property of possessing the
name 'Aristotle' 6 while the word 'Stagirite' does not connote that
property. - Similarly, we can demonstrate the groundlessness of
Lukasiewicz's view that "Two judgements: 'P has c' and 'P 1 has
c1' ••• are synonymous if P denotes the same objects as P', and c
denotes the same property as c1 ". 7 This view is false because, on
the basis of my definition of the expression 'synonymous proposi-
tions' given in Remark 1, the propositions 'P has c' and 'P 1 has
c1', in other words 'Pis having c' and 'P' is having c1', are not
synonymous if the words 'P' and 'P 1' connote different properties
- even in the cases when the words 'P' and 'P''denote the same
object, and the words 'c' and 'c 1' - the same property.
. .Remark 3. It follows from the definition of the expression 'syn-
onymous propositions' which I have adopted that I can ascertain
whether any two propositions are synonymous only when I have
formulated them as categorical propositions with positive copu-
las and predicates in the Nominative case. The question of syn-
onymity or non-synonymity of any two propositions would thus be
opened beforehand to all kinds of linguistic options and impres-
sions depending on habit and mood, had there not existed certain
general conventional-normative schemas indicating the way to ex-
ecute the above-mentioned reduction of linguistic periods to the
5 Lukasiewicz, ibid., p. 15.
6
Cf.: St. Lesniewski [1911], Przeglqd Filozoficzny (Phiiosophical Review)
p. 333.
7 Lukasiewicz, ibid., p. 15.
form of categorical propositions, and propositions with negative
copulas to the form of propositions with positive copulas. It is one
of the 'most burning' needs of the theory of language8 to work out
such conventional-normative patterns. The normative convention
for reducing categorical propositions with negative copulas and
predicates in the nominative case to the form of propositions with
positive copulas which I adopt is the following one: a proposition
"
with a negative copula can symbolize possessing, by the object
denoted by the subject of that proposition, properties connoted
by the expression consisting of the word 'not' and the predicate of
the proposition with a negative copula in question (the negation
'not' is to apply to the whole expression that follows it). If the
proposition with a negative copula has the form: 'no etc ... ', then
the word 'no' will be substituted, in the process of reduction, by
the word 'every'. Thus the proposition with a negative copula 'no
object can both possess and not possess one and the same prop-
erty', in other words 'no object is able to both possess and not
possess one and the same property', symbolizes the possessing by
the object denoted by the subject of that sentence, that is (after
substituting the word 'every' for the word 'no') the possessing by
every object of properties connoted by the expression consisting of
-~·~-··"··~the .word 'not'+ and the predicate of the proposition with a neg-
ative copula- - that is, the expression 'able to both possess and
not possess one and the same property'. The above proposition
can thus symbolize the possessing by every object of the proper-
ties connoted by the expression 'not able to both possess and not
possess one and the same property'. However, the possessing of
8
Cf.: Dr Anton Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Halle, 1908. Marty's remarks dealing
with the problem with which I am preoccupied here are anyway of extremely
perfunctory and vague character (pp. 26 and 27).
+ The negative form 'no object is not able to both possess etc~' requires, in
Polish, a double negation ('no object is not able etc.'), hence the occurrence
of the word 'not' in the passage (translators note).
these properties by every object can be sy1nbolized in the propo-

sition 'every object is not able to both possess and not possess
one and the same property' and it is with this proposition with
a positive copula that my formulation of the ontological principle
of contradiction, which I give in Section 1, is synonymous.
Re.mark 4. In the course of this section I have recognized as
synony;nous two propositions, one of which contains a negative
copula, and the other a positive one. Remark 3 is a commentary
on my position in relation to that problem. In the present remark
I shall examine Lukasiewicz's views on the matter. He defends
quite a contrary theoretical position and writes: 9 "No negative
judgement is synonymous with a positive one, because affirmation
and negation do not mean the same thing; the one ... cannot be in
any way reduced to the other". Since I have tried to explain my
positive attitude towards the question of the relation between neg-
ative and positive proposition in Remark 3, in which I have also
demonstrated the method of reducing negative propositions to the
form of propositions with positive copulas, I shall limit myself to
explaining why I find Lukasiewicz's argumentation in this matter
insufficient. It is, in fact, so feeble that a supposition suggests
itself that his argumentation hides 'lapsus linguae ', the direction
of which I ca.flnot quite realize. To demonstrate the unsoundness
of Lukasiewicz's reasoning more effectively, I shall assign various
meanings to the words 'affirmation' and 'negation'. (1) I shall
assume that the word 'affirmation' has here the same meaning
as the expression 'positive judgement', and the word 'negation'
the same meaning as the expression 'negative judgement'. In this
case, the above quoted Lukasiewicz's statement can be formulated
in the following way: 'No positive judgement is synonymous with
a negative one because a positive judgement means something
else than a negative one'. This reasoning does not suffice, because
the proposition that a positive judgement means something other
9 Lukasiewicz, ibid., p. 15; cf. also p. 45.

than a negative one, which is to stand for the sense of the propo-
sition that no negative judgement is synonymous with a positive
one - is a proposition which requires justification just as much as
does the proposition for whose acceptance it is supposed to be a
reason. (2) I shall now assume that the word 'affirmation' has here
the same Il}eaning as the expression 'the word 'affirmation'', and
the word '11egation' - the same meaning as the expression 'the
word 'negation''. The aforementioned Lukasiewicz's thesis can
then be formulated in the following way: 'No negative judgement
is synonymous with a positive one, because the word 'affirmation'
means something else than the word 'negation''. This reason-
ing is false because the non-synonymity of positive and negative
judgements does not follow from the non-synonymity of the words
'affirmation' and 'negation' - just as, e.g., it does not follow from
the non-synonymity of the expressions 'analytic proposition' and
'affirmative proposition' that no analytic proposition is synony-
mous with any positive proposition. Thus, neither interpretation
of the words 'affirmation' and 'negation' will suffice to defend
Lukasiewicz's argumentation.
§ 3. If, in the ontological principle of contradiction forn1ulated
~~-~,,~"}~~§~_c:~ion ~,} ~ubstitt1te the syn1bol 'P' for the word 'object' and
if I denote the possession of any property by an object by ineans of
an abbreviation 'P has c', then the ontological principle of contra-
diction will take the following forn1: 'no P can both have and not
have c'. Similarly, the formulation of the ontological principle of
contradiction given in Section 2 will take the form of the folluwing
proposition: 'every P is unable to both have and not have c'. The
two new propositions which we obtain in this way are then syn1-
bolic abbreviations of the ontological principle of contradiction;
they are according to Remark 3 of Section 2, synonymous.
Remark 1. Lukasiewicz considers it possible to formulate the
ontological principle of contradiction as a conditional-: "if P is an
object, then P cannot both have and not have c" - maintaining
at the same time that this conditional is synonymous with a cat-

egorical proposition: "no object can both have and not have one
and the same property" .10 I think that this assertion is false and
I support my opinion in the following way. Since I am using the
symbol 'P', as I have said in this section, in place of the 'object'
.
for which I have substituted the symbol 'P' while abbreviating
the ontological principle of contradiction, I can now substitute
'II
the symbol 'P' for the word 'object' and obtain, in the condi-
tional formulated by Lukasiewicz, the following proposition: 'if P
is P, then P cannot both possess and not possess c'. I can find
out whether this conditional is synonymous with the proposition:
'no object can both possess and not possess one and the same
property', in other words 'every P is unable to both possess and
not possess c' - only when I have formulated the conditional as
a categorical proposition with a positive copula and a predicate
in the Nominative case. However, I can carry out such reduction
properly only if I have the general conventional-normative schema
necessary for this operation. I adopt, in this respect, the follow-
ing normative convention: the conditional in the present tense,
whose categorical antecedent and consequent, with copulas and
predicates in Nominative containing identical subjects, can sym-
. bolize the possessing by every object (or the not possessing by any
object) denoted by a common subject and having properties con-
noted by the predicate of the antecedent - of properties connoted
by the predicate of the consequent. If I bring the above condi-
tional to the form of a period whose consequent contains a copula,
then I shall obtain the proposition: 'if P is P, then P is unable to
both have and not have c'. In order to reduce the latter of these
conditionals to the form of a categorical proposition I maintain
according to the above-adopted normative convention: the con-
ditional 'if P is P, then P is unable to both have and not have
c' can only symbolize the possessing by every object denoted by
10
Ibid., p. 46.
the subject common to the antecedent and consequent, and pos-

sessing properties connoted by the predicates of the antecedent,
that is by the word 'p' (or 'object') - of properties connoted by
the predicate of the consequent, that is the property of the im-
possibility to both have and not have c. If the possessing by
every object denoted by the subject common to antecedent and
consequent'and having properties connoted by the word 'P' - the
property ot'being unable to both have and not have c - could
be at all symbolized in the form of a categorical proposition with
a positive copula and a predicate in the Nominative case - then
the subject of that proposition would have to denote every object
denoted by the subject common to the antecedent and the conse-
quent and possessing properties connoted by the predicate of the
antecedent. However, the predicate of the antecedent, that is the
word 'P', or 'object' or being - connotes no properties, 11 thus,
no object possess properties connoted by the word 'P' and there
is no object denoted by the subject common to the antecedent
and the consequent and having, at the same time, the properties
connoted by the predicate of the antecedent, that is the word 'P'.
Therefore, no object can be denoted by means of the only expres-
sion that could be the subject of a categorical proposition with a
"positive copula"and predicate in the Nominative, that proposition
symbolizing the possessing, by every object denoted by the sub~
ject common to the antecedent and the consequent and having
properties connoted by the word 'P', of the property of impossi-
bility to both have and not have c. Yet, because the subject of
the proposition 'every P is unable to both have and not have c'
denotes every object - I have the right to say that subject of this
proposition can not be adequate in relation to the only expression
that could be the subject of a categorical proposition with a posi-
tive copula and predicate in the Nominative case, symbolizing the
possessing by every object, denoted by the subject co1nmon to the
antecedent and the consequent and having properties connoted by
11
Cf. Lesniewski, op. cit., p. 332.
the word 'P', of the property of not being able to both have and
not have c. Hence it follows that the subject of the proposition
'every P is unable to both have and not have c' cannot stand
in an adequate relation to the only expression that could be the
subject of such a categorical proposition with a positive copula
and a pr<idicate in the Nominative case, to which we should try
to reduce the conditional 'if P is P, then P is unable to both have
and not have c'. I thereupon conclude that the proposition 'every
Pis unable to both have and not have c' cannot be synonymous
with the proposition 'if P is P, then P is unable to both have
and not have c'; in other words, the proposition 'no object can
both possess and not possess one and the same property' cannot
be synonymous with the proposition 'if P is an object, then P
cannot both possess and not possess c'.
Remark 2. We can, in a similar manner, refute Lukasiewicz's
claim that the proposition 'all A are B' is synonymous with the
proposition 'if something is A, it is B', and the proposition 'no A
is B' is synonymous with 'if something is A, it is not B'. I shall
examine - to refute Lukasiewicz's thesis - a few different kinds
of propositions.
A. Lukasiewicz's claim that the proposition 'all A are B', in
other words 'every<A is B' is synonymous with the proposition
'if something is A, it is B' - is false if the symbol 'A' stands for
the word 'object' or 'P'. The word 'something' is equivalent to
the word 'object' or 'P'. I can thus formulate the proposition 'if
something is A, it is B' as 'if Pis P, it is B', and the proposition
'every A is B' as 'every P is B'. According to the normative
convention which I have adopted (in Remark 1), the conditional
'if P is P, it is B' can only symbolize the possessing by every
object, having the properties connoted by the word 'P', of prop-
erties connoted by the word 'B' could be at all sy1nbolized in the
form of a categorical proposition with a positive copula and a
predicate in the Nominative, then the subject of that proposition
would have to denote every object possessing the properties con-
noted by the word 'P'. The word 'P', however, does not connote
any properties; thus no object is an object possessing the prop-
erties connoted by the word 'P'; it follows further that no object
can be denoted by means of the only expression that could be the
subject of a qitegorical proposition with a positive copula and a
predicate in the Nominative case, that proposition symbolizing
the possessing by every object, having the properties connoted by
the word 'P', of properties connoted by the word 'B'. Yet, be-
cause the subject of the proposition 'every P is B' denotes every
object, I can maintain that the subject of that proposition cannot
be adequate in relation to the only expression that could be the
subject of a categorical proposition with a positive copula and a
predicate in the Nominative case, symbolizing the possessing, by
every object having the properties connoted by the word 'P', of
properties connoted by the word 'B' (that is :-- the proposition,
to which the conditional 'if P is P, it is B' should be reduced).
I thereupon conclude that the proposition 'every P is B' cannot
be synonymous with the proposition 'if P is P, it is B'.
B. Lukasiewicz's thesis formulated in passage A is also false
when the symbol 'B' stands for the word 'object' or 'P'. The
--·~'-···-··········propositions :every A is B' and 'if something is A, then it is B'
could be in such case formulated as 'every A is P' and 'if P is
A, it is P'. The predicate of the proposition 'every A is P', that
is the word 'P' connotes nothing; thus it cannot be, according
to the definition of the expression 'synonymous predicates' given
in Remark 1 of Section 2, synonymous with the predicate of any
other proposition. Hence it follows that, on the basis of the def-
inition of the expression 'synonymous propositions' given there,
the proposition 'every A is P' cannot be synonymous with any
other proposition. From here we may conclude that it is not syn-
onymous with the conditional 'if P is A, it is P', either.
C. Lukasiewicz's thesis that the proposition 'no. A is B' is
synonymous with the proposition 'if something is A, it is not B'
is false when the symbol 'A' stands for the word 'object', or 'P'.
The above proposition can then be formulated as 'every P is not

B' and 'if P is P, it is not B'. The last two propositions are not
synonymous: proof as in passage A.
Remark 3. \Ve may say, taking into consideration the argu-
ments contained in passages A and C of Remark 2, that propo-
sitio:q.s concerning all objects in general cannot be formulated as
conditionals. If we apply the word 'metaphysics' to denote the
system of true propositions concerning all objects in general, we
shall thus obtain the following thesis: metaphysics can be con-
structed only as a system of categorical propositions.
§ 4. The ontological principle of contradiction is a true one. I
shall try to prove it. I am to prove the validity of the proposition
'every P is unable to both have and not have c'. If I apply the
word 'a contradiction' as an equivalent of the expression 'both
having and not having c', then I can, within that proposition,
substitute the expression 'to be a contradiction' for the expres-
sion 'to both have and not have c'; I will then obtain one more
formulation of the ontological principle of contradiction: 'every
P is unable to be a contradiction'. In Jhis proposition, the ex-
pression 'unable' can be understood an;_biguously - depending on
various linguist~ic habits and options which arise from studying
miscellaneous treatises dealing with 'necessity' or 'the concept
of necessity'. Attempting to prove the ontological principle of
contradiction, I must ascribe a strictly defined meaning to the
expression 'unable'.
I apply the expression 'unable to be such and such' to denote
an object which is not such and such - in the case when a proposi-
tion negating this state of affairs is false a priori. I can then state
of every P that it cannot be a contradiction only if the proposi-
tion 'not every Pis not a contradiction' is false a priori. Thus the
proof that every Pis not able to be a contradiction must consist
of two parts: (1) a proof that every P is not a contradiction, and
(2) a demonstration that the proposition 'not every P is not a
contradiction' is false a priori.
I shall begin with the first part of the required proof; that is,
with proving that every Pis not a contradiction. This part of the
proof calls for some preparatory semiotic analyses; these I shall
carry out in the forthcoming sections.
§ 5. I divide all linguistic expressions into connoting and

non-connoti.ng; I adopt the expression 'connoting expression' to
denote such ~xpression as can be defined, and the expression 'non-
connoting expression' to denote expressions that cannot be de-
fined. The expressions 'man', 'green', 'square circle', 'centaur' are
examples of connoting expressions; the expressions 'to a man',
'well' 'at' 'abracadabra' 'obJ"ect' 'every man is mortal' etc 12
' ' ' '
are examples of non-connoting expressions.
' .
§ 6. I divide all linguistic expressions into those denoting

something and those denoting nothing, in other words symboliz-
ing something and symbolizing nothing or expressions which are
symbols and those which are not. I call the relation of expres-
sions to the objects denoted (in other words - symbolized) by
these expressions, a symbolic relation. I call that property of an
expression which consists in its symbolizing something, the sym-
bolic function of that expression. An expression which denotes
something, or which possesses the symbolic function, can be ex-
emplified by the following: 'man', 'green', 'object', 'the possessing
by every man of the property of mortality', 'every man is mortal',
etc. The expressions which do not denote anything, or do not pos-
sess symbolic functions, can be exemplified by the following ones:
'abracadabra', 'square circle', 'centaur', 'the possessing by every
man of the property of immortality', 'every man is immortal', etc.
The expression 'square circle' does not possess a symbolic func-
tion because no object is a square circle, in other words there is
no such object as could be symbolized by the expression 'square
12 Cf.: John Stuart Mill, System der deductiven und inductiven Logik,
Gomperz's translation, Leipzig 1884, Vol. I, p. 30; cf. also: Lesniewski,
op. cit., pp. 329, 330 and 332.
circle'; thus the expression 'square circle' symbolizes no object, in

other words symbolizes nothing. The expressions 'possessing by
every man of the property of immortality', 'every man is immor-
tal' do not possess a symbolic function because no man is immor-
tal, in other words there is no object that could be symbolized
..
by the aforementioned expressions. Therefore, these expressions
symbolize no objects, or symbolize nothing .
•
Remark 1. It follows from comparing Sections 5 and 6 that
there exist expressions which connote something (thus 'mean',
'bedeuten ') but denote 'bezeichnen' nothing; such expressions are,
e.g., 'square circle', 'centaur'. On the other hand, there exist ex-
pressions which connote nothing and yet denote something, e.g.,
'object', 'every man is mortal'. Besides, there also exist expres-
sions which neither denote nor connote anything; exa1nple: 'abra-
cadabra'.
Remark 2. The theses which I have formulated in Sections 5
and 6 enable the proper critical approach to all enunciations of
the type represented by, e.g., Lukasiewicz's clai1n that the word
'hippocentaur' 'denotes, indeed, something which does not exist
yet it is not devoid of meaning' .13 The expression 'something
~g!~~~~~~s not exist' does not denote any object because no ob-
ject possesses the property - connoted by that expression - of
'nonexistence'. Thus the word 'hippocentaur' does not denote
any object because no object is 'something which does not exist';
the word 'hippocentaur' does not, then, denote anything. This
does not mean, of course, that this word does not connote any-
thing - on the contrary, it can connote some quite strictly defined
properties as, e.g., the property of humanness and the property
of, so to say, horseness, and thus it can possess a strictly defined
'meaning'. Similarly false is Lukasiewicz's claim that the expres-
sion 'a square, constructed by means of a ruler and a pair of
compasses, with a surface equal to that of a circle with radius l'
13 Lu k·as1ew1cz,
. . op. cit.,
. p. 70 .
denotes an object 'with contradictory properties' .14 As I shall try

to demonstrate below, no object is one 'with contradictory prop-
erties', in other words there is no object that could be symbolized
by the above expression which connotes 'contradictory proper-
ties'. Therefore, this expression denotes nothing; which does not,
however, ~ean that it does not 'mean' anything.
§ 7. In~ufficient
clarity in realizing the mutual relations be-
tween various linguistic structures results, quite often, in treating
expressions which are not symbols as expressions possessing a
symbolic function. I call the property of an expression which con-
sists in that expression's application or treatment (according to,
or against, the adopted linguistic conventions) as one possessing
the symbolic function, the symbolic disposition of that expres-
sion. Thus, e.g., I say that the expressions: 'man', 'hippocen-
taur', 'every man is mortal', 'the possessing by a hippocentaur of
the property of horseness' - possess a symbolic disposition when
they are applied, or treated as expression-symbols. The first and
third of these expressions possess a symbolic function, but the
second and fourth do not because no object is a hippocentaur or
the possession by a hippocentaur of the property of horseness.
HeJ:lcethe conclusion that not all of the expressions possessing a
symbolic disposition possess, also, a symbolic function.
§ 8. The examples of expressions possessing a symbolic func-

tion which I gave in Section 6 indicate that the expression-
symbols, like other expressions, can· be connoting or non-
connoting. The former can be exe1nplified by 'man', 'the possess-
ing by every man of the property of mortality'; the non-connoting
expressions can be exemplified by 'object', 'every inan is n1or-
tal' etc. Similarly, expressions that do not possess a syn1bolic
function but possess a symbolic disposition, can be connoting or
non-connoting; examples of the former are the expressions 'hip-
pocentaur', 'the possessing by a hippocentaur of the property of
14 Ibid.
horseness'; of the latter the expression 'a hippocentaur possesses

the property of horseness'.
§ 9. All connoting expressions possessing a symbolic func-

tion can be divided into two groups: expressions which corre-
spond with any non-connoting expression symbolizing the same
.
object; and expressions which correspond with no non-connoting
expres~ion symbolizing the same object. Thus, e.g., the connoting
expression 'the possessing by every man of the property of mortal-
ity' corresponds with a non-connoting expression symbolizing the
same object, namely the expression 'every man is mortal'. The
latter also symbolizes the possessing by every man of the prop-
erty of mortality, and also the expression 'the possessing by ev-
ery man of the property of mortality'. 15 Whereas the connoting
expression 'man' corresponds with no non-connoting expression
which would symbolize the same objects as those symbolized by
the word 'man'.
§ 10. All connoting expressions possessing a symbolic disposi-
tion can be divided into two groups: expressions which correspond
with any non-connoting expression possessing the same symbolic
disposition, and expressions which correspond with no such non-
· · ·connoting expression.
§ 11. I call non-connoting expressions, possessing the dispo-

sition to symbolize relations of inherence, propositions. Proposi-
tions can thus be exemplified by the expressions 'hippocentaur is
a figment of imagination', 'every man is mortal', etc ...
§ 12. All propositions can be divided into two groups: propo-

sitions which possess a symbolic function, and propositions which
do not possess it. The former can be exemplified by the propo-
sition 'every man is mortal'; the latter by the proposition 'a hip-
pocentaur possesses the property of horseness'. The last proposi-
tion does not possess a symbolic function because no object is the
15 Cf.: Lesniewski, op. cit., p. 343.

possessing, by a hippocentaur, of the property of horseness; thus

no object is the only one that could be symbolized by the expres-
sion 'a hippocentaur possesses the property of horseness'.
§ 13. I call all propositions which possess a symbolic function,
true propositi}ms; I call all propositions which do not possess a
symbolic function, false propositions.
Remark! In view of the fact that, as I shall try to prove be-
low, no object can both possess and not possess one and the same
property, no proposition can be both true and false.
§ 14. I call a systematized aggregate of propositions which
possess a symbolic function (in other words, true propositions),
science. Therefore, the aim of a scholar in the field of any part
of science is to symbolize given objects by means of propositions.
The aim of an.y scientific criticism of a proposition or of a system
of propositions consists in answering the question whether these
propositions possess a symbolic function, i.e., whether they are
true. The purpose of a consistent scientific criticism is the exclu-
sion of a.11 propositions which do not possess a symbolic function,
or to put it differently, of all false propositions, from the system
of propositions which is considered to constitute the science.
§ 15. Science is, then, a system of linguistic symbols. To
construct and to understand linguistic symbols, it is necessary,
as in the case of any other symbols, to have certain rules of con-
structing those symbols and certain keys to decipher them. The
rules on which the construction of linguistic symbols are based
and the keys which decipher them are, on the one hand, precise
definitions of various expressions and, on the other, different kinds
of conventions concerning linguistic symbols, which I considered,
e.g., in Remark 3 of Section 2 and in Remark 1 of Section 3. Lin-
guistic conventions are, therefore, the necessary condition of any
scientific procedure and the indispensable key to understanding
science. The need that these conventions be formulated precisely
remains unnoticed when these or other demands of 'linguistic in-

tuition' are sufficient for mutual understanding among scholars.
It is, however, inevitable to appeal to linguistic conventions when
some doubts arise as to the way in which an object can be symbol-
ized or as to the way in which an expression can be understood.
§ 1"6. "' I find it useful for further reasoning to formulate certain

conventions which I shall adopt while using linguistic symbols.
Convention I: any proposition 16 possessing a symbolic func-
tion symbolizes the possessing by the object, symbolized by the
subject of that proposition, of properties connoted by its pred-
icate. This convention implies that propositions can symbolize
only the relations of inherence.
Convention II: a proposition having a denoting subject and
a connoting predicate possesses a symbolic function if a singular
proposition being its contradictory counterpart does not possess
the symbolic function. (I hold that a singular proposition is not
contradictory to any other proposition if this singular proposition
possesses a subject connoting such properties which are not con-
noted by the subject of the other proposition. Thus, the proposi-
tion 'a certain young man is not mortal' would not be considered
c~ntra~ict~~y to the proposition 'every man is mortal', but its
contradictory counterpart would be 'a certain man is not mor-
tal'.)
Convention III: no contradictory proposition possesses a sym-
bolic function.
Convention IV: if one of two propositions contradicting each
other possesses a symbolic function, then the other will not pos-
sess one.
Remark 1. From comparing Convention I and the theses es-
tablished in Section 9 it follows that a proposition syrnbolizing
16
In formulating these conventions I speak of propositions in the sense of
the ones reduced to the form of categorical propositions with positive copulas
and predicates in the Nominative case.
the same object corresponds only with those connoting expres-

sions which symbolize the relations of inherence.
Remark 2. Conventions II, III, and IV indirectly determine
the role of the word 'not' in the system of linguistic symbols. If
the role of the word 'not' were not determined, it would not be
possible to .decipher the system of linguistic symbols which em-
ploys this w~rd.
Remark 3. I think it superfluous to state that the linguistic
conventions which I have formulated and of which I make use
in my reasoning have no connection whatever with the so-called
'conventionalism' a.s represented, for example, by Henri Poincare.
This form of 'conventionalism' always consists in accepting certain
conventions as regards the objects about which the adherents of
'conventionalism' intend to pronounce certain theses which they
can justify only by means of various kinds of 'conventions'. Their
'conventions' do not pertain to the objects whose properties de-
pend on the will of those who make up these conventions but refer
to such objects which cannot be changed by any of the 'conven-
tions' accepted with respect to those objects. Thus, for example,
no 'convention' concerning some properties of space can by any
means change those properties because they are entirely indepen-
--~~---------------------- --of-the-scl1ofars-making up the 'conventions'. The proposi-
tions in which the content of such conventions is incorporated ei-
ther cannot be proved or justified, in which case the 'conventions'
do not have the value of scientific propositions, or can be proved,
and then there is no reason to accept them as conventions since
their subject matter contains no substance suitable for forming
conventions with respect to it, and the validity of such proposi-
tions is completely independent of the acceptance of a given 'con-
vention'. The acceptance of any such 'convention' is not, then, a
solution of a scientific problem, and the direction of solving this or
another problem indicated by the 'convention' requires every time
a separate analysis to decide whether the proposition formulating
the content of the convention is true or false; therefore, to have
such a 'convention' provides us with exactly the same inventory of

scientific propositions as in the case where there would be no 'con-
vention'. Of entirely different nature are the linguistic conventions
which I have formulated in this section. They are the necessary
condition for the possibility of understanding linguistic symbols
since t1!ey establish the rules on which the system of linguistic
symbols., that I use is constructed. Thus, they are the indispens-
able key to the deciphering of the expressions which I use. The
conventions which I accepted refer to the objects whose certain
properties are dependent on my will. It is I who decide what rules
to choose for constructing the system of linguistic symbols to be
used. Such or other linguistic conventions which I accept modify
in one way or another the objects to which they refer, e.g., sym-
bolic functions of certain linguistic expressions change according
to what functions I assign to these expressions in the conventions
that I accept. Propositions in which the content of the accepted
conventions can be stated are true because they symbolize the
state of affairs which, by means of accepting the conventions, I
create myself. Thus, the truth of such propositions depends on
the fact that I accept these and no other particular conventions,
and the objects to which these propositions refer, i.e. certain
functions of various linguistic expressions, constitute the mate-
rial for 'conventions' necessary in this field of knowledge. The
acceptance of various linguistic conventions solves then a num-
ber of problems concerning the functions of various linguistic ex-
pressions; therefore, it has a scientific value. Having a number
of such conventions, I am in possession of the true propositions
which have the functions of various linguistic expressions - the
propositions which I could not consider to be true unless I accept
the pertinent conventions. On the basis of these propositions and
of any other true propositions I can construct various proofs, thus
actualizing the argumentative potential inherent in the accepted
linguistic conventions.
§ 17. As a point of departure to prove the thesis formulated in

Section 4 that each Pis not a contradiction, I take the proposition
'no P is both having and not having c'. The following singular
proposition contradictory with respect to the above one: 'a cer-
tain P is both having c and not having c', is a contradiction. In
view of Con.vehtion III (Section 16) it does not possess a symbolic
function. TJ:iis being so, in view of Convention II (Section 16)
the proposition 'no P is both having and not having c', in other
words, 'every P is not a contradiction' has a symbolic function,
i.e. is true.
§ 18. I shall attempt to prove the validity of the second thesis
formulated in Section 4, which maintains that the proposition 'not
every P is not a contradiction' is false a priori. I call false a pri-
ori all such propositions whose falseness can be demonstrated by
means of linguistic conventions alone or the propositions which
can be inferred from those conventions. The proposition 'not ev-
ery P is not a contradiction' is contradictory to the proposition
'every P is not a contradiction'. Since the latter proposition pos-
sesses a symbolic function, which was shown in Section 17, the
proposition 'not every P is not a contradiction' does not possess
fa_1nction, i.e. is false in view of Convention IV (Sec-
tion 16). As we can see, to prove completely the falseness of
this proposition I have only employed linguistic conventions (viz.
Conventions III, II, and IV of Section 16). Thus, the proposition
'not every P is not a contradiction' is false a priori.
Remark 1. On the analogy of the definition of the expres-
sion 'proposition false a priori', I define the expression 'proposi-
tion true a priori'. I employ the latter expression to denote such
propositions whose validity can be demonstrated by means of lin-
guistic conventions alone or the propositions which can be inferred
from these conventions. For example, the principle of identity -
'every object possesses the property which it possesses', is a propo-
sition true a priori. Proof: (1) The proposition 'a certain object
does not possess the property which it possesses' is a contradic-

tion and, therefore, in view of Convention III (Section 16) does
not possess a symbolic function. (2) The proposition 'a certain
object does not possess the property which it possesses' is a sin-
gular proposition contradictory to the proposition 'every object
posse&se~ the property which it possesses'. The latter proposi-
tion i~ view of Convention II (Section 16) possE'.sses a symbolic
function, i.e. is true. (3) The validity of this proposition was
demonstrated by means of linguistic conventions alone (III and
II) and, therefore, the proposition is true a priori.
Remark 2. Of the four conventions accepted by me in Sec-
tion 16 only one (II) establishes the condition whose fulfillment
guarantees that the propositions possess symbolic functions, i.e.
a.re true. This convention is then the only ground on which we
can base the a priori proof of the validity of any proposition. Yet
the condition specified by Convention II does not decide about
the possessing of symbolic functions by any proposition but refers
exclusively to those propositions whose subjects possess symbolic
functions and whose predicates are connoting expressions. Hence
cit follows that the a priori proof of the validity of any proposition
is accomplished only if, on the basis of linguistic conventions and
- --of propositfon-s-inferred from these conventions alone, we demon-
strate that the subject of the proposition to be proved possesses
the symbolic function and a predicate of this proposition is a con-
noting expression. The conventions on which one can base the
proof of the thesis that the predications of given propositions are
connoting expressions can be the definitions of respective predi-
cates (as it follows from the definition of the expression 'connoting
expression' given in Section 5). vVe do not, however, have such
linguistic conventions on which in each case one can base the proof
of the thesis that the subjects of given propositions possess sym-
bolic functions. The definitions of respective subjects cannot be
regarded as such conventions because definitions do not indicate
that the respective expressions denote anything but only testify
that they connote certain properties. We do not have any doubts

a priori as regards the fact that the subject of a given proposi-
tion denotes anything only when this subject is the word 'object'
or its equivalent. This is so because we accept the convention
that the word 'object' is, as a basis of a whole complex system
of linguisti~ symbols, the symbol of everything. The method of
solving the L>roblem whether any other subject possesses a sym-
bolic function amounts only to the procedure that in each case
we separately solve the problem of whether any object possesses
the properties connoted by the subject of a given proposition. If
any objects possess such properties, then the subject of a given
proposition has a symbolic function and stands in symbolic re-
lation to the very objects which possess the properties connoted
by the subject of given proposition. If, however, no object pos-
sesses such properties, then the subject of the given proposition
does not have a symbolic function because it could stand in a
symbolic relation only to such an object which would possess the
properties connoted by that subject. Depending on whether the
thesis that any object possesses or does not possess the properties
connoted by the subject, it is or is not possible to prove a priori,
we have or have not the possibility of proving a priori that the
~"-,~~,~··-,.·connoting subject of a proposition possesses a symbolic function.
This fact in connection with other conditions mentioned in the
beginning of this remark provides or does not provide the possi-
bility of proving a priori the truth of a given proposition. Hence
we see that, if we have the a priori proof of a proposition whose
subject is not the word 'object', then this proof is not based on
linguistic conventions alone but also on the propositions inferable
from those conventions and it requires, as a premise, the propo-
sition that any object possesses the properties connoted by the
subject of that proposition. The propositions of the latter type
(whose subject is the word 'object') can be proved a priori on the
basis of linguistic conventions alone: (1) the convention that the
word 'object' possesses a symbolic function; (2) the definition of
the predicate; (3) Convention II (Section 16). Making such an
analysis of every a p1iori proof of any proposition, we arrive at

the conclusion that only the following two types of propositions
can be true a priori: (1) propositions whose subject is the word
'object', and (2) propositions which, apart from linguistic conven-
tions, are based only on propositions whose subject is the word
'object.'. •
Re'Kl.ark 3. In view of the fact that true propositions whose
subject is the word 'object' are always synthetic since their sub-
jects do not connote anything and, therefore, their predicates al-
ways connote the properties which are not connoted by the sub-
jects, 17 and in view of the results obtained in Remark 2, I can
venture to contend that only following two types of propositions
can be true a priori: (1) synthetic propositions and (2) propo-
sitions which are based only on synthetic propositions. Hence it
follows that all analytic propositions true a priori are based on
the validity of synthetic propositions. This conclusion can be of
some value for the theory of science.
§ 19. In Sections 17 and 18 I proved that (1) every Pis not
a contradiction, (2) the proposition 'not every P is not a con-
tradiction' is false a priori. From the comparison of the results
obtained with the remarks in Section 4 we can see that I proved
that every P is unable to be contradiction. That is to say: every
P is unable to both have and not have c. That is to say: every
object is unable to both possess and not possess the same prop-
erty. In other words: no object can both possess and not possess
one and the same property. Thus, I think that have proved the
ontological principle of contradiction.
Remark 1. Lukasiewicz holds that 'the only accurate formal
proof' of the principle of contradiction is the following reason-
ing: "we assume beforehand that the object is conceived only as
something which cannot both have and not have one and the
same property. From this assumption, which can be regarded as
17 Cf. Lesniewski, l.c., p. 331.

the definition of the 'object', it follows by virtue of the principle

of identity that no object can both possess and not possess the
same property" .18 A somewhat different formulation of this rea-
soning can be found elsewhere in his book: 19 "The only accurate
formal proof of the principle of contradiction (in its ontological
formulation) is based on the definition of the object. The only
reason why 1#no object can both possess and not possess the same
property is that the object is to be conceived as something which
cannot contain contradictory properties. Lukasiewicz's reasoning
is, I think, liable to the following objections: I. The word 'object',
just as the word 'being', 20 cannot be defined at all because there
is no expression which could be generic with respect to the word
'object', where 'object' would be the specific expression. IL The
expression 'by the word 'object' I mean something which cannot
both have and not have the same property' - or 'by the word 'ob-
ject' I mean such an object which cannot both have and not have
the same property', cannot be the definition of the word 'object'
because it does not contain the expression which could be generic
with respect to the word 'object' (thus it does not satisfy the
condition of specifying genus and differetiae specificae. III. On
account of the worthlessness of this definition of the word 'object'
-according to Lukasiewicz, is to be the ground for proving
the ontological principle of contradiction, the proof as such is de- i
prived of any value, and, therefore, I am entitled to contend_ ~hat/

Lukasiewicz 's reasoning mentioned above not only fails to be 'the
only accurate formal proof' of the principle of contradiction but
fails to be any proof of this principle at all.
Remark 2. Even if the expression quoted in the Objection II
in Remark 1 could pass for the definition of the word 'object' and
even if the proposition 'no object can have and not have the same
property' could be expressed in the form 'every object, unable to
18 Lukasiewicz, l.c., p. 119.

19 Ibid., p. 164.
2° Cf. Lesniewski, l.c., p. 332.
both possess and not possess the same property, is unable to both
possess and not possess the same property', in other words, 'if an
object cannot both possess and not possess the same property,
then it cannot both possess and not possess the same property'
- even then the last proposition could not be considered to be
prov~d on the grounds of the principle of identity. A few words
by w~ of explanation: Lukasiewicz formulates the principle of
identity in the following forms: "Every object possesses the prop-
erty which it possesses" and "no object possesses the property
which it does not possess" .21 He holds however that these two
propositions can be also expressed as conditionals: "If an object
possesses a property, then it possesses it" and "If an object does
not possess a. property, then it does not possess it". 22 I suspect
that this view is not in accord with the true state of affairs. In
view of the convention accepted in Remark 1 (Section 3), the
proposition 'if an object possesses a property, then it possesses
it' can be also expressed as 'every object possessing a property
is possessing it'; the proposition 'every object possesses the prop-
erty which it possesses' can be reformulated as 'every object is
possessing the property which it possesses'. The two proposi-
tions are not synonymous because their subject - 'every object
possessing the property' and 'every object' - are not equivalent,
and their predicates - 'possessing it' and 'possessing the prop-
erty which it possesses' - are not synonymous; the proposition
'if an object possesses a property, then it possesses it' is, then,
not synonymous with the proposition 'every object possesses the
property which it possesses'. For the same reason, the following
propositions are not synonymous either: 'if an object does not
possess a property, then it does not possess it' and 'no object pos-
sesses the property which it does not possess'. The first of these
propositions can be formulated as 'every object, not possessing a
property, is not possessing it' and the second one as 'every object
21 Lukasiewicz, l.c., p. 43.

22 Ibid.
is not possessing the property which it does not possess'. The

propositions: 'if an object possesses a property, then it possesses
it' and 'if an object does not possess a property, then it does not
possess it' are, therefore, not the formulations of the principle of
identity. Contrary to Lukasiewicz's statement, 23 it is impossible
to formulat.e this principle as the conditional 'if P possesses c,
then P pos~esses c'. This conditional is the symbolic abbrevia-
tion of the conditional 'if an object possesses a property, then it
possesses a property', but the latter is not the formulation of the
principle of identity. Lukasiewicz's reasoning which I quoted in
the beginning of Remark 1, which was to present the proof of the
principle of contradiction on the basis of the principle of identity
and the definition of the word 'object' has a form so little devel-
oped that its particular pre1nises can be only guessed with various
degrees of probability. I guess that this reasoning is the abbre-
viation of argumentation in which the proposition 'if an object
does not possess a property, then it does not possess it', regarded
by Lukasiewicz as the formulation of the principle of identity, is
to be the ground for the proposition 'if an object cannot both
possess and not possess the same property, then it cannot both
possess and not possess the sa1ne property'. The latter proposi-
'tion amounts to the ontological principle of contradiction if the
word 'object' be replaced by the expression 'object unable to both
possess and not possess the same property'. Since the proposi-
tion which should be a ground for the ontological principle of
contradiction is not the formulation of the principle of identity
(as I have tried to demonstrate) Lukasiewicz's reasoning quoted
in Remark 1 cannot be considered the proof of the principle of
contra.diction on the ground of the principle of identity.
Remark 3. Lukasiewicz's reasoning with which I dealt in Re-
marks 1 and 2 which was to be the formal proof of the principle of
contradiction, is regarded by its author a.s only the introduction
23
Ibid., pp. 45, 46.
'towards investigations' in this field. 24 He writes: "According to

one definition we mean by 'object' everything which is something
and not nothing" .25 "According to another definition, we mean
by 'object' everything which does not contain contradictions. The
question arises whether objects in the first sense are also objects
~
in the second sense. Is it true that things, people, phenomena,

events, relations, thoughts, emotions, concepts, theories etc. do
not contain contradictions? That is the real problem whose so-
lution has been sought from the beginning. 26 Elsewhere: "Such
a proof cannot be carried out". 27 And further on: "Since the
principle of contradiction cannot be proved objectively, though
it requires a proof - that principle does not have any logical
value". 28 These quoted statements are, in my opinion, liable to
the following objections: (1) The first 'definition' of the word 'ob-
ject' is of no value for the same reasons for which the second
'definition' is of no value; as I specified in Objections I and II of
Remark 1. (2) The 'real problem' stated above by Lukasiewicz
can be formulated in the following way: 'Are all objects free of
contradictions?' The answer to this problem can only be the the-
sis: 'no object contains contradictions'. The proof of this thesis -
contrary to Lukasiewicz's opinion - can be carried out. Its proof
i~ the proof of the ontological principle of contradiction to which
this study is devoted. (3) Since the principle of contradiction can
be proved (as I have tried to demonstrate in this work), it has a
logical value. To settle this problem was the ultimate aim of my
study.
24
Ibid, p. 119.
25 Cf. the definition of the word 'object', p. 9 and 10 (Ibid.).
26 Ibid., pp. 119, 120.
27
Ibid., p. 164.
28
Ibid., p. 165.
THE CRITIQUE OF THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLE
OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE
INTRODUCTION
The authors of numerous old and new handbooks and manuals of

'logic', and the creators of various 'logical' monographs are often
apt to believe that they establish order and discipline in the dis-
orderly sets of academic problems when they employ, as one of
the foundations of their theoretical conceptions, a certain thesis,
the so-called 'logical principle of the excluded middle', which dif-
ferent people state in various quite different ways. The aim of this
study is the critique of this thesis. To anticipate the final conclu-
sion - 'the logical principle of the excluded middle' not only does
not help to resolve 'logical' problems of various kinds, but is in
fact a dangerous theoretical obstacle which should be, therefore,
removed from science: it is invalid and, as all invalid principles,
should be removed from 'circulation'.
The main pa.rt of the present study consists in writing down of
the ideas which I tried to present in my papers entitled: 'On the
principles of the excluded middle' read to the Philosophical Soci-
ety of the Lw6w University during last year's summer term. Apart
from the main subject, it touches upon several logical and meta-
physical problems which stand in various relations to the principle
in question. In order to avoid the repetition of the same argument
in different studies and, on the other hand, being obliged to base
some of my theses on the results of my previous papers - I take
the liberty to remark that it seems desirable for the reader of my
study to first become acquainted with my other two papers - 'A
Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propositions' and 'An
Attempt to Prove the Ontological Principle of Contradiction' -
published in Przeglqd Filozoficzny. 1 This will permit me to con-

fine the proofs in the present article to those that concern only
these theses which I have not proved before.
§ 1. Among all propositions referred to by scholars as 'the

principle of the excluded middle', one can distinguish two types of
•
propositions: the first pertain to all objects in general, the second
- onl'Y to a certain group of those objects, namely, propositions.
The first type of propositions called 'the principle of the excluded
middle' can be exemplified by the following propositions: 'every
object must either possess or not possess every property', 'every
object must either possess or not possess property c', 'every object
has to stand, with respect to every property, either in relation of
possessing it or in relation of not possessing it', etc. The second
of the mentioned types of propositions can be exemplified by the
propositions 'at least one of the two contradictory propositions
has to be true', 'if one of the two contradictory propositions is
false, the other has to be true', etc.
The propositions belonging to the first type, i.e. those which
refer to all objects in general, are metaphysical propositions (I
can also call them 'ontological'). The propositions of the second
type are logical propositions. I use the name 'metaphysical propo-
sition'-to denote the above mentioned propositions - with refer-
ence to my study 'An Attempt to Prove the Ontological Principle
of Contradiction' in which I employed the word 'metaphysics' to
represent the system of true propositions concerning all objects
in general; 2 I can otherwise call metaphysical propositions 'on-
tological' - connecting up with Lukasiewicz's investigations. He
also applied the term 'ontological principle of contradiction' to
1 These papers slightly enlarged and changed a.re presently published in

Russian in the book Logical Investigations. Cf Przeglqd Filozoficzny (1911)
voL III and (1912) vol. IL
2 'An Attempt to Prove the Ontological Principle of Contra.diction',
Przeglqd Filozoficzny (1912) vol. II, p. 211; henceforth referred to as
'P.C.'.
Principle of the Excluded Middle 49
a statement of the principle of contradiction which, just like the

above stated versions of 'the principle of the excluded middle',
refers to all objects. 3 (In my above mentioned paper I accepted
Lukasiewicz's terminology - even in the title.) I employed the
expression 'logical proposition' in accordance with the sense in
which I use tl1e word 'logic'. I use the latter word to refer to
the disciplirie which investigates which propositions are true and
which are fa!se. , .
Remark 1. Metaphysics conceived as a system of true propo-
sitions concerning all objects has obviously nothing to do with the
system of propositions about allegedly existing 'objects in general'
or 'general objects'. The proposition 'every object possesses the
properties ci, c2, c3, ... , Cn' is a typical metaphysical proposition
(for example - the ontological principle of contradiction; it can
be also called a metaphysical principle). Metaphysical proposi-
tions can be contrasted with such propositions which do not refer
to all objects but only to some of them and which are exempli-
fied by the following types of propositions - 'some objects possess
the properties ci, c2, c3, ... , en', 'every object possessing the prop-
· c I , c I , c I , ... , enI possesses th e proper t ies
er t ies · CI, c2, c3, ... , en ' ,
1 2 3
'some objects possessing the properties ci, c~, c~, ... , c~ possess
·the properties ti, c2,·c3, ... , en', etc. 4 The types of propositions
of an alleged science about allegedly existing 'universal objects'
or 'general objects' could be the following: 'every general object
possesses the properties CI, c2, c3, ... , en', 'some general objects
possess the properties c1, c2, c3, ... , en', 'every general object pos-
sessing the properties ci, c~, c~, ... , c~' possesses the properties
ci, c2, c3, ... , en', 'some general objects possessing the properties
ci, c~, c~, ... , c~ possess the properties CI, c2, c3, ... , Cn ', etc. Such
propositions can be contrasted with the ones which constitute the
3
Cf. Jan Lukasiewicz [1910b], pp. 9, 19, 15-17.
4 Cf. Prof. L. Petrazycki, Introduction to the Study of Law and .Morality.
Psychology of Emotions (in Russian). Petersburg 1905, pp. 81~83.
elements of alleged sciences dealing with 'individual' or 'singu-

lar'5 objects allegedly opposed to 'general objects'. The former
are propositions of the following type: 'every individual object
possesses the properties ci, c2, c3, ... , en', 'every individual object
possessing the properties ci, c~, c~, ... , c~ possesses the properties
ci, c2, c3, t.., en', 'some individual objects possess the properties
ci, c2, c3, ... , en', 'some individual objects possessing the proper-
.
ties c1I , "c2f , c3I , ... , enI possess th e proper t.ies ci, c2, c3, ... , Cn ' , e t c.
The propositions about 'general' objects which are allegedly op-
posed to 'individual' objects cannot be metaphysical propositions
because they do not refer to 'individual objects' and, thus, are not
propositions concerning all objects.
Remark 2. It is characteristic of the above mentioned con-
ceptions of 'universal objects' or 'general objects' that they some-
times induce even extremely powerful minds 6 to indulge in mis-
leading and aimless 'speculations'. Surveying the numerous cri-
tiques of such conceptions, we come across various theoretical
missives, aimed by different authors at different forms of 'univer-
sal objects'. To mention only: Berkeley's 'classical' polemic with
'realism'; or Husserl's polemic with Locke's 'conceptualistic' idea
of 'general triangles' 7 and also with Prof. Twardowski's 'objects
of general representations'; 8 or Marty's polemic with 'universal
objects' in Husserl's 'idealistic' conceptions. 9 Since from all argu-
ments against 'general objects' familiar to me I could not extract
any proof of the fact that no object is such a 'general object', I
shall attempt to present here such a proof. Considering the large
5 Cf. the theory of 'general objects' in Edmund Husserl's Logische Unter-
suchungen, II, Halle, pp. 107-12L
6 To mention, by way of example, Husserl and Lukasiewicz.
7
Ibid., pp. 132, 133.
8 Ibid., pp. 134, 135. Cf.: Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegen-
stand der Vorstellungen, p. 105 and seq.
9 Dr. Antoni Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Halle 1908, pp. 328, 354. Cf. Husserl,
l.c., pp. 107, 108.
Principle of the Excluded A1iddle 51
variety of the existing conceptions of 'general objects' - I shall
try to formulate my reasoning in a form so general that it can be
applied mutatis mutandis to different variants of the conceptions
in question. 'General objects', according to the various authors
dealing with them, possess a single characteristic property and
that irrespe~ti<ve of particular forms assumed by those objects in
the different systems in which they exist either as e.g.: 'notions'
in the sense" of ancient and medieval 'realism', or Locke's 'gen-
eral ideas', or Twardowski's objects of general representations',
or Husserl's 'ideal' objects existing 'outside time'. This property
consists in this that the object which is allegedly 'general' with
respect to a group of 'individual' objects can possess only those
properties which are common to all corresponding 'individual' ob-
jects. If any property does not belong to all 'individual' objects of
a certain group but only to some of them, then the 'general' ob-
ject corresponding to a given group of 'individual' objects cannot
possess this property. For example, the 'realists' ' 'notion of trian-
gle', Locke's 'general idea of triangle', Prof. Twardowski's 'object
of general representation of triangle', Husserl's 'ideal' 'triangle in
general' - possess the property of triangularity which is common
to all 'individual' triangles, but do not possess, for instance, the
of being equilateral or isosceles, which does not belong
to all triangles but only to some of them. In order to prove the
thesis that no object is 'general', I shall argue by reductio ad ab-
surdum. I assume that there is an object Pk which is 'general' and
it corresponds to 'individual objects' P{, P~, Pj, ... , P~; for every
'individual object' P£, one can always find certain property ck
which is not common to all 'individual' objects P{, P~, Pj, ... , P~.
On the basis of the above the 'general object' P£ does not pos-
sess the property Ck (I). The 'individual' object P£ possessing
the property ck does not possess the property of not possessing
the property Ck. It is so because if it possessed the property of
not possessing the property ck, i.e. if it was not possessed of
the property ck, then it would be contradictory since it would
be an object both possessing and not possessing the property Ck.
The property of not possessing the property Ck is not common to

all 'individual' objects P{, P~, P~, ... , P~ because any 'individual'
object Pk possesses the property Ck. Consequently the 'general'
object Pk cannot possess the property of not possessing the prop-
erty ck, therefore it is not possessed of the property Ck, ergo it
possesses the property ck (II). From the comparison of the the-
ses (I) and (II) it follows that the assumption that any object
"
Pk is 'general' leads to contradiction because it implies that this
object both possesses the property ck (I) and does not possess
it (II). We conclude that the assumption that any object is 'gen-
eral' is false. I believe that the above reasoning demonstrates
that no object is a universal or a general object. I shall now ap-
ply this form of reasoning to a particular case mentioned above:
I assume that any objects Pb Pz, Pm, Pn fall under 'concept of
triangle' in the realistic sense; or the 'object of general idea of
triangle' of Locke, or 'the object of the general representation of a
triangle' of Twardowski, or the 'ideal triangle' in Husserl's sense.
The objects Pk, Pz, Pm, Pn do not possess the property of being
equilateral (III) because this property is not common to all 'indi-
vidual' triangles. For the same reason, the objects Pk, Pz, Pm, Pn
do not possess the property of not possessing the property of be-
ing equilateral, i.e. are not not-possessed of the property of being
equilateral, i.e. are possessed of the property of being equilateral,
i.e. possess the property of being equilateral (IV). The compari-
son of the theses (III) and (IV) shows that the assumption that
any objects Pk, Pz, Pm, Pn are the 'concept of a triangle' in 'real-
ists' 'sense, the 'general idea of triangle' in Locke's sense, the 'ob-
ject of general representation of triangle' in Twardowski's sense,
the 'ideal triangle' in Husserl's sense - leads to the contradiction
because the assumption implies that these objects both do not
possess the property of being equilateral (III) and possess it (IV).
Hence I arrive at a conclusion that the assumption that some ob-
jects are the 'concept of a triangle', the 'general idea of triangle',
the 'object of general representation of triangle', or the 'ideal tri-
angle' - is false. If my present reasoning proves to be correct,
it would amount to a proof-based 'death sentence' on 'realism',

'conceptualism', Twardowski's theory of 'general representation',
Husserl's 'idealism', and similar theories.
Remark 3. In this section I said that I use the word 'logic'
to denote the discipline which investigates the question which
propositions are true and which false. This may give rise to mis-
understa.ndiitgs: one might gather the impression that, by defining
the word 'logic' in this manner, I must accept as a consequence
that any scientific problem becomes a 'logical' one. The reason-
ing can go as follows: 'let's take any problem such as the question
whether the proposition that all bodies are heavy is true or false.
The question is a problem of physics; however, it concerns the
truth or falsehood of a proposition and, therefore, according to
the above definition of the word 'logic' is a logical problem. Simi-
larly, the geometrical problem whether the Pythagorean theorem
is true or false, should be a question of logic. The same holds for
any other problem of science. If this is so, the meaning of the word
'logic' is so wide that any inquiry becomes 'logic' '. This reasoning
is erroneous: the question whether the thesis that all bodies are
heavy is true or false - is not a problem of physics. It does not
concern bodies but propositions. A true or false answer to this
'problem 'is not a physical proposition - 'all bodies are heavy', or
'not all bodies are heavy' - but a logical proposition - 'the thesis
that all bodies are heavy is true' or 'the thesis that all bodies are
heavy is false'. To physical propositions 'all bodies are heavy' or
'not all bodies are heavy' corresponds the problem of physics 'are
all bodies heavy?'. It is a problem of physics because it does not
refer to a thesis as in the case of the above logical problem, but
it refers to bodies. Similarly, the question whether Pythagorean
theorem is true or false, is not a problem of geometry: it does not
refer to geometrical figures with which the theorem deals but to
the theorem itself which is by no means a geometrical figure. A
true or false answer to this problem is not a geometrical proposi-
tion - 'the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of squares
of the other two sides of the right-angled triangle' (Pythagorean

theorem) or 'the square of the hypotenuse is not equal to the sum
of the squares of the other two sides'~ but a logical proposition -
'Pythagorean theorem is true' or 'Pythagorean theorem is false'.
To the mentioned geometrical propositions corresponds the prob-
lem of geometry 'is the square of the hypotenuse equal to the sum
of the ~quares on the other two sides of a right-angled triangle?'.
" a problem of geometry because it does not refer to the
It is not
Pythagorean theorem itself, as in the case of the above logical
problem, but to the square on the hypotenuse with which the
theorem deals. As this analysis shows the definition of the word
'logic' formulated above does not imply that all science should
become logic. A logical proposition is not every proposition but
only such a proposition about a proposition or propositions which
asserts that the latter proposition (or propositions) is true or false.
To every true proposition of the type 'A is B' corresponds a true
logical proposition of the type 'the proposition 'A is B' is true'. In
some cases, the propositions of the type 'A is B' are not logical,
e.g., the proposition 'all bodies are heavy', which is a physical
proposition. In other cases, the propositions of the type 'A is B'
are logical, e.g., the proposition 'the proposition 'all bodies are
heavy' is true'. To the latter proposition as well as to any other
true one corresponds a logical proposition of the type 'the propo-
sition 'A is B' is true'. Such a proposition is the following one -
'the proposition 'the proposition 'all bodies are heavy' is true' is
true', etc.
Remark 4. Among logical propositions as well as among other
propositions it is possible to distinguish singular and general
propositions. As examples of the former take the propositions:
'the Pythagorean theorem is true', 'the proposition 'Paris is in
the Principality of Monaco' is false', As examples of general logi-
cal propositions take: 'every sentence being the conclusion of the
syllogism of the kind Barbara which contains true premisses - is
true', 'every proposition having a denoting subject and a connot-

ing predicate is true if its contradictory is false', 10 'every negative
existential proposition is false', 11 'every contradictory proposi-
tion is false'. Out of the infinite domain of logical propositions,
different scholars constructing 'general' systems of logic or logi-
cal monogr~phs choose certain propositions - in accordance with
their 'theor~tical' or 'practical' predilections. These predilections
can be very different. Some choose such logical propositions which
can help to solve scientific problems. Others employ propositions
which satisfy the desire, characteristic of certain minds, to con-
template the ingenious forms of proof constructions. Others again
while doing logic choose the most general of all logical proposi-
tions, pertaining to certain groups of propositions - irrespective
of their particular meanings ('formal' logic), etc., etc. If a scholar
constructing a 'system' of logic selects logical propositions in such
a way that his predilections are satisfied, it does not mean of
course that propositions not included in his system are not propo-
sitions of logic. For example, the proposition 'the proposition 'the
Pythagorean theorem is true' is true' is obviously a proposition
of logic according to the definitions given above. The proposition
which asserts that the proposition italicized is true also belongs
to logic. If, despite this neither of these propositions found a
place in a monograph or 'system' of logic, then this fact, apart
from other reasons, can be explained by reference to a predilec-
tion characteristic of the majority of scholars ... they want to be
read.
§ 2. In Section 1 I established that some of the propositions
called 'the principle of the excluded middle' are metaphysical (on-
tological) while others are logical. In the present study I shall deal
only with the propositions of the latter type.
10
Cf. 'P.C', p. 217.
11 Cf. St. Lesniewski, 'A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propo-
sitions', Przeglqd Filozoficzny (1911) vol. III, p. 340. Henceforth referred to
as 'E.P.'.
By the term 'the logical principle of the excluded middle' I

mean the proposition 'at least one of the two contradictory propo-
sitions must be true'. My analysis of this proposition can be
also applied, mutatis mutandis, to some other logical propositions
called 'the logical principle of the excluded middle'.
I:o. drder to prove that the logical principle of the excluded
middl; is invalid, I shall produce examples of a few types of con-
tradictory propositions where neither (of the pair*) is true.
§ 3. I have more than once pointed out that a system of

linguistic symbols, just as any other system of symbols, e.g., the
system of railway signals, requires the existence of certain rules
for constructing the symbols and keys for reading them. I have
repeatedly stressed that the functions of various complex linguis-
tic structures, e.g., those of propositions, should depend, in a
correctly constructe.:~ precise language, upon the functions or the
order of particular words - on the basis of certain patterns deter-
mined by general normative conventions the knowledge of which
permits the correct symbolization of an object in a given language
or the decoding of a symbol for a given language. Taking into ac-
count the need so specified for a precise language, I established, in
IQY preyious papers, various linguistic conventions indicating on
what rules the system of linguistic symbols is based and how to
understand statements about some constructions which I used in
analysis. 12 It was the purpose of one of these conventions to de-
termine what a proposition can represent. This convention reads
as follows: the proposition can represent only the possession by
the object represented by the subject of the proposition, of the
* Translator's addition.
12 Cf. 'E.P.', pp. 342, 343 and 'P.C.', pp. 204, 205, 207, 208, 216, 217.
Principle of the Excluded ]\!fiddle 57
properties connoted 13 by its predicate. 14 In establishing this con-

vention, I aimed to obtain uniformity for the relation between the
symbolic function of a proposition and certain words which con-
stitute this proposition. If this relation were not uniform for all
propositions, the language would become a deceptive instrument
of reasoning. "We would not, then, have any criterion to decide
if and what .a proposition represents because - without any gen-
eral rule determining the representation of objects in propositions
- the function of any proposition could be related to the sepa-
rate words in various and different ways related to the habits and
moods of the speaker and the listener.
From this convention concerning the representative function
of propositions, follow general theses which can be regarded as
the statement of two 'formal' truth-conditions vvith respect to any
propositions. These are the following two statements: (1) a true
proposition always possesses a subject which denotes something;
(2) a true proposition always possesses a predicate that connotes
something. In other words: (1) every proposition whose sub-
ject denotes nothing is a false proposition; (2) every proposition
whose predicate connotes (represents) nothing is a true propo-
sition.15 This means - in view of the definition of the expres-
~sion-'true proposition' - that a proposition whose subject denotes
nothing functions as a symbol, i.e. represents an object. 16 How-
ever when representing an object, this proposition must repre-
sent the possession by the object represented by the subject of
this proposition, of the properties connoted by its predicate. It
is so because, in view of the above convention, no proposition
can represent anything else; if this proposition, however, repre-
sents the possession by the object denoted by the subject of this
13 Cf. 'P.C.', pp. 212, 213.
14 I speak of propositions in the sense of those which are reduced to the
form of categorical propositions with positive copulas and the predicate in
the Nominative case. See 'P.C.', p. 216.
15 Cf. 'P.C.', p. 215.
16 Cf. 'P.C.', p. 212.
proposition, of the properties connoted by its predicate, then the

subject of the proposition denotes something; if it did not denote
anything, then no object would be denoted by this subject, and
therefore, no object would be the possession by the object denoted
by the subject, of the properties connoted by its predicate, and
therefo.re,~ no object would be such an object which is symbol-
ized by. the given proposition, and therefore, the given proposi-
tion would symbolize nothing, which contradicts the assumption
about this proposition functioning as a symbol. Thus, from the
assumption that a proposition whose subject denotes nothing is
a true proposition, we derived the conclusion that the subject
of this proposition denotes something, i.e. a conclusion which
contradicts the assumption; the assumption is, therefore, false.
Thus, the following proposition must be true: every proposition
whose subject denotes nothing is a false one. 17 It follows that
every true proposition possesses a subject which denotes some-
thing. For if a true proposition happened to possess a subject
which denoted nothing, then, as the above shows, it must have
been a false proposition. (2) Let us assume that a proposition
whose predicate connotes nothing is a true proposition, in other
words, functions as a symbol, in other words, represents an object.
· When ·representing an object, this proposition, as we have seen
above, must represent the possession by the object represented by
the subject of this proposition, of the properties connoted by its
predicate. If this proposition, however, represents the possession
by the object denoted by the subject of this proposition, of the
properties connoted by its predicate, then the predicate of the
proposition connotes something; if this predicate did not connote
anything, then no property would be connoted by this predicate,
and therefore no object would possess the properties connoted by
the predicate, and therefore, no object would be the possession by
the object represented by the subject, of the properties connoted
17 Cf. 'P.C.', Convention II, Section 16, pp. 216, 217.

by the predicate and therefore, no object would be the object sym-

bolized by the given proposition and therefore, the given propo-
sition would represent nothing, which contradicts the assumption
that this proposition functions as a symbol. Thus, from the as-
sumption that a proposition whose predicate connotes nothing,
we derived ~h~ conclusion that the predicate of this proposition
connotes something, i.e. the conclusion which contradicts the as-
•
sumption. The assumption is, therefore, false. Thus, the following
proposition must be true: every proposition whose predicate con-
notes nothing is a false proposition. Hence it follows that every
true proposition possesses a predicate which connotes something.
If an allegedly true proposition happened to possess a predicate
which connoted nothing, then, as the above shows, it must have
been a false proposition.
The theses which I have established in this section will be
employed in relation to the main problem of this study - in the
following sections.
§ 4. Let us suppose that I am to answer the question whether
the following propositions are true: 'every centaur has a tail',
'a certain centaur does not have a tail', 'every square circle is a
circ!e', 'a certain square circle is not a circle'. If we take into
account the above analysis, the answer to this question becomes
quite easy. Each of the four mentioned propositions is obviously
false because the subject of each denotes nothing. The word 'cen-
taur' which is the subject in the first two propositions, and the
expression 'square circle' being the subject in the remaining two
- denote nothing because no object is a centaur and no object is
a square circle. Thus, no object is such that it could be denoted
only by the word 'centaur' or by the expression 'square circle'.
These expressions denote no objects, that is to say - they denote
nothing.
Remark 1. The points raised in Sections 3 and 4 throw some
light on the 'problem' of negative propositions. They demonstrate
the falsehood of the theory of negative propositions, developed in
considerable detail by Sigwart in his Logic and defended by some

other modern logicians. According to this theory - the negative
proposition 'A is not B' is equivalent to the affirmative proposi-
tion 'the proposition 'A is B' is false'" The proposition 'A is not
B' is, then, not the proposition referring to the object A itself, but
the one .. referring to the proposition 'A is B' which refers to the
objectfl A. 18 I believe that the falsehood of Sigwart's theory can
be demonstrated in the following way: if any two propositions are
synonymous, they must be either both true or both false. If one of
the two propositions is true and the other is false, then this is the
best evidence of their not being synonymous. 19 The proposition
of the type 'the proposition 'A is B' is false' can be synonymous
with the proposition of the type 'A is not B' only when it is not
the case that a proposition of one type is false while the respective
proposition of the other is true. I shall attempt to show that such
cases can occur. Given the propositions 'the centaur has no tail',
'a square circle is not a circle' (propositions of the type 'A is not
B'), then the respective propositions of the type 'A is B' are: 'the
centaur has a tail', 'a square circle is a circle', and the respective
propositions of the type 'the proposition 'A is B' is false' are 'the
proposition 'the centaur has a tail' is false' and 'the proposition
'the square circle is a circle' is false'. The propositions of the type
'A is not B', i.e. 'the centaur has no tail' and 'a square circle is
not a circle' - are in this case false because, as we have seen, they
have subjects which denote nothing ('centaur' and 'square circle').
For the same reason, the respective propositions of the type 'A is
B' i.e. 'the centaur has a tail', 'a square circle is a circle' - are
also false. If, however, the last two propositions are false, then
the propositions stating their falsehood must be true. Thus, the
following propositions must be true: 'the proposition 'the centaur
18 Cf. Dr. Christoph Sigwart, Logic, vol. I, Ti.ibingen 1911, 4th ed., p. 164
seq. I sketched my own 'theory' of negative propositions.in Note III of Sec-
tion 2 of the study 'P.C.' (pp. 204, 205).
19 'P.C. ', pp 203, 204.
has a tail' is false' and 'the proposition 'a square circle is a circle'
is false'. The last two propositions belong to the type 'the propo-
sition 'A is B' is false'. Thus, the propositions of the type 'A is
not B', i.e. 'the centaur has no tail' and 'a square circle is not a
circle', are false while the respective propositions of the type 'the
proposition 'A f'is B' is false', i.e. 'the proposition 'the centaur
has a tail' is ·false' and 'the proposition 'a square circle is a circle'
" propositions. We have, however, seen that there
is false', are true
are such cases when the proposition of the type 'A is not B' is
false while the proposition of the type 'the proposition 'A is B' is
false' is true; therefore, Sigwart's thesis that the propositions - 'A
is not B' and 'the proposition 'A is B' is false' - are synonymous
cannot be correct. In other words, the theory which maintains
that negative propositions are propositions stating the falseness
of the respective affirmative propositions is false.
Remark 2. In modern logic there is a widespread conviction
that all analytic propositions are true. 20 Those who advocate such
a privileged position of analytic propositions in science claim that
the principle of contradiction would be in jeopardy if any proposi-
tion could be false in spite of its being analytic. The discussion in
Sections 3 and 4 indicates that some analytic propositions might
be true, while others might be false. Thus, e.g., the proposi-
0
. tions 'a contradictory object is contradictory' and 'a square circle

is a circle' are analytic because their predicates - 'contradictory'
and 'a circle' - do not connote the properties which are not con-
noted by their subjects - 'a contradictory object' and 'a square
circle'. 21 Nevertheless both propositions are false because their
subjects - 'a contradictory object' 22 and 'a square circle' - denote
2
° Cf. for example A. Wiedenski (Professor at the University of Petersburg),
Logic as a Part of the Theory of Knowledge, 1912, 2nd ed., p. 97.
21 Cf. 'E.P.', pp. 330, 331, 334-336.
22
Cf. 'P.C.'. This study is devoted to the proof of the fact that no object
is contradictory object.
nothing. On the other hand, the analytic propositions 'every non-

contradictory object is non-contradictory' and 'every green object
is green' are true because their contradictory counterparts - 'a
certain non-contradictory object is contradictory' and 'a certain
green object is not green' - are contradictions23 ergo false, and
the subjects of the propositions in question, i.e. the expressions
'a non-cW>ntradictory object' and 'a green object' function as sym-
bols (the former denotes all non-contradictory objects, i.e. all
objects in general, the latter - all green objects. 24 Thus, those
scholars who hold that all analytic propositions are necessarily
true propositions are in error.
Remark 3. The solution of Meinong 's 'paradox'. 25 Some mod-
ern scholars, e.g., Husserl, Lukasiewicz, Meinong, claim that cer-
tain objects are 'contradictory' and contend that it is possible to
investigate the properties of those objects. In my article 'An At-
tempt to Prove the Ontological Principle of Contradiction' I tried
to demonstrate that no object is contradictory. Hence the range
of objects with which we can deal does not contain any of the so-
called 'contradictory objects'. In this remark I intend to analyse
Meinong's reasoning which, as this scholar supposes, makes the
ac~eptance of 'contradictory' objects necessary. This reasoning
can be formulated as follows: if it were true that there are no 'con-
tradictory objects', in other words, no objects are contradictory,
then it would be true that 'a contradictory object is not an ob-
ject'. It can be, however, true that 'a contradictory object' is not
an object only in the case when a certain object is 'contradictory'.
If no object were 'contradictory', then no proposition about the
'contradictory object' could be true, including the proposition 'a
23
Cf. 'P.C.'. Convention III, Section 16, p. 217.
24 Cf. 'P.C.'. Convention II, Section 16, pp. 216, 217.
25 Cf. the formulation of this 'paradox' in Leon Chwistek's study Zasada
sprzecznosci w swietle nowszych badan Bertranda Russella, Krakow 1912,
p. 16.
contradictory object is not an object'. Thus, if it were true 'a con-

tradictory object' is not an object, then it must be also true that
a certain object is contradictory. This being so, the assumption
made at the beginning that no object is 'contradictory' entails the
conclusion that a certain object is 'contradictory'. If, on the other
hand, the a~sumption that no object is 'contradictory' is false,
then it is true,, that a certain object is 'contradictory'. Thus, both
the assumption that a certain object is 'contradictory' and the as-
sumption that no object is 'contradictory' entails the conclusion
that a certain object is contradictory. In either, the acceptance
of 'contradictory objects' becomes logically inevitable. 26 The so-
lution of this 'paradox' becomes quite simple if one takes into
account the discussion in Sections 3 and 4. Here is the solution:
if it is true that no object is 'contradictory', then the proposition
'a contradictory object is not an object' cannot be true contrary
to Meinong's opinion. This proposition cannot be true because
its subject 'contradictory object' denotes nothing if no object is a
contradictory object (the expression 'contradictory object' could
after all denote only an object which was contradictory). Since
the proposition 'a contradictory object is not an object' is false,
[
it is not necessary to accept the proposition 'a certain object is
~~····· contradictory' as true, it would have to be considered true if the
proposition 'a contradictory object is not an object' were true.
I Thus, contrary to Meinong, the assumption that no object is a
contradictory object does not entail the conclusion that a certain
object is contradictory. There is not, then, any logical necessity
such as Meinong envisages leading to the acceptance of 'contra-
dictory objects'.
26 Cf. A. Meinong, Uber die Ste/lung der Gegenstandstheorie in System der

Wissenschaften, Leipzig 1907, p. 17. I tried to present Meinong's reason-
ing in more developed and more general form; therefore, I do not speak of
'square circles' but, generally, of 'contradictory objects'. See also A. Meinong,
Uber Annahmen, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1910, p. 228 and Lukasiewicz, l.c., pp. 118,
119.
Remark 4. In Remarks 1, 2 and 3 I kept saying that vari-

ous connoting expressions which constitute the subjects of vari-
ous propositions denote nothing. Thus, the question might arise
whether I possess a criterion enabling me to decide whether a
given expression has a symbolic function, and what this criterion
is. If) did not have any criterion, then all I said in this matter
would be 'up in the air'. As we saw in Section 3, a certain nor-
•
mative convention formulated there, was used to decide whether
a proposition has a symbolic function, and what is represented by
this proposition. Similarly, I would have a criterion for deciding
the question whether and what is represented by a given connoting
expression, only if I were to have an appropriate conventionally-
normative schema. In my system of linguistic symbols I accepted
the following convention as a normative schema: the connoting ex-
pression 'W' represents any object possessing the properties con-
noted by the expression 'W' - with the exception of the expres-
sion 'W' itself together with those expressions which have at least
one element in common with the expression 'W'. When applied to
different connoting expressions, this convention produces different
results: (1) The expression 'man' denotes every object possessing
the properties connoted by the word 'man'. Thus, the expres-
sion 'man' denotes every man without exception (the exceptions
mentioned in the convention cannot be applied here because no
man is either the word 'man' or a linguistic expression which has
an element common with the word 'man'). (2) The English ex-
pression 'Polish expression' written in my manuscript in a certain
passage Mi denotes all objects possessing the properties connoted
by the English expression 'Polish expression', i.e. it denotes all
Polish expressions - except the English expression 'Polish expres-
sion' itself written in the passage Mi and except such expressions
which have some common element with the English expression
'Polish expression' written in the passage Mi. The English ex-
pression 'Polish expression' written in the passage Mi does not,
then, denote e.g., this English expression 'the expression 'Pol-
ish expression' '(this very one numerically) of which the English
expression 'Polish expression' written in the passage Mi is an

element. Neither does the English expression 'Polish expression'
written in the passage Mi denote this expression 'expression' (this
very one numerically) which is an element of the expression 'Pol-
ish expression' written in the passage Mi. I stress explicitly that
in saying 't:Q.is*expression', 'the same expression' I have always in
mind this eJ\J_:)ression numerically) the same one numerically. The
expression 'Polish expression' written in the passage M2 is not,
therefore, the same expression 'Polish expression' which is written
in the passage A11. As we have seen above, the expression 'Polish
expression' written in the passage Mi does not represent this par-
ticular expression 'Polish expression' which is written in the pas-
sage M1. It does however represent such expressions 'Polish ex-
pression' which are written in the passages M2,M3, ... ,Mn (dif-
ferent from lvfi). A similar situation exists with respect to such
expressions which have some common elements with the expres-
sion 'Polish expression' written in the passage M2, M3, ... , Mn.
The expression 'Polish expression' written in the passage Mi can
represent all those expressions. 27
Remark 5. One might have the impression that the discussion
in Remark 4 concerning the problem whether and what any ex-
pression 'W' represents contradicts the definii{ion of the expression
'W'. It is possible to develop the following line of reasoning: If the
definition of the expression 'W' is taken to be the proposition of
the type 'I employ the word 'W' to denote the objects which pos-
sess the properties ci, c2, c3, ... , en' (and it is this form that defi-
nitions in my articles have), then the definition of the expression
'W' is contradicted by every convention which implies that the
expression 'TV'does not denote an object possessing the properties
27 The theses developed in this remark, which imply that no connoting
expression can stand in a representing relation with itself - are, I think,
in accordance with the theoretical views of those scholars who reject the
so-called 'one element' relations (e.g. prof. K. Twardowski). The logical sig-
nificance of the discussion contained in this remark will be disclosed in one
of the subsequent sections, dealing with Epimenides' paradox.
ci, c2, c3, ... , Cn indicated in the definition of the expression 'W'.
Thus, the definition of the expression 'W' is contradicted by the
convention which I accepted in Remark 4 and which states that
the connoting expression 'W' does not represent every object pos-
sessing the properties ci, c2, c3, ... , en indicated in the definition,
but only~ such an object which is neither this particular (numer-
ically identical)
11
expression 'W' nor any expression possessing an
element common with this particular expression 'W'. Example: If
the definition of the expression 'biverbal expression' is understood
as the proposition 'I employ the expression 'bi verbal expression' to
denote expressions consisting of two words', then the definition of
the expression 'biverbal expression' is contradicted by any conven-
tion which implies that the expression 'biverbal expression' does
not denote a given expression consisting of two words. Thus, the
definition of the expression 'biverbal expression' is contradicted
by the convention accepted in Remark 2 because this conven-
tion implies that the expression 'biverbal expression' written in
a passage M does not denote this particular expression 'biverbal
expression' written in passage lvf, in spite of the fact that the last
expression consists of two words and is, therefore, a biverbal ex-
pression. Were it really the case that the convention of Remark 4
contradicts the definition of an expression, my reasoning, based
on this convention, would be totally worthless as containing a con-
tradiction. In fact, the matter does not look so sad. If, in order
to define an expression 'vV', I use the proposition of the type: 'I
employ the expression 'W' to denote objects possessing the prop-
erties c1, c2, c3, ... , en' I do so only for the sake of brevity which,
in most cases, does not lead to undesirable results. If, in defining
'
ii
' the expression 'lV', I did not use the shortened form, I would ern-
!I,. ploy the proposition 'I employ the expression 'W' in such a way
that if it denotes anything at all, it denotes only those objects
which possess the properties ci, c2, c3, ... , Cn '. It is the last sen-
tence that I regard as the definition of the expression 'W'. Thus,
the definition of the expression does not by any means postulate
that the expression 'W' denotes all objects possessing the prop-
erties c1, c2, c3, ... , en, but it only indicates that the expression
'W' does not denote any object which does not possess the set of
properties ci, c2, c3, ... , en. The definition of the expression 'W'
does not, therefore, contradict the convention used in Remark 4
which deter:mines which of the objects that, on the basis of the
definition, t~e expression 'W' should represent, are, in fact, rep-
resented by this expression. Thus, the definition of the expression
'biverba.l expression' does not contradict the convention stated in
Remark 4, which implies that the expression 'biverbal expression'
does not denote every expression consisting of two words. The
definition of the expression 'biverbal expression', i.e. the propo-
sition 'I employ the expression 'biverbal expression' in such a way
that if it denotes anything at all, it denotes only the expressions
consisting of two words' - indicates that the expression 'biverbal
expression' does not denote such objects which are not expres-
sions consisting of two words. On the other hand, the convention
stated in Remark 4 shows which of the expressions consisting of
two words a.re, in fact, represented by the expression 'biverbal
expression'.
§ 5. L~t us suppose that I am to answer the question whether
the following propositions are true: 'man exists', 'man is an ob-
ject'. If I take into account the discussion in Section 3, the an-
swer to this question turns out to be easy. Each of the mentioned
propositions is obviously false because the predicates of the propo-
sitions 'man is being' (instead of 'man exists') 28 and 'man is an
object' connote nothing. 29 For the same reasons, false are also
all propositions of the type 'A exists' and 'A is an object', i.e.
all positive existential propositions. 30 I have proved elsewhere 31
that all negative existential propositions are also false. From the
28 Cf. 'E.P. ' Remark 1 in Section 3, p. 332.
1
29 Ibid., also cf. 'P.C. ',pp. 208, 214.
3 o Cf. 'E.P.', pp. 329, 332.
31 'E.P. ', pp. 338-340.
conjunction of these two theses, I derive the conclusion that all

existential propositions are false.
Remark 1. Since the times of Artistotle logicians have highly
esteemed the so-called principles of conversion. These principles
as well as many other logical principles have not so far been
proved and therefore, it is quite likely that a more thorough analy-
sis caD<demonstrate their lack of validity. This is the destiny of all
unproved principles in the course of the development of science.
The theses established in this section will throw some light on the
theoretical value of the conversion principles so tenderly admired
by logicians. The present remark aims to prove that all principles
of conversion as handed down by the tradition are invalid. If one
wants to demonstrate the falsehood of a general thesis, it suffices
to point to at least one case in which something contradicts what
is stated in this thesis. It is this method that I shall use to prove
the invalidity of the principles of conversion. So far, three types
of conversion are accepted in logic: (1) simple conversion (con-
versio simplex), (2) conversion 'per accidens', and (3) conversion
by contraposition 32 (some authors do not regard what I called
'conversion by contraposition' proper conversion and, therefore,
they do not refer to it as conversion by contraposition but as con-
traposition;33 this distinction is of no importance for the present
discussion).
I. The principle of si1nple conversion refers to two kinds of
propositions - particular-affirmative and universal-negative. This
principle can be formulated as follows: (A) (with respect to
particular-affirmative propositions) if a proposition of the type
'some A is B' is true, then the proposition of the type 'some B
is A' is also true. (B) (with respect to universal-negative propo-
sitions) if a proposition of the type 'no A is B' is true, then the
32
Cf. e.g., John Stuart Mill, System der deductiven und inductiven Logic,
translated by Gomperz, 2nd German edition, vol. I, Leipzig 1884, pp. 184,
185.
33
Cf. e.g., Sigwart, l. c., p. 458.
proposition of the type 'no B is A' is also true. Let us substi-

tute, in the propositions 'some A is B' and 'no A is B', for the
word 'A' the word 'object' (we may do so since the principle of
conversion should be valid for all propositions of the mentioned
types). We obtain the propositions 'some object is B' and 'no
object is B'~ tet us now transform these propositions according
to the principle of simple conversion. We obtain: 'some B is an
object' and 'no B is an object'. As we have seen above, these
propositions can never be true - irrespective of the meaning of
the word 'B'. Yet, the proposition 'some object is B' is true if,
for example, the word 'B' is replaced by the word 'man', and the
proposition 'no object is B' is true if, for example, the word 'B' is
replaced by the expression 'square circle'. Thus, there are certain
cases where the propositions of the types 'some A is B' and 'no A
is B' are true whereas the respective converted propositions are
false, i.e. the propositions of the types 'some B is A' and 'no B
is A'. The principle of simple conversion is1 therefore, invalid.
One might suppose that this principle is jeopardized only when I
substitute the word 'object' for the word 'B' and, thereby, obtain
after conversion existential propositions. One might think that in
all other cases the principle of simple conversion remains valid.
Such a hypothesis is, however, erroneous. If, in the proposition
'no A is B', I replace the word 'A' by the word 'man', and the
word 'B' by the expression 'perpetuum mobile', I obtain a true
proposition 'no man is a perpetuum mobile'. If I, then, convert
this proposition, I shall obtain a false proposition 'no perpetuum
mobile is a man'. This proposition is false because its object 'per-
petuum mobile' denotes nothing; no object is a perpetuum mobile.
Thus, the principle of simple conversion has been, again, shown
to be invalid.
II. The principle of conversion 'per accidens' refers to
universal-negative propositions. It can be formulated as follows:
if a proposition of the type 'all A is B' is true, then the proposi-
tion 'some B is A' is also true. Let us substitute, in the propo-
sition 'all A is B', for the word 'A' the word 'object' and for the
word 'B' the expression 'non-contradictory object'. We obtain

true proposition 'all objects are non-contradictory objects'. If we
convert this proposition, we shall obtain the proposition 'some
non-contradictory object is an object', which, as we have seen
above, is false. Thus, the principle of conversion 'per accidens' is
•
also invalid.
III. *!'he principle of conversion by contraposition refers
to three kinds of propositions: universal-affirmative, universal-
negative, and particular-negative. The principle of conversion by
contraposition can be formulated in the following form: (A) (for
universal-affirmative propositions) if the proposition of the type
'all A is B' is true, then the proposition of the type 'no not-B
is A' is also true. (B) (for universal-negative propositions) if the
proposition of the type 'no A is B' is true, then the proposition
of the type 'some not-B is A' is also true. (C) (for particular-
negative propositions) if the proposition of the type 'some A is
not B' is true, then the proposition 'some not-B is A' is also
true. - Let us substitute for the word 'A' the word 'object' in the
propositions 'all A is B', 'no A is B' and 'some A is not B'. Let
us substitute for the word 'B' the expression 'non-contradictory
object' in the first proposition, and the expression 'contradictory
object' in the remaining two propositions. We obtain three true
propositions: 'every object is a not-contradictory object', 'no ob-
ject is a contradictory object', 'some object is not-a contradictory
object'. Let us convert (contrapose) those propositions. We ob-
tain the propositions: 'no object which is not a not-contradictory
object is an object', 'some object which is not a contradictory ob-
ject is an object', 'a certain object which is not a contradictory
object is an object'. As we know from the above discussion, all
those propositions are false (moreover, the first one is also false
because its subject denotes nothing; no object is an object which
is not non-contradictory). Thus, the principle of conversion by
contraposition is also invalid.
Remark 2. The considerations included in this section can

be also applied to the theory of syllogism. They indicate that
out of nineteen syllogisms considered to be correct, only sixteen
can be preserved since three of them are invalid. They are: Bra-
malip, Camenes, and Dimatis. Proof: the patterns of Bramalip,
Ca men es, a!1d• Dim atis are following:
Bramalip 11 Camenes Dimatis
All C is B, All C is B, Some C is B,
All Bis A, No Bis A, All Bis A,
Some A is C. No A is C. Some A is C.
Let us substitute for the word 'C' in Bramalip and Dima-

tis, the word 'object', for the word 'B' the expression 'non-
contradictory object', and for the word 'A' the expression 'an
object which is not a square circle'. We obtain the patterns:
Bramalip-Dimatis
34
Some } object is a non-contradictory object,
All35
All non-contradictory objects are objects which are not square
circles,
and_ thus,
Some object which is not a square circle is an object.
Let us substitute for the word 'C' in Camenes the word 'ob-
ject', for the word 'B' the expression 'non-contradictory object',
and for the word 'A' the expression 'square circle'. We shall ob-
tain:
Camenes.
All object is a non-contradictory object,
No non-contradictory object is a square circle,
and thus,
No square circle is an object.
34 For Dimatis.
35 For Bramalip.
Each of the premisses in each of the mentioned syllogisms is

true whereas the conclusions of these syllogisms are false because
they are of the types: 'A is an object' or 'A is not an object'.
(Moreover, the conclusion of Camenes is false also because its
subject 'square circle' does not function as a symbol.) It follows
that the•syllogisms Bramalip, Camenes, and Dimatis are false
because in some cases conclusions derived by means of those syl-
•
logisms from true premisses are invalid.
Remark 3. The method used to prove that Bramalip,
Camenes, and Dimatis are invalid consisted in the substitution
for the word 'C' (major term) in the major premiss (and as we
know, it is only in the major premiss that the term 'C' can occur)
of the word 'object'. With this substitution, the conclusion of the
syllogism resulted in an existential proposition and thus, a false
one. One might, therefore, think that it is enough to replace the
word 'C' by the word 'object' in each syllogism to obtain either
a positive or a negative existential proposition in the conclusion
of such syllogism and, thus, to expose the invalidity of each syl-
logism. This is, however, entirely erroneous: the substitution of
the word 'object' for the word 'C' in the patterns of Bramalip,
Camenes, and Dimatis resulted in the demonstration of the in-
validity of those syllogisms because, as we have seen above, it
produced a situation in which each of the two premisses in the
syllogisms Bramalip, Camenes, and Dimatis was true whereas
the conclusions of those syllogisms were invalid. Such a situation
cannot arise in other syllogisms which are considered valid: if, in
those syllogisms, we substitute for the major term 'C' the word
'object', then both premisses of the syllogism cannot be true at the
same time. I shall try to show this with respect to the remaining
sixteen valid syllogisms.
(A) The syllogisms Barbara, Celarent, Barii, Ferio, Darapti,
Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bocardo, Ferison, i.e. all syllogisms
of the first and third figures, have the major term 'C' in the pred-
icate of the major premiss. If for the word 'C' we substitute the
word 'object', then the major premiss will have the form of an
existential proposition and, thus, will be false.
(B) The syllogisms Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, i.e.
all syllogisms of the second figure, have the major term 'C' in the
subject of the major premiss. This premiss in all four syllogisms
is a universal :proposition whose quality is reverse to the quality
of the minor premiss. If we substitute the word 'object' for the
word 'C', th~n, in view of the identity of the predicates in both
propositions, the major premiss will contradict the minor premiss
because the latter will assert about objects A what is negated
with respect to each object by the major premiss, or, conversely,
the minor premiss will deny objects A such properties which are
granted to each by the major premiss. Therefore, both premisses
could not be true at the same time.
( C) In the kinds Fesapo and Fresison the major premiss is
the proposition 'no C is B'. If for the word 'C' we substitute
the word 'object', we obtain the proposition 'no object is B'. If
this proposition is true, then the word 'B' does not function as a
symbol and, thus, the minor premisses of both syllogisms in which
the word 'B' is a subject become false. 36
This discussion indicates that by means of the substitution
ofthe ~word 'object' for the word 'C' one cannot demonstrate the
invalidity of any of the remaining sixteen kinds of syllogisms.
§ 6. We have noticed in Section 4 that two contradictory
propositions, e.g., 'each square is a circle' and 'a certain square
circle is not a circle' or 'every centaur has a tail' and 'a certain
centaur has no tail' - can be both false if their subjects do not
function as symbols. Besides, the discussion in Section 5 shows
that two contradictory propositions, e.g., 'every man exists' and
'a certain man does not exist' or 'every man is an object' and 'a
36 The reasoning in the part (C) is not my own but has been provided by a
friend of mine, Karol Frenkel - a student of the Lvov University. He wanted
to find out what consequences for syllogisms can be inferred from my theory
of existential propositions.
certain man is not an object' - can be both false since they are
both existential. The logical principle of the excluded middle as-
serts that at least one of the two contradictory propositions has
to be true. Since I have shown in several cases that both propo-
sitions in a pair of mutually contradictory ones are false, I expect
also that the logical principle of the excluded middle is invalid.
·-
Rf#mark. The 'solution' of the paradox of Nelson and
Grelling 's. 37 This section points out that we have no reason to
'worry' if a given reasoning conflicts with the logical principle of
the excluded middle. As we have said, it is false, and, therefore
we should not be concerned with the question whether this prin-
ciple is observed in this or that reasoning. Logical 'paradoxes'
which arise contravention of the principle of the excluded mid-
dle do not need any 'solution' because, as I have already said,
the conflict between a certain reasoning and this principle by no
means creates any logical 'danger'. It is the Nelson and Grelling's
'paradox' that exemplifies 'paradoxes' which, contravening the
logical principle of the excluded middle, cause som.e logicians a
lot of trouble. This 'paradox' results from the desire to answer
the question whether a man who kills all non-suicides and does
not kill any suicide kills himself. What is supposed to be 'para-
doxical' is the fact that both affirmative and negative answers to
this question must be false: (1) The proposition 'the man who
kills all non-suicides and does not kill any suicide kills himself'
is false because it entails a contradiction: if somebody kills him-
self, he is a suicide, and thus, killing himself, he kills a suicide,
it follows that the man who does not kill any suicides kills a sui-
cide, namely himself. (2) The proposition 'the man who kills all
non-suicides and does not kill any suicide does not kill himself'
is false because it entails the contradiction: if somebody does not
37 Nelson and Grelling, 'Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxien von Russell und

Burali Forti'. The article has been published in Abhandlungen der Friesschen
Schule (I do not remember the number of the volume). Cf. the formulation
of Nelson and Grelling's 'paradox' in Chwistek, l.c., p. 12.
Principle of the Excluded Jl.!fiddle 75
kill himself, he is not a suicide, and thus, not killing himself, he

does not kill a certain non-suicide. Hence the man who kills all
non-suicides does not kill all non-suicides because he does not kill
himself.
This 'paradox' has the following logical 'solution': no object
is a man who kills all non-suicides and does not kill any suicide.
If a certain ~bject
,. were such a man, then it would be a contra.die-
tory object because he would both kill and not kill himself. He
would kill himself because if he did not, he would be a non-suicide
and, not killing himself, he would not kill a certain non-suicide,
which contradicts the assumption that he kills all non-suicides.
He would not kill himself because if he did, he would be a suicide
and, killing himself, he would kill a certain suicide, which contra-
dicts the assumption that he does not kill any suicide. Since no
object is the man who kills all non-suicides and does not kill any
suicide, no object is the object which alone can be represented by
the expression 'the man who kills all non-suicides and does not kill
any suicide'. Thus this expression does not represent any object,
in other words, it does not function as a symbol. As this expres-
sion does not function as a symbol, all propositions in which it
occurs as a subject are false. This accounts for the falsehood of
both-answers (affirmative and negative) to the problem formu-
lated by Nelson and Grelling. This involves no contradiction, just
as there is no contradiction in the fact that neither of the two
propositions: 'a square circle is a circle' and 'a square circle is not
a circle' - is a true proposition.
§ 1. In my article' An Attempt to Prove the Ontological Prin-
ciple of Contradiction' I said that a system of linguistic symbols
used by the scholar must be provided with various 'keys' which
make it possible to decipher linguistic constructions formulated
in accordance with the rules of a given system of linguistic sym-
bols. Various conventions which I have established in my papers
fulfill the function of such keys. All linguistic conventions can be
divided into two groups: (A) conventions which are definitions,
(B) conventions which are not definitions. We have an example

of a convention which is not a definition in the convention dealing
with the symbolic function of pn\)positions, formulated in Sec-
tion 3 of the present study or in the convention dealing with the
symbolic function of connoting expressions, adopted in Remark 4
of Section 4. Further conventions which are not definitions are
e.g., t'hose conventions which refer to the role of the words 'no',
'and', ~or', etc. in language. As I cannot define these words, I
mark their function in language by means of various postulates,
to which should correspond expressions in which these words oc-
cur as their elements. It is in this way fhat I marked the functions
of the word 'not' in the afore-mentioned paper. 38 In view of the
significance which the linguistic functions of this word have for
all my arguments, I shall restate here this convention in a some-
what more general fashion. I employ the word 'not' in a way
satisfying the following conditions: ( 1) every proposition having
a denoting subject and a connoting predicate functions as a sym-
bol if its contradictory does not function as a symbol. (2) No
self-contradictory functions as a symbol. (3) If one of the two
contradictory propositions functions as a symbol, the other does
not. In accordance with the definitions of the expressions: 'true
proposition' and 'false proposition' 39 - the first of the formulated
conventions can be expressed in the following way: every proposi-
tion having a denoting subject and a connoting predicate is true if
the proposition being its contradictory counterpart is false. As I
said elsewhere, 40 this proposition is true because it represents the
state of affairs created by accepting the above convention. It is,
so to speak, the principle of the excluded middle in an abridged
form. Thus, it is not true that of the two contradictory propo-
sitions at least one has to be true (the principle of the excluded
middle). On the other hand, it is true that if one of them is false,
38 Cf. 'P.C.', pp. 216, 217.

39 Cf. 'P.C.', p. 215.
4 o 'P.C.', pp. 217-219.
the other is true, provided it possesses a denoting subject and a
connoting predicate (for the sake of brevity I shall call this the
principle of contradictory propositions).
Remark 1. Solution of the paradox of Epimenides. 41 We have
a number of reasonings constructed at different times by different
people, which ~seem to indicate that not only the principle of the
excluded m\ddle is invalid (about whose lack of validity I have
tried to convince the reader in previous sections), but that the
principle of contrariety and the principle of contradiction, which
I regard as correct principles, are also invalid. The reasonings
which allegedly negate the value of the mentioned principles can
be exemplified by the most subtle of all 'antonomies' known to
me, i.e. the brilliant paradox of Epimenides'. I formulate this
paradox in the form in which, I think, the contradiction becomes
'tangible'. Epimenides asserts at time t1 - t2 the proposition 'the
proposition stated by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false'. That
is the actual datum. The logical task is to answer the question
whether the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t 2 is
true or false. The solution of the problem, as it might be thought,
arises in the following way: Let us assume (1) that the proposition
asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is true. If this proposi-
~ tioh is true, then the proposition asserting this fact is also true,
i.e. the proposition 'the proposition stated by Epimenides at time
t1 - t2 is true'. If the latter proposition is true, then its contradic-
tory, i.e. the proposition 'the proposition stated by Epimenides
at time t1 - t2 is false' is false, ~· e. the proposition asserted by
Epimenides at time t1 - t2. Thus, from the assumption that the
proposition stated by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is true, it follows
that this proposition is false. The assumption is, therefore, false
as it leads to contradiction. Let us assume (2) that the proposition
asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false. If this proposition
is false, the proposition asserting this fact, i.e. the proposition
'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false'
41 The formulation of this paradox can be found in Chwistek, l. c.
is true, which is the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time

t1 - tz. Thus, from the assumption that the proposition asserted
by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false, follows that this propo-
sition is true. The assumption is, therefore, false as it leads to
contradiction. We can see that the proposition 'the proposition
asserted. by Epimenides at time t1 -t2 is true' is false (assumption
(1)) b·ut the proposition contradicting it, i.e. the proposition 'the
propo~ition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false' 42 is
also false (assumption (2)). Since the proposition 'the proposi-
tion asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is true' is false, then
the proposition 'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time
t1 - t2 is true' (I). Since, on the other hand, the proposition 'the
proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 -t2 is false' is false,
then the proposition 'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at
time t1 -t2 is true' is true (II). Given theses (II) and (I), it follows
that the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 -t2 is both
true and false. The falsehood of the two contradictory assump-
tions (1) and (2) having denoting subjects and connoting pred-
icates implies the falsehood of the principle of contrariety. The
validity of the two theses (I) and (II) implies the falsehood of the
principle of contradiction. Thus, this admirable paradox seems
to disprove some most fundamental logical principles. I shall try
to prove that, in spite of its suggestiveness, the paradox does not
violate any of the above mentioned principles of logic. That will
be the solution of the paradox of Epimenides '. Before proceeding
to the analysis of the above reasoning, let us settle the question
whether the subject of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at
time t1 -t2 functions as a symbol. The subject of this proposition,
42 I put an emphasis on the fact that, when speaking of the propositions

in question as contradictory ones, I leave out the words 'every' and 'certain'.
Since there is only one proposition stated by Epimenides in the time t 1 - t 2 ,
the exclusion of those words does not affect the value of my theses. Should
anyone feel offended by this logical 'tactlesseness'' he could easily construct
the reasoning with the propositions which would be contradictory also on
account of the external evidence.
i.e. of the proposition 'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at

time ti - t2 is false', is the expression 'the proposition asserted
by Epimenides at time i1 - t2 '. Let us assume that this expres-
sion functions as a symbol. If so, it represents - on the basis
of the convention referring to the symbolic function of connoting
expressions, fo:rmulated in Remark 4 of Section 4 - every object
connoted by 'this expression, with the exception of itself, and such
expressions ~ith which it has elements in common. Thus, the ex-
pression 'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - tz'
being the subject of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at
time t1 - t2 represents every proposition asserted by Epimenides
at time t1 - t2, which is neither the subject of the proposition
stated by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 nor an expression having an
element common with the subject of the proposition asserted by
Epimenides at time t1 - tz. It follows that a certain object is the
proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2, which does
not have common elements with the subject of the proposition
asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 (if no object were such a
proposition, it would follow that the subject of the proposition
asserted by Epirnenides at time t1 - t2, which can represent only
such propositions, does not function as a symbol). I conclude that
-it-is the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 that
is the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2, which
is an expression which has no common elements with the subject
of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 (if some
other object and not the proposition asserted by Epimenides at
time t1 - t2, were the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time
ti - t2, which does not have common elements with the subject
of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2, then
it would follow that Epimenides asserted, at time t1 - t2, more
than one proposition whereas, in fact, he asserted at that time
only one proposition). Thus, the proposition asserted by Epi-
menides at time t1 - t2 does not have common elements with
the subject of this proposition (A); on the other hand, we know
that, for example, the word 'proposition' which is the first word
of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is also

the first word in the subject of this proposition. It follows that
the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 has an
element in common with the subject of this proposition (B); the
comparison of the theses (A) and (B) shows that the proposition
asserted ,.by Epimenides at time ii - t2 both has and does not
have an element in common with the subject of this proposition.
Thus, the assumption that the subject of the proposition asserted
by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 functions as a symbol - leads to
contradiction. This assumption is, therefore, false. It follows -
on the basis of the principle of contrariety - that the subject of
the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 does not
function as a symbol.
Now I proceed to analyse the paradox. Let us assume, as we
did when formulating the paradox, that the proposition asserted
by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is true. If so, then the subject of
the proposition functions as a symbol (C), which we know from
Section 3. However, we know from the above discussion that the
subject of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2
does not function as a symbol (D). From (C) and (D) follows that
the subject of the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time
t1 -:-- t2 both functions and does not function as a symbol. Thus,
the assumption that the proposition asserted by Epimenides at
time t1 - t2 is true leads to contradiction. This assumption is,
therefore, false. I follows - on the basis of the principle of contra-
riety - that the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2
is not true but false. (I can apply the principle of contrariety
because the subject of the proposition stated by me in 1913, i.e.
the proposition 'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time
t1 -t2 is false' and its subject being the expression 'the proposition
asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2' - represents the propo-
sition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2, which does not
have (numerically) any element in common with any expression
asserted either by me but not by Epimenides in 1913 and not at
time t1 ·- t2, i.e. at tirne contemporary with Epimenides.) Since
the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false,

then the p1oposition asserting this fact is true, i.e. 'the p1oposi-
tion assetied by Epimenides at time t1 -t2 is false' asse1ted by me
in 1913 or at any other time or by anybody at any time whatever,
but not by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 (if this proposition were
asserted by Ep.imenides at time t1 -t2, then, as we know, it would
be false because its subject would not function as a symbol). The
assumption that the p1oposition asse1ted by Epimenides at time
t1 - t2 is false does not, in itself, imply the contradiction involved
in the paradox because the above thesis that the proposition 'the
proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false' is true
does not imply that the very proposition which Epimenides as-
serted at time t1 - t2 is true. The proposition 'the proposition
asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false' is true when it is
not. the very proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2;
its truth does not entail the truth of the proposition asserted by
Epimenides at time t1 - t2 (as is the case with the paradox) but
the truth of the proposition consisting of the same words as in the
proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 which (latter
proposition)* I have shown above to be false. The proposition
'the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false' is
false when it is asserted by Epimenides at time ii - t2, i.e. pre-
cisely when its truth would imply that 'the proposition asserted
by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is true'.
Should anyone hold that, if the proposition asserted by Epi-
menides at time t1 - t2 that 'the proposition asserted by Epi-
menides at time ti - t2 is false' (E) is false, then its synonym 'the
proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is false' (F) as
asserted by anyone at any time is also false - such an argumenta-
tion would not 'restore' the removed contradiction. On the basis
of the definition of the expression 'synonymous propositions', 43
only such propositions can be synonymous which have subjects
* Translator's addition.
43 Cf. 'P.C.', p. 203.
that do not connote different properties and do not denote dif-

ferent objects. This condition is not satisfied by the propositions
(E) and (F). As we know, the subject of the proposition (E) does
not denote any object whereas the subject of the proposition (F)
denotes the proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t 1 - t2. 44
Thus, th~ propositions (E) and (F) are by no means synonymous.
Therefbre, of the two contradictory theses of which one claims
that tlfe proposition asserted by Epimenides at time t1 - t2 is
true and the other - that it is false - only the former leads to the
contradiction and is false. The latter does not lead to contradic-
tion and, as I have demonstrated above, is true. It follows that
the principle of contrariety finally wins out in the crucial test of
the paradox of Epimenides'. Thus, the principle of contradiction
also remains intact.
Remark 2. It is absolutely correct that I solved the paradox of
Epimenides only because I accepted the convention in Remark 4 of
Section 4 and - had I not accepted it, the paradox would not have
been solved. It is also correct to say that the above-mentioned
convention is 'arbitrary' in the sense that it conflicts with 'natural
intuitions' of language. These 'intuitions'' rights are undoubtedly
contravened by the fact that certain connoting expressions are not
supposed to represent all objects which have the properties con-
noted by the given expressions. Such statements, I say, would be
totally justified - they could not, however, depreciate the above
solution. Since, keeping to 'natural intuitions' of language we get
involved in irresolvable paradoxes, these 'intuitions' seem to imply
contradiction. The 'artificial' frame of strict conventions is thus a
far better instrument of reason than the language dissolving in the
opaque contours of 'natural' habits which often imply incurable
contradictions - much as the 'artificially' regulated Panama Canal
is a better waterway than the 'natural' rapids on the Dnieper.
44 Cf. the convention in Remark 4 of Section 4.

§ 8. As we have seen in Section 7, the principle of contrariety

has the form of a conditional. Obviously it is by no means syn-
onymous with the following false thesis which also has the form
of a conditional and is often called the logical principle of the
excluded middle: 'if one of the two contradictory propositions is
false, then the pt her one is true'. 45 The proof of the latter thesis is
completely analogous to that of the proof of the falsehood of the
thesis which•I have analysed, in previous sections, as the 'logical
principle of the excluded middle'. This thesis is shown to be false
when there is at least one case in which both contradictory propo-
sitions are false. 46 In Section 5 we noticed that such cases exist;
they always occur when either both contradictory propositions
have the subjects which do not possess the representing function
or they are existential propositions. Hence it follows that not
only the categorical proposition which I called the logical princi-
ple of the excluded middle is false but also the conditional which
I formulated at the beginning of this section. The value of these
two theses is removed by the same arguments and, therefore, it
is impossible, with for example Kotarbinski, to accept the second
thesis while rejecting the first. 47
Remark 1. Tadeusz Kotarbinski holds that the principle of
the excluded middle in its categorical formulation is false: of the
two contradictory propositions 48 neither is true in all those cases
when neither of them is false. In other words, either of the two
contradictory propositions can be neither true nor false. 49 If at
45 Cf., e.g., dr Tadeusz Kotarbinski 'Zagadnienie istnienia przyszlosci',

Przegl<:td Filozoficzny (1913), vol. I, p. 86.
46 Cf. ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 In the original, references are always made to 'judgements' and not to
'propositions'. In my correction of Kotarbi11.ski and in my polemic, I sub-
stitute the first word for the second one - to unify the terminology. In my
numerous conversations with the distinguished scholar, I became convinced
that this change would not introduce any logical complications.
49
Ibid.
least one of them is not the proposition which is neither true nor
false, then the other is certainly either true or false: (a) If one of
the two contradictory propositions is true, then the other is false
(the logical principle of contradiction according to Kotarbinski. 50
(b) If one of the two contradictory propositions is false, then the
other is. true (the logical principle of the excluded middle in the
conditional form). It is clear that the above theory which accepts
the ld'gical principle of the excluded middle in the conditional
form accepts the possibility of the existence of propositions that
are neither true nor false: 'this odd nature of propositions which
are neither true nor false' 'comes ... as a lawful owner and liber-
ator'; 'the very point is that the judgement which is not false is
not therefore necessarily true'. I shall present a proof that every
proposition is either true or false. Let us assume that a proposi-
tion which is not false is not true. It means - according to the
definitions of the expressions 'true proposition' and 'false propo-
sition'51 - that a proposition which does not function as a symbol
functions as a symbol. In other words, 52 a proposition which does
not function as a symbol functions as a symbol. The italicized
proposition is contradictory. Thus, the assumption that a propo-
sition which is not false is not true is false. It is, therefore, true
that the proposition which is not false is necessarily true (I). Now
let us assume that a proposition which is not true is not false. It
means that a proposition that does not function as a symbol does
function as a symbol. In other words, it not-does not function
as a symbol. The italicized proposition is contradictory. Thus,
the assumption that a proposition which is not true is not false is
false. It is, therefore, true that the proposition which is not true
is necessarily false (II). The comparison of the theses (I) and (II)
shows that if the proposition is not true, it is false, and if it is not
5o Ibid.
51 Cf. 'P.C.', p. 215. As Kotarbinski supplies no definitions of these expres-
sions, I am compelled to make use of my own definitions.
52 Cf. 'P.C.', p. 205.
false, it is true. Therefore, Kotarbinski is wrong in supposing that

there are such propositions which are neither true nor false,
Remark 2. Having accepted the assumption that 'free cre-
ativity' is possible, Kotarbinski tries to demonstrate in several
ways that certain propositions are neither true nor false. I con-
sider these to be some of the most admirable arguments in Polish
logical writipgs. If it were formally impeccable, this would indi-
cate that its assumption about the possibility of 'free creativity'
is false. If the assumption were not false, then it would not be
possible to justify the false thesis that certain propositions are
neither true nor false. 53 If we did not manage to find any gap in
the impressive arguments of the distinguished logician, then 'free
creation' would not be a 'fact' to be accepted as a 'foundation
stone' but an 'illusion' like the 'destruction' which Kotarbinski
regards as an illusion.
Conclusion. I believe that in this study I managed to keep
the promise given in the introduction. I proved that the logical
principle of the excluded middle is false in both formulations -
categorical and conditional. Hence, I think, the following moral
can be drawn: from the point of view of 'logical culture' it would
be desirable that the handbooks of logic leave out this principle
altogether.
San Remo, March 1913
53 I deal with the formal validity of Kotarbinski's respective reasonings in

the manuscript of my recent paper [1913b].
IS ALL TRUTH ONLY TRUE ETERNALLY
OR IS IT ALSO TRUE WITHOUT A BEGINNING
A popularizing and polemical sketch

concerning the theory of creativity
"Thoughts become confused for the

language is unfit... "
(Tadeusz Kotarbinski, 'Zagaclnienie istnienia
przyszlosci' (The Problem of the Existence of
the Future). Przeglci,d Filozoficzny, 1913.)
1. WHY DO I CALL MY SKETCH

'POPULARIZING AND POLEMICAL'
I read yesterday the beautiful and subtle study by Dr. Tadeusz

Kotarbinski 'The problem of the existence of the future' which
appeared in Przegl<=l;d Filozoficzny. 1 The elegant dialectic of the
respectable author of this work twanged upon some strings of my
intellect, standing in flagrant conflict with the convictions I had
most firmly entertained with regard to certain questions. The
theoretical 'stimulus' was so intense that it had evoked in me
an irresistible whim to state, and account for, several comments
upon some of the problems that Tadeusz Kotarbinski discusses
with such 'lace-like' indeed logical nicety in his treatise.
Wishing to 'popularize' among 'the wider circles of intelligen-
tsia' some of the ideas about creativity pronounced not by an
'artist' or a 'literary critic' but suggestively by a strict logician,
I shall not assume in this 'sketch' that the reader has a knowl-
edge of such or other theoretical trends pervading modern logic
and metaphysics, but will discuss by way of information son1e such
1 Przeglqd Filozoficzny 1 (1913), No. I, also in Nowe Tory, No. X.

Is All Truth Only True Eternally 87
statements that I would not have to touch upon in a 'professional'

journal. This is why I have called this 'sketch' - 'popularizing'.
I do not by any means consider rational the method, so fre-
quently used by a.11 kinds of 'popularizers', of 'popularizing' among
the 'non-specialists' such or other views of various 'specialists' by
means of 'wat~red-down' presentations of the relevant views which
utilize rubber-like, overstretched 'colloquial' expressions instead
of the more• or less well defined 'technical' terms that occur in
the 'professional' papers. I do not think, either, that it lies in
the good interest of 'accessibility' to a void to define the words
that are used by the 'popularizer'. On the contrary: a 'popular'
article may sometimes require even more definitions than a 'pro-
fessional' one, 'accessibility' being often produced just by defining
for the 'non-specialist' reader even such terms which are agreed
upon among bigger or lesser groups of 'specialists'. The 'popular-
izer' who, in the interest of the clarity of thought, cares to define
the terms he has in use can very often appear 'a crashing bore'
to the lazy reader, yet he avoids the charge of vagueness and ob-
scurity from the attentive one. An academic dissertation is not a
symbolic poem, and the 'popular' article which 'popularizes' the
views of a 'scholar' demands an entirely different 'setting' of the
reader's attention than a 'literary-critical' interpretation of sym-
bols from Micinski's 'Nietota' or from the tangled-up passages of
'J(rol Duch'.*
I have called this 'sketch' 'polemical' because, while analyz-
ing the views of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, I shall try to defend theses
that are just the opposite. However, this task is naturally fully
reconcilable with all the respect I have for that outstanding mind.
I take the liberty of publishing my 'sketch' in an educational jour-
nal because I think that the problem whether creativity is at all
possible may be not indifferent to the people whose 'creativity' is
to consist in 'moulding' the 'mind' and 'character' of the child.
* These are titles of difficult to translate literary works in Polish language

(translator's footnote).
2. HAS THAT WHICH IS GONE BY
ALSO CEASED TO EXIST
"Someone said correctly that what is
gone by has not ceased to exist..."
(Kotarbi:riski, loc. cit. p. 74)
•
If we want to answer the question whether that which is gone has
also ce~sed to exist, we must know what is meant by the phrase
'to cease to exist', just like e.g., we must be aware of what 'an
irrational number' is if we are to answer the question whether
some number is or is not irrational. One cannot possibly find
out what 'to cease to exist' means if one does not know what is
meant by 'to exist'. Thus he who does not know what is meant
by 'to exist' cannot provide a well-founded reply to the question
whether that which is gone by has also ceased to exist. The ques-
tion: what does it mean 'to exist' is not one of the infinite number
of questions about the meanings of words that the eight-formers
undergoing their logical 'initiation' sometimes ask in discussion
their antagonists. The meaning of this word is by no means 'self-
evident', as it might at the first glance appear to the reader who
is not acquainted with the so called 'history of philosophy'. On
the contrary: the real sense of the word 'to exist' is very often
the basis or condition for a whole series of logical, metaphysical
and 'gnosiological' (gnosiology - the so called 'theory of knowl-
edge') theories. Various philosophers, constructing their diverse
'philosophical' systems, often attach quite different meanings to
the word: 'to exist' now means 'to be perceived' (e.g., Berkeley),
now the same as 'to be conscious' (e.g., Florian Znaniecki in his
book Humanizm i poznanie (Humanism and J(now ledge)), in still
other cases - the same as 'to be able to be justly accepted' (e.g.,
Brentano, Marty and other representatives of the so called 'Aus-
trian school'), etc. It is clear that not all which is 'conscious'
is necessarily 'perceived', in other words - that which 'exists' in
one sense of the word 'to exist' does not also necessarily exist in
another sense of that word.
Tadeusz Kotarbinski, who asserts that what is gone has not

ceased to exist, is far too precise a thinker to neglect in expressing
such a thesis the describing of the word 'to exist': it means to him
the same as "to be an object such that an affirmative judgment
referring to it is true" (p. 75). The proposition that what is gone
has not cea~ecr to exist can thus be substituted by the proposition
that what i~ gone has not ceased to be an object such that an
affirmative judgment referring to it is true. Let us examine to
what extent such an assertion can be true.
Every affirmative judgment (I use here the word 'judgment'
instead of 'proposition' in keeping with the terminology of the
author whom I am criticizing) 'asserts' that an object possesses a
property. For example: the affirmative judgment 'Kotarbinski's
paper is short' asserts that Kotarbinski's paper possesses the
property of shortness. In the theory of relations the relation be-
tween an object and a property which consists in this object pos-
sessing that property is usually called the relation of 'inherence'.
Thus, if Kotarbinski 's paper is short, then between this paper
and the property of shortness obtains a relation of inherence; the
affirmative judgment 'Kotarbinski's paper is short' asserts this
relation of inherence - just like every other affirmative judgment
'asserts' the relation of inherence between some object and some
property.
We can, I suppose, assert - in view of the fact that every af-
firmative judgment 'asserts' nothing but a relation of inherence
- that of all objects only the relations of inherence can be 'as-
serted' in affirmative judgments, for if we were to assume that
these judgments can also 'assert' such objects that are not rela-
tions of inherence, then these affirmative judgments would 'assert'
not only relations of inherence which contradicts the assumption
that they 'assert' nothing but such relations.
If only relations of inherence can be 'asserted' by affirmative
judgments, then of course only relations of inherence can be such
objects that affirmative judgments referring to them a.re true. For
if some object other than a relation of inherence were an object
such that an affirmative judgment referring to it were true, then

an object which is not a relation of inherence would be 'asserted'
by this affirmative judgment. This contradicts the assumption
that of all objects only relations of inherence can be 'asserted' by
affirmative judgments.
Since according to the above-cited definition of the word 'to
exist' J;he expression 'to be an object such that an affirmative
judgment referring to it is true' means the same as 'to exist',
I can substitute the latter expression for the former one in the
theorem that I have proved above, that is that only relations of
inherence can be the objects such that affirmative judgments re-
ferring to them are true. I obtain in this way a new proposition:
'only relations of inherence can exist'. It follows that while the
relation of inherence between Kotarbinski's paper and the prop-
erty of shortness, otherwise the possessing by Kotarbinski's paper
of the property of shortness, does exist - neither the paper itself
nor its author Tadeusz Kotarbinski, do (after all, only relations
of inherence can exist, whereas neither Mr. K. nor his paper are
relations of inherence!)
Despite the fact that the proposition negating the existence
of both Mr. K. and his paper is necessarily true if the word 'to
exist' is given the very meaning that Mr. K. assigned to it in his
paper, he certainly would not approve that he does not exist, al-
though he wrote his paper. We can even find there the author's
quite unequivocal statement on the subject (p. 75): "And that
which is present today, or shall become present in the years to
come, will later after even more years be rightly called the past
and will rightly be considered by the contemporaries as existing
forever. Therefore we today must also consider it as existing, ex-
isting forever. We shall then exist even though we die, we shall
then exist after our death, and we shall be even though we will
not be there anymore? Yes ... " (there follows a proviso that the
word 'to exist' is used here in the sense I have formulated above).
Thus Mr. K. clearly thinks that, as 'present today', he exists not
only today but will exist forever, 'will be till the end of the world
and beyond'.
What is the solution of this logical tragedy? There is only
one, I suppose: either we have to acknowledge that the word 'to
exist' does not mean 'to be an object such that an affirmative
judgment r~ferring to it is true' and in this way allow the exis-
.
tence of Mr. K. and his paper, or to assert that Mr. K. is mistaken
thinking that he exists and accept such a meaning of the word 'to
'
exist' as is assigned to it by the non-existent Mr. K. himself.

Thus the acceptance of such a meaning of the word 'to exist' as
adopted by Mr. Kotarbinski necessarily leads to a contradiction
within his theoretical conception. It is still possible to suppose
that this contradiction was imposed, so to say, 'from without',
that it resulted from adopting the additional premise that every
affirmative judgment 'asserts' the possession by some object of
some property, that is a relation of inherence. Perhaps, it might
be thought, this contradiction could be removed if besides affirma-
tive judgments 'asserting' the possession by some object of some
property, such affirmative judgment could be accepted that 'as-
sert' simply the 'existence' of an object (e.g., 'Kotarbinski exists',
'Kotarbinski's paper exists', etc.). Such defence would be useless:
given the definition of the word 'to exist' adopted by Tadeusz
Kotarbinski himself, affirmative judgments 'asserting' the 'exis-
tence' of an object 'assert' the possession by this object of such
a property that consists in this object's being such a one that an
affirmative judgment which refers to it is true. Thus every affir-
mative judgment that 'asserts the existence' of an object 'asserts'
thereby a relation of inherence; it follows, as can be seen above,
that only relations of inherence can exist and this leads to the
indicated above incurable contradiction. 2
2 In order to avoid introducing in this paper unnecessary complications
I have been treating the word 'exists' as having only one meaning in Mr.
Kotarbi11ski's treatise. In all the above cases this word is indeed used in
the above-formulated sense. The author of the discussed treatise says quite
clearly, however, that the word 'exists' is sometimes used to mean 'is present'
What is then, finally, the position with respect to the question of

whether that which is gone has also ceased to exist.
The above discussion indicates that I am left with two a venues
of solvin~ the problem: either, in order to secure the existence of
Mr. K: and his paper, to use in the present polemic the word 'to
exist' i~ meaning different from that adopted by himself, or by
assigning to the word 'to exist' the latter meaning, to conclude
that Kotarbinski is in error when he says he exists. The first alter-
native does not fit my purpose because, by assigning to the word
'to exist' a meaning different from that of Kotarbinski's, I will in
fact be solving a problem totally different from that formulated
by Mr. Kotarbinski by means of the very word 'to exist'. I am
therefore left with only the second alternative, that is to become
reconciled with the fact that neither Mr. K. nor his paper exist
and use the word 'to exist' in the very sense that the non-existent
Mr. K. uses in his non-existent paper.
I suppose that I can, in accordance with Mr. Kotarbinski's
theoretical tendencies, formulate the question whether what is
gone has also ceased to exist, in the following way: 'has that
which is past also ceased to exist?'. I embark upon the solution
of the problem.
That which is past either existed or did not exist: past rela-
tions of inherence existed while such past objects that were not
relations of inherence did not exist. The former existed, in ac-
cordance with the definition of 'to exist' adopted by Kotarbinski,
in opposition to 'existed' or 'is past' and 'shall exist' or 'is to come'. The
affirmative judgment: 'Kotarbinski exists' 'asserts' in the one case that Kotar-
binski is possessed of the property of being an object such that an affirmative
judgment referring to it is true. In the other - that Kotarbi1iski is present.
Thus in both cases this judgment 'asserts' the relation of inherence between
Kotarbinski and some property, but in neither case does it assert Kotarbinski
himself as the author wishes on p. 77 ("when one says tl~at something ... ex-
ists, then one asserts it"). Therefore in neither case does Kotarbinski 'exist'
in the sense adopted in the text.
because they were objects such that affirmative judgments refer-

ring to them. were true. The latter did not exist because, as we
already know, no objects that are not relations of inherence can
'exist' in this sense. Thus the possession by Caesar of the property
of his crossing the Rubicon, otherwise the relation of inherence
because Caesar and the property of his crossing the Rubicon ex-
isted, while.neither Caesar nor the Rubicon existed because none
of these obj~cts was a relation of inherence.
To cease to exist one must have existed first, just like one
must first have lived to be able to cease being alive. A stone can-
not cease being alive because it is not alive, similarly Caesar did
not cease to exist because he had not existed at all. Thus past
objects that had not existed did not cease to exist. If that which
is gone had not existed) it could not cease to exist.
An object can possess a property only in relation to the time
in which it is present; a past object cannot possess any property
in the present or in the future, a present object - in the past or in
the future, a future object - in the past or in the present. Thus
a past object that once existed cannot at present, when it is not
present, possess the properties of redness, hardness, presence, of
having crossed the Rubicon, of being an object such that an affir-
. mative judgment referring to it is true, etc. A past object cannot
then possess the property of existence - in the present. If that
which once existed passed away, is gone, then it does not exist
in the present, and having existed in the past, it ceased to exist.
The possession by Caesar of the property of having crossed the
Rubicon existed when it was present; it ceased to exist after it
had passed a.way; it was an object such that an affirmative judg-
ment referring to it was true only at the time when it was present.
An affirmative judgment referring to it (that is the possession of
the property of having crossed the Rubicon)** is also true only
when it is present. The judgment: 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'
is sometimes present also when the possession by Caesar of the
** Explanation in parenthesis added by translator.

property of having crossed the Rubicon is not present; therefore

this judgment, being a true one, is also true when what is as-
serted by it has already passed away, that is when it does not
exist anymore - as I have proved above.
The above discussion shows that there is no universal answer
to the qµestion whether that which passed away has also ceased
I
'
i
to exist:.,some past objects have ceased to exist, other have not;
that which is gone by without having existed, has not ceased to
exist; that which existed and is gone by, has ceased to exist. The
former and the latter alike, as not present in the present time, do
not at present possess any property - including the property of
existence. Neither that which is gone by having existed nor that
which' existed and is gone, exist at present. Generally speaking:
Nothing that is gone by exists at present.
3. IS IT THE CASE THAT BOTH:

AN OBJECT EXISTS
AND AN AFFIRMATIVE JUDGMENT
REFERRING TO IT IS TRUE
- AT THE SAME TIME?
"only then and always, in relation
to time, a judgment... is true when
its object exists, and the other way
round."
(Kotarbinski, lac. cit., p. 75)
The question formulated in the title of this section can be divided

into two. First: does an object exist only then in time when an
affirmative judgment referring to it is true? Second: is an affirma-
tive judgment referring to an object true only then in time when
that object exists?
I have already noted above that an object can only then,
in time, possess some property when it is present. I have also
stressed that it follows, too, that a judgment can possess some
property, e.g., the property of being true, only then in time when
it is present. If, e.g., I utter at the present moment (Feb. 27) the
judgment: 'I was sad on Feb. 26' ,3 this judgment can only then
be true in time when I am uttering it, that is on Feb. 27. The
judgment which I have just uttered will not be true tomorrow
because as a past, bygone one it will not be anymore present to-
morrow. Similarly, an 'identical' (but not 'the same') judgment:
'I was sad on F~b. 26' which I shall utter only tomorrow, is no
more true today because it will only be able to possess any prop-
erties, thus also the property of being true, tomorrow. While I
was sad yesterday (Feb. 26) I did not utter any judgment refer-
ring to that fact; therefore none of the judgments: 'I was sad on
Feb. 26' (neither that I uttered today nor that I shall utter to-
morrow, nor any other) was present at the very moment that I
was sad. However, since I was indeed sad on Feb. 26, each of the
judgments; 'I was sad on Feb. 26' that I have uttered is (at the
very moment when it is present) true. The possession by me of
the property of sadness on Feb. 26 was then (at the very moment
when it was present, that is on Feb. 26) an object such that an
affirmative judgment referring to it is (when it is present, that is
today, tomorrow etc.) true. The possession by me of the property
of sadness on Feb. 26 'existed' (in the above sense of 'to exist')
exactly on Feb. 26. It follows that it 'existed' at the same time
. when a judgment referring to it was, as I have shown above, nei-
ther present nor true. In this way we obtain the answer to the first
of the above-formulated questions: an object exists not only then
in time when an affirmative judgment referring to it is true.
I have shown above that what is gone by does not exist at
present. The possession by me of the property of sadness on
Feb. 26 has passed away; so it does not exist today, Feb. 27. Yet,
as I have noted above, the affirmative judgment referring to it
that I uttered today is true today. Hence the answer to the sec-
ond of the above-formulated questions: an affirmative judgment
3 I say 'I utter a judgment'; but should someone prefer that 'judgments'
were 'written down' or 'experienced' 1 'felt' or 'lived through' - it would in no
way affect the results of my discussion.
referring to an object is sometimes true not only when zn time

that object exists.
4. IS ALL TRUTH TRUE ETERNALLY?

"all truth is true eternally ... "
(Kotarbinski, foe. cit., p. 78).
An inexactitude - quite harmless in most cases - which consists in

calling two or more identical ('the same') judgments one ('and the
same') judgment has become generally accepted. If, e.g., differ-
ent people utter at different times, in the same sense, an indefinite
number of judgments: 'man is mortal' then all these judgments
are usually considered to be 'one and the same' judgment: 'man is
mortal'. It could be said in this sense that the judgment: 'man is
mortal' 'lasts' from the moment when it is uttered by someone for
the first time, until the time when it becomes past being uttered
for the last time - possibly by someone else and at a different
place. The 'lasting' of a judgment is not, however, 'continuous'
even in this sense: it 'discontinues' every now and then when no-
body utters 'this' judgment. If we call an object 'eternal' on the
ground that it never ceases to be) then no judgment need be eternal
in }his sense: it ceases to last at the moment when it is uttered
for the last time. The final limit of the time for which a judgment
may last is in any case determined by the end of the existence of
the creatures by whom judgments are uttered. No true judgment,
in other words no truth, is eternal in this sense if the human race
that utters judgments is eternal.
One says sometimes (quite without precision) that a judgment
is true even at the moment when no one is uttering it. It is said,
for example, that the judgment 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' will
remain true even when all people shall die and there will be no
one to utter it. The assertion that the judgment 'Caesar crossed
the Rubicon' is true even when no one is uttering it can in this
imprecise sense mean the same as the assertion that this judg-
ment would be true if someone uttered it at the given time. The
assertion that some truth is eternal can be construed analogously,

it can then mean the same as the assertion that the moment in
which the given judgment will not be true if someone utters it,
will never come. If, for example, we say that the judgment 'Cae-
sar crossed the Rubicon' is an eternal truth, it may mean that
this judgment•will always be true when someone utters it, or that
the moment.. will never come when this judgment would not be
true provided it is uttered by someone.
When using this kind of terminology we will be forced to
answer the question whether all truth is true eternally in the af-
firmative: all truth is true eternally. In order to prove that thesis
let us propose, as it is often done in e.g., geometry, the truth of a
contradictory thesis. Let us then assume that some truth is not
eternally true, so that a time t will come when some judgment,
e.g., 'A is B' will not be true, provided it is uttered although it
is true at the present time. If the judgment 'A is B' is untrue at
time t, the judgment 'A is not B' is then true. We have assumed
that the judgment 'A is B' is true at the present time; it contra-
dicts the judgment 'A is not B' which would have to be true at
time t if our assumption that the judgment 'A is B' is untrue at
time t were valid. This assumption leads then to the conclusion
that the judgment 'A is not B', which contradicts the judgment
'A is B' true at the present time, becomes true at time t. An
obstacle to the acceptance of the above conclusion is presented
by the logical principle of contradiction which says that if one of
two contradictory judgments is true, then the other must be false.
Thus, if the judgment 'A is B' is true at the present time, we must
conclude that the contradictory judgment 'A is not B' is always,
thus also at time t, false. However, as I have shown above, the
latter judgment would have to be true at time t if our assumption
that the judgment 'A is not B' is untrue at time t, were valid.
It follows that the judgment 'A is B' is at time t both true and
false, thus untrue. Thus the assumption that the judgment 'A is
B' which is true at the present time becomes untrue at time t, in
other words - that some truth is not true eternally - leads to a
contradiction. We must therefore reject that assumption as false,

thereby accepting the view that all truth is true eternally.
One might say that my proof would be quite valid but for
the fault that it does not 'accord with reality'. To support this
objection one might cite a 'random', it seems, judgment which
is originally true and then ceases to be true, e.g., the judgment
'Stanfslaw Lesniewski will die'. This judgment is true for as long
as I am" alive; when I die it will become false because, when I
shall not be here any more, I shall not be able to die again. By
becoming false at the time of my death, the judgrn~nt 'Stanislaw
Lesniewski will die' will give way to the true judgment 'Stanislaw
Lesniewski died' which in its turn is false until I shall die.
This line of thought, with all its appearance of correctness, is
not really valid and as such does not, I believe, shatter my above
proof. The judgments: 'Stanislaw Lesniewski will die' uttered at
different times are by no means 'one and the same' judgment -
not even in the 'figurative' sense in which (as I have noted at
the beginning of this 4th section) this expression is commonly
used. These judgments 'assert' different things: thus e.g., the
judgment 'Stanislaw Lesniewski will die' 'asserts', if uttered at
the present time, the relation of inherence between myself and
the property of 'con1ing to cease to be alive' at a time which is in
the 'future' now, that is at 2 p. rn., March 2nd, 1913. Should the
judgment 'Stanislaw Lesniewski will die' be uttered by someone
after my death, e.g., at 5 a. rn., February 7th, 2000 then it will
assert the possession by me of the property of 'corning to cease
to be alive' at a time which is in the 'future' at the moment this
judgment is uttered, that is at 5 a. m., February 7th, 2000. Should
I die, say, in 1925 then the first of the two judgments: 'Stanislaw
Lesniewski will die' is true and the second is false because it is
then true in this case that I possess the property of 'coming to
cease to be alive' at a time which is in the 'future' at 2 p. rn.,
March 2nd, 1913 - and it is then false that I possess that prop-
erty at some time which is in the 'future' at 6 a. rn., February 7th,
2000. This does not mean, however, that 'the same' judgment
'Stanislaw Lesniewski will die' is true now and will later become
false; it only means that of two judgments, even if they are pho-
netically identical but 'semantically' (i.e. with respect to their
'function', 'sense') different, following each other at consecutive
times, the one is true and the other is false. However, these two
semantically different, thus not 'the same' judgments cannot be
considered t~ be 'one and the same' judgment in the above sense
and thus they cannot present an obstacle to the acceptance of all
truth as eternally true. Similarly, such an obstacle would not be
presented by any two phonetically-alike judgments one of which
is true and the other false, but which are not 'one and the same'
judgment, if they do not 'mean' the same, if they 'assert' different
objects. Such judgments are, among others, all such judgments
which consist of words whose meaning depends on who, in what
circumstances and when utters them, e.g., the words: 'I', 'you',
'he' 'mine' 'yours' 'his' 'tomorrow' 'today' 'yesterday' 'here'
' etc.' Judgments
'there', ' asserting
' ' occurred' in the'
that' something
past, or that something will happen in the future, or else that
something is occurring at present, but do not at the same time
say who or what is the reference point for placing that some-
thing in past, future or present are not 'the same' with other
phonetically identical judgments uttered at other times. Simi-
larly, two judgments: 'My father is an engineer', one of which is
uttered by me and the other by somebody else, although pho-
netically identical, differ 'semantically' because they refer to two
different persons and are not, therefore, 'one and the same' judg-
ment. However, if in any of the above judgments I substitute for
the expressions whose meaning varies with time or circumstances
such expressions whose semantic function is (for the given system
of linguistic symbols) constant, I will be immediately met with
truths that are 'eternally true'. If, e.g., instead of judgments:
'Stanislaw Lesniewski will die' or 'Stanislaw Lesniewski will cease
to be alive' I formulate the judgment: 'Stanislaw Lesniewski pos-
sesses the property of having ceased to be alive in the future of
2 p. m., March 2nd, 1913', then this judgment will be always true,
thus also after my death. Similarly, if I should indeed die in 1925,

then the judgment: 'Stanislaw Lesniewski possesses the property
of having ceased to be alive in the future of 5 a. m., February 7th,
2000', is already true even now.
My defense of the 'eternity of truth' could perhaps be met
with one more objection: to wit somebody might argue in the fol-
lowin~ way. The formulation of every judgment requires the use
of some verb in some form, thus every judgment 'asserts' some-
thing 'present', 'past' or 'future' with respect to the moment at
which this judgment is uttered. Therefore no judgment uttered
at time t can be 'one and the same judgment' as a phonetically
identical one uttered at some other time ti, (thus t1), for a judg-
ment uttered at time t 'asserts' that something happens at the
present, past or future precisely with respect to time t, whereas a
judgment uttered at time t1 'asserts' that something occurs at the
present, past or future precisely with respect to time t1. Thus a
judgment uttered at time t must always be semantically different
from a judgment uttered at time t1, therefore these judgments
can never be 'one and the same'. And if that is the case, the view
that any truth is eternally true is obviously false.
This line of thought is not correct. Expressing some judgment
about some object I can either ascribe to this object some prop-
erty c, or ascribe to it the property of not being possessed of the
property c, or else I may be not concerned with the property cat
all. Thus, e.g., talking about this paper I can either say that it
is boring, or that it does not possess the property of boringness,
i.e. is not boring, or else I can say that it is, e.g., polemical and
disregard altogether the question whether it is, or is not, bor-
ing. Properties of time are in this respect identical with all other
properties. Talking about some object, e.g., a human being, I can
ascribe to it a temporal property saying that he is in the present,
was in the past or will be in the future. Or I can ascribe to him
the property of not being possessed of the given temporal prop-
erty, saying that he is neither present, past nor future. Or else I
can say about a human being that he is mortal, leaving aside the
problem, when - at present, in the past or future. Naturally, this
does not mean that a human being can be mortal 'timelessly'; it
simply means that while saying that a human being is mortal I
do not ascribe to him any temporal properties. This means that
I am not talking about these properties at all. Similarly, e.g.,
uttering th~ judgment: 'the given triangle is rectangular' I am
not concerrn;d whether that triangle is, or is not, equilateral al-
though every triangle necessarily either is or is not equilateral. In
the unplanned process of language evolution precisely the same
linguistic forms often perform entirely different functions. Thus,
e.g., the word 'is' has sometimes the function of a simple copula
in a sentence (e.g., in the expression: 'man is mortal') while in
other cases it substitutes the word 'exists' (e.g., in the expres-
sion: 'there is God'). To such linguistic forms whose functions
vary with circumstances belong, among others, the present tense
forms used in judgments: these forms in some cases indicate that
what is 'asserted' by the given verb happens now, that is pre-
cisely at the time when the given judgment is uttered (e.g., in
the sentence: 'I am in San Remo'= 'I am now in San Remo'). In
other cases, on the other hand, the present tense forms do not at
all indicate the time at which happens that which is 'asserted' by
the given judgment (e.g., in the judgment: 'every man is mortal'
which asserts the possession of the property of mortality by ev-
ery human being without saying when that happens). There are
cases in which a judgment in the present tense asserts something
that does not happen now but at some other time; the present
tense of the verb does not then indicate any temporal property
of the 'asserted' fact and is only used in lieu of a non-existing
verbal expression of a 'timeless' import and indicative form while
the temporal property of the given fact is indicated by some spe-
cial expression. Thus, e.g., if I utter in March the judgment: 'In
June nights are short', then the present tense form 'are' does not
by any means indicate that precisely at the moment when I am
uttering that judgment nights in June are short. The word 'are'
has here no connection with the temporal property of the fact 'as-
serted' by the given judgment, that property being indicated not
by the present tense form 'are' but by the expression 'in June'.
The case of the word 'possesses' in the above-discussed judgment:
'Stanislaw Lesniewski possesses the property of having ceased to
be alive in the future of 2 p. m., March 2nd, 1913' is similar. The
temporal property of the asserted fact is here indicated not by the
prese~t tense form 'possesses' but by the latter part of the judg-
ment, beginning with 'in the future'. Thus, although the forms of
verbs are temporal, not every judgment 'asserts' that something
happens now, happened in the past or will happen in the future
in respect of the time at which the given judgment is uttered.
Therefore, the above-cited objection against regarding judgments
uttered at different times as 'one and the same' judgment fails.
Consequently, the assertion that all truth is true eternally proved
above, is valid.
5. IS ALL TRUTH TRUE WITHOUT A BEGINNING?

"but not all truth is true without a be-
. . ... "
gmnmg
(Kotarbiriski, ibid.).
Analogously with my handling of the question whether all truth is

true eternally I shall handle the question whether all truth is true
without a beginning. This question can be otherwise put as fol-
lows: was there ever any time at which a judgment which is now
true would not have been true had someone uttered it then?
All truth is true without a beginning. There has never been a time
at which a judgment which is now true would not have been true
had someone uttered it then . To prove this thesis let us assume
that there is a truth which had a beginning, that is that there
was a time tat which some judgment, e.g., 'A is B' was not true
although it is true now. If at time t the judgment 'A is B' was
not true, then the judgment 'A is not B' was true. We have as-
sumed that the judgment 'A is B' is now true. This judgment
contradicts the judgment 'A is not B' which must have been true
at time t if our assumption that the judgment 'A is B' was then
false was correct. Thus, this assumption leads to the conclusion
that the judgment 'A is not B' was true at time t, and this judg-
ment contradicts
ill
the judgment 'A is B' which is true now. Yet -
on the basis of the law of contradiction - since the judgment 'A is
B' is true at present, its contradiction 'A is not B' is always false
and so it was at time t. However, I have shown above that this
judgment must have been true at time t given our assumption
that the judgment 'A is not B' was false at time t. It follows that
the judgment 'A is not B' was at time t both true and false, thus
it was not true. Therefore the assumption that the judgment 'A
is B' which is true now was not true at time t, or that some truth
had a beginning, leads to a contradiction. We must therefore re-
ject this assumption as false and say that all truth is true without
a beginning. Therefore, if the judgment 'asserting' the crossing of
the Rubicon by Caesar in 49 B.C. is true now, then it was also true
- notwithstanding Kotarbinski - even before Caesar decided to do
it, e.g., in 55 B.C. Similarly, it is already now true not only that
· I shall die but also that I shall die at a given hour and minute, ...
and that I shall choose this rather than another profession, that
of two crossroads I shall take the right rather than the left one,
that at a given moment a certain thought will cross my mind as
summoned by my attention, that at times I will give, refuse, keep
or break my word of honour. "All this is already true today and
was true ages ago" even if "these future facts ... are in our hands
and within our power" ... 4
4 Cf.: Kotarbiriski, Zoe. cit., p. 79.

6. CAN ANY TRUTH BE CREATED?

"there are judgments which are made
to be true, whose truth is cre-
ated ... "
(Kotarbinski, loc. cit., p. 78)
No tru·th can be created! The need to stress and energetically in-

still thrs view in others is growing now that, at the present stage
of development of Polish 'philosophy', voices claiming that truths
are created are clamouring ever more loudly. It is not only the
protagonists of all sorts of 'Pragmatism', 'Humanism', 'Conven-
tionalism', 'Instrun1entalism', 'previdionism', etc., that speak of
the 'creation of truths', i.e. not only the representatives of these
'philosophical' trends according to whom a judgment 'becomes'
true: if it is useful for the preservation of the species; if it is an
effective instrument of thought; if it assists in predicting reality,
etc. That is not only those for whom, like for the Greek sophist
Protagoras and the Polish sophist Florian Znaniecki, 'man is the
measure of all things' and thus a 'measure' of truth. Slowly,
truths begin to become 'created' even by the representatives of
that camp which has gathered at the Lvov University around
ProfessoL Kazi1nierz Twardowski, that is the camp whose mem-
bers have for such a long time believed that a judgment is always,
'absolutely' true, i.e. that it is true independently of whether it
is useful or damaging; whether it helps to forecast the future or
not; whether a scholar felt like 'creating' the given truth and he
did, or refrained from such 'creation', etc. No truth can be cre-
ated! To 'create' something comes after all to making it so that
something arises that was not before. We could not say, e.g., that
Tchaikovsky 'created' 'Symphonie pathetique' or that Leonardo .
da Vinci 'created' 'Gioconda' had 'Symphonie pathetique' existed
before Tchaikovsky and 'Gioconda' before Leonardo. Similarly
with truths. One could say that someone 'created' a truth only
if he made it so that a judgment hitherto false became true. But
should a judgment hitherto false become true, this would mean
that the given truth has a beginning because it became true only
at a certain time. I have already demonstrated in Section 5 that
this is not possible, that all truth is true without a beginning.
It follows that no judgment which is false at a given time can at
another time become true, that is, no one can make it so that a
judgment hithei;to false suddenly becomes true. In other words:
no truth can be created.
d
7. DOES IT FOLLOW FROM THE FACT

THAT NO TRUTH CAN BE CREATED
THAT NOTHING CAN BE CREATED?
"for something to really begin to ex-
ist, an affirmative judgment referring
to it must be false before that some-
thing begins to exist. This is the con-
dition for creativity... "
(Kotarbinski, loc. cit., p. 80)
"We create truly only when we create truth", says Tadeusz Ko-
tarbinski. Thus the possibility of creation of truth is to be the
condition for any creativity at all. If creation of truth were not
possible then nothing could be created: "for something to really
begin to exist, an affirmative judgment referring to it must be
false before that something begins to exist. This is the condition
for creativity".
Such opinions are to be expected from a scholar who thinks, as
we saw in Section 3, that a judgment asserting an object can only
be true at the time when that object exists. These opinions can
result from, e.g., the following reasoning: 'to create something'
is to make it so that something which has not existed up to now
begins to exist. Since a judgment asserting an object can only
be true at the time when that object exists, it would be possible
to rnake it so that something which has not existed up to now
should begin to exist only if a judgment which asserts the given
object and is true when that object exists, were not true until
that object began to exist. If then all truth were true without
a beginning, if it could not be created, that is if it could not be

made so that a judgment asserting an object which has not been
true up to now should become true at a certain· time. If so, it
would consequently not be possible to make it so that something
which has not existed up to now should begin to exist. In other
words:"if truth could not be created then all creativity would be
impossible.
*e saw in Section 3 that the assumption with which this rea-
soning starts is unjustified: a judgment asserting an object is true
not only at the time when that object exists. So, for something
that has not existed up to now to start to exist, it is not neces-
sary that a judgment asserting it should be false up to now and
should now become true. Therefore the fact that every judgment
asserting something is true without a beginning does not in the
least impede creativity. It by no means follows from the fact that
no truth can be created, that nothing can be created.
8. DOES THE FACT THAT ALL TRUTH

IS TRUE WITHOUT A BEGINNING
RENDER 'FREE CREATIVITY' SUPERFLUOUS?
In several theoretical constructions which I rate among the most

beautiful to be found in Polish logical literature, Tadeusz Kotar-
biri.ski tries to demonstrate that if all truths were true without
a beginning then 'free creativity' would be superfluous. I cannot
'summarize' here the relevant opinions of the respectable author:
I would probably have to cite several pages of his extremely con-
cise paper, some sections of which are so much 'condensed' that
all attempts to 'summarize' them would miss the point. I shall
therefore consider only a few, so to say, theoretical 'focuses' in Ko-
tarbiri.ski 's reasoning in an attempt to throw some critical light
on the validity of his theoretical position.
The author's proofs in the matter here of interest 'focus', I
believe, on the two following points: (1) "Is it not simply super-
fluous to do anything in order to reach a goal that has already
been reached, exists, has come about ... ?" (2) "there is never any-
thing at all you can do to reach your goal and if some of your
so-called actions are required to do so, then they are only these
which must happen because they are already accounted among
the truths." 5 Let us briefly examine the two above points.
The first point can be developed into the following line of
thought: a judgment asserting something can only be true when
that somethrng exists. If, then, a judgment asserting some future
object is already true now, then that future object already exists
today. Therefore, if all truth is· true without a beginning, that
is - if every judgment, ·asserting a future object, which is always
true is already true now, then everything that is to exist in the
future already exists today. And if 'to create' is taken to mean
to make it so that something which has not yet existed starts to
exist, then nothing can be created because, as we can see from the
above, it is not possible to make it so that something which has
not yet existed should start to exist in the future. "Free creativity
is therefore not superfluous only if, at least, something which is
to exist in the future does not yet exist now, in other words - if at
least some truths have a beginning. Creativity and consequently
Freedom end ... where truth starts". (p. 82.)
I.think. that we can reply to this reasoning in the following
way: already in Section 3 we saw that a judgment asserting an
object can be true not only at the time when this object exists. If
this is so, then it does not follow from the fact that a judgment
asserting a future object is already now true, that this future ob-
ject exists at present. Example: let us assume that I can finish
this paper 'by a free act', but I can also ('by a free act', too)
not finish it and throw it 'into the wastepaper basket' before it
is concluded. Let us further assume that, being able to do either
'by a free a.ct', I will 'by a free act' conclude this paper. The
judgment asserting the possession by me the property of having
concluded this paper will then become true. However, in view of
5 Both quotations from p. 83.

the fact that all truth is true without a beginning, this judgment
is already true now. It is already true now although the object
asserted by this judgment, that is the possession by me of the
property of having concluded this paper, does not yet exist.
That object is a future one, and since it is not now present it
does not now possess - as we saw in Section 2 - any property and
consequ~ntly neither the property of 'existence'. Thus the future
object, the possession by me of the property of having concluded
this paper, only then possesses any properties, e.g., the property
of 'existence' which consists in the judgment asserting this future
object being true, when it becomes present. However, that judg-
ment is already true today although its object does not yet exist
and will only come to exist in future. No future object exists at
the present moment, for it is not present and similarly no past
object exists now since it is not present either. Nevertheless -
judgments asserting past and future objects are true even now.
'1
So it does not by any means follow, from the fact that all judg-
ments and so also judgments about the future are now true, that
any future object already exists at present. And since the future
does not exist at the present time, there is no objection to some-
one 'creating' this or that future object 'by a free act'. If the fact
that all truths are true without a beginning does not yet result in
the future existing already now, if future does not yet exist today
although judgments asserting future are already true - then the
fact that some truth is true without a beginning does not exclude
someone from 'creating' the object of the given truth which is
true eternally and without a beginning. And if future does not
yet exist, has not yet come about, if it is not here yet, - then
the first of the above-cited Kotarbinski's arguments in favour of
the view that if judgments asserting future are already true now,
creativity is superfluous, does not hold. If something that one
wishes for does not yet exist, the fact that the judgment which
asserts it is true does by no means render superfluous the 'free
creativity' directed towards the creation of that something.
I shall try now to develop the line of thought contained in the
second of Kotarbinski's arguments against all truths being true
without a beginning.
Creativity is 'free' only if, being able to bring something
about, one can also act in such a manner that it shall not be.
I can say, e.g.,• that I am going to create by a free act Section 9
of this 'sket~h' only if it is possible for me to both make it be
created or to •make it so that it is not created. Therefore if I write
Section 9 because I 'have to' do so, because I cannot do otherwise,
that section cannot be considered the product of 'free' creativity.
In more general terms: if at time t an object p 'must' possess a
property c and if it 'cannot fail' to possess it, - then the posses-
sion by object p of property c at time t cannot be a product of
free creativity. If an object which is somebody's goal must come
about then all creativity directed towards reaching this goal is
superfluous because that object cannot not exist and will obtain
even if no one contributes to its becoming. If it is already now
true that I shall write Section 9 of this sketch then - in virtue
of the logical principle of contradiction - it must already now be
false and cannot be true that I shall write it. Similarly - if it is
already now true that object p will possess property c at time t,
then it must already now be false that object p will not possess
property cat time t. And since it must be false that I shall write
Section 9, since the assertion that I shall write Section 9 cannot
be true if it is true that I shall write it - then I cannot not write
it. This is so because if I could not write Section 9, the assertion
that I shall write it could be true. This contradicts what we have
established above, namely that the assertion stating that I shall
write it cannot be true. In yet another words: since the assertion
that I shall write Section 9 cannot be true if it is already now
true that I shall write it, then I cannot not write Section 9 also
because I cannot do anything such that the assertion stating that
it has been done contradicts any true judgment. I could not write
Section 9 only if the assertion stating that I shall not write it did
not contradict any true judgment. Yet this assertion contradicts
the judgment that I shall write Section 9 and we have initially

assumed that this judgment is true. In more general terms: if it
must be false that an object p will not possess property cat time
t; if the assertion that the object p will not possess property c
at time t cannot be true; if it is true that object p will possess
prope.;rty c at time t - then the object p cannot possess property
c at t~me t because, if it could poss,ess it, the assertion that the
object p will not possess property c at time t could also be true.
Such a consequence contradicts the above result that the asser-
tion stating that the object p will not possess property c at time
t cannot be true. In other words again: if the assertion that the
object p will not possess property c at time t cannot be true; if
it is already now true that the object p will possess property c at
time t, then the object p cannot not possess property c at time t
also because nothing can take place such that its assertion contra-
dicts any true judgment. The object p could not possess property
c at time t only if the assertion that the object p will not possess
it at that time did not contradict any true judgment. Yet this
assertion contradicts the judgment that the object p will possess
property cat time t and we have initially assumed that this judg-
ment is true. We have thus come to the conclusion that, if it is
already now true that I shall write Section 9 of this 'sketch', then
I cannot not write that section, in other words - I must write it.
However, if I must write that section, I shall write it irrespective
of whether my 'free creativity' will or will not contribute to my
writing it. In a more general way: since the object p cannot not
possess property c at time t if it is already now true that the ob-
ject p will possess property c at time t, - then I need not create
the possession of property c by the object pat time t. This object
will possess that property at time t regardless of whether I shall
want it or not, or whether I shall do something about it or not.
Thus if all truth is true without a beginning then free creativity is
superfluous.
It appears to me that in 'unfolding' in the above line of
thought the second of Kotarbinski 's arguments against all truth
being true without a beginning, I have not misrepresented the the-

oretical leanings of the illustrious author of the discussed paper. I
was at the pains of extracting from that paper possibly everything
in favour of the position defended by Kotarbinski; I was anxious
to ensure that this position should lose as little as possible of the
suggestiveness Gharacteristic of Kotarbinski's own presentation -
the suggestiveness which I experienced myself while reading his
paper. It is n~vertheless difficult to report 'objectively' somebody
else's positions; it is still more difficult to report them in such a
manner that they should not lose their persuasive power in the re-
porter's hand. It is perhaps most difficult to unfold convincingly
positions that one is about to controvert ... And it would appear
that one cannot controvert Kotarbinski's theory in the following
manner:
No doubt Kotarbinski is right in asserting that, if it is already
now true that I shall write Section 9 of this sketch, then it must
be already false and cannot be true that I shall not write it. This
position is as sound as the logical principle of contradiction itself.
But the consequences that the author of 'The Problem of the Ex-
istence of the Future' intends to draw from this position are not as
sound. He would reason, according to what we have seen above,
as-Jollows: if it cannot be true that I shall not write Section 9
then I cannot not write it because, if I could not write it, then
the assertion that I shall not write it could be true; whereas the
assumption says that this assertion cannot be true.
This reasoning is not satisfactory. From the assertion that
I may not write Section 9 does not follow at all that the asser-
tion that I shall not write it may be true. The second thesis
would follow from the first only if the negation of the second the-
sis would contra.diet the first thesis (in that case the acceptance
of the first thesis would indeed necessitate the acceptance of the
second because if the latter were not accepted then an inevitable
contra.diction would necessarily result). The thesis that it may be
true that I shall not write Section 9 would only then follow from
the thesis that I may not write that section, if the negation of
the former, that is the judgment: 'It cannot be true that I shall
not write Section 9' would contradict the judgment: 'I may write
Section 9'. These two judgments, however, are of course not con-
tradictory. They are by no means such two judgments that the
one ascribes to an object such a property which the other does not:
the first of them ascribes some property to an assertion while the
secona ascribes it to myself. Someone might say that these judg-
ments, while not involving an open contradiction, may yet contain
a hidden one leading to a contradiction in the consequences. The
answer to this is that such an assertion would require a proof and
there is no reason to consider these two judgments contradictory
until someone presents such a proof. By the same token, we must
consider the thesis that if I could not write Section 9 then it could
be true that I shall not write it - as plainly and groundlessly arbi-
trary. However, since from the assumption that I may not write
Section 9 does not by any means follow that it may be true that I
shall not write Section 9 (this would contradict the earlier thesis
that such an assertion cannot be true), then J(otarbinski's thesis
that if the assertion that I shall not write Section 9 cannot be true
then I cannot not write Section 9, is quite arbitrary.
The illustrious logician brings out however one more argu-
ment in support of his thesis: I cannot do anything such that the
assertion which states my having accomplished it, contradicts a
true judgment. Thus, I cannot not write Section 9 because the
judgment saying that I shall not write it contradicts the judgment
saying that I shall write it, that is the judgment we have initially
assumed to be true.
Still, this line of thought is not tenable either - it is, too, quite
clearly arbitrary logically. I hope not to falsify Kotarbinski's the-
oretical leanings in developing his line of thought, a logical 'ab-
breviation', in the following way: if a judgment saying that I shall
do something cannot be true, then I cannot do it; if a judgment
saying that I shall do something contradicts a true judgment, then
it cannot be true. Thus - on the basis of the simple hypothetical
syllogism - if a judgment saying that I shall do something contra-

dicts a true judgment then I cannot do it. It follows that I cannot
not write Section 9 because the judgment saying that I shall not
write it contradicts the true judgment that I shall write Section 9.
We see that one of the premisses of this line of thought is the as-
sertion that I cannot do something if the judgment asserting that
I shall do it.cannot be true. I have indicated above that this pre-
• arbitrary; it follows that all conclusions deduced
miss is entirely
from such a premiss are invalid. Thus there is no reason to ac-
cept, as proven, Kotarbinski's view that I cannot do something
such that the assertion of having accomplished it contradicts a
true judgment. Therefore from the fact the assertion saying that
I shall not write Section 9 contradicts a true judgment does not
at all follow I cannot not write it.
I have demonstrated, I think that Kotarbinski did not by any
means prove in his paper that I cannot not do something in the
future if a judgment that I shall do it is already now true. And
if so, he also failed to prove that from the fact that all truth
is true without a beginning follows the impossibility and super-
fluity of one's being able to accomplish anything in 'free action',
which should have been shown by his arguments presented at the
beginning of this section.
The fact that all truth is true without a beginning does not by
any means make free creativity superfluous.
9. CONCLUSION
I am near the end of my argument. It led us to the conclusion

that, contrary to Kotarbinski's views, 'free creativity' can be fully
reconciled with the fact that all truth is true. without a beginning.
If there were no other arguments in favour of the view that 'free
creativity' cannot exist, it certainly could not be shaken by the
very fact that no truth can be created. Thus - not even the love
of 'freed01n' and 'creativity' can prevent us from gathering, in
these times of contempt for all 'uncompromizing' and 'absolute'
statements under the absolutist cry: 'Absolute and unchanging,

indestructible and impossible to create, true eternally and without
a beginning, truth!'
IS A CLASS OF CLASSES
NOT SUBORDINATED TO THEMSELVES,
SUBORDINATED TO ITSELF?
§ 1. The question whether a class of classes not subordi-

nated to themselves is subordinated to itself - may be answered
correctly in a positive way 'it is subordinated to itself' or in a
negative way 'it is not subordinated to itself' - only when there
is an object which is a class of classes not subordinated to them-
selves, and when no object is a class of classes not subordinated
to themselves, the expression 'a class of classes not subordinated
to themselves' denotes no object and thus every proposition that
includes this expression as its subject is false. 1 In such a case
both the propositions: 'a class of classes, not subordinated to
themselves, is subordinated to itself' and 'a class of classes, not
subordinated to themselves, is not subordinated to itself' are false
since both contain subjects which do not denote anything at all.
In order to answer the question whether a class of classes, not sub-
ordinated to themselves, is subordinated to itself, and taking into
consideration what I have already said in this section, I begin by
stating the problem which is fundamental to the title question and
which I am about to answer in what follows: is there any object
which is a class of classes not subordinated to themselves?
§ 2. The answer to the question whether any object is a class
of classes not subordinated to themselves - depends on the answer
to the question whether any object is a class not subordinated to
itself: if no object were such a class, then - of course - no object
could be this or that set of classes not subordinated to themselves,
e.g., a set of all classes not subordinated to themselves, thus the
1 Cf. St. Lesniewski, [1913c], p. 325; in separate print p. 13.

class of classes not subordinated to themselves (a class of objects

a is here taken to mean a set of all objects which are a; a class
of classes not subordinated to themselves would accordingly be
precisely the set of all classes not subordinated to themselves).
If then we should possess a proof that no object is a class not
subordinated to itself, it would amount to the proof that no ob-
ject i~ a class of classes not subordinated to themselves. Bearing
• this relation between the above two propositions, I shall
in mind
now proceed to prove that no object is a class not subordinated
to itself.
§ 3. I shall call any object P an object subordinated to the
class J( if given some meaning of the word 'a' the following two
conditions are fulfilled: (1) J{ is a class of (objects) a; 2 (2) P is a.
Examples: (A) any human being C is subordinated to the class
of human beings, given that the word 'a' is employed to mean
'human being', both the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled,
and namely: (1) the class of human beings is the class (of objects)
a, (2) a human being C is a; (B) any P which is a half of the
sphere Q is subordinated to the class of halves of the sphere Q
because, if the word 'a' is employed to mean 'half of the sphere
Q', then: (1) the class of halves of sphere Q is a class (of objects)
a, (2) a half P of the sphere Q is a. Since the class of the halves of
sphere Q is the sphere Q itself, and the latter is not only the class
of all its halves but also the class of all its quadrants. In other
words, since the class of halves of the sphere Q is at the same time
the class of quadrants of the sphere Q and the other way round,
then ( C) any given half P of sphere Q is subordinated to the class
of quadrants of the sphere Q. For if the word 'a' is employed to
mean 'half of sphere Q', then: (1) the class of quadrants of the
sphere Q is a class (of objects) a, (2) the half P of sphere Q is
a.
2 I add the word 'objects' in parenthesis to stress that it is not the class
I< that is to be a, but that it is formed by the objects of which class J{ is the
class.
A Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves 117
§ 4. According with what I have adopted in the preceding

section concerning the expression 'an object subordinated to class
J{' - I shall call any object P' an object not subordinated to
class K, if with no interpretation of the meaning of the word 'a'
the following two conditions will be fulfilled together: (1) J{ is
a class (of ~bjects) a; (2) P 1 is a (that is if given every possible
meaning of the word 'a' at least one of these conditions fails to
Ill
be fulfilled). Examples: (I shall limit myself to merely citing the

examples without commenting on then because they do not sig-
nificantly bear upon the problem I have chosen as the subject of
my discussion) - (A) No elephant S is subordinated to the class of
human beings because no matter what is the meaning of the word
'a' the following two conditions not are fulfilled together - (1) the
class of human beings is a class (of objects) a, (2) an elephant Sis
a; (B) No human being C is subordinated to the class of human
heads because no matter what is the meaning of the word 'a' the
following two conditions are not fulfilled - (1) the class of human
heads is a class (of objects) a, (2) a human being C is a.
Remark 1. It is probably superfluous to stress specifically the
fact that the expression 'an object subordinated to class J{, as it
was understood in Section 3, stands in disjunctive contrast with
the expression 'an object not subordinated to class J{' in precisely
the way established in Section 4, that is, it is to mean any ob-
ject P' related to class J{ in such a way that no matter what is
the meaning of the word 'a' the following two conditions are not
fulfilled together - (1) J{ is a class (of objects) a, (2) P' is a.
It might, indeed, seem reasonable to someone that - by analogy
to the sense of the expression 'an object subordinated to class J{'
given in Section 3, for an object P' not to be subordinated to class
]{, it would be enough that the conditions mentioned ( (1) J{ is a
class (of objects) a, (2) P 1 is a) were not fulfilled together given
some meaning of the word 'a'; such a position does however in-
volve a contradiction for it would then be possible for one and the
same object P to be both subordinated and not subordinated to
class K. An example: any given half ( P) of the sphere Q is, as we

know from Section 3, subordinated to the class of quadrants of the
sphere Q because, if the word 'a' is employed to mean the expres-
sion 'half of sphere Q', both conditions are fulfilled- (1) the class
of quadrants of sphere Q is a class (of objects) a, (2) the half (P)
of the sphere Q is a; yet the same half (P) of the sphere Q is not
subordinated
II
to the class of quadrants of the sphere Q because
given a certain meaning of the word 'a' to wit when it means 'a
quadrant of sphere Q', although the first condition is fulfilled (the
class of quadrants of the sphere Q is a class (of objects) a), the
half ( P) of the sphere Q is not a and thus - the second condition
is not fulfilled, the half (P) of the sphere Q is in this case both
subordinated and not subordinated to the class of quadrants of
the sphere Q.
Remark 2. Some readers may, perhaps, experience a theo-
retical 'shocking' because accepting for the expression 'an object
subordinated to class J{' established in Section 3 - a half of the
sphere Q can be subordinated to the class of quadrants of the
sphere Q, despite the fact that no half of the sphere Q is a quad-
rant of the sphere Q; in more general terms, someone might object
that it is not done to have an object which 'is not an a' itself, nev-
ertheless subordinated to the class of objects a, which is precisely
the case with a half of the sphere Q which is not a quadrant of the
sphere Q and yet is to be subordinated to the class of quadrants
of the sphere Q. In diagnosing the origin of this 'shock' it might
be suggested that the dissonance can be removed if the expression
'an object subordinated to class J{' were used to denote an ob-
ject P, not given some meaning of the word 'a' such that the two
above-established conditions are fulfilled, but when these condi-
tions are fulfilled given every meaning of the word 'a'; Thus the
expression 'an object not subordinated to class J{' would be used
to denote an object P' not when at none of the meanings of the
expression 'a' the above two conditions are not fulfilled together,
but when they are not fulfilled together given some meaning of
The Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves 119
(were this modification of the meaning of the expression 'an ob-

ject not subordinated to class J{' not introduced it is easy to see
that a contradiction would result because, if for an object P and a
class J{ the above conditions were fulfilled for some other mean-
ings of the word 'a', and not fulfilled for some other meanings of
that word, then the object P would neither be subordinated to
class K no~ ,,not subordinated to it). Indeed - given all this - any
half P of the sphere Q would be not subordinated to the class of
quadrants of the sphere Q because it is not with every meaning
of the word 'a' that: (1) the class of quadrants of the sphere Q is
a class (of objects) a, and at the same time (2) a half (P) of the
sphere Q is a: given some meaning of the word 'a' e.g., when the
word 'a' is used to mean the expression 'a quadrant of the sphere
Q' the first of these conditions is fulfilled (the class of quadrants
of the sphere Q is a class of quadrants of the sphere Q) while
the second is not, because a half P of the sphere Q is not a. If,
however, we adopt such a meaning of the expression 'an object
subordinated to class J{' and 'an object not subordinated to class
J(' as suggested above, it seems that the resulting 'shocking' will
be even greater. For no object at all would be then subordinated
to any class at all because, as can be easily seen, any given object
P stands in such a relation to any possible class J{ that given
some meaning of the word 'a' both of the conditions are not ful-
filled together: (1) ]{ is a class (of objects) a, (2) P is a, in other
words - no object P stands in such a relation to any class J{,
that given any possible meaning of the word 'a' both the above
conditions remain fulfilled. Proof: Let us assume that an object
P is subordinated to the class I<; it follows that along with every
meaning of the word 'a' the two conditions: (1) J{ is a class (of
objects) a, (2) Pis a, are fulfilled; let us use the word 'a' to mean
'a square circle'; naturally conditions (1) and (2) must remain ful-
filled given this meaning of the word 'a', because they are fulfilled
along with every meaning of that word; consequently (1) J{ is a
class of square circles, (2) P is a square circle. The last propo-
sition contains a contradiction and as such, it is false; therefore
it is false; therefore the assumption which leads to this false con-

sequence must also be false, that is the assumption that some
object P is subordinated to the class J{; and if the assumption
that some object is subordinated to some class is false, then no
object is subordinated to any class ... From the point of view of
'savoir .vitJre' of various theories of classes this may seem an even
greater .,dissonance than the fact established in Section 3, to wit
that any half P of the sphere Q is subordinated to the class of
quadrants of the sphere Q. If then we were to nut out the idea de-
veloped here with a view to removing the 'squeaky' consequences
of the position adopted in Section 3, such a conception would be
abortive - creating a much more serious 'dissonance' ...
Remark 3. It may appear that certain slight modification of
the account of the expression 'an object subordinated to class
]{' similar to that used in Remark 2, will remove the above-
mentioned negative consequences of the standpoint developed
there without, at the same time, introducing the 'paradoxical'
consequences appertaining to the standpoint adopted in Section 3:
It could be claimed that it would be sufficient to accept the ex-
pression 'an object subordinated to class J{' as denoting an object
P when, given any meaning of the word 'a', both conditions - (1)
and (2) _-are fulfilled together given that at least one of these
conditions is fulfilled. It is by no means a consequence of the
Remark 2 that given this meaning of the expression 'an object
subordinated to class ]{', no object can ever be subordinated to
any class: we have, to be sure, shown in the previous remark that
it is false to assume that for an object P and a class J{ the con-
ditions (1) and (2) are fulfilled together given any meaning of the
word 'a'; since, however, I was using there the word 'a' to mean
something ('a square circle') at which neither of the two condi-
tions (1) and (2) was fulfilled, the question remains whether a less
far-reaching interpretation than the one refuted in the previous
remark could be true. I mean here the view that an object P
may stand in such a relation to the class J{ that both conditions
(1) and (2) are fulfilled given any meaning of the word 'a' if at
least one of these conditions is fulfilled. Someone might wish to
defend such a thesis in view of all this claiming that - given the
meaning of the expression 'an object subordinated to the class ]{'
established in the present remark - some objects may still be sub-
.
ordinated to some classes. I shall try to show that this is not the
case: I maintain that even given the last interpretation no object
fl
can be subordinated to any class. I shall assume - for the sake of
the proof - that some object P is subordinated to class ]{. I can
maintain, on the basis of the principle of simplification, that P is
P or not P, thus if I use the word 'a' to mean the expression 'P or
not P', then Pis 'a'; then of the two conditions - (1) ]{is a class
(of objects) a; (2) P is a - given a meaning of the word 'a' - one
is fulfilled; Further, the object P being subordinated to class ]{,
both conditions must be fulfilled if one of them is fulfilled; thus
given this meaning of the word 'a' condition (1) - ]{ is a class
(of objects) a - must be also fulfilled; Substituting for the word
'a' its meaning 'P or not P' we obtain:]{ is a class (of objects)
P or not P. On the basis of the ontological principle of the ex-
cluded middle every object is P or not P, the class (of objects)
P or not P is then a set of all objects in the universe. Therefore
]{ is the universe. Since - given any meaning of the word 'a' -
the expressions: 'a class (of objects) a' and 'a class of classes (of
objects) a' are different descriptions of one and the same object,
namely the object which is a set of all a's, the expression 'a class
of classes (of objects) P or not P' represents the same object as
that represented by the expression 'a class (of objects) P or not
P'. Therefore ](, being a class (of objects) P or not P, is by the
same token a class of classes (of objects) P or not P; if then we
use the word 'a' to mean the expression 'a class (of objects) P or
not P', ]{ is a class (of objects) a; given this meaning of the word
'a' condition (1) is fulfilled and for that reason the other condi-
tion is fulfilled as well, that is P is a. Substituting for the word
'a' its present meaning, i.e. the expression 'a class (of objects)
P or not P, we obtain: P is a class (of objects) P or not P; we
already know, however, that a class (of objects) P or not P is a

universe and therefore an object P which is a class (of objects) P
or not P is a universe (I). Let us consider a class of objects which
are not universes; it is a set of all objects which are not - every
one by itself - a universe; such a set is naturally a universe; we
therefory consider a universe as being a class of objects which are
not univ~rses. If then the word 'a' is taken to mean the expres-
sion 'a non-universe object' or in other words 'an object which is
not a universe', then a universe is a class (of objects) a; we know
already that J{ is a universe and accordingly, given the (above)
meaning of the word 'a', J{ is a class (of objects) a; therefore
also given this meaning of the word 'a', of the conditions (1) and
(2) the condition (1) is fulfilled; thus the other condition, P is a,
is also fulfilled. Substituting for the word 'a' its new meaning,
that is the expression 'a non-universe object', we obtain: P is a
non-universe object, in other words P is not a universe (II); by
comparing theses (I) and (II) we have, on the basis of the princi-
ple of composition: P is both a universe and a non-universe. The
latter proposition is a contradiction and, as such, it is false; the as-
sumption which leads to this false consequence must also be false,
that is the assumption that an object P is subordinated to the
class J{; and if the assumption that some object is subordinated
to a class is false, then no object is subordinated to any class.
Thus even the considerations and tenets of the present remark do
not succeed in saving us from the theoretical consequences that
arose at the end of Remark 2 above.
Remark 4. Two consequences extremely important for the
class theory follow if we accept the form of the expression 'an
object subordinated to a class !{' established in Section 3 above.
Firstly: every object n is subordinated to the class (of objects) n,
secondly not every object subordinated to the class (of objects) n
is an n. Proof: L Let us assume that an object Pis an n; let us
use the word 'a' to mean the word 'n'; given this meaning of the
word 'a'- (1) the class (of objects) n is the class (of objects) a,
(2) P is a; since the two above conditions are both fulfilled given
some meaning of the word 'a', the object Pis subordinated to the
class (of objects) n. IL If every object subordinated to the class
of quadrants of a sphere Q would be a quadrant of the sphere Q
itself as we know from Section 3, any half P of the sphere Q is
subordinated to the class of quadrants of the sphere Q, given both
the above c~nditions it follows that a half of the sphere Q is also
a quadrant ~f the sphere Q which is obviously false; consequently
the assumption on which this conclusion is based, i.e. the as-
sumption that every object subordinated to the class (of objects)
n is an n, must be false. Thus: not every object subordinated to
a class {of objects) n is an n. It is important to bear in mind
these two simple principles, in order to guard against some very
common types of fallacious inference found in class theory.
§ 5. I use the expression 'a class subordinated to itself' to refer
to any class J( which is subordinated to class ]{; thus taking into
account the meaning of the expression 'an object subordinated to
the class IC established in Section 3, I can say that I call any
class ]{ a class subordinated to itself if given some meaning of
the word 'a' the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) ]{ is
a class (of objects) a, (2) ]{ is a. Examples: (A) the class of
objects present at the moment in my room is a class subordinated
to itself for, if we employ the word to mean 'an object present at
the moment in my room', then: (1) the class of objects present at
the moment in my room is a class (of objects) a, (2) the class of
objects present at the moment in my room is a (for this class is
itself an object present at the moment in my room); (B) a class
of classes is a class subordinated to itself because, if we use the
word 'a' to meaning 'a class', then: (1) a class of classes is a class
of objects a, (2) a class of classes is a.
§ 6. In accordance with the view I have adopted in the preced-
ing para.graph in relation to the expression 'a class subordinated
to itself', I use the expression 'a class not subordinated to itself'
to refer to any class ]{ 1 which is not subordinated to class ]{ 1 ;

thus taking into account the meaning of the expression 'an object
not subordinated to class J{' adopted in Section 4, I can say that
I regard as not subordinated to itself any class ]{1 if there is no
meaning of the word 'a' given which the two following conditions
are fu~fi.lJed together: (1) !{ 1 is a class (of objects) a, (2) ]{1 is
a.
§ 7. I find it impossible to give an example of a class not
subordinated to itself because there is no such a class: every class
is subordinated to itself. Proof: let us assume that some class J{
is not subordinated to itself; this means - on the basis of Sec-
tion 6 - that there is no meaning of the word 'a' such that given
it both of the two conditions: (1) J{ is a class (of objects) a,
(2) K is a (I), 3 are fulfilled together. Of necessity the class J{
is a class of some objects n; Let us mark the class of objects n
by means of the expression '.Z::::: n'; on the basis of the law of tau-
tology - L n = L n + L n 4 (II); as I have already observed in
Remark 3 of Section 4, the expression 'a class of objects n' refers
to the same object as that referred to by the expression 'a class of
classes of objects n', in other words - the expression 'I: n' refers
to the same object as that referred to by the expression '.Z::::: L n';
substituting the expression '.Z::::: L n' for one of the expressions
'.Z::::: n' in formula (II), we obtain: L n = LL n + L n (III).
We know that the logical sum of two classes of which one is
a class (of objects) a and the other a class (of objects) b is a
class of objects which are either a or b; thus LI: n + En,
that is the logical sum of the two classes LL n and L n one
of which is a class of objects I: n and the other a class of ob-
jects n, is a class (of objects) which are either L n or n; in
other words LL n + L:n = .Z:::::('L: n or n) (IV); since L n =
.Z:::::.Z:::::n + L:n (III), and I:I:n + L:n = .Z:::::(.Z:::::n or n) (IV),
therefore L n = .Z:::::(l:: n or n) (V); and since J{ is in fact :Z:::: n,
3 Sign '(I)' marks the fact that the thesis in question is stressed.
4 Cf., e.g., Louis Couturat, L 'algebre de la logique, 1905, p. 13.
then J{ is I:(I: n or n) (VI); as ]{ is I: n, then - on the basis

of the principles of simplification and syllogism - J{ is I: n or
n (VII); let us use the word 'a' to mean 'I: n or n'. Substituting
the word 'a' in (VI) and (VII) for the expression 'I: n or n' we
obtain: ]{ is I: a (VIII), ]{ is a (IX): thus given some meaning
of the word 'a:, and namely when the word 'a' is used to mean
':z= n or n ', 'both the conditions: ( 1) J{ is a class (of objects) a,
(2) J{ is a (X) 5 - are fulfilled together. Comparing statements (I)
and (X) we see that they are contradictory; thus the assumption
adopted above, i.e. that some class J{ is not subordinated to it-
self, leads to the consequence that two contradictory propositions
are both true; since the logical principle of contradiction prevents
us from accepting such a conclusion, the assumption which led to
it must be false, i.e. the assumption that some class ]{is not sub-
ordinated to itself, therefore every class is subordinated to itself.
Accordingly, such classes, e.g., the class of human beings, which
have so far been regarded as not subordinated to themselves, are
subordinated to themselves: if we use the word 'a' to mean 'a
human being, or the class of human beings', then (1) the class
of human beings is a class (of objects) a, (2) the class of human
beings is a.
§ 8. No object is a class, not subordinated to itself. Proof:
Let us assume that some object P is a class, not subordinated
to itself (I); since every class is subordinated to itself, the ob-
ject P which is a class, is a class subordinated to itself (II). On
the basis of the principle of composition we obtain from state-
ments (I) and (II) that P is a class both subordinated and not
subordinated to itself. The conclusion we have obtained is a con-
tradiction, therefore the assumption that some object P is a class,
not subordinated to itself, must be false; if so, then no object is a
class not subordinated to itself.
5 Sign '(X)' marks the fact that the thesis in question is stressed.
§ 9. As I have already indicated in-Section 2, the proof that

no object is a class not subordinated to itself, is indirectly a proof
that no object is a class of classes not subordinated to themselves.
I have proved in Section 8 that no object is a class not subordi-
nated to itself, thus we may conclude that no object is a class of
classes, .ndt subordinated to themselves. This is the answer to the
question.presented at the end of Section 1 above.
§ 10. It follows from Section 9 that the expression 'a class
of classes, not subordinated to themselves' does not denote any
object, therefore, as I have already stated in Section 1 above, the
question 'Is the class of classes not subordinated to themselves
s1tbordinated to itself' allows of neither a positive nor a negative
true answer. This constitutes the solution of the problem that is
the title of the present paper.
Remark 1. The solution of Russell's 'paradox'. It would prob-
ably never have occurred to me to answer the quite strange prob-
lem given in the title of this paper, were it not for its being related
to Russell's famous 'paradox'. That 'paradox' consists, as is well
known, in that both answers to the question, whether a class
of classes not subordinated to themselves is subordinated to it-
self, allegedly lead to a contradiction: (1) if a class of classes not
subordinated to themselves is subordinated to itself, then it is
subordinated to a class of classes not subordinated to themselves,
and if it is subordinated to a class of classes not subordinated
to themselves, then it is a class not subordinated to itself, which
contradicts one of the initial assumptions; (2) if a class of classes
not subordinated to themselves is not subordinated to itself, then
it is not subordinated to a class of classes not subordinated to
themselves, and if it is not subordinated to a class of classes not
subordinated to themselves, then it is not a class not subordinated
1',
to itself, or is a class subordinated to itself, which contradicts the
other assumption; but if the hypothesis (1) that a class of classes
not subordinated to themselves is subordinated to itself, is false,
then it is true that this class is not subordinated to itself (I); on
the other hand, however, since the hypothesis (2) that a class of
classes not subordinated to themselves is not subordinated to it-
self, is also false, then it is true that this class is subordinated to
itself (II); it follows from the comparison of theses (I) and (II)
that a class of classes not subordinated to themselves is both not
subordinated, and subordinated to itself; thus we have 'a para-
dox' !6 The 'solution' of this 'paradox' may consist in printing out
the errors inherent in its formulation; these errors are: (A) The
hypothesis (I) does not in the least lead to the contradiction in-
dicated above because we cannot, from the fact that a class of
classes not subordinated to themselves is subordinated to a class
of classes not subordinated to themselves, infer that a class of
classes not subordinated to themselves is a class not subordinated
to itself - since it is known from Remark 4 to Section 4 that not
every object subordinated to a class of objects n, is n. (B) We
cannot infer from the falseness of hypothesis ( 1) that thesis (I) is
true: as I have already indicated elsewhere7 - we can infer from
the falseness of one of two contradicting propositions that the
other is true - only in such cases when these propositions con-
tain subjects that denote something, while in our case the subject
of the propositions in question, that is t):ie expression 'a class of
---classes- not subordinated to themselves', denotes nothing as we
know from the present Section. Russell's 'paradox' has thus been
here solved by demonstrating that there are two different errors
in its formulation.
Remark 2. Russell's 'paradox' would also be solved if the
expressions: 'an object subordinated to the class J{' and 'an ob-
ject not subordinated to the class J{' - were used with meanings
adopted in Remarks 2 and 3 to Section 4. We already know from
these particular remarks that - given such meanings of the above
expressions - no object is subordinated to any class; it follows from
6 A more thorough formulation of Russell's 'paradox' can be found in Jan

Lukasiewicz's work (1910b], pp. 128-132.
7
Cf.: Lesniewski, I.e., p. 343 (in a separate print, p. 31).
this that no class (and therefore neither the class K) is subordi-

nated to itself; given this, every class is a class not subordinated
to itself. We can also talk of a class of classes not subordinated to
themselves; the latter class is, as every other class, not subordi-
nated to itself; this does not lead to contradictions because now,
from the fact that a class of classes not subordinated to them-
selves is not subordinated to a class of classes not subordinated
to themselves, does not follow that this class is subordinated to
itself (as was the case with hypothesis (2) of Remark 1): we can-
not, after all, refer here to the principle that if an object is not
subordinated to a class of objects n, then it is not n, because given
the meanings, adopted here such a principle is false. Proof: let
us assume that this principle is true; it follows that every object
not subordinated to the class of human beings is not a human be-
ing (III); we know already that no human being, just as no object
whatsoever, is subordinated to any class, thus neither the class
of human beings is (IV); it follows from comparison of theses (II)
and (IV) that no human being is a human being; therefore the
principle in question is false because it leads to a contradiction.
So even in such circumstances Russell's 'paradox' is 'slain'. The
'paradox' contributed to the clarification of the foundations of
class theory and that is its historic desert. Let it rest in glory!
J(imborciszki. In January, 1914.
FOUNDATIONS OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF SETS. I
(Part. Ingredient. Set. Class. Element. Subclass.

Certain interesting kinds of classes.)
Offered to my wife
"... it is easier, come what may, to

write out the truth, to thoroughly dis-
cuss and debate it, than to remain
wholly silent about it ... "
(Tadeusz Kotarbinski, 'Metoda Konstrukcyj-
na a rozumowanie osobiste' (The construc-
tive method and private reasoning), Przeglo,d
Filozoficzny (1914), p. 182.)
PREFACE
The present work is the first link in an extended series of works,

which I intend to publish in the near or distant future, desiring
contribute as much as possible to the justification of modern
mathematics. That such a justification is not a superfluous mat-
ter, is clear to anyone who is even acquainted with no more than
the 'antinomies' which mathematics has arrived at in the last
decades of its development.
The arrangement of definitions and truths, which I established
in the present work dedicated to the most general problems of
the theory of sets, has for me, in comparison to other previously
known arrangements of definitions and truths (Zermelo, Russell,
etc.,) this advantage, that it eliminates the 'antinomies' of the
general theory of sets without narrowing the original domain of
Cantor's term 'set', as is seen even in my Axiom III, and on
the other hand, it does not lead to assertions which are in such
startling conflict with intuitions of the 'commonalty', as e.g., the

theorem of the contemporary 'non-naive' theory of sets which
demands the differentiation of some object from the collection
which contains this one sole object as an element. I admit freely
that some of my theorems e.g., Theorem XXVII, could shock the
'mathematical intuitions' of various more or less sensitive thinkers
when 'contemplating the elegance of certain theoretical construc-
tions, •regardless of whether those constructions contribute in any
degree whatsoever towards the scientific capturing of reality, or
whether they merely serve to justify the dominant habits of our
epoch, which distinguish themselves by a high degree of inertia.
However, I cannot deny myself the pleasure of stating the fact that
I tried to write my work so that it would not concern exclusively
some kind of 'free creations' of various more or less Dedekindian
creative souls; it follows hence, that I cared more about the fact
that my theorems, while possessing as exact form as possible,
should harmonize with the 'common sense' of the representatives
of the 'esprit laique' who are engaged in investigating a reality
not 'created by them', than I did about the fact whatever I was
saying should be in accord with the 'intuitions' of the profes-
sional set-theoreticians whose intuitions emerge from a centrifuge
of mathematical minds equipped with an apparatus of 'free cre-
ativity' demoralized by 'unreal' speculative constructions.
I wish to add a few words as a preventative measure against
possible critical objections from the 'philosophical' camp: that
is - in my system the expressions are treated as a hypothetical-
deductive system, from which it follows that, properly speaking,
I assert only that those propositions which I call 'theorems' result
from the propositions which I call 'axioms'. The psychic 'sources'
of my axioms are my intuitions, which simply means, that I be-
lieve in the truth of my axioms, but I am unable to say why I
believe, since I am not acquainted with the theory of causality.
My axioms do not have a logical 'source', which simply means
that these axioms do not have proofs within my system, just as
in general no axioms, in the nature of things, have proofs in that
Foundations of the General Theory of Sets 131
system for which they are axioms. I am quite unable to answer

the question, what is the 'objective value' of my axioms, nor any
other sin1ilar questions, which concern the exponents of the so-
called theory of knowledge - because I admit sadly and to my
clear disadvantage, that despite my most sincere wishes, I am
still unable to understand even one of the problems which occur
in the just ~entioned
,, respectable 'science'.
On the question concerning the way of using expressions, I
mention that of the mathematical terms which I use, the ex-
pression 'part' is the only one I do not define, supposing that
this term will not cause misunderstandings, - considering that
its intuitive character acquires considerable clarity in the light of
Axioms I a.nd II. The terms 'set' and 'element', usually accepted
without definitions in the theory of sets, are defined in the present
work.
In concluding these introductory remarks I express sincere
thanks to all who contributed in various different ways to the
formation of my work, and above all to my honoured Professor
Waclaw Sierpiri.ski, who did not spare his authoritative informa-
tion and advice, and to my friend Dr. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, whose
remarks, numerous and full of logical subtlety, contributed greatly
~~··~~··· in their time to the elaboration of the main framework of the con-
ceptions which I was defending. To the 'Polish Scientific Circle in
Moscow' I express true gratitude for making possible the appear-
ance of my work as early as this.
Moscow, in April 1916.
§1
AXIOM I. If object P is a part of object P1, then object P1 zs
not a part of object P.
AXIOM II. If object P is a part of object P1, and object P1 zs
a pa1t of object P2, then object P is a part of object P2. ·
THEOREM I. No object is a patt of itself
Proof: We suppose, that some object X is a part of itself,

which rneans a part of object X. From this supposition it follows
- in accordance with Axiom I - that object X is not a part of
object X, which is a contradiction of our supposition. Therefore,
our supposition that some object is a part of itself, which led to
this contradiction, must be false. Thus, no object is a part of
itself,· which was to be proved.
If
§2
DEFINITIONI. I use the expression 'ingredient of object P' to

denote the same object P and every part of that object. 1
Among the consequences of this definition are the two follow-
ing theorems:
THEOREM II. Every object is an ingredient of itself.
THEOREM III. If P1 is a part of object P, then P1 is an in-
gredient of object P.
§3
THEOREM IV. If P is an ingredient of object P1 and P1 zs an

ingredient of P2, then P is an ingredient of object P2.
Proof: In accordance with definition I the proposition:
(1) 'Pis an ingredient of object Pi, and P1 is an ingredient of
object P2'
is true always and only then, if one of the four following proposi-
tions is true:
(2) 'P is P1, P1 is P2 ',
(3) 'Pis Pi, P1 is a part of object P2',
(4) 'Pis a part of object P1, P1 is P2',
(5) 'Pis a part of object P1, P1 is a part of object P2'.
1 The proposal to use the expression 'ingredient' in this context was sug-
gested to me by Lucyan Zarzecki.
If proposition (2) is true, then on the basis of the principle of

syllogism P is P2, and such being the case - on the grounds of
Theorem II - Pis an ingredient of object P2. If proposition (3) is
true, then P is here just the object P1, which is a part of object P2,
from which it follows, that P is a part of object P2, and therefore
.
- in accordance with Theorem III - P is an ingredient .
of P2. If
proposition C4) is true, then P, which is a part of object P1, is the
same part of P2, since P is - in accordance with proposition (4)
- none other than just this P2; thus from this it follows that P
is - in accordance with Theorem III - an ingredient of objectP2.
If proposition (5) is true, then - in accordance with Axiom II -
P is a part of object P2, from which it follows on the basis of
the Theorem III, that Pis an ingredient of object P2. So we see,
that, if any one of the propositions (2), (3), (4), (5) is true, then
P is an ingredient of object P2; but because this proposition (1)
is true just in case one of the four propositions (2), (3), (4), (5) is
true, therefore, if proposition (1) is true, then P is an ingredient
of object P2; differently: if P is an ingredient of object P1, and
P1 is an ingredient of object P2, then P is an ingredient of object
P2. Which was to be proved.
THEOREM V. If I is an ingredient of object PJ then some
· · ingredient of object I is an ingredient of object P.
Proof: We suppose, that the theorem which is to be proved,
is false. It follows from this, that there exists an ingredient Ii of
object P, [such] that no ingredient I1 is an ingredient of object P.
We see from this, that this object Ii (which in accordance with
Theorem II is an ingredient of object I1) is not an ingredient of
object P. We get the consequence that it must be false that I1
is not an ingredient of object P, since the object Ii denominated
above, is an ingredient of object P. Our supposition that Theo-
rem Vis false, which led to this consequence, must therefore also
be false. Thus Theorem Vis true.
THEOREM VI. If I is an ingredient of object P, then some

ingredient of object I is an ingredient of some ingredient of ob-
ject P.
Proof: We suppose, that the theorem which is to be proved,
is false. It follows from this, that there exists an ingredient Ii of
object P, [such] that no ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient
of any ingredient of object P. It follows further from this, that
no ingredient of object I1 is an ingredient of object P (which in
accordance with Theorem II - is an ingredient of object P). We
may formulate this differently (knowing this, that !1 is an ingre-
dient of object P), namely: no ingredient of some ingredient of
object P is an ingredient of this object P. The assertion we get is
a contradiction of Theorem V. Our supposition that Theorem VI
is false, which led to this contradiction, must therefore be false.
Thus - Theorem VI is true.
§4
DEFINITION II. I use the expression 'set [mnogosc1 of objects

m' to denote every object P, which satisfies the following condi-
tion: if I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of
_?~j-~<:j;~f_j~ anji:igredient of some m, which is an ingredient of
object P.
{Examples: I. Every given nation N is a set of people, since,
if I is an ingredient of nation N, then some ingredient of object I
is an ingredient of some man, who is an ingredient of nation N.
II. The surface of a chessboard is not a set of white squares, since
in this case the requirement of the condition of Definition II is not
maintained: here - no black square, which is an ingredient of a
chessboard, has even one ingredient, which is an ingredient of any
white square, therefore it is not true, that, if I is an ingredient of
the chessboard, then some ingredient of object I is an ingredient
of some white square, which is an ingredient of the chessboard.
III. We consider the segments AB of Figure 1 and we use the

A C D E G F B
m m m m
expression 'm' to denote every segment AC, CD, DE, and DB,
which is a partt of segment AB. Segment AF is not a set of ob-
jects m, bec~use
- ,, segment GF, which is an ingredient of segment
AF, has not even one ingredient, which is an ingredient of any
m, which is an ingredient of segment AF, therefore it is not true,
that, if I is an ingredient of segment AF, then some ingredient
of object I is an ingredient of some m, which is an ingredient of
segment AF.}
DEFINITION III. I use the expressions 'set of all objects m'
and 'class [klasa] of objects m' to denote every object P, which
satisfies the two following conditions:
1) every m is an ingredient of object P,
2) if I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some m.
{Examples: I. Mankind is the set of all men, or the class of
men, because 1) every man is an ingredient of mankind, 2) if I is
an ingredient of mankind, then some ingredient of object I is an
~-~"~~-~~-~ingretlielit~of some man. II. Segment AC of Figure 2 is not the
A C D B
class of parts of segment AB, because not every part of segment

AB is an ingredient of segment. AC, thus it does not maintain
condition 1 of Definition III. III. Segment AB of Figure 2 is not
the class of segment AC, because in this case condition 2 of Defi-
nition III is not maintained: segment DB, which is an ingredient
of segment AB, does no_t have even one ingredient, which is an
ingredient which is a part of segment AC, therefore it is not true,
that, if I is an ingredient of segment AB, then some ingredient
of object I is an ingredient of some part of segment AC.
AXIOM III. If some object ism, then some object is the class
of objects m.
AXIOM IV. If P is the class of objects m, and P1 is the class
of objects m, then P is P1.
§5
THEPREM VII. If P is the class of objects mJ then P is a set

of obfects m.
Pfoof: We assume, that
(1) P is the class of objects m.
In accordance with Definition III we may record:
(2) every m is an ingredient of object P.
(3) if I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some m.
From assertion (3) we infer on the basis of assertion (2), that, if
I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object I is
an ingredient of some m, which is an ingredient of object P. It
results from this - in agreement with Definition II - that
(4) P is a set of objects m.
Thus assertion (1) leads to assertion (4). It follows from this,
that, if P is the class of objects m, then P is a set of objects m,
which was to be proved.
~--~--------------THE-OREM VIII.-Every object P is the class of ingredients of
that object P.
Proof: On the basis of the law of identity we may record:
(1) every ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object P.
From Theorem VI we know, that,
object I is an ingredient of some ingredient of object P.
From assertions (1) and (2) we get in accordance with Defini-
tion III the given theorem.
THEOREM IX. If some object is a part of object P, then P is
the class of parts of object P.
Proof: We assume, that,
(1) some object is a part of object P.
It follows from this, that some object is an object P1, such that
(2) P1 is a part of object P.
On account of the truth of assertion (1) we infer from Theorem III,
that
(3) every part of object P is an ingredient of object P.
From asserti.ons (3) and (2) it results, that
(4) P1 is an ingredient of object P.
From Theorem II we know, that
(5) P1 is an ingredient of object P1.
From assertions (4) and (5) it follows, that
(6) some ingredient of object Pis an ingredient of object P1.
From assertions (6) and (2) we infer, that
(7) some ingredient of object P is an ingredient of some part of
object P.
We may state, that
(8) if C is a part of object P, then some ingredient of object C
is an ingredient of some part of object P,
since if we supposed differently it would follow that some part C1
of object P is such that no ingredient of object C1 is an ingredient
of any part of object P, from which it would result (in accordance
--~--~~-~~~--witJil'_b,~Qr_~mJl), that this object C1 is not an ingredient of any
part of object P, from which we get the inference, in contradiction
to Theorem II, the_Jnference namely, that C1 is not an ingredient
of object C1. In accordance with Definition I we write:
(9) every ingredient of object P is either object P or a part of
object P.
From assertions ( 7) and (8) we infer on the basis of assertion (9),
that
object I is an ingredient of some part of object P.
From assertions (3) and (10) it follows in accordance with Defini-
tion III, that
(11) Pis the class of parts of object P.
Thus assertion (1) leads to assertion (11). It follows from this,

that, if some object is a part of object P, then P is the class of
parts of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM X. Every given object P is the class of ob-
jects P.
P.roof: Knowing from Theorem II, that P is an ingredient of
object, P, we may record:
(1) every P is an ingredient of object P.
From Theorem V it is known, that,
object I is an ingredient of object P.
From assertions (1) and (2) we obtain the given theorem on the
basis of Definition III.
§6
DEFINITION IV. I use the expression 'element of object P' to

denote any object P1 when, with some meaning of the expression
'x' the following two conditions are maintained:
1) P is the class of objects x,
2) P1 is x.
{Examples: I. Segment AC in Figure 2 is an element of seg-
ment AB, because, if the expression 'x' is used with the meaning
of the expression 'segment, which is AC or AB', then 1) segment
AB is the class of objects x, 2) segment AC is x. II. A horse J{ is
not an element of the class of mice, because with some meaning of
the expression 'x' it is not true, that the class of mice is the class
of objects x, and at the same time the horse J( is x. (Comment:
the horse J{ is neither the class of mice nor a part of the class of
mice; it follows from this - in accordance with Definition I - that
the horse J( is not an ingredient of the class of mice; if with any
meaning of the expression 'x' it was true that the proposition:
1) 'the class of mice is the class of objects x' was true and at the
same time the proposition 2) 'the horse J{ is x', was true, then it
would result on the grounds of Definition III, that horse J( was

an ingredient of the class of mice)}.
§7
THEOREM .XI. If P1 is an ingredient of object P) then P1 zs

an element of object P.
Proof: We assume, that
About object P we may say - in accordance with Theorem VIII
- that
(2) P is the class of ingredients of object P.
Using the expression 'x' with the meaning of the expression 'in-
gredient of object P', we infer from assertions (2) and (1), that
(3) P is the class of objects x.
(4) P1 is x.
tion IV, that
(.5) P1 is an element of object P.
Thus, assuming assertion (1), we arrive at assertion (5). It follows
from this, that, if P1 is an ingredient of P, then P1 is an element
~.~-~.~~~0r·0ojecrP·,-·\vhTchwas -to be proved.
THEOREM XII. If P1 is an element of object P) then P1 is an

ingredient of object P.
(1) P1 is an element of object P.
From assertion (1) it follows - in accordance with Definition IV -
that there exists a meaning of the expression 'x', such that
(2) P is the class of objects x,
(3) P1 is x.
From assertion (2) we infer on the basis of Definition III, that
(4) every xis an ingredient of object P.
From assertions ( 4) and (3) it follows, that
Thus, assuming assertion (1) we arrive at assertion (5). It follows

from this, that, if P1 is an element of object P, then P1 is an
ingredient of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM XIII. If P1 is a part of object P, then P1 zs an
element of object P.
This theorem is inferred from Theorems III and XI.
-rHEOREM XIV. Every object is an element of itself
Proof: We suppose, that the theorem, which is to be proved,
is false. It follows from this, that some object is such an object
P, that
(1) Pis not an element of object P.
It follows from this, that
(2) P is not an ingredient of object P.
Since P is an ingredient of object P, then P is - in accordance
with Theorem XI - an element of P, which is contradictory to
assertion (1). Assertion (2) is contradictory to Theorem II. Our
assumption that Theorem XIV is false, which led to this contra-
diction, must therefore be false. Thus Theorem XIV is true.
THEOREM XV. If P is an element of P1) and P1 is an element
of object P2) then P is an element of object P2.
··· Proof J..Ve assume, that
(1) P is an element of object P1 and P1 is an element of
object P2.
It follows from this - in accordance with Theorem XII - that
(2) Pis an ingredient of object P1,
From assertions (2) and (3) we infer on the basis of Theorem IV,
that
(4) Pis an ingredient of object P2,
from which it follows - in agreement with Theorem XI - that
(5) P is an element of object P2.
Thus, assuming assertion (1 ), we arrive at assertion (5). It fol-
lows from this, that, if Pis an element of object Pi, and P1 is an
element of object P2, then P is an element of object P2. Which

was to be proved.
THEOREM XVI. If P is the class of objects m} then every m
is an element of object P.
(1) Pis the.class of objects m.
It follows from this - in accordance with Definition III - that
(2) every m is an ingredient of object~ P.
From Theorem XI and (2) it follows, that
(3) every m is an element of object P.
Thus, assuming assertion (1 ), we arrive at assertion (3). It follows
from this, that, if P is the class of objects m, then every m is an
element of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM XVII. If P is a set of objects m, then some m is
an element of object P.
It follows from this - in accordance with Definition II - that, if P
is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object I is an
ingredient of some m, which is an ingredient of object P. We see
-~,~~-~from-this, that some ingredient of this object P is (in accordance
with Theorem II) an ingredient of some m, which is an ingredient
of object P. Thus some ingredient of object P is an ingredient of
some object X, such that
(2) Xis m,
(3) X is an ingredient of object P.
From assertion (3) we infer- on the basis of Theorem XI-that
(4) X is an element of object P.
From assertions (2) and (4) it results, that
(5) son1e m is an element of object P.
Thus, assuming assertion (1), we arrive at assertion (5). It fol-
lows from this, that, if P is a set of objects m, then some rn is an
element of object P, which was to be proved.
§8
THEOREM XVIII. If P is m 1 then P is a set of objects m.

Proof: We suppose, that the assertion which is to be proved,
P 1 , that indeed
(1) P' ism,
but II
(2) P' is not a set of objects m.
(3) P' is an ingredient of object P 1•
In accordance with Theorem V
(4) if I is an ingredient of object P', then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of object P 1•
(5) if I is an ingredient of object P 1, then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of object P 1, which is an ingredient
of object P 1•
From assertions (5) and (1) it follows, that,
(6) if I is an ingredient of object P', then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some m, which is an ingredient
-----0r-0BjectP 1.-
From assertion (6) it results - in agreement with Definition II -
that
(7) P 1 is a set of objects m.
Assertion (7) is contradictory to Theorem 2. Our supposition,
that Theorem XVIII is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. Thus Theorem XVIII is true.
THEOREM XIX. If P is a set of objects m, and every m is n,
then P is a set of objects n.
Proof: We assume, that:
(1) P is a set of objects m,
(2) every m 1s n.
From assertion (1) we infer - in accordance with Definition II -

that,
object I is an ingredient of some m, which is an ingredient
of object P.
From assertion&..... (3) and (2) it results, that
(4) if I is an jngredient of object P, then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some n, which is an ingredient of
object P.
From assertion (4) we infer - in accordance with Definition II -
that
(.5) P is a set of objects n.
Thus, assuming assertions (1) and (2), we arrive at assertion (5).
It follows from this, that, if P is a set of objects m, and every m
is n, then P is a set of objects n. Which was to be proved.
THEOREM XX. If P is the class of sets of objects m, then P
is the class of objects m.
(1) Pis the class of sets of objects m.
It follows from this - in accordance with Definition III - that,
~~~~~<~<<~J~t~e".:~£Y~~~t9f_q];>j~ct_s vijs an ingredient of object P,
object I is an ingredient of some set of objects m.
From Theorem XVIII we infer, that
(4) every m is a set of objects m.
(5) every m is an ingredient of object P.
We can be convinced, that
object I is an ingredient of some m,
by means of the following reasoning: we suppose, that asser-
tion (6) is false; it follows from this, that some object is an object
I1, such that it is true that
(a) Ii is an ingredient of object P,

but
(b) no ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient of any m;
from assertions (3) and (a) we infer, that
(c) some ingredients of object Ii is an ingredient of some set
of ~bjects m, from which it follows, that some object is an
_.. ..
object
,, I2, such that
( d) I2 is a set of objects m,
(e) some ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient of object I2,
from assertion (e) it results, that some object is an object !3, such
that
(f) !3 is an ingredient of object Ii,
(g) J3 is an ingredient of object I2;
from assertion (d) we infer - in accordance with Definition II -
that
(h) if I is an ingredient of object I2, then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some m;
from assertions (h) and (g) it follows, that
(i) some ingredient of object !3 is an ingredient of some m
which means, that some object is an object J4, such that
l4_i~__ Q,pjngredient of object J3,
(1) J4 is an ingredient of some m;
from assertions (k) and (f) we infer - on the basis of Theo-
rem IV
(m) J4 is an ingredient of object Ii;
from assertions (1) and (m) it follows, that
(n) some ingredient of Ii is an ingredient of some m,
assertion (n) is contradictory to assertion (b ); Our supposition,
that assertion (6) is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. Thus assertion (6) is true. From assertions (5)
and (6) it results in accordance with Definition III, that
(7) P is the class of objects m.
Thus, assuming assertion (1), we arrive at assertion (7). That if

P is a class of sets of objects m, then P is the class of objects m,
which was to be proved.
THEOREM XXL If P is a set of objects m) then P is an in-
gredient of the class of objects m.
Proof: We*assume, that
It follows from this - in accordance with Axiom III - that some
object is an object P1, such that
(2) P1 is the class of sets of objects m.
From assertion (2) it results - in accordance with Definition III -
that
(3) every set of objects mis an ingredient of object P1.
(4) P is an ingredient of object P1.
From assertion (1) it follows - in agreement with Theorem XX -
that
(5) P1 is the class of objects m.
From assertions (4) and (5) we see, that
(6) P is an ingredient of the class of objects m.
~·.·~,~~~~,~Thus =~assuming assertion (1) - we arrive at assertion (6). From
this it follows, that, if P is a set of objects m., then P is an ingre-
dient of the class of objects m, which was to be proved.
THEOREM XXII. If P is the class of objects m; then P is the
class of sets of objects m.
Proof: We suppose, that the assertion, which is to be proved,
P1 that indeed
(1) P1 is the class of objects m,
but
(2) P1 is not the class of sets of objects m.
From assertion (2) we infer - in accordance with Definition III -
that at least one of the following assertions must be false:
(a) every set of objects mis an ingredient of object Pi,

(b) if I is an ingredient of object P1, then some ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some set of objects m.
We examine in turn the possible falsity of each of the two asser-
tions just formulated. We examine firstly proposition (a) and we
suppose,. that the proposition is false. It follows from this, that
some object
,, is such an object P2, that indeed
(a) P2 is a set of objects m,
but
(/3) P2 is not an ingredient of object P1.
From Theorem XXI and (a) we infer, that
('r) P2 is an ingredient of the class of objects m,
from which it follows, that some object is an object P3, such
that
(8) Pa is the class of objects m,
(E) P2 is an ingredient of object P3
from assertions (5) and (1) it results on the basis of Axiom IV,
that
(77) P3 is P1.
From assertions ( E) and (77) we see, that
"'"~-------~----~--------------- ___ ((}_f~_js an i!J:gregjent of object P1.
Assertion ( () is a contradiction of assertion (/3). Our supposition
that assertion (a) is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. We suppose, now, that assertion (b) is false.
It follows from this, that some object is such an object Ii, that
indeed
(B) Ii is an ingredient of object P1,
but
(l) no ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient of any set of
objects m.
(n:) I1 is an ingredient of object Ii.
From assertions ( l) and ( K) we infer, that
(.,\) Ji is not an ingredient of any set of objects m.

From assertions (B) and (.,\)it results, that
(µ) P1 is not a set of objects m,
from which it follows on the basis of Theorem VII, that
(v) P1 is not a class of objects m.
Assertion (v.) is a contradiction of assertion (1). Our supposition
that asserti<¥1 (b) is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. Thus then
(3) assertion (2) is false,
because, as we see, neither of the assertions (a) and (b), is false,
of which at least one must be false, if assertion (2) is true. Asser-
tion (3) is a contradiction of assertion (2). Therefore, our suppo-
sition that Theorem XXII is false, which led to this contradiction,
must be false. Thus Theorem XXII is true.
THEOREM XXIII. If it is true, that, if I is an ingredient of
object P1, then some ingredient of object I is an ingredient of
object PJ then P1 is an ingredient of object P.
Proof: We assume, that it is true, that
(1) if I is an ingredient of object P1, then some ingredient of
---~--~---~EtQmTh_eQ:r:emJLwe _know, that
From assertions (1) and (2) we infer, that some object is such an
object P2, that
(3) P2 is an ingredient of object P1,
(5) some object is an ingredient of object P1 and at the same
time an ingredient of object P.
It is clear, that
(6) every object which is an ingredient of object P1 and at the
same time an ingredient of object P, is an ingredient of
object P1.
We ca.n be convinced, that

(7) if I is an ingredient of object Pi, then some ingredient
of object I is an ingredient of some object, which is an
ingredient of object P1 and at the same time object P,
by means of the following reasoning: we suppose that assertion (7)
is false; it follows from this, that some object is such an object Ii,
that indeed
,,
(a) Ii is an ingredient of object P1,
but
(b) no ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient of any object,
which is an ingredient of object P1 and at the same time
object P;
From assertions (1) and (a) it follows, that
(c) some ingredient of object I1 is an ingredient of object P;
From assertion (c) we see, that some object is an object I2, such
that
(d) I2 is an ingredient of object 11,
(e) I2 is an ingredient of object P;
From assertions (cl) and (a) we infer, that
(f) I2 is an ingredient of object P1;
From asserti()nS (f) and (e) it results, that
(g) I2 is an object, which is an ingredient of object P1 and at
the same time of object P;
(h) I2 is an ingredient of object h;
From assertions (cl) and (h) it follows, that
(i) some ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient of object I2;
From assertions (i) an~ (g) we infer, that
(k) some ingredient of object I1 is an ingredient of some object,
which is an ingredient of object P1 and at the same time
object P2;
Assertion (k) is a contra.diction of assertion (b ); Our supposition,
therefore be false; thus assertion (7) is true. From assertions (6)

and (7) it follows on the grounds of Definition III, that
(8) P1 is a class of objects, which are ingredients of object P1
and at the same time object P.
From Theorem VII and (8) we infer, that
(9) P1 is th.e set of objects, which are ingredients of object P1
and at tpe same time object P.
It is clear, that
(10) every object, which is an ingredient of object P, is an
From assertions (9) and (10) it results in accordance with Theo-
rem XIX, that
(11) P1 is a set of ingredients of object P.
From Theorem XXI and (11) it follows, that
(12) P1 is an ingredient of the class of ingredients of ob-
ject P,
from which we infer, that some object is such an object Pa, that
(13) Pa is the class of ingredients of object P,
(14) P1 is an ingredient of object Pa.
From Theorem VIII we know, that
~~--~~-~~-,.-(15)._E.is _the class of ingredients of object P.
From assertions (13) and (15) it results in accordance with Ax-
iom IV, that
(16) Pa is P.
Thus, assuming assertion (1), we arrive at assertion (17). It fol-
lows from this, that, if some ingredient of any ingredient of object
P1 is an ingredient of object P, then this object P1 is an ingredient
of object P. Which was to be proved.
§9
THEOREM XXIV. Every object P is the class of elements of

that object P.
Proof: From Theorem XII we know, that
(1) every.element of object Pis an ingredient of object P.
From Theorem VI we know, that
(2) if lis an ingredient of object P1, then some ingredient of
From assertion (2) we infer - in accordance with Theorem XI -
that
(3) if I is an ingredient of object P, then sqme ingredient of
object I is an ingredient of some element of object P.
From assertions (1) and (3) in accordance with Definition III we
obtain the given assertion.
THEOREM XXV. Every set is its own element.
The assertion is inferred immediately from Theorem XIV.
THEOREM XXVI. No object is the class of sets which are not
their own elements.
"-~-----~---··--·------ ··_p·~-th-aT .
(1) P is the class of sets, which are not their own elements.
From Theorem VII and (1) it results, that
(2) P is a set of sets, which are not their own elements.
From Theorem XVII and (2) it results, that
(3) some set, which is not its own element, is an element of
object P.
From assertion (3) we see, that some object is such an object P1,
that
(4) P1 is a set which is not its own element,
Assertion (4) is a contradiction of Theorem XXV. Our supposi-

tion that Theorem XXVI is false, which led to this contradiction,
must therefore be false. Thus Theorem XXVI is true.
THEOREM XXVII. The assertion 'if P is an element of a set
of objects mJ then P ism' is false. 2
Proof: We suppose, that Theorem XXVII is false. We infer
from this, that
(1) the assertion 'if P is an element of a set of objects m, then
P is m' is true.
From assertion (1) it results, that
(2) if P is an element of a set of objects m, then P is m.
We consider any objects P1 and P2, such that
(3) P1 is a part of object P2.
From assertion (2) it follows, that
(4) if P1 is an element of a set of objects P2, then P1 is P2.
From Theorem X we know, that
(5) P2 is the class of objects P2.
From Theorem VII and (5) we infer, that
(6) P2 is a set of objects P2.
From assertion (3) it results - on the basis of Theorems III, X -
~~·,·~·~--~that·---·-···-----
(7) P1 is an element of object P2.
(8) P1 is an element of a set of objects P2.
(9) P1 is P2,
from which it results (in accordance with Theorem I), that
(10) P1 is not a part of object P2.
2 Each of the Theorems XXVI and XXVII shows that the s0:.called anti-
nomy of Russell definitely cannot be constructed within the theory of sets
developed in the present work.
Assertion (10) is a contradiction of assertion (3). Our supposi-

tion that Theorem XXVII is false, which led to this contradiction,
must therefore be false. Thus - Theorem XXVII is true.
§ 10
DEFINITION V. I use the expression 'subset of object P' to

denote any such object P1 , which satisfies the following condition:
every element of object P1 is an element of object P.
{Examples: I. Segment AC in Figure 2 is a subset of seg-
ment AB, because segment AC satisfies the condition of Defini-
tion V: every element of segment AC is an element of segment
AB. IL Segment AB in Figure 2 is not a subset of segment AC,
because it is not case that every element of segment AB is an
element of segment AC: here for instance the same segment AB,
which is - in accordance with Theorem XIV - an element of seg-
ment AB, is not an element of segment AC.}
DEFINITION VI. I use the expression 'proper subset of object
P' to denote any such subset P1 of object P, which is not P.
{Examples: I. Segment AC in Figure 2 is a proper subset of
segment AB, because segment AC is such a subset of segment
AB,- which is not segment AB. IL Segment AB in Figure 3 is not
a proper subset of segment AB, because segment AB is segment
AB, it is therefore not true, that segment AB is such a subset of
segment AB, which is not segment AB.}
§ 11
THEOREM XXVIII. If P1 is an ingredient of object P, then

P1 is a subset of object P.
is false. It follows from this, that some objects are such objects A
and B, that indeed
(1) A is an ingredient of object B,
but
(2) A is not a subset of object B.

From assertion (2) we infer on the basis of Definition V, that
(3) some element of object A is not an element of object B,
from which we see, that some object is such an object C, that
indeed
(4) C is.an element of object A,
but ill
(5) C is not an element of object B.

From assertion (5) it results, that
(6) C is not an ingredient of object B,
since if C were an ingredient of object B, then it would follow
from this on the grounds of Theorem XI, that C would be an ele-
ment of object B, which is a contradiction of assertion (5). From
The9rem XII and (4) we see, that
(7) C is an ingredient of object A. J
From assertions (7) and (1) we infer in accordance with Theo-

rem IV, that
(8) C is an ingredient of object B.
Assertion (8) is a contradiction of assertion (6). Our assumption
that Theorem XXVIII is false, which led to this contradiction
must therefore be false. Thus Theorem XXVIII is true.
'="""'~~=-~- -"~~-'n>~-~"~--~'""<-c• """~"" --
XXIX. If P1 is a subset of object P, then P1 is an

THEOREM
Proof: We suppose, that Theorem XXIX is false. It results
from this, that some objects are such objects A and B, that in-
deed
(1) A is a subset of object B,
but
(2) A is not an ingredient of object B.
(3) A is not an element of object B,
if A were an element of object B, then it would follow from this
on the basis of Theorem XII, that A is an ingredient of object B,
which is a contradiction of assertion (2). From Theorem XIV we

know, that
(4) A is an element of object A.
(5) some element of object A is not an element of object B.
From assertion (5) it results on the grounds of Definition V,
that ·
II
(6) A is not a subset of object B.
Assertion (6) is a contradiction of assertion (1). Our supposition
that Theorem XXIX is false, which led to this contradiction must
therefore be false. Thus Theorem XXIX is true.
THEOREM XXX. If P1 is a part of object P, then P1 is a
proper subset of object P.
From Theorem III and (1) it follows, that
From Theorem XXVIII and (2) we see, that
(3) P1 is a subset of object P.
From Theorem I and (1) we infer, that
J4:)_ .r1jf? -~gt ,P.
From assertions (3) and (4) it results in accordance with Defini-
tion VI, that
(5) P1 is a proper subset of object P.
Thus - assuming assertion (1), we arrive at assertion (5). It fol-
lows from this, that, if P1 is a part of object P, then P1 is a proper
subset of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM XXXI. If P1 is a proper subset of object P, then
P1 is a part of object P.
From assertion (1) we infer on the basis of Definition VI, that
(3) P1 is not P.
From Theorem XXIX and (2) it results, that
From assertions (4) and (3) it follows on the grounds of Defini-
tion I, that
(5) P1 is a pad of object P.
Thus, assu~ing
,, assertion (1), we arrive at assertion (5). We infer
from this, that, if P1 is a proper subset of object P, then P1 is a
part of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM XXXII. No object is a proper subset of itself.
Proof: if we suppose, that some object P is a proper subset
of itself, then this means, that some object P is a proper sub-
set of object P, then it would follow from this - in accordance
with Theorem XXXI - that P is a part of object P, which is a
contradiction of Theorem I.
THEOREM XXXIII. Every object is a subset of itself.
Proof: if we assume, that some object P is not a subset of it-
self, then this means, that some object Pis not a subset of object
P, then it would follow from this on the basis of Theorem XXVIII,
that P is not an ingredient of object P, which is a contradiction
of Theorem II.
THEOREM XXXIV. If P is a proper subset of object P1, then
P1 is not a proper subset of object P.
(1) P is a proper subset of object P1,
we infer from this in virtue of Theorem XXXI, that
(2) P is a part of object P1,
from which it results in agreement with Axiom I, that
(3) P1 is not a part of object P.
From Theorem XXXI and (3) it follows, that
(4) P1 is not a proper subset of object P.
Thus assertion (1) leads to assertion (4). We see from this, that,
if P1 is a proper subset of object P1, then P1 is not a proper subset
of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM XXXV. If P is a proper subset of object Pi, then
P is not a subset of object P.
Proof:* We suppose, that Theorem XXXV is false. It follows
from thi~, that some objects are such objects A and B, that in-
deed
(1) A is a proper subset of object B,
but
(2) B is a subset of object A.
From assertion (1) it follows - in accordance with Definition VI
-that
(3) A is not B.
(4) Bis not A.
From assertions (2) and (4) we infer on the basis of Definition VI,
that
(5) B is a proper subset of object A.
From Theorem XXXIV and (1) it results, that
--·· ·-"-·"-""""""-·"·"·" (6) B is not a proper subset of object A.
Assertion (6) is a contradiction of assertion (5). Our supposition
that Theorem XXXV is false, which led to this contradiction,
must therefore be false. Thus Theorem XXXV is true.
THEOREM XXXVI. If P is a subset of object Pi: and P1 is a
subset of object P2, then P is a subset of object P2.
( 1) P is a subset of object Pi,
(2) P1 is a subset of object P2.
From Theorem XXIX and (1) it results, that
From Theorem XXIX and (2) it follows, that
From assertions (3) and (4) we infer in accordance with Theo-

rem IV, that
From Theorem XXVIII and (5) it results, that
(6) P is a subset of object P2.
Thus, assuming assertions (1) and (2) we arrive at assertion (6).
It follows fr~m this, that, if P is a subset of object P1, and P1 is
•
a subset of object P2, then Pis a subset of object P2. Which was
to be proved.
THEOREM XXXVII. If P is a proper subset of object Pi,
and P1 is a subset of object P2, then P is a proper subset of
object P2.
(1) P is a proper subset of object P1,
(2) P1 is a subset of object P2.
From assertions (1) and (2) we infer on the basis of Theo-
rem XXXVI, that
We may state, that
(4) P2 is not P,
~~~--~------_§.~!J:~-~jf £2 were P, then it would result from this in accordance
with assertion (2), that P1 is a subset of object P, which must be
false, since it is known from Theorem XXXV and (1 ), that P1 is
not a subset of object P. From assertion (4) it follows, that
(5) Pis not P2.
From assertions (3) and (5) we infer on the basis of Definition VI,
that
(6) P is a proper subset of object P2.
It follows from this, that if P is a proper subset of object P1, and
P1 is a subset of object P2, then P is a proper subset of object
P2. Which was to be proved.
THEOREM XXXVIII. If P is a subset of object Pi, and P1

is a proper subset of object P2, then P is a proper subset of ob-
ject P2.
Proof: \Ve assume, that
(1) P is a subset of object Pi,
(2) P1 is a proper subset of object P2.
From as_5ertions (1) and (2) we infer on the grounds of Theo-
rem XXXVI, that
From Theorem XXXV and (2) it results that
(4) P2 is not a subset of object P1.
(5) P is not P2.
From assertions (3) and (5) we infer in agreement with Defini-
tion VI, that
(6) Pis a proper subset of object P2.
It results from this, that, if P is a subset of P1, and P1 is a proper
subset of object P2, then Pis a proper subset of object P2. Which
was to be proved.
- ·····---TUEOREM XXXIX. If P1 is an element of object P, then P1
is a subset of object P.
We get the theorem from Theorems XXVIII and XII.
THEOREM XL. If P1 is a subset of object P, then P1 zs an
element of object P.
We get the theorem from Theorems XI and XXIX.
THEOREM XLI. Every object P is the class of subsets of that
.object P.
Proof: From Theorem XXIX we know, that
(1) every subset of object P is an ingredient of object P.
From Theorem VI we know, that
(2) if I is an ingredient of object P, then some in.gredient of
From assertion (2) we infer-in accordance with Theorem XXVIII

- that
object I is an ingredient of some subset of object P.
From assertions (1) and (3) in accordance with Definition III we
obtain the given theorem .
.
THEOREM41 XLII. If P is a subset of object mJ every m zs nJ
then P is a subset of a class of objects n.
(1) P is a subset of objects m, and every m is n.
From Theorem XIX and (1) it results, that
(2) P is a subset of objects n.
From Theorem XXI and (2) it follows, that
(3) P is an ingredient of the class of objects n.
From Theorem XXVIII and (3) we infer, that
(4) P is a subset of the class of objects n.
Thus, assuming assertion (1) we obtain assertion (4). It follows
from this, that, if P is a subset of objects m, and every m is n,
then P is a subset of the class of objects n. Which was to be
proved.
§ 12
DEFINITION VII. I use the expression 'universe' to denote the

class of objects
THEOREM XLIII. Some object is the class of non-contradicto-
ry objects.
Proof: In agreement with the law of non-contradiction we
may state, tha.t every object is a non-contradictory object. It fol-
lows from this, that some object is a non-contradictory object,
from which - in accordance with Axiom III - the given theorem
results.
THEOREM XLIV. The class of non-contradictory objects zs

the universe.
Proof: In accordance with Definition III we may record
(1) every non-contradictory object is an ingredient of the class
of non-contradictory objects,
' v
(2) if ! is an ingredient of the class of non-contradictory ob-
jects, then some ingredient of object I is an ingredient of
some non-contradictory object.
In accordance with the law of non-contradiction
I
(3) every object is non-contradictory object.

(4) every object is an ingredient of the class of non-
contradictory objects.
From assertion (2) we see, that
(5) if I is an ingredient of the class of non-contradictory ob-
jects, then some ingredient of object I is an ingredient of
some object.
From assertions (4) and (5) we infer on the basis of Definition III,
that
(6) the class of non-contradictory objects is the class of ob-
jects,
from which - on the grounds of Definition VII - we obtain the
given theorem.
THEOREM XLV. If P is the universe, and P1 is the universe,
then P is P1.
Proof: We assume" that
(1) P is the universe,
(2) P1 is the uni verse.
From assertion (1) we get in agreement with Definition VII:
(3) P is the class of objects.
From assertion (2) we infer in accordance with Definition VII,
that
(4) P1 is the class of objects.
From assertions (3) and (4) it results on the basis of Axiom IV,
that
(5) P is P1.
It follows from this, that, if P is the universe, and P1 is the uni-
.
verse, then P is P1, which was to be proved .
.
§ 13
DEFINITION VIII. I use the expression 'object exterior to ob-

ject P' to denote every such object P1, which satisfies the fol-
lowing condition: no ingredient of object P is an ingredient of
object P1.
{Examples: I. Segment AC in Figure 2 is an object exterior
to segment DB, because no ingredient of segment DB is an in-
gredient of segment AC. IL Segment AD in Figure 2 is not an
object exterior to segment CB, because segment CD, which is an
ingredient of segment CB, is also an ingredient of segment AD,
therefore it is not true, that no ingredient of segment CB is an
ingredient of segment AD.}
THEOREM XLVI. If P1 is an object exterior to object P, then
~.~-c-··---1Lis-an -object-exterior -to object P1.
(1) P1 is an object exterior to object P.
From assertion (1) we infer on the basis of Definition VIII, that
(2) no ingredient of object Pis an ingredient of object P1,
from which it results, that
(3) no ingredient of object P1 is an ingredient of object P.
From assertion (3) it follows in virtue of Definition VII, that
(4) P is an object exterior to object P1.
Thus, assuming assertion (1) we obtained assertion (4). It follows
from this, that, if P1 is an object exterior to object P, then P is
an object exterior to object P1. Which was to be proved.
THEOREM XLVII. No object is an object exterior to itself.
Proof: We suppose, that Theorem XLVII is false. It follows

from this, that some object is such an object P, that
(1) Pis an object exterior to object P.
From assertion (1) we infer (in accordance with Definition VIII),
that
(2) no ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object P.
Assert.ion (2) is a contradictory assertion. Our assumption that
Theorem XLVII is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. Thus Theorem XLVII is true.
§ 14
DEFINITION IX. I use the expression 'complement of object

P1 with respect to P' to denote any object P2, if the two following
conditions are maintained:
(1) P1 is a subset of P,
(2) P2 is the class of elements of object P, exterior to ob-
ject P1.
{Examples: I. Stanislaw Poniatowski is the complement of
the class of Polish kings, who are not Stanislaw Poniatowski with
respect to the class of Polish kings, because: (1) the class of Pol-
ish kings, who are not Stanislaw Poniatowski, is a subset of the
class of Polish kings, (2) Stanislaw Poniatowski is the class of
such elements of the class of Polish kings, as are objects exterior
to the class of Polish kings, who are not Stanislaw Poniatowski.
II. Segment AC in Figure 2 is not the complement of segment
DB with respect to segment AB, because condition (1) is indeed
not observed here (segment DB is a subset of segment AB), but
condition (2) is not maintained (segment AC is not the class of
elements of segment AB, exterior to segment DB). III. Zermelo
is not the complement of the class of mathematicians, who are not
Zermelo, with respect to the class of mathematicians, who are not
Borel, because condition (2) is indeed maintained here (Zermelo
is the class of such elements of the class of mathematicians, as are
not Borel, who a.re objects exterior to the class of objects, which
a.re not Zermelo), but condition (1) is not maintained (the class
of mathematicians, who are not Zermelo, is not a subset of the
class of mathematicians, who are not Borel.}
§ 15
THEOREM: XLVIII. If P1 is a part of object P, then some

object is the complement of object P1 with respect to object P.
From Theorem XXX and (1) we infer, that
From assertion (2) it follows on the basis of Definition VI, that
(3) P1 is a subset of object P,
on the other hand on the basis of Theorem XXXV, that
(4) P is not a subset of object P1.
From assertion (4) it follows on the grounds of Theorem XXVIII,
that
(5) Pis not an ingredient of object P1.
We may state, that some object is such an object P 2, that
--"""" ---'{6}-:Pi-ts·a:n·ingr·edient of object P,
(7) no ingredient of object P2 is an ingredient of object P1,
because if no object is object P2, in compliance with assertions
(6) and (7), then it would follow from this, that it is true, that, if
I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object I is
an ingredient of object P1, on the other hand it would follow from
this in accordance with Theorem XXIII, that P is an ingredient
of object P1, which is a contradiction of assertion (5).
From assertion (7) we infer on the grounds of Definition VIII,
that
(8) P1 is an object exterior to object P2.
From Theorem XLVI and (8) it results, that
From Theorem XI and (6) it follows, that

From assertions (10) and (9) we see, that
(11) P2 is an element of object P, exterior to object P1.
From assertion (11) we infer - in agreement with Axiom III -
that •
(12) so;ne object P3 is the class of elements of object P, exterior
to object P3.
From assertions (3) and (12) it results on the basis of Defini-
tion IX, that
(13) P3 is the complement of object P1 with respect to P.
Thus, assuming assertion (1) we arrived at assertion (13). It fol-
lows from this, that if P1 is a part of object P, then some object
is the complement of object P1 with respect to object P, which
was to be proved.
THEOREM IL. If P2 is the complement of object P1 with re-
spect to P, then P2 is an object exterior to object P1.
Proof: We suppose, that Theorem IL is false. It follows from
this, that some objects are such objects P, P1 and P2, that in-
deed
(1) f2 is the complement of object P1 with respect to ob-
ject P,
but
(2) P2 is not an object exterior to object P1.
From assertion (1) we infer on the basis of Definition IX, that
ject P1.
From assertion (3) it results on the grounds of Definition III,
that
object I is an ingredient of some element of object P which
is an object exterior to object P1.
From assertion (2) it follows - in agreement with Definition VIII

- that
(5) some ingredient of object P1 is an ingredient of ob-
ject P2.
We see from this, that some object is an object P3, such that
(6) P2 is an)rtgredient of object P1,
(7) P3 is an .ingredient of object P2.
(8) some ingredient of object P3 is an ingredient of some
element of object P, which is an object exterior to ob-
ject P1.
It results from this, that some object is an object P4, such that
(9) P4 is an ingredient of object Pa,
(10) P4 is an ingredient of some element of object P, which is
an object exterior to object P1.
From assertion (10) it follows, that some object is an object P3,
such that
(11) Pa is an element of object P,
(12) P3 is an object exterior to object P1,
(13) P4 is an ingredient of object Ps.
-----~ <<<Erom< assertion (12) we infer on the basis of Definition VIII,
that
(14) no ingredient of object P1 is an ingredient of object Ps.
From assertions (9) and (6) it results on the grounds of Theo-
rem IV, that
(16) P4 is not an ingredient of object Ps.
Assertion (16) is a contradiction of ~ssertion (13). Our suppo-
sition that Theorem IL is false, which led to this contradiction,
must therefore be false. Thus Theorem IL is true.
THEOREM L. If P2 is the complement of object P1 with respect
to P, then P2 is a part of object P.

(1) P2 is the complement of P1 with respect to P.
From assertion (1) we infer - in agreement with Definition IX -
that
(3) P2 js the class of elements of object P, exterior to object
P1. II
From assertion (3) it results - in accordance with Definition III -
that ·
object I is an ingredient of some element of object P, which
is an object exterior to object P1;
It follows from this, that
object I is an ingredient of some element of object P.
From assertion (5) we infer on the basis of Theorem XII, that
From assertion (6) it results on the grounds of Theorem IV,
that
. {7)jf ! is ap. ingredient of object P2, then some ingredient of
From Theorem XXIII and (7) it follows, that
From Theorem IL and (1) we infer, that
From assertion (9) it results in agreement with Definition VIII,
that
(10) no ingredient of object P1 is an ingredient of object P2.
(12) P1 is not an ingredient of object P2.
From Theorem XXIX and (2) we infer, that

(14) P2 is not P.
tion I, that .- •
Thus, assuming assertion (1), we obtain assertion (15). We infer
from this, that, if P2 is the complement of object Pi with respect
to P, then P2 is a part of object P, which was to be proved.
THEOREM LI. If P2 is the complement of object Pi with re-
spect to object P, then P1 is the complement of object P2 with
respect to P.
(1) P2 is the complement of object P1 with respect to ob-
ject P.
It results from this on the basis of Definition IX, that
ject Pi,
on the other hand, on the basis of Theorem L, that
-~~-~---c(3J_P2js a parLofobject P.
From assertion (3) it follows on the grounds of Theorem XXX,
that
(4) P2 is_ a subset of object P.
From assertion (2) we infer in agreement with Definition III,
that
(5) every element of object P, exterior to object P1, is an
ingredient of object P2.
We may be convinced, that
(6) every element of object P, exterior to object P2, is an
ingredient of object P1,

tion (6) is false; it results from this, that some object is such
an object P3, that indeed
(a) P3 is an element of object P,
(b) P3 is an object exterior to object P2,
but •
(c) P3 is not an ingredient of objec~ P1;
from assertion (c) it follows, that some object is such an object
P4, that
( d) P4 is an ingredient of object P3,
(e) no ingredient of object P4 is an ingredient of object P1;
because if no object is object P4, in compliance with assertions
(d) and (e), it would follow from this, that it is true, that, if I is
an ingredient of object P3, then some ingredient of object I is an
ingredient of object P1; on the other hand it would result from
this in accordance with Theorem XXIII, that P3 is an ingredi-
ent of object P1, which is a contradiction of assertion (c); from
assertion (e) it follows on the basis of Definition VIII, that
(f) P1 is an object exterior to object P4;
from Theorem XLVI and (f) we infer, that
---~---~---~---------fg) JJ4 js_an object exterior to object P1;
from Theorem XI and (d) it results, that
(h) P4 is an element of object P3;
from assertions (h) and (a) it follows on the grounds of Theo-
rem XV, that
(i) P4 is an element of object P;
from assertions (i) and (g) we see, that
(k) P4 is an element of object P, exterior to object P1;
from assertions (5) and (k) we infer, that
(1) P4 is an ingredient of object P2;
from assertion (b) it results in agreement with Definition VIII,
that
(m) no ingredient of object P2 is an ingredient of object P3 ;
from assertions (m) and (1) it follows, that

(n) P4 is not an ingredient of object P3;
assertion (n) is a contradiction of assertion ( d); Our supposition
therefore be false; th us assertion (6) is true. From assertion (1) it
follows in accordance with Definition IX, that
·-
(7) P1 is a subJlet of object P,
on the other hand, in accordance with Theorem IL, that
From Theorem XL and (7) we see, that
From Theorem XLVI and (8) we infer, that
(11) P1 is an element of object P, exterior to object P2.
From Theorem V we know, that
object I is an ingredient of object P1.
,------~-·--Qbject_Jjs_,aningredient oLsome element of object P, which
is an object .exterior to object P2~
From assertions (6) and c(13) we infer on the basis of Definition III,
that
ject P2.
From assertions (4) and (14) it results on the grounds of Defini-
tion IX, that
ject P.
Thus, assuming assertion (1 ), we arrive at assertion (15). It fol-
lows from this, that, if P2 is the complement of object P1 with
respect to object P, then P1 is the complement of object P2 with
respect to P. Which was to be proved.
THEOREM LIL If P2 is the complement of object P1 with re-

spect to P, then P1 is a part of object P.
The theorem is inferred from Theorems L and LI.
THEOREM LIII. If P1 is a proper subset of object P, then some
object is the complement of object P1 with respect to object P.
The theorem is inferred from Theorems XLVIII and XXXI.
TilEOREM LIV. If P2 is the complement of object P1 with re-
spect to P, and P3 is the complement of object P1 with respect to
P, then P2 is P3.
ject P,
ject P.
From assertion (1) we infer on the basis of Definition IX, that
ject P1.
From assertion (2) it results on this basis, that
(4) P3 is the class of elements of object P, exterior to object
P1.
-From assertions ( 3) and (4) it follows on the grounds of Axiom IV,
that
(5) P2 is P3.
Thus the required assertion is true.
THEOREM LV. No object is the complement of itself with re-
spect to some objects.
Proof: vVe suppose, that Theorem LV is false. We infer from
this, that some objects P and P1 are such, that
ject P.
From Theorem IL and (1) it results, that
Assertion (2) is a contradiction of Theorem XLVII. Our assertion

that Theorem LV is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. Thus Theorem LV is true.
THEOREM LVI. No object P is the complement of a given
object with respect to object P.
Proof: We suppose, that Theorem LVI is false. It follows from
this, that so~e object is an object P1, such that
(1) Pis the complement of object P1 with respect to ob-
ject P.
From Theorem IL and ( 1) we infer, that
(2) P is a part of object P.
Assertion (2) is a contradiction of assertion (1 ). Our assumption
that Theorem LVI is false, which led to this contradiction, must
therefore be false. Thus Theorem LVI is true.
THEOREM LVII. No object is the complement of a given object
P with respect to the same object P.
Proof: We suppose, that Theorem LVII is false. We see from
this, that some object is an object P1, such that
(1) P1 is the complement of object P with respect to ob-
ject P.
-~~~~J'xom.Theorem LII and (1) we infer, that
(2) Pis a part of object P.
Assertion (2) is a contradiction of Theorem I. Our assumption
that Theorem LVII, which led to this contradiction, must there-
fore be false. Thus Theorem LVII is true.
THEOREM LVIII. If P2 is the complement of object P1 with
respect to object P, then P is the class of objects, which are P1
and P2.
ject P.
From assertion (1) it results on the basis of Theorem LII, that
(2) P1 is a part of object P,
on the other hand on the basis of Theorem L, that

(3) P2 is -a part of object P.
From Theorem III and (2) it follows, that
From Theorem III and (3) we infer, that
(5) .Pi is an ingredient of object P.
Fro~ assertions (4) and (5) it results, that
(6) every object, which is P1 or P2, is an ingredient of ob-
ject P.
From assertion (1) it follows on the grounds of Definition IX,
that
ject P1.
From assertion (7) we infer in agreement with Definition III,
that
(8) every element of object P, exterior to object P1 is an
ingredient of object P2.
We may be convinced, that
(9) if I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient
of object I is an ingredient of some object which is P1
orJ:~2, ____ _
tion (9) is false; it results from this, that some object is such
an object I1, that indeed
(a) I1 is an ingredient of object P,
but
(b) no ingredient of object Ii is an ingredient of the given
object, which is P1 or P2;
from assertion (b) it follows, that
(c) no ingredient of object I1 is an ingredient of object P1,
(d) no ingredient of object Ii is an i of object P2;
from assertion (c) we infer in accordance with Definition VIII,
that
(e) P1 is an object exterior to object I1;

from Theorem XLVI and (e) it results, that
(f) 11 is an object exterior to object P1;
from Theorem XI and (a) it follows, that
(g) I1 is an element of object P;
from assertiqn~ (g) and (f) we see, that
(h) I1 is an ~lement of object P, exterior to object P1;
from assertions (8) and (h) we infer, that
(i) I1 is an ingredient of object P2;
from Theorem II we know, that
(k) I1 is an ingredient of object Ii;
from assertions ( d) and (k) it results, that
(1) Ii is not an ingredient of object P2;
assertion (1) is a contradiction of assertion (i). Our supposition
therefore be false; thus assertion (9) is true. From assertions (6)
and (9) it follows on the basis of Definition III, that
(10) P is the class of objects, which are P1 or P2. Thus, assum-
ing assertion (1) , we arrive at assertion (10). The given
theorem results from this.
ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
To my Esteemed and Beloved Pro-

fessor of Philosophy, Dr. Kazimierz
Twardowski, I offer this work as a de-
layed jubilee tribute, a philosophical
apostate, but a grateful pupil.
INTRODUCTION°
The aim of this work is the removal of a painful situation, in which

I have found myself for a number of years. The situation consists
in this, that I possess a good many unpublished scientific results
from various areas of the foundations of mathematics, that the
number of these unpublished results continually grows, and since
these results inter-relate with each other and with the results of
other researchers in these areas, the technical-editorial difficul-
ties connected with their preparation for publication continually
1
O Translator's Note: [These sections were published in Polish as follows:

0 podstawach matematyki, Wst~p. Rozdzial I: 0 pewnych kwestjach, doty-
cz&:cych sensu tez 'logistycznych'. Rozdzial II: 0 'antynomji' p. Russella,
dotycz&:cej 'klasy klas, nie b~d&:cych wlasnemi elementami'. Rozdzial III:
0 roznych sposobach rozumienia wyrazow 'klasa' i 'zbior'. Przegla,,d Filo-
zoficzny 30 (1927), pp. 164-206. This work is a considerable developement of
Lesniewski's theory of sets which was published in 1916 as 'Foundations of
the general theory of sets. I'.]
1 Lesniewski's writing in this work is precise, but the explanatory and
polemical parts, in contrast to the technical sections, are often involved and
sometimes excited. In order to retain his individual style and to minimize
the risk of losing any of the subtlety of his thinking, the ·translator has aimed
at a literal translation rather than a smooth one. Lesniewski's symbolism
has been retained throughout and so has the lay-out and stylish punctuation
On the Foundations of Mathematics 175
While I was trying different ways of arranging the scien-
tific results to which I had arrived, I considered among others
a systematic-compendium method, I took as a model in this con-
nection the well-known work of Whitehead and Russell. 2 However
such a task is again spreading over a number of years, and it is
difficult for me tG> determine how much time I would still need, in
order to subrrilt in this way for a wider technical discussion the
whole of the r~sults, to which I have been led by already more
than ten years of reflection on the foundations of mathematics.
This painful situation is further complicated by the fact, that,
just as I reached some of my views and some scientific results un-
der the influence of conversations with my colleagues and in con-
nection with their still unpublished scientific results, so also my
views .and observations, which I had formulated during a number
of years in university lectures and in numerous scientific discus-
sions, have contributed to the formation of certain opinions and
results of my colleagues, who, out of an admirable loyalty towards
me, have withheld from publication until now a number of their
scientific results, until my own related results are published.
Wishing to hasten the publication of the results of my re-
search in the domain of the foundations of mathematics, I felt
~~~-·-compelled.tocha.nge.my.procedure again. I decided this time to
use a method of writing which one can call an autobiographical-
summary method in contrast to the systematic-compendium
method. I have decided for the time being to pass over in si-
lence the majority of the consequences which I had previously
of his proofs, and his frequent use of quotation marks.

The translator wishes to acknowledge the generous help given by George
Sobolowski with the translation. He also wishes to thank Dr. J. Srzednicki
for suggestions concerning certain difficult passages in Lesniewski's prose.
Gratitude is also due to Carol Atkins for patient and very expert typing and
to Christopher Fryar for help in preparing the typescript.
2 Alfred North \Vhitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia ~Mathematica,
Cambridge, Vol. I 1910, Vol. II 1912, Vol. III 1913, Vol. I, second edition,
1925.
intended to deduce explicitly from my various assumptions and

to concentrate on the most lucid presentation of the foundations
and the basic shape of the theory which I was constructing. In my
exposition I will take care that the reader can realize the chrono-
logical order and the mutual interdependence of certain scientific
facts, and especially may orient himself with regard to those re-
sults of other scholars not yet announced in print, on which I have
found~d various of my theorems or constructions.
The system of foundations of mathematics whose outline I
wish to present in this work, new in some respects in essentials
and in method, embraces three deductive theories, whose union
I consider to be one of the possible foundations for the whole of
the system of the mathematical science. These theories are:
(1) the theory I call protothetic 3 which corresponds in con-
tent, although very roughly, to the theory known in the science
as 'calculus of equivalent statements' ,4 'A ussagenkalkiil', 5 'theory
of deduction', 6 in connection with the 'theory of apparent vari-
ables'7 etc.;
(2) the theory I call ontology, which forms a certain kind of
modernized 'traditional logic', and which in content and 'power'
3 Fo,rmerly I used for its denotation the expression 'logistic'; see: Comptes
rendus de seances de la Societe des Sciences et de lettres de Varsovie XIX
(1926). Adolf Lindenbaum and Alfred Tarski, 'Komunikat o badaniach z
zakresu teorji mnogosci.' Przedstawil W. Sierpinski (Communication on Re-
search in the Domain of the Theory of Sets. Presented by W. Sierpinski),
p. 322.
4 See: Ernst Schroder, Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik (exacte
Logik), Erster Band, Leipzig 1890, p. 161.
5
See: Schro_der, op. cit., zweiter Band, erster Abteilung, Leipzig 1891,
pp. 1-84 and 256-276.
6
See: '\Vhitehea.d and Russell, Op. cit., Vol. I, second edition, pp. 90 -
126.
7 See: l. c., pp. 127-186.
r~
--------~--
most nearly approaches the Schroder 'J(lassenkalkul', 8 considered
as including the theory of 'individuals'; 9
(3) the theory which I name 'mereology' and whose first, but
in many respects imperfect, outline I published in a work entitled
'Foundations of the general theory of sets, I' .10
In the h~story of the establishment of mathematics, the most
imposing embodiment
Ill
of the achievements made since Greek
times on the question of the soundness of the deductive method, is
still for ·me the 'Grundgesetze der A rithmetik' of Gottlob Frege. 11
Frege's system is, however, an inconsistent system, as was demon-
strated by Bertrand Russell, as is well known, when he con-
structed his celebrated 'antinomy', concerning 'the class of classes
which are not their own elements' .12
The problem of the 'antinomies', under the powerful influence
of the researches of Bertrand Russell, as become the central prob-
lem in the intellectual endeavours of a number of prominent math-
ematicians. These endeavours were often significantly remote
from the historical, intuitive basis from which the 'antinomies'
developed. They encouraged the disappearance of the feeling for
the distinction between the mathematical sciences, conceived as
deductive theories, which serve to capture various realities of the
~-.~-~.
· ·-world·inthe most· exact-laws possible, and such non-contradictory
deductive systems, which indeed ensure the possibility of obtain-
ing, on their basis, an abundance of ever new theorems, but which
8 See: Schroder, Op. cit., erster Band, pp. 160-161.
9 See: op. cit., erster Band, pp. 318-349.
lO Prace Polskiego Kola Naukowego w Moskwie. Sekcya matematyczno-

przyrodnicza [Works of the Polish Scientific Circle in Moscow. Mathematical-
natural science section], No. 2. Stanislaw Lesniewski. Podstawy ogolnej teorji
mnogosci. I. (Cz~sc. Ingredyens. Mnogosc. Klasa. Element. Podmnogosc.
Niektore ciekawe rodzaje klas.) [Foundations of the General Theory of Sets.
I. (Part. Ingredient. Class. Element. Subset. Some Interesting Kinds of
Classes.)]. Moscow, 1916.
11 G. Frege, 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet',
Jena, Erst.er Band, 1893. Zweiter Band, 1903.
12 See: Frege. Op. cit., zweiter Band, pp. 253-254.
simultaneously distinguish themselves by the lack of any connec-

tion with reality of any intuitive, scientific value.
In the appendix to the second volume of the above mentioned
'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik' Frege gives a method of modify-
ing his system, by which Russell's 'antinomy' can no longer be
constructed; this method consists in the replacement of one of
the axi~ms of the system by a certain other axiom, 13 which, one
"
can presume on the basis of the general tone of the aforesaid ap-
pendix, lacks sufficient support, even in the intuitions of the au-
thor himself. The architectonically refined construction of Ernest
Zermelo,14 introduces int? the 'theory of sets' a number of pro-
hibitions devoid of intuitive basis, aimed at the removal of the
'antinomies' from mathematics. The question, whether the Frege
system changed as indicated above or also the 'Mengenlehre' of
0
Zermelo will ever lead to a contradiction, is completely imma-

terial from the point of view of an intellectual anxiety, directed
resolutely towards reality, and which stems from an irresistible,
intuitive necessity of belief in the 'truth' of certain assumptions
and in the 'correctness' of certain inferences, which in combina-
tion with those assumptions, lead to contradiction. From this
point of view the only real 'solution' to the 'antinomies' is the
~·-···~······--··'"-··-----method--of~a.n-intuitive undermining of the combination of infer-
ences or assumptions which contribute to the contradiction. 15 A
non-intuitive mathematics contains no effective remedy for any
malady of the intuition.
Russell, creating his 'theory of types' for the removal of the
'antinomies', appealed to considerations of an intuitive nature,
13 See: l. c., pp. 262-265.

14
E. Zermelo, 'Untersuchungen iiber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I',
:Afathematische Annalen 65, 1908
15 See: K. Grelling and L. Nelson, 'Bemerkung zu deri Paradoxieen von
Russell und Burali Forti', Abh.andlungen der Fries'schen Schule, Neue Folge,
Zweiter Band. 3. Heft. 1908. p. 314
among others. 16 The 'theory of types' is, as is known, one of
the cardinal elements of the work of Whitehead and Russell men-
tioned above. 17 In the area of combat against the 'antinomies', it
constitutes the most representative synthesis thus far. However
not even Whitehead and Russell are satisfied with it in its present
form. 18 .
•~
Both editions of the system of Whitehead and Russell possess

" 19 In particular - the matter of establishing on
shocking defects.
the grounds of this system the conditions, which are to be fulfilled
by any expression, in order to be accepted as a definition or added
to the system as a new theorem, is presented disastrously. 20
Leon Chwistek took care in his system of the foundations
of mathematics 21 to formulate the 'directives', regarding the es-
tablishing of definitions or the addition of new theorems to the
16 See: Bertrand Russell, 'Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory

of Types', American Journal of Mathematics, XXX 1908, p. 222. See also:
Whitehead and Russell. l. c., p. 37.
17 See: l. c., p. VII.
18 See: l. c., p. XIV.
19 In connection with the first edition of the system see for example: Leon
Chwistek, 'The Theory of Constructive Types (Principles of Logic and Math-
~-,~~ e~atics). -Pa;ccc;~~~~CP~i~cipies of Logic. Theory of Classes and Rela-
tions', Extracted from the Annales de la Societe Mathematique de Pologne.
Cracow 1923, p. 22, footnote 3 - Chwistek's work includes a number of in-
teresting and severely critical, objective remarks on the first edition of White-
head and Russell.
20 See: Frege's 'Principles', binding for the establishment of definitions
(Frege, op. cit., erster Band, pp. 51-52), and 'Rules', binding for the proof
of theorems (!. c., pp. 61-64). See also l. c., pp. VI and VII. See also:
1) Bertrand Russell. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London, New
York. Second Edition, 1920, p. 151. 2) Chwistek, l. c., p. 21.
21 See op. cit. The continuation of this work has already appeared in
print: Leon Chwistek, 'The Theory of Constructive Types'. (Principles of
Logic and Mathematics). Part II. 'Cardinal Arithmetic'. Roczniki Polskiego
Tow. Matematycznego. Annales de la Societe Polonaise de Mathematique,
Tome III, Annee 1924, 1925. There exists a printing of part II with separate
pagination, forming a continuation of the pagination of the printing of part I.
system, more meticulously than did Whitehead and Russell. 22 I

shall subject Chwistek's system to a critique in this work.
I have not encountered in the scientific literature any theoret-
ical conception, which satisfies the requirements which I place on
deductive theories, which at the same time 'solves' the existing
'antinomies' in a way adequate for me. The conception which I
wish to cl,evelop below, satisfied immediately in the one respect as
well as in the other.
The system of the foundations of mathematics I have con-
structed owes a number of important improvements to Alfred
Tarski, a lecturer in the philosophy of mathematics at the Univer-
sity of Warsaw, who was my student at the University in the years
1919-1923 and "my" Doctor in the year 1924. Regarding the con-
crete results of the deliberations in which Tarski has engaged in
connection with my system, I will endeavour to show them explic-
itly; but because of the nature of things I cannot show properly
all of Tarski's occasional critical remarks, which undermined this
or that link of my theoretical conceptions at the different stages
in the building of my system, and all the subtle and sympathetic
counsel and often impalpable suggestions, from which I had the
opportunity to profit in numerous conversations with Tarski.
----~~-~-------~ ----------To-aconsiclerable-degree, the sole axiom of the theory which
I have named protothetic owes its present shape, determined as a
result of a number of successive simplifications of the original form
of this axiom, to the results of research by Mordchaj Wajsberg, a
student of the University of Warsaw.
In referring to 'The Theory of Constructive Types', I shall always give the

page numbers according to the pagination of the printing.
22 See: Chwistek, op. cit., pp. 20-33.
CHAPTER I
ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING
T.HE SENSE OF THE 'LOGISTIC' THESES
In the year 1'911 (still in my student years) I came across a book

by Jan Lukasiewicz about the principle of contradiction in Aris-
totle.1 This book, which in its time had a considerable influence
upon the intellectual development of a number of Polish 'philoso-
phers' and the 'philosophising' scholars of my generation, became
a revelation for me in many respects and for the first time in my
life I learned of the existence of the 'symbolic logic' 2 of Bertrand
Russell as well as his 'antinomy' regarding the 'class of classes,
which are not elements of themselves. 3
The first encounter with 'symbolic logic' created within me
a strong a version to that discipline for a number of years to
come. Even the exposition of its elements included in the book
by Lukasiewicz, and certain other expositions of 'symbolic logic'
which I attempted in succession, wishing somehow to absorb the
results reached the~ ~~po[lents of this science, were incom-
prehensible to me, and not because of my own fault, as I once
thought. Steeped in the influence of John Stuart Mill in which I
mainly grew up, and 'conditioned' by the problems of 'universal-
grammar' and of logico-semantics in the style of Edward Husserl
and by the exponents of the so-called Austrian School, I inef-
fectually attacked the foundations of 'logistic' from this point of
view. Not possessing the faculty of entering into the spirit of the
other people's ideas, I was estranged from the science itself by the
considerable effect of the obscure and ambiguous comments pro-
vided by its exponents. The decidedly sceptical dominant note
1 Jan Lukasiewicz, [1910b].
2 See: Op. cit., pp. 166-210.
3 See: Lukasiewicz, Op. cit., pp. 128-132.
of the position I occupied for a number of years in relation to

'symbolic logic', stemmed from the fact that I was not able to
become conscious of the real 'sense' of the axioms and theorems
of that theory, - 'of what' and 'what', respectively, it was desired
to 'assert' by means of the axioms and theorems.
The character of the semantical doubts which possessed me
for some time during attempts, long futile, to read the works writ-
ten by 'logicists' can easily be realized by anybody by a careful
analysis of the comments which Whitehead and Russell provide
for particular types of expressions which occur in the 'theory of
deduction', and he may also reflect on such an occasion how much
the aforesaid comments are infused with refined cruelty towards
a reader who is accustomed to giving some attention to anything
he reads:
Say that a reader of Whitehead and Russell's work wishes
to find out what the sense is of the expression 'f-: q. :.J . p V q'
occurring in their system as 'primitive proposition' *l.3. 4
The authors comment: "This principle states: if q is true,
then p or q is true". 5
Wishing to find some general principles which would be re-
liable in this sort of interpretation of the 'primitive proposition'
.. *l.3,the-reader.. mayrefer to the earlier comments regarding ex-
pressions of the type 'f- . p', 'p V q' and the type 'p :.J q', as these
types of expression appear in the 'primitive proposition' *1.3.
Pondering over the meaning of the expression of the type 'f-
. p', the reader encounters in the work 'of Whitehead and Russell
the following passage: "The sign 'f-', called the 'assertion-sign',
means that what follows is asserted. It is required for distinguish-
ing a complete proposition, which we assert, from any subordinate
propositions contained in it but not asserted." 6 In another place
one reads: "In symbols, if 'p' is a proposition, 'p' by itself will
4
Whitehead and Russell, l. c., p. 96.
5 Loe. cit.
6
L. c., p. 8.
stand for the unasserted proposition, while the asserted propo-

sition will be designated by 't- . p'. The sign 't-' is called the
assertion-sign *; it may be read 'it is true that' (although philo-
sophically this is not exactly what it means)" .7 According to
the first of these passages a reader can assume that the proposi-
tions assert~_d •by the authors in their system are the propositions
which follo~ the assertion signs and the full stops placed imme-
diately after them in expressions of the type 't- . p'; on the basis
of the second, that the propositions asserted in the system are
just the expressions of the type 't- . p'. The first of these hypothe-
ses seems to be supporte~ by the passage: "The dots after the
assertion-sign, indicate its range; that is to say, everything fol-
lowing is asserted, until we reach either an equal number of dots,
preceding a sign of implication or the end of the sentence" ;8 the
passage - "On all occasions where, in Principia Mathematica, we
have an asserted proposition of the form 't- . f x' or 't- . f p' this is
not to be taken as meaning 't-. (x). fx' or 't-. (p). fp"' 9 - seems
to support the second hypothesis.
After reading all the passages of the work which refer to the
assertion sign and expressions of the type 't- . p', the reader who
is not particularly distinguished by exuberant frivolity can hardly
~~----say--that-he-understands-the intentions of the authors. The reader
who wishes to discover, on the basis of Whitehead and Russell's
comments, the sense conferred by the authors on expressions of
the type 't- p', and perhaps - to read these expressions with the
aid of expressions from colloquial language without changing their
sense, will find in the authors' comments only one clear indica-
tion that it is not possible to read the aforesaid expressions with
the help of corresponding expressions of the type 'it is true, that
p' without changing their meaning; this indication is the above
quoted remark of the authors according to which the assertion
7 L. c., p. 92.
8 L. c.
9 L. c., p. XIII.
sign may be read by means of the expression 'it is true, that' al-
though 'philosophically' the expression does not mean quite the
same, as is meant by the assertion sign.
Not finding in Whitehead and Russell sufficient information
on the question of the sense of expressions of the type 'r p',
the reader is forced to devise his own improvisations in this do-
• c
main., The character of these improvisations may be revealed

among others in the manner in which the following questions are
grasped:
(1) Whether, if an expression 'p' is a proposition, then the cor-
responding expression of the type 'I- . p' is also a proposition?
(2) whether, if an expression 'p', having sense, is a proposi-
tion, then the corresponding expression of the type 'I- . p' has the
same sense?
(3) what actually should we consider as being the axioms and
theorems of Whitehead and Russell: the whole expression of the
type 'I- . p' or only the parts of those expressions which follow af-
ter the assertion sign and the dots which stand immediately after
it? In particular in axiom *1.3 the whole expression 'I-: q. :J .
p V q' or the expression 'q. :J . p V q' constituting a part of the
.
prev10us express10n.
.
--c-----For--me;-there come to mind three very dissimilar conceptions
which I think many readers of Whitehead and Russell's work are
likely to improvise to assist with the assertion sign and expres-
I I sions of the type 'I- . p'. Those concepts are as follows:.
Conception A: The assertion sign means in Whitehead and
! ;
Russell just the expression 'we assert, that'; expressions of the
type 'I- . p' may be read with the aid of the corresponding ex-
pressions of the type 'we assert, that p'; if an expression 'p' is a
proposition, then the corresponding expression of the type 'I- . p'
is also a proposition; the proposition 'I- . p' has the same sense as
the proposition 'we assert, that p', but not the same sense as the
proposition 'p' alone; we should consider as axioms and theorems
of the system of Whitehead and Russell the whole expression of
On the Foundations of A1athematics 185
the type 'r- . p'; in particular the axiom *1.3. is the whole expres-
sion 'r-: q. ~ . p V q', with the same sense as the expression 'we
assert, that q. ~ .p V q'.
Conception B: The assertion sign according to Whitehead and
Russell means just the expression 'that which follows, is asserted';
expressions of the type 'r- . p' can be read without change of sense
with the aid' of corresponding expressions of the type,
'that whrch follows, is asserted p';
if any expression 'p' is a proposition, then the corresponding ex-
pression of the type 'r- . p' is not a proposition; it is a peculiar
composite of three parts following one after the other, of which
the first, the assertion sign, is a proposition in the form of a sin-
gle expression having the same sense as the proposition: - 'that
which follows, is asserted', the second is formed of dots, and the
third, the expression 'p', is a proposition, as we assumed; this con-
coction, not being a proposition, does not have the same sense
as the expression p which is a proposition; we should consider as
axioms and assertions of the system of Whitehead and Russell
not an expression of the type 'r- . p', but only the parts of those
expressions which follow the assertion sign and the dots which
stand immediately after it; in particular, axiom *1.3 is not the
-~~-~-,-express10n--G:-q
. 'L .-;;J .pV q ' , -b ut t h e express10n
. ' q. ~ . p V q ' , wh'ich
is a part of the previous expression; contrasting their 'symbolism'
to the 'ordinary written language' 10 and feeling no anxiety that
the reader will not know whether a particular proposition found
in Principia l\/fathematica in the 'ordinary written language' is or
is not a proposition asserted by the authors, Whitehead and Rus-
sell can however see this danger as far as the propositions formu-
lated in the 'symbolism' are concerned, and to avoid the danger
they introduce the assertion sign, which they wish to place before
propositions formulated in the "symbolism", in those and only
those cases where they are asserting those propositions.
lO See l. c., p. 8
Conception C: If some expression 'p', having sense, is a propo-

sition, then the corresponding expression of the type 'r . p' has
the same sense; expressions of the type 'r . p' can be read, without
changing their meaning, in exactly the same way as are the parts
I:,
'p' of those expressions alone: thus e.g., the expressions 'r: q. :J
. p V q' .and 'q . :J . p V q' can be read in exactly the same way,
that ·is to say, the same way as the second of those expressions
is to be read; if some expression 'p' is a proposition, then the
corresponding expression of the type 'r . p' is also a proposition;
utilizing in their 'symbolism' in addition to each meaningful ex-
pression 'p' which is a proposition, also a parallel form of the type
'r .p' having the same sense and being a proposition as well, the
authors mean to assign the form 'r .p' to just those propositions
formulated in their 'symbolism' which they are asserting; White-
head and Russell wish to show the reader in this way whether
a given proposition formulated in the 'symbolism' is or is not
being asserted by them (similarly, by applying different printing
types to different groups of propositions of his own system, any-
one can show the reader, that e.g., such and such propositions
are borrowed from such and such an author, without affecting the
meaning of the propositions); we should consider as axioms and
.assertions of Whitegead and Russell the complete expressions of
the type 'r . p'; in particular, axiom *1.3 is the whole expression
'r: q. :J . P v q' .
. Improvising various conceptions related to expressions of the
type 'r . p' and to the assertion sign in the system of Whitehead
and Russell, a reader will be compelled to look perfunctorally
at various passages in the authors' comments on their system; it
would be difficult, e.g., to interpret the authors' remark quoted
above according to which the assertion sign means that what fol-
lows is being asserted, - so that this remark would not 'clash' with
conception C; similarly it would not be an easy task to 'bend' the
passage above in which it is said, that "the asserted proposition
will be designated by 'r .p' ", for the needs of conception A or
conception B.
Without prejudging the question whether and in what way a

reader would finally wish to seek a solution of the puzzle of the
assertion sign in the system of Whitehead and Russell, I take the
opportunity of observing that, considering their work from the
point of view of any one of the three interpretational conceptions
which I outlined for the better elucidation of the whole question,
the reader can regard the entire work with complete scepticism as
to its merit.• At this point the reader can raise e.g., the following
objections:
In connection with conception A:
If the axioms and theorems of some theory are expressions of
the type '~ . p', but expressions of the type '~ . p' have the same
sense as the corresponding expressions of the type 'we assert, that
p', then these axioms and theorems clearly express of course only
the fact that the authors of the given theory are asserting this
or that, and in that way are very special propositions about the
authors of the theory; a system created from that type of proposi-
tion, is not a system of logic at all; 11 It could rather be considered
as a deductive confession of the authors of the given theory.
In connection with conception B:
If Whitehead and Russell introduce the assertion sign as a
--0~---·~ prophylacticdevice, .- for the purpose of avoiding the danger
••
that the reader will not know whether a given proposition for-
mulated in the 'symbolism' is or is not a proposition asserted by
them - , then they are liable to the charge that they behave in
practice in a manner which is not in· accordance with the aim
which they set themselves, for they actually place assertion signs
before propositions formulated in the 'symbolism' which they do
not at all assert; thus e.g., we encounter in their work the follow-
ing phrase:
"Similarly~: (y): (3x) .f(x,y)";12
In this phrase the expression '(y) : (3x) . f (x, y)' is certainly
11 See: l. c., p. 85.

12 L. c., p. XXIV.
a proposition formulated in the 'symbolism'; the assertion sign

standing before this expression, according to the authors' com-
ments interpreted by the notion of conception B, would indicate
that the proposition '(y): (jx).f(x,y)' is a proposition which is
asserted by the authors; yet it is quite obvious, that Whitehead
and Russell do not in any way assert the aforesaid proposition. If
in relation to the proposition '(y) : (jx) . f (x, y)' and in relation
to the 'Still longer series of other propositions found in Principia
Mathematica and formulated in the 'symbolism', we are sure that
they are not propositions asserted by the authors, then in a large
measure this comes about due to the circumstance that even the
sign of assertion, so brilliantly qualified to throw the reader off
the track, has not succeeded in leading us astray in the given
cases.
In connection with conception C, it is possible to put for-
ward, mutatis mutandis, the objection presented in connection
with concept B.
Continuing further our analysis of the 'primitive proposition'
*1.3 and taking into consideration the question of the sense of
propositions of the type 'q. ~ . p V r', represented in this 'prim-
itive proposition' by the proposition 'q. ~ . p V q', the reader
____________ en<;m,inters_in __the_work of Whitehead and Russell the following
passage, establishing generally the sense of propositions of the
type 'p ~ q': "we put:
*1. 01 . p ~ q . = . ,...., p V q Df.
Here the letters 'Df' stand for 'definition'. They and the sign
of equality together are to be regarded as forming one symbol,
standing for 'is defined to mean *'. Whatever comes to be left of
the sign of equality is defined to mean the same as what comes
to the right of it" .13 On the basis of this passage a reader can
interpret propositions of the type 'q. ~ . p V r' with the aid of the
corresponding propositions of the type
(a) 'rvq.V.pVr'.
13 L . c., p. 94.
A reader who wishes to use the comments of Whitehead and
Russell to grasp the sense which the authors confer on proposi-
tions of the type '"" p', will encounter in their work the follow-
ing passage: "If p is any proposition, the proposition 'not p' or
'p is false', will be represented by '"" p' ". 14 From this passage
the reader can infer that according to the authors' point of view
propositions of the type '"" p' can be read without any alter-
nation of the sense of these propositions either with the aid of
corresponding propositions of the type 'not-p' or with the aid of
corresponding propositions of the type 'p is false'. Considering
that if some expression of the type 'p' is a proposition then the
corresponding expression of the type 'pis a' may be treated as a
proposition having sense only on the assumption that the subject
'p' of the proposition is being used in the 'material supposition',
that consequently the proposition just mentioned of the type 'p is
a' is a proposition about the proposition 'p' and means as much
as the corresponding proposition of the type' 'p' is a', whose sub-
ject ''p'' is a name of the corresponding proposition 'p' and is
no longer used in the 'material supposition' (likewise e.g., the ex-
pression 'between is an expression of two syllables' can be treated
as a proposition having sense only on the assumption that the
-~--"---subjecL:between'-"of that proposition is being used in the 'mate-
rial supposition', that consequently .the proposition 'between is
an expression of two syllables' is a proposition about the expres-
sion 'between' and means as much as the proposition ''between'
is an expression of two syllables', whose subject ''between'' is the
name of the expression 'between', and is no longer used in the
'material supposition') then a reader, accustomed to the indiffer-
ent and careless use of inverted commas typical of Whitehead and
Russell, 15 in contrast to Frege, has the right to surmise that in
case where some expression 'p' is a proposition, the authors are
14 L . c., p. 93.
15 See e.g., the expression 'denoted by 'p V q'' (Whitehead and Russell, !.
c., p. 6) and the expression 'denoted by 'p = q'' (l. c.), p. 7) or again the
expression 'proposition p' ( l. c., p. 6) and the expression 'proposition 'p'' (l.
using a corresponding proposition of the type 'p is false' in the

same meaning, as the corresponding proposition of the type ''p'
is false', that consequently propositions of the type 'rv p' could, in
accordance with the position of the authors, be interpreted with
the aid of corresponding propositions of the type 'not-p' and the
type ''p' is false'. Interpreting in this double way the left side
of any proposition of the above-mentioned type a, a reader will
obtain indirectly two new propositions, which are interpretations
of the corresponding proposition of the type 'q. ~ . p V r'; they
are the corresponding propositions of the type
:1.'
(b) 'not-q. V .p V r'
and
(c) ' 'q' is false . V . p V r'.
Wishing to understand the sense which the authors are giving
to the expressions of the type 'p V q', the reader will find in their
work the following passage: "If p and q are any propositions, the
proposition 'p or q', i.e., 'either p is true or q is true' where the
alternatives are to be not mutually exclusive, will be represented
by
'p v q' "_ 16
Circumstances analogous to those which compel the reader to
-interpret-propositions of the type 'p is false' with the aid of the
corresponding propositions of the type' 'p' is false', may also cause
the reader to assume, that, if some expression 'p' is a proposition
then, according to the authors, the corresponding proposition of
the type 'pis true' does not differ, with regard to sense, from the
corresponding proposition of the type ''p' is true'; consequently
then, relying upon the passage quoted a minute ago, the reader
can interpret propositions of the type 'p V q' with the aid of cor-
responding propositions of the type 'p or q', and also of the type
''p' is true or 'q' is true'. Interpreting in these two different ways
c., p. 8). Concerning the question of inverted commas in Frege see: Frege, l.
c., p. 4.
16 Whitehead and Russell, l. c., p. 93.
the right side of any proposition of the type (a), the reader will
indirectly obtain two new propositions, which are the two new
interpretations of the corresponding proposition of the type 'q. :::::>
. p V r'; they are the corresponding propositions of the types
( d) 'f"V q . V . p or r',
and
.-
(e) 'f"V q . V .'q' is true or 'r' is true'.
Interpreting further on the same principle, but in one way
only, propositions of the types (a), (d), and (e) with the aid of
corresponding propositions of the types
(f) ' 'f"V q' is true or 'p V r' is true',
(g) "f"V q' is true or 'porr' is true',
(h) ''f"V q' is true or ''p' is true or 'r' is true' is true',
the reader has in his possession three further types of proposition
which are indirectly interpretations of the corresponding proposi-
tions of the type 'q. :::::> . p V r'. Interpreting the right sides of the
propositions of the type (b) and (c) in the two different ways, the
reader can assert that according to the authors the propositions
of the types
(i) 'not-q.V.porr',
(k) 'not-q. V .'p' is true or 'r' is true',
""""""'='-"'"'=~~=-·~-°'0-=~=~~~-·....-~-- 0 ,-~,~ ·- - ,- ~-~ ,~.~~4·•-00·-"~°'- ~ •m·~---~·- >
(1) ' 'q' is false . V . p or r',

(m) ''q' is false . V. 'p' is true or 'r' is true',
also do not differ with regard to sense from the corresponding
propositions of the type 'q. :::::> .p V r'. The reader arrives at yet
another two interpretations of that type of proposition, when in-
terpreting corresponding propositions of the type (b) and (c) with
the aid of corresponding propositions of the types
(n) ''not-q is true or 'p V r' is true'
and
(o) '' 'q' is false' is true or 'p V r' is true'.
The double interpretation of proposition of each of the types (i) -
(m) produces eight further types of propositions, which are the
interpretations of the corresponding proposition of the type 'q . ::J

.p V r':
(p) 'not-q or (p or r )',
( q) ''not-q' is true or 'p or r' is true',
(r) ''not-q' or ('p' is true or 'r' is true)',
(s) ''not~q' is true or ''p' is true or 'r' is true is true',
(t) ' 'q• is false or (p or r) ', ;
(u) '' 'q' is false' is true or 'p or r' is true',
(v) '' q' is false or ('p' is true or 'r' is true)',
(x) '' 'q' is false' is true or' 'p' is true or 'r' is true' is true'.
The admissibility of interpreting propositions of the type 'q.
::J . p V r' with the aid of the corresponding propositions of each
of the types (f) - (h) and (n) - (x) fills the reader with complete
resignation with regard to the possibility of grasping the real ter-
minological inclinations of Whitehead and Russell: considering
propositions F - H as well as N - X, belonging to the types
(f) - (h) and (n) - (x) respectively and envisaging the above in-
terpretations of the proposition 'Paris is situated on the Seine. ::J
:Warsaw is situated on the Seine. V .Warsaw is situated on the Vis-
tula', the reader not only has no reasonable cause to consider all
~L--~~~~-,-- --~ - ---these propositions as propositions which are mutually equivalent
to each other, but he can even presume perfectly reasonably, that
none of the propositions F - Hand N - X can be equivalent to
any other of these propositions, and he can explain this presump-
tion by making reference to the circumstance that in at least one
of the propositions of each pair of the propositions F - H and
N - X there is talk about such and such an object (in particular
about some proposition), about which there is no talk whatever
in the second proposition of the given pair.
{Thus e.g., in the proposition
(P) 'not-(Paris is situated on the Seine) or (Warsaw is situated
on the Seine or Warsaw is situated on the Vistula)',
belonging to the domain of geography, there is a talk about Paris,
the Seine, Warsaw and the Vistula, but there is no talk at all
about any propositions, in particular about the proposition 'not-
(Paris is situated on the Seine)' and also nothing about the propo-
sition 'Warsaw is situated on the Seine or Warsaw is situated on
the Vistula', while at the same time in the proposition,
(Q) ''not-(Paris is situated on the Seine)' is true' or' 'Warsaw
is situated on the Seine or Warsaw is situated on the
Vistula' i~- true',
which obviou;ly does not belong to the domain of geography
which, as is known, does not concern itself at all with the truth
or falsity of this or that proposition, there actually is talk [in (Q)]
about the propositions 'not-(Paris is situated on the Seine)' and
'Warsaw is situated on the Seine or Warsaw is situated on the
Vistula'; similarly in the proposition
(T) ''Paris is situated on the Seine' is false or (Warsaw is situ-
ated on the Seine or Warsaw is situated on the Vistula)'
there is talk about the proposition 'Paris is situated on the Seine',
about which there is no talk whatever either in proposition (P)
or in proposition (Q); and so on}.
Returning to the comment of Whitehead and Russell quoted
on page ... about the 'fundamental proposition' *1.3 and in-
terpreting - according to the already discussed interpretative
--~-c-c-~-~schema-for propositions of the type 'p is true', whose subject 'p'
is a proposition - the proposition 'if q is true, then 'p or q' is
true' with the aid of the conditional phrase 'if 'q' is true, then 'p
or q' is true', the reader can presume that according to the point
of view of the authors the proposition 'q. ~ . p V q' does not differ
in regard to sense from the aforesaid conditional phrase. Con-
sidering, that according to the passage - 'The symbol employed
for 'p implies q', i.e., for 'rv p V q', is 'p ~ q'. This symbol may
also be read 'if p, then q'.' 17 - the conditional phrase 'if 'q' is
true, so 'por q' is true' does not differ in regard to sense from the
proposition' 'q' is true.~ . 'porq' is true', nor therefore from the
proposition 'rv(' q' is true) . v . 'p or q' is true'' and nor therefore
17 L. c., p. 7
from the different ways of reading the left side of that proposition
in its two interpretations -
(a) 'not-(' q is true) . V . 'p or q' is true'
and
({3) '' 'q' is true' is false . V . 'p or q' is true',
and nor therefore from the propositions
'!"'
('r) 'n~t-('q' is true) or 'p or q' is true',

(8) ''not-('q' is true') is true or ''p or q' is true' is true',
(c) '' 'q' is true' is false or 'p or q' is true',
( () '' ''q' is true' is false' is true or ''p or q' is true' is true',
being the interpretations envisaged above (two each) of proposi-
tions (a) and ({3) of the form 'p V q', the reader can find a basis
for an interpretation of the proposition 'q. :J .p V q' with the aid
of each of the propositions (/) - (().
Considering the kind of propositions which are talked about
in propositions (I) - (() and having no reasonable cause to think
that any of the propositions (/) - ( () has the same sense as any
other of these propositions or as any of the aforesaid interpre-
tations of the proposition 'q. :J . p V q', belonging to the type
(f) - (h) or (n) - (x), the reader will constantly wilt under the
weight of this medley of interpretations. The impenetrable chaos
"""~~-~--·-~-.--- -·-wlilch--ls--the-actuar-result of the reader's effort aimed at grasp-
ing the sense of the 'primitive proposition' *1.3, could be even
intensified, if the reader refers to a series of other comments con-
tained in the work of Whitehead and Russell and connected with
the comments on the mentioned problems, which do not harmo-
nize with the authors' comments already quoted or even with one
another.
I dwelled a little longer here on the problem of the interpre-
tation of the 'primitive proposition' *1.3, which illustrates very
well the doubts of a semantic nature, which I experienced in the
first years of my association with 'symbolic logic', because I pre-
sume that the matter of far reaching misunderstandings about
the sense of the fundamental formulas of that discipline is today
an exceedingly topical matter, misunderstandings which can re-
pel an interest in 'logistic' for a considerable number of scientific
workers who are not satisfied just by the delights of writing signs
and the transformation of formulas, and who - in contrast to
the devotees of empty mathematics (and such occur )18 - wish
to understand. the meaning of the transformed formulas, and to
know 'of what' and 'what', respectively, 'of what' and 'what' it is
wished to as~ert by means of those formulas.
I myself, who have been more or less systematically concerned
with the work of Whitehead and Russell since the year 1914,
reached the conclusion only after four years that the formulas of
the so-called deduction theory, become intelligible formulas when
we ignore the assertion sign, and they begin to 'hold together',
when the propositions of the type 'r-v p', 'pVq', 'p :=> q' etc., which
enter their composition are interpreted consistently with the aid
of the corresponding propositions of the type 'not p', 'p or q', 'if
p, then q' etc., supplemented in case of possible misunderstand-
ings by parentheses adapted to the circumstances, but in no case
- despite the authors' comments - I consider it inadmissible to
read the formulas with the aid of propositions about propositions
and asserting some relation as e.g., the relation of 'implication'
-~~·--·--~--between propositions. The proposition 'q. :=> . p V q' analysed
above is interpreted, by the method of interpreting the formulas
of the 'theory of deduction' just described - with the aid of the
proposition 'if q, then (p or q)', the proposition 'p V q .p' - with
the aid of the proposition 'if p or p, then p', the proposition 'p V q
. :=> • q V p' - with the aid of the proposition 'if p or q, then (q
or p)', the proposition 'p V (q V r). :=> . q V (p V r)' - with the
a.id of the proposition 'if p or (q or r), then 'q or (p or r) )',the
proposition 'q :=> r. :=>: p V q. :=> . p V r' - with the aid of the
proposition 'if, if q, then r, then, if p or q, then (p or r)', the
18 See: e.g., J. v. Neumann, 'Zur Hilbertschen Beweistheorie' Mathematis-
che Zeitschrift, Sonderabdruck aus Band 26, Heft 1, Berlin 1927, pp. 3 - 5. In
connection with the question of meaningfulness of mathematical propositions
see: Frege, op. cit., Zweiter Band, pp. 96-139.
proposition 'q. ~ . p ~ q' - with the aid of the proposition 'if q,

then, if p, then q', the proposition 'rv p. ~ . p ~ q' - with the aid
of the proposition 'if not p, then, if p, then q', etc. Please note, in
passing, that the interpretation announced here of the formulas -
'q. ~ .p ~ q' and 'rv p. ~ .p ~ q' is not, of course, as capable
of successfully 'startling the bourgeoisie' of 'philosophical logic',
as is tffe interpretation by means of the propositions - 'a true
proposition is implied by any proposition' and 'a false proposition
implies any proposition' which, although brilliant in this respect,
obscures the real sense of the aforesaid formulas. 19
19 See: Whitehead and Russell, l. c., p. 99.

CHAPTER II
ON RUSSEL'S 'ANTINOMY' CONCERNING
';THE CLASS OF CLASSES WHICH ARE
NOT ELEMENTS OF THEMSELVES'
,,
I return to the 'memoirs' of the year 1911.
I encountered the above mentioned book of Lukasiewicz at
the time when my doctoral work was ready for print under the
title of 'A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Proposi-
tions', written in 1910 and supplemented in 1911 under the influ-
ence of critical remarks by Dr. Kazimierz Twardowski, Professor
of Philosophy at Lw6w University and, in 1912, my supervisor
for the doctorate of philosophy. 1 Lukasiewicz's book became the
starting point for my subsequent work entitled 'An Attempt At a
Proof of the Ontological Principle of Contradiction' written in the
year 1911. 2 In connection with the work of Tadeusz Kotarbinski
entitled 'The Problem of the Existence of the Future' ,3 I wrote
an article in the year 1913 devoted to the problem 'Is All Truth
Only True Eternally or Is It Also True Without a Beginning?' 4
~~.., __,,,,__~AT-aboufth-at-fimelprepared for print a work entitled 'The Cri-
tique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle'. 5 Living

intellectually beyond the sphere of the valuable achievements of
the exponents of 'Mathematical Logic', and yielding to many de-
structive habits resulting from the one sided, 'philosophical' -
grammatical culture, I struggled in the works mentioned with a
1 St. Lesniewski, (1911].

2 Stanislaw Lesniewski [1912]. The two memoirs mentioned appeared in a
somewhat altered form in Russian.
3 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, 'Zagadnienie istnienia przyszlosci' (The problem
of the existence of the future), Przeglq,,d Filozoficzny XVI, No. I; 1913.
4 Stanislaw Lesniewski, [1913b]
5 Stanislaw Lesniewski, [1913c].
number of problems which were beyond my powers at that time,

discovering already-discovered Americas on the way. I have men-
tioned those works desiring to point out that I regret that they
have appeared in print, and I formally 'repudiate' them herewith,
though I have already done this within the university faculty,
affirming the bankruptcy of the 'philosophical' - grammatical
work'of the initial period of my work. 6
"
6 I devoted a passage of the work entitled 'The Critique of the Logical
Principle of the Excluded Mid~le' (see op. cit., pp. 317 - 320) to a critique of
the concepts of the 'general objects' (in my book [1913a] the corresponding
passage is found on pp. 27 - 33). Attempting to prove that 'no object is
a 'general' object' (p. 320), I stated in that passage that regardless of the
specific forms.which the 'general object' takes according to various thinkers,
and which appears in different systems either as 'concept' in the meaning of
the ancient or 'medieval' 'realism', or - as 'general ideas' of Locke or 'rep-
resentative general objects' of Professor Twardowski, or again - as 'ideal'
objects of Husserl existing 'beyond time' - those objects possess, for such au-
thors, a certain characteristic peculiarity consisting in this, that 'the object',
which is allegedly a 'general object' with respect to some group of 'individ-
ual' objects, can possess only those features which are common to all the
'individual' objects (p. 319) corresponding to them. At the time I wrote that
_ p_Ct§§age_Lbdieved that there are in existence in this world so called features
and so called relations, as two special kinds of objects, and I felt no scruples
about using the expressions 'feature' and 'relations'. It is a long time since
I believed in the existence of objects which are features, or in the existence
of objects which are relations and now nothing induces me to believe in the
existence of such objects (see: Tadeusz Kotarbinski, [1921], pp. 7 - 11) and
in situations of a more 'delicate' character I do not use the expressions 'fea-
ture' and 'relation' without the application of various extensive precautions
and circumlocutions. I also have no inclination at present - considering the
possibility of various interpretational misunderstandings - to ascribe this or
that opinion on the question of 'general objects' to the authors mentioned
in the passage quoted above. However, in connection with that passage and
with reference to all those who, by reason of the meaning they give to ex-
pressions of the type 'general object with respect to objects a, are inclined to
state the proposition 'if X is a general object with respect to objects a, X is
b, and Y is a, then Y is b', I wish to state here that this proposition entails
the proposition 'if there exist at least two different a, then a general object
While publishing in turn the above works, I occupied myself
zealously with the 'antinomies'. From the time when in the year
1911 I began an acquaintance with them by meeting with the
'antinomies' of Russell related to the 'class [klasy} of classes not
elements of themselves', and problems concerning the antinomies
were the most· demanding subject of my deliberations for over
eleven years: I shall present various results which I achieved in
Ill
with respect to objects a does not exist', in accordance with the following
schema:
(1) if X is a general object with respect to objects a, X is b, also Y is a,
then Y is b. (assumption)
from (1) it result, that
(2) if X is a general object with respect to objects a, X is different from
Z, and Z is a, then Z is different from Z,
and
(3) if X is a general object with respect to objects a, X is identical with
Z, and Y is a, thren Y is identical with Z;
from (2) it follows, that
(4) if X is a general object with respect to objects a, and Z is a, then X is
identical with Z,
from (4) however, that,
(5) if X is a general object with respect to objects a, Z is a, and Y is a,
-~-~-··~~·-·"'~.}h~_ILJJ.:j~~~<g~.11~!?:-LC>.l:>je,<;t \,Vith respect to objects a, X is identical
with Z, and Y is a);
from (5) and (3) it follows, that,
(6) if X is a general object with respect to objects a, Z is a, and Y is a,
then Y is identical with Z,
from (6) however, that, if there exist at least 'two different a, then a general
object with respect to objects a, does not exist. (This schema would retain
value, mutatis mutandis, if instead of expressions of the type e.g., 'general
object with respect to objects a' one used in an analogous way some other
expressions of the type 'the general object a' or expressions of the type 'the
general object concept a'). I regard my treatment as the result of a careful
formulation of theoretical tendencies involved, more or less explicitly, in the
argumentation of opponents of the different kinds of 'universals' in various
phases of their 'disputes' about them. If one takes the position that this
assertion is a banal one, I would cite in defence the circumstance that ex-
ponents of 'philosophy' defend, regrettably often, positions at variance with
banal assertions.
that field, in different sections of the present work. I wish to give

here an account of some of the results of this analysis of Russell's
'antinomy', derived from the years 1913 and 1914. The starting
point of my research on this 'antinomy' was its formulation in the
aforesaid book by Lukasiewicz with which I became acquainted
much earlier than with any other. However, my considerations
below can easily be applied, mutatis mutandis, to a number of
other k~own formulations of Russell's 'antinomy'.
Lukasiewicz writes in his book as follows: "we say of objects
belonging to a particular class, that they are subordinated to that
class."
It most often happens that a class is not subordinated to itself,
as being a collection {zbi6r} of elements, it generally possesses dif-
ferent features from each ofthe elements separately. A collection
of men is not a man, a collection of triangles is not a triangle, etc.
In some cases, it happens in fact to be otherwise. Let us consider
e.g., the conception of a 'full class' {klasy pelne}, i.e., a class to
which belong, in general, some individuals. For not all classes are
full, some being empty; e.g., the classes: 'mountain of pure gold',
'perpetuum mobile', 'square circle', are empty, because there are
no individuals which belong to those classes. One can then distin-
~----------------- -guish among them those classes to which belong some individuals,
and form the conception of a 'full class'. Under this conception
fall, as individuals, whole classes, e.g., the class of men, the class
of triangles, the class of the first even number (which contains
only one element, the number 2), etc. A collection of all those
classes constitutes a new class, namely 'the class of full classes'.
So that the class of full classes is also a full class and therefore is
subordinated to itself.
If some classes are subordinated to themselves and others are
not, then, for the purpose of differentiating the one type of class
from the other, one can form a conception of 'a class which is not
subordinated to itself'. Under this conception fall, as individuals,
the class of men, triangles, first even numbers, etc. The collection
of all those classes, constitutes 'the class of classes which are not
subordinated to themselves'. For brevity let us call it class]{.
So arises the question: Is class K subordinated to itself or
not? If we accept that class ]{ is subordinated to itself, then be-
cause each class subordinated to the class]{ is not subordinated
to itself, we reaoh the conclusion that class]{ is not subordinated
to itself. The;efore
,, a contradiction arises, for from this, that class
]{ is subordinated to itself, it results that ]{ is not subordinated
to itself.
If we wish to a void this contradiction, we must accept that
class ]{ is not subordinated to itself. However, if it is not sub-
ordinated to itself, then it belongs to class ]{, consequently it is
subordinated to itself. And so here also there arises a contradic-
tion, since from the fact that class ]{ is not subordinated to itself,
it results that it is subordinated to itself. Whichever way we turn
we encounter a contradiction. What is to be done? 7
I wished to 'do something' but at the same time was unable
to present anything reasonable in rebuttal of any of the supposed
assumptions on which the above 'antinomy' relies, nor in rebuttal
of the reasoning which leads to the contradiction on the basis of
those assumptions. I began to examine examples of situations in
~~,,~-~,,--which,-in-practice, I··considered or did not consider a particular
object to be the class or collection respectively of such and such
objects (having at my disposal the expressions 'class' and 'collec-
tion', I called a class of some a just a collection of a's only 8 ) and
to submit to critical analysis my belief in the various assumptions
of this 'antinomy' from that particular point of view (the ques-
tion of 'empty classes' was not the subject of my considerations at
7 Lukasiewicz, op. cit., pp. 129-131.

8 See: Stanislaw Lesniewski, [1914] p. 64. In this rather inferior paper
I gave my view on the 'antinomy' of Russell. Not yet having my own ax-
iomatised theory of classes, I referred here and there to various theses which
I found necessary for my deliberations. My procedure in this regard was
wholly similar to the procedure of the 'set theoreticians' who do not build
their work on explicit axiomatic foundations.
that time, because, from the first contact, I treated the concep-
tion of 'empty classes' as a 'mythological' conception and without
hesitation took the position, that
(1) if any object is the class 9 of objects a, then some object is
alO).
ln.tliis way I arrived at the conviction, that,
(2) It happens frequently that a certain object is a class of such
and such objects and at the same time, a class of entirely dif-
ferent objects (so e.g., segment AB, Figure 1 is the class of
segments which are segment AC or segment CB, and at the
c D
A B
Fig. 1.
9
When I wish to remove readers' doubts about the grammatical case in
which I use here and there various expressions, I will use the corresponding
grammatical case of the expression 'object' ['przedmiot'], placed before the
expression which is doubtful as to grammatical case, and written in the short-
ened form ('p-fo', 'p-t6w' etc.), which I will not use in any other situation.
The expressions 'p-tu P', 'p-t6w a' etc. used in this way to remove grammat-
ical doubts, I will in practice treat as the corresponding grammatical cases of
the expressions 'P', 'a' etc. Previously I used the expressions '(przedmiotu)
P' '(przedmioiow) a' etc. in analogous situations. For uniformity of exposi-
tion and to avoid the complications of small historical details I will present
matters below as though I had previously also used the expressions 'p-tu P',
'p-t6w a' etc. in the above situations.
IO See l. c.
same time is the class of segments, which are segments AD

or segment DB) 11
and that,
(3) if one and only one object is P, then Pis the class of objects
P (so e.g., segment AB, Fig. 1, is the class of segments AB
in Fig. ~~) •
Trying to .grasp in just what way I was using expressions of the
type 'P is subordinated to class J(' which following Lukasiewicz,
I then used quite promiscue as equivalent to expressions of the
type 'P is an element of class ]{' 12 , I established a definition,
according to which I asse:i;ted that
(4) P is subordinated to the class J{ when and only when, for
some meaning of the expression 'a' these conditions are ful-
filled: (a) ]( is the class of objects a, (/3) P is a 13
(at the time I did not yet know how to operate with quanti-
fiers, 14 and requiring in the colloquial language which I was using,
some equivalents of expressions of the type '(3a). J(a)', '(3X, a)
. j(_}(, a)', etc. familiar in 'symbolic' language, 15 I used corre-
sponding expressions of the type 'for some meaning of expression
'a' J(a)', 'for some meanings of expressions 'X.' and 'a J(X,a)'
and the like, treating these complicated expressions in the same
~-~··---·warin·practice, mutatis mutandis, as one would treat the cor-
responding expressions of the types '(3a).f(a)', '(3X,a)', etc.
Sentence (4) in my language of that time, was a practical coun-
terpart of the following sentences written in a considerably more
11 See: l. c. See also: G. Frege, 'Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in

E. Schroder's Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik', Archiv fiir Philoso-
phie1 Zweite Abhandlung. Archiv fiir systematische Philosophie 1 Neue Falge
der Philosophischen Monatshefte, I 1895, pp. 434 - 435.
12 See: Lukasiewicz, /. c.
13 See: Lesn1ews
' . k.i, l . c.
14 See: C. S. Peirce, On the Algebra of Logic. 'A Contribution to the Philos-
ophy of Notation', American Jo·urnal of Mathematics, VII, 1885, p. 197.
15 See: Whitehead and Russell, l. c., p. 15.
'symbolic' language 'P is subordinated to class J{. - . (3a). J{

is the class of objects a. P is a' 16 and 'P is an element of class
]{. = .(3a). J{ is the class of objects a. P is a', and because
of that it harmonised fully with the current practice of the 'set-
theoreticians'' way of using the expression 'element').
U~irrg individual sentences of the type 'A is b' in a way which
allows.one to assert, that
(5) if Pis a, then one and only one object is P,
and that,
(6) if Pis a, then P is P,
I stated in accordance with (5) and (3), that,
(7) if P is a class, then P is the class of objects P,
in accordance with (7) and (6) however, that,
(8) if P is a class, then: (a) P is a class of objects P, ((3) P is
P.
From (8) I inferred that,
(9) if P is a class, then, for some meaning of the expression 'a'
these conditions are fulfilled: (a) P is a class of objects a, ((3)
Pis a,
and from (9) - in accordance with (4) - that,
~~----~--------- __ (JOLiLf is a class, then Pis subordinated to class P.
On the basis of (10) I asserted, that
(11) no object is a class not subordinated to itself, 17
(12) no object is the class of classes not subordinated to them-
selves.18
16 See: Whitehead and Russell, l. c., pp. 7 and 6.

17 See: Lesniewski, op. cit., p. 72. In this work I obtained a result corre-
sponding to thesis (11) formulated above, in a way which was different from
that presented above, which I already knew then. In the aforesaid work from
the year 1~14, I chose a more complex form of reasoning which appeared to
me to be more 'interesting'. The wording of the relevant passage (p. 71 - 73)
is, unfortunately, not clear without further comment.
18 See: op. cit., p. 73.
I believe firmly in (12), I do not perceive even a hint of an

'antinomy' in the circumstance that the assumption, that the class
of classes not subordinated to themselves is subordinated to it-
self, together with the assumption, that the class of classes not
subordinated to themselves is not subordinated to itself, leads to
a contradiction, - similarly seeing that no object can be a round
square, I arri not aware of any 'antinomy' in the circumstance
a
that leads to contradiction, - from the assumption that a round
square is round, together with the assumption that a round square
is not round. I have ceased then to see the 'antinomy' in Russell's
construction, having ceased to believe in the class of classes which
are not subordinated to themselves, thereby rejecting one of the
fundamental steps in the above construction. 18
However, I considered this construction to be defective for yet
another reason:
Considering a figure analogous to Fig. 1, I asserted as in the
example relating to thesis (2), that
(13) AB is the class of segments, which are segment AC or seg-
ment CB,
and
(14) AB is the class of segments, which are segment AD or seg-
_,__",,_,,,...... -ment .n B.
Considering, that
(15) AC is a segment, which is a segment AC or segment CB,
I inferred from (13) and (15), that
(16) for some meaning of the expression 'a' these conditions are
fulfilled: (a) AB is the class of objects a, (/3) AC is a,
from (4) however, and (16), that
(17) AC is subordinated to class AB.
stating that
(18) AC is not a segment, which is segment AD or segment DB,
and naturally ceasing to believe in view of (14), (17) and (18),
18 See: Lesniewski, op. cit., p. 74.

that if ]{ is the class of objects a, and P is subordinated to

class ]{, then P is a, 19 I rejected in this way the implied as-
sumption of Russell's construction which for me would make
possible the assertion, that, if the class of classes not subor-
dinated to themselves, is a class of classes not subordinated
to themselves, and the class of classes not subordinated to
themselves, is subordinated to the class of classes which are
not• subordinated to themselves, then the class of classes not
subordinated to themselves is a class not subordinated to it-
self, consequently - in view of (6) - also rejecting the as-
sumption, that, if the class of classes not subordinated to
themselves, is subordinated to the class of classes not subor-
dinated to themselves, then the class of classes not subordi-
nated to themselves is a class not subordinated to itself, and
which therefore could, from my position, constitute a basis
for the construction of the 'antinomy', and of the possibil-
ity of deducing a contradiction from the supposition that the
class of classes not subordinated to themselves, is subordi-
nated to itself. This circumstance was the reason for which I
could no longer see any 'antinomy' in Russell's construction. 20
The 'solution' of the 'antinomy' regarding the 'class of classes
which are not elements of themselves', which is outlined in
this chapter, harmonizes fully with the related theory devel-
oped below which, furthermore, is based on explicit axiomatic
foundations.
19 See: op. cit., p. 70.

CHAPTER III
ON VARIOUS WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING
THE EXPRESSIONS
•
'CLASS' AND 'COLLECTION'
The starting cpoint of all my considerations concerning Russell's

'antinomy', was the conception of 'class' (respectively, collection),
which allows one to assert in general about each class ( respec-
tively, about each collection) of various objects, which 'consists'
(not necessarily in a separable manner) of just those objects, in
the same way as the above-mentioned segment AB in Fig. 1,
which constitutes for me the class of segments which are segment
AD or segment DB, 'consists' of just those segments which are
segment AD or segment DB, in accordance with my conception
stated above. In this regard my conception is on the one hand,
so far as I can see, completely in agreement with the way of using
the expressions 'class' and 'collection', which is most common in
the colloquial language of people who have never occupied them-
selves with any 'theory of classes' nor with the 'theory of sets',
and on the other hand it is based on a strong scientific tradition
~~~,,~~,,~representecrmore or 'less consistently by numerous scientists old
and new, but in particular by Georg Cantor.
From the multitude of Cantor's utterances which characterize
his position on the question of the relation of collections of some
objects to those objects, I quote, e.g., the following statement:
"Any set of distinct things can be regarded as a single thing in
which those objects are constituents or constitutive elements." 1
So e.g., each of the sounds, the collection of which is some mu-
sical composition, constitutes according to Cantor a component
part of that collection, and the musical composition itself consists
1 Georg Cantor, 'Mitteilungen zur Lehre von Transfiniten', Zeitschrift fiir
Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, Neue Folge, Einundneunzigster Band.
1887, p. 83.
of the sounds, of which it is a collection, 2 similarly with a picture

which consists of its various suitably matched parts, whose col-
lection it is. 3 Being in complete agreement here with Cantor, I
am not going to attempt to resolve questions which are beyond
my interpretative abilities, as to whether or not some collection
of sounds which is a musical composition, e.g., Beethoven's Fifth
Symphony, "is related to the Platonic clDoe or lDco:, as well as
to wliat Plato calls in his Dialogue Philebos or the Supreme Good
a µlxrav" ,4 not to establish to what degree my view of classes
and collections harmonizes with Cantor's declaration, which says
so very little, that by 'aggregate' or 'set' he understands "any
multitude which may be thought of as One, i.e., every totality of
definite elements, which can be joined into a whole by means of a
rule" ,5 also that he understands "By a 'set' [Menge] any collection
into a whole M of definite, distinct objects m of our intuition or
our thought (which will be called elements of M)" 6
Frege has made a number of interesting observations in his
works on the questions connected with the position according to
which any class at all of various objects consists of just those
objects. I will cite here a few quotations from that author, in
order to place my own views on related matters in an historical
background..
In the aforesaid work devoted to the principles of Arithmetic,
Frege writes: "The concepts which one needs must naturally
2
See: Georg Cantor, 'Mitteilungen zur Lehre von Transfiniten', (Fortset-
zung des Abschnittes VIII and Schluss des Aufsatzes), Zeitschrift fiir Philoso-
phie und Philosophische Kritik, Neue Folge, Zweiundneunzigster Band. 1888,
pp. 242 and 243.
3
See: loc. cit., p. 243.
4
Georg Cantor, Grundlagen einer allgemeinen M annigfaltigkeitslehre.
Ein mathematisch-philosophischer Versuch in der Lehre des Unendlichen,
Leipzig 1883, p. 43.
5 Loe. cit.
6
Georg Cantor, 'Beitrage zur Begriindung der transfiniten Mengenlehre
(Erster Artikel)' Afathematische Annalen 46, 1895, p. 481.
be conceived precisely. This holds especially for what math-
ematicians would like to designate by the word 'set' [Menge].
Dedekind"... "uses the word 'System' for very much the same
purpose". 7 And a little later: "it is here particularly clear that ac-
cording to Dedekind the elements constitute the real constituents
of the system'!. 8 And still later: "Schroeder also at bottom, re-
gards the elements as what constitute his class [J(lasse]. An empty
class should• not really occur with Schroeder any more than an
empty system with Dedekind; but the need arising from the na-
ture of the situation makes itself felt in different ways with both
writers." Dedekind continues the above disjointed passage: "On
the other hand, for certain reasons we will here wholly exclude
the empty system which contains no element, although for other
investigations it can be convenient to invent such a system." Thus
such an invention is allowed; only for certain reasons it is a voided.
Schroeder ventures to invent an empty class. Thus as it seems,
both are in agreement with many mathematicians that one may
invent anything one pleases which does not exist - even what is
unthinkable; for if it is the elements which form the system, then
the system is removed at the same time as the elements. As to
where the limits of this inventive caprice lie, and whether there are
--~,~~,,,--suchlimits,there is to be found little clarity and agreement." 9
Frege's remarks relating to the 'invention' by mathematicians
of objects which do not exist are, unfortunately, very timely even
now, as is evident even from the following examples:
I. P. Feliks Hausdorff in his famous textbook on 'the theory of
sets', writes: "A set [Menge] is formed by the collection of single
objects into a whole. A set is a plurality thought of as a unity.
If these or similar statements are taken as definitions, then one
7 G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Erster Band, p. 1.

8 Loe. cit., p. 2.
9 Loe. cit., pp. 2 and 3. See: Richard Dedekind, Was sind und was sollen
die Zahlen? Braunschweig 1888, p. 2.
would rightly object that they define idem per idem 10 or even
obscurum per obscurius. 11
However we can consider them as demonstrations, as references to
a primitive act of thought, [Denkakt] familiar to all, whose reso-
lution into more primitive acts would perhaps be neither possible
nor necessary. We will content ourselves with this conception and
take it as fundamental that an object M determines certain other
objects a, b, c, . . . in a characteristic, indefinable way; a relation
which we express by means of the words: the set M consists of
the objects a, b, c, ...
A set can consist of a natural number of things or not; it is
called finite or infinite accordingly. Examples of the former are
the set of inhabitants of a city, the hydrogen atoms in the sun,
the natural numbers from 1 to 1000, of the latter, the set of all
natural numbers, all points on a line, all circles in a plane." 12
A little later: "Following G. Peano, we designate the funda-
mental relation of an object a to a set to which it belongs in words
and in formula as follows:
a is an element of A: a E A" .13
Having stated in this way that a collection is formed by a
'Zusammenfassung' 'into a whole' of certain objects called ele-
ments-of.that--collection, and producing examples of collections
consisting of different kinds of such elements, namely inhabitants
of some city, atoms of hydrogen, etc., Hausdorff then commences
'to admit' (according to Dedekind's and Frege's terminology we
could say - 'to invent' something which is apparently also a col-
lection, although it does not have any elements, therefore neither
consists of any of them nor is formed by 'collection' 'to a whole'
10
Translator's note: something in terms of the same thing.
11 Translator's note: the obscure by the more obscure.
12 F. Hausdorff, Mengenlehre, Zweite, Neubearbeitete Auflage, Goschens
Lehrbiicherei I. Gruppe, Reine Mathematik, Band 7, Berlin und Leipzig 1927,
p. 11.
13 Loe. cit. ·
from them. The author declares namely: "On the grounds of ex-
pedience, we also admit a set 0, the null set or empty set, which
contains no element" .14
II. In a textbook on the 'theory of sets', the author of which
is Wadaw Sierpinski, we encounter the following definition: "A
collection formed of all and only those elements, which belong
simultaneously to A and to B, we call a product of collections
A and B a~d denote this by A x B, A . B, or simply AB" .15
Considering that according to this definition
( 1) if any collection X is AB, then collection X has been formed
out of elements belonging simultaneously to A and to B,
and on the other hand, that,
(2) if a collection X has been formed out of the elements belong-
ing simultaneously to A and to B, then there exists at least
one element, which belongs simultaneously both to A and to
B,
because, in this world in which we live, which is not a mytho-
logical world, nothing at all can be 'created' out of something
which does not even exist - we state on the basis of (1) and (2),
that if any collection X is AB, then there exists at least one ele-
ment, belonging simultaneously to A and to B. The circumstance
--~·""""""···that,---in accordance with the above, there is not in this world a
product of two such collections which do not possess common el-
ements, does not present a barrier to Sierpinski in the 'invention'
of any object which is apparently a product of just two such col-
lections. Wherever Hausdorff uses 'admission' Sierpinski applies
'introduction'. The author writes as follows: "Each set of col-
lections obviously comprises a definite totality". So that we can
say exactly the same about a product and a difference we must
introduce an empty collection which we will denote by 0. So, e.g.,
a formula
14 Op. cit., p. 12.

15 Wadaw Sierpinski, Zarys teorji mnogosci. Cz~sc pierwsza. (Outline of
the theory of sets. First part) Warszawa, MCMXXIII, p. 4.
"AB = 0 expresses the fact that collections A and B do not

possess any element in common." i 6
III. An object 'invented' by Adolf Fraenkel would appear
rather interesting if it existed: as we will see later on, it could be
attractively described in the author's terminology as an improper
collection, which is, in fact, not a collection at all, although it is
a co1lection. In one of his works Fraenkel writes: "the product
'.D J..1" = '.D (N, P, R, ... ) on the other hand is the set of all those
elements which a.re contained simultaneously in all sets N, P, R,
... The union set corresponds to the logical 'or', the product to
the logical 'both'. If e.g., Mi= {1,2,3, ... }, M2 = {2,3,4, ... },
Af3 = {3,4,5, ... } and so on, and if M = {Mi,M2,M3, ... } desig-
nates enumerable set of all these (individually enumerable) sets,
then the union set SM is obviously identical to {l, 2, 3, ... } (there-
fore identical to Mi), on the other hand the product i:DM is iden-
tical to the null set; for there is no natural number, however large,
which occurs simultaneously in all all sets Mi, M2, M3, ... "i 7 On
the basis of the first half of this quotation we can assert, that,
considering the second half
( 1) product '.D M is the collection of elements contained simulta-
neously in each of the collections Mi, M2, M3, ...
~- Taking into account the way in which Fraenkel uses expres-
sions of the type {a, b, c, ... } , we establish on the basis of the
above, that,
(2) if X is an element contained simultaneously in each of the
collections Mi, M2, M3, ... ,then Xis a natural number.
In accordance with the conclusion of that quotation we state,
that
16 s·1erpms
· · k'i, op. cit.,
· p. 5.
i7 Adolf Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre. Eine elementare Ein-
fiihrung in das Reich des Unendlichgrossen, Zweite erwiterte Auflage, Berlin
1923, Die Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften in Einzeldarstel-
lungen mit besonder Beriicksichtigung der Anwendungsgebiete, Band IX,
p. 55.
(3) there is no natural number which is an element contained
simultaneously in each of the collections Mi, M2, M3, ...
On the basis of many contexts in his book, it is for me beyond
question that we may infer from (1 ), in accordance with the point
of view of the author, that,
(4) if Y is ap element of the product '.D M, then Y is an element
containe~ simultaneously in each of the collections Mi, M2,
M3, ...
from (2) and (3) it follows, that
(5) there is no element contained simultaneously in each of the
collections M1, M2, M3, ... ,
from (4) and (5) we see, that
(6) the product '.Dlvf does not contain an element.
For the proper utilization of what we know up till now, let us con-
sider the following passages: "On purely formal grounds, namely
to be able to express certain facts more easily and more con-
veniently, we introduce at this point a further improper [un-
eigentliche] set, the so-called null set"... "This is defined as con-
taining no element whatever; it is therefore really not a set at all,
but it will be considered as one and will be designated by 0" 18
Out of these passages it follows, that
~.~-~····~T1r·rrz is o, then z
is an improper collection,
(8) if Z does not contain any element, then Z is 0,
and
(9) if Z is 0, then Z is not properly a collection at all.
From (8) and (6) we infer, that
(10) the product '.DM is 0,
from (7) and (10), that
(11) product '.DM is an improper collection,
and from (9) and (10), that
(12) product '.DM is not properly a collection at all.
18 Op. cit., p. 15.

Consequently, the product '!JM, being 'introduced' by Fraen-

kel as the 'null set' in accordance with (10), in the second quoted
passage of his work, is - according to (11), (12), and (1), - just
the above mentioned improper collection, which is not properly a
collection at all, although it is a collection. 19
I return once more toFrege. All the objections of this scholar
directe<j against those who admit the existence of 'empty classes',
although stating on the other hand that classes consist of ele-
ments, do not apply, naturally, to my conception of classes out-
lined above in connection with Russell's 'antinomy'. Being of the
opinion that, if an object is the class of some a (e.g., people,
points, square circles), then it actually consists of a, I always re-
jected, in accordance with thesis (1) on page 186, the existence
of theoretical monstrosities like the class of square circles, un-
derstanding only too well that nothing can consist of something
which does not even exist. There has never been a time in.my life
in which I would not have been in complete agreement with the
lapidary remark of Frege a propos the theory of classes of Ernest
Schroeder: "If"... "a class consists of objects, is an aggregate,
a collective unity of them, then it must vanish when the objects
19 On the grounds of Fraenkel's expression concerning the 'null-set', one

could assert that one could get a contradiction and, consequently, all the
sensational theses in a far shorter way. I would reply that in my reasoning I
have avoided most carefully all positions of doubtful interpretation; thus e.g.,
from the author's declaration concerning the 'null-set' 'introduced' by him
that it is an improper collection, I have not yet inferred the conclusion that
the 'null-set' is a collection, for I did not consider it to be out of the ques-
tion that Fraenkel uses the term 'improper collection' in the way everyday
speech uses the expressions 'dead men', 'false diamond', 'painted fish' and so
on. (See e.g.,: Hauptwerke der Philosophie in originalgetreuen Neudrucken,
Band IV. Werke Bernard Bolzanos, I Wissenschaftslehre in vier Banden, Er-
ster Band, Leipzig 1914, p. 257, also the quotation from Savonarola on p. 79.)
I have also not used the author's enunciation, which for me is wholly suspect
but little understood, according to which the 'null-set' is not a collection at
all, but 'shall be regarded' as a collection.
I ~
vanish. If we burn all the trees in a forest, we thereby burn the
forest. Thus there can be no empty class" 20
To eliminate possible misunderstandings, I also wish to say
here a few words in connection with my thesis (3) on page 187,
and, at the same time, in connection with Frege's article on
Schroeder's. 'ailgebra of logic' which has been mentioned several
times.
From thesis (3) it follows, that
(A) if one and only one object is an element of class I<, then the
element of class J{ is the class of elements of class J{.
Holding the view, that
(B) if X is the class of elements of class J{, then class J{ is the
same object as X,
without causing doubts in the light of considerations in Chap-
ter II, or from the point of view of the theory developed below
which is already based on axiomation foundations, I infer from (A)
and (B), that
( C) if one and only one object is an element of the class J{, then
class K is the same object as the element of class J(;
consequently if I use the expression 'singular class' in a way which
allows one to assert, that
- ·~~··~·---·~(Dr7< is a-singular class when and only when, one and only one
object is an element of class J{, 21
then relying upon (D) and ( C) I can say, that
(E) if some class is a singular class, then it is the same object as
its single element.
The possibility of obtaining thesis (E) on the basis of my views
about classes harmonises most completely, it seems, with Frege's
position represented in the sentence: "Now our assumption that
° Frege, Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in Schroeder's Vorlesungen

2
iiber die Algebra der Logik, pp. 436 and 437.
21 See: Schroeder, Op. cit., First Volume, p. 247. See also Frege, Op. cit.,
p. 443.
singular classes coincide with individuals is a necessary conse-

quence of the conception that classes consist of individuals" 22 if
the expression in this sentence 'singular classes coincide with in-
dividuals', constituting, as it appears, in this colloquial language
of the author an equivalent of the form used by him a little earlier
"a class which consists of only one object, coincides with it" ,23
,,
Being able to affirm thesis (E) with complete conviction, I
firmly reject simultaneously the view according to which
(E*) every object is a class, whose only element is just that object,
because, considering e.g., segment AB of Fig. I and taking
into account the circumstance that, from the point of view of
my conception of classes (see thesis ( 17), Chapter II), segment
AC is an element of segment AB which is in accordance with
thesis (13) the class of the segments which are segment AC or
segment CB, I am, of course, entitled to assert that although
one and only one object is segment AB of Fig. 1, and although
such being the case, in accordance with thesis (3) segment AB
is also the class of segments AB, that segment is by no means
the class whose only element is just that segment AB.
Believing that if a class is a singular class whose only element
is some 'point' indivisible in time and space (without being preju-
diced about the question as to whether singular classes exist in the
world) then it is the same object as its only element, and believing
at the same time that not every object at least, is a class whose
only element is that same object, it appears that I am in sharp
conflict with the position taken by Frege. In a passage which I
divide into three parts to facilitate its use, the author writes:
(a) "The doubt whether every individual be regarded as a
class that consists of it alone is strengthened by the following
consideration. For P in our discussion presented above, we can
also take a class which itself includes a set of individuals; for as
22
0 p. cit., p. 44 5.
23
Op. cit., pp. 443 and 444.
the author says on p. 148, such a class can be presented as an
object of thought and accordingly as an individual" 24
(b) "Now if Q as above is the class of objects which coincide
with P, then Q is a singular class which contains only P as
an individual." 24
(c) "Now i{it• were right that a singular class coincides with the
sole ind~vidual it contains, then P coincides with Q. Now let
us assume that a and b are different objects contained as in-
dividuals within P, then they would also be contained within
Q; that is, both a and b would coincide with P. Consequently
a also coincides with b contrary to our permissible assumption
that they were different." 25
Thus Frege is denying the supposition that "each individual
may be regarded as a class that consists of it alone" with the
help of reference to the contradiction which would follow from
the supposition "that a singular class coincides with the sole in-
dividual under its concept". In general it appears that in the ar-
ticle discussed the author treats the two mentioned suppositions
very promiscue. Such a position cannot of course be maintained
upon the basis of my views of classes if, as I believe, the first
of those suppositions may be expressed in my above terminology
~-~-·--~~····by~means ofthe· proposition "every object can be considered as a
class, whose only element is just that object" (note the incompat-
ibility of thesis (E*) with my conception of classes), the second
on the other hand - derived from theses (E) on the basis of my
above point of view concerning classes. From the so-expressed sec-
ond supposition resulting from the considerations in section (c),
on the basis of my conception of classes it follows completely that
passage (b) has no value ~rom the point of view of this conception,
enabling Frege to assert in part (c), that in the situation indicated
by him "both (a) and (b) coincide with P", which may be refuted
24 0 p. cit., p. 444.
24 0 p. cit., pp. 444 and 445.
25 0 p. cit., p. 445.
from my point of view of classes by reference to the circumstance

that segment AB Fig. 1, constituting one single object which is
the same object as segment AB, is indeed, in accordance with
thesis (3) on page 213, the class of objects which are the same ob-
jects as segment AB, but it is not a singular class (see thesis (D))
because both segment AC and also segment AB are elements of
segment AB (see theses (17) and (10) of Chapter II).
The firm assertion of the author, that "the conception in
which the class consists of individuals, and therefore the single
thing coincides with the singular class, cannot be upheld in any
case", 26 I consider to be completely unfounded because, from my
point of view, there is no inherent validity in that passage and no
power in that crucial 'therefore'.
In opposing the position according to which every class of
various objects consists of just those objects, Frege defends, in
contrast to that position, his own conception of classes, treating
them as 'extensions of concepts' 27 [' zakresy poj~c'] about which
'extensions of concepts' he expresses, among others, the following
obscure sentence: "The extension of a concept does not consist
of the objects which fall under the concept, as a forest consists of
trees, but attaches to the concept [hat an dem Begriffe selbst ...
seinen Halt] and to it alone" 28 In another place the author writes
in regard to 'extensions of concepts': "In the course of these con-
siderations we have once more been shown"... "that the extension
of a concept has its being [hat seinen Bestand] not in the individ-
uals but in the concept itself; i.e. in what is asserted of an object
when it is brought under a concept. There is then no objection
to speaking about the class of objects which are b's, even when
26 Loe. cit.
27
see: e.g., Frege, [1893], pp. 253 and 254.
28
Frege, [1895], p. 455.
there are no b's. And all empty concepts now have the same ex-
tension"... "We can e.g., take b as the object which is not the
same as itself" 29
'
I will not attempt here to submit Frege's conception which
treats classes as 'extensions of concepts' to analytic assessment
because, despite my best efforts in this direction, I am still un-
able to understand what the various authors are saying when they
use the exptession 'extension of a concept'. If the 'extension of
concept a' 30 is not to be the class of objects a consisting of objects
a in accordance with my conception of classes then, being unable
to answer my own question as to what this 'extension of concept
a' could be and when and where one could become acquainted
with such an 'extension' and whether anything like it exists in
the world, I am none the less inclined to surmise meekly that it is
simply an object 'dev1ised' by logicians for the annoyance of many
generations. I am no more able to understand Frege's utterance
quoted above that the 'extension of a concept' "attaches to the
concept itself and to it alone", than I am the most obscure enun-
ciation of the exponents of 'romantic philosophy', which simply
means that I do not understand the utterance at all. The dec-
laration, according to which "With such functions whose value
~-·--·"···-"~is __always_a _truth:::value, .we can say 'extension of the concept'
instead of 'course of values of the function' and it seems appropri-
ate to call directly a concept, a function whose value is always a
truth-value" ,31 does nothing to clarify for me the question of the
'extensions of concepts' because the expression 'course of values
of the function' is no more intelligible to me than the expression
29 The passages which I have quoted from the works of Frege can be seen
as an antidote to the possibility of false ideas about this author which could
result from the general remark of Weyl, that Dedekind, Frege and Russell
"obviously conceive the 'set' as a collective". (See H. Weyl, Philosophie der
Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Miinchen und Berlin 1927, p. 11)
3
° Frege, [1893], pp. 7 and 8.
. p. 8 .
31 L oc. czt.,
'extension of the concept'. 32 Anyone who hopes to make it eas-

ier to understand Frege's views on the 'extensions of concepts'
by analyzing the views of the 'traditional logicians' may be com-
pletely disappointed in this regard by the following words written
by our author in connection with the revision to which he sub-
jected._hrs earlier position on the question of the 'extensions of
concep~s' under the influence of the emergence of the above men-
tioned 'antinomy' of Russell discussed above: "If it is in general
permissible, for any first-level concept, to speak of its extension,
then the case arises of concepts which have the same extension
although not all objects which fall under one of these concepts
also fall under the other.
But this really abolishes the concept extension in the ordinary
sense of the words. One may not say that in general the expression
'the extension of one concept coincides with that of a second' is
synonymous with the expression 'all objects which fall under the
first concept also fall under the second, and conversely'. From
the result of our derivation we see that it is simply not possible
to connect with the words 'the extension of concept D ()' a sense
such that in general from the identity of extensions of concepts
one can conclude that every object falling under one of them also
falls under the other." 33 Zermelo appears to adopt a position ac-
cording to which every collection is an 'extension of a concept',
but by no means every 'extension of a concept' is a collection;
"Now since, on the other hand, 'order type of a well ordered set'
is certainly a logically permissible concept, it follows further, as
already results in a much simpler way from the 'Russell antinomy',
that not every arbitrary extension of a concept may be treated
as a set and therefore the customary definition of set is too wide.
But if in set theory we confine ourselves to certain established
principles such as those which are the basis of our proof, which
32
See: Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Vol. I, Cambridge
1903, pp. 511-514.
33
Frege, Op. cit., Zweiter Band, pp. 260 and 261.
enable us to form initial sets and to derive new sets out of given
ones, then all such contradictions can be avoided." 34 If I am not
mistaken in thinking that Zermelo considers collections as 'exten-
sions of concepts', then my inability, noted above, to answer the
question as to what the various authors are saying when they use
the expression.'extension of a concept' will, of course, also concern
the 'theory 'of sets' of Zermelo. Whatever the views of Zermelo
on question$' about this subject, I can not imagine what sorts of
objects there could be to which his axiomatisation of the 'theory
of sets' would apply for some specific meaning of the expression
'set' and of the expression ' '. 35 Whitehe~d and Russell write in
Principia Mathematica: "The symbols for classes, like those for
descriptions, are, in our system, incomplete symbols: their uses
are defined, but they themselves are not assumed to mean any-
thing at all. That is to say, the uses of such symbols are so defined
that, when the definiens is substituted for the definiendum, there
no longer remains any symbol which would be supposed to repre-
sent a class. Thus classes so far as we introduce them, are merely
symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects as their
members are if they are individuals.
It is an old dispute whether formal logic should concern itself
~·~~~~---IDP.inlJ-_with intentions or with extensions. In general, logicians
whose training was mainly mathematical have decided for ex-
tensions. The facts seem to be that, while mathematical logic
requires extensions, philosophical logic refuses to supply anything
except intentions. Our theory of classes recognizes and reconciles
these two, apparently opposite facts, by showing that an extension
(which is the same as a class) is an incomplete symbol, whose use
always acquires its meaning through a reference to intention.
34 E. Zermelo, 'Neuer Beweis fiir die Moglichkeit einer Wohlordnung',

Mathematische Annalen 65, 1908, p. 124.
35 See: Zermelo, Untersuchungen iiber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre,
p. 262.
In the case of descriptions it was possible to prove that they

are incomplete symbols. In the case of classes, we do not know
of any equally definite proof, though arguments of more or less
cogency can be elicited from the ancient problem of the One and
the Many.* It is not necessary for our purposes, however, to assert
dogmati.cally that there are no such things as classes. It is only
necessary for us to show that the incomplete symbols which we
introdrtce as representative of classes, yield all the propositions for
the sake of which classes might be thought essential. When this
has been shown, the mere principle of economy of primitive ideas,
leads to the non-introduction of classes except as incomplete sym-
bols". 36 The asterisk '*' contained in the passage quoted refers
to a footnote which reads as follows:
"Briefly these arguments reduce to the following: If there is
such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one object.
: 'I ~
Yet it is only of classes that many can be predicted. Hence, if we

admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object
can be both one and many which seems impossible." 37
In another place the authors declare: "The following theory of
classes, although it provides a notation to represent them, a voids
the assumption that there are such things as classes." 38
On the~basis of the quoted enunciations of Whitehead and
Russell, I understand the situation in the following way:
(1) the authors are indeed operating in their system with various
expressions containing 'symbols for classes' as useful 'symbolic
or linguistic conveniences', but they have no intention what-
ever of saying anything about the objects which are classes
in the meaning adopted in the author's comments on their
system and allow one to assert that a class 'is the same' as
36
Whitehead and Russell, loc. cit., pp. 71 and 72.
37 Loe. cit., p. 72.
38 Loe. cit., p. 187. In connection with the last three quotations see: B. Rus-
sell, 'Les paradoxes de la logique', Revue de Metaphysique et de la Morale
14, p. 636.
an 'extension'; Whitehead and Russell do not assert in their

system that certain objects are classes, nor do they assert that
no object is a class in the aforesaid sense;
(2) considering, in the comments on their system, the question of
the existence of objects which are classes in the above sense,
and being unable to prove their non-existence, the authors
nevertheless do not believe that any object could be a class in
41
the above meaning, relying with complete seriousness on the
argument that 'if we admit classes as objects, we must sup-
pose that the same object can be both one and many, which
seems impossible';
(3) not believing in the existence of objects which are classes in
the above meaning, and at the same time having no doubts
in regard to the existence of objects which are 'symbols for
classes' and which, like all 'symbols for classes', are 'incom-
plete symbols' ,39 Whitehead and Russell obscure their own
position by generously dispensing various fa9ons de par/er like
the utterance contained in one of the above quoted passages
that, 'an extension (which is the same as a class) is an in-
complete symbol' which, according to the intentions of the
authors should mean the same as the sentence40 'a symbol
-----------~---------for--an-extension,-{which is the same as a class) is an incom-
plete symbol', which, taken literally by the reader, will cre-
ate the false suspicion that the authors sometimes regard not
only 'symbols for classes', but also the classes themselves as
'incomplete symbols', consequently as 'genuine objects' of a
certain particular kind.
In connection with the above, I must add:
To (1): I do not know what Whitehead and Russell under-
stand by the word class in their comments on their system. The
fact that a 'class' has to be, according to the author's position,
39 See: Whitehead and Russell, loc. cit., p. 66.

40 The word 'which' applies in that sentence to the expression 'extension',
not to the words 'symbol for extension'.
the same as an 'extension' does not help at all, as I also do not

know what the authors understand by an extension. Therefore
I also know nothing about the question of the existence or non-
existence of the particular objects they are considering when they
deliberate on the problems of the existence or non-existence of ob-
jects w~ich are 'classes'. The authors' comments on their system
do not :r.rovide enough information in this respect. Being unable
•
to understand the terminology of Whitehead and Russell, I can
give no account of the particular question whether and in what
degree their doubts with regard to the existence of objects which
are classes according to their understanding, would apply to the
particular situation of my conception of classes outlined above. In
Principia Mathematica I did not find a single passage in relation
to which I could entertain the slightest supposition which would
question the existence of classes as I understand them.
Scenting in the 'classes' of Whitehead and Russell and in the
'extensions of concepts' of Frege, the aroma of mythical specimens
from a rich gallery of 'invented' objects, I am unable to rid my-
self of an inclination to sympathize 'on credit' with the authors'
doubts as to whether objects which are such 'classes', do exist in
the world. - The question of the relation of my conception of
classes to the views represented in the comments of Whitehead
and Russell on their system, can be illuminated by Russell's re-
mark regarding 'heaps'. Russell writes in one of his works: "We
cannot take classes in the pure extensional way as simply heaps
or conglomerations. If we were to attempt to understand how
there can be such a class as the null-class, which has no members
at all and cannot be regarded as a 'heap'; we should also find it
very hard to understand how it comes about that a class which
has only one member, is not identical with that one member. I
do not mean to assert or to deny, that there are such 'entities'
as 'heaps'. As a mathematical logician, I am not called upon to
have an opinion on this point. All that I am maintaining is that,
if there are such things as heaps, we cannot identify them with
the classes composed of their constituents." 41 If I understood the
above passage rightly, the fact that some object P is a 'heap' of
some a, consisting of every a, would not be a sufficient basis for
Russell to assert that object P is a 'class' of objects a. Russell's
terminology here is decidedly at variance with my own: accord-
ing to my way of using the expressions 'collection' and 'class'
and to the ·accepted use in colloquial language of the expression
'heap' (Rus;ell does not establish explicitly the meaning of the
expression 'heap' but takes this expression in its 'raw' state from
colloquial language) I can say about a 'heap' of some a, that it is
a collection of objects a, and about a 'heap' of objects a consisting
of every a, that it is the class of objects a. If I am not mistaken
in conjecturing on the basis of the quoted passage that a class of
some a, as understood by Russell, would consist, if it existed, of
the objects a as its 'constituents', then it can not happen that,
not consisting of the said objects a, the class of objects a as un-
derstood by Frege, should be at the same time a class of objects a
as understood by Russell's view. The difficulty of understanding
in what, from Russell's point of view, would consist the differ-
ence between the 'heap' of objects a and the 'class' of objects a,
if both existed, and if each one of them consisted of every a - is
-~--~-~······a.difficulty. which I am unable to resolve.
To (2): Despite my sincerest wish, I am unable to treat se-
riously the thesis which proclaims that, "if we admit classes as
objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one
and many which seems impossible", as I feel in it some gross mis-
understanding: even posito that the expression 'many' causes no
doubts on the theme 'at least how many?', I can find no sense
in saying about some object that it is 'many' even though, by as-
suming that the meaning of the expression 'many' is not uncertain
with respect to quantity, that it means e.g., the same as 'at least
two', I fully understand e.g., the utterance that 'many objects' ex-
ist in the world, or even the utterance that segment AB of Fig. 1
41 B. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 183.

has 'many' parts. Seeing no sense in the thesis quoted, I cannot

regard it as an even slightly 'cogent' argument for anything at all
in the world .
•
CHAPTER IV 0
ON "FOUNDATIONS OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF SETS. I"
In the year i915 I made a first attempt to give a deductive form

to my conception of classes and collections, which I was using in
the analysis of the 'antinomy' of Russell. Relying on four propo-
sitions called axioms, and using a number of other propositions
which I called definitions, I arrived at a number of interesting the-
orems with methods which I was then able to use. Part I of the
outline of this 'general theory of sets', I published in 'Foundations
of the General Theory of Sets, I' mentioned in the introduction
(the continuation has not appeared in print). In the introduc-
tion to that work I characterised my 'general theory of sets' in
a general way, and wrote: "The arrangement of definitions and
truths, which I established in the present work dedicated to the
most general problems of the theory of sets, has for me this advan-
tage, that in comparison to other previously known arrangements
of definitions and truths (Zermelo, Russell, etc.,) it eliminates
~~'"~-e-~-thee-'antinomies' of the general theory of sets without narrowing
the original domain of Cantor's expression 'set', as is seen from
my Axiom III, and on the other hand, it does not lead to the-
orems which are in such startling conflict with the intuitions of
the 'commonalty', as e.g., the theorem of the contemporary 'non-
naive' theory of sets which demands the differentiation of some
object from the collection which contains this one sole object as
an element. I admit freely that some of my theorems, e.g., Theo-
rem XXVII, could shock the 'mathematical intuitions' of various
more or less sensitive thinkers when contemplating the elegance
O [This chapter was published in Polish as follows: 'O podstawach matem-

atyki', Rozdzial IV: 'O podstawach og6lnej teoryi mnogosci. I.' Przeglqd Filo-
zoficzny 31 (1928), pp. 261-291.]
of certain theoretical constructions, regardless of whether those

constructions contribute in any degree whatsoever towards the
scientific capturing of reality, or whether they merely serve to
justify the dominant habits of our epoch which yet distinguish
themselves by a high degree of inertia. However, I cannot deny
myself.the pleasure of stating the fact that I tried to write my
work so that it would not concern exclusively some kind of 'free
creat~ons' of various more or less Dedekindian creative souls; it
follows hence, that I cared more about the fact that my theorems,
while possessing as exact form as possible, should harmonise with
the 'common sense' of the representatives of the 'esprit laique'
who are engaged in investigating a reality not 'created by them',
than I did about the fact that whatever I was saying should be
in accord with the 'intuitions' of the professional set-theoreticians
whose intuitions emerge from a centrifuge of mathematical minds
equipt with an apparatus of 'free creativity' demoralized by 'un-
real' speculative constructions" .1 (Axiom III, referred to in the
cited passage, reads as follows: "If some object is m, then some
object is a class of objects m" 2 - in the same passage, the phrase
"the theorem of contemporary 'non-naive' theory of sets which
demands the differentiation of some object separate from the col-
lection "which contains this object as its only element" is not clear,
and is subject to various interpretations; using this expression, I
had in mind a point of view which is hardly in accordance with the
intuitions of the 'commonalty', in the light of which there are in
existence two different objects, one of them being a collection con-
taining the second one as its only element. - Theorem XXVII,
discussed in the passage cited, is of the following form: 'the sen-
tence 'if P is an element of the set of objects m, then P is m'
is false'. ) 3 On the subject of terms which I used in my work, I
wrote in its introduction: "On the question concerning the ways
1 Lesniewski, [1916], pp. 5-6.

2 Op. cit., p. 12.
3 Op. cit., p. 24.
of using expressions, I mention that of the mathematical terms

which I use, the expression 'part', is the only one I do not define,
supposing that this term will not cause misunderstandings, -
considering that its intuitive character acquires considerable clar-
ity in the light of Axioms I and II. The terms 'set' and 'element',
usually accepted without definitions in the theory of sets, are de-
,, work." 4 (The sense of the expression 'mathemati-
fined in pres.ent
cal term' in my terminology of that time was exceedingly unclear.
All terms other than the expression 'part', which I used without
definitions in the basis of the 'general theory of sets', I treated as
'non-mathematical' terms, accepted from 'anterior' theories, on
which my 'general theory of sets' was based; unfortunately I was
unable to characterise those 'anterior' theories sufficiently. Ax-
ioms I and II, about which there is mention in the passage cited,
read as follows: Axiom I. "If object P is a part of object Pb then
object P1 is not a part of object P" ;5 Axiom II. "If object P is a
part of object P1, and object P1 is a part of object P2, then object P
is a part of object P2" .6 - I do not accept the position according
to which the terms 'set' and 'element' are 'accepted without any
definitions in the theory of sets', as I wish to a void the possibility
of misinterpretations connected with the expression 'definition':
--~~·~---~~so -even Cantor's enunciation in 'Beitrage zur Begriindung der
transfiniten Mengenlehre' referred to in Chapter III 7 which can
not be accepted as a 'definition' of the expressions 'set' and 'ele-
ment', without terminological 'shock'. 8
Taking into- consideration that my 'Foundations of the Gen-
eral Theory of Sets. I.' is now a 'bibliographical rarity', I will illus-
trate here some of the more important results contained in that
4 Op. cit., p. 7.
5 Op. cit., p. 9.
6 L. c.
7 Stanislaw Lesniewski, [1917], p. 191.
8 See e.g.: Zermelo, Op. cit., p. 261.
work. Preserving generally the 'style' of the original while formu-

lating theses which belong to the system and while constructing
the proofs, I will nevertheless introduce at the same time in my
exposition a number of small improvements on the original (what
this particular theory looks like in its final form, the reader may
learn only after reading one of the further chapters of the present
work which deals with the foundations of 'mereology').
"
AXIOM I. If P is a part of object Q, then 9 Q is not a part of
object P. 9a
AXIOM II. If P is a part of object Q, and Q is a part of
object R, then P is a part of object R.
DEFINITION I. P is an ingredient of object Q when and only
when, P is the same object as Q or is a part of object Q.10
DEFINITION II. P is the class of objects a, when and only
when the following conditions are fulfilled:
9 Here, and in writing the mentioned work, I use propositions of the type
'A is not b' as equivalents of the corresponding propositions of the type 'A
is an object, and not (A is b)', but not the corresponding propositions of
the type 'not (A is b)'. Knowing that no object is a round square, then in
accordance with thesis (5), chapter II (Lesniewski, /. c., p. 187} and in full
h~~'inony-wit:h the theory of 'ontology' developed below, not (a round square
is as aeroplane), but also not (a round square is an object), nor do I have
any basis in the above terminology to assert that a round square is not an
aeroplane, whereas moreover I do have full licence to assert in the aforesaid
terminology, that not (a round square is not an aeroplane). See: Whitehead
and Russell, l. c., p. 69.
9a Translator's note: [As the Polish language does not contain counter-
parts of 'a' and 'the', the translator has had to add the appropriate article
whenever English has required it. In this connection see footnote n, P. m
below.]
10 Propositions which I called definitions in the original were propositions
about myself; and thus 'Definition I' of the original reads: "I use the ex-
pression 'ingredient of object P' to denote the object P itself, and every
part of that object". (Lesniewski, [1916], p. 9.) The proposal for the use of
the expression 'ingredient' in this context, was suggested to me by Lucjan
Zarzecki.
(a) P is an object;
(jJ) 11 every a is an ingredient of object P;
(1) 11 a for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some
ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a. 12
Examples: I. Segment AB of Fig. 2 is the class of parts of
segment AB, .be·cause the conditions of Def. II are fulfilled.
Al 1-
• - _C--+-_D_ _ E-----11 B
Fig. 2
II. Segment AB of Fig. 2 is not the class of parts of seg-
ment AD, because although conditions (a) and (jJ) are fulfilled,
11 Here, and in writing the mentioned work, I use propositions of the type
'every a is b' as equivalents of the corresponding propositions of the type
'some object is a, and for any X, if X is a, then X is b', not however of
the corresponding propositions of the type 'for any X, if X is a, then X
is b'; similarly I was using, and still use, propositions of the type 'no a is
b' as equivalents of the corresponding propositions of the type 'some object
is a, and for any X, if X is a, then X is not b', but not of corresponding
propositions of the type 'for any X, if X is a, then X is not b'.
--~~--·:i.Ia·~Trrinsliitors nofe: · ·[Throughout this work Lesniewski uses 'przy
wszelkiem' as a universal quantifier phrase in contexts such as this. Al-
though 'przy' might be more literally translated as 'with', the translator has
adopted 'for' on the grounds of its familiarity. 'Wszelkiem' has been rendered
as 'any' in order to avoid existential import (see e.g., Lesniewski's footnote 5,
p. 273). On the other hand 'kaide', which Lesniewski always uses in contexts
such as line (/3) above, has been translated as 'every' in view of Lesniewski's
statement in the above footnote 11 above that 'kaide' does have existential
import.]
12 See Lesniewski, op. cit., p. 12. Def. III. This definition reads as follows:
"I use the expressions - 'the set of all objects m' and 'the class of objects m',
to denote every object P which fulfills the two following conditions:
(1) every mis an ingredient of the object P,
(2) if I is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object I is an
ingredient of some m".
condition ('r) is not fulfilled (segment EB is an ingredient of seg-

ment AB, while not (some ingredient of segment EB is an ingre-
dient of some part of segment AD)).
III. Segment AC of Fig. 2 is not the class of ingredients of
segment AB, because conditions (a) and (1) are fulfilled, but
conditio11 (/3) is not fulfilled. (Segment AB is an ingredient of
segment AB, but not an ingredient of segment AC.) 13
AXIOM III. If P is the class of objects a, and Q is the class
of objects a, then P is Q .14
AXIOM IV. If some object is a, then some object is the class
of object a. 15
THEOREM I. If P is an object, then P is not a part of ob-
ject P. 16
13 Below we will see that conditions ((3) and ('y) of Def. II, which I for-
mulated in accordance with the text cited above in footnote 3 of p. 264,
Def. III of the original entails, on the basis of my 'general theory of sets',
condition.
14 See: l. c., Ax. IV.
15 See: l. c., Ax. III.
16 Theorem I of the original reads: "No object is a part of itself" (op.
-ciL~ p. 9.). This theorem states, in the terminology presented above in foot-
note 11, that some object is an object and for any X, if Xis an object, then X
is not a part of the object X. In proving this theorem I relied upon the clear
assumption, which raised no doubts for me, that some object is an object.
It is impossible to obtain a thesis asserting that some object is an object on
the basis of the system of 'ontology' developed below. (I note here for the
purpose of avoiding possible misunderstandings, that, in view of the fact that
I use propositions of the type 'some a is b as equivalents of corresponding
propositions of the type 'for some X ( X is a and X is b) ', in which the expres-
sion 'for some X' assumes the role of a 'quantifier', (EX)", - the proposition
'some object is an object' is for me equivalent to the proposition 'for some
X (X is an object, and X is an object)', consequently it is equivalent to the
proposition 'with some X, Xis an object'.) Wishing to adapt my exposition
of the 'general theory of sets' to the system of 'ontology' mentioned, I will not
use the assumption here that some object is an object. The desire to avoid
just this assumption was the cause of my formulating Th. 1 of this exposition
as a weaker proposition than Th. 1 of the original.
Proof: we assume, that

(1) P is an object;
from Ax. I we see, that 17
(2) if Pis a part of object P, then not (Pis a part of object P),
from (2), to
a
(3) not (P is part of object P);
from (1) and, (3) we infer, 18 that
P is not a part of object P.
THEOREM II. If P is an object, then P is an ingredient of
object P .19 (results fromDef. I, noting that if P is an object,
then P is the same object as P).
THEOREM III. If some object is a part of object P and Q is
an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is an
ingredient of some part of object P. 20
(1) some object is a part of object P,
and
(2) Q is an ingredient of object P;
from Def. I and (2) it results, that
(3) Q is the same object as P, or Q is a part of object P;
~._~~~~·~"fornI(l) it follows, that for some R
(4) Risa part of object P,

from Def. I and (4)
(5) R is an ingredient of object P;
17 See above footnote 6 of p. 263.

19 Theorem II of the present exposition is a weaker proposition than Th. II
of the original which reads: "Every object is an ingredient of itself" (L. c.).
(Th. II of the original was founded on the assumption that some object is an
object.)
20 See op. cit., p. 14, thesis (10) in the proof of Th. IX.
from (4) we see, that 21

(6) R is an object,
from Th. II and (6), to
(7) R is an ingredient of object R;
from (5), (4) and (7) we infer, that
(8) .soine ingredient of object P is an ingredient of some part of
Qbject P;
from Th. II and (2) it results, that 22
(9) Q is an ingredient of object Q,
from (3), (8) and (9) it follows, that
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some part of
object P.
THEOREM IV. If P is an ingredient of object Q) and Q is an
ingredient of object R, then P is an ingredient of object R. 23
(1) Pis an ingredient of object Q,
and
(2) Q is an ingredient of object R;
from Def. I and (1) we see, that
(3) Pis the same object as Q, or Pis a part of object Q,
from Def. I and (2), to
(4) Q is the same object as R or Q is a part of object R;
from (3), and (4), and Ax. II we infer, that
(5) P is the same object as R or P is a part of object R;
from Def. I and (5) it results, that
P is an ingredient of object R.
THEOREM V. If {for any S, if S is an ingredient of object
P, then some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of object R)
21 Here, and in the above mentioned work, I use the expression 'object' in
a way which allows one to assert that if A is b, then A is an object. This
harmonises fully with the system of 'ontology' developed below.
22 See above footnote 3.
23 See op. cit., p. 9, Th. IV.
and Q is an ingredient of object P J then some ingredient of object

Q is an ingredient of some ingredient of object R, which is an
ingredient of object P .24
(1) for any S, if Sis an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of.object S is an ingredient of object R,
and •
from (1) and (2) it follows, that, for some T
(3) T is an ingredient of object Q,
and
(4) Tis an ingredient of object R;
from Th. IV, (3), and (2) we see, that
(5) T is an ingredient of object P;
from Th. II and (3) we infer, that
(6) Tis an ingredient of object T;
from (3), (4), (5) and (6) it results, that
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some ingredi-
ent of object R, which is an ingredient of object P.
THEOREM VI. If P is the class of objects a and Q is an ingre-
~-----~---~dienf-oj-object P, then some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient
of some a, which is an ingredient of object P .25
(1) P is the class of objects a,
and
from Def. II, (1) and (2) it follows, that
(3) some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a;
from Def. II and (1) we see, that
(4) each a is an ingredient of object P,
from (3) and (4), to
24 See op. cit., p. 22, thesis (7) in the proof of Th. XXIII.
25 See op. cit., the proof of Th. VII, p. 13, lines 1-3.
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a which

is an ingredient of object P.
THEOREM VII. If P is an object) then P is the class of in-
gredients of object P .26
(1) P is ~n object;
from Th. II and ( 1) we infer, that
(2) some object is an ingredient of object P;
from Th. II it results, that
(3) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then (Q is an
ingredient of object Q, and Q is an ingredient of object P),
from (3), to
(4) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some in-
gredient of object Q is an ingredient of some ingredient of
object P,
from Def. II, (1), (2) and (4), it follows, that 27
P is the class of ingredients of object P.
THEOREM VIII. If P is an object) then P is the class of ob-
28
jects P.
~-~"-·----· ········ · (1) ·~p·J.fran object,
from (1) we infer in accordance with thesis (6) of Chapter II,
and in harmony with the system of 'ontology' developed below,
that
26 By means of the clumsy proposition 'every object P is the class of ingre-

dients of that object P ', constituting Th. VIII of the original ( l. c.), I wished
to assert that every object is the class of ingredients of that object; Th. VII
of the present exposition is a weaker proposition.
27 See above footnote 2, p. 264.
28 By means of the clumsy proposition: 'Every given object Pis the class of
objects P', constituting Th. X of the original (op. cit., p. 14.), I intended to
express an idea which I could better express in the proposition 'some object
is an object, and for any P, if Pis an object, then Pis the class of objects P':
Th. VIII of the present exposition is a weaker proposition.
(2) Pis P;
from Th. II and (1) it results, that
(3) P is an ingredient of object P,
from (3), to 29
(4) for any Q, if Q is P, then Q is an ingredient of object P;
from Th. II jt 'follows, that
(5) for any {J, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then (Q is an
(6) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of object Q is an ingredient of object P; 29 a
from Def. II, (1), (2), (4) and (6) we see, that
P is the class of objects P.
THEOREM IX. If some object is a part of object P) then P is
the class of parts of object P .30
from Ax. I and (1) we infer, that 31
(2) P is an object,
from (1) and Def. I it results, that
-#-~-- -{3) every part of object P is an ingredient of object P;
from Th. III and (1) it follows, that
dient of object Q is an ingredient of some part of object P;
from Def. II, (2), (3) and (4) we see, that
Pis the class of parts of object P.
29
Here, and in the above mentioned work, I use propositions of the type
'A is b' in a way which allows the assertion that if A is B and B is c, then
A is c. This harmonises completely with the system of 'Ontology' developed
below.
29 a Translators note: [The Polish original has 'some' in error for
'object'.]
30 See op. cit., p. 13, Th. IX.
THEOREM X. If P is an ingredient of object Q, then Q is the

class of ingredients of object Q. 32
(1) P is an ingredient of object Q;
from Def. I and (1) we infer, that
(2) Pis the same object as Q, or Pis a part of object Q,
from' fl(2) and Ax. I, to
(3) Q is an object;
from Th. VII and (3) it results, that
Q is the class of ingredients of object Q.
DEFINITION III. P is a collection of objects a, when and only
when, the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) P is an object;
(/3) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some in-
gredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a which is an
ingredient of object P. 33
Examples: I. Segment AC of Fig. 2 is a collection of parts of
segment AB, because the conditions of Def. III are fulfilled.
II. Segment AC of Fig. 2 is not a collection of ingredients of
segment DB, because although condition (a) is fulfilled, con di-
. tion(/3) is ~not fulfilled. (Segment AC is an ingredient of seg-
ment AC, however, not (some ingredient of segment AC is an
ingredient of some ingredient of segment DB, which is an ingre-
dient of segment AC)).
III. Segment AE of Fig. 2 is not a collection of segments which
are segments of AC or segments of AB, because condition (/3) is
not fulfilled, (segment DE is an ingredient of segment AE, but
not (some ingredient of segment DE is an ingredient of some seg-
ment which is a segment of AC or a segment of AB and which is
at the same time an ingredient of segment AE)) although condi-
tion (a) is satisfied.
32 See op. cit., p. 15, Th. XI.

33 See op. cit., p. 11, Def. II.
IV. Not (a round square is a collection of round squares),
because although condition (/3) is fulfilled, condition (o:) is not
fulfilled.
THEOREM XI. If P is a collection of objects aJ and every a
is b, and Q is an ingredient of object P J then some ingredient
of object Q is q,n 'ingredient of some b, which is an ingredient of
object P. 34 ,,
(1) P is a collection of objects a,
(2) every a is b,
and
from Def. III, (1) and (3) it follows, that
(4) some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a, which
is an ingredient of object P,
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some b,
which is an ingredient of object P.
THEOREM XII. If P is a collection of objects a, and every a
is b, then P is a collection of objects b. 35
~_, ___ --·----12roof;--We assume, -that

and
(2) every a is b;
from Th. XI, (1) and (2) we see, that
gredient of object Q is an ingredient of some b, which is an
ingredient of object P;
from Def. III, (1) and (3) we infer, that
P is a collection of objects b.
34
See op. cit., p. 18, thesis (4) in the proof of Th. XIX.
35 See l . c., Th. XIX.
THEOREM XIII. If P is a, then P is a collection of ob-

36
jects a.
(1) Pisa;
(2) ~ is an ingredient of object P;
from Th. II it follows, that
•
(3) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then (Q is an
from (3), (1) and (2), to
gredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a, which is an
ingredient of object P;
from Def. III, (1) and (4) we see, that
P is a collection of objects a.
THEOREM XIV. If P is the class of objects a; then P zs a
collection of objects a. 37
(1) P is the class of objects a;
from Th. VI and (1) we infer that
. (2) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some in-
from Def. III, and (1) and (2) it results, that
P is a collection of objects a.
THEOREM XV. If P is the class of collections of objects a, and
Q is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q
is an ingredient of some a. 38 .
(1) P is the class of collections of objects a,
36 See op. cit., p. 17, Th. XVIII.
37 See op. cit., p. 12, Th. VII.
38 See op. cit., p. 19, thesis (6) in the proof of Th. XX.
and
from Def. II, (1) and (2) it follows, that for some R and S
(3) R is an ingredient of object Q,
(4) S is a collection of objects a,
and
(.5) R is an ingredient of object S;
from Def. III, (4) and (5) we see, that
( 6) some ingredient of object R is an ingredient of some a;
from (6) and Th. IV and (3) we infer, that
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a.
DEFINITIONIV. P is an element of object Q when and only
when, for some a ( Q is the class of objects a and P is a). 39
THEOREM XVI. If P is an element of object Q, then P is an
ingredient of object Q.40
Proof: 'lVe assume, that
(1) P is an element of object Q;
from Def. IV and (1) it results that, for some a
(2) Q is the class of objects a,
and
-·.
-~,"~~~~T3TP.is a;
P is an ingredient of object Q.
THEOREM XVII. If P is an ingredient of object Q, then P is
an element of object Q .41
from Th. X and (1) we see, that
39
See: Lesniewski, [1927], p. 187. See also: Lesniewski, [1916], p. 14,
Def. IV.
4 o See op. cit., p. 15, Th. XII.
41 See l. c., Th. XI.
(2) Q is the class of ingredients of object Q;

from Def. IV, (2) and (1) we infer, that
Pis an element of object Q.
THEOREM XVIII. If P is a part of object Q, then P zs an
element of object Q .4 2
(Jtesults from Def. I and Th. XVII.)
TllEOREM XIX. If P is an object, then P is an element of
object P .43
(Results from Def. II and Th. XVII.)
THEOREM XX. If P is the class of objects a, then every a is
an element of object P .44
(Results from Def. II and Th. XVII.)
THEOREM XXL If P is a collection of objects aJ then some a
is an element of object P .45
(1) P is a collection of objects a;
(2) P is an ingredient of object P;
from Def. III, (1) and (2) it follows, that
(3) some a is an ingredient of object P,
from-(3) and Th. XVII, to
some a is an element of object P.
THEOREM XXII. If P is a part of object Q, then not (for any
R and a, if R is an element of some collection of objects a, then
R is a). 46
42 See op. cit., p. 16, Th. XIII.

43
Th. XIX of the present exposition is a weaker proposition than Th. XIV
of the original, which reads: "Every object is an element of itself" (l. c.).
44
See l. c., Th. XVI.
45 See op. cit., p.17, Th. XVII.
46
See op. cit., p. 24, Th. XXVII. This theorem reads: "the assertion 'if
P is an element of the set of objects m, then P is m' is false". In place of
this clumsy proposition, I would say today in an analogous situation: 'not

(1) Pis a part of object Q;
from Th. IX and ( 1) we see, that
(2) Q is Q,
from Th. XIII and (2), to
(3) Q is a c;ollection of objects Q;
from Th. XYIII and ( 1) we infer, that
from Th. I and (2) it results, that
(5) Q is not a part of object Q;
from (1) and (5) it follows, that
(6) not (P is the same object as Q),
from (2) and (6), to4 7
(7) not (Pis Q);
from (3), (4) and (7) we see, that
not (for any R and a, if R is an element of some collection
of objects a, then R is a).
THEOREM XXIII. If P is an element of object Q, and Q is
an element of object R, then P is an element of object R. 48
~-~" ~- (for-any p and m if p is an element of some collection of objects m, then p

is m) '. In the proof of Th. XXVII, I relied upon the assumption that some
object is a pa.rt of some object, which, although it seemed certain to me, was
impossible to prove in my 'general theory of sets'. In the present exposition,
I do not repeat the same error and I shape my present Th. XXII so that it
assumes the form of conditional proposition equivalent to the proposition 'if
some object is a pa.rt of some object, then not (for any P and m if P is an
element of some collection of objects m, then P is m) '. We will see below that
by adopting the assumption that there are in existence at least two different
objects, one can easily prove the thesis asserting that some object is a part
of some object.
47 Here, and while writing the above mentioned work, I used propositions
of the type 'A is the same object as B' in a way which allows one to assert
that if A is B, and B is an object, then A is the same object a.s B. This
harmonises fully with the system of 'ontology' developed below.
48
See op. cit., p. 16, Th. XV.

(1) Pis an element of object Q,
and
(2) Q is an element of object R;
from Th. XVI and ( 1) we see, that
(3) I:. is an ingredient of object Q,
from 'J'h. XVI and (2), to
from Th. IV, (3) and (4) it results, that
(5) P is an ingredient of object R,
from Th. XVII and (5), to
P is an element of object R.
THEOREM XXIV. If P is the class of collections of objects a;
then P is the class of objects a. 49
(1) P is the class of collections of objects a;
from Def. II and (1) it follows, that
(2) every collection of objects a is an ingredient of object P;
from (2) we see, that 50
(3) some object is a collection of objects a,
from (3) and Th. XXI, to
(4) some object is a;
from Th. XIII and (2) we infer, that
(5) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P;
from Th. XV and (1) it results, that
dient of object Q is an ingredient of some a;
from Def. II, (1 ), (4), (5) and (6) it follows, that
P is the class of objects a.
49 See op. cit., p. 18, Th. XX.

SO See above footnote 2 of p. 264.
THEOREM XXV. If P is the class of objects a, then P is the

class of collections of objects a. 51
from Th. XIV and (1) we see, that
(2) P is a GoHection of objects a;
from Ax. IV.and (2) we infer, that for some Q
(3) Q is the class of collections of objects a,
from Th. XXIV and (3), to
(4) Q is the class of objects a;
from Ax. III, ( 1) and (4) it results, that
(5) Pis Q
from (5) and (3), to 52
P is the class of collections of objects a.
THEOREM XXVI. If P is a collection of objects a, then P is
an ingredient of the class of objects a. 53
( 1) P is a collection of objects a;
from Th. XXI and (1) it follows, that
-·-------------from -Ax:-III we see, that
(3) for any Q and R, if R is the class of objects a, and Q is the
class of objects a, then (R is Q and Q is an object),
from (3), to 54
(4) for any Q and R, if R is the class of objects a, and Q is the
class of objects a, then R is the same object as Q;
from Ax. IV and (2) we infer, that for some S
(5) S is the class of objects a,
from Th. XXV and (5), to
51 See op. cit., p. 20, Th. XXII.
53 See op. cit., p. 20, Th. XXL
(6) S is the class of collections of objects a;

by Def. II, (6) and (1) it results, that
(7) P is an ingredient of object S;
from (5) and (4) it follows, that 55
(8) S is the same object as the class of objects a,
from (7)·and (8), to
P js an ingredient of the class of objects a.
THEOREM XXVII. If P is an object, and for any S 1 if S -is
an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object S is an
ingredient of object R, then P is an ingredient of object R. 55 a
(1) Pis an object,
and
dient of object S is an ingredient of object R;
from Th. V and (2) we see, that
55 Here, and while writing the above mentioned work, I used propositions
()L!~~tJ::i:>e
'/Lis_ the same object as B' in a way which allows one to assert,
that, if A is B, and for any C and D, if C is B and D is B, then C is the
same object as D, then A is the same object as B. This harmonises fully with
the system of 'ontology' developed below.
55
a See op. cit., p. 21, Th. XXIII. This theorem reads: 'If it is true, that, if I
is an ingredient of object P 1 , then some ingredient of object I is an ingredient
of object P, then P 1 is an ingredient of object P'. In using in the formula-
tion of Th. XXIII the clumsy phrase 'it is true, that, if I is an ingredient
of object P 1 , then some ingredient of object I is an ingredient of object P',
I wished to express an idea which I might have expressed more gracefully
using the expression 'for any I, if I is an ingredieµt of object P 1 , then some
ingredient of object I is an ingredient of object P'. Throughout inattention I
did not include the proposition. 'P1 is an object' as the second component of
the antecedent of this theorem, though I made implicit use of it in the proof
of the mentioned Th. XXIII (see l. c., thesis (2)). By a mistake of the pub-
lisher or of the au th or, 'P2 ' occurs instead of the required 'P1 ' in the proof
of Th. XXIII, in line 5 from the bottom of p. 22 of the mentioned work.
(3) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredi-
ent of object Q is an ingredient of some ingredient of object R,
which is an ingredient of object P;
from Def. III, (1) and (3), we infer, that
(4) P is a collection of ingredients of object R,
from Th. Xf(VI and (4), to
(5) P is an jngredient of the class of ingredients of object R;
from Th. XXI and (4) it results, that for some T
(6) Tis an ingredient of object R,
from Th. X and (6), to
(7) R is the class of ingredients of object R;
from Th. X and (5) it follows, that
(8) the class of ingredients of object R is an object;
(9) R is the same object as the class of ingredients of object R,
DEFINITION V. P is a sub-collection of object Q, when and
only when, the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) P is an object;
~~~~~ ~~-~~ (/3) every element of object P is an element of ob-
ject Q. 56
THEOREM XXVIII. If P is a sub-collection of object Q) then
P is an element of object Q.57
(1) P is a sub-collection of object Q;
from Th. XIX and (1) we infer, that
(2) Pis an element of object P,
from Def. V, (1) and (2) it results, that
P is an element of object Q.
56 See op. cit., p. 25, Def. V.

57 See op. cit., p. 30, Th. XL.
THEOREM XXIX. If P is an element of object Q, then P is

a sub-collection of object Q .58
from Th. XIX and (1) it follows, that
(2) Pis an element of object P,
from Th. XXIII and (1), to
(3) for any R, if R is an element of object P, then R is an element
of object Q;
from Def. V, and (2) and (3) we see, that
P is a sub-collection of object Q. 59
THEOREM XXX. If P is a part of object Q, then P is a sub-
collection of object Q.60
(results from Th. XVIII and Th. XIX).
VI. P is exterior to Q when and only when the
DEFINITION
following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) P is an object,
(/3) no ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of object P. 61
--~-~~-~-~--~~----~~o --- • --58 - --

See l. c., Th. XXXIX.
59
Theorems XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX indicate that with the introduc-
tion in the basis of my 'general theory of sets' of propositions of the type
'Pis an ingredient of object Q' - 'Pis an element of object Q' and 'P is
a sub-collection of Q', I introduced three types of propositions equivalent to
one another in a way that merely complicated my terminology unnecessarily,
as any one of these three kinds of propositions would have been sufficient be-
cause of their equivalence for all my theoretical purposes. My recognition that
this state of affairs was ugly was caused by the critical observations (in 1918)
on my work by Dr. Kazimierz Kuratowski, now Professor of Mathematics in
Lw6w Polytechnic, but then a student at Warsaw University. Prof. Kura-
towski's observations can also be applied mutatis mutandis to propositions
of the type - 'Pis a part of object Q' and 'Pis a proper subset of object Q'.
(See op. cit., p. 25, Def. VI, and P.· 27, Theorems XXX and XXXI.)
60 See l. c., thesis (3) in the proof of Th. XXX.
61 See op. cit., p. 32, Def. VIII.
Examples. I. Segment AC of Fig. 2 is exterior to segment DB,

because all three conditions of Def. VI are fulfilled.
II. Segment AD of Fig. 2 is not exterior to CB because al-
though condition (a) is fulfilled, condition (/3) is not fulfilled.
(Segment CD is an ingredient of segment CB and at the same
time an ingre<!lient of segment AD.)
III. No(( a round square is exterior to itself) because although
(/3) is fulfill~d, (a) is not fulfilled.
THEOREM XXXI. If P is an object, then P is not exterior
to P.62
(1) P is an object;
from Def. VI we infer, that 63
(2) not (P is exterior to P),
P is not exterior to P.
THEOREM XXXIL If P is exterior to Q, then Q is exterior
to P. 64
(1) P is exterior to Q;
-·-·~-~-... from Def. -Vl and (I) it results, that
(2) some object is an ingredient of object Q,
and
(3) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, then R is not an
ingredient of object Q,
(4) Q is an object;
62 Theorem XXXI of the present exposition is weaker than Th. XLVII of
the original, which reads: "No object is an object exterior to itself" (op. cit.,
p. 33; see above footnote 2, p. 264.
64 See op. cit., Th. XLVL In the formulation of this theorem on p. 32, line
five from the bottom, 'P1 ' appears instead of 'P', due to a publisher's or
author's error.
from Th. II and (1) we see, that

from Def. VI, (4), (5) and (3) we infer, that 65
Q is exterior to P.
DEFINITION VIL Pis complement of object Q with respect to
R whe.n and only when, the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) Q ~s a sub~collection of object R
((3) P is the class of elements of object R exterior to Q. 66
Examples: I. Segment AC of Fig. 2 is the complement of the
class of parts of segment AB which are exterior to segment AC
with respect to segment AB, because the conditions of Def. VII
are fulfilled.
II. Segment AD of Fig. 2 is not the complement of seg-
ment CB with respect to segment AB, because condition (a)
is fulfilled, but condition (/3) is not fulfilled.
III. Segment AC of Fig. 2 is not the complement of seg-
ment DB with respect to segment AC, because condition ((3)
is fulfilled, but condition (a) is not fulfilled.
THEOREM XXXIII. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, then Q is an ingredient of object Q.67
(Results from Def. VII and Th. II).
THEOREM XXXIV. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, and S is an ingredient of object P, then some in-
gredient of object S is an ingredient of some element of object R,
which is exterior to Q. 68
(1) P is the complement of object Q with respect to R,
and
(2) S is an ingredient of object P;
66 See op. cit., p. 33, Def. IX.
67 See op. cit., p. 37, thesis (11) in the proof of Th. L.
68
See op. cit., p. 36, thesis (4) in the proof of Th. L.
by Def. VII and (1) it results, that
(3) P is the class of elements of object R exterior to Q;
some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of some element
of object R, which is exterior to Q.
THEOREM XXXV. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to ~ and S is an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of object S is an ingredient of object R. 69
and
from Th. XXXIV, (1) and (2) we see, that
(3) some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of some element
of object R,
from (3) and Th. XVI, to
(4) some ingredient of object Sis an ingredient of some ingredient
of object R;
from (4) and Th. IV we infer, that
some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of object R.
--·,·~--~--- · THEOREM XX:XVI. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, then P is exterior to Q .70
(1) Pis the complement of object Q with respect to R;
from Th. XXXIII and (1) it results, that
(2) Q is an ingredient of object Q;
from Th. XXXIV and (1) it follows, that
(3) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object P, then for some
T (T is exterior to Q, and some ingredient of object Sis an
ingredient of object T),
from (3) and Def. IV, to
69 See l. c., thesis (7).
70
See op. cit., p. 35, Th. IL.

dient of object S is not an ingredient of object Q,
from (4) and Th. IV, to
(5) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object P, then not ( S is an
ingredient of object Q);
from ~ef: VI, (1), (2) and (5) we see, that
P ii) exterior to Q.
THEOREM XXXVII. If P is an object, then P is not the com-
plement of object P with respect to R. 71
(Results from Th. XXXI and XXXVI).
THEOREM XXXVIII. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, and S is the complement of object Q with respect
to R, then P is S. 72
(1) Pis the complement of object Q with respect to R,
and
(2) Sis the complement of object Q with respect to R;
by Def. VII and ( 1) we infer, that
(3) P is the class of elements of object R exterior to Q,
by Def. VII and (2), to
(4) Sis the class of elements of object R exterior to Q;
i' from Ax. III, (3) and (4) it results, that
Pis S.
THEOREM XXXIX. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, then P is an ingredient of object R. 73
(1) P is the complement of object Q with respect to R;
from Th. XXXV and (1) it follows, that
71 See op. cit., p. 40, Th. LV. The theorem reads: "No object is the com-
plement of itself with respect to that same object".
72 See op. cit., p. 39, Th. LIV.
73 See op. cit., p. 36, thesis (8) in the proof of Th. L.

dient of object S is an ingredient of object R;
from Th. XXVII, (1) and (2) we infer, that
THEOREM XL. If Pis the complement of object Q with respect
to R, S is a.n tlement of object R, and not (S is an ingredient of
object Q}, t!v;n not (S is exterior to P). 74
(2) S is an element of object R,
and
(3) not (Sis an ingredient of object Q);
from Def. VII and (1) we infer, that
(4) Pis the class of object R which are exterior to Q;
from Th. XXXIII and (1) it results, that
(5) Q is an ingredient of object Q;
from Th. XXVII, (2) and (3) it follows, that
for some T
(6) T is an ingredient of object S,
and
--~·····- ~·(-7) not (some ingredient of object T is an ingredient of ob-
ject Q);
from Th. XVII and (6) we see, that
(8) Tis an element of object S,
from Th. XXIII, (8) and (2), to
(9) T is an element of object R;
from Def. VI, (6), (5), and (7) we infer, that
(10) T is exterior to Q;
from Def. II, (4), (9) and (10) it results, that
from Def. VI, (11) and (6) it follows, that
74 See op. cit., p. 37, thesis (6) in the proof of Th. LI.
not (Sis exterior to P).

THEOREM XLI. If P is the complement of object Q with re-
spect to R, and S is an ingredient of object R, then some ingre-
dient of object S is an ingredient of some (Q or P ). 75
(1) J? is the complement of object Q with respect to R,
and ,,
(2) S is an ingredient of object R;
from Th. XVII and (2) we see, that
(3) S is an element of object R;
from Th. XL, (1) and (3) we infer, that
(4) Sis an ingredient of object Q, or not (Sis exterior to P);
(5) S is an ingredient of object S,
from Th. II and (1), to
from (4), (5), Def. VI and (6) it follows, that
(7) some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of object Q, or
some ingredient of object Sis an ingredient of object P;
from Def. VII and ( 1) we see, that
~(8) Qis ~Q or P,
from (1), to
(9) P is Q or P;
from (7), (8) and (9) we infer, that
some ingredient of object Sis an ingredient of some ( Q
or P).
THEOREM XLII. If P is a part of object Q, then some object
is the complement of object P with respect to Q .76
( 1) P is a part of object Q;
75
See op. cit., p. 41, thesis (9) in the proof of Th. LVIII.
76 See op. cit, p. 34, Th. XLVIII.
from Th. XXX and (1) it results, that

(2) P is a sub-collection of object Q;
from Ax. I and (1) it follows, that
(3) Q is not a part of object P,
(4) not (Q is the same object as P);
from Def. I, (4) and (3) we see, that
-
(5) not (Q is an ingredient of object P);
from Th. II and (1) we infer, that
from Th. XXVII, (3) and (5) it results, that, for some S
(7) S is an ingredient of object Q,
and
(8) not (some ingredient of object P 1s an ingredient of ob-
ject S);
from Th. XVII and (7) it follows, that
(9) S is an element of object Q;
from Def. VI, (7), (6) and (8), we see, that
(10) S is exterior to P;
from Ax. IV, (9) and (10) we infer, that
eeo_/ll)_J3Qffie,opj~c:t is the class of elements of object Q exterior
to P;
from Def. VII, (2) and (11) it results, that
some object is the complement of object P with respect
to Q.
THEOREM XLIII. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, then P is a part of object R. 77 -
(1) Pis the complement of object Q with respect to R;
from Th. XXXIX and (1) it follows, that
(2) P is an ingredient of object R;
77 See op. cit., p. 36, Th. L.

from Th. XXXVI and (1) we see, that

from Def. VI and (3) we infer, that
(4) some ingredient of object Q is not an ingredient of ob-
ject P,
from (4)-, Th. XVII and Th. XVI, to
(5) SOple element of object Q is not an element of object P;
from Def. V and (5) it results, that
(6) not (Q is a sub-collection of object P);
from Def. VII and (1) it follows, that
(7) Q is a sub-collection of object R;
(8) not (Pis the same object as R),
from Def. I, (2) and (8), to
P is a part of object R.
THEOREM XLIV. If P is an object) then P is not the com-
plement of object Q with respect to P. 78
(Results from Th. I and Th. XLIII.)
THEOREM XLV. If P is the complement of object Q with re-
spect to R, then Q is the complement of object P with respect
to R}'iJ.
(1) P is the complement of object Q with respect to R;
from Th. XLIII and (1) we infer, that
(2) P is a part of object R,
from Th. XXX and (2), to
(3) P is a sub-collection of object R;
by Def. VII and (1) it results, that
(4) Q is a sub-collection of object R,
from Th. XXVIII and (4), to
78 See op. cit., p. 40, Th. LVL This theorem has the following clumsy form:
'No object Pis the complement of a given object with respect to object P'.
79 See op. cit. p. 37, Th. LL
1
(5) Q is an element of object R;

from Th. XXXVI and (1) it follows, that
(6) P is exterior to Q,
from Th. XXXII and (6), to
(7) Q is exterior to P;
from Th. X.L and (1) we see, that
(8) for any$, if Sis an element of object R exterior to P, then
S is an ingredient of object Q;
from Th. II, (5) and (7) we infer, that 80
(9) for any S, if Sis an ingredient of object Q, then some ingre-
dient of object Sis an ingredient of some element of object R,
which is exterior to P;
from Def. II, (5), (7), (8) and (9) it results, that
(10) Q is the class of elements of object R exterior to P;
from Def. VII, (3) and (10) it follows that
Q is the complement of object P with respect to R.
THEOREM XLVI. If P is the complement of object Q with
respect to R, then Q is a part of object R. 81
(Results from Th. XLV and LIL)
THEOREM XLVII. If P is an object, then P is not the com-
--"~,--,,-·------·plement of object Q with respect to Q. 82
(1). P is an object;
from Ax. I we see, that
(2) not (Q is a part of object Q);
from Th. XLVI and (2) we infer, that
P is not the complement of object Q with respect to Q.
80
See above theses (3) and (4) of the proof of Th. XIII.
81 See op. cit., p. 39, Th. LIL
82
See op. cit., p. 40, Th. LVII. This theorem has the following clumsy
form: 'No object is the complement of object P with respect to the same
object P'.
THEOREM XLVIII. If P is the complement of object Q with

respect to R, then R is the class of objects (Q or P ). 83
(I-) Pis the complement of object Q with respect to R;
from Th. XLVI and (1) it results, that
(2) Q is a part of object R,
from Vef. I and (2), to
(4) R is an object;
from (1) we see, that
(5) Pis Q or P,
from Th. XXXIX and (1 ), to
(6) P is an ingredient of object R;
from (3) and (6) we infer, that
(7) for any S, if S is Q or P, then S is an ingredient of ob-
ject R;
from Th. XLI and (1) it results, that
(8) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object R, then some ingre-
dient of object S, is an ingredient of some (Q or P);
. frow Def. II, (4), (5), (7) and (8) it follows, that
R is the class of objects (Q or P). 84
83 See l. c., Th. LVIII.

84 In 1926 Tarski drew my attention to the conception of 'events' explained
by Whitehead in his interesting book of 1919 (A. N. Whitehead, An En-
quiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, Cambridge 1919; see
pp. 61, 62, 68-81 and 101-103) and to the close relationship between that
conception and my 'general theory of sets' whose outline part I, bearing the
year of publication 1916, I reported in the present chapter. Actually White-
head makes no attempt to put his conception of 'events' into the form of a
deductive theory, as is evident in the following passage which explains the
relation 'of extension' which occurs between 'events': - "Every element of
space or of time (as conceived in science) is an abstract entity formed out of
the relation of extension (in association at certain stages with the relation of
congredience) by means of a determinate logical procedure (the method of

extensive abstraction).
The importance of this procedure depends on certain properties of ex-
tension which are laws of nature depending on empirical verification. There
i.s, so far as I know, no reason why they should be so, except that they are.
These laws will be stated in the succeeding parts so far as it is necessary to
exemplify the definitions which are there given and to show that these def-
initions reallf indicate the familiar spatial and temporal entities which are
utilized by sci~nce in precise and determinate ways. Many of the laws can be
logically proved when the rest are assumed. But the proofs will not be given
here as our aim is to investigate the structure of the ideas which we apply
to nature and the fundamental laws of nature which determine their impor-
tance, and not to investigate the deductive science which determines their
importance which issues from them" (op. cit., pp. 75 and 76). The follow-
ing paragraph throws light on a number of merits of Whitehead's conception
and on the accuracy of the formulation of that conception, as well as on its
relationship to my 'general theory of sets': "27. The Relation of Extension,
Fundamental Properties. 27.1 The fact that event a extends over event b will
be expressed by the abbreviation aKb. Thus 'I{' is to be read 'extends over'
and is the symbol for the fundamental relation of extension.
27 .2 Some properties of J{ essential for the method of extensive abstrac-
tion are,
(I) aI<b implies that a is distinct from b, namely, 'part' here means
'proper pa.rt':
(II) Every event extends over other events and is itself part of other
events: the set of events which an event e extends over is called the set of
parts of e;
(III) If the parts of b are also parts of a and a and b are distinct, then
aKb:
(IV) The relation]{ is transitive, i.e. if aKb and bI<c, then aKc;
(V) If aK c, there are events such as b where aI<b and bl{ e;
(VI) If a and b are any two events, there are events such as e where eK a
and eI<b.
It follows from (I) and (IV) that aI<b and bI<a are inconsistent. Prop-
erties (II) and (V) and (VI) together postulate something like the existence
of an ether; but it is not necessary here to pursue the analogy.
28. Intersection, Separation and Dissection. 28.1 Two events 'intersect'
when they have parts in common. Intersection, as thus defined, includes the
case when one event extends over the other, since K is transitive. If every
intersector of b also intersects a, then either aKb or a and b are identical.
Events which do not intersect are said to be 'separated'. A 'separated

set' of events is a set of events of which any two are separated from each
other.
28.2 A 'dissection' of an event is a separated set such that the set of in-
tersectors of its members is identical with the set of intersectors of the event.
Thus a dissection is non-overlapping exhaustive analysis of an event into a
set of parts, and conversely the dissected event is the one and only event of
which that set is a diss~ction. There will always be an indefinite number of
dissectidhs of any given event.
If aKb, there are dissections of a of which bis a member. It follows that if
b is a part of a, there are always events separated from b which are also parts
of a" (op. cit., pp. 101 and 102; the passage quoted constitutes the beginning
of the chapter called: 'Principles of the method of extensive abstraction').
Analysing the relation of theses (I)-(VI) of this passage to the remaining
theses of Whitehead concerning 'events', Tarski conjectured in 1926 that nei-
ther of the theses contained in this paragraph 'If every intersector of b also
intersects a, then aKb or a and. b are identical' and 'if b is part of a, there
are always events separated from b which are also parts of a' - result from
theses (I)-(VI) nor do they follow from the relevant definitions given by the
author, and that consequently appearances notwithstanding, theses (I)-(VI)
would not be sufficient, as an axiomatic foundation for the notion of 'events'
which Whitehead develops in his work. In analyzing Tarski's conjecture, I
began to feel doubts concerning the interpretation of certain of Whitehead's
theses which are formulated with the assistance of phrases used all too freely
in this work, e.g., in attempting to write down some of the author's theses
in_ '~yl!l:bolic' language, I was unable to decide how to deal with the plural
phrase 'other events' in thesis (II) or 'there are events' in theses (V) and (VI),
and, again, what I sh01dd do with the expression 'two' in the thesis (VI), or
in the proposition 'Two events 'intersect' when they have parts in common'
(p. 102). I have experienced great difficulty in peeling off various casual
phrases of the colloquial laJ?.guage which Whitehead uses in introducing new
terms of some general scheme into his presentation which should, according
to the author's inten_tions, be used in putting into a more precise language
my means of particular definitions of his theory of 'events'. Having no in-
tention, in face of these interpretative doubts, of deciding the problem which
was raised by Tarski's conjecture, I will make some tentative observations
here which could be considered as steps towards a solution of Tarski's prob-
lem, if, as I am finally inclined to think on the basis of 'intuition' and of
the comparison of statements of various passages of Whitehead, that theses
(I)-(VI) and the theses 'If every intersector of b also intersects a, then either
a Kb or a and b are identical', and 'if b is part of a, there are always events
separated from b which are also parts of a' - after eliminating superfluous
and rather primitive definitions from these theses - served respectively, in
accordance with the intentions of the author, to inform the reader, that
(1) if aKb, then a is different from b,
(2) if a is an event, then (for some b, (bis an event and bKa)),
(3) if a is an event, b is an event, (for any c, if c is an event and bf{ c then
aKc) and a is different from b, then aKb,
(4) if aI<b and bKc, then aKc,
(5) if aK c, t~n for some b, (bis an event, aI<b and bf{ c),
(6) if a is an event and b is an event, then for some e, (e is an event, eKa
and eKb),
(7) if a is an event, b is an event, and for any c and d, if c is an event, d is
an event, cKd and bKd, then for any e, (e is an event, cKe and aKe),
then (aKb or a is identical to b). (See above Th. XXVII),
(8) if a is an event, bis an event and aKb, then for some c, (c is an event, not
(for some"e, (e is an event, cKe and bKe)) and aKc) (See Lesniewski,
op. cit., p. 35, thesis (II) in the proof of Th. XLVIII).
I would point out that the application of the well-known method of 'in-
terpretation' made it obvious to me that neither thesis (7) nor thesis (8)
result from theses (1)-(6), if we have a consistent theory, which I will here
call T, and which is constructed in axiomatic form on seven suitably selected
theses of standard arithmetic, (in these theses, expressions of the type 'a>b'
mean the same as the corresponding expressions of the type 'a is a ratio~al
number, b is a rational number and a > b') stating, that
(a) for some a - a is a rational number,
-"""--.-{B) ifais a rational number, then for some b - (bis a rational number
and a>b),
w
('Y) if a is a rational number, then for some b - (b is a rational number

and b>a),
w
(8) if a>c,
w
then for some b - (bis a rational number, a>b w
and b>c),
w
(c) if a>b,
w
then a is different than b,
(() if a>b,
w
then also b>c,
w
a>c,
w
(17) if a is a rational number, b is a rational number, and a is different than

b, then (a>b w
or b>a):
w
Replacing in theses (1)-(6) expressions of the type 'a is an event' and 'al{b'
respectively, by expressions of the type 'a is a rational number', and 'a>b w
respectively, I obtained from the above theses six new theses stating respec-
tively, that
(A) if a>b,w
then a is different than b,
(B) if a is a rational number, then ((for some b - (b is a rational number
and a>b))
w
and for some b - (bis a rational number and b>a).
w
(C) if a is a rational number, b is a rational number (for any c, if c is a

rational number, and b>c,
w
then a>c)
w
and a is different than b, then
a>b,
w
(D) if a?;b and b?;c, then a?;c,
(E) if a>c, then for some b - (b is a rational number, a>b and b>c),
1U 'W w
(F) if a is a rational number, and bis a rational number, then for some e -
(e is a ·rational number, e>a
w
and e>b).
w
From th~ses (7) and (8) I have obtained in the same way theses, stating
respectively, that
(G) if a is a rational number, b is a rational number, and for any c and d,
if c is a rational number, dis a rational number, c>d and b>d, then for
some e (e is a rational number, c>e and a>e), then ( a>b or ;; is identical
to b), w w w
(H) if a is a rational number, bis a rational number and a>b, then for some
c - (c is a rational number, not (for some e - (e is awrational number,
c>e and b>e)) and a>c).
These; (A), (D) and (E) ~re valid on the basis of theory T, being merely
repetitions of axioms (c:), ((), and (8) of this theory. That theses (B), (C)
and (F) are also valid on the basis of theory T - is shown by the following
remarks:
Ad (B): Thesis (B) results from axioms (/3) and ('y).
Ad (C): From Ax. (c:) it results, that
(a) not (a>a),
w
from (a), that,
(b) if a is a rational number, and for any c, if c is a rational number and
~IJ>~~-thena>c,· then not (b>a),
w w w
from (b) however, that,
(c) if a is a rational number, b is a rational number, (for any c, if c is a
rational number and b>c, then a>c) and a is different from b, then (a is
a rational number, b isw a rationai number, a is different from b and not
(b>a) );
from (cJ and Ax. (TJ) results thesis (C).
Ad (F): From Ax. ('y) it results, that
( d) if a is a rational number, b is a rational number and not (a is different
from b), then for some e (e is a rational number, e>a
w
and e>b),
w
and
(e) if a is a rational number and a>b, w
then ((for some e (e is a rational
number and e>a))w
and a>b),
w .
from (e), however and Ax. (() that,
(f) if a is a rational number and a>b, w

then for some e (e is a rational number,
e>a
w
and e>b);
w
from axioms (77), (d) and (f), results thesis (F).
On the basis of theory T the following theses are also valid stating,
that
(G) for some a and b (a is a rational number, b is a rational number, (for
every c and •
d, if c is a rational number, dis a rational number, c>d w
and
b>d, then for some e (e is a rational number, c>e and a>e)), not (a>b)
'W - w w w
and not (a is identical to b)),
and
(H) for some a and b (a is a rational number, b is a rational number, a>b
and for any c, if c is a rational number and a>c, w
then for some e ( e i; a
rational number, c>e and b>e)
1JJ w
),
is shown by the following remarks:
Ad (G): From Ax. ((3) it results, that
(g) if a is a rational number, c is a rational number and not (a is different
from c), then for some e (e is a rational number, c>e w
and a>e),
w
(h) if a is a rational number and c>a, then ((for some e (e is a rational
number and a>e)) and c>a), w
from (h) and Ax. ((), that w
(i) if a is a rational number and c>a, w
then for some e (e is a rational number,
c>e
w
and a>e),
w
from Ax. (77), (g) and (i), that,
(k) if a is a rational number, and c is a rational number, then for some e (e
is a rational number, c>e and a>e).
--~~"~Tiom~Ax~-(a)ai:id Ax. (1) itresults, that
(f) for some a and b (a is a rational number, b is a rational number and
b>a);
from (C), (k), Ax. ((), (a) and Ax. (c) .results thesis (G).
Ad (H): Thesis (H) results from(?) and (k).
Thesis (G*) is inconsistent with thesis (G) and thesis (H*) with the-
sis (H) in connection with the already established fact that theses (G) and
(H) are valid on the basis of theory T, this enables one to state that if the-
ory T is a consistent theory, then neither thesis (G*) nor thesis (H*) can
be proved on the basis of that theory. From the fact that on the basis of
the theory T theses (A)-(H) are valid, while, if theory Tis a consistent the-
ory, neither thesis (G*) nor thesis (H*) can be proved in it, it is possible to
conclude in accordance with the well-known reasoning used in the 'interpre-
tation' proofs of independence, that if theory T is a consistent theory, then
neither thesis (7) nor thesis (8) follows from theses (1)-(6).
CHAPTER yo
FURTHER THEOREMS AND DEFINITIONS
• OF THE 'GENERAL THEORY OF SETS'
· FROM THE PERIOD UP TO THE YEAR 1920 INCLUSIVE.
I begin with the exposition of some of the results from the domain
of my 'general theory of sets' which were not published in 'Foun-
dations of a General Theory of Sets. I' mentioned in Chapter IV
and which have not appeared in print until now. I commence in
keeping with the title of this chapter - with the results in the pe-
riod up to the year 1920 inclusive. All results known to me in the
field of my 'general theory of sets' which derive from this period,
were my own work. The situation began to change in this respect
only from the year 1921. Putting various theorems and definitions
into an organized whole according to the historical order of their
discovery, I have attempted to achieve here, a particular result,
as in other cases, viz., an easy satisfaction of the requirements of
the chronologic principle 'suum cuique' while presenting my own
and other people's results. For the sake of preserving the unity of
presentation of the 'general theory of sets' - I shall continue to
formulate further theses of the system and to construct proofs in
the same 'style' with which the reader has become familiar in the
previous chapter.
THEOREM IL. If {for any Q, if Q is the same object as P,
or Q is a part of object P, then some object which is the same
object as Q or is part of Q, is a or is a part of object a) and R is
an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object R is an
ingredient of some a.
O Translator's note: [This chapter was published in _Polish as follows: 'O

podstawach matematyki, Rozdzial V: Dalsze twierdzenia i definicje 'og6lnej
teorji mnogosci', pochodzqce z okresu do r. 1920 wlqcznie', Przeglqd Filo-
zoficzny 32 (1929), pp. 60-101.]
Proof: vVe assume, that

(1) for any Q, if Q is the same object as P, or Q is a part of
object P, then some object which is the same object as Q or
is a part of object Q, is a or is a part of some q,,
and
(3) R is the ~ame object as P or R is a part of object P (Results
from Def. I and (2));
from (1) and (3) we see, that for some S
(4) S is the same object as R or S is a part of object R,
and
(5) Sis a or Sis a part of some a;
(6) Sis an ingredient of object R (Results from Def. I and (4))
(7) Sis an ingredient of object S (from Th. II and (6))
(8) S is an ingredient of some a (from (5), (7) and Def. I) some
ingredient of object R is an ingredient of some a,(from (6),
(8) ).
THEOREM L. P is a part of object Q when and only when, (P
is an ingredient of object Q and not {P is the same object as Q)
(Results from Def. I and Ax. I1 ).
---------------THEOREM LL If P is an ingredient of object Q and Q is an
ingredient of object P, then P is the same object as Q.
and
(3) Pis the same object as Q, or Pis a part of object Q (Results
from Def. I and (1))
(4) Q is the same object as P, or Q is a part of object P (from
Def. I and (2))
Pis the same object as Q ((3), (4), Ax. I).
1 See above theses (1 ), (3) and (4) of the proof of Th. XLII.
THEOREM LIL If some object is a part of object P, (Joi any

R, if R is a part of object P, then some ingredient of object R
is an ingredient of object Q) and S is an ingredient of object P,
then some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of object Q.
( 1) s9rrre object is a part of object P,
(2) f01 any R, if R is a part of object P, then some ingredient of
object R is an ingredient of object Q,
and
(4) Sis the same object as ~p or Sis a part of object P (from
Def. I and (3));
from (1) we infer, that for some T
(5) T is a part of object P;
(6) some ingredient of object Tis an ingredient of object Q (from
(2), (5))
(7) Tis an ingredient of object P (Def I, (5))
(8) some ingredient of object Pis an ingredient of object Q ((6),
Th. IV, (7))
some ingredient of object Pis an ingredient of object Q ((4), (8),
(2)).
THEOREM LIII. If P is an ingredient of object Q, then every
ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object Q.
(1) Pis an ingredient of object Q;
(2) P is an ingredient of object P (from Th. II, (1))
(3) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, then R is an
ingredient of object Q (Th. IV, (1))
every ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object Q ( (2),
(3) ).
THEOREM LIV. If P is the class of objects a, and Q is the
same object as P or is a part of object P, then some object which
is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q is a, or is a part

of some a.
and
(2) Q is th~ sctme object as P or is a part of object P;
(3) Q is an 1,ngredient of object P (Def. I, (2));
from Def. II, (1) and (3) it results, that for some R and S
(5) S is a,
and
(6) R is an ingredient of object S;
(7) R is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q (Def. I,
(4))
(8) R is the same object as S or R is a part of object S (Def. I,
(6))
(9) R is a, or R is a part of some a ( (8), (5))
a certain object which is the same object as Q, or is a part of
object Q is a or is a part of some a ((7), (9)).
THEOREM LV. If P is an object, (for any Q, if Q is a, then Q
~.-·~-~· ··is an··ingredient of object P) and for any Q, if Q is an ingredient
of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of
some a, then P is the class of objects a.
(1) P is an object,
(2) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P,
and
(4) P is an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (1))
(5) some object is a ((3), (4))
Pis the class of objects a (Def. II, (1), (5), (2), (3)).
THEOREM LVI. If P is an object, {for any Q, if Q is a) then

Q is the same object as P, or is a part of object P ) 1 and for any
Q, if Q is the same object as P, or Q is a part of object P, then
some object which is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q,
is a or is a part of some a, then P is the class of objects a.
Prf>of: We assume, that
(1) P iJs an object,
(2) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is the same object as P, or is a
part of object P,
and
(3) for any Q, if Q is the same object as P, or Q is a part of
object p,, then some object which is the same object as Q, or
is a part of object Q, is a or is a part of some a;
(4) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P ((2),
Def. I)
(5) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of object R is an ingredient of some a (Th. IL, (3)).
Pis the class of objects a (Th. LV, (1), (4), (5)).
THEOREM LVII. If P is the class of objects a, when and only
when, {P is an object {for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient
_of_object P ) 1 and for any Q, ifQ is an ingredient of object P, then
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a). (Results
from Th. LV and Def. II).
THEOREM LVIII. If every ingredient of object P is an ingre-
dient of object Q, then P is an ingredient of object Q.
(1) every ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object Q;
(2) P is an object ( (1 ), Th. X),
(3) Pis an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (2)),
Pis an ingredient of object Q ((1), (3)).
THEOREM LIX. If P is an ingredient of object Q, and not (Q
is P }, then Q is not an ingredient of object P.
(I) Pis an ingredient of object Q,

and
(2) not ( Q is P);
(3) Q is Q (Th. X, (1)),
(4) not (Pis the same object as Q) ((2), (3))
(5) not (Q is an ingredient of object P) (Th. LI, (1), (4))
Q is not an ingredient of object P ((3), (5)).
THEOREM LX. If eve1y a is an ingredient of object P, and
for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredi-
ent of object Q is an ingredient of some a, then P is the class of
objects a.
(1) every a is an ingredient of object P,
and
from (1) it follows, that for some R
(4) P is an object (Th. X, (3))
Pis the class of things a (Def. II, (4), (1), (2)). 2
~-~,"-.,-~.·~~,-~--·-THEOREM 'DXL If every a is the same object as P, or is a
part of object P, and fo1 any Q, if Q is a part of object P, then

some object which is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q,
is a or is a part of some a, then P is the class of objects a.
(1) every a is the same object as P, or is a part of object P,
and
2 From Th. LX, we see that conditions ((3) and (1) of Def. II entail, on the
basis of my 'general theory of sets', condition (a). See: Stanislaw Lesniewski,
'O podstawach matematyki' (On the Foundations of Mathematics), Przeglqd
Filozoficzny 31, No. III, 1928, p. 265, footnote 1.
(2) for any Q, if Q is a part of object P, then some object which

is the same as object Q, or part of object Q, is a or is a part
of some a;
(3) some object which is the same object as P, or is a part of
object P, is a (1)
(4) P. is' an object ((3), Th. IX)
(5) fo1 any Q, if Q is the same object as P, or Q is a part of
object P, then some object, which is the same object as Q, or
is a part of object Q, is a or is a part of some a ((3), (2))
Pis the class of objects a (Th. LVI, (4), (1), (5)).
THEOREMLXII. If P is the class of objeCts a and for any
Q7 (Q is a when and only when Q is b), then P is the class of
objects b.
and
(2) for any Q (Q is a when and only when Q is b);
(3) every a is an ingredient of object P, and for any Q, if Q is an
ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is an
ingredient of some a (Def. II, ( 1))
(4) -every bis an ingredient of object P, and for any Q, if Q is an
ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is an
ingredient of object P ( (3), (2))
Pis the class of objects b (Th. LX, (4)).
THEOREM LXIII. If P is the class of objects a 1 Q is an ingre-
dient of object R, and Q is an ingredient of object P, then some
ingredient of object R is an ingredient of some a.
(2) Q is an ingredient of object R,
and
(4) some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a (Def. II,

(1), (3))
some ingredient of object R is an ingredient of some a (( 4), Th. IV,
(2)).
THEOREM LXIV. If P is the class of objects a, Q is the class
of objects b, fl 'is the class of objects (P or Q), and S is a or b,
S is an ingre<Jient of object R.
(2) Q is the class of objects b,
(3) R is the class of objects (P or Q),
and
(4) S is a or b;
(5) Sis an ingredient of object P, or Sis an ingredient of object Q
((4), Th. LVII, (1), (2))
(6) Pis an ingredient of object R (Th. LVII, (3), (1))
(7) Q is an ingredient of object R (Th. LVII, (3),(2))
Sis an ingredient of object R ((4), Th. IV, (6), (7)).
THEOREM LXV. If P is the class of objects a, Q is the class
of objects b, R is the class of objects P or Q, and S is an ingredi-
---~-~-ent-of-object -R-, -then some ingredient of object S is an ingredient
of some (a orb).
(3) R is the class of (P or Q),
and
(4) Sis an ingredient of object R;
from Def. II, (3) and (4) we see, that for some T and U
(5) Tis an ingredient of object S,
(6) U is P or Q,
and
(7) Tis an ingredient of object U;
(8) U is the class of objects a or U is the class of objects b (6),

(1 ), (2))
some ingredient of object Sis an ingredient of some (a or b) ( (8),
Th. LXIII, (5), (7)).
THEOREM LXVL If P is the class of objects a, Q is the class
of obj.eds b and R is the class of objects (P or Q}, then R is the
class oj objects (a or b).
(2) P is the class of objects b,
and
(3) R is the class of objects (P or Q);
(4) for any S, if S is a or b, then S is an ingredient of object R
(Th. LXIV, (1 ), (2), (3))
(5) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object R, then some ingre-
dient of object S, is an ingredient of some (a orb) (Th. LXV,
(1 ), (2), (3))
R is the class of objects (a orb). (Th. LV, (3), (4), (5)).
THEOREM LXVII. If P is an ingredient of object Q, when
and only when, each ingredient of object P is an ingredient of
o~bjecLQ.o..
(Results from Th. LVIII and Th. LIII).
THEOREM LXVIII. If P is the class of objects a, {for any RJ
if R is the class of objects a, then R is the class of objects b) and
Q is the class of objects b, then Q is the class of objects a.
(2) for any R, if R is the class of objects a, then R is the class of
objects b,
and
(3) Q is the class of objects b;
(4) Pis the class of objects b ((2), (1))
(5) Q is P (Ax. III, (3), (4))
Q is the class of objects a ((5), (1)).

THEOREM LXIX. If every a is an ingredient of object P, and
an ingredient of object Q, and for any R, if R is an ingredient of
object P, or R is an ingredient of object Q, then some ingredient
of object R is an ingredient of some object a, then P is Q.
Proof: )Ne assume, that
(1) every a is an ingredient of object P and an ingredient of ob-
ject Q,
and
(2) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, or R is an ingre-
dient of Q, then some ingredient of some R is an ingredient
of some a;
(3) P is the class of objects a (Th. LX, (1 ), (2))
(4) Q is the class of objects a (Th. LX, (1 ), (2))
Pis Q (Ax. III, (3), (4)).
THEOREM LXX. If every a is the same object as P, or is a
part of object P, every a is the same object as Q, or is a part of
object Q, and for any R, if R is a part of object P, or R is a part
of object Q, then some object which is the same object as R or is
a part of object R is a, or is a part of some a, then P is Q.
-··~
.... ~·-~------Proof: .We.assume, that
(1) every a is the same object as P or is a part of object P,
(2) every a is the same object as Q,
a.nd
(3) for any R, if Risa part of object P or Risa part of object Q,
then some object which is the same object as R, or is a part
of object R is a or is a part of some a;
(4) P is the class of objects a (Th. LXI, (1 ), (3))
(5) Q is the class of objects a (Th. LXI, (2), (3))
Pis Q (Ax. III, (4), (5)).
THEOREM LXXI. If P is the class of objects aJ Q is the class
of objects b, and for any R, (R is a if and only if R is b), then P
is the same object as Q.

(3) for any R, (Risa when and only when R is b);
(4) Pis the same object as Q (Ax. III, (4), (2)) .
.
THEOREM LXXIL If P is the class of objects a, then P is the
class <f'j the class of objects a.
(2) P is the class of objects P (Th. VIII, (1))
(3) for any Q, if Q is P, then Q is the class of objects a (1)
(4) for any Q, if Q is the class of objects a , then Q is P (Ax. III,
(1))
Pis the class of the class of objects a (Th. LXII, (2), (3), (4)).
THEOREM LXXIII. If some object is aJ then for some P, ((for
any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P) and for any
Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of ob-
ject Q is an ingredient of some a).
(Results from Ax. IV and Th. LVII.)
THEOREM LXXIV. If some object is a, then the class of ob-
jects a is an object.
from Ax. IV and (1), we infer, that for some S
(2) S is the class of objects a
(3) Sis the same object as the class of objects a 3 ((2), Ax. III)
the class of objects a is an object (3).
THEOREM LXXV. If P is the class of objects a, Q is the class
of objects a and R is the class of objects (a or b), then R is the
class of objects (P or Q).
3 See above theses (3)-(5) and (8) in the proof of Th. XXVI.
On the Foundations of !Yfathematics 275
(I) P is the class of objects a,

and
(3) R is the class of objects (a or b);
(4) some object is the class of objects (P or Q) (Ax. IV, (1))
(5) for any.s; if Sis the class of objects (P or Q), then Sis the
class of ~bjects (a or b) (Th. LXVI, (1) ,(2))
R is the class of objects (P or Q). (Th. LXVIII, (4), (5), (3)).
THEOREM LXXVI. If P is the class of objects a, and Q is the
class of objects b) then {R is the class of objects {P or Q) when
and only when R is the class of objects (a or b).
(Results from Th. LXXV and Th. LXVI.)
THEOREM LXXVII. If (for any R and S, if R is a collec-
tion of objects a and S is a collection of objects a, then R is the
same object as S )) P is a and Q is a, then P is the same object
as Q.
(I) for any R and S, if R is a collection of objects a and Sis a
collection of objects a, then R is the same object as S,
(2) P is a,
(3) Q is a;
(4) P is a collection of objects a (Th. XIII, (2))
(5) Q is a collection of objects a (Th. XII, (3))
Pis the same object as Q ((I), (4), (5)).
THEOREM LXXVIII. If P is a collection of collections ob-
jects a) and Q is an ingredient of object P) then some ingredient
of object Q is an ingredient of some a) which is an ingredient of
object P.
(I) P is a collection of collections of objects a,
and
from Def. III, (I), and (2) it results, that for some R and S

(4) S is a collection of objects a,
(5) S is an ingredient of object P,
and
from Def. III, (4), and (6) it follows, that for some T and U
(7) T.is an ingredient of object R,
(8) U is a,
(9) U is an ingredient of object S,
and
(10) T is an ingredient of object U;
(11) Tis an ingredient of object Q (Th. IV, (7), (3))
(12) U is an ingredient of object P (Th. IV, (9), (5))
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a, which is
an ingredient of object P ((11), (8), (12), (10)).
THEOREM LXXIX. If P is a collection of collections of ob-
jects a, then P is a collection of objects a.
(1) P is a collection of collections of objects a;
ingredient of object P (Th. LXVIII, (1 ))
P is a collection of objects a (Def. III, (1 ), (2) ).
THEOREM LXXX. If P is a collection of objects a, and for
any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P, then P is
the class of objects a.
and
(2) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P;
dient of object Q is an ingredient of some a (Def. III, (1))
THEOREM LXXXL If P is a collection of objects a, then P

is the class of objects a, which are ingredients of object P.
(1) P is a collection of objects a;
gredient. of object. Q is an ingredient of some a, which is an
ingredieljt of object P (Def. III, (1))
P is the class of objects a which is an ingredient of object P
(Th. LV, (1), (2)).
THEOREM LXXXII. P is the class of objects a when and only
when, (P is a collection of objects a, and for any Q, if Q zs a,
then Q is an ingredient of object P).
(Results from Th. LXXX, Th. XIV and Th. LVII.)
THEOREM LXXXIII. If P is a collection of objects a, then for
some b, (P is the class of objects b, and for any Q, if Q is b, then
Q is a).
(Results from Th. LXXXI.)
THEOREM LXXXIV. P is an element of object Q when and
only when, P is an ingredient of object Q.
(Results from Th. XVII and Th. XVI. )4
· THEOREM LXXXV. P is an ingredient of object Q when and
only when, for some a {Q is the class of objects a and P is a).
(Results from Th. LXXXIV and Def. IV)
THEOREM LXXXVI. If Q is the class of objects a, and P is
a, then P is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q.
(Results from Th. LXXXV, Def. I.)
THEOREM LXXXVII. If P is the class of objects, then not {P
is a part of object Q).
(1) P is a class of objects;
4 See l. c., p. 278, footnote 1.

(2) not (Q is an object) or Q is the same object as P or Q is a

part of object P (Th. LXXXVI, (1))
not (P is a part of object Q) ( (2), Axiom 1).
THEOREM LXXXVIII. P is the class of objects a, when and
only when, (P is an object, (for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is the
same .obJect as P, or is a part of object P}, and for any Q, if Q
is the i#ame object as P, or Q is a part of object P, then some
object, which is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q, is
a or is a part of some a).
(Results from Th. LVI, Th. LXXXVI and Th. LIV.)
THEOREM LXXXIX. If P is the class of objects, and P is an
ingredient of object Q, then Q is the class of objects.
(1) P is the class of objects,
and
(3) not (Pis a part of object Q) (Th. LXXXVII, (1))
(4) P is the same object as Q (Def. , (1 ), (2), (3))
Q is the class of objects ((1), (4)).
THEOREM LC. If P is the class of objects a, and some a is
- the class of objects, then P is the class of objects.
and
(2) some a is the class of objects;
(3) some ingredient of object P is the class of objects ((2),
Th. LXXXV, (1))
Pis the class of objects. (Th. LXXXIX, (3)).
THEOREM XCI. If P is a collection of objects a, then some a
is an ingredient of object P. 5
(Results from Th. XXI and Th. VI.)
5 See above thesis (3) in the proof of Th. XXL

THEOREM XCII. If P is a collection of objects a, (for any Q

and R, if Q is a and R is a) then Q is the same object as R) and
S is a, then S is an ingredient of object P.
(2) for any. Q· and R, if Q is a and R is a, then Q is the same
object a~ R,
and
(3) Sis a;
from Th. XCI and (1) we see, that for some T
(4) Tis a,
and
(6) Tis the same object as S ((2), (4), (3))
Sis an ingredient of object P ((5), (6)).
THEOREM XCIII. If P is a collection of objects a, and for any
Q, if Q is a, then Q is b, then P is a collection of objects b.
and
(2) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is b;
(3) some object is a (Th. XCI, (1))
Pis a collection of objects b (Th. XII, (1), (3), (2)).
THEOREM XCIV. If P is a collection of objects a , and for
any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is a, then Q is the same object as
R, then P is the class of objects a.
and
(2) for any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is a, then Q is the same
object as R;
(3) for any S, if S is a, then S is an ingredient of object P
(Th. XCII, (1), (2)).
THEOREM XCV. If P is the class of objects aJ and for any

Q, if Q is a, then Q is b, then P is a collection of objects b.
and
(2) fpr ·any Q, if Q is a, then Q is b;
(3) R is a collection of objects a (Th. XIV, (1) ).
Pis a collection of objects b (Th. XCIII, (3), (2)).
THEOREM XCVI. P is a collection of objects a, when and
only when, for some b {P is the class of objects b, and for any Q,
if Q is b, then Q is a.)
(Results from Th. XCV and Th. LXXXIII.)
THEOREM XCVII. If P is the class of the class of objects a,
then P is the class of objects a.
(1) P is the class of the class of objects a;
(2) some object is the class of objects a, (Th. XX, (1))
(3) for any R, if R is the class of objects a, then R is the class of
the class of objects a (Th. LXXII)
P is the class of objects a (Th. LXVIII, (2), (3), (1 )).
THEOREM XCVIII. If (for any P and Q, if P is a, and Q
is a, then P is the same object as Q), R is a collection of ob-
jects a, and S is a collection of objects a, then R is the same
object as S.
(1) for any P and Q, if Pis a, and Q is a, then Pis the same
object as Q,
(2) R is a collection of objects a,
and
(3) S is a collection of objects a;
(4) R is the class of objects a (Th. XCIV, (2), (1))
(5) Sis the class of objects a (Th. XCIV, (3), (1))
R is the same object as S (Ax. III, (4), (5)).
THEOREM IC. If P is a collection of the class of objects a)

then P is the class of objects a.
(1) P is a collection of the class of objects a;
(2) for any Q and R, (if Q is the class of objects a, and R is the
class of pbjects a, then Q is the same object as R (Ax. III)
(3) Pis the.class of classes of objects a (Th. XCIV, (1 ), (2))
Pis the class of objects a (Th. XCVII, (3)).
THEOREM C. For any P and Q, if P is a, then P is the same
object as Q, when and only when for every R and S, if R is a
collection of objects a, and S is a collection of objects a, then R
is the same object as S.
(Results from Th. LXXVIII and Th. XCVIII.)
THEOREM CI. If P is an object and for any Q, not (P is a
part of object Q}, then P is the class of objects.
(1) P is an object,
and
(2) for any Q, not (Pis a part of object Q);
from Ax. IV and (1) we infer, that for some R,
(3) R is the class of objects
(4) not (Pis a part of object R) (2)
(5) Pis the same object as R (Th. LXXXVI, (3), (1), (4))
Pis the class of objects ((3), (5)).
THEOREM CII. If some object is a, then for some P, ((for
any Q, if Q is a, then Q is the same object as P, or is a part of
object P }, and for any Q, if Q is the same object as P, or Q is a
part of object P, then some object, which is the same object as Q,
or is a part of Q, is a, or is a part of some a).
(Results from Ax. IV and Th. LXXXVIII. )6
6 The statement of Theorems LIX, LXIX, LXX, LXXIII and CII in this
chapter is connected with later considerations in the present work. Only this
THEOREM CIII. If P is an object, and for any Q, if Q is an

object, then Q is an ingredient of object P, then P is the class of
objects.
(1) P is an object,
and .
(2) fo~ any Q, if Q is an object, then Q is an ingredient of ob-
ject P;
from Ax. IV and (1) it results, that for some R
(3) R is the class of objects
(4) R is an ingredient of object P ((2), (3))
P is the class of objects (Th. LXXXIX, (3), (4) ).
THEOREM CIV. If P is the class of objects a, and Q is the
class of objects not a, then (P is the class of objects or Q is the
class of objects).
(I) P is the class of objects a,
and
(2) Q is the class of objects not a;
from Ax. IV and (1) it follows, that for some R
(3) R is the class of objects;
(4) R is a, or R is not a (3)
(5) some a is the class of objects, or some not a is the class of
objects ((4), (3))
P is the class of objects or Q is the class of objects ( (5), Th. XC,
(1), (2)).
THEOREM CV. P is a class of objects when and only when,
(P is an object and for any Q, not {P is a part of object Q))
(Results from Th. CI and Th. LXXXVII).
circumstance induced me to insert the theorem here, which, on its own, I

consider to be of little interest.
THEOREM CVI. P is a class of objects when and only when)

(P is an object and for any QJ if Q is an object) then Q is an
ingredient of object P)
(Results from Th. CIII and Th. LXXXV) .
. THEOREM CVII. If P is the class of objects a, and Q is the
class of obj~cts not a, then (P is an ingredient of object Q, or Q
is an ingred~ent of object P).
and
(2) Q is the class of objects not a;
(3) Pis the class of objects, or Q is the class of objects (Th. CIV,
(1), (2))
P is an ingredient of object Q, or Q is an ingredient of object P
((3), Th. LXXXV, (2), (1)).
THEOREM CVIII. If P is an object, and not (P is the same
object as the class of objects), then some object is a part of some
object.
(1) Pis an object,
and
(2) not (Pis the same object as the class of objects);
(3) the class of objects is the class of objects (Th. LXXIV, (1))
(4) Pis a part of the class of objects (Th. LXXXVI, (3), (1),
(2))
some object is a part of some object ((4), (3)).
THEOREM CIX. If P is an object, Q is an object) and not
(P is the same object as Q}, then some object is a part of some
object.
(1) Pis an object,
(2) Q is an object,
and
(3) not (P is the same object as Q);

(4) not ( P is the same object as the class of objects) or not ( Q is
the same object as the class of objects) (3)
some object is a part of some object ((4), Th. CVIII, (1), (2)). 7
THEOREM CX. If some object is a part of object P, and for
any .fl,· if R is a part of object P, then some ingredient of ob-
ject ~ is an ingredient of object Q, then P is an ingredient of
object Q.
and
(2) for any R, if R is a part of object P, then some ingredient of
object R is an ingredient of object Q;
(3) P is an object (Th. IX, (1))
(4) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of object S is an ingredient of object Q (Th. LII, (1),
(2))
P is an ingredient of object Q (Th. XXVII, (3), (4) ).
THEOREM CXI. If P is the class of objects a, Q is the class
of objects b, and for every R, if R is a, then R is b, then P is an
. ingredient of object Q.
and
(3) for any R, if R is a, then R is b;
(4) Q is the class of collections of objects b (Th. XXV, (2))
(5) P is a collection of objects b (Th. XCV, (1 ), (3))
Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. LXXXV, (4), (5)).
7
Th. CIX shows that the acceptance of the assumption that there are
at least two different objects, as in the 'general theory of sets' would make
possible the proof, on the basis of the theory of deduction, of the statement,
some object is a part of some object. See I.e., p. 273, footnote 5.
THEOREM CXII. If each part of object P is an ingredient of

object Q, then P is an ingredient of object Q.
(1) every part of object P is an ingredient of object Q;
(2) for any R, if R is a part of object P, then (R is an ingredi-
ent of o!:>ject R, and R is an ingredient of object Q) (Th. II,
(1)) I/II
(3) for any R, if Risa part of object P, then some ingredient of

object R is an ingredient of object Q (2)
P is an ingredient of object Q (Th. CX, (1), (3)).
THEOREM CXIII. P is a sub-collection of object Q, when and
only when, P is an element of object Q.
(Results from Th. XXIX and Th. XXVIII. )8
THEOREM CXIV. P is a sub-collection of object Q when and
only when, P is an ingredient of object Q.
(Results from Th. CXIII and Th. LXXXIV.) 9
THEOREM CXV. If P is an ingredient of object Q, then not
(P is exterior to Q).
(2) ~pis an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (1))
not (Pis exterior to Q) (Def VI, (1), (2)).
THEOREM CXVI. If P is an object, Q is an object and not
(some ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object Q), then P
is exterior to Q.
(1) P is an object,
(2) Q is an object
and
8 See l.c., p. 278, footnote 1.

9
See I.e.
(3) not (some ingredient of object P is an ingredient of ob-

ject Q);
(4) Q is an ingredient of object Q (Th. II, (2))
Pis exterior to Q (Def. VI, (1), (4), (3)).
THEOREM CXVII. If P is a part of object Q, then not (P is
exter.iot to Q).
(tlesults from Def. I and Th. CXV.)
THEOREM CXVIII. If (for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of
object P, then for some R, (R is a and not (Q is exterior to R)))
and S is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of ob-
ject S is an ingredient of some a.
(1) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then for some R
(R is a and not ( Q is exterior to R)),
and
from (1) and (2) we see, that for some R
(3) R is a,
and
(4) not ( S is exterior to R);
. (5) some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of object R
(Th. CXVI, (2), (3), (4))
some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of some a ((5),
(3)).
THEOREM CXIX. If P is an object, Q is an object and not (P
is exterior to Q), then (P is the same object as Q or P is a part
of object Q, or Q is a part of object P or some part of object P
is a part of object Q).
(1) P is an object,
(2) Q is an object
and
(3) not (P is exterior to Q);
from Th. CXVI, (1), (2) and (3) we infer, that for some R
(4) R is an ingredient of object P,
and
(5) R is an ingredient of object Q;
(6) R is the same object as P, or R is part of object P (Def. I,
(4))
(7) R is the s"'me object as Q, or R is a part of object Q (Def. I,
(5)).
P is the same object as Q, or P is a part of object Q, or Q is a
part of object P, or a certain object Pis a part of object Q ((6),
(7) ).
THEOREM CXX. If {for any X and Y) if X is a) and Y is
a, then X is the same object as Y, or is exterior to Y )J (for any
x, if x is b, then x is a), {for any x) y and z, if x is b, and
Y is a collection of objects a, Z is a collection of objects a, X is
(Z ), then Y is the same object as Z, P is a; Q is a collection of
objects a, R is an ingredient of object Q, S is b, S is {P ), S is
an ingredient of object P, Tis b, Tis {Q) 1 U is an ingredient of
object TJ V is P, and U is an ingredient of object V) then R is
an ingredient of object P.
Proof:
-
We assume,. that
(1) for any X and Y, if Xis a, and Y is a, then Xis the same
object as Y, or is exterior to Y,
(2) for any X, if X is b, then X is a,
(3) for any X, Y, and Z, if Xis b, Y is a collection of objects a,
Z is a collection of objects a, X is (Y), and X is ( Z), then Y
is the same object as Z,
(4) Pis a,
(5) Q is a collection of objects a,
(7) S is b,
(8) Sis (P),
(9) Sis an ingredient of object P,
(10) T is b,
(11) Tis (Q),
(12) U is an ingredient of object T,
(13) V is P,
and
(14). u· is an ingredient of object V;
(15) ,J? is a collection of objects a (Th. XIII, (4))
(16) Tis a ((2), (10))
(17) V is the same object as P ( (13), (4))
(18) U is an ingredient of object P ((14), (17))
(19) not (Tis exterior to P) (Def. VI, (18), (12))
(20) T is the same object as P ( (1 ), (16), (4), (19))
(21) Sis a ((2), (7))
(22) not (Sis exterior to P (Th. CXV, (9))
(23) S is the same object as P ( (1 ), (21 ), (4), (22))
(24) Tis the same object as S ((20), (23))
(25) Sis (Q) ((11), (24))
(26) Q is the same object as P ((3), (7), (5), (15), (25), (8))
R is an ingredient of object P ((6), (26))
T:EI:EOREM CXXI. If P is exterior to Q, R is an ingredient of
object Q, and S is an ingredient of object P, then not (S is an
ingredient of object R).
(1) Pis exterior to Q,
and
(4) not ( S is an ingredient of object Q) (Def. VI, (1 ), (3))
not (Sis an ingredient of object R) (Th. IV, (2), (4)).
THEOREM CXXII. If P is exterior to Q, and R is an ingre-
dient of object Q, then P is exterior to R.
and
(3) not (some ingredient of object Pis an ingredient of object R)
(Th. CXXI, (1), (2))
Pis exterio! to R (Th. CXVI, (1), (2), (3)).
THEORE~.M CXXIII. If P is the class of objects a, and Q is an
ingredient of object P, then for some R, {R is a, and not {Q is
exterior to R)).
and
from Def. II, (1 ), (2) it results, that for some Rand S
(3) Sis an ingredient of object Q,
(4) Risa,
and
(6) not ( Q is exterior to R) (Def. VI, (5), (3))
for some R (Risa and not (Q is exterior to R)) ((4), (6)).
THEOREM CXXIV. If P is an object, (for any Q, if Q is a,
then Q is an ing1edient of object P) and for any Q, if Q is an
ingredient of object P, then for some R (R is a and not (Q zs
exterior to R)), then P is the class of objects a.
(1) P is an object,
(2) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P
and
(3) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then for some R
(R is a and not (Q is exterior to R) );
(4) for every S, if S is an ingredient of object P, then some in-
gredient of object S is an ingredient of some a (Th. CXVIII,
(3))

THEOREMCXXV. P is an element of object Q exterior to R
when and only when, P is an ingredient of object Q exterior
to R.
(Results from Th. LXXXIV.)
THEOREM CXXVI. S is the class of elements of object Q ex-
terio,r to R when and only when, S is the class of ingredients of
object Q exterior to R.
(Results from Th. LXII and Th. CXXV).
THEOREM CXXVII. P is exterior to Q when and only when,
Q is exterior to P.
(Results from Th. XXXII.)
THEOREM CXXVIII. If P is an ingredient of object QJ then
not (Q is exterior to P).
(Results from Th. CXV and Th. XXXII.)
THEOREM CXXIX. P is exterior to Q when and only when,
(P is an object, Q is an object and not {some ingredient of ob-
ject P is an ingredient of object Q)).
(Results from Th. CXVI, Th. XXXII and Def. VI.)
THEOREM CXXX. If P is a part of object Q, then not (Q is
exferiOr To P). ~·.
(Results from Th. CXVII and Th. XXXII.)
THEOREM CXXXI. If P is exterior to Q, then not {some part
of object P is a part of object Q).
(Results from Th. CXXIX and Def. I.)
THEOREM CXXXII. P is exterior to Q when and only when,
(P is an object, Q is an object, not (P is the same object as Q),
not (P is a part of object Q), not (Q is a part of object P) and
not {some part of object P is a pat of object Q)).
(Results from Th. CXXX, Th. XXXII, Th. XXXI, Th. CXVII,
Th. CXXX and Th. CXXXI.)
THEOREM CXXXIII. If P is a class of objects, then not (Q

is exterior to P).
(1) P is a class of objects;
(2) not (Q is an object) or Q is an ingredient of object P
(Th. LXXV, (1))
not (Q is e;terior
fl
to P) ( (2), Th. CXV).
THEOREM CXXXIV. P is the class of objects a, when and
only when, (P is an object (for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an
ingredient of object P) and for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of ob-
ject P, then for some R, (R is a and not (Q is exterior to R))).
(Results from Th. CXXIV, Th. LXXXV and Th. CXXIII.)
THEOREM CXXXV. If P is the class of objects a, Q is an
object, and not (Q is exterior to P), then for some R (R is a,
and not (Q is exterior to R)).
(2) Q is an object
and
(3) not ( Q is exterior to P);
(4) some ingredient .of object Q is an ingredient of object P
(Th. CXVI, (2), (1 ), (3) );
from Th. LXIII, (1) and (4) it follows, that for some Rand S
(5) S is an ingredient of object Q,
(6) Risa,
and
(8) not ( Q is exterior to R) (Def. VI, (7), (5))
for some R (Risa and not (Q is exterior to R)) ((6), (8)).
THEOREM CXXXVI. If R is an object, P is the class of ob-
jects (Q or R), S is an ingredient of object P, S is exterior to Q,
and T is an ingredient of object S, then some ingredient of ob-
ject T is an ingredient of object R.
1',1',

(1) R is an object,
(2) P is th~ class of objects ( Q or R),
(4) S is exterior to Q,
and . ·
(5) T"' is an ingredient of object S;
(6) Tis an ingredient of object P (Th. IV, (5), (3))
(7) Q is an object (Th. XXXII, (4));
from Def. II, (2) and (6) we see, that for some U and V
(9) V is Q, or V is R,
and
(10) U is an ingredient of object V;
(11) U is an ingredient of object S (Th. IV, (8), (5))
(12) not (U is an ingredient of object Q) (Def. VI, (4), (11))
(13) not (Vis the same object as Q) ((10), (12))
(14) not (V is Q) ((7), (13))
(15) Vis R ((9), (14))
(16) V is the same object as R (1)
(17) U is an ingredient of object R ((10), (16))
some ingredient of object P is an ingredient of object R (17).
THEOREM CXXXVII. If P is the class of objects a, Q is ex-
terior to P, and R is a, then Q is exterior to R.
(1) Pis the class of objects a,
(2) Q is exterior to P,
and
(3) R is a;
(4) R is an ingredient of object P (Th. LXXXV, (1), (3))
Q is exterior to R (Th. CXXII, (2), (4)).
THEOREM CXXXVIII. If P is the class of objects a) and for

any R) if R is a, then Q is exterior to R, then Q is exterior
to P.
(I) Pis the class of objects a,
and
(2) for any Q, if R is a, then Q is exterior to R;
from Th. XX and (1) we infer, for some S
(3) Sis a;
(4) Q is an object ( (2), (3))
Q is exterior to P (Th. CXXXV, (1), (4), (2)).
THEOREM CXXXIX. If P is the class of objects a) then (Q
is exterior to P when and only when) for any R) if R is a, then
Q is exterior to R).
(Results from Th. CXXXVIII and Th. CXXXVII.)
THEOREM CXL. If P is a collection of objects a) and for any
R, if R is a) then Q is exterior to R, then Q is exterior to P.
Prqof: We assume, that
and
(2) for any R, if R is a, then Q is exterior to R;
(3) P is the class of objects a which are ingredients of object P
(Th. LXXXI, (1))
Q is exterior to P (Th. CXXXVIII, (3), (2)).
THEOREM CXLI. If P is an object) (for any Q, not (Q is
exterior to P)) and R is an object, then R is an ingredient of
object P.
(1) P is an object,
(2) for any Q, not (Q is exterior to P)
and
(3) R is an object;
(4) for any Q, if Q is an object, then some ingredient of object Q

is an ingredient of object P (Th. CXVI, (2), (1))
R is an ingredient of object P (Th. XXVII, (3), (4)).
THEOREM CXLIL If R is an object) P is the class of objects
(Q or R)) S is an ingredient of object P) and S is exterior to Q)
then.S'is an ingredient of object R.
P~oof: We assume, that
(1) R is an object,
(2) Pis the class of objects ( Q or R),
and
(4) S is exterior to Q;
(5) for any T, if T is an ingredient of object S, then some ingre-
dient of object Q is an ingredient of object R (Th. CXXXVI,
(1), (2), (3), (4)).
Sis an ingredient of object R (Th. XXVII, (3), (5)).
THEOREM CXLIII. If P is an object and for any Q, not (Q is
exterior to P) J then P is the class of objects.
(1) P is an object
and
(2) for any Q, not (Q is exterior to P);
(3) for every R, if R is an object, then R is an ingredient of
object P (Th. CXLI, (1 ), (2))
Pis the class of objects (Th. CIII, (1), (3)).
THEOREM CXLIV. P is the class of objects when and only
when, (Pis an object and for any Q! not (Q is exterior to P )).
(Results from Th. CXLII and Th. CXXXIII.)
THEOREM CXLV. P is the complement of object Q with re-
spect to R; when and only when! (Q is an ingredient of object R
and P is the class of ingredients of object P exterior to Q).
(Results from Def. VII, Th. CXIV and Th. CXXVI).
THEOREM CXLVI. P is the complement of object Q with re-

spect to R when and only when; Q is the complement of object P
with 1espect to R.
(Results from Th. XLV).
DEFINITION VIII. P is Q + R when and only when, the fol-

lowing condiJ;ions are satisfied:
) P is the class of objects (Q or R);
) Q is exterior to R.
Examples: I. AB in Fig. 2 is AC + the class of objects AB ex-
terior to AC, because the conditions of Def. VIII are satisfied.
II. AB in Fig. 2 is not AE + CB because condition ) is satis-
fied, but not condition ).
III. AE in Fig. 2 is not AC+ DE because condition ) is sat-
isfied but not condition ).
THEOREM CXLVII. not {P is Q + Q).
(Results from Def. VIII and Def. VI).
THEOREM CXLVIII. If Pis Q+R) then R is exterior to Q.
(Results from Def. VIII and Th. XXXII).
THEOREM CIL. If P is Q + R)S is Q or R) and T is Q or
-R; then S is the same object as T) or is exterior to T.
(1) Pis Q + R,
(2) S is Q or R,
and
(3) T is Q or R;
(4) Q is exterior to R (Def. VIII, (1))
(5) R is exterior to Q (Th. XXXII, (4))
(6) S is the same object as Q, or S is the same object as R ( (2),
(4), (5))
(7) Tis the same object as Q, or Tis the same object as R ((3),
(4), (5))
Sis the same object as T, or is exterior to T ((6), (7), (5), (4)).
THEOREM CL. If P is the class of objects 1 then not (R zs

Q+P).
(Results from Th. CXXXIII and Def. VIII).
THEOREM CLI. If P is Q + RJ and S is exterior to P J then S
.
is exterior to Q.
(1) Pig Q + R,
and
from Def. VIII and (1) it results, that
(3) P is the class of objects (Q or R),
(4) Q is Q or R;
Sis exterior to Q (Th. CXXXVII, (3), (2), (4) ).
THEOREM CLII. If P is Q + R; S is exterior to Q) and S is
exterior to RJ then S is exterior to P.
(1) Pis Q + R,
(2) Sis exterior to Q,
and
. (3) S is exterior to R;
from Def. VIII and (1) it follows, that
(4) P is the class of objects ( Q or R),
and
(5) Q is an object;
(6) R is an object (Th. XXXII, (3))
(7) for any T, if Tis Q or R, then (Tis the same object as Q, or
Tis the same object as R) ((5), (6))
(8) for any T, if T is Q or R, then S is exterior to T ((7), (2),
(3))
Sis exterior to P (Th. CXXXVIII, (4), (8)).
THEOREM CLIIL lf P is Q + R, and S is Q +R 1 then P is
the same object as S.
(1) Pis Q + R,
and
(2) Sis Q + R;
(3) P is the class of objects (Q or R) (Def. VIII, (1))
(4) Sis the class of objects (Q or R) (Def. VII, (2))
Pis the same object as S (Ax. III, (3), (4)).
THEOREM CLIV. If (for any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is the
class of objects (a and not Q), then P is Q + R), S is a., T is a,
and not (S is the same object as T), then S is exterior to T.
(1) for any Q and R, if Q is a and R is the class of objects (a
and not Q), then P is Q + R,
(2) S is a,
(3) Tis a,
and
(4) not (Sis the same object as T);
(5) not (Tis S) ((2), (4))
(6) Tis not S ((3), (5));
from Ax. IV, (3) and (6), we see, that for some U
(7) U is the class of objects (a and not S);
•·.~-c -· (8) pis s+tJ ((1), (2), (7))
(9) S is exterior to U (Def. VIII, ( 8))
Sis exterior to T (Th. CXXXVII, (7), (9), (3), (6)).
THEOREM CLV. If P is exterior to Q, then P + Q is an ob-
ject.
from Ax. IV and ( 1) we infer, that for some R
(2) R is the class of objects (P or Q);
(3) R is P + Q (Def. VIII, (2), (1))
(4) R is the same object as P + Q (10 (3), Th. CLIII)
·o . See
1
l.c., p. 276, footnote 2.
P + Q is an object (2)
THEOREM CLVI. If P is an object and for any Q and R) not
(R is Q + P )) then P is the class of objects.
(1) P is. an object,
and ·
(2) for any Q and R, not (R is Q + P);
(3) for any Q, not (Q is exterior to P) (Th. CLV, (2))
Pis the class of objects (Th. CXLIII, (1), (3)).
THEOREM CLVII. P is the class of objects when and only
when, (P is an object and for any Q and R, not {R is Q + P}).
(Results from Th. CLVI and Th. CL).
THEOREM CLVIII. If R is the complement of object Q with
respect to P, then P is Q + R.
(1) R is the complement of object Q with respect to P;
(2) Pis the class of objects (Q or R) (Th. XLVIII, (1))
(3) R is exterior to Q (Th. XXXVI, (1))
(4) Q is exterior to R (Th. XXXII, (3))
P is Q + R (Def. VIII, (2), (4)).
THEOREM CLIX. If P is Q + R, R is the complement of ob-
ject Q with respect to P.
(1) Pis Q + R;
from Def. VIII and (1) it results, that
(2) Pis the class of objects (Q + R),
and
(3) Q is exterior to R;
(4) Q is an ingredient of object P (Th. LXXXV, (2), (3))
(6) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object P, exterior to Q,
then Sis an ingredient of object R (Th. CXLII, (5), (2))
On the Foundations of lv!athematics 299
(7) R is an ingredient of object P (Th. LXXXV, (2), (5))

(8) for any S, if S is an ingredient of R, then some ingredient
of object S is an ingredient of some ingredient of object P,
which is exterior to Q. (Th. II, (7), (5))
(9) R is the class of ingredients of objects P, exterior to Q
(Th. LV~ (5), (6), (8))
R is the complement of object Q with respect to P (Th. CXLV,
(4), (9)).
THEOREM CLX. If P is a part of object Q, then for some R 7
(Q is P + R).
(Results from Th. XLII and Th. CLVIII).
THEOREM CLXI. If P is Q+ R, then R is a part of object P.
(Results from Th. CLIX and Th. XLIII).
THEOREM CLXII. If P is Q + R, then Q is a part of ob-
ject P.
(Results from Th. CLIX and Th. XLVI).
THEOREM CLXIII. P is Q + R! when and only when 7 R is
exterior to object Q with respect to P.
(Results from Th. CLVIII and Th. CLIX) .
.. TH~OREM CLXIV. Not (Pis Q + R).
(From Th. CLXI and Ax. I).
THEOREM CLXV. Not (Pis P + R).
(From Th. CLXII and Ax. I.)
THEOREM CLXVI. R is Q+P! when and only when, (Q is an
ingredient of object R! and P is the class of ingredients of object R
exterior to Q).
(Results from Th. CLXIII and Th. CXLV).
THEOREM CLXVII. R is Q + P, when and only when, R is
P+Q.
(Results from Th. CXLVI and Th. CLXIII).
THEOREM CLXVIII. If R is Q + P, and R is Q + S, then P

is the same object as S.
(1) R is Q + P,
and
(2) R.is 'Q + S;
(3) P .. is the class of ingredients of object R exterior to Q
(Th. CLXVI, (1))
(4) S is the class of ingredients of object R exterior to Q
(Th. CLXVI, (2))
Pis the same object as S (Ax. III, (3), (4)).
THEOREM CLXIX. If P is Q + R, and S is exterior to P,
then S is exterior to R.
(1) Pis Q + R,
and
(3) Pis R + Q (Th. CLXVII, (1))
Sis exterior to R (Th. CLI, (3), (2)).
THEOREM CLXX. If Pis Q + (R + S), then Pis Q + (S +
R).
(1) Pis Q + (R + S);
(2) R +Sis R + S (Th. CXLVIII, (1))
(3) R + S is S + R (Th. CLXVII, (2))
(4) R +Sis the same object as S + R ((3), Th. CLIII)
Pis Q + (S + R) ((1), (4)).
THEOREM CLXXI. If P is Q + R,
then (S is exterior to P
when and only when, {S is exterior to Q, and S is exterior
to. R)).
(Results from Th. CLII, Th. CLI and Th. CLXIX).
THEOREM CLXXII. P is Q + (R + S) when and only when,

P isQ+R (S+R).
(Results from Th. CLXX).
THEOREM CLXXIII. If Pis Q+(R+S), then Pis S+(Q+
R).
(1) Pis Q +.(R + S);
(2) R + Sis R + S (Th. CXLVIII, (1))
(3) Sis exterior to R (Th. CXLVIII, (2))
(4) Sis the class of objects S (Th. VIII, (3));
from Def. VIII and (1) it follows, that
(5) Pis the class of objects (Q or (R + S)),
and
(6) Q is exterior to (R + S);
from Th. CLXXI, (2) and (6) we see, that
(7) Q is exterior to R,
and
(8) Q is exterior to S;
(9) Q + R is Q + R (Th. CLV, (7))
(10) Q + R is the class of objects (Q or R) (Def. VIII, (9))
(1frQ is the Class of objects Q (Th. VIII, (7))
(12) R +Sis the class of objects (R or S) (Def. VIII, (2))
(13) P is the class of objects (Q or (R or S)) (Th. LXVI, (11),
(12), (5))
(14) Pis the class of objects (Sor (Q or R)) (Th. LXXII, (13))
(15) P is the class of objects (Sor (Q + R)) (Th. LXXV, (4),
(10), (14))
(16) Sis exterior to Q (Th. XXXII, (8))
(17) S is exterior to ( Q + R) (Th. CLII, (9), (16), (3))
P is S + (Q + R) (Def. VIII, (15), (17) ).
THEOREM CLXXIV. If Pis S+(Q+R), then Pis Q+(R+
S).

( 1) P is S + (Q + R);
(2) Pis S + (R + Q) (Th. CLX, (1))
(3) P is Q + (S + R) (Th. CLXXIII, (2))
Pis Q + (R + S) (Th. CLXXX, (3)).
':fHEOREM CLXXV. P is Q + (R + R) when and only when,
P is-s + (Q + R).
(Results from Th. CLXXIV and Th. CLXIII).
DEFINITION IX. P is the sum of objects a, when and only
when, the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) P is the class of objects a;
((3) for any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is a, then Q is the same
object as R or is exterior to R.
Examples: I. Segment AB in Fig. 2 is the sum of the objects
which are segments of AC or the class of parts of segment AB
exterior to segment AC, because the conditions of Def. IX are
satisfied.
II. Segment AB in Fig. 2 is not the sum of parts of seg-
ment AB, because although condition (a) is satisfied, condi-
tion (/3) is not satisfied (Segment AC is a part of segment AB,
segment AD is a part of segment AB, but not (segment AC is the
same object as segment AD, or is exterior to segment AD)).
III. AB of Fig. 2 is not the sum of objects AC, because al-
though condition ((3) is satisfied condition (a) is not satisfied.
THEOREM CLXXVI. If P is the sum of objects (Q or R), Q
is an object, R is an object and not (Q is the same object as R),
then P is Q + R.
(1) P is the sum of objects ( Q or R),
(2) Q is an object,
(3) R is an object
and
(4) not (Q is the same object as R);
(5) Pis the class of objects (Q or R) (Def. IX, (1))

(6) Q is exterior to R (Def. IX, (1), (2), (3), (4))
Pis Q + R (Def. VIII, (5), (6)).
THEOREM CLXXVII. If P is an object) then P is the sum of
objects P.
(1) P is an object;
(2) P is the class of objects P (Th. VIII, (1) );
from (1) we infer in keeping with thesis (5) of Chapter 2 and
in full harmony with the system of 'ontology' 11 developed below,
that
(3) for any Q and R, if Q is P, and R is P, then Q is the same
object as R;
Pis the sum of objects P (Def. IX, (2), (3)). I
~
THEOREM CLXXVIII. If P is a collection of objects a, and

for any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is a, then Qis the same object
as R, or is exterior to R, then P is the sum of objects a, which
are ingredients of object P.
~=~--~------ and
(2) for any Q and R, if Q is a, then Q is the same object as R,
or is exterior to R;
(3) P is the class of objects a, which are ingredients of object P
(Th. LXXXI, (1))
P is the sum of objects a, which are ingredients of object P
(Def. IX, (3), (2)).
THEOREM CLXXIX. If P is the sum of objects a, and for any
Q (Q is a, when and only when, Q is b), then P is the sum of
objects b.
11 See: Russell, op. cit., pp. 176 and 177.

(1) P is the sum of objects a,

and
(2) for any Q, (Q is a, when and only when, Q is b);
from Def. IX and (1) it results, that
and
(4) fQf any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is a, then Q is the same
object as R or is exterior to R;
(5) Pis the class of objects b (Th. LXII, (3), (2))
(6) for any Q and R, if Q is b, and R is b, then Q is the same
object as R or is exterior to R ((2), (4))
Pis the sum of objects b (Def. IX, (5), (6)).
THEOREM CLXXX. If P is a collection of objects a, and for
any Q and R, if Q is a 1 and R is a, then Q is the same object
as R, then P is the sum of objects a.
and
object as R;
· (3) P is the class of objects a (Th. XCIV, (1 ), (2))
Pis the sum of objects a (Def. IX, (3), (2)).
THEOREM CLXXXI. If P is Q + R, then P is the sum of
objects (Q or R).
(1) Pis Q + R;
(2) P is the class of objects ( Q or R) (Def. VIII, (1))
(3) for any Sand T, if Sis Q or R, and Tis Q or R, then Sis
the same object as T, or is exterior to T (Th. CIL, (1))
Pis the sum of objects (Q or R) (Def. IX, (2), (3)).
THEOREM CLXXXII. If P is the sum of objects a, Q is the
sum of objects b, Q is exterior to P, R is a, and S is b, then R
is exterior to S.

(2) Q is the sum of objects b,
(3) Q is exterior to P,
(4) R is a,
and
(5) Sis b; •
(6) Q is the class of objects b (Def. IX, (2))
(7) P is the class of objects a (Def. IX, (1))
(8) Q is exterior to R (Th. CXXXVII, (7), (3), (4))
R is exterior to S (Th. CXXXVII, (6), (9), (5)).
THEOREM CLXXXIII. If P is the sum of objects a 7 Q is the
sum of objects b, P is exterior to Q, R is a orb, and S is a orb,
then R is the same object as S, or is exterior to S.
(4) R is a or b,
and
(5) S is a or b;
(6) Q is exterior to P (Th. XXXII, (3))
R is the same object as S, or is exterior to S ((4), (5), Def. IX,
(1), Th. CLXXXII, (2), (3), (6)).
THEOREM CLXXXIV. If P is the sum of objects a, Q is the
sum of objects b, and R is P + Q, then R is the sum of objects (a
orb).
and
(3) R is P + Q;
(4) P is the class of objects a (Def. IX, (1) ),
(5) Q is the class of objects b (Def. IX, (2));
from Def. VIII and (3), it follows, that
(6) R is the class of objects (P or Q),
and · ·
(7) P 41 is exterior to Q;
(8) R is the class of objects (a orb) (Th. LXVI, (4), (5), (6))
(9) for any S and T, if Sis a or b, and Tis a or b, then S is the
same object as T, or is exterior to T (Th. CLXXXIII, (1), (2),
(7))
R is the sum of objects (a or b) (Def. IX, (8), (9) ).
THEOREM CLXXXV. If P is the sum of obJ.ects a, and Q is
the sum of objects a, then P is the same object as Q.
(Results from Def. IX and Ax. III).
THEOREM CLXXXVI. If P is the class of objects a and for
any Q and R, if Q is a and R is the class of objects (a and not Q),
then P is Q + R, then P is the sum of objects a.
and
(2) for any Q and R, if Q is a, and R is the class of objects (a
and not Q), then Pis Q + R;
(3) for any S and T, if S is a, and T is a, then S is the same
object as Tor is exterior to T (Th. CLIV, (2))
P is the sum of objects a (Def. IX, (1 ), (3)).
THEOREM CLXXXVII. If some object is a, and for any Q
and R, if Q is a, and R is a, then Q is the same object as R or
is exterior to R, then the sum of objects a is an object.
(1) some object is a,
and
On the Foundations of Afathematics 307

object as R, or is exterior to R;
from Ax. IV and (1) we see, that for some S
(3) S is the class of objects a;
(4) Sis the sum of objects a (Def. IX, (3), (2))
the sum of objects a is an object (1 2 ( 4), Th. CLXXXV).
THEOREM CLXXXVIII. If P is the sum of objects a, Q is a,
and R is the class of objects (a and not Q}, then P is Q + R.
( 1) P is the sum of objects a,
(2) Q is a,
and
(3) R is the class of objects (a and not Q);
(4) Q is the class of objects Q (Th. VIII, (2))
(5) Pis the class of objects a (Def. IX, (1))
(6) for any S, (Sis a, when and only when, Sis Q or (a and
not Q)) (2),
(7) Pis the class of objects (Q or (a and not Q)) (Th. LXII, (5),
(6))
(8) Pis the class of objects (Q or R) (Th. LXXV, (4), (3), (7) );
· consiaering, that if A 1s the same object as B, then ( B is B, and
A is the same object as B) that then, if A is the same object as B,
then B is A, we infer from Def. IX, (1) and (2), that
(9) for any S, if Sis a and not Q, then Q is exterior to S;
(10) Q is exterior to R (Th. CXXXVIII, (3), (9))
Pis Q + R (Def. VIII, (8), (10)).
THEOREM CLXXXIX. P is the sum of objects a, when and
only when, {P is the class of objects a, and for any Q and R, if
Q is a, and R is the class of objects {a and not Q), then P is
Q+R).
(Results from Th. CLXXXVI, Def. IX and Th. CLXXXVIII).
12 See above proof of Th. CLV from thesis (3) inclusive.

THEOREM CXC. P is Q + R when and only when, {P is the

sum of objects (Q or R}, Q is an object, R is an object and not
(Q is the same object as R)),
(Results from Th. CLXXVI, Th. CLXXXI, Th. CLXII,
Th. CXLVIII, and Th. CXLVII).
DEFINITION X. P is cpa{ a, b, cp} when and only when, (P is
b and..for some Q, (Q is a collection of objects a, Pis cp (Q) and
not (Pis an ingredient of object Q))). 13
THEOREM CXCI. If {for any X and Y, if X is a, and Y is a,
then X is the same object as Y, or is exterior to Y) (for every X,
if X is b, then X is a), P is the class of objects cpa{ a, b, cp }, Q is
a and Q is an ingredient of object P, then Q is cpa{ a, b, cp}.
object as Y or is exterior to Y,
(3) P is the class of objects cpa{ a, b, cp },
(4) Q is a,
and
from Th. CXXIII, (3), and (5) it results, that for some R
(6) R is cpa{a,b,cp},
and
(7) not ( Q is exterior to R);
(8) R is b (Def. X, (6))
(9) Risa ((2), (8)),
(10) Q is the same object as R ((1), (4), (9), (7)).
Q is cpa{a,b,cp} ((6), (10)).
13
The reader will be able to realize the auxiliary role of Def. X further
below.
THEOREM CXCII. If {for any X, if X is b, then X is a)

and P is the class of objects cpa{ a, b, <p}, then P is a collection of
objects a.
and ·
(2) P is the celass of objects cpa{ a, b, <p };
(3) P is a collection of objects b (Th. XCV, (2), Def. X)
Pis a collection of objects a (Th. XCIII, (3), (1)).
THEOREM CXCIII. If (for any X and Y, if X is a, and Y is
a, then X is the same object as Y, or is exterior to Y) (for any
X, if X is b, then X is a), (for any X, if X is a collection of
objects a, then for some Y, {Y is b, and Y is <p (X))), and P is
the class of objects cpa{ a, b, <p}, then for some Q and R, (Q is b,
R is a collection of objects a, Q is <p {P ), Q is <p (R) and not (P
is the same object as R)).
--~----- - -(3) for -any X, if X is a collection of objects a, then for some Y
(Y is band Y is <p (X)),
and
(4) Pis the class of objects cpa{a,b,cp};
(5) Pis a collection of objects a (Th. CXCII, (2), (4));
from (3) and (5) it follows, that for some Q
(6) Q is b,
and
(7) Q is cp(P);
(8) Q is a ((2), (6)),
(9) if Q is an ingredient of object P, then Q 1s cpa{ a, b, cp}
(Th. CXCI, (1), (2), (4), (8))
(10) if not (Q is an ingredient of object P), then Q is <pa{ a, b, 'P}
(Def. X, (6), (5), (7))
(11) Q is <pa{a,b,<p} ((9), (10)),
(12) Q is an ingredient of object P (Th. LXXXV, (4), (11));
from Def. X and (11) we see, that for some R
(13) R is a collection of objects a,
(14) Q is <p(R)
and
(15) not ( Q is an ingredient of object R);
(16) not (Pis the same object as R) ((12), (15))
for some Q and R, ( Q is b, R is a collection of objects a, Q is
<p(P), Q is <p(R), and not (Pis the same object as R)) ((6), (13),
(7), (14), (16)).
THEOREM CXCIV. If P is b, Q is a collection of objects a,
and P is <p( Q), then (P is an ingredient of object Q, or some
object is the class of objects cpa{ a, b, <p}).
(Results from Def. X and Ax. IV).
THEOREM CXCV. If P is a, (for any X, if X is a, then for
some Y, {Y is b, and Y is <p(X))), and for any Y, not (Y is the
class of objects <pa{ a, b, <p }}, then for some S, (Sis b, S is <p(P),
· and·S is an ·frfgtedienrof object P).
(1) Pis a,
(2) for any X, if X is a, then for some Y, (Y is b, and Y is
<p(X))),
and
(3) for any Y, not (Y is the class of objects <pa{a,b,cp});
(4) Pis a collection of objects a (Th. XIII, (1));
from (2) and (1) we infer, that for some S
(5) S is b,
and
(6) Sis <p(P);
(7) S is an ingredient of object P (Th. CXCIV, (5), (4), (6),

(3))
for some S, (Sis b, Sis cp(P), and Sis an ingredient of object P
((5), (6), (7)).
THEOREM CXCVI. If (for any X and Y, if X is a, and Y is
a, then X is the same object as Y, or is exterior to Y ), (for any
X, if Xis lJ,; then Xis a), Pis a, Risa and14 the collections
of objects a are as numerous as the objects b, then P is the same
object as R.
(1) for any X and Y, if X is a, and Y is a, then X is the same
(3) P is a,
(4) R is a,
and
14 In full harmony with the commonly used enunciation of the 'theory of

sets' about the comparison of 'collections' with respect to 'power' ['moc'], and
at ~he. ~ame time in full harm()I1Y wifa the. systell1 of 'ontology' developed be-
low, I use expressions of the type 'the objects a are as numerous [tylez] as
the objects b' in a way which allows one to assert that
the objects a are as numerous as the objects b, when and only when,
for some <p, ((for any X, if X is a, then for some Y, (Y is b, and Y is
<,o(X))), (for any X, Y and Z, if X is a, Y is b, Z is B, Y is rp(X), and
Z is rp(X), then Y is the same object as Z) ((for any X, if Xis b, then
for some Y, (Y is a and X is rp(Y))) and for any X, Y and Z, if X is
b, Y is a, Z is a, X is <,o(Y), and X is <,o(Z), then Y is the same object
as Z),
and again, I use expressions of the type 'the objects a are fewer [mniej] than
the objects b' in a way which allows one to assert, that
the objects a are fewer than the objects b, when and only when, ((for
some c, ((for any X, if X is c, then X is b) and the objects a are as
numerous as the objects b)) and for every c, if for any X, if Xis c, then
X is a, then not (the objects b are as numerous as the objects c))).
: !
(5) the collections of objects a are as numerous as the ob-

jects b;
(6) for any X, if Xis P or R, then Xis a ((3), (4))
from (5) it results, that 15 for some r..p
(7) for any X, if X is a collection of objects a, then for some Y,
(Y is' band Y is r..p(X)),
and fl
(8) for any X, Y and Z, if X is b, Y is a collection of objects a,
Z is a collection of objects a, Xis r..p(Y), and Xis r..p(Z), then
Y is the same object as Z;
(9) for any X, if Xis a, then for some Y, (Y is b, and Y is r..p(X))
(Th. XIII, (7))
(10) for any Y, (not (Y is a collection of objects a) or for any X
and Z, if X is b, Z is a collection of objects a, X is r..p(Y), and
X is r..p(Z), then Y is the same object as Z) (8)
(11) for any Y, not (Y is a class of objects r..pa{a,b,r..p})
((IO)Th. CXCII, (2), Th. CXCIII, (1), (7));
from Ax. IV and (3) it follows, that for some Q
(12) Q is the class of objects (P or R);
(13) Q is a collection of objects a (Th. XCV, (12), (6))
(14) R is an ingredient of object Q (Th. LXXXV, (12), (4))
(15) Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. LXXXV, (12), (3));
from Th. CXCV, (3), (9), (11) we see, that for some S
(16) S is b,
(17) Sis r..p(P)
and
from (7) and (13) we infer, that for some P
(19) T is b,
and
(20) T is r..p( Q);
15 See above footnote 1, p. 98.

(21) Tis an ingredient of object Q (Th. CXCIV, (19), (13), (20),

(11) );
from Def. II, (12), and ( 21), we infer, for some U and V
(23) V is P, or V is R,
and
(24) U is all, ingredient of object V;
from Th. CXCV, (4), (9) and (11) it follows, that for some 0
(25) 0 is b,
(26) 0 is cp(R),
and
(27) 0 is an ingredient of object R;
(28) R is an ingredient of object P, or P is an ingredient of ob-
ject R ((23), Th. CXX, (1), (2), (8), (3), (13), (14), (16), (17),
(18), (19), (20), (22), (24), (4), (15), (25), (26), (27))
(29) not (Pis exterior to R ((28), Th. CXXVIII, Th. CXV)
Pis the same object as R ((1), (3), (4), (29)).
THEOREM CXCVII. If (for any X and Y, if X is a, and Y
is a, then X is the same object as Y; or is exterior to Y) P is
a, R is a and not (P is the same object as R), then the objects a
arefewer than the collections of objects a.
(1) for any X and Y, if X is a, and Y is a, then Xis the same
object as Y or is exterior to Y,
(2) P is a,
(3) R is a
and
(4) not (Pis the same object as R);
(5) for any b, if for any X, if X is b, then X is a, then not
(the collections of objects a are as numerous as the objects b)
(Th. CXCVI, (1), (2), (3), (4));
considering, that
for any X, if X is a, then (X is a, and X is 16 Id( X)) for

any X, Y and Z, if Xis a, Y is a, Z is a, Y is Id(X), and
Z is Id(X), then Y is the same object as Z,
and
for any X, Y and Z, if Xis a, Y is a, Z is a, Xis Id(Y), and
X is- Id(Z), then Y is the same object as Z,
as th~,,a.ssembly 17 of objects a are as numerous [tylei] as the ob-
jects a, confirmed in accordance with Th. XIII, and (5), so18 the
objects a are fewer than the collections of objects a.
THEOREM CXCVIII. If some object is the sum of objects a,
P is a, R is a, and not (P is the same object as R}, then the
objects a are fewer {mniej} than the collections of objects a.
(1) some object is the sum of objects a,
(2) P is a,
(3) R is a,
and
(4) not (Pis the same object as R);
(5) for any Q and S, if Q is a, and S is a, then Q is the same
object as S, or is exterior to S (Def. IX, (1)) the objects a are
fewer than the collections of objects a (Th. CXCVII, (5), (2),
(3), (4)).
16 Propositions of the type 'A is Id(B)' I use here, as equivalents of the

corresponding propositions of the type 'A is the same object as B'.
CHAPTER VI 0
THE AXIOMATIZATION
OF THE 'GENERAL THEORY OF SETS'
' FROM THE YEAR 1918.
#ff
The above Axioms III and IV of my 'general theory of sets' were

formulated with the aid of the term 'class' previously introduced
in Definition II; however, this Definition II was formulated with
the aid of the term 'ingredient' previously introduced in Defini-
tion I. As time went by this situation began to trouble me. In 1918
I examined all the different possible arrangements of axioms for
the 'general theory of sets' which could be formulated with the
fundamental term 'part' and which would not contain terms intro-
duced into the framework of the theory by means of definitions. I
then became convinced that one could obtain a 'general theory of
sets' equivalent to the theory presented in Chapters IV and V, if
one assumed as axioms the following theses, which are formulated
with the aid of the fundamental term 'part' and which contain no
terms introduced into the framework of the theory by means of
definitions, and which state respectively, that,
(A) if Pis a part of object Q, then Q is not a part of object P,
(B) if P is a part of object Q, and Q is a part of object R, then
P is a part of object R,
(C) if every a is the same object as P, or is a part of object P,
every a is the same object as Q, or a part of object Q, and for
O [Translator's note: These chapters were published in Polish as follows:

'O podstawach matematyki, Rozdzial VI: Aksjomatyka 'ogolnej teorji mno-
gosci', pochodz(\ca z r. 1918. Rozdzial VII: Aksjomatyka 'og6lnej teorji mno-
gosci', pochodzqca z r. 1920. Rozdzial VIII: 0 pewnych ustalonych przez
pp. Kuratowskiego i Tarskiego warunkach, wystarczajqcych i koniecznych
do tego, by P bylo klasq p-t6w a. Rozdzial IX: Dalsze twierdzenia 'ogol-
nej teorji mnogosci', pochodz(\ce z lat 1921-1923, Przeglqd Filozoficzny 33
(i930), pp. 77-105.]
any R, if R is a part of object P, or R is a part of object Q,

then some object which is the same object as R, or a part of
object R, is a or is a part of some a, then P is Q,
and
(D) if some object is a, then for some P, ( (for any Q, if Q is a,
th.en· Q is the same object as P, or is a part of object P) and
for,, any Q, if Q is a part of object P, then some object which
is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q, is a or is a
part of some a),
terms like 'ingredient' and 'class' may be introduced by suitable
definitions, establishing respectively, that
(E) P is an ingredient of object Q when and only when, P is the
same object as Q or is a part of object Q,
and
(F) P is the class of objects a when and only when, (P is an ob-
ject, (for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P)
and for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some
ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a) 1 :
The fact that on the basis of the theory presented in Chapters
IV and V, it is possible to obtain the counterparts of all theses
which are obtainable on the basis of the new theory based on the
1 Because of the already proven fact that conditions (/3) and ('y) of Def. II
entail, on the basis of my 'general theory of sets' condition (a) (see Stanislaw
Lesniewski, 'O podstawach matematyki' (On the Foundations of Mathemat-
ics), Przeglqd Filozoficzny, 32, nos. I-II, p. 64, footnote 1), I now use Def. (F)
instead of Def. II when introducing the term 'class'. The conditions (a) and
(!) are common to both dek Instead of condition (/3) of Def. II there ap-
pears in Def. (F) the weaker condition, that for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an
ingredient of the object P. This condition in conjunction with condition (1)
no longer entails condition (a), as can be seen, e.g., from the fact that:
for any Q, if Q is a round square, then Q is an ingredient of a round
square
and
for any Q, if Q is a round square, then Q is an ingredient of some round
square, while at the same time, not (a round square is an object).
(See the examples to Def. II).
Axioms (A)-(D) together with Defs. (E) and (F), we can easily
establish by noting that theses (A)-(C), (E) and (F) are merely
repetitions of Ax. I, Ax. II, Th. LXX, Def. I and Th. LVII re-
spectively of the theory presented in Chapters IV and V, while
thesis (D) results directly from Th. CII of that theory. 2 Con-
versely, on th~ basis of Axioms (A)-(D) and Defs. (E) and (F),
one can obtain counterparts to all theses obtainable in the the-
ory of Chap!ers IV and V, as we can see by noting the fact that
Ax. I, Ax. II and Def. I are merely repetitions of theses (A), (B)
and (E), and by deducing explicitly the counterparts of Def. II,
Ax. III and Ax. IV from theses (A) as well as (C)-(F), which can
be done as follows:
THEOREM G. If some object is a, (for any Q, if Q is a, then
Q is the same object as P, or is a part of object P), (for any Q, if
Q is a part of object P, then some object) which is the same object
as Q, or is a part of object Q) is a or is a part of some a) and R
is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object R is
an ingredient of some a.
(1) some object is a,
(2) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is the same object as P, or is a
part of object P,
is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q, is a or is a
part of some a,
and
(5) R is the same object as P, or Risa part of object P (Results
from (E) and (4))
(6) some object which is the same object as P, or is a part of
object P, is a (from (1) and (2));
from (5), (6) and (3) we see, that for some S
2
See l. c., p. 74 footnote 1.
(7) S is the same object as R, or S is a part of object R,

and
(8) Sis a, or S is a part of some a;
(9) Sis an ingredient of object R (from (E) and (7))
(10) Sis an ingredient of object S (3 (E), (9))
(11) S.is 'an ingredient of some a ((8), (10), (E))
some iRgredient of object R is an ingredient of some a ((9),
(11) ).
THEOREM H. If P is a class of objects a, then every a is an
(2) Pis an ingredient of object P ((E), (1))
(3) some object is a ((F), (1), (2)).
(4) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P ((F),
(1))
every a is an ingredient of object P ((3), (4)).
THEOREM K. If P is the class of objects a, and R is a part
of object P, then some object which is the same object as R, or is
a part of R, is a or is a part of some a.
· Proof: We assume, that
and
(2) R is a part of object P;
''ii
(3) R is an ingredient of object P ((E), (2));
from (F), (1) and (3) we infer, that for some Q and S
(4) Q is an ingredient of object R,
(5) S is a,
and
(6) Q is an ingredient of object S;
3 See above argument to Th. II.

(7) Q is the same object as R, or is a part of object R ((E),

(4))
(8) Q is the same object as S, or Q is a part of object S ((E),
(6))
(9) Q is a, or Q is a part of some a ( (8), (5) ),
some object which.is the same object as R, or is a part of object R
is a or is a parf of some a ((7), (9)).
fl
THEOREM M. If P is the class of objects a, then every a is the

same object as P, or is a part of object P. (Results from Th. (H)
and Th. (E).)
THEOREM N. (corresponding to Def. II). P is the class of
objects a when and only when, it satisfies the fallowing condi-
tions:
(a) P is an object;
(/3) every a is an ingredient of object P;
(1) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some
ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a.
(Results from (F) and Th. (H)).
THEOREM 0. (corresponding to Ax. III). If P is the class of
objects a, and Q is the class of objects a, then P is Q.
P1oof: We assume, that
( 1) P is the class of objects a,
and
(3) every a is the same object as P, or is a part of object P
(Th. (M), (1) ).
(4) every a is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q
(Th. (M), (2)).
(5) for any R, if Risa part of object P, or Risa part of object Q,
then some object which is the same object as R, or is a part
of object R, is a or is a part of some a (Th. (K), (1), (2)).
Pis Q ((C), (3), (4), (5)).
THEOREM P. (corresponding to Ax. IV). If some object is a,

then some object is the class of objects a.
from (D) and (1) it results, that for some P
(2) for. any Q, if Q is a, then Q is the same object as P, or is a
part of object P,
and
is the same object as Q, or is a part of object Q, is a, or is a
part of some a;
(4) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P ((2),
(E))
(5) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of object R is an ingredient of some a (Th. (G), (1), (2),
(3) );
from (1) and (2) it follows, that for some S
(6) Sis the same object as P, or Sis a part of object P;
(7) Pis an object ((6), (A))
some object is the class of objects a ((F), (7), (4), (5)).
CHAPTER VII
THE AXIOMATIZATION
• FROM THE YEAR 1920
Ill
In 1920, I noticed that instead of the term 'part', I could take

as the fundamental term of my 'general theory of sets' the term
'ingredient' and that I would then obtain a theory equivalent to
the theory which I presented in Chapters IV and V, if I used as
axioms of the theory the following theses, stating respectively,
that,
(a) if Pis an ingredient of object Q and not (Q is P), then Q is
not an ingredient of object P,
(b) if P is an ingredient of object Q, and Q is an ingredient of
object R, then P is an ingredient of object R,
(c) if every a is an ingredient of object P, and an ingredient of
object Q, and for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, or R
is an ingredient of object Q, then some ingredient of object R
is an ingredient of some a, then P is Q,
and
(d) if some object is a, then for a certain P, ((for any Q, if Q is
a, then Q is an ingredient of object P) and for any Q, if Q is
an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is
an ingredient of some a),
The terms 'pa.rt' and 'class' may be introduced by suitable defi-
nitions establishing respectively, that
(e) P is a part of object Q when and only when, (P is an ingre-
dient of object Q and not (P is the same object as Q),
and
(f) P is the class of objects a when and only when, ( P is an ob-
ject, (for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P)
-1
!!
and for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some

ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a )4 :
The fact that on the basis of the theory which I presented in
Chapters IV and V, one can obtain the counterparts of all theses
which one is able to obtain on the basis of the new theory based on
Axioms _(a)-(d) and containing the Definitions (e) and (f), we can
easily establish by taking into consideration the fact that the the-
" are respectively merely repetitions of Th. LIX, Th. IV,
ses (a)-(f)
Th. LXIX, Th. LXXIII, Th.Land Th. LVII of the theory which I
presented in Chapters IV and V. 5 Conversely, on the basis of the
new theory based on Axioms (a)-( d) and Definitions (e) and (f)
one can obtain counterparts for all theses obtainable on the basis
of the theory of Chapters IV and V, as we can see by explicitly
deducing counterparts of Ax. I, Ax. II, Def. I, Def. II, Ax. III and
Ax. IV, from theses (a)-(f), which can be done as follows:
THEOREM g. (corresponding to Ax. I). If P is a part of ob-
ject Q, then Q is not a part of object P.
(1) P is a part of object Q;
from (e) and (1) we see, that
(~) _P is an ingredient of object Q,
and ,
(4) not (Q is P) ((1), (3))
(5) Q is not an ingredient of object P ((a), (2), (4)),
Q is not a part of object P ((5), (e)).
THEOREM h. (corresponding to Ax. II). If P is a part of
object Q, and Q is a part of object R, then P is a part of ob-
ject R.
(1) Pis a part of object Q,
4 See thesis (F), Ch. VL

5 See I.e., p. 74, footnote 1.
and
(2) Q is a part of object R;
(3) Pis an ingredient of object Q ((e), (1))
(4) Q is an ingredient of object R ((e), (2))
(5) Pis an ingredient of object R ((b), (3), (4))
(6) Q is not a' part of object P (Th. (g), (1))
(7) not (P if3 the same object as R) ((6), (2))
Pis a pa.rt of object R ((e), (5), (7)).
THEOREM i. If S is an object then for some P} {S is an ingre-
dient of object P, and for any Q} if Q is an ingredient of object P,
then some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some S ).
(1) S is an object;
from (d) and ( 1) we infer, that for some P
(2) for any Q, if Q is S, then Q is an ingredient of object P,
and
dient of object Q is an ingredient of some S;
(4) Sis an ingredient of object P ((2), (1))
for some P, (Sis an ingredient of object P, and for any Q, if Q
is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is
an ingredient of some S) ((4), (3)).
THEOREM k. If S is an object, then for some P, (T is an
ingredient of object S).
(1) Sis an object;
from Th. i and (1) it results, that for some P
and
(3) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then for some T,
(T is an ingredient of object Q); for some T, (T is an ingre-
dient of object S) ((3), (2)).
THEOREM L If S is an object) (for any Q, if Q is an ingredi-

ent of object P, then some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient
of some S) and R is an ingredient of object P, then some ingredi-
ent of object R is an ingredient of some ingredient of object S.
(1) Si~ an object,
(2) for titny Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some ingre-
dient of object Q is an ingredient of some S,
and
from (2) and (3) it follows, that for some U and V
(4) U is an ingredient of object R,
(5) Vis S,
and
(6) U is an ingredient of object B;
(7) Bis the same object as S ((5), (1))
(8) U is an ingredient of object S ((6), (7));
from Th. k and (4) we see, that for some T
(9) Tis an ingredient of object U;
(10) Tis an ingredient of object R ((b), (9), (4))
some ingredient of object R is an ingredient of some ingredient of
object S ( (10), (8), (9) ).
THEOREM m. If S is an object, then S is an ingredient of
object S. 6
(1) Sisanobject;
(2) some object is an ingredient of object S (Th. k, (1))
(3) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object S, then (R is an
ingredient of object S, and for some T, (Tis an ingredient of
object R)) (Th. k);
from (i) and (1) we infer, that for some P
6 See Th. IL
On the Foundations of !Ylathematics 325

and
dient of object Q is an ingredient of some S;
(6) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object S, then Q is an ingre-
dient of _object T and an ingredient of object S ((b), (4))
(7) for any Jl,, if R is an ingredient of object P, or R is an ingredi-
ent of object S, then some ingredient of object R is an ingre-
dient of some ingredient of object S (Th. 1, (1), (5), (3))
(8) Pis S ((c), (2), (6), (7))
(9) Pis the same object as S ((8), (1))
Sis an ingredient of object S ((4), (9)).
THEOREM n. If P is the same object as Q} then P zs an
ingredient of object Q.
(1) P is the same object as Q;
(2) P is an ingredient of object P (Th. m, (1))
Pis an ingredient of object Q ((2), (1)).
THEOREM o. (corresponding to Def. I). P is an ingredient of
object Q when and only when} P is the same object as Q, or is a
part of object Q (Th. n< and (e)).
THEOREM p. If P is the class of objects a} then every a is an
ingredient of object P. 7
( 1) P is the class of objects a;
(2) P is an ingredient of object P (Th. m, (1))
every a is an ingredient of object P (( 8 f), (1), (2)).
THEOREM q. (corresponding to Def. II). P is the class of
objects a} when and only when} the following conditions are sat-
isfied:
7 See above Th. (H), Ch. VI.

8 See the proof of Th. (H).
(a) P is an object;
((3) every a is an ingredient of object P;
(Results from (f) and Th. p 9 ) .
.
THEOREM r. (corresponding to Ax. III). If P is the class of
objectg a, and Q is the class of objects a, then P is Q.
and
(3) every a is an ingredient of object P (Th. p, (1))
(4) every a is an ingredient of object Q (Th. p, (2))
(5) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object P, or R is an in-
gredient of object Q, then some ingredient of object R is an
ingredient of some a (Th. q, (1 ), (2) ).
Pis Q ((c), (3), (4), (5)).
THEOREM s. (corresponding to Ax. IV). If some object is a,
then some object is the class of objects a.
r
(1 some object is a;
from (d) and (1) it results, that for some P
(2) for any Q, if Q is a then Q is an ingredient of object P,
and
from (1) and (2) it follows, that for some R
',
";I
i (5) Pis R, or Pis not an ingredient of object R ((a), (4))
(6) Pis the class of objects a ((f), (5), (2), (3))
some object is the class of objects a (6).
9
See above argument to Th. (N), Ch. VI.
CHAPTER VIII
ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS
ESTABLISHED BY KURATOWSKI AND TARSKI
WHICH ARE SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY
FOR P TO BE THE CLASS OF OBJECTS A
In 1921 Kuratowski showed on the basis of my 'general theory of

sets', that
(a) P is the class of objects a, when and only when, (every a is
an ingredient of object P, and for any Q, if every a is an in-
gredient of object Q, and Q is an ingredient of object P, then
Q is the same object as P),
however since then Tarski has proved on the same basis
that
(b) P is the class of objects a when and only when, (every a is
an ingredient of object P, and for any Q, if every a is an in-
gredient of object Q, then Pis an ingredient of object Q),
and
(c) P is the class of objects a, when and only when, ( P is an ob-
ject and for any Q (every a is an ingredient of object Q when
and only when, Pis an ingredient of object Q)).
Kuratowski and Tarski obtained the results formulated here in-
dependently of one another.
Not wishing to begin the continuation of my own theorems
from the domain of the 'general theory of sets' without first
demonstrating to the reader chronologically the earlier results of
others in that field, I will consider in this chapter theses (a)-
(c) quoted above and deduce them with the assistance of a few
auxiliary theorems in the simplest possible way from the theses
contained in the Chapters IV and V.
In my deductions I will not refer back to the original proofs

of Kuratowski and Tarski; after all these years I am not able to
reconstruct them.
The numbering of the theses below constitutes a continuation
of the numbering interrupted in Chapter V.
THEOREM CIC. If (for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of
object Q, then P is an ingredient of object Q), every a is an in-
gredient of object R, and R is an ingredient of object P, then R
is the same object as P.
(1) for any Q, .if every a is an ingredient of object Q, then P is
an ingredient of object Q,
(2) every a is an ingredient. of object R,
and
(4) Pis an ingredient of object R ((1), (2))
R is the same object as P (Th. LI, (3), (4)).
THEOREM CC. If P is the class of objects a, and P is an in-
gredient of object Q, then every a is an ingredient of object Q.
and
(3) every a is an ingredient of object P (Def. II, (1))
every a is an ingredient of object Q ((3), Th. IV, (2)).
THEOREM CCL If P is the class of objects a, and every a is
an ingredient of object Q, then P is an ingredient of object Q.
and
(2) every a is an ingredient of object Q;
(3) Q is the class of ingredients of object Q ((2), Th. X)
Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. CXI, (1), (3), (2)).
- - - ----------------------------111111111111111
THEOREM CCII. If every a is an ingredient of object P, and

for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of object Q, and Q is an
ingredient of object P, then Q is the same object as P, and P is
and ,,
(2) for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of object Q, and Q is an
ingredient of object P, then Q is the same object as P;
from Ax. IV and (1) we see, that for some R
(3) R is the class of objects a;
(4) every a is an ingredient of object R (Def. II, (3))
(5) R is an ingredient of object P (Th. CCI, (3), (1))
(6) R is the same object as P ((2), (4), (5))
Pis the class of objects a ((3), (6)).
THEOREM CCIII. If P is the class of objects a, every a is an
ingredient of object Q, and Q is an ingredient of object P, then
Q is the same object as P.
(2) every a is an ingredient of object Q,
and
(4) Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. CCI, (1), (2))
Q is the same object as P (Th. LI, (4), (3)).
THEOREM CCIV. If P is the class of objects a, then (every a
is an ingredient of object Q when and only when, P is an ingre-
dient of object Q).
(Results from Th. CC and Th. CCI.)
THEOREM CCV. If every a is an ingredient of object P, and
for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of object Q, then P is an
ingredient of object Q, then P is the class of objects a.

and
(2) for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of object Q, then P is
an ingredient of object Q;
(3) for any R, if every a is an ingredient of object R, and R is
an· ingredient of object P, then R is the same object as P
(a'h. CIC, (2))
P is the class of objects a (Th. CCII, (1 ), (3) ).
THEOREM CCVI. (Theorem (a), Kuratowski). P is the class
of objects a when and only when, {every a is an ingredient of ob-
ject P, and for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of object Q, and
Q is an ingredient of object P, then Q is the same object as P.
(Results from Th. CCII, Def. II and Th. CCIII.)
THEOREM CCVII. If P is an object and for any Q, (every a is
an ingredient of object Q when and only when, P is an ingredient
of object Q), then P is the class of objects a.
(1) P is an object,
and
(2) for any Q, (every a is an ingredient of object Q when and
only when, P is an ingredient of object Q);
(3) P is an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (1))
(4) every a is an ingredient of object P ((2), (3))
Pis the class of objects a (Th. CCV, (4), (2)).
THEOREM CCVIII. (Theorem (b ), Tarski). P is the class of
objects a when and only when, (every a is an ingredient of ob-
ject P, and for any Q, if every a is an ingredient of object Q,
then P is an ingredient of object Q).
(Results from Th. CCV, Def. II and Th. CCI.)
THEOREM CCIX. (Theorem (c), Tarski). P is the class of
objects a when and only when, (P is an object and for any Q
(every a is an ingredient of object Q when and only when, P is
an ingredient of object Q)).
On the Foundations of JJ!fathematics 331
(Results from Th. CCVII and Th. CCIV.)

CHAPTER IX
FURTHER THEOREMS
FROM THE YEARS 1921-1923
Proceeding with the further continuation of my own theorems

from the domain of my 'general theory of sets', I shall now com-
mence the report of the results which I achieved in this field in
this years 1921-1923.
THEOREM CCX. If {for any S, if Q is a part of object S, and
R is a part of object S, then P is an ingredient of object S) not
(Q is the same object as R}, not (Q is a part of object R), not {R
is a part of object Q), Q is an object, R is an object, and every
(Q or R) is an ingredient of object T, then P is an ingredient of
object T.
(1) for any S, if Q is a part of object S, and R is a part of object S,
then P is an ingredient of object S,
(2) not ( Q is the same object as R),
(3) not ( Q is a part of object R),
(4) not (Risa part of object Q),
(5) Q is an object,
(6) R is an object,
and
(7) every (Q or R) is an ingredient of object P,
(8) every (Q or R) is the same object as T, or is a part of object T
((7), Def. I)
(9) Q is the same object as T, or Q is a part of object T ((8),
(5))
(10) R is the same object as T, or Risa part of object T, ((8),
(6))
P is an ingredient of object T ( (9), (10), (2), (3), (4), (1) ).

THEOREM CCXI. If P is an object not (P is the same object
as Q}, R is an object, Q is the class of objects b, (for any S, if S
is b, then S is P or R}, T is b} and T is P} then (P is b, and R
is b}.
Proof: We' assume, that
(1) P is an ebject,
(2) not (P is the same object as Q),
(3) R is an object,
(5) for any S, if Sis b, then Sis P or R,
(6) T is b,
and
(7) Tis P;
(8) Tis the same object as P ((7), (1))
(9) P is b ( (6) , (8))
(10) P is the class of objects P (Th. VIII, (1))
(11) not (Q is the class of objects P) (Ax. III, (10), (2))
(12) for any S, if Sis P, then Sis b (9);
from Th. I:XI~,J4), (11) and (12) we infer, that for some S
(13) S is b,
and
(14) not (S is P);
(15) Sis R ((5), (13), (14))
(16) Sis the same object as R ((15), (3))
(17) R is b ( (13), (16))
Pis b, and R is b ((9), (17)).
THEOREM CCXII. If P is an object, then P is the same object
as a collection of objects P.
(1) P is an object;
(2) P is a collection of objects P (Th. XIII, (1))
(3) for any Q and R, if Q is P, and R is P, then Q is the same

object as R (1)
(4) for any R and S, if R is a collection of objects P, and S
is a collection of objects P, then R is the same object as S
(Th. XCVIII, (3))
Pis the·saine object as a collection of objects P ((2), (4)).
THE6REM CCXIII. If P is an object, not (P is the same ob-
ject as Q), R is an object, not (Q is the same object as R) and Q
is a collection of objects (P or R), then P is a part of object Q.
(1) P is an object,
(2) not (Pis the same object as Q),
(3) R is an object,
(4) not (Q is the same object as R),
and
(5) Q is a collection of objects (P or R);
from Th. LXXXIII and (5) it results, that for some b,
and
(7) for any S, if Sis b, then Sis P or R;
from Th. XX arid (6) it follows, that for some T
(8) Tis b;
(9) Tis P, or Tis R ((7), (8))
(10) Pis b ((9), Th. CCXI, (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), (4))
Pis a part of object Q (Th. LXXXVI, (6), (10), (2)).
THEOREM CCXIV. If every part of object P is a part of ob-
ject Q, then P is an ingredient of object Q.
(Results from Def. I and Th. CXII.)
THEOREM CCXV. If P is the class of objects a, and for
any R, if R is a, then R is an ingredient of object Q, then P
is an ingredient of object Q.
and
(2) for any R, if R is a, then R is an ingredient of object Q;
(3) some object is a (Th. XX, (1))
P is an ingredient of object Q (Th. CCI, (1 ), (3), (2) ).
THEOREM CCXVI. If Q is an ingredient of object P, R is an
ingredient oj object P, and for any S, if every {Q or R) is an
ingredient of.object S, then P is an ingredient of object S, then
P is the class of objects (Q or R).
(1) Q is an ingredient of object P,
and
(3) for any S, if every ( Q or R) is an ingredient of object S, then
P is an ingredient of object S;
(4) for any S, if Sis Q or R, then Sis an ingredient of object P
((1), (2)).
Pis the class of objects (Q or R) (Th. CCV, (1), (4), (3)).
THEOREM CCXVII. If every part of object P is a part of ob-
ject Q, and every part of object Q is a part of object P, then P is
the same object as Q.
Proof: ""vVe assume, that
(1) every part of object P is a part of object Q,
and
(2) every part of object Q is a part of object P;
(3) Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. CCXIV, (1)),
(4) Q is an ingredient of object P (Th. CCXIV, (2)),
Pis the same object as Q (Th. LI, (3), (4)).
THEOREM CCXVIII. If P is a collection of objects a, and for
any R, if R is a, then R is an ingredient of object Q, then P is
an ingredient of object Q.
(1) P is a collection of objects a
and
(2) for any R, if R is a, then R is an ingredient of object Q;

(3) P is the class of objects a, which are ingredients of object P
(Th. LXXXI, (1))
Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. CCXV, (3), (2)).
THEOREM CCXIX. If Q is an ingredient of object P, then P
is the cldss of objects (Q or P).
PrQoj: We assume, that
(2) P is an object (Th. X, (1))
(3) Pis an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (2))
(4) for any S, if every (Q orP) is an ingredient of object S, then
P is an ingredient of object S (2)
P is the class of objects ( Q or P) (Th. CCXVI, (1), (3), (4) ).
THEOREM CCXX. If P is an object, (for any R, if R is ex-
terior to P, then R is exterior to Q) and S is an ingredient of
object Q, then some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of ob-
ject P.
(1) P is an object,
(2) for any R, if R is exterior to P, then R is exterior to Q,
and
(3) S is an ingredient of object Q;
(4) not (Sis exterior to Q) (Th. CXV, (3))
(5) not (Sis exterior to P) ((2), (4))
some ingredient of object S is an ingredient of object P
(Th. CXVI, (3), (1), (5)).
THEOREM CCXXI. If R is an ingredient of object P, and R
is an ingredient of object Q, then not {for any S, some object,
exterior to P or exterior to Q, is not (exterior to S)).
and
(3) for any T, if Tis exterior to P, or Tis exterior to Q, then T

is exterior to R (Th. CXXII, (1 ), (2))
not (for any S, some object exterior to P or exterior to Q is not
(exterior to S)) (3).
THEOREM CCXXII. If for any S, some object, exterior to P
or exterior Jo 'Q, is not (exterior to S) then P is an object.
(1) for any S, some object exterior to P or exterior to Q is not
(exterior to S);
from ( 1) we see, that for some R
(2) R is exterior to P, or R is exterior to Q,
and
(3) R is not (exterior to Q);
(4) R is exterior to P ((2), (3))
Pis an object (Th. XXXII, (4)).
THEOREM CCXXIII. If P is an object, Q is an object and
not (P is exterior to Q) then for some a and b, (P is the class of
objects a, Q is the class of objects b, and some a is b).
(1) P is an object,
(2) ~Q is an object,
and
(3) not (P is exterior to Q);
from Th. CXVI, (1), (2) and (3) we infer, that for some R
and
from Th. LXXXV, and (4) it results, that for some a
and
(7) Risa;
from Th. LXXV and (5) it follows, that for some b
and
(9) R is b;
for some a and b, (P is the class of objects a, Q is the class of
objects b, and some a is b) ((6), (8), (7), (9)).
THEOREM CCXXIV. If P is the class of objects a, Q is the
class of objects b, and some a is b, then not {P is exterior
to Q). ,,
and
(3) some a is b;
(4) some ingredient of object Pis an ingredient of object Q ((3),
Th. LXXXV, (1), (2)).
not (P is exterior to Q (Th. CXXIX, (4)).
THEOREM CCXXV. P is exterior to Q when and only when,
(P is an object, Q is an object, and for every a and b, if P is the
class of objects a, and Q is the class of objects b, then not (some
a is b)).
(Results from Th. CCXXIII, Th. XXXII and Th. CCXXIV.)
THEOREM CCXXVI. If for any S, some object, exterior to P
or exterior to Q, is not (exterior to S }, then Pis exterior to Q.
(1) for any S, some object, exterior to P or exterior to Q, is not
(exterior to S);
(2) Pis an object (Th. CCXXII, (1)),
(3) Q is an object (Th. CCXXII, (1)),
(4) not (for some R, (R is an ingredient of object P, and R is an
ingredient of object Q)). (Th. CCXXI, (1)).
Pis exterior to Q (Th. CXVI, (2), (3), (4)).
THEOREM CCXXVII. If Q is an object) P is an object) and
for any R, if R is exterior to P, and R is exterior to Q, then Q
is exterior to P.

(1) Q is an object,
(2) P is an object
and
(3) for any R, if R is exterior to P, then R is exterior to Q;
(4) for any.s; if Sis an ingredient of object Q, then some ingre-
dient of.object Sis an ingredient of object P (Th. CCXX, (2),
(3)).
Q is an ingredient of object P (Th. XXVII, (1), (4)).
THEOREM CCXXVIII. If P is an object, (for any Q and R,
if Q is exterior to P, and R is a, then Q is exterior to R) and S
is a, then S is an ingredient of object P.
(1) P is an object,
(2) for any Q and R, if Q is exterior to P, and R is a, then Q is
exterior to R,
and
(3) Sis a;
(4) for any Q, if Q is exterior to P, then Q is exterior to S ( (2),
(3)).
Sis an ingredient of object P (Th. CCXXVII, (3), (1), (4)).
THEOREM CCXXIX. If P is exterior to Q, then some object
exterior to P or exterior to Q, is not (exterior to S).
(2) not (Sis an ingredient of object Q) or not (Sis an ingredient
of object P (Def. VI, (1)),
(3) Q is an object (Th. XXXII, (1))
(4) if S is an object, then for some R, ( (R is exterior to P,
or R is exterior to Q) and not (R is exterior to S)). ( ( 2),
Th. CCXXVII, (3), (1))
(5) if not (Sis an object), then (Pis exterior to Q and not (Pis
exterior to S)) ((1), Th. XXXII).
some object, exterior to P or exterior to Q, is not (exterior to S)

((4), (5)).
THEOREM CCXXX. If P is an object) Q is an object) and for
any R, (R is exterior to P, when and only when, R is exterior
to Q}, then P is the same object as Q.
Proof:· We assume, that
(1) P is«tn object,
(2) Q is an object,
and
(3) for any R, (R is exterior to P, when and only when, R is
exterior to Q);
(4) P is an ingredient of object Q (Th. CCXXVII, (1), (2),
(3)).
(5) Q is an ingredient of object P (Th. CCXXVII, (2), (1),
(3)).
Pis the same object as Q (Th. LI, (4), (5)).
THEOREM CCXXXI. Q is an ingredient of object P, when
and only when, (Q is an object, P is an object, and for any R, if
R is exterior to P, then R is exterior to Q).
(Results from Th. CCXXVII, Th. X, and Th. CXXII.)
TlfEbREM CCXXXII. If P is an object and for any Q, (Q is
exterior to P, when and only when, for any R, if R is a, then Q
is exterior to R), then P is the class of objects a.
(1) P is an object,
and
(2) for any Q, (Q is exterior to P, when and only when, for any R,
if R is a, then Q is exterior to R);
(3) for any S, if S is a, then S is an ingredient of object P
(Th. CCXXVIII, (1), (2)).
(4) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then for some R,
(Risa and not (Q is exterior to R)) (Th. CXC, (2)).
(5) for any S, if S is an ingredient of object P, then some in-

gredient of object S is an ingredient of some a (Th. CXVIII,
(4)).
THEOREM CCXXXIII. P is exterior to Q, when and only
when, for any S, some object, exterior to P or exterior to Q, is
not ( exterioJ' to S)
(Results from Th. CCXXVI and Th. CCXXIX).
THEOREM CCXXXIV. P is the class of objects a, when and
only when, {P is an object and for any Q, {Q is exterior to P,
when and only when for any R 1 if R is a, then Q is exterior
to R)).
(Results from Th. CCXXXII and Th. CXXXIX).
THEOREM CCXXXV. P is the class of objects a, when and
only when, {P is an object and for any Q, Pis exterior to Q when
and only when, for any R, if R is a; then R is exterior to Q)).
(Results from Th. CCXXXIV and Th. CXXVII).
THEOREM CCXXXVI. If {for any P, {P is <p(a) when and
only when, (P is an object and for any Q, (P is exterior to Q,
when and only when, for any R, if R is a) then R is exterior
to Q)))) and some object is a, then <p(a) is an object.
(1) for any P, (Pis <p(a) when and only when, (P is an object
and for any Q, (P is exterior to Q when and only when, for
any R, if Risa, then R is exterior to Q)))
and
(3) for any P, (Pis <p(a), when and only when, Pis the class of
objects a) (Th. CCXXXV)
(4) for any P and Q, if Pis <p(a), and Q is <p(a), then Pis the
same object as Q (Ax. III, (3));
from Ax. IV and (2) we see, that for some S,
(5) S is the class of objects a;
(6) S is <p (a), ( (3), (5)),

<p(a) is an object ((6), (4))1°
THEOREM CCXXXVII. If P is Q + R, then not {some ingre-
dient of object Q is an ingredient of object R).
(Results
. from Def. VII and Th. CXXIX) .
THEbREM CCXXXVIII. If P is Q + R, then not {some part
of objecr'Q is a part of object R}.
(Results from Def. VIII and Th. CXXXI).
THEOREM CCXXXIX. If P is Q + R, then not {R is a part
of object Q).
(Results from Th. CXLVIII and Th. CXVII).
THEOREM CCXL. If P is Q + R, then not {Q is a part of
object R).
(Results from Th. CXLVIII, and Th. CXXX).
THEOREM CCXLI. P is exterior to Q, when and only when,
some object is P + Q.
(Results from Def. VIII and Th. CLY).
THEOREM CCXLII. If P is Q + R, Q is an ingredient of ob-
ject S, and R is an ingredient of object S, then P is an ingredient
of object S. _
(1) Pis Q + R,
(2) Q is an ingredient of object S,
and
(4) P is the class of objects (Q or R) (Def. VIII, (1))
(5) for any T, if Tis Q or R, then Tis an ingredient of object S
((2), (3) ).
10
The statement of Theorem CCXXXVI in this chapter is connected with
later considerations in the present work. Only this circumstance induced me
to insert the theorem here, which I consider to be of little interest on its
own.
Pis an ingredient of object S (Th. CCXV, (4), (5)).

THEOREM CCXLIII. If P is Q + R, Q is a part of object S,
and R is a part of object S, then P is an ingredient of object S.
(1) Pis Q + R,
(2) Q is a pa;t of object S,
and ,,
(3) R is a part of object S;
(4) Q is an ingredient of object S (Def. I, (2)),
(5) R is an ingredient of object S (Def. I, (3)),
Pis an ingredient of object S (Th. CCXLII, (1), (4), (5)).
THEOREM CCXLIV. If P is an object, (for every S, ((Q is
an ingredient of object S, and R is an ingredient of object S) when
and only when, P is an ingredient of object S)) and not (some
ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of object R) 1 then P is
Q +R.
(1) P is an object,
(2) for any S, ((Q is an ingredient of object S, and R is an ingre-
dient of object S) when and only when P is an ingredient of
· object S), ··
and
(3) not (some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of ob-
ject R);
(4) Pis an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (1));
from (2) and (4) we infer, that
(5) Q is an ingredient of object P,
and
(7) for any S, if every (Q or R) is an ingredient of object S, then
(Q is an ingredient of object S, and R is an ingredient of
object S) ((5), (6)).
(8) for any S, if every (Q or R) is an ingredient of object S, then

P is an ingredient of object S ( (7), (2) ).
(9) P is the class of objects (Q or R) (Th. CCXVI, (5), (6),
(8)).
(10) Q is exterior to R (Th. CXVI, (5), (6), (3)).
Pis Q .+ 'R (Def. VIII, (9), (10)).
TH:l!OREM CCXLV. If P is an object, (for any S, {(Q is a
part of object S, and R is a part of object S) when and only when
P is an ingredient of object S }}, not (Q is the same object as R},
not (Q is a part of object R}, not {Risa part of object Q) and not
{some part of object Q is a part of object R), then P is Q + R.
(1) Pis an object,
(2). for any S, ( ( Q is a part of object S, and Risa part of object S)
when and only when P is an ingredient of object S),
(3) not (Q is the same object as R),
(4) not (Q is a part of object R),
(5) not (R is a part of object Q)
and
( 6) not (some part of object Q is a part of object R);
(7) P is an ingredient of object P (Th. II, (1) );
from (2) and (7) it results, that
(8) Q is a part of object P,
and
(9) R is a part of object P;
(10) Q is an ingredient of object P (Def. I, (8))
(11) R is an ingredient of object P (Def. I, (9))
(12) for any T, if every (Q or R) is an ingredient of object T,
then P is an ingredient of object T (Th. CCX, (2, 3, 4, 5, 8,
9))
(13) P is the class of objects (Q or R) (Th. CCXVI, (10, 11,
12)).
(14) Q is exterior to R (Th. CXIX, (8, 9, 3, 4, 5, 6)).
Pis Q +R (Def. VIII, (13, 14)).

THEOREM CCXLVI. If P is an object, (for any S, (S is ex-
terior to P, when and only when, (S is exterior to Q , and S is
exterior to R))) and Q is exterior to R, then P is Q + R.
(1) P is an abject,
(2) for any 5 (S is exterior to P when and only when, (S is
exterior to Q, and Sis exterior to R)),
and
(4) R is an object (Th. XXXII, (3)),
(5) for any S, if for any T, if Tis Q or R, then Sis exterior to T,
then (Sis exterior to Q, and Sis exterior to R) ((3), (4)),
(6) for any S, if for any T, if Tis Q or R, then Sis exterior to T,
then Sis exterior to P ((5), (2)), .
(7) for any Sand T, if Sis exterior to P, and Tis Q or R, then
(T is the same object as Q, or is the same object as R, Sis
exterior to Q and Sis exterior to R ((3), (4), (2)),
(8) for any S and T, if S is exterior to P, and T is Q or R, then
S is exterior to T (7),
(9) Pis the class of objects (Q or R) (Th. CCXXXII, (1), (6),
(8) ),
Pis Q + R (Def. VIII, (9), (3)).
THEOREM CCXLVII. If P is Q + R, and P is an ingredient
of object S, then Q is a part of object S.
(1) Pis Q + R,
and
(3) P is the same object as S, or P is a part of object S (Def. I,
(2))
(4) Q is a part of object P (Th. CLXII, (1)),
Q is a part of object S ((3), (4), Ax. II).
THEOREM CCXLVIII. P is a part of object Q, when and only

when, for some R, {Q is P + R).
(Results from Th. CLXII and Th. CLX).
THEOREM CCIL. If P is a part of object Q, then for some R,
(R is an object, not (Q is the same object as R} and Q is a col-
lection of objects (P or R}).
Prt1Jof: We assume, that
from Th. CLX and (1) it follows, that for some R
(2) Q is P + R;
(3) R is an object (Th. CXLVIII, (2)),
(4) not (Q is the same object as R) (Th. CLXIV, (2)),
(5) Q is the class of objects (P or R) (Def. ·VIII, (2)),
(6) Q is a collection of objects (P or R) (Th. XIV, (5)),
for some R, (R is an object, not (Q is the same object as R) and
Q is a collection of objects (P or R)) ((3), (4), (6)).
THEOREM CCL. P is Q + R when and only when, (P is an
object, (for any S, (S is exterior to P when and only when, (S is
exterior to Q, and S is exterior to R})) and Q is exte1ior to R.
(Results from Th. CCXLVI, Th. CLXXI and Def. VIII).
THEOREM CCLI. if P is Q + R 1 and P is an ingredient of
object S, then Q is an ingredient of object S.
(Results from Th. CCXLVII, and Def. I).
THEOREM CCLII. If P is Q + R, and P is an ingredient of
object S, then R is a part of object S.
(1) Pis Q + R,
and
(3) Pis R + Q (Th. CLXVII, (1))
R is a part of object S (Th. CCXLVII, (3), (2) ). ·
THEOREM CCLIII. P is a part of object Q, when and only

when, (P is an object, not {P is the same object as Q) and for
some R, (R is an object, not (Q is the same object as R) and Q
is a collection of objects (P or R))).
(Results from Th. CCXIII, Th.Land Th. CCIL).
THEOREM 'CCLIV. If P is Q + R, and R is an ingredient of
object S, therJ, R is an ingredient of object S.
(Results from Th. CCLII and Def. I).
THEOREM CCLV. If P is Q + R, then {(Q is a part of ob-
ject S, and R is a part of object S) when and only when P is an
ingredient of object S.
(Results from Th. CCXLVII, Th. CCLII and Th. CCXLIII).
THEOREM CCLVI. If P is Q + R, then ((Q is an ingredient
of object S, and R is an ingredient of object S) when and only
when P is an ingredient of object S ).
(Results from Th. CCLI, Th. CCLIV, and Th. CCXLII).
THEOREM CCLVII. P is Q + R, when and only when, (P is
an object, (for any S, ((Q is a part of object S, and R is a part of
object S) when and only when, P is an ingredient of object SJ),
and not (Q is the same object as R), not (Q is a part of object R),
not {R- is a part of object Q), and not (some part of object Q is a
part of object R)).
(Results from Th. CCXLV, Th. CCLV, Th. CXLVII,
Th. CCXL, Th. CCXXXIX and Th. CCXXXVIII).
THEOREM CCLVIII. P is Q + R when and only when, (P is
an object, (for any S, ((Q is an ingredient of object S, and R is
an ingredient of object S) when and only when P is an ingredient
of object S)) and not (some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient
of object R)).
(Results from Th. CCXLIV, Th. CCLVI and Th. CCXXXVII).
THEOREM CCLIX. P is Q + R,when and only when, (P is
an object, (for any S, ((Q is a part of object S, and R is a part
of object S) when and only when, P is the same object as S, or
is a part of object SJ), not {Q is the same object as R)J not (Q is

a part of object R), not (R is a part of object Q) and not {some
part of object Q is a part of object R)).
(Results from Th. CCLVII and Def. I).
THEOREM CCLX. If P is the same object as Q, then for
some.a; (Q is the sum of objects a, and P is a).
(1) P is the same object as Q;
(2) Pis the sum of objects P (Th. CLXXVII, (1)),
(3) Q is the sum of objects P ( (2), (1))
for some a, (Q is the sum of objects a, and Pis a) ((3), (2)).
THEOREM CCLXI. If Q is the sum of objects a, and P is a,
then P is an ingredient of object Q.
(1) Q is the sum of objects a,
and
(2) P is a;
(3) Q is the class of objects a (Def. IX, (1))
Pis an ingredient of object Q (Th. LXXXV, (3), (2)).
THEOREM CCLXII. If P is a part of object Q, then for
some a~ (Q is the sum of objects aJ and P is a).
from Th. CLX and (1) we infer, that for some R
(2) Q is P + R;
(3) Q is the sum of objects (P or R) (Th. CLXXXI, (2)).
for some a, (Q is the sum of objects a, and Pis a) ((3), (1)).
THEOREM CCLXIII. If P is an ingredient of object Q, then
for some a, {Q is the sum of objects a, and P is a).
(Results from Def. I, Th. CCLX, and Th. CCLXII).
THEOREM CCLXIV. P is an ingredient of object Q, when

and only when, for some a, {Q is the sum of objects a, and P
is a).
(Results from Th. CCLXI and Th. CCLXIII).
Theorems CCXLVIII, CCLIII, LXXXV, CCXXXI, CCLXIV
and CLXIII. show that instead of such terms as 'part' and 'in-
gredient' I could choose as the fundamental term of my 'general
fl
theory of sets', any of the terms '+', 'collection', 'class', 'exterior

to', 'sum of' and 'complement of'.
I
l
~
I
)
CHAPTERX0
THE AXIOMATIZATION
OF THE 'GENERAL THEORY OF SETS',
FROM THE YEAR 1921
In 1921 I established the fact that I would obtain a theory equiv-

alent to the theory which I presented in Chapters IV, V, VIII
and IX, if, using the fundamental term 'exterior to', 1 I assumed
as axioms of the theory the following theses, stating respectively,
that
(2l) P is exterior to Q when and only when, for any S, some
object exterior to P or exterior to Q, is not (exterior
to S),
and
(~) if (for any P, (Pis <p(a) when and only when, (Pis an
object and for any Q, (P is exterior to Q when and only
when, for any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to Q)))) and
some object is a, then cp( a) is an object.
However, the terms 'class', 'ingredient' and 'part' were introduced
with the help of definitions, establishing respectively, that
( <?:) P is the class of objects a when and only when, ( P is an
object and for any Q, (P is exterior to Q when and only
when, for any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to Q)),
CD) P is an ingredient of object Q when and only when, for
some a, (Q is the class of objects a and P is a),
O '[Translator's note: These chapters were published in Polish as follows:

'0 podstawach matematyki, Rozdzial X: Aksjomatyka 'og6lnej teorji mno-
gosci', pochodzqca z r. 1921. Rozdzial XI: 0 zdaniach 'jednostkowych' typu
'Acb',' Przeglqd Filozoficzny 34 (1931), pp. 142-170.]
1 See Stanislaw Lesniewski, 'O podstawach matematyki' (On the Foun-
dations of Mathematics), Przeglqd Filozoficzny 33, nos. I and II, 1930i
p. 105.
and
( ~) P is a part of object Q when and only when, (P is an
ingredient of object Q and not (Pis the same object
as Q));
That, on the basis of the theory which I presented in Chapters
IV, V, VIII,. and IX, one can obtain equivalents of any theses
which one can obtain on the basis of the new theory based on the
-
axioms (Qt) and (~) and containing definitions (<t)-(~), we can
readily establish by taking into consideration the fact that the-
ses (Qt)-(~) are only repetitions respectively of Th. CCXXXIII,
Th. CCXXXVI, Th. CCXXXV, Th. LXXXV and Th. L of the
theory which I presented in Chapters IV, V, VIII, and IX. 2
That conversely, the equivalents of all theses which can be
obtained on the basis of the earlier theory can be obtained within
the framework of the theory based on the axioms (Qt) and(~) and
containing definitions ( Q:)-( ~), we can convince ourselves by de-
ducing explicit equivalents of Ax. I, Ax. II, Def. I, Def. II, Ax. III,
Ax. IV, and Def. VI from the theses (Qt)-(~), which can be done
as follows:
THEORE~.I <£. If P is an object} then P is the class of ob-
jects P .3
(1) P is an object;
(2) for any Q, if for any R, if R is P, then R is exterior to Q,
then P-is exterior to Q (1)
Pis the class of objects P ((~), (1), (2)).
THEOREM ®. If R is an object, and for any S and T, if R is
exterior to S, and T is P or R, then T is exterior to S, then R
is the class of objects (P or R).
(1) R is an object,
2
See I.e., p. 99, footnote 1.
3 See Th. VIII.
and
(2) for any Sand T, if R is exterior to S, and Tis P or R,
then T is exterior to S;
(3) for any S, if for any T, if Tis P or R, then Tis exterior
to S, then R is exterior to S (1 ),
R is. tlie class of objects (P or R) ( ( ~), (1 ), (3), (2) ).
THEOREM SJ. If P is an ingredient of object Q, and Q is
exterior to R, then P is exterior to R.
and
from ( '.D) and ( 1) we see, that for some a
(3) Q is the class of objects a,
and
(4) P is a;
Pis exterior to R ((<!:), (3), (2), (4)).
THEOREM J. If P is an object, then P is an ingredient of
object P. 4
Proof: "\Ve assume, that
(1) Pis an object;
(2) P is the class of objects P (Th. ~' (1) ),
Pis an ingredient of object P (('.D), (2), (1)).
THEOREM Jt. If every a is an ingredient of object P, P is
exterior to S, and R is a, then R is exterior to S.
(2) P is exterior to S,
and
(3) R is a;
(4) R is an ingredient of object P ((i), (3)),
4 See Th. II.

R is exterior to S (Th. SJ, (4), (2)).

THEOREM .£. If P is the same object as Q then P is an in-
gredient of object Q.
5
( Results from Th. J).
THEOREM VJ1. P is a part of object Q when and only when}
((for some a} '(Q is the class of objects a; and P is a)) and not
(P is the same object as Q)).
(Results from(~) and CD)).
THEOREM m.
If P is a part of object Q, and Q is exterior
to R, then P is exterior to R.
and
(3) P is an ingredient of object Q ( ( ~), (1) ),
Pis exterior to R (Th. SJ, (3), (2)).
THEOREM $. (corresponding to Def. I). P is an ingredient of
object Q when and only when) P is the same object as Q or is a
part of object Q.
(Results from Th . .£and (~) 6 ).
THEOREM.0. ff P is a part of object Q) Q is exterior to S,

and R is P, then R is exterior to S.
(2) Q is exterior to S,
and
(3) R is P;
(4) P is exterior to S (Th. m, (1 ), (2) ),
R is exterior to S ((3), (4)).
5 See above proof of Th. n, Chapter VII.

6 See above argument for Th. o, Chapter VII.
THEOREM 91. If P is a part of object Q, Q is a part of ob-

ject R, R is exterior to S, and T is P or R, then T is exterior
to s.
(2) Q is a part of object R,
(3) R is exterior to S,
and
(4) T is P or R;
(5) Q is exterior to S (Th. m, (2), (3)),
(6) P is exterior to S (Th. m, (1 ), (5) ).
Tis exterior to S ((4), (6), (3)).
THEOREM 6. Not {P is exterior to P ).
(Results from 2l and the observation that not (some object
exterior to P or exterior to P, is not (exterior to P))).
THEOREM ~. P is exterior to Q when and only when, Q is
exterior to P .7
(Results from (2l)).
THEOREM il. If {for any Q, if Q is exterior to R, then Q is
exterior to P) R is exterior to S, and T is P or R, then T is
exterior to S.
( 1) for any Q, if Q is exterior to R, then Q is exterior to P,
(2) R is exterior to S,
and
(3) T is P or R;
(4) for any Q, if R is exterior to Q, then P is exterior to Q
( (1 ), Th. ~).
( 5) P is exterior to S ( (4), ( 2))
T is exterior to S ((3), (5), (2)).
7
See Th. CXXVII.
THEOREM W. If P is the class of objects aJ then for some R 7

(R is a).
(Results from ( <r) and Th. 6).
THEOREM 211. If P is an ingredient of object Q, then not (Q
is exterior to P ) 8
(Results .from Th. SJ and Th. 6).
THEOREM X. If P is an object, R is an object, and for any Q,
if Q is exterior to R, then Q is exterior to P, then P is an ingre-
dient of object R. 9
(1) P is an object,
(2) R is an object,
and
(3) for any Q, if Q is exterior to R, then Q is exterior to P;
then T is exterior to S. (Th. il, (3))
(5) R is the class of objects (P or R) (Th. <B, (2), (4)),
Pis an ingredient of object R (CD), (5), (1)).
THEOREM ZJ. If P is the class of objects a 1 then every a is
an ingredient of object P .10
(2) some object is a (Th. W, (1) ),
(3) for any Q, if Q is a, then Q is an ingredient of object P
((i'), (1)),
every a is an ingredient of object P ((2), (3)).
THEOREM 3. If P is exterior to Q, and R is an ingredient of
object Q, then not (R is an ingredient of object P).
8 See Th. CXXVIII.

9 See Th. CCXXVII.
10
See above Th. H, Chapter VI and Th. p, Chapter VII.
and
(3) not ( Q is exterior to R) (Th. filJ, (2) ),
(4) not (R is exterior to Q) ((3), Th. 'I),
not (R i's an ingredient of object P) (Th. SJ, (1 ), (4) ).
TfIEOREM 2t2L If Q is an object) R is an object and for any P,
not (P is exterior to R}, then some ingredient of object Q is an
ingredient of object R.
(1) Q is an object,
(2) R is an object
and
(3) for any P, not (Pis exterior to R);
(4) Q is an ingredient of object Q (Th. J, (1)),
(5) for any P, if P is exterior to R, then P is exterior to Q
(3),
( 6) Q is an ingredient of object R (Th. X, (1 ), (2), (5))
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of object R ((4),
(6) ).
THEOREM 2( Q3. If Q is an object, R is an object, not (R is
exterior to Q}, and P is exterior to R, then some ingredient of
object Q is an ingredient of object R.
(1) Q is an object,
(2) R is an object,
(3) not (R is exterior to Q)
and
(4) P is exterior to R;
from and (3) we infer, that for some S
(5) for any T, if Tis exterior to R or is exterior to Q, then Tis
exterior to S;
On the Foundations of A1athematics 357
(6) Pis exterior to S ((5), (4)),

(7) Sis an object (Th. 'I', (6)),
(8) Sis an ingredient of object Q (Th. x, (7), (1), (5)),
(9) Sis an ingredient of object R (Th. x, (7), (2), (5)),
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of object R ((8),
(9) ). .
THEORB'M 2l<t. If (for any Q) if Q is an ingredient of object P)
then some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a) (for
any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to S) and U is an ingredient
of object P) then not {U is an ing1edient of object S).
ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a,
(2) for any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to S,
and
(3) U is an ingredient of object P;
from (1) and (3) it results, that for some T and V
(4) Tis an ingredient of object U,
(5) Vis a,
(6) Tis an ingredient of object V;
(7) Vis exteriOr to S ((2), (5)),
(8) S is exterior to V (Th. 'I', (7)),
(9) not (U is exterior to V) (Th. 3, (6), (4)),
not (U is an ingredient of object S) (Th. S), (8), (9)).
THEOREM 2l'.D. If P is exterior to Q) then any ing1edient of
object Q is not an ing1edient of object P.
(1) Pis exterior to Q;
(2) Q is an object (Th. 'I, (1)),
(3) Q is an ingredient of object Q (Th. J, (2)),
(4) for any R, if R is an ingredient of object Q, then R is not
an ingredient of object P (Th. 3, (1) ),
no ingredients of object Q are not ingredients of object P ( (3),

(4) ).
THEOREM 2l<E. If Q is an object, R is an object and not (R
is exterior to Q}, then a certain ingredient of object Q is an in-
gredient of object R. 11
(Results from Th. 2l~ and 2l2l).
THEOREM 2l~. If P is an object, and if every ingredient of ob-
ject Q is not an ingredient of object P, then P is exterior to Q.
(1) P is an object,
and
(2) every ingredient of object Q is not an ingredient of ob-
ject P;
(3) Q is an object ((2), ('.D)),
Pis exterior to Q (Th. Ql<E, (3), (1), (2)).
THEOREM 2l!.5. If P is the class of objects a; and Q is an
ingredient of object P, then some ingredient of object Q zs an
ingredient of a certain a.
and
(3) not (Pis exterior to Q) (Th. W, (2));
from ( Q:), (1) and (3) it follows, that for some R
(4) R is a,
and
(5) not (R is exterior to Q);
(6) some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of object R
(Th. Qt <E, (2), (4), (5)),
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a ((6),
(4) ).
11 See Th. CXVI.

THEOREM 2Uj. If P is an object, (for any Q, if Q is an ingre-

dient of object P, then some ingredient of object P is an ingredient
of some a} and for any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to S, then
P is exterior to S.
(1) P is an. object,
(2) for any iJ, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some
ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a,
and
(3) for any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to S;
(4) Pis an ingredient of object P (Th. J, (1));
from (2) and (4) we see, that for some T
(5) Tis a;
(6) Tis exterior to S ((3), (5)),
(7) Sis an object (Th. 'I', (6)),
(8) for every U, if U is an ingredient of object P, then not (U is
an ingredient of object S) (Th. Q{Q.:, (2), (3)),
Pis exterior to S (Th. 21~, (7), (1), (8)).
I THEOREM 2.lJ. (corresponding to Def. VI). P is exterior to Q
I
tI
when and only when, the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) P is an object;
((3) every ingredient of object Q is not an ingredient of ob-
ject P.
(Results from Th. 21J' and Th. 21'.D).
THEOREM Qt.ft. If P is an object, every a is an ingredient of
object P, and for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then
some ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a, then P is
(1) P is an object,
and

ingredient of object Q is an ingredient of some a;
(4) for any S, if for any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to S,
then Pis exterior to S (Th. QLS), (1), (3)),
(5) for any R and S, if P is exterior to S, and R is a, then R is
exterior to S (Th. Jt, (2) ),
Pis t1ie class of objects a((~), (1), (4), (5)).
THEOREM QL£. (corresponding to Def. II). P is the class of
objects a when and only when) the fallowing conditions are satis-
fied:
(a) P is an object;
(/3) every a is an ingredient of object P;
( /) for any Q, if Q is an ingredient of object P, then some
(Results from Th. QlJ{, Th. q), and Th. Ql'8).
AUXILIARY DEFINITION~. Pis Kl (a) when and only when,
P is the class of objects a.
THEOREM Ql9J1. P is Kl(a) when and only when, P is an ob-
ject and for any Q, (P is exterior to Q when and only when, for
any R, if R is a, then R is exterior to Q)).
(Results from Def. ~ and ( ~)).
THEOREM Ql91. If some object is a, then Kl (a) zs an ob-
ject.
(Results from ( ~) and Th. Qlwt).
THEOREM QlD. (corresponding to Ax. IV). If some object is
a, then some object is the class of objects a.
(Results from Th. Qlryt and Def. ~ ).
THEOREM Qt~. (corresponding to Ax. III). If P is the class
of objects a,and Q is the class of objects a, then P is Q.
and

(3) some object is a (Th. W, (1) ),
(4) Kl (a) is an object (Th. QtSJl, (3) ),
(5) Pis Kl (a) (Def.~' (1)),
(6) Q is Kl (a) (Def. ~' (2) ),
Pis Q (1 2 {4)·, (5), (6)). 13
12 See the above derivation of thesis (3) in the proof of Th. CLXXVII and
the derivation of thesis (9) in the proof of Th. CLXXXVIII.
13 Since 1920, in constructing the 'general theory of sets', instead of using
expressions of the type 'part of object A', 'ingredient of object A', class of
objects a, exterior to A etc., I used shorter expressions of the type 'cz(A)',
'ingr(A)', 'KI(a)', 'zw(A)' respectively. In view of the fact that, in the expo-
sition of my 'general theory of sets' commencing in Chapter IV, I introduced
expressions of the first of these two sorts, I continued to use those expressions
- for the purpose of preserving uniformity in the exposition. Had I also used
systematically in the theses of the theory which I presented in Chapters IV,
V, VIII, and IX, as well as in the theses of the present chapter, expressions
of the type 'Kl( a)' instead of corresponding expressions of the type 'class of
objects a', I would have had no need, in deducing the equivalents of theses
(Ql'.D), and (2lit), to use any auxiliary definition at all: instead of the above
Def. .6. and Theorems 2(ryi-2lit I could here formulate for example just three
theorems, stating respectively, that:
THEOREM 2(ryi_ If some object is a, then Kl( a) is an object.
(Results from the counterpart of thesis (25) and the counterpart of the-
sis (It).
COUNTERPART OF THEOREM 2lD. If some object is a, then some object
is Kl( a).
(Results from Th. Qtryi.)
COUNTERPART OF THEOREM 2lit. If p is Kl( a), and Q is Kl( a), then
Pis Q.
(1) Pis Kl( a),
and
(2) Q is Kl(a);
(3) some object is a (from the counterpart of Th. 25 and (1)),
(4) Kl(a) is an object (Th. Qlryi, (3)),
P is Q ( (4) , ( 1) , ( 2)) .
THEOREM 2lQ. (counterpart of Ax. I). If P zs a part of ob-

ject Q, then Q is not a part of object P.
from Th. and (1) we infer, that
(2) Q is. an object
and -
(4) Pis the class of objects P (Th. ~' (1)),
(5) not (Q is the class of objects P) (Th. 2l~, (4), (3)),
(6) for any Rand S, if Q is exterior to S, and R is P, then R
is exterior to S (Th. 0, (1));
from , (2), (5), and (6) it results, that for some S
(7) for any R, if R is P, then R is exterior to S
and
(8) not ( Q is exterior to S);
In my original 1921 deduction of the counterparts of Theorems QtD

and ~~' I used the same scheme of reasoning. If I wish to reason in a com-
pletely analogous way, hence without the assistance of an auxiliary definition,
in the case where in the theses of the 'general theory of sets' I use as before,
not expressions of the type 'Kl(a)', but the corresponding expressions of the
type 'the class of objects a', then, in deriving the counterparts of Th. mm
from the theses (Q)) and (e=), I could raise doubts in the reader's mind in
regard to the question whether and why I am allowed to 'substitute' the ex-
pression 'the class of objects a' for the expression '<p(a)' in thesis (Q)). (See
here Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, [1926], pp. 209, 210, 213 and 214. 1927. Kaz-
imierz Ajdukiewicz, 'Sprostowanie wazniejszych bl~d6w zawartych w artykule
p.t. 'Zalozenia logiki tradycyjnej'' (Report on the More Important Errors
Which are Contained in the Article Under the Title 'Presuppositions of Tra-
ditional Logic'), Przeglqd Filozoficzny 30, No. II-III; V. Neumann, op. cit.,
p. 42; Stanislaw Le8niewski, [1929b], p. 77). Not wanting to enter into the
subtleties of this 'substitution' here, and yet wanting to avoid the possibility
of such doubts, I have chosen to employ somewhat longer reasonings with
the help of the introduced ad hoc auxiliary definition .6.. In deducing Th. mm
from thesis (Q3) and Th. 2l9J1, I have used in this situation an ordinary 'sub-
stitution' of the 'constant' 'Kl' for the 'variable' '1.p' in thesis (Q3) which raises
none of the above doubts.
(9) P is exterior to S ( (7), (1) ),

(10) not (Q is a part of object P) (Th. 91, (9), (8)),
Q is not a part of object P ((2), (10)).
THEOREM Ql~. (counterpart of Ax. II).' If P is a part of ob-
ject Q, and Q is. a part of object R, then Pis a part of object R.
(1) Pis a paf't of object Q,
and
(2) Q is a part of object R;
(3) R is an object (Th. Wl, (2)),
then Tis exterior to S (Th. 91, (1), (2)),
(5) R is the class of objects (P or R) (Th. ~' (3), (4)),
(6) Q is not a part of object P (Th. Q(Q, (1)),
(7) not (Pis the same object as R) ((6), (2))
P is a part of object R (Th. m?, (5), (1 ), (7) ).
CHAPTER XI
ON 'SINGULAR' PROPOSITIONS OF THE TYPE 'Ac:b'
.
Becaus~ of technical and editorial problems I wish to discontinue
here the discussions in the domain of my 'general theory of sets'. I
will return once more to the subjects in that field in later chapters
of this work. However, in connection with the previous chapters,
I would like to point out at this juncture that the period of years
1915 to 1923 inclusive, from which period come the results pre-
sented in Chapters IV-X in the domain of my 'general theory of
sets', I subjected the external form of those results to a number of
more or less substantial and gradually executed changes in respect
of the formulation of theses as well as in the method of construct-
ing the proofs. The historical picture of these changes, which I
decided upon gradually as a result of the increasing clarity that
was coming to me, and of the solution by workers in 'mathemat-
ical logic' of various real and symbolic difficulties in the day to
day foundations of mathematics, has become quite obliterated in
the uniformity of the external appearance - for my convenience
and that of the reader - as is illustrated in Chapters IV-X of
the present work. The more important stages of the evolution of
the outer forms which I gave to the theories constructed by me
in this period will become visible to the reader in rough outline
in my further deliberations.
Under the influence of conversations which I had in 1920 in
Warsaw with Dr. Leon Chwistek, now Professor of Logic in the
University of Lvov, I decided on the introduction into my scientific
practice of some 'symbolic' language using formulas constructed
by 'mathematical logicians' in place of the colloquial language
which I had used up to that time with obstinate determination,
attempting, like many others, to tame colloquial language, and
in its 'logical' aspect, ant to bend it to theoretical purposes for
I
I
l,J=,'==
which it was not originally created. The linguistic operation I

performed on myself in this way (so that, as it has become clear
later, I would never again desire a return to nature in this respect)
was then largely prepared psychologically by the years of critical
distrust of the fundamental formulas of 'the mathematical logic'
in connectioIJ. with the questions discussed in Chapter I concern-
ing the meani,ng of those formulas, a period which I closed in 1918
and 1919 with the observation, valuable for me if banal for others,
about the system of Whitehead and Russell which I formulated
in Chapter I that "the formulas of the so-called deductive theory,
become comprehensible formulas if we ignore the assertion signs,
and begin to 'hold together', if one consistently interprets propo-
sitions of the type 'f',,,J p', 'p V q', 'p :.J q', etc., contained therein
with the aid of corresponding propositions of the type 'not p', 'p
or q', 'if p, then q' etc., supplemented in case of possible mis-
understandings by suitable brackets, but in no case - contrary
to the authors' remarks - is it permissible to read the formu-
las mentioned by means of propositions which relate propositions
and which state certain relations, e.g., relations of 'implication',
between propositions", 1 and connected with that observation, the
appropriation for oneself of the relevant features of the elements
of the ·'deductive theory' interpreted in that way. In my public
statements I commenced a systematic use of a symbolic language
instead of a colloquial one in the year 1920, in my course on the
'Foundations of the Theory of Classes' (the name which I used at
that time for my 'general theory of sets') at Warsaw University in
the academic year 1919/1920, which was my first year of lectures
at the university.
The symbolism I adopted, based on formulas constructed by
'mathematical logicians', I used as a tool which is technically
much simpler than the colloquial language and at the same time
less prone than that language to lead to misunderstanding in the
1 S. Lesniewski, 0 podstawach matematyki (On the Foundations of Math-

ematics), Przeglqd Filozoficzny 30, Nos. II-III, 1927, p. 181.
formulation of ideas. In attempting to translate the theses of my

'general theory of sets' as scrupulously as possible from the col-
loquial language into my new 'symbolic language', I nevertheless
constructed the proofs of the theorems of that theory in an in-
tuitive way without in any way basing those proofs upon some
clearly codified system of 'mathematical logic', a procedure I had
used up,, to then. The change to a 'symbolic' way of writing,
which constituted a far-reaching revolution in my scientific life in
the field of symbolic technique, was not accompanied by any far-
reaching parallel events in the domain of my 'logical' views.
In 'symbolic' formulations of propositions in various areas, I
adopted from the beginning (with insignificant modifications) the
form of the 'constant' terms of the 'deductive theory' and the form
of the quantifiers from Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and
Russell, as well as the method of using dots to replace brackets; 2
in place of the expression 'is' in 'singular' propositions of the type
'A is b' I commenced, followi~g Peano, to use the sign 'c;', which
is the first letter of the word 'c;o-rt'; 3 in addition I used a number
of different signs of my own invention.
While using colloquial language in scientific work and at-
tempting to control its 'logic', I endeavoured to somehow ratio-
nalize the way in which I was using in colloquial language various
types of propositions passed down to us by 'traditional logic'.
While relying on 'linguistic instinct' and the often non-uniform
tradition of 'traditional logic', I attempted to devise a consistent
method of working with propositions which were 'singular', 'par-
ticular', 'general', 'existential' etc. The results of my efforts were
useful and I continued my efforts in applying to the 'symbolism'
the equivalents of various types of propositions, after the change
to the 'symbolic' way of writing.
2 See: Whitehead and Russell, l. c., pp. 9-11.

3 See: G. Peano, 'Logique mathematique', (Formulaire de Mathematiques)
II§ 1 [I<,£, '.:), "', =, -, '--",A, 3, t, t, K', '--"', ,.....,', , Sim, rep]. 11-VIII-
1897.
On the Foundations of Afathematics 367
It so happened in connection with the semantic analyses which

I applied to various categories of propositions, and in connection
with considerations to do with the possibility of 'reducing' by def-
initions one type of proposition to others in keeping with my way
of using various types of propositions, my interest in 1920 was cen-
tred on 'sin_gu1ar' propositions of the type 'Ac:b' and on the mutual
relations between such propositions. Having acquired consider-
"
able experience in the consistent scientific operation with these
,,
I 'singular' propositions and having at my disposal a considerable
\
number of what were for me thoroughly reliable theoretical syn-
theses which, although they were constructed more or less ad hoc,
and not formulated within the limits of a deductive system, nev-
ertheless made it much easier for me to elucidate for myself and
others the subtleties of my scientific language, I wished to take
one step further and, using the 'singular' propositions of the type
'Ac:b', to base all my deliberations on some clearly formulated ax-
iomatization which would harmonize with my theoretical practice
in this domain at that time. In relation to such an axiomatization
I required that no 'constant' terms should appear in it with the
exception of the expression '.' in propositions of the type 'Ac:b'
and terms which appear in the 'deductive theory'.
Feelingthe need of a deductive theory axiomatized in the way
described, I nevertheless could not find a ready theory of that sort
in the work of either the 'traditional logicians' or the 'mathemati-
cal logicians'. Concerned with questions connected with the real-
ization of the general plan of such a theory, I one day formulated
in my 'Exercises in the Domain of the Cantorian Theory of Sets',
which I conducted at Warsaw University in the summer semester
in the academic year 1919/1920, a number of theses which would
be valid on the basis of the theory mentioned. I cannot recall
which theses I mentioned then - after so 1nany years - but I
can state with complete confidence, referring partly to facts to
which I had an opportunity to refer in the present work, that at
that time I would not have accepted as sufficient for my theoret-
ical purposes as described above any axiomatization which did
not guarantee the possibility of deriving from it - while permit-

ting, of course, operations with definitions which harmonized with
my way of using the corresponding expressions in my scientific
practice, - 'symbolic' equivalents of theses, stating respectively,
that
(1) sorµe·a is b when and only when, for some X, (Xis a, and X
is b), 4
(2) if A is b, then A is an object. 5
(3) every a is b when and only when, (some object is a, and for
any X, if Xis a, then Xis b). 6
(4) A is the same object as B when and only when, (A is B, and
Bis A),
(5) at most one object is a when and only when, for any A and B,
if A is a, and B is a, then A is the same object as B,
and
(6) A is a when and only when, (each A is a, and at most one
object is A).
From among the different theses, whose 'symbolic' equivalents
were valid in the deductive theory which I wished to build, I have
selected here theses ( 1)-(6), as they appear to me a convenient
jntuitiye tr3:n~sitio11 to other deliberations: thesis (6), or any other
thesis more or less similar to thesis (6), has played a far-reaching
role at the creation of the aforesaid theory, whose sole Axiom I
devised by analysis of that thesis; theses (1)-(5), selected to avoid
intuitive difficulties for the reader, throw some light (directly or
indirectly) on the way in which I used the expressions appearing
in thesis (6). I infer from theses (1)-(6) certain consequences:
(7) some object is a when and only when, for some X, (Xis a),
(Results from (1) and (2));
4 See: S. Lesniewski, 0 podstawach matematyki (On the Foundations of

Mathematics), Przeglqd Filozoficzny 31, No. III, 1928, p. 265, footnote 4.
5 See l.c., p. 266, footnote 3.
6 See l. c., p. 264, footnote 2.
(8) every a is b when and only when, ((for some X, (X is a))

and for any X, if X is a, then X is b), (Results from (3)
and (7));
(9) if for any A and B, if A is a, and B is a, then A is B, then
for any A and B, if A is a, and B is a, then A is the same
object as f3 ·(Results from the observation, that, if for any A
and B, if 4'A is a, and B is a, then A is B, then for any A
and B, if A is a, and Bis a, then (A is B, and Bis A), and
thesis (4)); ·
(10) (for any A and B, if A is a, and Bis a, then A is the same
object as B) when and only when, for any A and B, if A is a
and B is a, then A is B (from (9) and (4));
(11) at most one object is a when and only when, for any A and
B, if A is a and Bis a, then A is B (from (5) and (10));
(12) A is a when and only when, ((for some X, (X is a)), (for
any X, if Xis A, then Xis a, and for any Band C, if Bis
a, and C is a, then Bis C) (from (6), (8) and (11));
(13) A is a when and only when, ((for some B, (B is A)), (for
any B and C, if B is A, and C is A, then B is C) and for
any B, if B is A, then B is a) 7 (from (12)). The symbolic
equivalent of (13) is:
(A,a): :Aca. _ :.(3B).BcA:.(B,C):BcA.CcA. ::::>.
BcC:.(B):BcA. ::::>.Bea,
I commenced to use this - yet again in the same year 1920 -, as
the sole axiom of my deductive theory. 8 This axiom was entirely
sufficient for all theoretical purposes which I wished to achieve by
means of the required axiomatized theory.
I needed a name for the theory I had commenced to build.
I decided to apply here the expression 'ontology'. I will explain
below the reasons for selecting this term.
7
See the analysis of the proposition 'the author of Waverley was Scotch'
in Russell (Russell, op. cit., p. 177).
8 See: Stanislaw Le8niewski, [1930a], p. 114.
I presented the first general outline of ontology in my lecture

entitled 'On the Principles of Ontology' which took place during
the scientific session of the Polish Association for Psychology on
10th January, 1921. 9
I presented systematically a number of results in the domain
of onto!ogy and discussed a considerable number of problems from
that field in my course 'The Foundations of Arithmetic', at the
Warsaw" University, lasting through the II and III trimesters of
the academic year 1920/1921 and through the academic years
1921/1922 and 1922/1923. In that course I dealt with a set of
theses, which I called arithmetic, as a part of ontology. I also
dedicated to questions of ontology - wholly or partly - a lec-
ture entitled 'On Comparisons of the Grammatical Functions',
which took place during the scientific session of The Logical Sec-
tion of the Warsaw Philosophical Institute, 10th March 1921, 10
a paper entitled 'On the Foundations of Ontology' in the section
on logic which took place during the Second Polish Philosophical
Congress in September 1927, 11 and my further three lectures at
Warsaw University: the course on 'Foundations of Ontology' dur-
ing the academic years 1925/1926 and 1926/1927, and the courses
'Directives on Logistic and Ontology' and 'An Elementary Out-
line of Ontology', started at the beginning of the academic year
1929/1930 and continued up to the present time. Until now my
only printed publication in the do~.ain of ontology is the above
mentioned 22-page communication 'Uber den Grundlagen der On- -
tologie', published in the year 1930, in which I formulated as pre-
cisely as possible, among other things, the conditions which must
9 See: Proceedings of the Polskie Towarzystwo Psychologiczne, for the pe-

riod from 1January1921 to 31March1922, Przeglqd Filozoficzny 25 (1922),
No. IV, p. 561.
10
See: Proceedings of the Warszawski Instytut Filozoficzny Polskie To-
warzystwo Psychologiczne, for the period from 1 January 1920 to 25 June
1921, Przeglqd Filozoficzny 24 (1921), No. III and IV, 1921, p. 248.
11 See: 'Ksi~ga Pami&tkowa Drugiego Polskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego,
Warszawa, 1927', Przeglqd Filozoficzny 31 (1928), No. I-II, p. 160.
be fulfilled by an expression, in order that it be accepted into on-
tology as a definition, or included in the system of ontology as a
theorem; 12 in the report mentioned, I also gave an account in brief
outline of the gradual simplifications of the ontological axiom, by
me and by Boleslaw Sobocinski, a student of the University of
vVarsaw. 13 .
In the course of the last ten years, in which my ontology has
(I
been known to others from my manuscripts, university lectures I'
and papers, and from discussions with me as well as from students'

notes and other forms of 'tradition', I had the opportunity to hear
a number of public statements about the theory which I was con-
structing, (I wish to mention here in concreto the lecture entitled
'On Prof. Lesniewski's Ontology'), which was delivered by Dr. Jan
Lukasiewicz, Professor of Philosophy at Warsaw University, dur-
ing the session of the Logical Section of the Warsaw Philosophical
Institute on 24th March, 1921) 14 and also to encounter a number
of references to that theory in the learned publications of various
Polish authors. On the part of one of those authors, Dr. Tadeusz
Kotarbinski, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Warsaw,
my dear friend and colleague from students years - my ontology
has met with a systematic and favourable scientific support from
the time ofits "birth. Judging favourably the theory which I had
concocted, Kotarbinski introduced its elements into his lectures at
the university 15 for a number of years, and also expressed himself
very decidedly in its favour in his new work entitled 'Elements of
12 Lesmews k"1, op. czt.,
I • . p. 127 .
13 Op. cit., pp. 131 and 132.
14 See: 'Proceedings of the Warszawski lnstytut Filozo:ficzny for the period
from 1 January 1920 to 25 June 1921', p. 248.
15 See: (1) Kurs logiki (Course on Logic), (Lectures given by Prof. Kotar-
binski in the winter semester, year 1923/1924). (Prepared by The Publishing
Commission of the Circle of Philosophy Students at the University of War-
saw), (Mimeographed), pp. 145 and 146. (2) Logika, (Logic), Mimeographed
from lectures given by Prof. Tadeusz Kotarbinski in the autumn trimester,
academic year 1924/1925, Warsaw 1925, pp. 106-118. (3) Elementy logiki
formalnej teorji poznania i metodologii (Elements of Formal Logic, Theory
the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology' 16 as is

clear from the section which, full of pride, I introduce shortly. -
From the remote period of our common 'philosophical' past when
each one of us, pursuing our various aims, was straying along blind
alleys in semantics and theories of 'truth', whether in a pilgrim-
age to .the unpromising land of 'free activity' or in disorganized
flight fi;pm the formidable spectre of Epimenide's - The Liar
and other fearsome creatures belching contradictions, I became
accustomed to check my various ideas and theoretical projects in
scientific discussions with Tadeusz Kotarbinski: I availed myself
on various occasions of his subtle analytical help; I constantly re-
ferred to his sharp insights during the establishment of various
assumptions in the different deductive theories which I was con-
structing; I listened to his relevant and fair critical observations
of Knowledge and Methodology), Authorized mimeograph of lectures given

by Prof. T. Kotarbinski in the autumn trimester, academic year 1926/1927,
prepared by D. Steinberzanka, Warsaw 1926, Nos. 9-10, pp. 229-250.
16 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, [1929]. In connection with my ontology see here
pp. 227-247, 253, 254 and 459. Of the comments by other authors con-
cerning this theory, I mention here the references which occur in the fol-
lowing places: (1) Lindenbaum and Tarski, op. cit., pp. 299, 312, 315,
316, 322 and 326. (2) Jan Lukasiewicz, 0 znaczeniu i potrzebach logiki
matematycznej (On the Importance and the Needs of Mathematical Logic),
Reprint from Volume X of 'Nauka Polska', Rocznik Kasy im. Mianowskiego,
p. 608. (3) Jan Lukasiewicz, Elementy logiki matematycznej (Elements
of Mathematical Logic), Authorized mimeograph prepared by M. Pres-
burger, Wydawnictwa Kola Matematyczno-Fizycznego Sluchacz6w Uniwer-
sytetu Warszawskiego (Publications of the Circle of Mathematical-Physical
Students of the University of Warsaw 1929, Vol. XVIII, p. 25. (4) Studjum
matematyki, fizyki i astronomji na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, Informa-
tor dla student6w (Studies in Mathematics, Physics and Astronomy at
the University of Warsaw, Guidebook for Students), Wydawnictwa Kola
Matematyczno-Fizycznego Sluchacz6w Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego (Pub-
lications of the Circle of Mathematical-Physical Students of the University
of Warsaw, Vol. XIII, 2nd Edition, completely revised, 1930. (5) J. L. Billich
and St. Jaskowski, Logika matematyczna i jej metodologja (Mathematical
Logic and Its Methodology), p. 139.
and felt concerned whenever I deviated too much from his theo-
retical conceptions of my own views. The most sincere joy fills
my heart in the light of the fact that, as far as my ontology is
concerned, I have an established right to claim that in Tadeusz
Kotarbinski I have a learned ally. - I intended to be as parasitic
as possible OJ?. the above mentioned 'Elements of the Theory of
Knowledge, F9rmal Logic and the Methodology of Science' .17
In one part of his work Kotarbinski writes: "For the calcu-
lus of names we preferred to take as a foundation the system of
Lesniewski, known to us from manuscript and given to a large
number of students in the form of lectures, for we regard this as
the most mature, most natural and most practical of the systems
known to us for the systematisation of the calculus of names. In
addition, it is closely connected with traditional Aristotelian for-
mal logic, of which it is an extension and an improvement, while
on the other hand it is a terminal point in the attempt to construct
a calculus of names in the area of logistics. In particular we took
from Lesniewski's system the axiom, the definitions and the stock
of theorems, some of which (e.g., Th. 38) are characteristic of that
system. But the author of this work bears the sole responsibility
for the choice of this or that theorem, the indication of relation-
ships~,between formulas of the calculus of names and formulas of
the calculus of propositions, and also for the interpretation of the
quantifiers and for the ways of interpreting the formulas in ab-
breviated forms. - We will add that Lesniewski calls his system
'ontology' in harmony with certain terms used earlier (as in the
'ontological principle of contradiction', the thesis that no object
may possess and not possess the same feature, in Lukasiewicz's
book (On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle', 1910, p.9ff;
see here Th. 19. ). This name also has a basis in this, that the sin-
gle characteristic primitive term in the axiomatization accepted
17 [Translator's note: Presumably a return compliment to T. Kotarbinski
who wrote, in praise of Lesniewski, of 'the third, parasitic stage in the his-
tory of concretism' based on Lesniewski's Ontology. See: T. Kotarbinski,
[1966b).]
here is the term 'est', that is 'is', which corresponds to the Greek
'£arl'. Hence, wishing to emphasize this, one can form a name
for the system from the corresponding participle which reads 'on'
(gen. 'ontos'), and means 'being'.- If in spite of these reasons we
do not use the word 'ontology' here as a name for the calculus
of naf!les, this is only becau~e of the fear of a misunderstanding.
Misun~erstanding could arise from the fact that this name has its
roots already in another role, i.e., it has been long agreed to call
'ontology' the enquiry 'on the general principles of existence' con-
ducted in the spirit of certain parts of Aristotelian 'metaphysical'
books. It has to be admitted however, that if the Aristotelian
definition of the main theory ('prote filosofia') discussed in those
books is interpreted in the spirit of a 'general theory of objects',
then both the word and its meaning, can be applied to the calcu-
lus of names of Lesniewski" .18 As we can see, this passage brings
out those features which can be taken as a guide in selecting the
expression 'ontology', as a name for my theory. Generalizing the
terminological inclinations of Lukasiewicz cited by Kotarbinski
to which I became accustomed over a period of some years, and
ta.king into consideration the relation existing between the single
characteristic primitive term of my theory and the Greek par-
ticiple explained by Kotarbinski, I used the name 'ontology' 19 to
characterize the theory I was developing, without offence to my
'linguistic instincts' because I was formulating in that theory a
certain kind of 'general principles of existence'.
Passing from the name 'ontology' to the other questions con-
nected with the theory with which I am now dealing, I wish to
return for the moment to 'singular' propositions of the type 'Ac:b'
which appear in the basis of that theory.
Discussions which I held at various times have convinced me
that in using the aforesaid 'singular' propositions, my intentions
were not always correctly understood. It often happened that
18 Kotarbinski, op. cit., pp. 253 and 254.

someone with whom I spoke did not realize the sense in which
I was using the sign 'e' in my ontology, and experienced inter-
pretational difficulties in attempting to relate the given sign se-
mantically to one or other signs handed down by the tradition of
'mathematical logic' and 'the theory of sets'. In the troublesome
theoretical situations in which I found myself due to this state of
affairs, I shar~d the misfortune of all who are forced by circum-
stances to convey in 'their own words' the sense of the various
primitive terms of deductive theories which they were construct-
ing. I avoided the aforesaid situations, with or without success,
by applying - depending on the character of the interlocutor -
very varied methods of appealing to their intuitions. While for
one person the most eloquent and appealing circumstance was
that I used the the expression 'c' in a sense which satisfied the
above axiom of ontology - another person felt happier receiv-
ing the comment that I used propositions of the type 'Ac:b' as
equivalents of corresponding propositions of the type 'every A is
b, and at the most one object is A' in my colloquial language; 20
whereas a third person was helped by the remark that proposi-
tions of the type 'A is b' are, in my colloquial language, equivalent
to the corresponding propositions of the type 'A is the only one
of objects b', understood in a way which would make them appli-
cable also in the case where A is the sole such object which is b-
yet another person began to understand the semantical situation
correctly when I mentioned to him that I was using the sign 'c:'
in propositions of the type 'Ac:b' in the same sense as I use the
expression 'is' in, e.g., the propositions belonging to colloquial
language - 'this man is elderly', 'Rome is older than Warsaw',
'the point of intersection of line P with line R is the centre of the
circle IC.
Desiring, naturally, that the reader should realize as clearly
as possible the sense which I give to my 'singular' propositions
of the type 'Ac:b' and, like everybody else in a similar situation,
20
See above thesis (6).
lacking a general and reliable technique for a mutual understand-

ing with the reader on this matter and for 'infecting' him with
just those semantical 'attitudes' concerning the sign '.' which I
myself experience, I am balled, and refer at once to all the above
remarks simultaneously. To complement the remarks I will again
quote-. to make it a little easier for myself in this difficult matter
- somf passage from the cited work of Kotarbinski:
Discussing some of the fundamental questions concerned with
the axiom and the single characteristic primitive term of my ontol-
ogy Kotarbinski writes among other things: "After these remarks
we will explain the elements of the calculus of names basically in
accordance with the system of Lesniewski. The author introduces
only one axiom for the calculus of names. In that axiom there
is only one primitive sign, namely the word 'is' in the role of a
connection between subject and predicate. Here is the axiom:
II A, B {A est B =[II X (X est A< X est B) .
.~X ( X est A) . II X, Y ( X est A. Y est A < X est
Y)]}.
This is to be read as follows: For A and B, A is B always and
only if: (1) for )(, if X is A, then X is B, (2) for some X, X is
A, (3) for X and Y, if ..Y is A and Y is A, then Xis Y. Example:
Jan 'III Sobieski is' the deliverer of Vienna - then equivalent to
this: (1) about any object whatsoever it is true, that if it is Jan III
Sobieski, it is also true about it that it 1s the deliverer of Vienna,
(2) somebody is Jan III Sobieski, (3) if this is Jan III Sobieski and
that is Jan III Sobieski, then this is that (therefore, we consider,
it is the same individual).
We should remember that the above axiom does not consti-
tute a definition, therefore it is not a definition of the word 'is'
in the role of copula. This word is accepted here in the role of
primitive term. The reader's understanding of it is counted on, in
particular, in the sense which we have in mind in this exposition.
It is thus important to prevent serious misunderstandings before-
hand. - We note therefore, that 'is' does not operate here by
assuming the independent role of a predicate, which it has in the
sentence: 'God is', 'there is justice' etc., and in which it is equiv-
alent to 'exists' in one of its chief meanings. We also strongly
emphasize that 'is' does not appear here in the role of an abbre-
viation for the expression 'is now' and does not inform us as to
whether the s_ubject of discussion is of the present time (in con-
trast to the roJe of the word 'is' in, e.g., the sentence 'Poland is
independent', expressed with an allusion to the implied 'although
until recently it was enslaved'). 21
And further: "A sentence of the type 'A is b', where the word
'is' appears in the role which corresponds to the axiom quoted
above, we call a singular proposition. It should be remembered
however that in ordinary language other meanings different from
that intended are often concealed within that form. So e.g., the
proposition 'man is mammal', is only superficially individual be-
cause of the meaning which is normally being expressed. In reality
it constitutes an abbreviation of the utterance 'whatever is a man
is a mammal', in the symbols agreed upon 'II X (Xis man < ..Y is
a mammal)', for which utterance the abbreviation normally rec-
ommended being the proposition 'any man is a mammal', a so-
called weak general and not a singular proposition. The word 'is'
in such a proposition does not play precisely the same role here
as in a singular proposition, but rather forms, together with the
word 'any', one new sign, which will have a separate symbol in
the agreed upon notation, in the way 'if ... then' is symbolized
with one symbol '<' in the calculus of propositions. 22
Elsewhere we read: "we were led astray by the variety of ways
of using a construction of the type 'A is B' in the Polish lan-
guage. Sometimes the use is an essential and central one, c:s in
the proposition 'Uranus is a planet'. Here the word 'is' plays
21 Kotarbinski, op. cit., pp. 227 and 228.

22 Op. cit., p. 229. In connection with the way Kotarbiriski uses the word
'any' ('wszelki') in contrast to the word 'every' ('kaide'), see op. cit., pp. 223-
225.
an elementary role, a role of a timeless connection between an

individual name on the left and another name on the right side.
On another occasion the use is secondary, derivative, indirect, as
in the proposition 'It is a full moon'. Here the word 'is' performs
the role of the first 'is' supplemented by the word 'now' or its
equiv.alent. Another time we encounter a secondary use of the
discu&Ped construction in e.g., the proposition 'The whale is a
mammal'. Here an individual name need not appear on the left
side ('whale' is a general name) and the whole functions in the
role of a substitute abbreviation for another proposition of a con-
ditional construction. In the present case it would read as follows:
'Whatever is a whale, is also a mammal'. There are also other
occurrences of the secondary usage of our construction, e.g., in
the example below concerning seniority. The whole fulfills here
also the role of an abbreviation, but an abbreviation of a proposi-
tion of a much more complicated construction than the example
about the whale. The proposition whose abbreviation is the ut-
terance 'Seniority is a transitive relation', reads in unabbreviated
form: 'If any object is senior to another object, and that other
object is senior to yet another, then the first object is senior to
the third one'. 23 And another still: "In the proposition 'seniority
is-a-transitive relation' we have indeed a construction of the type
'A is B', but it is in the secondary usage, in which the word 'is'
reads as (or resembles) the connection in the sentence 'Uranus is
a planet', but performs a quite different role". 24
The examples cited in the passages from Kotarbinski's book
illustrate the well-known fact that the expression 'is' and propo-
sitions of the type 'A is b' are used in colloquial language in a
highly inconsistent way. I do not need to mention here that by
using the expression 's' consistently on the basis of my ontol-
ogy in propositions of the type 'Acb' and in the same sense in
which, on the basis of colloquial language, I use the expression
23 0 p. cit., pp. 8 and 9.

24 0 p. cit., p. 9.
'is' in the proposition 'This man is elderly' and in the other two .,
propositions which I cited above as examples, I obviously cannot,
nor do I wish to, correct every inconsistency of the expression
'is' and of propositions of the type 'A is b' as used in colloquial
language, nor can I bring them into harmony with the way the
expression 'c:'. and propositions of the type 'Ac:b' are used in my
ontology. It 'Yould be trite to remark that an obstinate 'collo-
quialist's' substitution - through ignorance or eccentricity - of
the use of the forms of everyday language, perhaps subjected to
various clarifying, preventative, treatments in the shape of se-
mantic palliatives, as superior to the use of 'symbolic' language,
even in scientific enunciations requiring great precision and stylis-
tic care, could easily have the 'logical' value of my own colloquial
language increased to some extent by means of the elimination
from this language - in the formulation of theses concerning
matters which demand 'delicacy' in the semantical verbal formu-
lations of the words - of all ways of operating with propositions
of the type 'A is b' which Kotarbinski calls, in one of the above
quoted passages from his book, the 'method of secondary usage'
of such propositions. Such elimination would consist in the fact
that ideas previously expressed in the 'secondary' way such as
the ideas expressed in this way by means of the propositions -
'Poland is independent', 'man is a mammal', 'seniority is a transi-
tive relation' quoted by Kotarbinski, would instead be expressed
in different forms of words depending on their character, such as
those verbal forms given by Kotarbinski in the above quotation,
which do not contain propositions of the type 'A is b' used in this
'secondary' way.
In connection with the passages of Kotarbinski 's work deal-
ing with propositions in which 'with the assistance of the present,
the past or the grammatical future' of the indicative forms of the
words 'to be' one wishes to lay stress in ordinary language on
the present, the past or the future of whatever is talked about,
and in discussing a 'treatment' of these propositions in which 'the
time mark would be transferred from the copula to the subject or
predicate', 25 there comes to my mind a certain typical difficulty

which will come as a surprise to anyone who wishes to use propo-
sitions of the type 'A is b' in his colloquial language in a way
which harmonizes with the use of propositions of the type 'Ac:b'
in my ontology. This difficulty would appear e.g., if he were to
assert .successively, as may happen, that
(a) Wq.rsaw is older than the Sa.ski Garden,
(b) Warsaw of 1830 is smaller than Warsaw of 1930,
( c) Warsaw of 1930 is Warsaw,
and
( d) Warsaw of 1830 is Warsaw;
from theses (a)-( d) and the aforesaid thesis (13), whose 'sym-
bolic' equivalent I began to use, as noted, in 1920 as the sole
axiom of ontology, such a person could easily reach the following
consequences:
(e) if A is a, and B is A, then B is a 26 (results from (13) ).
(f) if A is a, B is A, and C is A, thenB is C (from (13) );
(g) \Varsaw of 1930 is Warsaw of 1830 (from (f), (a), (c)
and (d));
(h) Warsaw of 1930 is smaller than Warsaw of 1930 (from (e ), (b)
and (g)).
Thesis (h) is, of course, an ordinary absurdity. Analysing the
premises which lead to this absurdity, I should mention here the
following: anyone who uses the expression 'Warsaw' and wishes
to do so consistently, has to decide what he will denote by the
use of that expression and in particular he must not vacillate in
his linguistic usage between two 'intruding' interpretations: the
first-, in which there is just one object possessing a definite time
dimension yet unknown to us, i.e., concerning 'Warsaw from the
beginning to end of its existence' one could rightly say that it
25 Op.cit., p. 228.
26 See:
S. Lesniewski, '0 podstawach matematyki' (On the Foundation of
Mathematics), Przeglqd Filozoficzny 31, No. III, 1928, p. 269, footnote 1.
is Warsaw, but it is not possible to call vVarsaw any time-slice

or any 'section' of the time of the one Warsaw mentioned, and
consequently in this interpretation neither the so-called Warsaw
of 1930 nor the so-called Warsaw of 1830 have any right to the
name 'Warsaw', being time-slices of 'Warsaw from the beginning
to the end of its· existence', although the name 'time-slice ofWar-
saw' could be•applied to them; the second - in which there are
many different objects, in particular 'Warsaw from the beginning
to the end of its existence', 'Warsaw of 1930' and 'Warsaw of
1830', of which one can rightly say that they are Warsaws, and in
which one can assert quite generally, that if some object is War-
saw, and another object is a time-slice of the first object, then the
second object is Warsaw also. If my assumption is accurate, that
the expressions 'Warsaw of 1930' and 'Warsaw of 1830' which ap-
pear in the above argument having the absurd consequence (h),
denote two different time-slices of the object which one would be
inclined to call, in a quite free colloquial language, 'Warsaw from
the beginning to the end of its existence' (in the absence of this
assumption I would not be concerned about the argument men-
tioned, for I would not know what is referred to in the premisses
of the argument), then one can establish easily and convincingly
that 116 matter how one used the expression 'Warsaw', one would
not be able simultaneously to assert theses (a), (c) and (d), con-
stituting the premisses of the argument discussed, without sharp
conflict with the tendencies expressed in my ontology: if one used
the expression 'Warsaw' in such a way that one could rightly say
about just one object that it is Warsaw, one could not jointly
-assert thesis (c) and thesis (d), establishing as I assume, with
respect to two different time-slices of a certain object, and conse-
quently with respect to two different objects that are Warsaw; if
one used the expression 'Warsaw' in a way which would enable one
to assert about two different objects that they are Warsaws, one
would not be able to assert thesis (a), which leads to the conse-
quence (see above thesis (6)), that at most one object is Warsaw.
Attempting to adapt myself in this way to the linguistic difficulty
which I analysed here, and being inclined myself towards using

the expression 'Warsaw' as a name which denotes one object only,
I would feel somewhat safer from misunderstandings in my collo-
quial language if, on those occasions which require great 'logical'
caution, instead of the expressions 'Warsaw of 1930', 'Warsaw of
1830',. etc., I were to use the expressions 'the time-slice of War-
saw o! 1930', 'the time-slice of Warsaw of 1830', etc., or other
similar expressions which would not lead to the unjustified belief
that both the objects denoted by those expressions are Warsaws
I
(the expressions 'of 1930', 'of 1830' etc., would obviously not refer
here to Warsaw, but to the time-slices of Warsaw, which could -
for greater safety - be stressed with the assistance of suitably
placed brackets). However, even in the case where the expression
'Warsaw' denotes a number of objects, I would be a little afraid of
the expressions 'Warsaw of 1930' and 'Warsaw of 1830', because
expressions of the type 'a from the period X' are used in collo-
quial language in a certain quite different way, as is readily seen
in the case of the expression 'the Rector of the Warsaw University
of January 1923' which we would be inclined to use in colloquial
language to mean not so much the time-slice of the Rector of
Warsaw University of January 1923, as rather a man ('from the
beginning to the end of that man'), who was in January 1923 the
Rector of TVarsaw University.
With the aid of semantical analyses related to those which
were conducted above in connection with the theses (a)-(h), it is
possible to settle, from the point of view of my ontology, a large
number of other analogical difficulties arising out of propositions
of the type 'A is b' in colloquial language, by characterizing the
object with respect to time. But an ontologist who is betting
on a rise in the shares of a linguistic enterprise which is com-
peting against the colloquial language has no need to rend his
fine 'symbolic' garments over the difficulties resulting from the
inconsistent usage in the above mentioned colloquial language of
various expressions connected with a number of mutually com-
peting 'linguistic instincts'.
The Lesniewski Collection
The Ballieu Library ~nd the Philosophy Department of the University of Melbourne
have formed the· Lefoiewski Collection. This collection comprises all materials
published by St~islaw Le§niewski during his lifetime, and some unpublished
materials in their original languages.
Lesniewski's works are being published in English translation in the Nijhoff

International Philosophy Series
S. Ldniewski' s Collected Works

Edited by J.T.J. Srzednicki, S.J. Surma and D. Barnett with an annotated
bibliography by V.F. Rickey.
1992. Volume 44. ISBN 0-7923-1512-X
S. Ldniewski' s Lecture Notes in Logic
Edited by J.T.J. Srzednicki and Z. Stachniak.
1988. Volume 24. ISBN 90-247-3416-9.
Together with:
-~: 1-~~r1J~~ski'~ ~ysterns_

articles by various authors in two volumes:
Ontology and Mereology

Edited by J.T.J. Srzednicki and V.F. Rickey and J. Czelakowski.
1984 (NIPS 13) ISBN 90-247-2879-7
- Protothetics
(in preparation)
As supporting service for researchers the Ballieu Library will on application, and payment of
a fee for costs, provide micro-fiche copies of the Lesniewski. originals in the original
languages. Applications can be made to:
Philosophy Department, University of Melbourne or to:
The Ballieu Library, University of Melbourne,
Parkville 3052, Victoria, Australia.
1. N. Rotenstreich: Philosophy, History and Politics. Studies in Contemporary

English Philosophy of History. 1976 ISBN Pb 90-247-1743-4
2. J.T.J. Srzednicki: Elements of Social and Political Philosophy. 1976
ISBN Pb 90-247-1744-2
3. W. Tatarkiewicz: Analysis of Happiness. Translated from Polish by E. Rothert
41
and D. Zielinski. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1807-4
4. K. Twardowski: On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological
Investigation. Translated from Polish with an Introduction by R. Grossmann.
1977 ISBN Pb 90-247-1926-7
5. W. Tatarkiewicz: A History of Six Ideas. An Essay in Aesthetics. Translated
from Polish a.o. by C. Kasparek. 1980 ISBN 90-247-2233-0
6. H.W. Noonan: Objects and Identity. An Examination of the Relative Identity
Thesis and Its Consequences. 1980 ISBN 90-247-2292-6
7. L. Crocker: Positive Liberty. An Essay in Normative Political Philosophy.
1980 ISBN 90-247-2291-8
8. F. Brentano: The Theory of Categories. Translated from German by R.M.
Chisholm and N. Guterman. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2302-7
9. W. Marciszewski (ed.): Dictionary of Logic as Applied in the Study of
Language. Concepts - Methods -Theories. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2123-7
10. I. Ruzsa: Modal Logic with Descriptions. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2473-2
11. P. Hoffman: The Anatomy of Idealism. Passivity and Activity in Kant, Hegel
and Marx. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2708-1
12. M. S. Gram: Direct Realism. A Study of Perception. 1983
ISBN 90-247-2870-3
13. J.T.J. Srzednicki, V.F. Rickey and J. Czelakowski (eds.): Letniewski' s
Systems. Ontology and Mereology. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2879-7
For 'The Lesniewski Collection' see also Volumes 24 and 44.
14. J. W. Smith: Reductionism and Cultural Being. A Philosophical Critique of
Sociobiological Reductionism and Physicalist Scientific Unificationism. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2884-3
15. C. Zumbach: The Transcendent Science. Kant's Conception of Biological
Methodology. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2904-1
16. M. A. Nottumo: Objectivity, Rationality and the Third Realm« Justification
and the Grounds of Psychologism. A Study of Frege and Popper. 1985
ISBN 90-247-2956-4
Volumes 1-8 previously published under the Series Title: Melbourne International Philosophy Series.
17. I. Dilman (ed.): Philosophy and Life. Essays on John Wisdom. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2996-3
18. J. J. Russell: 1'-nalysis and Dialectic. Studies in the Logic of Foundation
Problems. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2990-4
19. G. Currie an<! A. Musgrave (eds.): Popper and the Human Sciences. 1985
ISBN Hb 90-247-2998-X; Pb 90-247-3141-0
20. C. D. Broad: Ethics. Lectures given at Cambridge during the Period 1933-34
to 1952-53. Edited by C. Lewy. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3088-0
21. D.A.J. Seargent: Plurality and Continuity. An Essay in G.F. Stout's Theory of
Universals. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3185-2
22. J.E. Atwell: Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought. 1986
ISBN 90-247-3167-4
23. J. Agassi, and I.C. Jarvie (eds.): Rationality: The Critical View. 1987
ISBN Hb 90-247-3275-1; Pb 90-247-3455-X
24. J.T.J. Srzednicki and Z. Stachniak: S. Lesniewski' s Lecture Notes in Logic.
1988 ISBN 90-247-3416-9
For 'The Lesniewski's Collection' see also Volume 13 and 44.
25. B.M. Taylor (ed.): Michael Dummett. Contributions to Philosophy. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3463-0
26. A· Z.:.Ba.I"-On: The Categories and the Principle of Coherence. Whitehead's
Theory of Categories in Historical Perspective. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3478-9
27. B. Dziemidok and P. McCormick (eds.): On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden.
Interpretations and Assessments .. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0071-8
28. J.T.J. Srzednicki (ed.): Stephan Korner - Philosophical Analysis and
Reconstruction. Contributions to Philosophy. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3543-2
29. F. Brentano: On the Existence of God. Lectures given at the Universities of
Wiirzburg and Vienna (1868-1891). Edited and translated from German by
Susan F. Krantz. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3538-6
30. Z. Augustynek: Time. Past, Present, Future. Essays dedicated to Henryk
Mehlberg. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0270-2
31. T. Pawlowski: Aesthetic Values. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0418-7
32. M. Ruse (ed.): What the Philosophy of Biology Is. Essays dedicated to David
Hull. 1989 ISBN 90-247-3778-8
33. J. Young: Willing and Unwilling. A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur
Schopenhauer. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3556-4
34. T. Z. Lavine and V. Tejera (eds.): History and Anti-History in Philosophy.
1989 ISBN 0-7923-0455-1
35. R.L. Epstein: The Semantic Foundations of Logic. Volume 1: Propositional

Logics. With the assistance and collaboration of W.A. Carnielli, I.M.L.
D'Ottaviano, S. Krajewski and R.D. Maddux. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0622-8
36. A: Pavkovic (ed.): Contemporary Yugoslav Philosophy. The Analytic Ap-
. preach. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3776-1
37. •A. Winterbourne: The Ideal and the Real. An Outline of Kant's Theory of
Space, Time and Mathematical Construction. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3774-5
38. K. Szaniawski (ed.): The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. 1989 .
ISBN 90-247-3798-2
39. G. Priest: In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3630-7
40. J. Wolenski (ed.): Kotarbinski: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0865-4
41. P. Geach (ed.): Logic and Ethics. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1044-6
42. U. Wybraniec-Skardowska: Theory of Language Syntax. Categorial Approach.
1991. ISBN 0-7923-1142-6
43. J. Bransen: The Antinomy of Thought. Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation
between Thoughts and Objects. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1383-6
44. J.T.J. Srzednicki, S.J. Surma, D. Barnett and V. F. Rickey: S. Lefoiewski' s
Collected Works. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1512-X
For 'The Lesniewski's Collection' see also Volumes 13 and 24.
Further information about our publications on Philosophy are available on request.
Kluwer Academic Publishers - Dordrecht I Boston I London

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Stanislaw Lesniewski: Collected Works

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On Definitions in the So-Called Theory of Deduction

Stanislaw Lesniewski was born on the 30th of March, 1886 in Ser-

years he continued to be reluctant to adopt the mathematical

A great period in mathematical logic and the foundations of

ematics, §1-§11', 1929.

Comprising a resume of his series 'On the Foundations of Math-

'Elementary Outline of Ontology', 1929-32.

Between 1918 and 1927 Lesniewski read several papers.

For Lesniewski there was no need to introduce the usual first

of Cracow, Poland, and The University of Melbourne, Victoria,

§ 1. TJ;ie expression 'existential proposition' refers to those

1 In the terminology of J. St. Mill.

propositions - a.ga.inst the recommendations of Cornelius who set-

2Ha.ns Cornelius, Versuch einer Theorie der Existenzialurteile, Munich,

expression 'synthetic proposition' to denote those propositions

Consequently, the thought which I formulated at the begin-

('denotation' as used by Mill) everything. This view conflicts with

really so, one could foresee certain difficulties in regarding as an-

connotes always the one characteristic of complete identity with

Remark 1. One hears, from time to time, of 'natural' and

I consider, as the touchstone of theoretical usefulness of a

e.g., the propositions 'non-existent people do not exist', 'a square

IO Dr F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Staridpunkte, Volume I,

existential proposition and, as such, contradictory. Paris, how-

Remark. I have discussed, in this section, the adequate and

on identical relationship between specific words - in quite differ-

§ 8. The inadequacy of verbal representations of some con-

various accidental inadequacies of representation in different fields

Introduction. The purpose of this study is to state and jus-

1 Jan Lukasiewicz, [1910b] 0 zasadzie sprzecznosci u Arystotelesa.

thus a dead, question a live problem of no mean consequence,

§ 1. I employ the expression 'ontological principle of contra-

'mortal' and 'a being·possessed of the property of mortality' - are

these properties by every object can be sy1nbolized in the propo-

9 Lukasiewicz, ibid., p. 15; cf. also p. 45.

at the same time that this conditional is synonymous with a cat-

the subject common to the antecedent and consequent, and pos-

The above proposition can then be formulated as 'every P is not

§ 5. I divide all linguistic expressions into connoting and

§ 6. I divide all linguistic expressions into those denoting

circle'; thus the expression 'square circle' symbolizes no object, in

denotes an object 'with contradictory properties' .14 As I shall try

§ 8. The examples of expressions possessing a symbolic func-