TOPIC 6

THE INTERWAR YEARS

Part I: Soviet Ukraine in the interwar period (1920-41)

As a result of World War I and the revolution Ukrainian territories were divided
among four states. Bukovyna was attached to Romania. Transcarpathia was joined
to the new Czechoslovak Republic. Poland got Galicia and western Volhynia. The
lands east of the Polish border formed Soviet Ukraine (2/3 of Ukrainian
territories).
The territories under Bolshevik control were formally organized as the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. By declaring the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic the Bolsheviks wanted to show that they respected Ukrainians’ national
rights. In such a way they planned to reduce the influence of Ukraine’s
nationalistic forces. The city of Kharkiv was made the capital of Ukraine. It
remained Ukraine’s main city until 1934 when Kyiv became capital again.
On Dec. 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – a federation of
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasian republic (Armenia, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan) – was proclaimed.1 Soviet republics were formally independent but in
reality they were under full control of a highly centralized political organization –
the Communist Party apparatus. All orders from Moscow were compulsory for all
“sovereign” republics. Thus in reality the Soviet Union was not a federation but
rather a highly centralized unitary state.

NEP
The major task facing the Bolsheviks after the war was to rebuild the economy.
The policy of “War Communism” – based on nationalization of all enterprises,
forced labor, state redistribution of goods, and the forcible requisition of food –
caused economic chaos. In 1921, industrial production in the Ukrainian lands was
1
The number of republics gradually increased to 9 and then to 15.
1
only one tenth of the prewar figure, and trains ran just once a week between the
major cities. The forcible requisition of extra food and the prohibition of trade did
not stimulate peasants to produce food beyond their needs. They did not sow much
grain. Thus, when drought came in 1921 it caused a famine that killed over a
million of peasants in Ukraine and the Volga region in Russia.
Dissatisfied with Bolshevik agrarian policy peasants rebelled in many
regions of Ukraine and Russia. There were strikes in Petrograd and even the
marines of the Kronshtadt fortress, the cradle of the Bolshevik revolution, staged
an uprising. Faced with such problems Vladimir Lenin in March 1921 introduced
the New Economic Policy (NEP), which denationalized small-scale industry and
trade and replaced grain requisitions with a tax that enabled the peasant to sell the
surplus of food on the free market. The policy of creating collective farms was also
abandoned. Reach peasants even got the right to hire poor peasants. Thus the NEP
included elements of a free-market economy. The results were quite good. By
1927, the Ukrainian economy had recovered to the prewar level.

Ukrainization
In 1923 the Bolsheviks announced the policy of indigenization, or korenizatsiia
(“putting down roots”). As the name implies the Bolsheviks wanted to ‘put down
roots’ (вкоренитись) in all Soviet republics.
The policy had three major tasks: 1) promotion of native languages in all
spheres of life; 2) fostering of national cultures; 3) recruitment of the party and
government cadres from the indigenous (local) populations to bind them to the
Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks did not want their party made up mainly of Jews
and Russians look foreign in Soviet republics. The Ukrainian version of this policy
was called Ukrainization. By korenizatsiia the Bolsheviks attempted to disarm the
forces of nationalism in Soviet republics. The new Communist regime tried to
show that in contrast to Tsarist Russia it respected the cultures of the non-Russians
in the USSR.
2
 In Ukraine, this program started a decade of rapid cultural flourishing.
Enrollments in Ukrainian-language schools and the publication of Ukrainian-
language books increased dramatically. Government officials who could not speak
Ukrainian were forced to attend language courses. If they did not want to learn
Ukrainian they could lose their jobs. A lot of various Ukrainian cultural
organizations were established.
The results of Ukrainization were really impressive. Whereas in 1922 only
20% of government business was conducted in Ukrainian, by 1927 the figure rose
to 70%. In 1923 only 35% of government employees and 23% of party members
were Ukrainian. By 1926-27 the respective percentages rose to 54% and 52%. In
1929, over 80% of schools and 30% of universities offered instruction in Ukrainian
only. By 1930, nearly 80% of all books published were in Ukrainian, and by 1931
nearly 90% of all newspapers were in Ukrainian.2 All radiobroadcast was in
Ukrainian only. The Ukrainian language stopped being primarily a village
language. It became a language of government and science.
The Communists widely used their achievements in cultural policy for
domestic and international propaganda. It was effective. Many Ukrainian political
emigrants decided to return to Ukraine (M. Hrushevsky and others). Thousands of
West Ukrainians also moved to Soviet Ukraine from Poland. Later, in the 1930s,
they were repressed.
The purpose of Ukrainization was to implant Soviet power. But there was a
side effect of this policy. Ukrainians started to hear their previously persecuted
national language in schools and in the workplace. Forbidden under the tsarist
regime courses in Ukrainian history, culture and literature were now taught in
schools and universities. A national revival began in Ukraine.
By the 1930s the Kremlin understood that korenizatisiia did not contribute to
the unity of the state as it developed different national identities in the USSR. The
growth of national consciousness in Soviet republics could lead in time to demands
2
It should be noted, however, that Ukrainian books did not dominate the republic’s book market, as three quarters of
the books sold in the republic were published in Russia. Many Russian-language newspapers were also brought to
Ukraine from Russia.
3
for economic and then political independence. The Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin
decided to use the old experience of Tsarist Russia and strengthen his totalitarian
empire through the promotion of a single culture. Such a culture was to be
common to all Soviet nations. The only common culture was Russian. So, since the
1930s till the end of the 1980s the Soviet nations had been experiencing a
favorable promotion of Russian culture at the expense of their own. Russification
in all republics reached gigantic proportions. The study of national histories,
languages, and literatures was severely limited. The communist government tried
to create a new people – the “Soviet people”, and Russian culture was to serve as
the basis for the development of this people. That explains why national cultures
and languages in the Soviet Union had not been paid proper attention since the
1930s. As a result of such a policy Ukraine gradually became heavily Russified
and the level of national consciousness significantly dropped.

Industrialization
When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 they believed that they had started a
revolution which would soon spread all over the world. Thus all nations were
expected to build a new communist society together. By the end of the 1920s it
became apparent that the world revolution would not happen. The party declared a
new course aimed at “building socialism in a single country.” The Soviet
leadership wanted to create a powerful industrial base which would enable the
USSR to survive in a hostile capitalist environment. A strong industrial base was
also a necessary condition for creating an efficient army. Some historians believe
that the major aim of industrialization was militarization. The NEP helped the
Soviet Union reach the pre-war industrial level. But it was clear that the
communist state was lagging far behind major capitalist countries. New radical
reforms were needed to show the world the advantages of a new socialist society,
to prove that the revolution with its numerous sacrifices did not happen in vain.

4
The NEP was also not good for the Bolsheviks since it created self-reliant
businessmen who were difficult to control.
The Soviet government under the leadership of Stalin, who by the end of
1920s had assumed dictatorial power, decided to build a powerful industry in a few
years at the expense of the Soviet people. The NEP policy was curtailed as it was
unable to solve this problem. All factories and plants were proclaimed the
“people’s property” and came under state control. A strictly centralized planned
economy was introduced. Five-Year Plans were implemented that determined
every detail of every branch of economic activity – production, trade, services,
prices, wages, costs. Every enterprise, and every worker, was given ‘norms’ that
were to be fulfilled without discussion. The workers were exploited harshly. They
had to work long hours (with one day-off on Sundays) and got very low wages.
The labor discipline was very strict. If a worker was late for work for three times
he could be accused of sabotage (‘вредительство’) and sent to the Gulag (forced
labor camps system). Many workers lived in barracks.3 Food and goods were
rationed (distributed through card system). Besides, millions of convicts in the
Gulag worked for free.
The reward for hard work and successful accomplishments was praise rather
than money. Various propagandistic techniques were used to arouse enthusiasm
among the workers. One of the most famous innovations was the so-called
‘socialist competition.’ Brigades of workers, factories, cities, and even republics
competed with each other. Outstanding workers were honored as “heroes of
socialist labor” and highly praised in newspapers and on the radio. Many workers
believed that sufferings were necessary and temporary. Stalin set the tone in his
famous 1931 speech: “We are behind the leading countries by 50-100 years. We
must make up this time in ten years”. Stalin also warned: “If in ten years we do not
cover the distance we will be crushed.”

3
The lucky ones lived in so-called communal apartments where each family occupied a single room. Families in
barracks used curtains to separate their beds from the others.
5
 There was also another thing that stimulated people to work enthusiastically.
The noble aim of building the “best society in the world” united many people and
gave meaning to their lives. Despite severe hardships many people really believed
they were happy (mostly because of an enormous impact of propaganda) and
helped each other in work. Collectives at factories and plants were like families for
many workers. Stalin was interested in the formation of collectivistic mentality
among Soviet people because individualistic mentality (typical of western
democracies) was not good for his totalitarian regime. People with collectivistic
mentality are easier to be manipulated because they believe that the government
must rule and give orders and instructions.
The achievements of industrialization were great. Eastern Ukraine was
turned onto a huge construction place. Hundreds of huge plants and factories
emerged within several years. The most impressive among them were such giants
as the Kharkiv tractor-building plant, the Kryvyi-Rih metallurgical plant
(Криворіжсталь), the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station or Дніпрогес (which was the
largest in Europe and became a symbol of industrialization), and others. In a
decade the USSR became the world’s second largest industrial power. Ukraine
became one of Europe’s most advanced industrial countries. The modernization of
industry stimulated the process of urbanization as well. Before the industrialization
every fifth Ukrainian lived in a city, after – every third. Ukrainian cities became
less Russified.
Industrialization had serious setbacks, however. Though the quantity of the
output was impressive, its quality was low. Moreover, heavy industry was
developed at the expense of light industry. Thus, the common people could not
find many kinds of necessary goods in shops. Their food was rationed. The
standard of living of the ordinary people was extremely low. In contrast, the living
standard of high-ranking party officials was high. They lived in large apartments,
received high salaries, and bought goods and food in special shops. They also often
had household servants. In fact they formed a special privileged class called the
apparatchiks or nomenklatura.
6
 Europe and especially the USA profited greatly from Soviet industrialization
in the time of world depression. In 1931, for example, the USSR purchased 30
percent of the world export of machinery and equipment for plants and factories; in
1932 – almost 50 percent. Some historians blame the West that its greed for money
helped raise the “communist monster.” Other historians say that the Soviet Union
by buying western industrial products helped western economies during hard times
of the world recession of the 1930s. Thanks to industrialization the USSR turned
from a country that imports machinery into a country that produces machinery. In
the 1930s the Soviet Union became one of a few countries capable of producing
any kind of industrial goods.

Collectivization and the famine of 1932-33

The ambitious industrialization program required a lot of money. Stalin decided to
get it mostly by exploiting the peasantry. With this aim the program of
collectivization was designed. Soviet plans for industrial expansion were based on
the assumption that the state would be able to buy grain cheaply from the peasants.
Stalin planned to sell grain abroad to finance industrialization. But the prices the
state offered – often as little as one-eighth of the market price – were considered
too low by the peasants and they refused to sell their grain. Infuriated by this
“sabotage,” Stalin decided to put the peasants under total control through
collectivization and squeeze grain from them practically free of charge.
Wholesale collectivization began in 1929. Realizing that the wealthier
peasants (kulaks in Russian or kurkuls in Ukrainian) would resist collectivization
most bitterly, Stalin decided to liquidate them as a class. By liquidating the kulaks
Stalin also planned to deprive the peasants of their leaders and weaken their
resistance. Hundreds of thousands of kulaks were deprived of their property and
deported to forced labor camps in Siberia. As the kulaks were crushed, Stalin
launched his attack on the peasantry as a whole.

7
The Famine of 1932-33
The famine that occurred in 1932-33 was a great tragedy in Ukrainian history. It
clearly shows an inhumane nature of the Stalinist regime. The famine was
completely artificial. The harvest of 1932 was only 12% below the 1926-30
average. In 1932 many trains loaded with grain crossed the Soviet Union’s state
borders as usual.
Many historians believe that Stalin made famine to put down mass resistance
to collectivization. For example, in the Ukrainian village in the period from
January till June 1930 over 1500 terrorist acts against Communist officials were
registered. In a number of oblasts armed revolts occurred. Historians calculated
that the number of rebels in the Ukrainian village exceeded 40 000 in 1930. Before
joining collective farms the peasants slaughtered 50% of their livestock. The
peasants who did not want to join a collective farm faced serious difficulties. They
were given poor land and were forced to pay high taxes. Some peasants were just
deported to Siberia for refusal to join a collective farm. Those who joined did not
show much enthusiasm to work for a symbolic reward. Their efficiency in
collecting the harvest which did not belong to them was low. The amount of
collected grain was declining year after year despite good weather conditions.4
Such ‘sabotage’ enraged Stalin who needed grain to finance the ambitious
industrialization program. The dictator decided to teach peasants a lesson by
famine.
In fact, all grain after 1932 harvest and all remaining food supplies were
taken from the peasants. The government needed grain not foodstuff (vegetables,
honey, nuts, dried fruits, etc) for export. Thus, it collected the foodstuff only to
punish the villagers. The result was the famine of 1932-33 that killed over three
million people.5 Lacking bread, peasants ate pets, rats, frogs, earthworms, bark,
and leaves. There were numerous cases of cannibalism. Whole regions died out.
4
According to some historians Stalin also believed that the peasants were hiding grain from the state.
5
The most distinguished Ukrainian expert on the famine of 1932-33, historian S. Kulchytsky, calculated that the
direct losses of the famine were not more than 3, 5 million. The same figures are given by the famous Australian
demographer Stephen Wheatcroft and Ukraine’s Institute of Demography. Some politicians try to exaggerate the
number for political reasons and say that over 10 million died from the famine.
8
Special police forces often blocked the areas with dying peasants preventing them
from leaving the place. The famine inflicted an incurable psychological trauma on
the peasants: they lost the will to fight for their rights. The peasants’ will and the
spirit of individualism were broken. In fact, they were turned into serfs. They did
not have the right to leave their villages without permission. They worked almost
for free. They lost interest in the land and in the results of their labor. The
Holodomor (the name of the famine of 1932-33) imbued the peasants with fear,
political apathy, and passiveness. The village could not oppose the regime
anymore. By the end of 1935 almost all peasants were collectivized.
Many Ukrainian historians, especially in western Ukraine and Kyiv,
consider the famine of 1932-33 as genocide (killing a group of people because of
their nationality) against the Ukrainian people. In their opinion Stalin used famine
to crash the foundation of Ukrainian nationalism – the peasantry. Russian
historians and many Ukrainian historians from Eastern Ukraine admit that
Holodomor was a horrible crime but refuse to recognize it as an act of genocide
because the 1932-33 famine killed not only millions in Ukraine but also 1,5 million
in Kazakhstan (38% of its population) and over two million in some regions of
Belarus and Russia (the Central Volga region, the Northern Caucasus Territory, the
Kuban region, the Don region, Western Siberia, Southern Urals, and Central Black
Soil Region).6 In those territories there were also blockades to prevent people from
escaping. Russian historians stress the fact that many Ukrainian (not Russian)
communist activists actively participated in food requisitions in villages that
caused numerous deaths. Not only Ukrainians died on Ukrainian territory, many
thousands of Germans (the descendants of the colonists brought here by Catherine
II), Jews, Russians, Tatars, and other nationalities also perished in Ukraine in
1932-33. Russian historians say that if most productive peasants had lived in cold
regions of the USSR they would have suffered not less than Ukrainian peasants.
They claim that famine happened mostly in regions with rich soil where peasants
6
Some Russian historians say that of 8 million people perished from the famine, Ukraine lost less than 50 percent
(3,5 million), the Russian Federation lost 4,5 million. The heaviest losses in the USSR among the peasants were in
Saratov region (Russia) – over 41 percent.
9
had individualistic mentality and showed serious resistance to collectivization. In
their opinion Stalin used the famine as a tool to force the peasants to cooperate
with the regime and he was indifferent to their nationality.
Russian historians suggest that their Ukrainian colleagues should prove with
facts that Ukrainians died because of their nationality and that “the Holodomor was
engineered for this very purpose.” They stress the fact that the communist
leadership was international (with a Georgian on the top)7 and that neither Russian
nor Ukrainian archives have party orders to use famine for killing Ukrainians.
Thus, in their view, there is no direct evidence that Ukrainians were killed by
starvation because they were Ukrainians. Statistics says that in contrast to the
Ukrainian village the mortality rate in Ukrainian cities in 1932-33 was usual.8 It
was the place of living (city or village) and not nationality that defined people’s
chances for survival. In 2009 Russian historians published archive documents that
show that Kremlin provided aid to starving people in Ukraine in 1933. Without this
aid almost all of the 25 million people who lived in the rural areas of Ukraine
would have died. According to Russian historians these documents refute the
concept of the ‘engineered genocide against Ukrainians.’ Ukrainian historians say
that Kremlin, after confiscating all foodstuffs from the village, decided to feed the
peasants to secure the 1933 harvest that was needed for export. In 2008 Russia
proposed to create an international commission to investigate the famine of 1933.
Foreign scholars’ views on the problem also differ. The majority of foreign
historians believe that Holodomor was aimed not at the Ukrainians as a nation but
rather at the peasants to break their resistance to collectivization. In 2003 the UN
General Assembly recognized the fact of horrible artificial famine in Ukraine, but
it refused to regard it as genocide. A similar resolution was issued by UNESCO on
November 1, 2007. In 28 April 2010, Parliamentary Assembly of Council of
Europe (PACE) also recognized the famine of 1932-33 as crime against humanity
and refused regard it as genocide.
7
Stalin was Georgian. His real name was Dzhugashvili.
8
After 1928 the food stores and shops turned into distribution centers where foods were available to people with
ration cards for foodstuffs and industrial goods. Thus peasants could not buy food in cities.
10
 The question of genocide is highly politicized in Ukraine. President Viktor
Yushchenko urged the parliament to recognize the famine as an act of genocide
against the Ukrainians. Some analysts say that in such a way he wanted to discredit
his political rivals (who are mostly pro-Russian). In 2006 the Ukrainian parliament
rather reluctantly recognized the famine as an act of genocide.9 Yushchenko also
tried to introduce criminal punishment for those who refuse to regard the famine as
an act of genocide but failed. The concept of genocide is very harmful for Russia
politically since it seriously undermines a popular in Russia and Eastern Ukraine
idea about common roots of Russians and Ukrainians and deprives the Kremlin of
arguments for reunification.
Some Ukrainian political analysts criticize Yushchenko for drawing extra
attention to the issue of Holodomor. “Historically, the complex of ‘victim’ has
been formed in Ukraine that doesn’t exist in Russia and Belarus,” said V. Fesenko,
director of Penta political research center. “We form the nation not on our
successes, but on defeats,” stressed he.
The question of whether the famine was genocide or not provokes debate not
only among historians and politicians but also among Ukrainian public in general.
In November 2009 the Horshenin Institute’s survey revealed that 66 percent of
Ukrainians believe that the famine was not genocide. Thirty-two percent believe it
was, while two percent say the Holodomor didn’t happen at all. The position of the
new Ukraine’s president Victor Yanukovych on the famine does not differ from
that of European Union.
The topic of Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 had been taboo in the Soviet
Union for decades. The official Soviet propaganda claimed that it never existed
and was “invented” by “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” in emigration for
political aims. The fact of the famine was officially recognized during Gorbachev’s
perestroika in the late 1980s.

Repressions
9
Almost half the parliament (the Party of Regions and Communists) refused to take part in voting.
11
Repressions as a whole are typical trait of a totalitarian regime. In fact, it cannot
exist without them. One of the major aims of repressions of the Stalinist regime
was to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. When a person lives in fear he
is much easier to control. Even high governmental positions did not guarantee
safety. Quite the contrary, the ruling class was the first victim of repressions. The
majority of high-ranking party officials in Moscow as well as in all other Soviet
republics were repressed. For example, of 1966 deputies of the USSR Supreme
Council 1931 (more than 95%) were repressed in the middle of the 1930s. Of 66
members of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine 55 were
repressed. Of 11 members of Ukrainian Politburo 10 were repressed. In 1938 all
the Ukrainian government (17 ministers) were arrested and shot. The Prime
Minister P. Liubchenko committed suicide. Before killing himself he killed his
wife to save her from tortures by the political police and from a horrible life in the
Gulag. In general, 37% of Ukrainian Communists (170,000) were repressed. By
the late 1930s, the limited self-government that Ukrainians (and other non-
Russians in their republics) had possessed earlier was almost totally destroyed.
A lot of intellectuals (because they could think critically and understand the
nature of the regime) in all republics were repressed.10 The NKVD (political
police) accused many representatives of the Ukrainian cultural elite of participating
in secret anti-Soviet organizations, spying and terrorism. Victims were usually
asked two questions “Who recruited you?” and “Whom did you recruit?” Then
under physical tortures or threats to repress close relatives the victims usually
pointed at any people they knew. In all, some four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural
elite was repressed in the course of the 1930s. As a result of such a policy the
intelligentsia was intimidated and had to glorify the regime.
Besides intellectuals many ordinary Soviet citizens perished in prisons or
were shot. Millions political prisoners worked in the Gulag in extremely difficult
conditions. The food ratio of a Gulag victim was less than the food ratio of a dog

10
The regime was afraid of them because intellectuals remained the only source of alternative information and they
could tell the brain-washed citizens the truth about the regime.
12
that guarded the Gulag. In the Soviet Union nobody could feel secure and many
people could not trust each other. There were millions of informants. Even children
were encouraged to inform on their parents and friends.11 Under such conditions
the forming of any kind of opposition was impossible. Thus, through repressions,
Stalin consolidated his rule in the USSR.
The Ukrainian Autocephalous (Independent) Orthodox Church was banned
and many of its priests were sent to prisons. Practically all Ukrainian kobzari (folk
musicians and singers of poems about the Cossacks12) were invited to a congress,
then arrested and shot. By eradicating Ukrainian religious and cultural differences
Stalin planned to make his empire more unified. The same policy was adopted in
other Soviet republics.
All those who were repressed were officially called “enemies of the people”.
The NKVD even had plans how many people were to be repressed within a certain
time. For example, 268 950 Soviet citizens were to be repressed from August till
December of 1937. Of that number 75 500 were to be executed immediately. In
1991, shortly before the collapse of the USSR, the KGB (successor of the NKVD)
announced that 42 million Soviet citizens died during the dictatorship of Stalin
(1928-1953) as a result of the forced collectivization and repressions.
The political police (NKVD) was also not immune from repressions. The
majority of NKVD leaders in Moscow, Kyiv and other Soviet capitals were
repressed in the 1930s. In Ukraine alone 1193 senior NKVD officials died as a
result of repressions in the 1930s.

Part II: Western Ukraine between the Wars

Ukrainians under Polish rule

The fate of Western Ukraine was decided at the Paris peace conference (1919).
The Ukrainians made 64% of the region’s ethnic composition, the Poles – 25%,

11
The famous cult of Pavlik Morozov who informed on his father was created.
12
The Cossack was a symbol of freedom.
13
and the Jews – 10%. The majority of Ukrainians (94%) lived in villages. At the
conference Poland promised to grant the Ukrainians autonomy and respect their
rights. The Entente powers accepted the Polish proposal and placed Western
Ukraine under Polish jurisdiction. France, the major power in Entente, was
interested in creating a strong Poland as a counterbalance to Germany in Eastern
Europe. Paris believed that in case of war between France and Germany the
grateful Poland would attack the Germans from the East. The Entente also wanted
Poland to be a strong barrier between Bolshevik Russia and Europe. These facts
explain why Western Ukraine found itself under Polish rule.
Poland did not keep its promise, however. Western Ukraine did not get
autonomy. The number of Ukrainian-language secondary schools was reduced and
Ukrainian was pushed out of administrative use. The old Austrian system of
Ukrainian elementary schools was transformed into a bilingual one in which Polish
was dominant. Ukrainian Studies departments at Lviv University, created under
Austrian rule, were abolished. But in contrast to the totalitarian Bolshevik Ukraine,
Western Ukraine enjoyed some political liberties under Poland. There were many
Ukrainian political parties that existed legally and issued their newspapers.13
Numerous Ukrainian cultural, scientific, professional and public organizations
such as Prosvita (275 000 members and 3071 libraries in 1936), T.Shevchenko
Scientific Society, the Association of Ukrainian Women (50 000 members), the
Association of Ukrainian Teachers, the Association of Ukrainian Lawyers, etc
acted quite freely. It was allowed to establish private schools with Ukrainian as the
language of instruction. The Polish parliament had a significant number of
Ukrainian deputies (25%), and even its vice-speaker was a Ukrainian. The largest
and most influential legal Ukrainian political party was UNDO (Ukrainian
National Democratic Union) which advocated constitutional democracy and
favored a compromise with the Poles. The program-maximum of the party was the
establishment of independent Ukraine by legal means. The program-minimum was
autonomy.
13
There were 83 Ukrainian newspapers in Poland, 21 of them were political.
14
 For security reasons Poland tried to gradually eradicate the differences
between Poles and Ukrainians. The old name of “Western Galicia” was changed
into “Eastern Little Poland.” Greek Catholic priests received government orders to
change Ukrainian last names in church documents according to Polish samples (for
example “Levytsky” was to be changed into “Lewitski”). There were numerous
official attempts to describe the Ukrainians not as a different nation but as a branch
of the Polish people, and the Ukrainian language, accordingly, as a Polish dialect.
The Polish government forbade using word ‘Ukrainian,’ the old word ‘Ruthenian’
was reanimated instead. This measure was aimed at discouraging West Ukrainians
from perceiving themselves as part of a broader Ukrainian nation. To dissolve the
predominantly Ukrainian ethnic composition of Galicia and Volyhnia Polish
authorities settled about 200,000 Polish colonists there. The Polish government
also tried to instigate religious conflicts between 3-million Greek Catholics
Ukrainians of Galicia and 2-million Orthodox Ukrainians of Volhynia (Divide-
and-Rule policy). Since rural areas of Western Ukraine were overpopulated many
Ukrainians emigrated to the USA, Canada, Argentina, etc.

Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia

Ukrainian nationalists gained wide influence in Galicia in the interwar period
(1920-1939). In 1920, the secret Ukrainian Military Organization (УВО – in
Ukrainian) was founded by veterans of WWI and the civil war, headed by Colonel
Yevhen Konovalets. From its very beginning the organization applied terror14 as a
way of destabilizing Polish control over the Ukrainian population. In 1929, УВО
was transformed into a broader underground movement, the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
The major aim of the OUN was unification of all Ukrainian ethnic lands in
one independent state. The aim was to be achieved by violent means (through
revolution and establishment of a dictatorship).
14
It included the burning of Polish estates; the destruction of Polish governmental buildings, railroads, and telegraph
lines; and political assassinations of Poles and Ukrainians who favored cooperation with the Poles.
15
 The ideology of the OUN was based on the writings of Dmytro Dontsov
(1883-1973). Dontsov’s nationalism, which came to be known as integral
nationalism, proclaimed that a nation was an absolute value (‘The Nation above
All’). Everything, including human lives, should be sacrificed in the name of the
nation, according to this teaching. Integral nationalists called for the creation of a
new type of Ukrainian, one who was unconditionally committed to the nation and
to independent statehood.
According to integral nationalists, the political system of a future state must
be based on the rule of one nationalist party (all other parties should be banned)
under the leadership of a strong leader (“вождь”) with unlimited powers. He must
be responsible only to God. The nation should be purified and consist of
Ukrainians only (‘Ukraine for Ukrainians!’). Democratic ideas were proclaimed
decadent. Integral nationalists believed that it was impossible to achieve
independence by democratic means. Hence is their skeptical attitude to democracy.
Integral nationalists paid special attention to Ukrainian history which was to
be rewritten and mythologized (all negative aspects were to be silenced and the
cult of heroes created) with the aim of brining up nationalistic youth. The
ideological writings of such Ukrainian national leaders as Drahomanov, Franko,
and Hrushevsky were condemned as too soft and “feminine” (because they praised
democracy and humanism). The idea of creating a merciless super human being
was widely propagated among youth.
Ukrainian integral nationalism was a typically totalitarian movement with
elements of fascism. Similar movements were popular in Europe in the 1920s.
Such half-fascist nationalistic movements as the Iron Guard in Romania, the
Ustashi in Croatia, the Arrow Cross in Hungary, the Iron Wolves in Lithuania, and
related movements in other countries were quite influential in the interwar period.
Italian and German fascists gave an example of creating a powerful nationalistic
state. Dontsov himself admired Hitler and Mussolini and published their speeches
in his journal.

16
 The OUN was quite intolerant to other political views except its own. In its
practical activity the OUN carried out acts of terror aimed at Polish officials and
those Ukrainians who favored compromise with the Poles. A popular brochure,
published in Lviv in 1929 said, “Треба крові – дамо море крові! Треба терору –
учинимо до пекельності. Не встидаймось убивств, грабунків і підпалів. У
боротьбі не існує етики.”15
A number of high-ranking Polish politicians and liberal Ukrainians (who
cooperated with the Poles) were assassinated. In fact more Ukrainians were killed
by OUN terrorists than Poles. By using terror OUN leaders wanted not only to
destabilize Polish rule but also to provoke the Ukrainian masses to rebellion.
Stepan Bandera, most popular OUN leader, believed that the Ukrainian people
were ready for rebellion; they needed only to be awakened by terrorist acts. 16
Hatred for OUN enemies (the Poles) was cultivated to unite the nation. Dontsov
wrote, “Hatred for the enemy must be felt even if he has done nothing harmful to
you”.
The OUN managed to attract widespread support among Ukrainian youth.
Its stress on revolutionary action, radical solutions, and the creation of a new type
of “super Ukrainians” appealed to youth who wanted to be heroes. The OUN
leaders believed that using terror would help them to destabilize the situation in
Poland until the government collapsed. Older generation usually condemned the
terror unleashed by the OUN. Many parents criticized the OUN for the
involvement of their immature and inexperienced teenagers into terrorist activity
that often ended tragically. The Creek Catholic church condemned using terror as
political means. Its head, metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, asked Ukrainians to
stop killing people in terrorist acts as it would bring only harm to Ukraine. He
believed that ‘a person who sheds the innocent blood of his political opponent is
just as much as murderer as one who does it for robbery.’ The metropolitan
15
“If blood is needed we’ll provide a sea of it, if terror is needed we’ll give a hell of it! Do not be ashamed of
killings, robberies and arsons. There is no ethics in the struggle.”
16
S. Bandera was a major organizer of terrorist acts in the interwar Galicia. On February 25, 2010 the European
Parliament passed a resolution on Ukraine where it expressed its regret over granting by President V. Yushchenko
the title of ‘National Hero of Ukraine’ to S. Bandera, posthumously.
17
advocated the policy of cooperation between Poles and Ukrainians. All legal
Ukrainian parties publicly denounced the terrorist activities of the OUN. The OUN
in its turn condemned all legal Ukrainian parties as collaborationists.
The reaction of Polish authorities to the terrorist activity of the OUN was
often brutal. The most notorious action was so-called “pacification campaign,”
(September-October 1930). During the campaign Polish police forces and army
units encircled Ukrainian villages and brutally searched for terrorists, humiliating
the local population.
The underground movement in Galicia consisted of two major political
forces. One was the OUN. The other one was the Communist Party of Western
Ukraine (CPWU). The Communists wanted to separate Galicia from Poland
through a revolution and join it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The
influence of the CPWU dropped significantly when it became known about large-
scale repressions and Holodomor in Soviet Ukraine.17

Ukrainians under Romanian Rule

After the First World War the Entente gave the former Austrian province of
Bukovyna to Romania. Under Austrian rule, Ukrainians in Bukovyna enjoyed wide
political rights, extensive local self-government, and a well-developed system of
Ukrainian-language education. The situation radically changed when the region
became part of Romania. Like Poland, Romania pursued a policy of assimilation.
Ukrainian schools, parties, cultural organizations and newspapers were shut down.
The departments of Ukrainian studies at Chernivtsi University were abolished.
Bucharest refused to recognize the Ukrainians as a distinct nationality. Ukrainians
were classified as “Romanians who had forgotten their native language” or
“Ukrainized Romanians.” Ukrainian surnames were changed to sound more

17
The similar processes took place in areas populated by Ukrainians in Romania and Czechoslovakia. The
Communist forces in those countries wanted unification with Soviet Ukraine while nationalists wanted creation of
an independent state.
18
Romanian. The same happened with Ukrainian names of villages and towns. In
1940 the Rumanian government under pressure from Stalin ceded Bukovyna to
Soviet Ukraine.

Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia
In 1919 Transcarpathia voluntarily joined the newly created by the Entente
Czechoslovak republic, one of the most democratic states in Europe. The
population of the region consisted of Ukrainians (71,3%), Jews (13%), Hungarians
(7%), and other minorities such as Slovaks, Germans, Czechs, and Romanians. The
Czech government allowed its population to use the language of its choice in
schools and open cultural and political organizations. Such liberalism led to the
growth of Ukrainian national life in the region. The Czech government, however,
planned to abolish any possibility of unification of Transcarpathian Ukrainians
with Ukrainians in other lands. Prague propagated the idea that Ukrainians in
Transcarpathia were a separate nation – Carpathian Rusyny. This movement was
called Rusynophile and it enjoyed significant support of the government. Another
Ukrainian movement in Transcarpathia was called Russophile (москвофіли або
русофіли). Russophile believed that Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were in fact
Russians. The third movement was that of Ukrainophiles who believed that
Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were brothers of the Ukrainians who lived under
Polish and Soviet control. The fourth movement was called Magyarophile
(“мадярони”). The Magyarophiles wanted to return Carpathian Ukraine under
Hungarian control.18 Thus Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia had four national
orientations and that suited Prague well as it prevented Ukrainians from
unification.

Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy

18
Hungary (as part of Austro-Hungarian Empire) controlled Transcapathia from 1867 till 1918.
19
In October 1938 Prague granted autonomy to Transcarpathia. A famous Ukrainian
political figure and respected Greek Catholic priest, Avhustyn Voloshyn, was
appointed head of the cabinet, which started a large-scale Ukrainization policy.
The educational system, publications, and administration were Ukrainized. All
political parties except the pro-governmental Ukrainian National Union were
banned and their newspapers closed. In February 1939, elections were held for the
regional parliament and the Ukrainophiles received 86% (or 94% according to
other data) of the votes. Some historians say that the elections results were
falsified. It was not difficult under such non-democratic conditions. Meanwhile, a
military organization, the Carpathian Sich, was organized and soon had about 5000
soldiers, who were mostly enthusiastic Ukrainian youth from Galicia – many of
them members of the OUN.
There were pressing reasons for establishing a military force, for as
Czechoslovakia slowly disintegrated, neighboring Hungary demanded the return of
its former Transcarpathian lands. On 14 March 1939, the Hungarian army moved
into the region. On 15 March, in a symbolic gesture, the Voloshyn government
proclaimed the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine19 and sent a telegram to
Hitler asking him to accept the new republic as a German protectorate. 20 Voloshyn
did not know that Hitler had already promised Transcarpathia to his ally and friend
Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian dictator. The sejm (parliament) adopted the blue-
yellow national flag, the coat of arms containing a trident, and the national anthem
‘Ukraine has not perished yet’ (Ще не вмерла Україна). Ukrainian was
proclaimed the state language. Many young integral nationalists from Galicia
illegally crossed the border and joined the Carpathian Sich. The Carpathian Sich
showed brave but futile resistance to the outnumbered enemy. Soon the whole
territory was occupied by Hungarians.21

19
Strictly against the proclamation of independence were local Slovaks, who wanted to join Slovakia, and local
Hungarians, who wanted to join Hungary.
20
Protectorate means a country that is controlled and protected by a more powerful state.
21
The independence of Carpatho-Ukraine lasted only one day.
20
 After conquering Transcarpathia the Hungarian government started
Magyarization (Hungarization) policy. All Ukrainian publications and
organizations, including Prosvita, were banned. The Ukrainian language in schools
was gradually replaced with Hungarian.

21