Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Civil Law
Civil Law
SUGGESTED ANSWERS
to the
2018 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN
CIVIL LAW
Sidley and Sol were married with one (1) daughter, Solenn. Sedfrey and
Sonia were another couple with one son, Sonny. Sol and Sedfrey both perished in
the same plane accident. Sidley and Sonia met when the families of those who
died sued the airlines and went through grief-counseling sessions. Years later,
Sidley and Sonia got married. At that time, Solenn was four (4) years old and
Sonny was 5 years old. These two (2) were then brought up in the same
household. Fifteen (15) years later, Solenn and Sonny developed romantic
feelings towards each other, and eventually eloped. On their own and against
their parents’ wishes, they procured a marriage license and got married in church.
(a) Is the marriage of Solenn and Sonny valid, voidable, or void? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage is voidable for lack of parental consent. At the time of
their marriage, Solenn and Sonny were only 19 and 20 years old,
respectively. Assuming their marriage was under the Family Code, Article 14
provides that parental consent is required where either or both of the parties
are between 18 and 21 years old at the time of marriage. In the absence of
such parental consent, Article 45 of the Family Code provides that the
marriage is voidable. Since the marriage was against their parents’ wishes,
their marriage is voidable. Unlike in the Civil Code, their being step-siblings
is immaterial under the Family Code and will not render the marriage void
since such is not considered incestuous nor against public policy.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it can be ratified by free cohabitation. Article 45(1) of the Family
Code provides that such voidable marriage may be ratified by free
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cohabitation of the party/ies over 18 years old but below 21 who married
without the consent of his/her parents, by living together as husband and wife
after attaining the age of 21.
Here, Solenn and Sonny freely cohabitated and lived as husband and
wife after attaining 21 years, then the marriage is considered ratified,
provided that the parents have not filed an action for annulment before the
parties reached 21 years old.
II
After finding out that his girlfriend Sandy was four months pregnant,
Sancho married Sandy. Both were single and had never been in any serious
relationship in the past. Prior to the marriage, they agreed in a marriage
settlement that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage. Shortly after the marriage, their daughter,
Shalimar, was born.
Before they met and got married, Sancho purchased a parcel of land on
installment, under a Contract of Sale, with the full purchase price payable in equal
annual amortizations over a period of ten (10) years, with no down payment, and
secured by a mortgage on the land. The full purchase price was PhP 1million,
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. After paying the fourth (4th) annual
installment, Sancho and Sandy got married, and Sancho completed the payments
in the subsequent years from his salary as an accountant. The previous payments
were also paid out of his salary. During their marriage, Sandy also won
PhP1million in the lottery and used it to purchase jewelry. When things didn’t
work out for the couple, they filed an action for declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on the psychological incapacity of both of them. When the
petition was granted, the parcel of land and the jewelry bought by Sandy were
found to be the only properties of the couple.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2
(b) What system of property relationship will be liquidated following the
declaration of nullity of their marriage? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The property regime that will be liquidated is co-ownership under
Article 147 of the Family Code. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership
(Article 147, Family Code). Sancho and Sandy were capacitated to marry
each other; however, their marriage was declared void under Article 36.
(c) In the liquidation, who should get the parcel of land? The jewelry?
(2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sancho should get the parcel of land while Sandy should get the
jewelry. According to Article 147 of the Family Code, property acquired
through their work or industry by a man and a woman, who are capacitated
to marry each other and who cohabited under a void marriage, shall be
governed by rules on co-ownership and in the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they live together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. In the given case,
Sancho bought the parcel of land and paid for it using his salary while Sandy
used her winnings from the lottery to purchase the jewelry.
It was not established that Sandy cared for or maintained the family;
hence, she should not be deemed to have contributed to the acquisition of the
parcel of land. The jewelry was acquired by Sandy using her lottery winnings
which she obtained not by work or industry but by chance.
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Shalimar is not entitled to presumptive legitime. The liquidation of
the co-ownership under Article 147 did not provide for the obligation to pay
the presumptive legitime of the common children. Said obligation applies
only to the liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, which provisions
are inapplicable to a void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the parties should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership
[Dino v. Dino, 640 SCRA 178 (2011); Valdes v. RTC, 260 SCRA 221 (1996)].
III
Silverio was a woman trapped in a man’s body. He was born male and his
birth certificate indicated his gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon.
When he reached the age of 21, he had a sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
and, from then on, he lived as a female. On the basis of his sex reassignment, he
filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and his gender, to
female. While he was following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, he met Sharon Ston, who also filed a similar action to change her first
name to Shariff, and her gender, from female to male.
Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she
developed male characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal
hyperplasia (“CAH”) which is a condition where a person possesses both male
and female characteristics. At puberty, tests revealed that her ovarian structures
had greatly minimized, and she had no breast or menstrual development. Alleging
that for all intents and appearances, as well as mind and emotion, she had become
a male, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
should be changed from female to male, and that her first name should be changed
from Sharon to Shariff.
Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry. Realizing that their
marriage will be frowned upon in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas,
USA where they got married based on the law of the place of celebration of the
marriage. They, however, kept their Philippine citizenship.
(a) Is there any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition for
correction of entries in his birth certificate? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, there is no legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition.
As settled in the case of Silverio v. Republic (G.R. No. 174689, October 22,
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2007), our laws do not sanction change of name and correction of entry in the
civil register as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Sex reassignment is
not one of the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed under
Republic Act No. 9048. The petition for correction of entry as to sex of the
birth certificate of Silverio cannot prosper, because the said document
contained no error and it cannot be corrected. Silverio was born a male. The
sex of a person is determined at birth. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
(b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon’s petition?
(2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer will not be the same. In the case of Republic v.
Cagandahan (G.R. 166676, September 12, 2008), the Supreme Court held that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the
age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sharon is considered
an intersex, because he has CAH, which means that she has the biological
characteristics of both male and female. Based on that case, Sharon’s petition
should be granted since he has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. The
change of name should also be granted considering that it merely recognizes
Sharon’s preferred gender.
(c) Can the marriage of Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) be legally
recognized as valid in the Philippines? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it cannot be legally recognized as valid. Laws relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad (Article 15, Civil Code). One of the
requisites of a marriage is that the contracting parties must be a male and a
female (Article 2, Family Code). Since Silverio and Sharon are Filipino
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citizens their status, condition and legal capacity is determined by Philippine
law, their marriage abroad is not a valid marriage under Philippine law,
because both contracting parties are males.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes. If Silverio and Sharon used their original birth certificates-- one
showing that one is registered male and the one showing that other is
registered female, then the marriage may be a valid marriage under
Philippine law.
IV
6
(a) Was the first sale to Dr. Santos, and the subsequent repurchase,
valid? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the sale is valid but only with respect to the shares pertaining to
Soler, Sulpicio and Segundo. Upon Severino’s death, his heirs became the co-
owners of the only property he left since the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code). In a co-ownership, each co-owner may alienate his part but the effect
of the alienation with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to the co-owner who alienated his share (Article 493,
Civil Code). The repurchase by Soler and Sulpicio was valid up to their
respective shares. The repurchase of Segundo’s share did not make
Saturnina the owner of the share redeemed although she is entitled to
reimbursement.
(b) Was the second sale to Dr. Sazon valid? May the twins redeem their
share after they reach the age of majority? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The second sale was valid only as to the aliquot shares of Saturnina and
of the three older siblings. Under Article 225 of the Family Code, the father
and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of
the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. This guardianship, however, only extends to powers of
administration over the property of the child, and does not include the power
to alienate, which is an act of strict dominion. Saturnina had no authority to
sell the twins’ property, and the sale to that extent is unenforceable. Since it is
already unenforceable, the twins do not need to redeem the property upon
reaching the age of majority.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The second sale is valid as to Saturnina and the other siblings, but as to
the twins the sale is invalid and the twins are allowed to recover or demand
the reconveyance of their share in the property.
7
V
Sol Soldivino, widow, passed away, leaving two (2) legitimate children: a
25-year old son, Santino (whom she had not spoken to for five [5] years prior to
her death since he attempted to kill her at that time), and a 20-year-old daughter,
Sara. She left an estate worth PhP 8 million and a will which contained only one
provision: that PhP1 million should be given to “the priest who officiated at my
wedding to my children’s late father.” Sara, together with two (2) of her friends,
acted as an attesting witness to the will.
On the assumption that the will is admitted for probate and that there are no
debts, divide the estate and indicate the heirs/legatees entitled to inherit, the
amount that each of them will inherit, and where (i.e., legitime/free
portion/intestate share) their shares should be charged. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Santino and Sara are entitled to P3.5 Million each while the priest who
officiated at the wedding of Sol to her children’s father is entitled to receive
P1 Million as legacy from the free portion of the Sol’s estate. 2 Million out of
the 3.5 Million comes from their legitime, while the remaining 1.5 Million is
from the free portion.
Santino is not disqualified to inherit from her mother, because an
attempt against the life of the decedent is a cause for unworthiness of an heir
only if there is a final judgment of conviction (Article 1032, Civil Code). The
given facts do not mention that Santino was convicted of an attempt against
the life of Sol.
Sara is also capacitated to inherit from Sol. The statement found in
Article 1027 of the Civil Code that an attesting witness to the execution of a
will shall be incapable of succeeding is qualified by Article 823, Civil Code,
which provides that the devise or legacy in favor of a person who is an
attesting witness to the execution to the will shall be void. Sara is not a
devisee or legatee under Sol’s will. She is an intestate and compulsory heir.
The priest is also capable of succeeding as a legatee, because under
Article 1027, Civil Code only the priest who heard the confession of the
testator during his last illness and his relatives within the fourth degree and
the church to which he belongs are disqualified from inheriting from the
decedent by will. The priest only officiated the wedding of the decedent.
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VI
Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining
lots from their grandfather. Sammy is based overseas but wants to earn income
from his inherited land, so he asked a local contractor to build a row of apartments
on his property which he could rent out. The contractor sent him the plans and
Sammy noticed that the construction encroached on a part of Santi’s land but he
said nothing and gave approval to construct based on the plans submitted by the
local contractor. Santi, based locally, and who loved his cousin dearly, did not
object even if he knew of the encroachment since he was privy to the plans and
visited the property regularly. Later, the cousins had a falling out and Santi
demanded that the portion of the apartments that encroached on his land be
demolished.
Can Santi successfully file legal action to require the demolition? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Santi cannot successfully file a legal action to require the
demolition. Since the builder and the landowner both acted in bad faith,
their rights shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith (Article
453, Civil Code). Sammy is not a builder in good faith with respect to the
portion of the apartment encroaching on Santi’s property, because he knew
that he was not the owner of the land when he built the apartment. There is
bad faith, likewise, on Santi’s part, because he did not object to the
construction although he had knowledge thereof (Article 453, Civil Code).
In cases where both the landowner and the builder acted in good faith,
the landowner does not have the option to demand the demolition of the work
(Article 448, Civil Code).
VII
Sydney, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice,
she remained unmarried and devoted all her time to taking care of her nephew and
two (2) nieces: Socrates, Saffinia, and Sophia. She wrote a will giving all her
properties remaining upon her death to the three (3) of them. The will was
admitted to probate during her lifetime. Later, she decided to make a new will
giving all her remaining properties only to the two (2) girls, Saffinia and Sophia.
She then tore up the previously probated will. The second will was presented for
probate only after her death. However, the probate court found the second will to
be void for failure to comply with formal requirements.
9
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the said doctrine will not apply.
In the case of Molo v. Molo (G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951), the
court stated that the doctrine of relative revocation is a rule where revocation
of the old will is a suspensive condition or depends upon the efficacy of the
new disposition, and if the new will intended as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in force. This was applied
based on the fact that the original will appears to be lost; hence, the second
will was executed with a revocatoty clause, but in both instances, the wife was
instituted as the universal heir.
In this case, however, the revocation of the original was not through
the execution of a subsequent will with a revocatory clause, but through
destruction with intent to do so. It does not appear either that the
revocation of the old will operates as a suspensive condition to the efficacy of
the subsequent will, because the testator revoked the 1st original will, as she
does not wish to institute the same heirs, unlike in Molo v. Molo where the
wife was the heir in both wills.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, because the act of destroying the previous will is connected with
the making of the new will raising a presumption that the testator meant the
revocation of the previous will dependent upon the efficacy of the new will.
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Here, the revocation is
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new will. Since the new
will in this case turns out to be void for failure of to comply with formal
requirements, the previous will is not considered revoked [III Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., p. 145].
(b) Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid
but both Saffinia and Sophia renounce their inheritance? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
10
VIII
Sofronio was a married father of two when he had a brief fling with
Sabrina, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of their son Sinforoso. Though
his wife knew nothing of the affair, Sofronio regretted it, but secretly provided
child support for Sinforoso. Unfortunately, when Sinforoso was 10 years old,
Sofronio died. Only Sofronio’s father, Salumbides, knew of Sabrina and
Sinforoso. For the purpose of providing support to Sinforoso, Salumbides gave
Sabrina usufructruary rights over one of his properties — a house and lot — to
last until Sinforoso reaches the age of majority. Sabrina was given possession of
the property on the basis of caucion juratoria. Two (2) years after the creation of
the usufruct, the house accidentally burned down, and three (3) years thereafter,
Sinforoso died before he could reach the age of 18.
Will the usufruct continue after the house has burned down? If yes, will it
continue after Sinforoso’s death? (2.5 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the usufruct will continue after the house was burned. If the
usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms
part, and the latter should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the
usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the materials
(Article 607, Civil Code). The usufruct over the land and the materials
continues. The thing was lost only in part, the right continues on the
remaining parts (Article 604, Civil Code).
No, it will be extinguished after Sinforoso’s death. A usufruct granted
for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, shall
subsist for the number of years specified, even if the third person should die
before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted
only in consideration of the existence of such person or contrary intention
clearly appears (Article 603, 606, Civil Code). The circumstances given show
that the usufruct was established by Salumbides in consideration of the
existence of Sinfroso. It was meant for his support; hence, his death
extinguished the usufruct even though he died before reaching the age of
majority.
IX
Newlyweds Sam and Sienna had contracted with Sangria Hotel for their
wedding reception. The couple was so unhappy with the service, claiming,
among other things, that there was an unreasonable delay in the service of dinner
and that certain items promised were unavailable. The hotel claims that, while
there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the
sudden increase of guests to 450 from the guaranteed expected number of 350, as
11
stated in the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract. In the action for damages
for breach of contract instituted by the couple, they claimed that the Banquet and
Meeting Services Contract was a contract of adhesion since they only provided
the number of guests and chose the menu. On the other hand, the hotel’s defense
was that the proximate cause of the complainant’s injury was the unexpected
increase in their guests, and this was what set the chain of events that resulted in
the alleged inconveniences.
(a) Does the doctrine of proximate cause apply in this case? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the doctrine does not apply. In the case of Spouses Guanio v.
Makati Shangri-la Hotel (G.R. No. 190601, September 7, 2011), the doctrine of
proximate cause, is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to
a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Where,
however, there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who make law between them.
Here, there is a contract, the terms and conditions of such contract will
govern the rights and obligations between the contracting parties in case of
breach thereof, not the doctrine of proximate cause.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is a contract of adhesion, but the same is not void.
A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties
imposes a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may accept or
reject, but which the latter cannot modify. Here, the contract is ready-made
by Sangria, as the spouses only chose the menu and provided the number of
guests but they cannot modify the terms thereof; hence, a contract of
adhesion.
Although a contract of adhesion, it is not entirely against the law and is
as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres
to the contract is free to reject it entirely, but the effect, as ruled in Orient Air
v. CA (G.R. No. 76931, May 29, 1991), is that in case of ambiguity it is
12
construed against the party who caused it to be drafted and could have
avoided it by the exercise of a little more care.
X
Sinclair and Steffi had an illicit relationship while Sinclair was married to
another. The relationship produced a daughter Sabina, who grew up with her
mother. For most parts of Sabina’s youth, Steffi spent for her support and
education. When Sabina was 21 years old, Sinclair’s wife of many years died.
Sinclair and Steffi lost no time in legitimizing their relationship. After the 40-day
prayers for Sinclair’s late wife, Sinclair and Steffi got married without a marriage
license, claiming that they have been cohabiting for the last 20 years.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair and Steffi because she was
conceived and born outside a valid marriage (Article 165, Family Code). She
was not legitimated by the subsequent marriage between Sinclair and Steffi.
Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated (Art. 177, Family Code). At the time of
Sabina’s conception, her parents were disqualified by an impediment to
marry each other, because Sinclair was married to someone else.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
13
Family Code). Considering the foregoing rules, Sinclair is enjoined by law to
finance Sabrina’s law education even beyond the age of majority.
XI
Samantha sold all her business interest in a sole proprietorship to Sergio for
the amount of PhP 1 million. Under the sale agreement, Samantha was supposed
to pay for all prior unpaid utility bills incurred by the sole proprietorship. A
month after the Contract to Sell was executed, Samantha still had not paid
the PhP 50,000 electricity bills incurred prior to the sale. Since Sergio could not
operate the business without electricity and the utility company refused to restore
electricity services unless the unpaid bills were settled in full, Sergio had to pay
the unpaid electricity bills. When the date for payment arrived, Sergio only
tendered PhP 950,000 representing the full purchase price, less the amount he paid
for the unpaid utility bills. Samantha refused to accept the tender on the ground
that she was the one supposed to pay the bills and Sergio did not have
authorization to pay on her behalf.
(a) What is the effect of payment made by Sergio without the knowledge
and consent of Samantha? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
14
(b) Is Samantha guilty of mora accipiendi? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi.
The requisites for mora accipiendi are: (i) offer of performance by the
debtor; (ii) offer must be to comply with prestation as it should be
performed; and (iii) the creditor refuses to accept the performance without
just cause.
Here, Sergio validly made an offer to comply with the prestation of
payment, albeit for P950,000 only. Sergio’s offer is justified based on the
concept of partial legal compensation up to the amount of P50,000, since
Sergio and Samantha are in their own right principal debtors and creditors
of each other. Samantha’s refusal was without just cause as she cannot be
permitted to benefit or use as a defense her own failure to fulfill her part of
the obligation to pay the electricity bills.
XII
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A contract of simple loan is created when a depositor opens a deposit
account with a bank. Fixed, savings and current deposits of money in banks
and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning
simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code]. The creditor is the depositor, while the
debtor is the bank.
15
(b) In this case, did the bank have the right to take over Saachi’s bank
deposit? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the bank did not have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit.
In the case of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosales (G.R. No. 183204,
January 13, 2014), it was held that the "Hold Out" clause, which was similar
to the Holdout Agreement in the instant case, can be invoked only if there
was a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of
obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi- delict. The only possible source
of obligation of Saachi to Shanghainese Bank based on the given facts is
delict. As the criminal case filed by the bank against Saachi was still pending
and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered, Saachi had no valid
and existing obligation to the bank; thus, the bank had no right to take over
the deposits of Saachi.
XIII
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, SEP can legally recover the deficiency. The prohibition against
further collection under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, or the Recto Law,
only applies if the seller chooses to foreclose the chattel mortgage and not
when the seller opts to exact the fulfilment of the obligation (Tajanlangit v.
Southern Motors, G.R. 10789, May 28, 1957). SEP chose to exact the
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fulfillment of the obligation by commencing a collection suit against SI. SEP
did not opt to foreclose the chattel mortgage over the equipment. The
machineries were sold in an execution sale and not in a foreclosure sale;
hence, the prohibition against further collection does not apply.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
XIV
17
annotation of an adverse claim against 50 sq. m. on Lot A’s Transfer Certificate of
Title, asserting the existence of a legal easement.
(a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, a legal easement of lateral and subjacent support exists.
According to Article 684 of the Civil Code, no proprietor shall make such
excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. In the given case, an easement of
lateral and subjacent support exists in the property of Soccoro in favor of the
property of Segunda. In the case of Castro v. Monsod, (G.R. No. 183719,
February 2, 2011) in which the situation of the properties of the two
landowners were similar to that in the given problem, the Supreme Court
held that an easement existed in favor of the property of higher elevation,
because it was the owner of the said property which sued to have the
easement recognized. Such finding, however, does not mean that no similar
easement exists in favor of the property of lower elevation, since Article 684
does not make a distinction as to the elevation of the property.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the
disputed land Castro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486, Feruary 2, 2011). Segunda is
not claiming ownership over the property of Socorro. She only wanted a
judicial recognition of the existence of the easement. According to the
Supreme Court in the cited case, an annotation of the existence of the lateral
and subjacent support is no longer necessary, because it exists whether or not
it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition
of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same, including
her successors-in-interest.
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ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, it is not proper because an annotation of the existence of the lateral
and subjacent support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is
annotated or registered in the registry of property. Although, there is nothing
which bars the annotation of an easement, not as an adverse claim, but as a
real right.
XV
(a) Can Simon compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into
writing? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Simon can compel Shannon to reduce the agreement into writing.
While an agreement for the leasing of real property for a longer period than
one year is covered by the Statute of Frauds, thus, requiring a written
memorandum of its essential provisions under Article 1403, Civil Code.
According to Article 1406 of the Civil Code, the parties may only avail
themselves of the right under Article 1357 of the Civil Code if the contract is
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The contract was taken out of the
operation of the Statute of Frauds under the Doctrine of Part Performance.
Under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties may
compel each other to observe the form of contract required by law.
(b) Does the sublease without Simon’s knowledge and consent constitute
a ground for terminating the lease? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it does not constitute a ground for terminating the lease. In the
contract of lease of things, if there is no express prohibition, the lessee may
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sublet the thing leased (Article 1650, Civil Code). In this contract, there
appears to be no prohibition regarding subleasing; thus, there is no violation
of the contract which can be used as a ground for terminating the contract.
The act of a lessee in subleasing the thing without notifying the lessor leased
is not one of the causes for which the lessor may terminate the lease and
judicially eject the lessee (Article 1673, Civil Code).
XVI
Selena was a single 18-year old when she got pregnant and gave birth to
Suri. She then left to work as a caregiver in Canada, leaving Suri with her parents
in the Philippines. Selena, now 34 years old and a permanent resident in Canada,
met and married Sam who is a 24-year old Canadian citizen who works as a
movie star in Canada. Sam’s parents are of Filipino ancestry but had become
Canadian citizens before Sam was born. Wanting Suri to have all the advantages
of a legitimate child, Selena and Sam decided to adopt her. Sam’s parents,
already opposed to the marriage of their son to someone significantly older,
vehemently objected to the adoption. They argued that Sam was not old enough
and that the requisite age gap required by the Inter-Country Adoption Act between
Sam as adopter and Suri as adoptee was not met.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Sam’s parents are incorrect. Under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8043 or the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, the requirement that the
adopter must be at least twenty-seven years of age and at least sixteen years
older than the adoptee does not apply if the adopter is the spouse of the
parent by nature of the adoptee. Since, Sam is the spouse of Selena, who is
the parent by nature of Suri, Sam may adopt Suri even if he is below twenty-
seven years of age and is not at least sixteen years older than the adoptee.
[NOTE: The Inter-Country Adpotion Act of 1995 requires that only a child who
is below 15 years of age and is voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department of Social Work and Services (DSWD) may be adopted under the
inter-country adoption law, and the adopter must be at least 27 years of age and
at least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application
unless the adopter is the natural parent of the child to be adopted or the spouse
of such parent].
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XVII
Sofia and Semuel, both unmarried, lived together for many years in the
Philippines and begot three children. While Sofia stayed in the Philippines with
the children, Semuel went abroad to work and became a naturalized German
citizen. He met someone in Germany whom he wanted to marry. Semuel
thereafter came home and filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for partition of the common properties acquired during his union with
Sofia in the Philippines. The properties acquired during the union consisted of a
house and lot in Cavite worth PhP 2 million, and some personal properties,
including cash in bank amounting to PhP 1 million. All these properties were
acquired using Semuel’s salaries and wages since Sofia was a stay-at-home
mother. In retaliation, Sofia filed an action, on behalf of their minor children, for
support.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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(b) Should Semuel be required to support the minor children? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Even if the new national law of Samuel does not oblige him to support
his minor illegitimate children in the Philippines, the said foreign law
cannot be applied in the Philippines for two reasons: (1) the Philippines
may refuse to apply said foreign law, because it is contrary to a sound
and established policy of the forum; and (2) the Philippine laws which
have for their object public policy cannot be rendered ineffective by a
foreign law [Art. 17, par. 3, NCC; Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA
516 (2014)].
XVIII
(a) Should either, or both, SAL and SMA be held liable for damages that
Shasha suffered? (2.5%)
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER :
SAL and SMA may be held solidarily liable to Sasha. SAL is liable to
Sasha for breach of the contract of carriage, because it failed to bring Sasha
to the latter’s destination as agreed upon in the contract. SAM, on the other
hand, is liable to Sasha for tort under the provisions of Article 2176, in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. While SAM is an independent
contractor, and not an agent of SAL, both SAL and SAM are solidarily liable
to Sasha, because a contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when
the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual
and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort
is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a
quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
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contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules
on tort to apply (LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003).
(b) Assuming that one is an agent of the other, is the agency coupled
with interest? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the agency was constituted as a means of fulfilling an obligation
which had already been contracted and also a bilateral contract depends
upon the agency [Article 1927, Civil Code]. In the case of Philex Mining v.
CIR, (G.R. No. 148187, April 16, 2008) the Court defined an agency coupled
with an interest as one that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal
due to an interest of a third party that depends upon it, or the mutual interest
of both principal and agent.
Here, since the ticket is exclusively endorsable to the agent, SAM, then
it has a mutual interest with the principal, SAL, in the fulfillment of the
obligation.
XIX
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secure payment of his taxes, if found to be due. In consideration of the issuance
of the bond, he executed an Indemnity Agreement with SSC whereby he agreed to
indemnify the latter in the event that he was found liable to pay the tax. The BIR
eventually decided against Sebastian, and judicially commenced action against
both Sebastian and SSC to recover Sebastian's unpaid taxes. Simultaneously, BIR
also initiated action to foreclose on the bond. Even before paying the BIR, SSC
sought indemnity from Sebastian on the basis of the Indemnity Agreement.
Sebastian refused to pay since SSC had not paid the BIR anything yet, and alleged
that the provision in the Indemnity Agreement which allowed SSC to recover
from him, by mere demand, even if it (SSC) had not yet paid the creditor, was
void for being contrary to law and public policy.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
XX
Simeon was returning to Manila after spending a weekend with his parents in Sariaya,
Quezon. He boarded a bus operated by the Sabbit Bus Line (SBL) on August 30, 2013. In the
middle of the journey, the bus collided with a truck coming from the opposite direction, which
was overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck. Though the driver of the SBL bus tried to avoid
the truck, a mishap occurred as the truck hit the left side of the bus. As a result of the accident,
Simeon suffered a fractured leg and was unable to report for work for one week. He sued SBL
for actual and moral damages. SBL raised the defense that it was the driver of the truck who
was at fault, and that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on what the source of obligation the action is based.
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If based on contract, SBL will be liable for actual damages, but not
moral damages. As a common carrier, SBL is required to observe
extraordinary diligence, and the law expressly provides that its liability does
not cease upon proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting and supervising its driver. It is not liable, however, for
moral damages as Art. 2220 requires it to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, which is not provided by the facts.
If the action, however, is anchored under quasi-delict, SBL will be
liable for actual and moral damages. As a common carrier, it is required to
exercise extraordinary diligence. Moral damages also may be awarded
under Article 2219 if the plaintiff suffered physical injuries as a result of a
quasi-delictual act.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In a contract of carriage, the carrier is required to exercise
extraordinary diligence and is liable whenever a passenger suffers injury
before he reaches his destination. In an action to recover damages arising
from breach of contract of carriage, the passenger needs only to prove the
existence of the contract and the failure of the carrier to safely bring him to
his destination. Moral damages may not however be recovered from the
carrier unless: (a) the passenger dies, or (b) the carrier is guilty of bad faith
or gross negligence. Neither applies in this case. (Estrada v. Philippine Rabbit
Bus Co., G.R. No. 203902, July 19, 2017).
(b) Will SBL be liable to pay interest if it is required to pay damages,
and delays in the payment of the judgment award? What is the rate of
interest, and from when should the interest start running? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, SBL will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% from the
finality of the judgment until satisfaction. According to the case of Nacar v.
Gallery Frames (G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013), when the judgment of the
court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction.
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