This document discusses six remedies to address short-term thinking or "myopia" in companies: 1) Reducing pressure for short-term profits, 2) Using pre-action reviews to control long-term investments, 3) Lengthening performance measurement horizons for rewards, 4) Changing metrics to value creation instead of income, 5) Improving accounting to better reflect economic income, and 6) Supplementing accounting with non-financial value drivers. It then provides examples of implementing each remedy, noting challenges include distinguishing operating vs development costs, employees discounting delayed rewards, and potential bias in estimates.
This document discusses six remedies to address short-term thinking or "myopia" in companies: 1) Reducing pressure for short-term profits, 2) Using pre-action reviews to control long-term investments, 3) Lengthening performance measurement horizons for rewards, 4) Changing metrics to value creation instead of income, 5) Improving accounting to better reflect economic income, and 6) Supplementing accounting with non-financial value drivers. It then provides examples of implementing each remedy, noting challenges include distinguishing operating vs development costs, employees discounting delayed rewards, and potential bias in estimates.
This document discusses six remedies to address short-term thinking or "myopia" in companies: 1) Reducing pressure for short-term profits, 2) Using pre-action reviews to control long-term investments, 3) Lengthening performance measurement horizons for rewards, 4) Changing metrics to value creation instead of income, 5) Improving accounting to better reflect economic income, and 6) Supplementing accounting with non-financial value drivers. It then provides examples of implementing each remedy, noting challenges include distinguishing operating vs development costs, employees discounting delayed rewards, and potential bias in estimates.
1. Reducing the pressure for short-term profit 2. Using preaction reviews (action controls) to control developmental, long-term invesments 3. Lengthening the horizon over which performance is measured and rewarded ( using long-term incentives ) 4. Changing what is measured ( other proxies for shareholder value creation instead of accounting income ) 5. Adjusting or improving accounting measures to better reflect economic income 6. Replacing (or complementing ) accounting measures with (nonfinancial ) value drivers of performance ( that is, using combination of measures systems )
B. HOW DOES IT WORK ? PRINCIPLES :
1. Reducing the pressure for short-term profit = The reductions in pressure can be affected in either of two basic ways, the weighting placed on the annual (or quarterly) profit targets can be reduced, perhaps even to zero, while other, longer term performance indicators, such as market share or technical breakthroughts, are emphasized. The short term profit targets can be made easier to achieve. 2. Using preaction reviews (action controls) to control developmental, long-term invesments = The key to implementing this approach is to distinguish between operating expenses, which are necessary to produce current-period revenues, and developmental expenses, which are incurred in order to generate revenues in future periods. If this distinction can be made, the profit center managers are asked to maximize operating income – that is, they are asked to focus on current period sales and costs – which are good indicators of short-term performance. 3. Lengthening the horizon over which performance is measured and rewarded ( using long-term incentives = One way to enhance congruence is by providing incentives tied to performance measured over longer periods; that is, by providing long-term incentives. 4. Changing what is measured ( other proxies for shareholder value creation instead of accounting income ) = This direct measurement of the value of an entity can be made both at the beginning and the end of a measurement period. The difference between the beginning and ending values is a direct estimate of the value created during the period, and thus of economic income. The idea of measuring economic income directly and then using it in a financial results control system to motivate managers’ behaviors is fraught with difficulties, however. Hence, this remedy to myopia suffers from feasibility. Will the cash flow forecasts prove to be accurate? Who should prepare the forecasts? Certainly some measurement difficulties need to be faced, but some believe that measuring changes in economic income directly might be workable within usable levels of accuracy in some situations (although likely rather infrequently). 5. Adjusting or improving accounting measures to better reflect economic income = A fifth approach to mitigate investment myopia involves changing the measurement rules to make the accounting income measures better; that is, more congruent with economic income. These improvements address one or more of the deviations between accounting income and economic income. 6. Replacing (or complementing ) accounting measures with (nonfinancial ) value drivers of performance ( that is, using combination of measures systems ) = The short-term, backward-looking, transactions-based orientation of accounting measures can be balanced by focusing also on other performance measures that are more future-oriented. For example, well-chosen nonfinancial measures can provide signals about what is likely in the future. Accomplishments in areas such as R&D, new product development, product quality, and customer satisfaction are often value drivers and hence, leading indicators of future financial performance. carefully selected value drivers are leading indicators of forthcoming cash flows and profits, value drivers focus managers’ attention on actions and decisions they should worry about today in order to create (or not destroy) value in the reasonably distant future.
C. HOW IS THE IMPLEMENTATION ?
1. Reducing the pressure for short-term profit : Weightings placed on annual or quarterly targets can be reduced even to zero : PT. X in 2016 had relatively small profits due to investment activities such as purchasing new machines, opening new plants and launching new products. PT.X's small profit does not indicate that PT.X has a poor financial performance because on the other hand PT. X has a large share, then has good product quality and high customer satisfaction. So that does not indicate that the financial performance is bad because there are still other things that will increase profits in the future. Put more emphasis on long-term indicators, such as market share or technical breakthroughs : Such as market share, customer satisfaction, research & development and others. 2. Using preaction reviews (action controls) to control developmental, long-term invesments : Standard Profit / Loss Report : Revenue $100 Expense $ 90 Net profit $ 10 Earnings Report with Performance : Revenue $ 100 Operating costs $ 50 Operating margin $ 50 Development Investment $ 40 Net profit $ 10 3. Lengthening the horizon over which performance is measured and rewarded ( using long-term incentives ) : General Electric Company Long Therm performance Awards (LTPA): This LTPA was approved in 2006 and an Award was made in 2009, with 600 executive candidates selected based on 2006-2008 performance. Awards are based on four performance measurements based on : a) Average income per share growth rate b) Average rate of income growth c) Total capital cumulative returns d) Cumulative cash flow from operating activities The type of incentive is retirement, how does retirement affect income? Simulated with calculations: As measured regarding the effect of retirement on income, the measurements are: a) Threshold Payment b) Target Payments c) Maximum Payment 4. Changing what is measured ( other proxies for shareholder value creation instead of accounting income ) : If rewards are linked to cash flow estimates, managers might be tempted to make biased estimates. This deviation may be controlled by having an estimated preparation or at least an assessment conducted by an independent third party, such as a consulting or auditor company. 5. Adjusting or improving accounting measures to better reflect economic income : in mark to market accounting (calculation of actual market value) in some industries (for example banks), when certain assets in the statement of financial position hold market values rather than their cost history, so that profits and losses are recorded when there is a change in the observed value and not only when assets will be sold. The next example is when an oil company can immediately reward exploration experts, geologists and geophysicists after they have succeeded in creating value for the company (when oil or gas was discovered). In this case, the reward or bonus will be based on an estimate of the value of their findings 6. Replacing (or complementing ) accounting measures with (nonfinancial ) value drivers of performance ( that is, using combination of measures systems ) : General Electric (GE) In the 1990s a multi-product and service company from the United States, General Electric decentralized the organization to more than one hundred profit centers. Managers develop measurement systems that consist of eight main measurements: a. Short-term Profit b. Market Share c. Productivity d. Product Leadership e. Employee Attitude f. Personnel Development g. Public Responsibility h. The balance between short-term and long-term goals The eight things above are not just a measurement system, but rather as a reminder that short-term and long-term balance is very necessary.
D. LIMINATION CHALLENGE / ISSUE HAS TO BE ADDRESED :
1. Reducing the pressure for short-term profit : The risk to doing this is to reduce the long-term profit pressures that trigger the slowness of a loss from short-term concentration without the need to sharpen the long-term focus. Therefore, when short-term pressure is reduced, managers who apply pressure must be trusted or vice versa, pressure must be applied in other ways, such as evaluating non-financial performance. 2. Using preaction reviews (action controls) to control developmental, long-term invesments : The key to applying this approach is to distinguish between operating costs needed to generate current period income and development costs incurred with the aim of generating revenue in the future period. 3. Lengthening the horizon over which performance is measured and rewarded ( using long-term incentives ) : The mental discount rate employees apply to delayed rewards isgreater than the time value of money. Hence, extending the time horizon of incentives has a cost interms of providing higher payoffs in expectation.Another riskcan be found in the performance standard. Firms commonly use the numbers includedin the long-term strategic plan as the standard. But this can drive much of the creative thinkingout ofstrategic planning. 4. Changing what is measured ( other proxies for shareholder value creation instead of accounting income ) : Most companies do have considerable experiencein preparing and analyzing estimates of future cash flows, and therefore should not be a problem.Riskin this approach is measurement precision and objectivity. Managers may be tempted to biastheir estimates if the rewards are linked to the cash flow estimates. 5. Adjusting or improving accounting measures to better reflect economic income : most of the improvements in measurement deviate from applicable accounting rules. Therefore, their implementation will cause the performance reports used for management control purposes to differ from the financial statements prepared. And this improvement requires the use of third financial records that are determined by management to complete records designed for financial statements and tax purposes. 6. Replacing (or complementing ) accounting measures with (nonfinancial ) value drivers of performance ( that is, using combination of measures systems ) : If the company has determined which are the main indicators and which indicators are supporting, then profit will definitely follow. Therefore managers must carefully consider which key indicators will be used or used. Some managers do not fully understand what should be done to increase the value of the entity. With this combination of measurement systems, managers get more guidance on how to create value compared to using a system based on a summary of performance measurements, both market and accounting naturally.