CASE DIGEST ON BASIC LEGAL ETHICS SUBJECT

1st Year 2nd Semester

Student : Guerrero, Grandeur P.G.

Freshman, Juris Doctor
Professor : Atty. Teofilo S. Villanueva

Case Digest, in re: Good Moral Character

Titles: ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY.

LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent [A.C. No. 6697,
25 July 2006]

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,

INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES [Bar Matter No. 1227, 25
July 2006]

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY.

LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR.

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005
TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP
RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY,
ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM
FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP
FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS [A.M. No. 05-
5-15-SC, 25 July 2006]

Ponente: Per Curiam

FACTS:

Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or

disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds:

1. Atty. De Vera alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension

order rendered against him by the State Bar of California.
2. That the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due
his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department –
San Francisco, State Bar of California. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to
 practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended 3
year suspension.

Atty. De Vera stated in his reply that the issues raised in above-mentioned
Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed
by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said
issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by
the SC in its Decision in Dec. 11, 2005 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard De Vera). He prayed that the instant administrative complaint be
dismissed following the principle of res judicata.

Complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing

respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used
as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent
never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant argued that the
respondent failed to present evidence that the SC of California accepted
the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited
that this should not absolve the respondent from liability. Moreover,
complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification.

ISSUE:

W/N ATTY. LEONARD S. DEVERA committed malpractice which amounted

to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and should such be an
applicable basis for a disbarment in the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes, there is substantial evidence of malpractice by Atty. De Vera. SC

suspended him for 2 years.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

“Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.”

Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's (Julius Willis) allegation in the
latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended
for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account
and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount
for personal purposes. Atty. De Vera insists that Julius’ father authorized
him to use the money, and has repayed the full amount even before the
administrative case was filed against him. However, aside from these self-
serving statements, the SC cannot find anywhere in the records of this
case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds
of his client.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer
that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might
use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his
client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de
Vera or the way such character was perceived.

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.

Atty. De Vera’s actions caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the
noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.