How we look towards sciences?

We come to a theory of science in another sense if we

study not the actions of scientists but their results, namely, science is a body of ordered

knowledge. Here, by the results we do not mean beliefs, images, etc, and the behavior influences

by them. In psychology perse, as we find it today, there is, besides the physiological and the

behavioristic approach. The question as to its validity, limits, and necessity are still more unclear

and in need of further discussion, much of what has been said about it, especially by

philosophers, may be looked at with some suspicion as how we look science from then until

now. As it defined again science has something to do with a systematic process that gain up

knowledge in the form of understanding of scientific things and its scientific processes or

methods, as well as in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe.

Nowadays, science and philosophy are more related to each other. The concept of

philosophy of science is concentrated more on the assumptions, foundations, methods,

implications of science, and with the use and merit of science. This can be explained by a few

concepts that associated with the philosophy of science such as induction, deduction,

epistemology, empiricism, falsification, and demarcation problem. This is because science is

based on theories that have observable consequences which must agree with the previous

theories. While theories in philosophy are complied with existing theories. In a general process

of science, all the things happen need to be observed. The science materials are facts. It provides

the data with empirical facts during the experimental processes. Science is described as the

empirical investigation can only observe the things happen. This observation is to describe the

process. Science is for efficiency as it helps to invent technologies and its goals are predicted.

Physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, and zoology are the example of science. All of them

have a goal to be achieved and things to be proven. The outcomes of those sciences will give an

increase in global technologies. While in philosophy, the general process focuses more on
examining the data of the observation and reasoning through it. The materials of philosophy are

conceptual based conceptualized. In philosophy, people are able to construct arguments over all

those things observed. The process is to provide explanations over the arguments that lead to the

development of the worldwide system. Philosophy complies with a search and understanding of

meaning. As for example, when one is asking what time is, there will be many answers as it can

be argued.

In doing the research and studies regarding the philosophy of science, there are many

philosophers and scientists involved. Some of them are Aristotle and Karl Popper. Aristotle

discovered about the topics called as physics, astronomy, biology as well as epistemology and

mathematics. While Karl Popper argued that falsifiability is both the hallmark of scientific

theories and the proper methodology for scientists to employ. He claimed that all scientists

should seek the opportunity to try to falsify the theories. Besides Popper and Aristotle, Francis

Bacon is also promoting a scientific method in which scientists collect many facts from their

observations and experiments in order to make inductive inferences about the patterns in nature.

While Paul Feyerabend argued that there is no scientific method. He said that without regard to

rational guidelines, scientists do anything in order to come up with new ideas and influence

others to accept them.

Philosophy of Physics
 Among the sciences that philosophers have discussed, physics has enjoyed a favored

position. In part, this is because physics is regarded as the “basic” science; its subject matter

includes the fundamental elements that make up our universe. If materialism is correct, then

physics studies the phenomena that compose the entire propriety domain of every other science,

from molecular chemistry and geology to economics and cosmology. More important, the

favored status of physics derives from its notable predictive and explanatory successes,

compared to those of the other special sciences. We can have no better grounds for confidence in

the methods and practices of a discipline than its actual production of instrumentally and

explanatorily reliable theories.

Historically, according to J.D Trout, the relationship of physics and philosophy has been

exercised in two ways, in philosophical discussions of methods of physics, and in the interaction

between substantial views in physics (about, say, the nature of matter, cause, space, and time) on

the one hand, and traditional philosophical doctrines regarding this phenomena on the other.

Developments in two areas of physics have been particularly influential in philosophy: quantum

mechanics and the physics of space-time.

In light of the probabilistic quantum phenomena, incompatibilist advocates of free will

embraced these results. This enthusiastic coopting of quantum phenomena mechanics seems to

have been premature bred from an inadequate analysis of how quantum phenomena bear on

issues of free will and from an overly simplistic understanding of the nature of deterministic

systems. This oversimplication is especially prominent in popularizations of quantum mechanics,

but it is not entirely accurate; the inaccuracy will be dealt with shortly. It is perhaps, irenic then

that Quine 1951 should use the very considerations of underdeterminaation and holism to argue

against the putative analytic character of theoretical choices advertised as “true by convention,”
though, the success of Quine’s anticonventionalist arguments is still a matter of some dispute.

The fact that the mind-dependence of reality is regarded by many as a dispensable assumption is

a testament to the powerful grips that locality has on contemporary physicists. Here, Nick

Herbert’s sentiment that “it is difficult to convey to outsiders the distaste which he majorities of

physicists feel when they hear the word ‘non-locality’. It might be worth mentioning that this

single “single well-determined ensemble” view is no longer regarded as a live option in the

literature.

Meanwhile, by the time of Newton, a lively conversation between physics and a new and

distinctly modern western philosophical tradition was well underway - and has flourished up to

the present day. According to the Newtonian conception of the world, the physical furniture of

the universe consists entirely of infinitesimal material points - of what are referred to in the

physical literature as classical particles. It comes in a potentially infinite variety of different

masses and electric charges. And so on, but the only physical attribute of a classical particle that

can change with time is its position. Newtonian Mechanics is deterministic. Given a list of the

positions of all of the particles in the world at any particular time, and of how those positions are

changing, at that time, as time flows foreword, and of what the intrinsic properties of those

particles are, the universe's entire history, in every detail, from that time foreword, is fixed and

determined (if this theory is true) with absolute certainty. Newton constructs a certain formula

how this determinism evolved as to the help of the study given by David Z. Albert:

The most illuminating way of doing that - for our present purposes - will be by means of

a succession of progressively better and better approximations

 The first goes like this: Calculate the positions of all the particles at t=T by supposing

that their velocities are constant - and equal to their above-mentioned values (v0 i ) at t=0 -

throughout the interval between t=0 and t=T.

This calculation will place particle i at x0 i + v0 i T at t=T; but it hardly needs saying that

this calculation is not a particularly accurate one, because (unless it happens that no forces are at

work on any of the particles here) the velocities of these particles will in fact not remain constant

throughout that interval.

Here's a somewhat better one:

Divide the time-interval in question into two, one extending from t=0 to t=T/2 and

the other extending from t=T/2 to t=T. Then calculate the positions of all the particles at T/2 by

supposing that their velocities are constant - and equal to their values at t=0 - throughout the

interval between t=0 and t=T/2 (this will place particle i at x0 i + v0 i (T/2) at T/2).

Then calculate the forces acting on each of the particles at t=0 (what those forces are,

remember, will follow from the positions of those particles at t=0 together with their masses and

their charges and their other internal properties - all of which we are given at the outset).

Then calculate each particle's velocity at T/2 by plugging those forces into the

abovementioned law of motion (plugging them, that is, into F=ma), and assuming that the

particles' accelerations are constant throughout the interval from t=0 to t=T/2 - and are equal to

theirvalues at t=0 (this will put the velocity of particle i at v0 i + a0 i (T/2), where a0 i is equal to

the force on particle i at t=0 divided by particle i's mass).

 Then, finally, calculate position of particle i at t=T (which is what we're after here) by

supposing that this particle maintains this new velocity throughout the interval between t=T/2

and t=T.

Connections of Quantum Theory and the Structure of Space-Time

There are a number of quite fundamental tensions between quantum theory and the

special theory of relativity. These tensions have been very much in plain sight for more than

thirty years at this writing - but it is only of late that the will to resolutely look them in the face

has begun to take hold.

To begin with, every understanding of quantum theory we have, every attempt at solving

the problem of measurement we know of, is committed to a description of the states of physical

systems at least partly in terms of wave-functions. And the wave-functions for systems

consisting of more than a single particle are simply not expressible as functions of space and

time - they are ineluctably functions of time and position in a much larger-dimensional space, a

space in which the fundamental relativistic criterion of Lorentz-invariance can apparently not

even be unambiguously defined - called configuration-space.

Moreover, there is a very intimate connection - a connection which has been at the center

of the canonical understanding of the special theory of relativity from its earliest beginnings -

between Lorentz-invariance and locality. This connection is now understood not to be a matter

straightforward logical implication - indeed, we can now point to a number of explicit models of

simple physical theories which are both Lorentz-invariant and non-local - but none of these seem

to have quite the same sort of non-locality in them as quantum theory does. Both the standard
formulation of quantum mechanics and every single one of the proposals we have for solving the

measurement problem - with the exception, once again, of the theories in the tradition of Everett

- requires that Lorentz-invariance be explicitly false. Every one of those proposals - more

particularly - requires that there be a preferred, absolute, non-Lorentz-invariant standard of

simultaneity.

These tensions have already generated a broad and unprecedented revival of interest in

the long-neglected approach of Lorentz to the physical phenomena associated with the special

theory of relativity, and there can be little doubt that the business of coming fully to grips with

all this - and with its further ramifications for the much-discussed project of the reconciliation of

quantum theory with the general theory of relativity - will be a central concern of the

philosophical foundations of physics over the coming years.

Scientific theories have many different structures, structures that exhibit patterns in

diverse domains of phenomena. Inferential patterns are crucial to understanding some aspects of

science and the way that it changes over time. But there is a great deal more to be said about

these patterns than can be said by assimilating them to an inferential pattern. Non-formal patterns

(such as mechanistic patterns) are also important for understanding how theories are used and

constructed. Closer scrutiny of the diverse structures of scientific theories, especially mechanistic

patterns, is likely to pay serious dividends for understanding science and scientific practice.

In conclusion, it can be seen that science and philosophy are related to each other.

Without philosophy, science cannot be improved. While scientist does observe the data of their

experiments, philosophers examine it and the reason through it. Science help to increase the

world’s technology and philosophy do develop the worldwide system. Science has also been

divided into many branches compared to philosophy itself.