”LEGAL RESEARCH ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT FOR

ALLOWING ALFREDO OPIGAN TO PLEAD GUILTY FOR VIOLATION

OF SECTION 31 0F RA 10591”

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, G.R. No. 99287 June 23,

1992, plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p.
1037). Likewise, in Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, the Court
ruled that there is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.
The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system -
speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party,
the prosecution, and the court. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-
count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage
of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused
sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged,
or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary.

A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction

of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense

under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of
right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of
the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991,
En Banc Resolution).

In addition, Section 5 of Rule 120 of Rules of Court provides:

 Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint
or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

The accused in the Information was charged with Violation of Section

28 (a) of R.A 10591 of the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act but he wants to plead guilty to a lesser offense under
Section 31 of the same law. As regards to this, the Trial Court correctly
pointed out that Sec 28 upon which the accused is charged has the essential
element of unlawful possession, meaning without a license; while Section
31 has the essential element of absence of permit to carry outside
residence x x x a registered firearm, meaning with license to possess but
without permit to carry outside his given residence. That in both cases, the
possession is illegal and therefore, by the definition of a lesser offense
stated above, Section 31 is included in Section 28; hence a lesser offense.

However, the prosecution argued that the imposable penalty on the

lesser offense of Section 31 is more than two (2) degrees lower, and
therefore, the plea of guilty to a lesser offense under the said Section
should not be allowed. The Trial Court did not agree on this matter. It
ruled that the imposable penalty is not the basis in determining whether or
not an offense constitutes a lesser offense, but the very nature of the offense
charged and the lesser offense, in which the essential elements must be
considered.

In relation to the Trial Court’s opinion, it is common to the

understanding of men that the imposable penalty and the nature of the
offense charged are two different things. Imposable penalty is that imposed
by law while the nature of the offense charged is the very crime itself and
its elements.

As evident from the foregoing, since the prosecution refused to give

its consent and conformity, the trial court need not wait for a guideline
from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's
motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment
whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end
that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. (People of the
Philippines v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992).

In the same vein, in Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, the
plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which
may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denote an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused
to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be
allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused.

Under the same jurisprudence, the rules on plea bargaining neither

create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means
to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the

defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered
and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser
crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be
convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself. (Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679).

The accused charged in the Information has pleaded guilty for a

lesser offense under Section 31 of RA 10591 instead of Section 28(a) of the
same law, in which it was allowed by the Trial Court.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.

In this case, the plain meaning of RA 10591’s simple language is most
favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for
the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused. Therefore the plea of guilty of the accused Opigan to a lesser
offense must be accorded with finality (Agote v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675,
July 22, 2005).