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DEPOSITORY
 AREA HANDBOOK
for
BANGLADESH

Coauthors
Richard F. Nyrop
Beryl Lieff Benderly
Cary Corwin Conn
William W. Cover
Barrel R. Eglin

Research completed April 1975

First Edition

Published 1975

DA Pam 550-175
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Nyrop, Richard F.
Area handbook for Bangladesh.
"One of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign
Area Studies (FAS) of the American University."
"DA Pam 550-175."
Bibliography: pp. 307-327
Includes index.
Supt. of Docs, no.: D 101.22:660-176
1. Bangladesh. I. American University, Washington,
D. C. Foreign Area Studies. II. Title.
DS393.4.N97 954.9"2 75-619340

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $6.10
 FOREWORD
This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area
Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to
military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic
facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and
practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description
of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable
changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to
present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on
space and research time permit. It was compiled from information
available in openly published material. An extensive bibliography is pro
vided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed
information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of
view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook
represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the offi
cial view of the United States government.
An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as
possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations,
and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information
and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for
factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be wel
comed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to:
The Director
Foreign Area Studies
The American University
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016

in
 PREFACE
On March 26, 1971, the leaders of the Awami League declared East
Pakistan independent of Pakistan, of which it had been a part since 1947,
and announced the creation of Bangladesh, the land or home of Bengalis
(see Glossary). A brutal civil war broke out, and the issue of East Paki
stan's secession was not resolved until elements of the Indian armed
forces launched a formal invasion of the area on December 4. The Paki
stan army commander in Dacca surrendered on December 16, and a few
days later the Bangalee (see Glossary) government-in-exile returned to
Dacca to set up a government.
On January 11, 1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami
League, returned from West Pakistan, where he had been imprisoned
since the previous March. Under his leadership the Awami League
formed a parliamentary government. Over the next three years a
number of foreign countries and international organizations provided a
vast amount of economic aid and assistance, and Mujib's government
sought to establish a system of law and order. By late 1974, however, the
economy was a shambles, the society remained seriously disorganized,
and most institutions of government were inefficient, corrupt, or both.
Under Mujib's guidance the national Parliament on January 25, 1975,
through a constitutional amendment abolished the parliamentary
system, established a presidential one, and granted Mujib power to
create a one-party state, which he created a short time later. Mujib had
earlier suspended the constitutional guarantees of fundamental or civil
rights, and the constitutional amendment sharply curtailed the powers of
the judicial system in this field. In April 1975 Mujib directly controlled
or possessed the major powers of the state—including those of the mili
tary, paramilitary, and police forces.
On August 15, however, Mujib, his wife, and several members of his
family were assassinated in a coup d'etat. In the immediate aftermath of
the coup little information was available, and many of the early reports
were contradictory. The most reliable sources available in early Novem
ber believed that a small group of middle grade army officers planned
and executed the coup because of Mujib's continued failure to check the
open corruption that ran from the lowest to the highest levels of govern
ment and because of Mujib's increasing efforts to politicize the armed
forces and civil services (see ch. 1).
A long time colleague of Mujib, Khandakar Mushtaque Ahmad,
emerged as the new president. He instituted strong programs to reduce
corrupt practices and to restore efficiency and public confidence in the
government, and he promised to restore parliamentary democracy by
February 1977. He also issued orders for the transfer of all the equipment
and assets and most of the personnel of the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini to the
army and for the eventual abolition of the Rakkhi Bahini, which had been
viewed as Mujib's private army (see ch. 14). He hoped thus to avert a civil
war between the two military forces.
Mushtaque Ahmad was unable, however, to control the power
struggles within the army. On November 3 the army chief of general
staff, Brigadier Khalid Musharaf, temporarily emerged as the dominant
military figure, superseding Major General Ziaur Rahman, who had been
appointed army chief of staff in late August but who was now dismissed.
Mushtaque Ahmad was replaced as president by the chief justice of the
Supreme Court, Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem. Sometime between
November 3 and November 6 four prominent politicians who had been
imprisoned since August were killed. The four were former prime minis
ters Tajuddin Ahmed and Mansoor Ali, former vice president Syed
Nazrul Islam, and a former commerce minister, A.H.M. Kamuruzza-
man. Also during this period some or all of the officers who had engi
neered the August 15 coup turned up in Thailand seeking political
asylum.
On November 6 the new president repeated his predecessor's pledge
to restore parliamentary democracy by February 1977. The next day
President Sayem announced that he would govern the country under
martial law provisions and that he would be assisted by the chiefs of staff
of the armed forces. The army chief of staff was identified as Major
General Ziaur Rahman, who had been dismissed only three days before.
Khalid Musharaf had disappeared from the public scene and reportedly
was dead. As of November 14, when the page proofs of this study were
returned to the printer for binding, observers believed that at least
momentarily Ziaur Rahman had emerged as the nation's strongman, but
they refused to speculate as to how long he would be able to retain control.
The Area Handbookfor Bangladesh is an attempt to provide a compre
hensive study of the dominant social, political, and economic aspects of
Bangalee society and to identify the patterns of behavior characteristic
of its members. The study results from the combined efforts of a Foreign
Area Studies multidisciplinary team of researchers assisted by the
organization's research support staff. The team was chaired by Richard
F. Nyrop, who wrote chapter 1 and, with Robert A. Kirchner, chapter 10
and coordinated the contributions of the other authors. Beryl Lieff
Benderly wrote chapters 4,5, and 6; Cary Corwin Conn wrote chapters 2,
8, and 9; William W. Cover wrote chapters 3, 7, and 14; and Darrel R.
Eglin wrote chapters 11, 12, and 13. The authors wish to express their
gratitude to persons in various agencies of the United States government
who gave of their time, documents, and special knowledge to provide
data and perspective. Special gratitude is also due to various Bangalee
residents of Washington, D.C.

vi
 Sources of information used included scholarly studies, official reports
of governments and international organizations, foreign and domestic
newspapers, and current journals. Relatively up-to-date economic data
were available, but many of the demographic data are based on pre
liminary reports of the 1974 census and are subject to considerable
revision. Reliable information on social life and organization was ex
tremely scarce. A glossary is included for the reader's convenience.
Although the Bangalee government presents many of its data in the
metric system, most commerce is conducted in indigenous weights. The
usual units are the maund, the seer, and the tola. Technically, the maund
is composed of forty seer and each seer of eighty tola. Under this system
the maund equals 82.28 pounds; the seer, 2.057 pounds; and the tola,
0.4114 ounce. The weights vary wildly from area to area, however, and
even within a given area the measuring devices may be so primitive that
weights are frequently no more than estimates. Jute fiber, the major
export, is usually shipped in bales of about 400 pounds. Unless otherwise
cited, the weights are given in metric tons.
For more than a century most government business in the area that
is now Bangladesh has been conducted in English. By 1975, however, the
Bangalee government more and more frequently used Bengali. In addi
tion, even in its English publications the government often makes refer
ence to the Bengali calendar. The Bengali year begins on April 15 of the
Gregorian calendar (see fig. A). April 15, 1975, was the first day of
Boisak 1381. The Muslim, or Hijrah, calendar is widely used in religious
life.
Although Bangladesh is among the youngest of the world's nations, the
history of its society and of the larger political systems on the Indian sub
continent of which the Bengali people have been a part is long and com
plex. A brief chronology of some of the more important events is included
for the convenience of the reader (see table A).
The transliteration of Bengali varies widely among Bengali and foreign
scholars. Common family names may be transliterated in several ways,
for example, Choudhury, Chaudri, Chowdhury, and several other vari
ants. The authors have followed the spelling used by the individual where
known. In other instances the authors have followed the form used by the
Bangalee government; for example, the word national is transliterated
as jatiyo, although many American scholars use jatiya. To the extent
possible, the authors used the place names established by the United
States Board on Geographic Names.
On May 17, 1975, Bangladesh devalued its currency from Tk18.97 per
British pound sterling to Tk30 per pound sterling. The devaluation fol
lowed pressure from the International Monetary Fund, the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, commonly known as
the World Bank), and international aid donors for Bangladesh to bring
its exchange rate into alignment with the taka's purchasing power. The
devaluation established a more realistic exchange rate and should pro-

vii
Center circle— An 1975
Middle circle— Hijra (Muslim) 1395
Outer circle— Bengali 1381

Note— Shaded area represents eleven-day discrepancy between Hijra (lunar) calendar and solar calendar.

Source: Based on information from Jean Ellickson, "A Believer Among Believers: The
Religious Beliefs, Practices, and Meanings in a Village in Bangladesh," Ann Arbor,
1972, p. 83.
Figure A. Calendars Used in Bangladesh

vide substantial help to the country's exports, particularly jute. By mid-

1975 the government had begun to tackle economic problems with more
vigor. Deficit financing had declined, industrial efficiency had improved,
and additional reforms were prepared for the fiscal year (FY) 1976
budget. Foreign observers were agreed, however, that it would still take
time and extensive foreign aid to raise the economic growth rate sig
nificantly above the rate of population increase.

viii
 Table A. Bangladesh, Chronology of Important Events

Period Description

Ancient Empires
ca. 3000-1500 B.C Harappan culture in Indus Valley
ca. 1500-500 B.C Invasions of Aryan-speaking tribes; Vedic Age
ca. 550-486 B.C Life of Gautama Buddha; founding of Buddhism
ca. 320-180 B.C Mauryan Empire; Asoka most famous emperor;
spread of Buddhism
ca. 180 B.C. -A. D. 150 Saka kingdoms in Indus Valley and northwest
ca. A.D. 78-A.D. 200 Kushan Empire; Gandharan art flourished
third-fifth centuries A. D Gupta Empire; Classical Age in northern India
fifth-sixth centuries A.D Hun invasions
Coming of Islam
711 Arab Muslims invade and conquer Sind
998-1030 Mahmud of Ghazni raids into the subcontinent from
Afghanistan
1192 Muhammad of Ghor defeats Rajputs
1206 Establishment of Delhi Sultanate
1398 Destruction of Delhi by Timur
The Mughal Period
1526 Babur victorious in first Battle of Panipat
1526-30 Babur lays foundations of Mughal Empire
1530-56 Wars of succession
1556 Akbar victorious in second Battle of Panipat
1556-1605 Akbar the Great
1605-27 Jahangir; in 1612 British East India Company opens
first trading center
1628-58 Shah Jahan
1658-1707 Aurangzeb
1761 Third Battle of Panipat; an Afghan victory for the
Mughals over a Maratha army
1707-1858 Lesser emperors; the decline of the empire
British India
1757 Battle of Plassey—victory of British East India
Company army over Mughal forces in Bengal;
conventional date for beginning of British rule in
India
1784 Pitt's India Act
1793 Permanent Settlement of 1793; established new land
lord system in Bengal, which was disastrous for
Bengali farmers
1835 Institution of English education and other reform
measures
1857-58 Uprising, variously known as Mutiny of 1857, the
Great Mutiny, the Sepoy Rebellion, and the first
war of independence
1858 British Raj (British Indian Empire) begins
1885 Indian National Congress formed
1905 Partition of Bengal
1906 Muslim League founded
1911 Partition of Bengal modified

IX
 1919 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms
1935 Government of India Act of 1935
March 23, 1940 Muslim League adopts Pakistan Resolution
Pakistan
August 14, 1947 Partition and independence; Mohammad Ali Jinnah
becomes governor general; Liaquat Ali Khan
becomes prime minister
September 11, 1948 Jinnah dies; Khwaja Nazimuddin becomes governor
general
October 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan assassinated; Ghulam Mohammad
becomes governor general
September 1955 Ghulam Mohammad dies; succeeded by Iskander
Mirza
March 23, 1956 Constitution adopted; Mirza becomes president
October 7, 1958 President Mirza abrogates constitution, declares
martial law
October 27, 1958 Mirza sent into exile; General Mohammad Ayub
Khan begins rule
March 25, 1969 Ayub resigns as result of public pressure; General
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan assumes power
March 26-December 16, 1971 . Awami League declares independence of Bangla
desh; Pakistan army in East Pakistan surrenders
to Indian armed forces; East Pakistan becomes the
independent state of Bangladesh
Bangladesh
January 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returns from prison in
West Pakistan; promulgates an interim constitu
tion and is sworn in as prime minister
November 1972 New Constitution approved by Constituent As
sembly
March 1973 Parliamentary elections; Awami League wins all but
seven seats in 315-member Parliament
December 1974 State of emergency declared; fundamental rights
suspended
January 25, 1975 Constitution amended abolishing parliamentary
system, establishing presidential system with de
facto one-man rule
February 1975 President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman abolishes all
parties but one—the Krishak Sramik Awami
League—which was under his direct control
 COUNTRY SUMMARY
1. COUNTRY: People's Republic of Bangladesh. Formerly the province
of East Pakistan. Independence from Pakistan proclaimed March 26,
1971 (Independence Day), and achieved December 16, 1971 (National
Day), after civil war and Indian military intervention. Citizens, almost
all of whom are ethnic Bengalis, known as Bangalees.
2. POPULATION: Estimated to be 81.6 million or more in early 1975.
About 50 percent under age fifteen; male-female ratio reported as 108 to
100, probably distorted by undercounting of females. Annual growth rate
3 percent or higher. Countrywide density conservatively estimated at
about 1,300 people per square mile. About 95 percent rural villagers.
Dacca by far largest city: at least 1.5 million. Unchecked population
growth a critical national problem.
3. GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION: About 55,598 square miles; part of
Plain of Bengal at eastern end of Indo-Gangetic Plain. Mostly a flat, allu
vial delta; older deposited soils in northern portion. Dominant feature is
profusion of rivers, flowing generally south. Hot, humid monsoonal
climate. High levels of seasonal rainfall augmented by enormous water
volumes through river drainage from surrounding countries; widespread
annual flooding and high winds—especially cyclones off the Bay of Bengal
—cause distress and frequent disaster. Landscape extensively culti
vated, substantial forestation only about 16 percent of country area.
4. LANGUAGE: Bengali spoken nearly universally; English widely
used in modern sector.
5. RELIGION: Between 85 and 90 percent Muslim, remainder pre
dominantly Hindu. Small numbers of Buddhists and Christians. Govern
ment officially secular.
6. EDUCATION: Literacy slightly over 20 percent. Government hopes
to reorient educational system to meet needs of rural population.
Government claimed 50 percent of children in primary school in 1975.
7. HEALTH: Poor nutrition and sanitation contribute to high maternal
and child death rates; high incidence of infectious diseases including
smallpox, cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid, diphtheria, and others. Inade
quate health care system.
8. GOVERNMENT: In January 1975 the 1972 Constitution amended to
replace parliamentary system with presidential one. As president,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman dominant in executive and legislative affairs;
possessed extensive potential power over judiciary.

xi
9. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: On March 26, 1975, president
announced that previous system of four divisions divided into twenty-
one districts to be replaced by sixty-two districts and that districts will be
administered by administrative councils that will be controlled by mem
bers of nation's only legal political party. As of June 1975 system not yet
implemented.
10. JUSTICE: Supreme Court of Bangladesh, highest tribunal in land,
consists of High Court Division and Appellate Division. January 1975
amendment to Constitution removed from High Court Division its previ
ous charge of enforcing fundamental rights, which in any event were
suspended. Courts of session at former district level and multitude of
magistrates' courts at lower levels.
11. INTERNATIONAL MEMBERSHIPS: Member of the United Na
tions and most of its agencies, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the
Conference of Nonaligned States. Treaty of friendship and commerce
with India major treaty agreement as of early 1975.
12. ECONOMY: Predominantly an agricultural economy, which grew at
about the same rate as population between 1947 and 1970, more slowly
since then. Agriculture largely stagnated while a small modern industrial
sector was added. With independence in 1971 the government, through
extensive nationalization of industry and commerce and the First Five
Year Plan (1973-78), attempted to raise the rate of economic growth but
with little success by early 1975. With an annual per capita income the
equivalent of about US$70, the country is one of the poorest in the world.
Much of the population has grown steadily poorer since 1947.
13. EXPORTS: Exports in fiscal year (FY) 1974 were about US$360
million, substantially less in value and much less in volume than in FY
1970. Jute fiber and woven products amounted to about 80 percent of
export earnings since 1971. Supply and demand conditions make an
appreciable increase of jute exports doubtful. Other important exports
include tea, animal hides, and fish products.
14. IMPORTS: Economy needs almost every kind of imported com
modity. Grain imports, necessary to keep the population's diet even at
very inadequate levels, have averaged over 2 million tons a year since
1971. Most construction materials imported, and industry heavily
dependent on imports of machinery and parts, raw materials, and a num
ber of commodities used in production process. Imports in FY 1974
amounted to an estimated US$875 million. Sharp increases in import
prices in FY 1974 and FY 1975 created severe problems in maintaining
volume of essential imports required by economy.
15. FINANCE: Currency unit is the taka, which is tied to British pound
sterling at a rate of Tk18.97 per pound, yielding a cross rate with the
United States dollar of Tk8 per US$1 in 1974. Purchasing power of the
taka diminished tremendously after 1971 because of high rate of inflation
caused by scarcity of goods and deficit financing by government. Budget

xu
revenues have not matched expectations, and development expenditures
for economic growth were largely financed from the counterpart of
foreign aid and borrowing from banks. The government failed to mobilize
domestic resources, substantially increasing the country's dependence
on foreign assistance for economic improvement.
16. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION: Riverine topography favors
water transport; inhibits other means. Profusion of rivers provides vast
network (about 5,000 miles) of inland waterways accounting for about 75
percent of all movement of goods and people by river steamers, motor
launches, ferryboats, barges, and traditional sail craft. Five major river
ports and at least 1,400 landings. Rail transport of secondary importance.
Basic rail system laid down during British rule. Route mileage about
1,800 miles in 1971, about one-third broad gauge and two-thirds meter
gauge. Road system of tertiary importance; improvements initiated in
1973 with external assistance. All transport facilities heavily damaged by
November 1970 cyclone. and war of 1971.
17. PORTS AND AIRPORTS: Ocean shipping serviced at two seaports:
Chittagong, principal port developed after 1947, and Chalna, or Mongla
Port, south of Khulna. In early 1975 merchant marine consisted of eleven
ships, 10,000 tons or less; about twenty more to be acquired by late 1978.
Principal airport at Dacca, serviced by a number of international
carriers. At least eight secondary airports and several lesser airstrips.
National airline is Bangladesh Biman (Air Bangladesh), operating nine
or ten aircraft in late 1974—mostly in-country traffic—some flights to
India, Nepal, and Great Britain.
18. AID PROGRAMS: More than US$2.5 billion of foreign aid had been
pledged to Bangladesh by early 1975 by more than forty countries and
international agencies. Much aid was for relief and reconstruction after
disasters although aid also had been committed to a number of projects
for economic development. Military aid had been small. The United
States had provided by far the largest amount of aid, followed by India
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD,
commonly known as the World Bank).
19. NATIONAL SECURITY: All armed forces, police, and security
agencies except special paramilitary Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini or National
Defense Force (usually called Rakkhi Bahini) built from models of
corresponding services during British rule, with some modifications.
Regular services small, constrained by both low budgets and limitations
of small professional cadre to manage much larger forces. Army of about
25,000 in 1975, navy and air force each 1,000 or less. Service voluntary,
available manpower far in excess of requirements. Police and border
security force, called Bangladesh Rifles, totaled perhaps 30,000. Threats
to security mainly internal rather than external. Rakkhi Bahini, respon
sible directly to President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, apparently intended
to have principal role in internal security. This force totaled about 30,000

Xlll
in 1975 and reportedly was planned to be greatly expanded. Supreme
command of regular forces, police, and Rakkhi Bahini centralized in
person of the president.

xiv
 BANGLADESH
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD iii
PREFACE v
COUNTRY SUMMARY xi
SECTION I. SOCIAL
Chapter 1 . General Character of the Society 1
2. Historical Setting 11
Early History—European Colonization—The British Raj—
Independent Pakistan—The Ayub Khan Era: 1958-69—Yahya
Khan and Bangladesh
3. Geography and Population 55
Boundaries and Subdivisions—Regions, Rivers, and Hills—
Climate and Rainfall—Soils, Vegetation, and Wildlife—Fuel and
Mineral Resources—Transportation and Water Control: Man-
made Features—Population
4. Education and Living Conditions 93
Living Conditions—Education
5. Religious Life 109
Islam—Muslim Institutions and Leadership—Hinduism—
Buddhism—Christianity
6. Social System 131
Historical Background—The Structure of the Society—Family,
Household, and Kinship
7. Communications and the Arts 147
Mass Communications—Artistic and Intellectual Expression
SECTION II. POLITICAL
Chapter 8. The Governmental System 171
Background—The 1972 Constitution—Governmental Institu
tions under the Amended Constitution
9. Political Dynamics 189
Background—Political Groups and Political Events: 1972-April
1975
10. Foreign Relations 201
Relations with Other South Asian States—Relations with Is
lamic States of the Middle East—Relations with Various Other
States—Mechanics of Foreign Relations
SECTION III: ECONOMIC
Chapter 11. Character and Structure of the Economy 209
A Sketch of the Economy—Current Development Strategy—
Status and Prospects of the Plan

XV
 12. Agriculture 227
The 1974 Famine and Food Balances—Water: Too Much and
Too Little—Role of Government—Land Utilization—Cropping
Patterns—Livestock—Fishing—Forestry
13. Industry and Commerce 249
Domestic Commerce—Foreign Commerce—Foreign Aid—
Industry
SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY
Chapter 14. National Defense and Internal Security 275
Regular Armed Forces—Police and Security Forces—Criminal
Law and the Emergency Rules of 1975—Security Environment
BIBLIOGRAPHY 307
GLOSSARY 329
INDEX 331

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page

A Calendars Used in Bangladesh viii

1 People's Republic of Bangladesh xviii
2 Bengal, 1772, 1856, 1945, and 1947 13
3 Bangladesh, Principal Regions, Rivers, and Hills 59
4 Bangladesh, Mean Annual Rainfall 69
5 Bangladesh, Principal Railways and Roads 75
6 Bangladesh, Population Growth, Selected Years, 1901—75 81
7 Bangladesh, Density of Population by District, 1974 82
8 Bangladesh, Approximate Age-Sex Pyramid, 1960 and 1970 84
9 Bangladesh, Major Tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 137
10 Bangladesh, Cultural Regions 139
11 Bangladesh, Structure of the Central Government as Provided in Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, January 1975 173

LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
A Bangladesh, Chronology of Important Events ix
1 Bangladesh, Temperature at Selected Locations 67
2 Bangladesh, Major Water Control Projects 77
3 Bangladesh, Divisional Population Distribution, 1974 83
4 Bangladesh, Age-Sex Distribution, 1961 Census 85
5 Bangladesh, Distribution of Employed Persons, 1963 and 1968 89
6 Bangladesh, Per Capita Consumption of Selected Commodities, 1970 and 1973 95
7 Bangladesh, Major Daily and Weekly Newspapers and Magazines, 1974 .... 153
8 Bangladesh, Radio Stations, 1974 157
9 Bangladesh, Leadership Changes in the Central Government of Pakistan,
1947-71 191
10 Bangladesh, Summary of Government Budgets, Fiscal Years 1973-75 222

XVI
11 Bangladesh, Annual Development Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1973-75 223
12 Bangladesh, Estimated Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1973-75 261
13 Bangladesh, Industrial Production in Nationalized Industries, Selected Com
modities, Fiscal Years 1970, 1973, and 1974 269

XVI 1
Note— Districts named after their capitals. — ..- District
International
boundary
boundary

O National capital
• District capital

Figure 1. People's Republic of Bangladesh

XV111
 SECTION I. SOCIAL
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY
In the quarter century between 1947 and 1972, the people of Bangla
desh twice declared their freedom and independence. When British India
was partitioned in August 1947, the area that is now Bangladesh became
part of the independent Dominion of Pakistan and was known as the East
Wing, East Bengal, or East Pakistan. In March 1971 East Pakistan's
political leaders proclaimed the independence of Bangladesh, and on
December 16, 1971, when the commander of the Pakistan armed forces
surrendered in Dacca, the secession of East Pakistan was complete, and
the independence of Bangladesh was achieved.
The name Bangladesh means the land, or home, of Bengalis, those
whose mother tongue is Bengali and who are only truly at home in a
Bengali cultural milieu (see ch. 7). For centuries that land was a part of
some larger political entity: the Mughal Empire, British India, or
Pakistan (see table A). It has always been and it remains a part of Bengal,
the cultural area closely coterminous with Bangladesh and the Indian
state of West Bengal (see fig. 1). During the Pakistan period the Bengalis
of East Pakistan described the province not as the eastern part of
Pakistan but rather as the eastern part of Bengal. In the mid-1970s the
Bangalees, as the citizens of Bangladesh are called, used the same
description—that is, Bangladesh is the eastern part of Bengal.
The history of Bengal, particularly in the form of legends and folk
beliefs, includes the recurring themes of the exploitation of the land and
the people by alien rulers and of steadfast and often violent Bengali
resistance. The chronicles of the Mughal Empire refer to Bengal as an
excellent source of war elephants but also as a region in which armies got
lost and disappeared. During the decline of the Mughals in the eighteenth
century, the British East India Company became one of several ruling
powers in Bengal, and British rule on the Indian subcontinent began
there, after the company army defeated a Mughal army in the Battle of
Plassey in 1757 (see ch. 2).
Through the vehicle of the British East India Company, British traders
ravaged the land, and British governors committed colossal, if well-
intentioned, administrative mistakes. Perhaps the most disastrous
British decision was the imposition of the Permanent Settlement of 1793,
which among other things destroyed the extant landholding system and
created a new landlord class, the zamindars. Most of these zamindars
were Hindus and, in what is now Bangladesh, most of the dispossessed
tenants were Muslims, a circumstance that hampered the material
progress of the Bengali Muslims and added more tension to ancient
Hindu-Muslim rivalry (see ch. 5; ch. 6). In addition the British mercan
tile policies of the late eighteenth century favored the textile mills of
England and Scotland, and within a few decades the large, prosperous,
and world-renowned weaving industry in Bengal was destroyed, and the
large artisan class, accounting for perhaps one-third of the working force,
lost its occupation. From that time to the present agriculture has been
the only occupation available to an overwhelming majority of the popula
tion and for many has meant life as a tenant or landless laborer (see
ch. 12).
The first serious challenge to British rule—called the Great Mutiny,
the Mutiny of 1857, or the Sepoy Rebellion by British historians but
frequently cited by South Asians as the uprising of 1857—broke out in
what was known as the Bengal Army and involved many Bengalis (see ch.
2). For a long time thereafter British officials viewed Bengalis as
treacherous. For that and other reasons, the British generally excluded
Bengalis from recruitment into the British Indian Army and, despite a
relatively high literacy rate, did not encourage the recruitment of
Bengalis into the civil service. Even during the period between World
War I and World War II when the British launched a cautious policy of
recruiting and training Indian army officers, a practice known as
Indianization, few Bengalis were selected. Although several Bengalis
secured admission to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) during this period,
few of them were Bengali Muslims.
As a result, when the new state of Pakistan was established on August
15, 1947, there were less than a dozen Bengali officers in the Pakistan
armed forces. In the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the successor to the
ICS, the Bengali representation was somewhat higher, but Bengalis
remained a minority throughout the Pakistan period. West Pakistanis
also retained control of most of the vital political posts in the new
government. The Bengalis of East Pakistan observed that West
Pakistanis controlled the government, the military, the civil service, and
industry and commerce and referred bitterly to the West Pakistanis as
"brown Englishmen." The East Pakistanis responded to this domination
with agitation for provincial and cultural autonomy; by early 1971, when
in their judgment their demands had not been met, they were prepared to
secede.
The decision to secede and to proclaim the province an independent
nation was made by the leaders of the dominant political party in the
province, the Awami League. More specifically, the decision was made by
the party's chief, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a charismatic personality
known as the Sheikh, Mujib, and—affectionately and reverently—the
Bangabandhu, the friend of Bengal. In December 1970 the Awami

2
League emerged as the majority party from the first universal suffrage
direct election ever held in Pakistan. The party platform called for almost
complete provincial autonomy. The military government then in power in
the nation's capital of Islamabad and the West Pakistani political leaders
refused to convene a constituent assembly in which Mujib and his party
would have been able to draft a constitution and to form a government.
On March 26, 1971, since celebrated in Bangladesh as Independence Day,
civil war broke out.
Mujib was seized and moved to a West Pakistan prison, but many of his
colleagues escaped into India where they established a government-in-
exile. After eight months of guerrilla warfare between Bengali insurgent
forces—the most important of which was the Mukti Bahini (Liberation
Army)—and the Pakistan armed forces, India entered the war. On
December 16, now National Day in Bangladesh, the Pakistan military
commander in Dacca surrendered to the commander of the Indian
invasion force. A few days later the Pakistanis released Mujib from
prison, and in January 1972 he returned to Dacca to assume control of the
new government (see ch. 8).
The situation confronting Mujib and his associates was chaotic. In the
autumn of 1970 a cyclone and subsequent flooding had devastated large
sections of the country, killing scores of thousands and making hundreds
of thousands homeless. During the civil war an estimated 200,000 women
and girls had been raped, rendering them unsuitable for marriage,
virtually the only accepted role for women; most of them were cast out of
their families to live off public charity (see ch. 4). Furthermore, some
400,000 children were orphaned, thousands of teachers and intellectuals
were killed or maimed, some 300,000 schools were destroyed or damaged,
an unknown number of people—variously estimated at between 1 million
and 3 million—were killed, and nearly 10 million fled to India. The surface
transportation system was severely damaged during the war, and
communications between Dacca and some parts of the country simply did
not exist.
Furthermore, a national government had to be created, and such
governmental institutions as the police, the courts, the schools, and local
administrative bodies had to be reconstituted. With the exodus of West
Pakistanis, the country lost the bulk of its experienced executives,
entrepreneurs, and senior government officials. Some official action had
to be taken against known wartime collaborators with the Pakistani
military, while at the same time protection was necessary for some who
were accused of collaboration but were perhaps innocent. And in an effort
to lower the incidence of violent crimes that were reported from all parts
of the country, the government needed to disarm its citizens, who
possessed large but unknown amounts of small arms and ammunition
acquired during the civil war.
Even to attempt these tasks the government needed a strong, viable
civil service, and this it neither possessed nor attempted to develop.

3
Many of the East Pakistanis who had achieved senior positions in the CSP
had been serving in West Pakistan when the civil war broke out and were
detained there until 1973 and 1974. Even when these experienced officers
returned to Dacca, however, they were only rarely given positions of
responsibility. Mujib's failure to rely upon the civil service, and the
issuance of a 1972 presidential order that deprived the civil service of its
traditional immunity from political reprisal, prompted some observers to
note that Mujib in power behaved as though he were still in opposition.
Other observers commented that during both the British India and the
Pakistan periods the military and civil bureaucracy had actually run the
government and that Mujib appeared determined to exclude both groups
from influence in his new state (see ch. 8; ch. 14).
In the words of Mujib and his most ardent supporters, Mujib is the new
state. In November 1974 the lead sentence of an article in a newspaper
operated by Mujib's nephew stated that "the people want the benefit of
[Mujib's] direct rule as the earth receives the sun's rays." A few weeks
later another newspaper editorialized that "Bangabandhu's sagacity, the
most valued element," would save the nation. In an interview with Lewis
M. Simon of the Washington Post, Mujib revealed the extent to which in
his own mind he is Bangladesh: "My factories are working, my jute mills,
my industries, my cultivators are working. I am a member of the World
Bank, I am a member of the IMF, I am in the Asian Development Bank, I
am in the Islamic Bank, I am in the Commonwealth."
Foreign analysts of Bangalee politics frequently seek to ascertain the
reasons for what they view as procrastination by Mujib in implementing
announced policy. In early 1972 Mujib stated that the civil service would
be reorganized; as of April 1975 this had not been done (see ch. 8). Also in
early 1972, he announced that the sixty-two subdivisions would be
changed into districts, to replace the existing system of four divisions and
nineteen districts. Mujib reiterated that intention in his Independence
Day speech on March 26, 1975, but as of April 1975 he had not
implemented his proposals (see ch. 9). The pattern of arousing and then
not meeting expectations has been repeated on many occasions involving
both minor and major sociopolitical issues. Observers concluded that
Mujib refuses to delegate authority and proposed action is therefore
delayed, that his political associates block implementation of his
proposals, or that Mujib simply changes his mind frequently. In any
event, in early 1975 observers were agreed that Mujib's record as an
administrator was a poor one and that this had contributed to the general
lowering of the standard of living of most Bangalees (see ch. 4; ch. 12).
The crush of people upon the land and their general level of poverty
remained the dominant aspects of Bangalee society in the mid-1970s.
Near famine conditions in late 1974 reduced the already subsistence
standard of living of many even further. In early 1975 an estimated 81.6
million people were crowded onto about 55,598 square miles, resulting in
a population density of more than 1,400 people per square mile. With the
exception of the city-state of Singapore, Bangladesh was the world's most
densely populated nation. Because parts of the coastal swamps are not
suitable for human habitation and because the hilly region known as the
Chittagong Hill Tracts can support only a relatively light population, the
area centering on the capital city of Dacca had a population density
considerably in excess of 2,600 per square mile (see ch. 3).
Although frequent natural disasters, such as floods and cyclones, kill
scores of thousands and widespread chronic malnutrition and poor
sanitation result in high rates of death from a wide variety of diseases, in
the early 1970s the population contined to grow at an annual rate of 3
percent or higher (see ch. 4). Bangalee government officials and foreign
analysts were agreed that the already large and rapidly increasing
imbalance between the population and the nation's natural resources
loomed as the nation's most critical, but seemingly insoluble, problem. In
early 1975 Mujib identified population growth as second only to
corruption as a national issue, and he intimated, as other government
officials had earlier, that unspecified but draconian methods to curb
population growth might be imposed. .
The annual per capita income in 1974 was the equivalent of US$70 or
less, making the society one of the world's poorest. An estimated 94
percent of the population resides in rural villages, and about 80 percent
depends on agriculture for subsistence. Although data were imprecise
and frequently no more than informed estimates, about 37 percent of the
working force was reported to be unemployed or underemployed.
In the early 1970s the cropped area was about 150 percent of the arable
land (meaning that part of the land produced two or more crops annually) ,
and almost all of the arable land was under cultivation (see ch. 12). The
competition for land was therefore an intense zero-sum game, prompting
political chicanery, corruption, and violence. The cultivation of the two
major crops, rice and jute, and of another important crop, tea, is labor
intensive but, in spite of an abundance of labor, yields were low.
According to agricultural experts, an increase in rice and jute production
is possible only through a severalfold increase in such inputs as high-yield
seeds, fertilizers, and irrigation coupled with flood control. Such inputs
are expensive and in the mid-1970s were beyond the reach of the
Bangalee economy. Moreover, the introduction of such methods into the
Banglee agricultural society and their proper utilization would require, in
the opinion of foreign observers, a sophisticated and efficient bureauc
racy that in the implementation of political decision would be immune
from political interference. In 1975 Bangladesh lacked that kind of
bureaucracy.
Despite agriculture's obvious weaknesses, in 1973 the sector contri
buted about 56 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), and jute
fiber and woven products accounted for about 80 percent of the country's
export earnings. These earnings were the equivalent of about US$360
million, compared to imports of about US$875 million (see ch. 11). In
addition to vast amounts of grains that had to be imported—about
one-third of the value of the 1975 imports—the economy had to import
construction equipment, transportation and communications equipment,
machinery and spare parts, and a wide variety of raw material for its
fledgling industrial sector. Because of the large deficits in the balance of
payments and the foreseeable continuing need to procure huge food grain
imports, the major thrust of Mujib's foreign policy was the continuation of
large amounts of foreign economic aid (see ch. 10). In 1973 industry and
commerce combined contributed only 18 percent of the GDP (see ch. 13).
Except for natural gas reserves variously estimated at 10 trillion to
26.8 trillion cubic feet, the country possesses inadequate natural
resources for the development of conventional heavy industry. Because
of the millennia of silt deposits by the enormous river system—the most
dominant feature of the landscape—the known coal reserves are so deep
that commercial exploitation might not be economically feasible (see ch.
3). Large deposits of hard rocks that could be used for construction are
also far underground; although technically possible, extraction did not
appear economically practical. A steel mill at Chittagong therefore
remained dependent on imported coking coal, iron ore. and manganese
and in early 1975 operated at less than 50 percent of capacity. Textile
mills, most of which were built during the Pakistan period to use cotton
fiber and yarn from West Pakistan, also operated far below capacity (see
ch. 13).
Since independence, political and governmental decisions have further
hampered the already weak industrial and commercial sectors of the
economy. During the 1970 elections the Awami League had campaigned
not only on provincial autonomy but also on what came to be known as
Mujibism: nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy. In early
1972 Mujib fulfilled part of the campaign promises by nationalizing the
banks, the life insurance companies, and most major elements of
industry, including jute, sugar, and textile mills; paper and paperboard
factories; minerals, oil, and gas; fertilizer, chemical, and pharmaceutical
plants; and food-processing plants. Unfortunately the government had
few trained administrators and even fewer with business and commercial
experience. As a result the government assigned supervision of many of
the nationalized industries to members of the Awami League. Some were
honest and competent men who did the best they could under trying
circumstances. Others were competent only in furthering their private
interests by virtually dismembering the plants they controlled. Accord
ing to foreign and Bangalee observers, a small class of nouveaux riches is
emerging whose members have become wealthy not as result of
entrepreneurial genius and risk taking but through corruption on a vast
scale (see ch. 6).
Mujib's decision to abolish parliamentary democracy constituted a
political about-face. During the period of military dictatorship in
Pakistan, Mujib had been a constant critic of the regime and an exponent

H
of the need for parliamentary democracy. He admired the British politi
cal system and expressed a desire to emulate the policies of the British
Labour Party. On his return to Dacca in January 1972, he relinquished
the presidency to which he had been elected while in prison and became
the prime minister of a parliamentary democracy. At his direction his
colleagues drafted a constitution that made the executive branch of
government responsible to the legislative branch and assigned to an
independent judiciary the enforcement of fundamental rights.
By 1974, however, Mujib was becoming increasingly frustrated by his
own creation, and he was particularly bitter toward the courts,
complaining that they smacked of "free-style democracy" and were a relic
of the colonial period. Ironically, Mujib's remarks closely paralleled those
of General Mohammad Ayub Khan when he seized the government of
Pakistan in a military coup d'etat in 1958.
Mujib's anger with the courts resulted from decisions of the High Court
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. In early 1974 a group of
lawyers and scholars had formed a committee to provide legal aid to
individuals they believed had been denied due process of law through
illegal detention by the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force,
known as the Rakkhi Bahini), a paramilitary force responsible solely to
Mujib. In May 1974 the High Court Division accepted a plea from this
committee for a writ of habeas corpus for an individual believed to be in
the custody of the Rakkhi Bahini. The Rakkhi Bahini ignored the writ,
prompting a pronouncement by the High Court Division that the Rakkhi
Bahini's "methods of operation have shown a complete disregard for the
procedural reforms as are enjoined by the Constitution as well as by the
general law of the country." In another case, in August 1974, the High
Court Division ruled that various government orders designed to combat
"lawlessness" were "illegal, ultra vires, and prejudicial to the fundamen
tal rights ensured in the Constitution."
Mujib's response was to change the Constitution and the laws. On
December 28, 1974, the president, acting on Mujib's orders, proclaimed a
state of emergency that among other things suspended the fundamental
rights enumerated in the Constitution. On January 25, 1975, the Awami
League-controlled Parliament, in a one-hour session without debate,
amended the Constitution, delegating all power to the president and
naming Mujib to the presidency "as though elected to it." The amendment
denies Parliament the right to reverse a presidential act and grants the
president the power to dismiss Supreme Court and lesser judges on the
general grounds of incompetence. The president remains commander in
chief of the armed forces of about 27,000 officers and men, of the police
and a border security force with a combined total of about 30,000 men,
and of the Rakkhi Bahini with approximately another 30,000 men. Mujib
was dictator in all but official designation.
The amendment also empowered the president to establish a new
national political party and to abolish all other parties and political
interest groups. A few weeks later Mujib announced that henceforth the
Krishak Sramik Awami League (Peasants, Workers, and Peoples
League) would be the only legal political party. He stated that, pending a
possible future reorganization, the former Awami League governing
bodies and officeholders would continue to function under the new name.
Mujib further stipulated that any member of Parliament who failed to join
the party would automatically forfeit his or her seat in Parliament. Mujib
emphasized that all government servants were free to join (see ch. 8; ch.
9).
As the sole formulator of party as well as government policy, Mujib
declared on March 26, 1975, that he envisaged five wings for the national
party: peasant, workers, youth, students, and women. He further noted
that in the future an administrative council would be established in each
of the projected sixty-two districts, which would be the key level of local
government. According to Mujib, a party worker would head each of the
administrative, or governing, councils, and the membership of the
councils would include representatives of the five wings of the party.
Foreign and Bangalee observers concluded that Mujib intends in the
future to govern through the party rather than the traditional
government institutions.
Mujib described the governmental and political changes he instituted
in early 1975 as the Second Revolution, the first being the secession from
Pakistan. In a speech on March 26, 1975, commemorating the fourth
Independence Day, Mujib said that the purposes of the Second
Revolution were to eradicate corruption, reduce the rate of population
growth, increase agricultural and industrial production, and forge
national unity. As of late April, four months after he declared a state of
emergency, he had taken no direct, decisive, or discernible action, either
judicially or politically, to purge his party or his government of those
engaged in corrupt practices, although he had stated that corruption was
rampant. According to analysts, any increase in industrial or agricultural
output is likely to be achieved only slowly and laboriously, and any
significant decrease in population production is considered improbable for
the foreseeable future. Mujib's desire to foster national unity is therefore
understandable, as is his assertion that the primary task of the national
party will be to inculcate a sense of national unity and national identity.
In language and religion Bangalees are remarkably homogeneous and
possess a feeling of cultural if not political unity. All but a few hundred
thousand speak Bengali as their mother tongue, and nearly 90 percent
profess their faith in Islam. Numerous Bengali Muslims retain as "family"
names or honorific titles various secular or religious designations (such as
majumdar and talukdar, derived from landholding, and syed and sheikh,
derived from Islamic functions), but by South Asian standards the society
is strongly egalitarian. The sense of egalitarianism, however, is coupled
with and is an integral part of a feeling of superiority vis-a-vis
non-Bengalis.

8
 The feeling of superiority centers on an intense pride in Bengali culture
in the broadest sense of the term. The works of the two most famous of
their poets, Rabindranath Tagore, a Hindu, and Kazi Nazrul Islam, a
Muslim, are equally revered by the two religious communities (see ch. 7).
Much of the poetry, like the culture, involves an almost mystical
attachment to the land—literally, to the earth—of Bengal. The pressui%
on the land has long been intense and economic deprivation long a fact of
life, but Bengalis traditionally and Bangalees in the mid-1970s have been
perhaps the least mobile of the major South Asian linguistic and ethnic
groups. Their cultural heritage, their "Bengalihood," frequently unites
Hindus and Muslims against outsiders in a sense of "them against us."
Yet factionalism, opposition to authority, and violence are basic to the
Bengali culture (see ch. 6). Beyond the constant danger of strife between
Hindus and Muslims, Bangalees tend to have and to express as many
separate viewpoints as there are Bangalee participants. Occasionally a
charismatic personality such as Mujib is able to secure and hold the
allegiance of the party faithful and the masses over a long period of time,
but most political and social alliances are shifting and transistory affairs,
and regroupings and new alliances are the norm. Participants come and
go not so much on ideological grounds as on support of or opposition to a
particular issue or individual.
Ruefully and yet with a perverse pride, Bangalees relate variations of a
timeworn joke dating back at least to the nineteenth century: "One
Bengali—one political party; two Bengalis—two political parties; three
Bengalis—still two parties, but each has two factions." Observers
consistently refer to factionalism and feuds within village councils, rural
cooperatives, labor unions, student groups, university faculties, and the
committees that handle the affairs of a local mosque or Hindu temple. The
factional strife not only tends to immobilize the workings of the group but
also often results in violence.
The tendency to resort to violence becomes more pronounced in
frustrated political action groups. Until the establishment of Bangladesh,
most Bengali politicians were by definition engaged in opposition politics
and, in the past as in present-day Bangladesh, the efforts of many
opposition parties have been focused on violent and terrorist acts,
especially assassinations. Between January 1972 and January 1975, over
3,000 members of the Awami League were alleged to have been
murdered, and the government and foreign observers agreed that most
of the murders were political and factional (see ch. 14).
The chronicles of the Mughal Empire refer to the unruly Bengalis, and
the British recorded acts of violence from the earliest days of the British
East India Company. After the uprising of 1857 British officals continued
to record terrorist acts in response to governmental acts, such as Hindu
violence in protest over the partitioning of Bengal in 1905 and Muslim
violence when Bengal was reunited in 1911 (see ch. 2.) Some of the
bloodiest of the communal riots that accompanied the partitioning of
British India occurred in Calcutta, and these were abated only through
the fasting and intercession of Mahatma Gandhi.
The use of violence and rioting to achieve political ends continued
during the Pakistan period. An attempt by the central government to
deny Bengali status as a national language resulted in extensive student
riots in Dacca, in early 1952. At least one student was killed, and scores
were wounded. Bengali was declared one of the two national languages,
and the Bangalee government observes the day of rioting as a national
holiday.
Some observers suggest that the recurrence of antigovernment
violence reflects a cultural antipathy to authority, especially government
authority. Writing in 1971, one observer concluded that Bengalis view
government at all levels as an "unpredictable force, remote, ominous, and
disposing of great power" that should either be avoided or "invoked
against one's enemies." This observer, Richard S. Wheeler, noted that
this attitude generally conformed to the criterion used by the American
political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba to describe a
"subject" people as opposed to a "civic culture" that involves participat
ory politics.
Mujib's critics maintained that by abolishing parliamentary democracy
in January 1975 he confirmed that he was not prepared to accept
participatory politics—that, whether in opposition or in power, he
comprehended only the ruler and the ruled roles of subject politics.
Mujib's argument would seem to be that he would secure "the consent of
the governed" through his national party, which all were free to join.
Mujib appeared determined that any nonviolent participation in
Bangalee politics would be on his terms and that violent participation
would be crushed. In the spring of 1975 he continued to dominate
Bangalee political and social life, and he remained the preeminent and
possibly the only, cohesive political force. Neither overtly nor covertly
was any individual or any group of individuals able to mount an effective
nonviolent challenge to his authority and leadership. As he increased his
reliance upon coercion and force, however, in 1974 and early 1975, some of
his aides and colleagues either were forced from his presence to still their
criticism or left voluntarily—some going abroad—to preserve then-
future. Some of Mujib's former associates referred to him as the sole
Bangalee banyan tree; an old South Asian legend has it that nothing can
grow under a banyan tree, although a multitude can receive temporary
shelter there.

10
 \

CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL SETTING
Bangladesh carries in its name 3,000 years of history but has been a
nation only since December 1971. Previously East Bengal and more
recently East Pakistan, the state of Bangladesh, under the leadership of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (commonly called Mujib), is attempting to
overcome the centuries of neglect and the series of natural catastrophes
that have left it all but prostrate and at the mercy of the world. In early
1975 its major task was to provide food, clothing, and shelter for a
population of about 81.6 million while placing its economy on a sound
footing to utilize the nation's available resources. The fertility of the soil,
a surplus labor supply, and the recent discovery of natural gas reserves
offer Bangladesh at most a modest prospect even under careful
management (see ch. 11; ch. 12).
Since 1000 B.C. the Ganges-Brahmaputra river delta has been a land of
refuge for people fleeting the expansion of empire (see ch. 3). Although
linked with the great empires of the subcontinent, the area maintained an
extremely independent position. Its geography made it remote and
inaccessible until the sixteenth century, when the Mughal emperors
decided to exploit the region's agricultural wealth and to open the area to
trade.
Though physically isolated, Bengal had a high degree of cultural
contact with the religious and social movements of the subcontinent,
which was manifest in its scholars, institutions, and architecture (see ch.
7). Although Buddhism and Hinduism were practiced in the early years of
Bengal's history, they were replaced in importance by the introduction
and mass acceptance of Islam in the thirteenth century. Islam has
remained the dominant religious and cultural influence, and about 85
percent of Bangladesh's population professed Islam in the mid-1970s (see
ch. 5).
The area now encompassed by Bangladesh has been known by many
names. Between 1947 and December 1971, as the eastern province of
Pakistan, it was known as the East Wing and as East Pakistan. Before
1947 East Bengal was part of the British Indian state of Bengal (see fig.
2). During much of the British Raj and Mughal periods, the area referred
to as Bengal included the present-day Indian states of Bihar and West
Bengal and various Indian states and territories to the east of
present-day Bangladesh. In addition, British India at one time was

11
divided into three administrative units known as presidencies, of which
the Bengal Presidency was the most important.
European trading companies from the early sixteenth century onward
attempted to take advantage of the opening offered by the Mughals but
with little lasting effect. The local cloth industries thrived, and
agricultural production increased, to the prosperity of Bengal, the
Mughals, and the traders. The steady decline in Mughal power and the
effects of political activities in Europe worked in favor of the British East
India Company. Having outlasted its European competitors, it was free
to move from the status of merchant at Calcutta to administrator of
Bengal. As administrators the British introduced British law, institu
tions, and customs that provided a firm base for Bengalis to administer
their own affairs. Education and some practical experience left a cadre of
Bengalis equipped to assume the reins of government upon indepen
dence. The British failed, however, to provide the area with a viable
modern economy. By encouraging the production of raw materials to
supply British factories, they stimulated agriculture while they reduced
the incentive for native industry by introducing cheap British manufac
tured goods.
The partition of India in 1947 along religious lines did not improve East
Pakistan's economic position. The agricultural hinterland was cut off
from the region's industrial and banking center at Calcutta. New markets
had to be developed for agricultural products, and industrial plants were
established for processing and manufacture. The departure of Hindu
artisans and merchants weakened the economy, while the influx of
Muslim immigrants put further strain upon it. The two parts, or "wings"
of Pakistan were unlikely economic partners to begin with, and the
inequality of the relationship became more pronounced with the passage
of time. The East Wing continued in general to be a supplier of raw
materials while the West Wing built up factories and assumed the role of
processor. The people of East Pakistan developed the feeling that the
central government located in the west was oppressing them. The rapidly
expanding population created a surplus labor force with no hope of full
employment in the agricultural east. Most job possibilities were in the
west, 1,000 miles from home.
The state of Pakistan was created on the British model with a governor
general, prime minister, and a parliament, under the leadership of
Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Unfortunately for the
political development of the new state, Jinnah died in 1948, and Liaquat
was assassinated in 1951. After several years of political instability and,
at times, violence and strife, martial law was imposed in 1958. In 1962
another attempt was made at political, as opposed to military, rule under
a constitution promulgated by the martial law administration. In March
1969, however, that constitution was suspended, and the military again
took power with the promise of free elections. The first such elections
were held in late 1970, resulting in the renunciation of the old parties and

12
 NEPAL

BHUrAN ,----~~S

SFNARES 3^)/. ft'-' ASSAM /

\bihar
n. -a >'

Sv \ V »
"~X BENGAL 1
VWV * BURMA
CALCUyyA^,

o \:::|
/ \ \ i

.^ NEPAL (^BHUTAN J^,^

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3^
n/manipur
'"*
BIHAR
' ****
!f EAST
)
2 ,'MANIPUR
/ V PAKISTANIS
H
1 j^^SHILLONG ^-TRIPURA
_J-A BIHAR C BENGAL \_j r^'WESTV . Vl \
\^7-rIPPERA \ "~i BENGALS hpx 1
' -. ^CALCUrrA* 1 a!°G V
^V- iJ>ALCUTTA
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ORISSA I "

/ A
Source: Based on information from Michael Edwards, A History of India, Bombay, 1961,
pp. 219, 287, 331, and 343.
Figure 2. Bengal, 1772, 1856, 19U5, and 1947

politics. The Awami League of Mujib received all but two seats allocated
to the eastern sector in the legislature and a majority of 60 percent in the
nation. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
came in second, with a majority in the west but less than 30 percent in the
nation.
The military regime refused to accept the victory of the Awami
League, fearing the effects of its six-point program on the country,
especially in respect to the legislature's formulation of a new constitution.
The Awami League interpreted the response as a denial of East
Pakistan's rights and, failing to reach an agreement with the govern
ment, declared the independence of East Pakistan on March 26, 1971 . The
nine-month civil war that followed brought about complete separation.
Mujib, who had been imprisoned in West Pakistan throughout the civil
war as instigator of the rebellion, was released by President Bhutto on
January 8, 1972, in an effort to smooth relations between the divided
provinces. On January 12, 1972, Mujib took charge as prime minister of
Bangladesh (see ch. 8). As a last effort at reconciliation or as a political
gesture Bhutto offered to turn the government of Pakistan over to Mujib

13
and permit the eastern unit as much autonomy as desired. Mujib's
response was that Bangladesh was independent and Pakistan was not
needed.
EARLY HISTORY
The Asian subcontinent has been the scene of successive invasions from
the northwest, where great local empires rose and then moved south and
east into India. The direction of such movements remained the same until
the advent of European traders, who swarmed over the area from all
directions.
Before the arrival of the British, the history of what is now Bangladesh
was primarily that of an observer rather than a participant in the great
political and military events of the subcontinent. Settled in 1000 B.C. by
the Bang tribe, a Dravidian-speaking people driven out of their northern
homeland by Aryan-speaking people from the Iranian and central Asian
plateaus, Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal became
identified as the home of the Bang tribe. The region, in whole or in part,
bore various titles, such as Vanga, Banga, Bangala, Bangal, Bengal, and
East Bengal and West Bengal. Except for the occasional use of royal
family names, each name reflected the early tribal name, as does
Bangladesh, despite the later migration of Aryan speakers and other
peoples into the region.
The first great native empire to spread over most of India including
present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh was the Mauryan Empire (321-185
B.C.), whose most famous ruler was Asoka (ca. 250 B.C.). Although the
empire has been described as being well administered and tightly knit
politically, little is known ofany reciprocal benefits between it and Banga.
After the decline of the Mauryan Empire the eastern portion of Banga
became the kingdom of Samatata. It remained politically independent of
the Gupta Empire (A.D. 320-499) but paid tribute to remain so.
The third great empire was the Harsha Empire (A.D. 606-47);
although smaller than the former two, it drew Samatata into its loosely
administered political structure. The demise of this short-lived empire
left its remnants in disarray. The total breakdown of authority forced the
people of Bengal to unite in selecting a leader to end the anarchy and
confusion. They chose a Buddhist chief named Gopala, who became the
first ruler of the Pala dynasty (A.D. 750-1150). He and his successors
provided Bengal with stable government, security, and prosperity while
spreading Buddhism throughout the state and into neighboring ter
ritories. Trade and influence were extensive under Pala leadership,
ambassadors being sent as far as Tibet and Sumatra. It has been
suggested that Buddhist beliefs weakened the military sector of the state
and left it vulnerable to the Senas. These orthodox Hindus introduced an
anti-Buddhist reaction shortly before the Muslim invasion in the early
thirteenth century. Opposed to Hinduism and the Senas and dissatisfied
with Buddhism, vast numbers of Bengalis converted to Islam.

14
 The Muslim conquest of the subcontinent was a long-drawn-out process
covering several centuries (see ch. 5). What are now the Indian states of
Bihar and West Bengal were among the first native states to fall (in 1193).
The latter,- succumbing to a force of eighteen troopers, formed the
easternmost extremity of the empire. By 1246 the authority of the
Sultanate of Delhi came under serious question, as a result of internecine
conflict for leadership. West Bengal was nearly independent because of
the disruption of communications between it and the seat of government.
The situation remained unchanged until Balban, a Muslim slave, took the
throne at Delhi as Ghiyas al-Din (1266-87). Bengal was important to the
sultanate as a source of war elephants, and thus in 1280 Ghiyas al-Din
reinstituted control over West Bengal by forcibly removing the
governor. Ghiyas al-Din made his own son the governor, and his family
continued to rule there until a dispute over the governorship in 1318
caused the Delhi government to intervene. Order was reestablished, and
East Bengal was annexed for the first time as a province of the sultanate.
In 1338 East Bengal revolted against its overlords and regained its
independence, whereas West Bengal did not succeed in doing so until
1345. Reunification of the two Bengals (outside the sultanate) took place
in 1352, when West Bengal annexed the east. Attempts by Firuz Shah to
retake united Bengal in the 1353-54 period and in 1359 proved fruitless,
but Sikander Shah of Bengal agreed to reinstitute the old tribute of forty
elephants a year.
Sikander Shah ruled Bengal until his death in 1393, patronizing
learning, law, and justice. His successor, Raja Ganesh—a Hindu
official—brought religious feelings into play, disturbing the Muslim
community. Muslim leaders successfully summoned the sultan to remove
him yet willingly permitted his son to rule upon his conversion to Islam in
1415. Ruling under the name Jalal al-Din Muhammad, he brought peace
and prosperity to the province. Trade increased, and architecture
flourished (see ch. 7). Between 1433 and 1493 Bengal labored under the
misrule of the Ilyas Shahi dynasty and a succession of Habshi rulers, who
were the descendants of Abyssinian slaves. After the murder of the last
of the Habshi rulers, the chiefs elected Husain Shah as their sovereign.
During a reign of twenty-four years there was peace and prosperity. His
son Nusrat Shah ruled in much the same way until his death, in 1533, at
the hands of palace guards.
A series of Afghan (Pathan) kings controlled the government from 1533
to 1576. The last of these was Daud Shah, who invaded the Mughal
Empire to extend his territory only to discover that the Emperor Akbar
had no intention of losing territory. Avar's generals conquered Bengal
and killed Daud Shah.
This began the political integration of Bengal with the rest of the
subcontinent. Bengal had never been truly subjugated. It was always too
remote from the center of government and, given poor lines of
communication, the local governors found it easy to ignore imperial

15
directives and follow an independent course. Bengal remained provincial
and was dissociated from the larger events of the subcontinent. It was not
isolated intellectually, however. It provided literary and philosophical
stimulation for the entire region. Religious scholars and holy men from
the fifteenth century onward have proved influential throughout the
subcontinent.
Bengal remained a land into which rebels disappeared and where
armies got lost. Although it was an important source of war elephants, it
held little value for the great emperors of the northwest. It was under the
Mughals that the value of Bengal was realized. It became the milch cow
rather than a strong political entity.
When Akbar came to the throne of Delhi, a road connecting Bengal
with Delhi was under construction. Postal service was being planned as a
step toward drawing Bengal into the operations of the empire. But it was
Akbar who brought all of this to reality. Annexation of Bengal was not
sufficient. It was necessary to reduce the resistance of the local chiefs.
This feat was still to be accomplished in the reign of Akbar's grandson
Aurangzeb. Akbar introduced the present Bengali calendar year (see
Preface), and his son, Jahangir, introduced a form of feudalism. Both
were undertaken to bring better administrative order into the province.
The local reluctance to submit to Mughal authority required the
placement of the empire's most powerful generals in the province as
governors. Bengal became the breadbasket of India, and as the richest
province in the empire it was drained of its resources to maintain the
army. Unwilling or unable to trust the Bengalis with imperial
administration, the Mughals sent in their own people as rulers.
By killing the native chiefs and heads of society Akbar and Jahangir
limited resistance but left the countryside as far north as the capital at
Dacca defenseless against Arakanese and Portuguese pirates. The
emperors refused to interfere with the Portuguese, who supplied them
with arms for their military campaigns. The pirates would loot and burn
villages and carry off captives to be sold as slaves. In one year as many as
40,000 people were seized, but the central government refused to
intervene.
Despite the seeming lawlessness of the Mughal regime, Bengal
prospered with greater security than its population had experienced in
centuries. The feuding of local chiefs was ended, trade was encouraged,
and Dacca became one of the centers of the cloth trade. Agricultural
production increased, raising the income of the peasants. This of course
inspired rather than discouraged pirates, who took advantage of the
overextended and softening Mughal leadership, as did the European
merchants, who were little better than "institutionalized pirates."
EUROPEAN COLONIZATION
The subcontinent had indirect relations with Europe by way of the
overland caravan route, as well as the maritime route, dating back to the

16
fifth century B.C.; but the lucrative spice trade with India was mainly in
the hands of Roman and, later, Arab merchants. By the fifteenth century
European traders came to believe that the commissions they had to pay
the Arabs were prohibitively high and therefore sent out fleets in search
of new trade routes direct to "India."
The arrival of the Europeans in the last quarter of the fifteenth century
marked another great turning point in the history of the subcontinent.
The dynamics of its history, hitherto mainly intertwined with those of
central Asia, came.to be affected chiefly by the Europeans' political and
trade relations with India as India was swept into the mainstream of
European power politics. The arrival of the Europeans generally
coincided with the gradual decline of Mughal power, and the subcontinent
became the scene of power conflict not only between Europeans and the
native powers but also among the Europeans. As result, for 4V£ centuries
the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British left varying degrees of
political and cultural imprints on the area.
The Portuguese were the first to arrive. In 1498 Vasco da Gama
anchored off Calicut on the eastern coast of India, inaugurating the first
direct maritime contact with the Indians. Under Admiral Alfonso de
Albuquerque, the Portuguese successfully challenged and eliminated the
maritime power of the Arabs in the Indian Ocean. To strengthen their
maritime power, the Portuguese also seized strategically located Goa on
the west coast of India in 1510.
In 1514 the Portuguese moved to the eastern side of the subcontinent,
settling in Orissa. Three years later Chittagong was investigated as a
possible trading station, but it was not until 1536 that the territorial
governor, Mahmud Shah, permitted the establishment of factories
(trading posts) at Chittagong and Satgaon. They were also given control
of the customhouses, grants of land, and the authority to collect rent from
the natives. Both locations were eclipsed by the development of Hooghly,
in 1579 and 1580, under a grant from Akbar. Clergymen and missionary
teachers were sent out from Goa to the stations in Bengal and Arakan.
They established schools, churches, and hospitals to strengthen their
enclave and spread Christianity. In 1607 the native leaders began to
persecute the Christians. The settlers at Dianga were massacred, and the
king of Chandikan had one of the Portuguese officials murdered.
Nevertheless, the Portuguese continued to benefit from Hooghly until
1632, when the imperial army of Shah Jahan crushed it, causing the
Portuguese to depart. This left the way open to the Dutch and British.
The United Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602 under
government patronage with power to maintain fleets and armed forces,
sought a share of the Portuguese monopoly. As early as 1607 they were in
the area of Bengal and in 1615 assisted the king of Arakan against the
Portuguese. Excursions into the area became more frequent in the 1620s.
In 1625 their first factory in Bengal was placed at Chinsura, a short
distance from Hooghly.

17
 The British East India Company, a private company formed in 1600
during the reign of the great Mughal Akbar and operating under a charter
granted by Queen Elizabeth I, was slower to expand its trade in the area
but, as Portuguese influence was reduced to a few costal enclaves and
with the arrival of the more powerful Dutch and English fleets, the
rivalry between the Dutch and the British mercantile establishments
intensified. The contest continued well into the last decade of the
eighteenth century, when the Dutch were forced from the Indian scene
by the British and thereafter focused their primary attention on the East
Indies. Although a private commercial company, beginning in 1684 the
British East India Company was aided occasionally in its power struggle
in India by the armed forces of Great Britian.
The French were the last of the European powers to arrive. The
French East India Company was founded with government support in
1664. After the initial French settlement near Madras in 1670, they set up
trading posts on the southwestern and eastern coasts and moved their
main base of power to Pondicherry. The French ceased to be serious
rivals to the British by the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
Although the intial aim of the British East India Company was to seek
trade under concessions obtained from local Mughal governors, the
collapse of the Mughal dynasty forced the company into a gradual
involvement in internal politics and in military activity for the protection
of its trade interests. Capitalizing on the political division of India among
the native powers—Rajputs, Marathas, Sikhs, and independent Muslim
governors—the British ultimately rose to supremacy through military
expeditions, annexation, bribery, the system of "subsidiary alliance,"
and playing one party against another. Aside from the superior military
power of the British, their ascendancy was fostered by the tottering
economic foundations of the native powers, undermined by a series of
ravaging dynastic wars and by the consequent displacement of the
peasants from the land, which was the principal source of state revenue.
Although the first British settlement was established at Surat on the
western coast of India in 1612, the British had visited Bengal in the 1580s
and had been attracted to the trade in saltpeter and silk. During the first
thirty years of the seventeenth century they attempted without success
to secure a position in Bengal. In the meantime they established
themselves in Madras and Bombay. From a small post on the Hooghly
River the company moved in 1690 to the present site of Calcutta. The
island in the middle of a malarial swamp seemed an unlikely spot for
prosperity, but its deepwater port faculties held a potential that was soon
realized. Additional expansion into Chittagong was attempted but
countered by Emperor Aurangzeb's officers, who also expelled the
British from Bengal and Surat. When allowed to return, the British
constructed a fortified factory at Calcutta to prevent any further Mughal
interference with trade. The government even gave the company the
right to collect rent from three neighboring villages.

18
 The pace of British encroachment was stepped up after the acquisition
of the wealthy and strategically situated province of Bengal from its
Muslim governor, Siraj-ud-Daulah, who had unwisely provoked a
military confrontation with the British at Plassey in 1757. Although allied
with the French, Siraj-ud-Daulah was defeated by Robert Clive, a young
official of the British East India Company. For the Bengalis, Plassey was
no different from a hundred other battles that had resulted in the
exchange of conquerors, but the British viewed it quite differently.
Native as well as French resistance to British expansion was on the
decline. By 1770 the French were driven out of southern India by the
British, in part as a consequence of British victories over the French in
Europe and North America. By 1815 the supremacy of the British East
India Company was unchallengeable. By the 1850s British control and
influence had extended to territories essentially the same as those that
became the independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947, with the
exception of Baluchistan and Upper Assam.
THE BRITISH RAJ
It is conventional to date the beginning of British rule from the Battle
of Plassey because it gave effective control of Bengal to the British East
India Company. Clive's victory was consolidated in 1764 at the Battle of
Buxar on the Ganges, where the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam, was
defeated by the British. As a result the British East India Company was
appointed diwan (collector of the revenue) in the areas of Bengal, Bihar,
and Orissa, making it the supreme, but not the titular, governing power.
The company and its agents continued to trade, however, and there
followed a period that British historians have called "shaking the pagoda
tree" during which the net transfer of wealth from Bengal to Great
Britian was astronomical.
Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the
foundations of British rule had been effectively laid, the British
Parliament showed an increasing interest in India, aroused in part by the
alleged misuse of power and indulgence in greed, recklessness, and
corrupt activities by the private British East India Company and in part
by the wealth that India was reputed to possess. Thus from 1773
Parliament sought to regulate the company's administration, and by
1784, although allowed to retain a certain measure of autonomy and
monopoly in trade, the company was made responsible to Parliament for
its civil and military affairs and was transformed into an instrument of
British foreign policy.
The Permanent Settlement of Lord Charles Cornwallis in 1793, which
regulated the activities of the British agents and imposed a system of
revenue collection and landownership, stands as a monument to the
disastrous effects of the good intentions of Parliament. As a British
official later wrote: "Our dealings with the land have been more destruc
tive of all ancient proper rights than were the old methods. . . . Our rigid

19
and revolutionary methods of exacting the land revenue have reduced the
peasantry to the lowest extreme of poverty and wretchedness, and the
procedure of our settlement courts has been the means of laying upon
them burdens heavier than any they endured in former times." Lord
Cornwallis and his successors also laid the basis for what became the
hallmarks of British rule: a corruption-free higher administration, well
trained in special institutions and elitist in outlook, and a judical system
modeled on that of Britian.
The British who had served with the company until the end of the
eighteenth century were not political or social revolutionaries; they were
content with making profits and leaving the social institutions untouched.
A growing number of Christian missionaries, however, felt that certain
features of the social institutions should be reformed. In England the
utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham and others that societies could be
reformed by proper laws was much in vogue. Influenced in part by these
factors, British administrators in India embarked on a series of social and
administrative reforms that were not warmly received by the conserva
tive elements of the Indian society.
Emphasis was placed on the introduction of Western philosophies,
technologies, and institutions rather than on the reconstruction of old
institutions. Thus the early attempts by the company to encourage
Hindus and Muslims to learn by means of Sanskrit and Persian, the
classical languages, were abandoned in favor of teaching Western science
and literature, elementary education being in the vernacular and higher
education in English. The stated purpose of this secular education was to
produce a class of culturally British Indians. Persian was replaced by
English as the official language of the government, a measure strongly
resented by the Muslims.
Judicial reforms were undertaken, and a code of civil and criminal
procedure was imposed, fashioned after Western legal formulas but with
certain necessary compromises. In the field of social reforms, the British
suppressed what they considered to be inhumane practices, such as
suttee (the self-immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their
husbands), female infanticide, and the sacrifice of human beings.
The expansionist mood of the British administrators was most evident
in their economic and mercantile policies toward colonial India. As a
result of the British policy of dumping machine-made goods, India's
domestic craft industries were thoroughly ruined, and its trade and
commerce collapsed. Particularly hard hit was Bengal. Muslin cloth from
Dacca was popular in eighteenth-century Europe until English cloth
drove it off the market. Handwoven jute goods began to take up the
economic slack in the cloth trade, but the British built jute mills in
Scotland in the early nineteenth century and once again cut out the native
production. British colonial policy viewed colonies as suppliers of raw
materials and purchasers of manufactured goods.
In the field of agriculture and fiscal administration, the British

20
overhauled the system of rent collection in an attempt to increase receipts
and revenues from the land. The traditional system of the hereditary
rent-collecting official aristocracy (zamindars), which combined the
functions of revenue collectors and local magistrates, was replaced by a
new system of "tax farmers" (also called zamindars), to whom the British
assigned the status and rights of landlords, modeled mainly on the
English landed gentry and aristocracy. Under the new system the
revenue-collecting rights were auctioned to the highest bidders whether
or not they had any knowledge of rural conditions or the managerial skills
necessary to improve agriculture. The result was that agriculture
became a matter of speculation among urban financiers, and the
traditional personal link between the resident zamindars and the
peasants was broken. Absentee landlordship became commonplace, and
agricultural development stagnated.
The company became sovereign in fact if not in name over an
ever-widening area of the subcontinent. Princely states were pressed
into "subsidiary alliance," under which they accepted British
paramountcy in return for defense and annual cash settlements and
surrendered all control except that of internal administration. Other
states were annexed by a variety of means; lack of an heir (known as the
principle of lapse), internal mismanagement, or outright abolition of
sovereignty in the name of the Mughal emperor. Wars with Burma and
Nepal brought territory in the northeast, including Assam in 1826.
Meanwhile, there were changes in Great Britain that had important
consequences for India, some of which had been caused by the acquisition
of power in India. Between 1770 and 1830 there was a transformation in
British industry and massive shifts in its foreign trade. Demographic
changes were accompanied by acquisition of wealth and political influence
by the middle class. In 1831 Parliament deprived the British East India
Company of its legal monopoly over the India trade and in 1833 stripped it
of all commercial functions. The company continued to govern British
India until 1858, and extended its borders whenever an opportunity
presented itself.

The Uprising of 1857 and Afterward

The uprising of 1857 was called many names by British historians,
including the Great Mutiny, the Sepoy Rebellion, and the Mutiny of 1857;
many people of the subcontinent regard it as their first war of
independence. It was allegedly sparked by the use of cartridges greased
with pig or cow fat, which was offensive to religious beliefs of Muslim and
Hindu sepoys (Indian soliders employed by the British). Confined more
or less to northern and central India (southern India was untouched) and
limited mostly to the sepoys, the mutiny lasted for more than a year.
The mutiny was the great divide in modern South Asian history,
marking the end of rule by the British East India Company. In 1858, as a
direct consequence of the mutiny, the company was dissolved, and the

21
British crown assumed direct responsibility for the government of India,
which was to be headed by a governor general (called viceroy when acting
as the direct representative of the British crown). The governor general,
who embodied the supreme legislative and executive authority in India,
was made responsible to the secretary of state for India, a member of the
British cabinet in London.
For administrative purposes British India was divided into provinces,
each under a governor. They were in turn subdivided into divisions and
then into districts. The district, under the control of a district officer (also
known as magistrate and collector), became the basic administrative
unit. The British also developed a highly efficient administrative
machinery known as the Indian Civil Service (ICS), admission being
based on competitive examinations held in London. Initially the ICS
consisted almost exclusively of British members but, gradually, limited
numbers of Indians were admitted. In 1871 a system of local
self-government, modeled mainly along British lines, was introduced in
limited scope in both rural and urban areas. In the rural areas district
boards composed of elected members were set up under the chairmanship
of the district officers. In the urban areas municipal committees
consisting of elected representatives were entrusted with the actual
municipal administration.
The uprising also brought a swift reversal of British policy, from
reform and expansion to noninterference in the social and political affairs
of the native states. Formal annexations under the principle of lapse
virtually ceased, and the political boundaries of British territories
vis-a-vis the native states became frozen. By this time the British
territories occupied about three-fifths of the subcontinent, and some 562
native states of varying size occupied the remainder. The British
relationship with the native states was governed by the so-called
principle of paramountcy, whereby the princely states exercised
sovereignty in their internal affairs; but their power of external relations
was exercised by Great Britain, the paramount power. Great Britain
assumed responsibility for the defense of the native states and reserved
the right to intervene in cases of maladministration or gross injustice.
A great transformation took place in the economy in the late nineteenth
century. The British authorities quickly set out to improve the means of
inland transport and communication, primarily for strategic and
administrative reasons. By 1870 an extended network of railways,
coupled with the removal of internal customs barriers and transit duties,
opened up the interior markets to domestic and foreign trade and further
linked what is now Bangladesh to Calcutta. India found itself within the
orbit of worldwide markets, especially with the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869. Foreign trade, though under virtual British monopoly, was
stimulated. Indian markets were flooded with foreign manufactured
goods, to the detriment of local artisans, and India began for the first time
to produce for world markets, though its exports were in raw materials

22
rather than in finished items. The economy was quickly transformed into
a colonial agricultural arm of British industry.
Despite the British policy of discouraging industrialization, the
development of railways contributed to the development of coal
production and was also responsible for the growth of other industries,
especially cotton, jute, iron and steel, paper, and tanning and leather.
Although the growth was slow because of the lack of native capital and an
unfavorable tariff policy that gave preference to the industrial establish
ments of Great Britain, the framework of future industry was solidly laid
out. Convinced that the expansion of nascent industries had to be
accompanied by political autonomy, a rising industrialist class gave
financial support to furthering the nationalist movement.
Nationalism
The recovery of the Muslim community from its low estate after the
1857 mutiny was a gradual process that was still going on a century later.
In education, commerce, and government service they lagged behind the
Hindus, who more quickly adapted themselves to rapidly changing
socioeconomic conditions. By standing aloof from the Western-oriented
educational system, the Muslims cut themselves off from the many new
avenues opening up for the emerging middle class. These shortcomings
led to an intensified awareness of their minority role. Toward the end of
the nineteenth century there was even a certain amount of opposition to
the extension of representative government; this, in fact, helped them to
reestablish rapport with the British, who by that time were casting about
for support against a rising Hindu nationalism.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, under the leadership of
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a beginning was made toward reconciliation
between the traditional views of Indian Muslims and the new ideas and
educational system being introduced by the British. Sir Syed was
responsible for the founding in 1875 of the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental
College (present-day Aligarh Muslim University), at which Islamic
orientation and religious instruction were combined with an English
university system. Graduates of the school eventually filled important
posts in the government and also provided leadership in the nationalist
movement of the twentieth century. In the field of politics Sir Syed was
one of the first Muslims to recognize the problems facing his community
under a government ruled by the majority. He did not propose specific
alternatives to majority rule, but he warned that safeguards were
necessary to avoid the possibility of open violence between the religious
communities of India.
Great Britain's conquest of India had been made relatively easy by the
absence of unity and nationalism, but by the first decade of the twentieth
century the nationalist movement had gathered sufficient force to be a
factor influencing government policy. Under its aegis it united the most
diverse political, social, and economic elements—elements that could not

23
agree on what was to replace the existing order. As the hour of freedom
drew near, this negative unity proved unequal to the task of holding the
Hindu and Muslim communities of India together.
Despite evidence of nationalist awakenings earlier, the division of
Bengal in 1905 was the first major issue to occasion widespread public
reaction. The separation of Bihar and Orissa from Bengal, with which
they had been grouped for administrative purposes, brought forth a
reaction, which began among Hindu Bengalis and spread until a serious
state of unrest prevailed in all of India. Muslims generally favored the
move, but their voices were lost in the more articulate outcry of the
economically powerful Hind as. Out ofthe furor two things emerged: first,
an awareness that regional sympathies were so strong that they verged
on the antinational in all but their united opposition to British rule;
second, that a political party was needed that would serve the interests of
the Muslim community.
Seven years later the partition of Bengal was voided in recognition of
the grievances of the Hindu Bengalis, who found themselves outnum
bered in the legislatures in the provinces of both Bengal and East Bengal.
The move recognized the serious character of the growing estrangement
between the Muslims and Hindus in many parts of the country. The
capital of India was removed from the highly charged atmosphere of
Calcutta to Delhi.
During the years of Bengal's partition, nationalism asserted itself in
the formation of the Muslim League (League), which met in Dacca for the
first time in 1906 to support the partition of Bengal. The Muslim request
for separate electorates was incorporated in the governmental reforms of
1909.
The League was not the first Indian national party. The Indian
National Congress (Congress) had been founded twenty years before the
first partition of Bengal. From its inception it claimed to represent Indian
national aspirations regardless of religious community. In its early years
some leaders in the Muslim community opposed Muslim participation in
Congress meetings on the grounds that it was Hindu dominated. Other
Muslims, however, joined it, participated in its deliberations and, on
occasion, provided active leadership. The League never claimed to
represent any interests other than those of the Muslim community. Both
parties, composed of intellectuals and the middle class, lacked mass
following until after 1930, and both demanded self-government with the
stipulation of safeguards in the case of the League.
During and after World War I the League and the Congress united in
opposition to the British. Jinnah was a member of both the Congress and
the League when, in the Lucknow Pact in 1916, the two parties expressed
agreement on communal representation and national independence.
In the early years of the twentieth century, there had been growing
concern among Indian Muslims over the fate of Turkey. The Balkan
wars, the Italo-Turkish War, and the struggles of World War I were

24
portrayed by Muslim writers in India as Islam confronted by Western
imperialism. The sultan of Turkey claimed to be the caliph, or successor,
of the Prophet Muhammad and therefore spiritual ruler of the Muslims;
many Muslims felt passionately that to dismember the Turkish Empire
was to destroy the last great Islamic power. In addition, Muslims were
seriously concerned over the reports that the Allied powers con
templated placing some of the holy places of Islam under non-Muslim
mandates. When the British government, in spite of its wartime
promises, turned a deaf ear to pleas for the preservation of Turkey's
territorial integrity, Mohammad Ali and his brother Shaukat AH
launched the Khilafat (procaliph) movement—a strange combination of
nationalism and pan-Islamic sentiment mixed with strong anti-British
overtones.
For several years the Khilafat movement replaced the League as the
major focus of Muslim interest. An agreement between the leaders of the
movement and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi), the
leading figure in the Congress, resulted in the joint advocacy of home rule
for India on the one hand and agitation for the protection of Islamic holy
places and the restoration of the caliph of Turkey on the other.
In 1922 the Hindu-Muslim accord suffered a double blow whei. their
noncooperation movement miscarried and the Khilafat movement
foundered. The outbreak of rioting with communal aspects in a number of
places caused Gandhi to call off the joint noncooperation movement. The
Khilafat movement lost its purpose when the postwar Turkish
nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later known as
Kemal Ataturk) abolished the sultanate, proclaimed Turkey a secular
republic, abolished the religious office of the caliph, and sent the last of
the Ottoman ruling family into exile.
The spirit of communal unity was never reestablished in the subcon-
tient. Congress took an uncompromising stand, seriously underestimat
ing the intensity of minority fears that were to strengthen the influence
and power of the League. As late as 1938 Jawaharlal Nehru, already a
leading figure in the Congress, said, "There is no religious or cultural
problem in India. What is called the religious or communal problem is
really a dispute among upper class people for a division of the spoils of
office or a representation in a legislature." Dr. B. R. Ambedkar,
however, the fiery leader of the Untouchables, described the twenty
years following 1920 as "Civil War between Hindus and Muslims,
interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace."
In 1935 the British passed the Government of India Act, which widened
the franchise and provided the basic administrative machinery for
self-government but did not make the viceroy or provincial governors
responsible to the local electorate. Elections in 1937 for the new
provincial assemblies gave Congress candidates majorities in seven of
the eleven provinces. Muslim premiers headed coalition parties in Punjab
and Bengal but, by the application of uncompromising parliamentary

25
procedures, the Congress excluded the League from active participation,
even in the provinces where it had a clear-cut majority. Many prominent
Muslims who had supported the national noncommunal approach now
saw in the League the only alternative to political submergence in the
Hindu-dominated Congress and concluded that power in the hands of a
Hindu majority would be used to exclude Muslims from all power once the
British had departed. Jinnah, who had returned in 1934 from practicing
law in England, abandoned hope for Hindu-Muslim unity and dedicated
his efforts to the cause of Muslim autonomy. He again became the
League's spokesman and leader but this time without Congress party
affiliations. To members of the League, the main issue became one of
finding an alternative to replacing British with Congress—that is,
Hindu—rule.
Two Nations
The political-intellectual ferment in India during the late 1920s and the
1930s produced the first articulations of a separate state as an expression
of Muslim nationhood. The leading modern Muslim philosopher in South
Asia, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, discussed contemporary problems in his
presidential address to the League conference at Allahabad in 1930. He
saw India as Asia in miniature, in which a unitary form of government
was inconceivable and community rather than territory was the basis for
identification. To him, communalism in its highest sense was the key to
the formation of a harmonious whole in India. Therefore, he demanded
the creation of a confederated India that would include a Muslim state
consisting of the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP),
Sind, and Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings Sir
Muhammad reiterated the claims of Muslims to be considered a nation
"based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of
economic interests."
Sir Muhammad gave no name to his projected state; that was done by
Rahmat Ali and a group of students at Cambridge who issued a pamphlet
in 1933 entitled Now or Never. They opposed the idea of federation,
denied that India was a single country, and demanded partition into
regions, the northwest receiving national status as "Pakistan." They
explained the name: "Pakistan . . . [is] . . . composed of letters taken from
the names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghana (NWFP), Kashmir,
Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. It means the
land of the Paks , the spiritually pure and clean. " There was a proliferation
of articles on the theme of Pakistan expressing the subjective conviction
of nationhood but no coordination of political effort to achieve it. There
was no reference to Bengal.
In 1934 Jinnah took over leadership of the League, which was without a
sense of mission—very different from the Khilafat movement, which had
combined religion, nationalism, and political adventure. Jinnah set about
restoring a sense of purpose to Muslims. He emphasized the two-nation

26
theory based on the conflicting ideas and conceptions of Hinduism and
Islam.
The 1937-40 period was critical in the growth of the theory. Under the
1935 act, elections to provincial assemblies were held in 1937, giving
Congress majorities in seven of the eleven provinces. But Congress
refused to form ministries unless the governors promised not to use their
special reserve powers to interfere in administration. The viceroy, Lord
Linlithgow, satisfied Congress on that count, but the Muslims and other
special-interest groups were fearful of the consequences. The Congress
also took a strictly legalistic stand on the formation of ministries and
refused to form coalition governments with the League even in the
United Provinces (the present-day Indian state of Uttar Pradesh), which
had a substantial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the League's
claim to be the only true representative of Indian Muslims. In the Punjab
and Bengal, coalition ministries were formed under the Muslim
leadership of Sikander Hiyat Khan and Fazlul Huq, respectively; these
worked well, neither Congress nor the League being strong. Neverthe
less, the conduct of Congress governments permanently alienated the
League.
By the late 1930s Jinnah was convinced of the need for a unifying issue
among Muslims, and Pakistan was the obvious answer. At its annual
session in Lahore, the League on March 23, 1940, resolved that the areas
of Muslim majority in the northwest and the northeast of India should be
grouped to constitute independent states, autonomous and sovereign,
and that no independence plan without this provision would be acceptable
to the Muslims. Federation was rejected and, though confederation on
common intersts with the rest of India was envisaged, partition was
predicated as the final goal.
The Pakistan issue brought a positive goal to the Muslims and
simplified the task of political agitation. It was no longer necessary to
remain "yoked" to Hindus. For the next few years the League did little to
refine its demand. The main opposition to the proposal came from
orthodox Muslims, who rejected the idea because they viewed Islam as a
global religion that would be hampered by having a separate state,
because they doubted the ability of the League's secular leaders to build
an Islamic state, and because they believed that partition would not solve
the minority problem on the subcontinent.
It is an interesting feature of the Pakistan movement that it received
its greatest support from areas where the Muslims were in a minority,
such as the United Provinces. When the Congress ministries resigned on
December 10, 1939, the Muslims celebrated Deliverance Day. The
Punjab and Sind did not respond to the League until 1946, and the NWFP
remained loyal to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the Frontier
Gandhi, until independence. The League's leaders in Bengal were less
opposed to cooperation with the Congress than were the League
spokesmen in the United Provinces.

27
 Toward Partition
The Congress predictably opposed all proposals of partition. It stood
for a united India having a strong center and fully responsible
government. To many, as to Nehru, the idea of a sovereign state based on
a common religion seemed a historical anachronism and a denial of
democracy. From 1940, reconciliation between the Congress and the
League became increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Muslim en
thusiasm for Pakistan grew in direct proportion to Hindu condemnation
of it; the concept took on a life of its own and became an objective fact in
1947"
During the war years the League and the Congress adopted different
attitudes toward the British government. Whereas Congress ministries
resigned when war was declared for India without consulting Indians, the
League followed a course oflimited cooperation, gaining time and favor to
consolidate itself. Its success can be gauged from its sweep of 90 percent
of all Muslim seats in British India during the 1946 elections—compared
with a mere 4.5 percent in the 1937 elections. It was clear that there were
now three parties to any discussions on the future of India—the British,
the Congress, and the League.
Spurred by the Japanese advance in Asia and friendly advice from
allies, Winston Churchill's war government in 1942 sent a mission headed
by Sir Stafford Cripps to obtain agreement from Indian leaders for a plan
of settlement. Briefly, the plan provided for dominion status after the war
for an Indian union composed of those British Indian provinces and
princely states wishing to accede to it and for a separate dominion of those
that did not. Although Sir Stafford was sympathetic to Indian
nationalism, his mission failed.
In August 1942 Gandhi launched the revolutionary Quit India
movement against the British Raj. Jinnah condemned it. The govern
ment retaliated by arresting about 60,000 individuals and outlawing the
Congress. The League stepped up its political activity. Communal
passions rose, as did the incidence of communal violence. Talks between
Jinnah and Gandhi in 1944 proved as futile as negotiations between
Gandhi and the viceroy.
In July 1945 the Labour Party came to power in Great Britian with a
vast majority. Its choices in India were limited by the decline of British
power and the spread of Indian unrest, even to the armed services. Some
form of independence was the only alternative to forceful retention of
control over an unwilling dependency. The viceroy, Lord Wavell, held
discussions with Indian leaders in Simla in 1945 in an attempt to decide
what form an interim government might take, but no agreement
emerged.
New elections to the provincial and central legislatures were ordered,
and a three-man cabinet mission arrived from Great Britian to discuss
plans for self-government. Although the mission did not directly accept
the Pakistan demand, concessions were made by severely limiting the
power of the central government; by creating a three-tier federation in
which the eleven provinces were assigned to three "sections," each of
which could immediately form a "group" with one executive and one
legislature; and by giving a veto power to each community over
legislation concerning itself. An interim government composed of the
parties returned by the election was to start functioning immediately, as
was the newly elected Constituent Assembly.
The Congress and the League had emerged from the elections as the
two dominant parties. At first both parties seemed to accept the cabinet
mission plan, despite grave reservations, but subsequent behavior of
their leaders soon led to mistrust and bitterness. Jinnah demanded parity
for the League in the interim government and temporarily boycotted it
when the demand was not met. Nehru indiscreetly made statements that
cast doubts on Congress' sincerity in accepting the cabinet mission plan.
Each party disputed the right of the other to appoint Muslim ministers.
When the viceroy proceeded to form an interim government without
the League, Jinnah called for demonstrations, or "direct action," on
August 16, 1946. Communal rioting on an unprecedented scale broke out,
especially in Bengal and Bihar; the massacre of Muslims in Calcutta
brought Gandhi to the scene. His efforts calmed fears in Bengal, but the
rioting spread to other provinces and continued into the following year.
Jinnah took the League into the government in an attempt to prevent
additional communal violence, but disagreements among the ministers
rendered the interim government ineffective. Over all loomed the
shadow of civil war.
In February 1947 Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed viceroy with
instructions to arrange for the transfer of power by June 1948. Lord
Mountbatten made a quick assessment of the Indian scene that persuaded
him that the Congress was willing to accept partition as the price for
stopping bloodshed, that Jinnah was aware that a smaller Pakistan than
the one demanded might have to be accepted, and that the Sikhs were
reconciled to a division of the Punjab. Lord Mountbatten obtained
sanction from London for the drastic action he proposed and then
persuaded most of the Indian leaders to acquiesce in a general way to his
plan.
On June 3, Prime Minister Clement Atlee introduced a bill in the House
of Commons calling for independence and partition of India, and on July
14 the Commons passed the India Independence Act, by which two
independent dominions were created on the subcontinent and the
princely states were left to accede to either. Throughout the summer of
1947, as communal violence mounted and drought and then floods racked
the land, preparations for partition proceeded in Delhi. Not surprisingly,
these preparations were inadequate. Assets had to be divided, boundary
commissions set up to demarcate frontiers, and British troops evacuated.
A restructuring of the military forces into two forces took place while law
and order broke down in different parts of the country. Civil servants

29
were given the choice of joining either country. British officers could
retire with compensation if not invited to stay on. Jinnah and Nehru tried
unsuccessfully to quell the passions that neither fully understood. Jinnah
flew from Delhi to Karachi on August 7 and took office seven days later as
the first governor general of the new Dominion of Pakistan.

Legacy of the British Raj

Evaluations of the British Raj tend to vary with the outlook and
nationality of the evaluator and the criteria used for assessment.
Moreover, British dominance in India was extended first by the merchant
adventurers of the eighteenth century and then by the overt imperialists
of the nineteenth century. Ideas of trusteeship were evolved to justify
continued British rule by those convinced of its benefits but came into
conflict with demands for self-government as the logical culmination of
the Raj. The Indian subcontinent itself was not homogeneous, and its
inhabitants' responses to the British impact varied with time, place, and
social position. Keeping these qualifications in mind, a broad balance
sheet can be suggested.
The British Raj secured the subcontinent from external attack and
provided a relatively high standard of internal security for about 150
years. The main instruments for security were the army and the police,
both of which were developed into superb professional machines.
Financed by India and manned largely by Indians, the army was
organized under British officers (almost exclusively so until the 1920s)
and kept under British control to serve imperial interests. Indian troops,
recruited from the so-called martial races, were organized into military
units formed with men of like backgrounds of caste or tribal origin and
segregated from the rest of the population, as were the police.
Nevertheless, the services proved to be invaluable legacies to the
succeeding states.
Extending over 55 percent of the subcontinent and encompassing 75
percent of the population, the British Raj provided a political unity
seldom enjoyed in South Asian history. This unity was reinforced by law
and government as much as by modern means of communication. The
Indian national movement was a product of British imperialism, and the
claim has often been made that India as a unified political entity was a
British achievement. Partition of the subcontinent into two hostile states
shattered that claim.
A more significant contribution was made in the legal sphere. English
law was the basis of the civil and criminal codes drawn up in the 1860s,
which remain substantially in force in present-day Bangladesh, India,
and Pakistan. Respect for the integrity and independence of judges,
concern for due process in relations between government and citizen, and
the principle of equality of persons before the law were evolved in Great
Britain, but the people of the subcontinent became enthusiastic converts
to the "rule of law," criticizing such aberrations as special procedures for
Europeans and repressive security measures. Civil liberty was enjoyed
in British India, especially after freedom of the press was granted in the
late nineteenth century.
Before the introduction of representative institutions in the twentieth
century, the British Raj was a highly centralized bureaucracy. Its
highest cadre was the ICS, a small and elite corps that until shortly before
independence had few Indian members. The ICS staffed the expanding
functions of government and generally maintained high standards of
ability and probity. Its members enjoyed paternal power in the
countryside and were called ma-baap (mother-father) by the people
whose welfare they held in trust. Praiseworthy as it was, this "steel
frame" of the Raj produced some adverse effects. Traditional forms of
local self-government atrophied and were replaced by excessive
dependence on government. The exclusiveness of the ICS and its
assumption of innate superiority were largely inherited by the succeed
ing bureaucracies in the states of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (see
ch. 8).
Britian's political impact, however, went further than administration.
It gave the subcontinent an introduction to the principles and procedures
of parliamentary democracy; it provided a body of literature on liberal
political ideas and institutions that could not be matched in the indigenous
traditions.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the British Raj was economic.
Despite nineteenth-century efforts to rectify earlier errors in land
revenue policy and to encourage agricultural production through vast
irrigation works, agriculture stagnated after the 1890s. Legislation to
provide famine relief testified to the increasing impoverishment of the
cultivators. An infrastructure of industry was laid, and industrialization
began, but the process was inhibited rather than encouraged by the
government. Electric power, defense industries, and technical education
were neglected. No central bank or fiscal autonomy existed until the
1920s. At the time of independence Pakistan and India still had economies
with pre-twentieth-century frameworks.
Through Great Britain a close relationship was created between
Western and Eastern civilizations. Both gained from this and might have
gained further if the relationship of ruler and ruled had not been tainted
by racism. Great Britian, perhaps unconsciously, acted as an "engine of
progress," for which the subcontinent paid a high price.

INDEPENDENT PAKISTAN
Problems at Independence
Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947, burdened with
handicaps. Its territories were in two widely separated areas. Economi
cally it scarcely seemed a viable state; and it lacked the machinery of
central government in terms of personnel, equipment, and a capital city

31
with government buildings. Above all, the new state was racked by the
gigantic problem of refugees fleeing in both directions fearful for their
lives, honor, and property. Nobody was prepared for the unprecedented
violence of the communal riots or the mass movements of populations that
took place after partition. Conservative estimates of 250,000 dead and at
least 12 million refugees provide only a hint of the human tragedies
involved.
In 1947 East Bengal did not face a comparable problem, but its
administrative and economic resources were poor and heavily dependent
on the Hindus. Many Hindus left in 1950, and their place, particularly in
commerce, was taken mostly by Bihari Muslims migrating from India or
by Punjabis.
The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically free to
accede to either dominion, but in practice the choices open to the princes
were limited. Bahawalpur State in Rajputana, having a predominantly
Muslim population of 1.5 million, acceded to Pakistan. Other bordering
states may have been tempted to do so, but their rulers were preempted
by skillful Indian diplomacy and anti-Muslim demonstrations in some
cities. On August 18 the nawab ofJunagadh, acceded to Pakistan, but this
action was negated by an Indian police action and subsequent
referendum.
The nizam of Hyderabad in the Deccan also attempted to resist internal
and external pressures to join India, probably wishing to remain
independent. His government, however, was unpopular, and a break
down of law and order combined with clashes between Muslim and Hindu
extremist groups provided the excuse for Indian military takeover in
September 1948.
In the state of Jammu and Kashmir the unpopular Hindu ruler
vacillated until uprisings in Punch, assisted by tribesmen from the
NWFP, forced him to seek military assistance from India. He formally
signed accession papers in October 1947, and Indian troops proceeded to
retake most of the state. Jinnah, however, denounced the accession as a
fraud, refused to recognize it, and conducted an active military and
diplomatic campaign to undo its results. Pakistan's position was
consistent with the two-nation theory that Muslim majority areas should
be part of Pakistan and with the sentimental appeal Kashmir had for
Muslim nationalists. A cease-fire was arranged by the United Nations
(UN) in January 1949 after the initial hostilities had involved the armies
of both states. About 38 percent of the former state of Jammu and
Kashmir remained under Pakistan's control.

The 1948^56 Period

The territory of Pakistan was formed with little or no regard for its
economic relationship with areas in India. Pakistan produced more wheat
than it consumed, and it grew cotton. In undivided India the wheat had
gone to deficit areas, and the cotton was milled in cities that remained in
India. East Pakistan raised most of the world's jute crop, but the jute
mills were in or around Calcutta. Coal, sugar, and other basic necessities
had been supplied by areas in India. Of the four major ports in undivided
India, only Karachi was allocated to Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan
had practically no economic relations before partition and were separated
by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Thus the new state of Pakistan
had little economic viability.
Just before partition India and Pakistan had agreed to allow free trade
and free movement of goods, persons, and capital without duties or
restrictions until early 1949, but these arrangements quickly broke
down. In November 1947 Pakistan levied export duties on raw jute and
cotton, and India retaliated with duties on its own exports to Pakistan.
The burden of the jute war fell on East Pakistan, and Pakistani spokes
men accused India of trying to break Pakistan by destroying the economy
of the East Wing. The trade war reached a crisis in September 1949 when
Britain announced a devaluation of the pound sterling. India and most
sterling countries also devalued, but Pakistan refused, and India severed
trade relations. The Bank of Pakistan purchased the entire jute crop for
that year to prevent disaster in the East Wing.
The Pakistan economy as a whole was saved by the outbreak of the
Korean War in June 1950 and the subsequent sharp rise in world prices of
jute, cotton, and wool. Construction of jute and cotton mills in Pakistan
was rapidly undertaken, and new foreign trade arrangements were made
to replace the relationship with India. Though the two countries
reopened trade in 1951, there was a steady decline in value and volume, so
that subsequent severance of trade barely affected either country. Illegal
transactions across borders continued to pose problems for both
countries.
The division of assets of British India was begun by the viceroy's
partition council in June 1947 in a ratio of seventeen to five. But the
division was hasty and difficult to implement, and Pakistan was at the
receiving end of precarious communications. Inevitably, Pakistan
complained of nondeliveries, and in December 1948 a financial agreement
was reached with India, allotting Pakistan shares of the combined assets.
The division of assets and the settlement of other financial disputed
continued through thousands of transactions until final settlement in
1960.
At the level of the all-India services of the ICS and the Indian Police
Service (IPS), there were at partition 1,157 Indian members, of whom
only 101 were Muslim. Ninety-five of these opted for Pakistan; they were
joined by one Christian, eleven Muslim army officers who transferred to
the civil service, and fifty Britons. But of the total of 157, over one-half
had less than ten years of service, and only twenty had more than fifteen
years. Around them were built the government, the judicial services, and
the diplomatic service. They were the core of the Civil Service of Pakistan
(CSP), which became one of the most elite and privileged bureaucracies in

33
the world. The services of the civil servants and army officers in tiding
Pakistan over the first years of independence were unquestionably high,
and they have been virtually indispensable to all subsequent govern
ments. Few ofthem, however, were Bengalis, and this was to become one
ofthe many points of dispute between East Pakistan and West Pakistan.
At independence Jinnah was the supreme authority. An active
politician for most of his adult life, he was more than a party leader in the
Western sense. He had won independence for Pakistan within seven
years and was hailed by his followers in phrases more appropriate to a
Mughal emperor than to a democratic political leader. Too much of a
constitutional lawyer to wish royal honors, Jinnah nevertheless could not
conceive of himself as a prime minister advising a British governor
general. He chose to be governor general of the new dominion and united
in himself the ceremonial functions of a chief-of-state with the effective
power of a chief executive. Provisions in the India Independence Act of
1947 and the Government of India Act of 1935 were adapted to give the
office wide powers of discretion and special responsibility.
Within the League Jinnah had looked for lieutenants, not colleagues,
and after independence he often presided over the deliberations of the
cabinet or sent it directives. As president of the Constituent Assembly as
well as its legal adviser, Jinnah was intolerant of delay or imprecise
drafting. He was most concerned with three things: maintenance of law
and order; rooting out bribery and corruption; and equal rights for all
citizens. All three were problems that continued to trouble Bangladesh in
the mid-1970s.
In keeping with his practice of centralized power, Jinnah looked for
strong and experienced men to appoint as governors, and he instructed
them to report in detail every fortnight. The machinery established was
similar to the viceregal system that had prevailed in preindependence
days and enabled Jinnah to intervene in the administrations of the
provinces. No formal limitations on his constitutional power were
deemed relevant. In the 1970s in Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
enjoyed much the same prestige and exemption from the normal rule of
law.
In short, Jinnah was the virtual ruler of Pakistan, and as such he was a
source of authority and inspiration that enabled the new state to survive
its birth pangs. But he died in September 1948, leaving it to his
successors to tackle the problems of continued existence and democratic
government.
Khwaja Nazimuddin, chief minister of East Pakistan, was appointed
governor general; and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (known as the
Quaid-i-Millet, Leader of the Community), Jinnah's acknowledged
lieutenant, assumed leadership of the government. Liaquat had the
advantage of long political experience and was not identified with any one
province of Pakistan. He became president of the League and was influ
ential in the Constituent Assembly. He tried to evolve a system more

34
consistent with cabinet government than Jinnah's had been; but he failed,
largely because the two main instruments of political development in
Pakistan, the League and the Constituent Assembly, had serious flaws.
The League had been too preoccupied with its struggle for Pakistan to
formulate a viable program for social and economic reform. The League's
mass base in the areas that became Pakistan was weak, and in order to
consolidate its position it came to terms with local leaders. In West
Pakistan in particular, these were often men having entrenched personal
power based on hereditary privilege who had little taste for party
discipline. Moreover, the League was obliged to take responsiblity for
everything that seemed to have deteriorated since independence and to
answer for all the high hopes that had been raised and left unfulfilled. Not
surprisingly, it lost popularity, especially among the refugees, who
provided ready fuel for urban demonstrations. In the provincial elections
of 1954, the League lost heavily in West Pakistan and was completely
defeated in East Pakistan.
The Constituent Assembly of eighty members was composed of
members of the 1946 Indian Constituent Assembly with additions to
represent the divided provinces and the refugees. But some of its
members never attended sessions, and many held offices that claimed a
higher priority on their time. There was no series of informed high-level
debates on principles and forms of modern constitutional development.
Its only achievement was the Objectives Resolution of March 1949,
introduced by the prime minister, which specified that the future
constitution would be Islamic, democratic, and federal. But there was no
agreement on how these objectives would take form and therefore no
detail. The Islamic cast of the wording, in particular, created fears among
the substantial Hindu minority of East Bengal as to their future place in
the polity, and there was a new flood of refugees into West Bengal.
The rising level of frustration and opposition can be judged to some
extent by the government's increased use of preventive detention powers
and Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, when invoked,
gives local civil servants virtual martial law powers. The Security of
Pakistan Act was passed in 1952, giving the government extensive
powers in the interests of public order. Perhaps the most serious threat to
the government, however, was posed by the armed forces themselves,
because some officers desired a more aggressive attitude vis-a-vis India
and Kashmir. In March 1951 the chief of the general staff of the army,
General Mohammad Akbar Khan, and fourteen other military officers
were arrested on charges of plotting a military coup d'etat. The authors of
what came to be called the Rawalpindi Conspiracy were tried in camera
by a special court. Fourteen men were found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment of up to twelve years. In spite of the serious charges,
however, all were later released. As of 1975, no full account of the
conspiracy had been made public.
A few months after the discovery of the army officers' plot, Liaquat

35
was assassinated in Rawalpindi in October 1951. No evidence of
conspiracy was revealed, but no satisfactory explanation of the
assassination has been made. Pakistan had lost its two most able and
experienced leaders in the first four years of existence. The paucity of
leadership qualities among the survivors soon became glaringly obvious.
Moreover, there was no consensus on political norms to override the
ensuing scramble for power, the shufflings of office, or the prolonged
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. Instead, differences of
opinion on crucial issues intensified. The major issues included the
division of executive power between the governor general and the prime
minister; the delineation of the powers of permanent officials relative to
those of elected leaders; the distribution of powers between the central
government and the several provincial governments; the balance of
power between the western and eastern wings of the country; and ways
in which practical form could be given to Islamic principles.
After Liaquat's assassination Governor General Nazimuddin became
prime minister; and a former finance minister and a former civil servant,
Ghulam Mohammad, became governor general. But Ghulam Mohammad,
who was from the Punjab, remained politically active and worked to
expand his power. In 1953 he imposed martial law in the Punjab and
governor's rule in East Pakistan and dismissed the prime minister. In
1954 he proceeded to appoint his own "cabinet of talents." These actions
were of doubtful constitutional validity and, when he dismissed the
Constituent Assembly in 1954, the Federal Court pronounced against
him. The dilemma remained when Pakistan became a republic in 1956
with a president as the chief-of-state and a prime minister as chief of
government under a constitution that divided power between them.
Broadly speaking, assertions of power by the head-of-state were
successful largely because the army and the civil service supported them;
the actions tended to strengthen the powers of officials relative to those of
politicians. A clash of interests between these two contending groups was
particulary obvious in Sind and East Pakistan. In the Punjab and, to a
lesser extent, in the NWFP, the clash of interests was less pronounced
because the leading families frequently had representatives in both
groups. But the first decade in Pakistan's history produced evidence of a
polarity between "government," representing administration and au
thority, and "politics," claiming to represent the will of the people.
The inability of the politicians to provide a stable government or
practical programs was due to their mutual suspicions. Their loyalties
tended to be personal and provincial rather than national and issue
oriented. Provincialism was openly expressed in the deliberations of the
Constituent Assembly. There existed fears that the Punjab would
dominate the nation, or at least West Pakistan, and that East Pakistan,
the more populous wing, would gain the upper hand through a democratic
political process; that all the other provinces would combine against the
Punjab; and that West Pakistan would dominate and exploit East
Pakistan. It took more than seven years to draft a constitution, which for
all practical purposes was never put into effect.
By late 1953 the post-Korean War recession was taking its toll of
Pakistan's balance of payments, and neither food production nor
industrilization was proceeding in pace with rising demands. Govern
ment administration generally had deteriorated under conditions of
political uncertainly, and the armed forces were outspoken on their need
for improved equipment. In these circumstances Governor General
Ghulam Mohammad appointed as prime minister Mohammad Ali Bogra,
who was then ambassador to the United States. The rest of the new
cabinet was also chosen by Ghulam Mohammad, who continued to make
the important decisions. The major achievement of the new government
was to enlist the assistance of the United States in the military and
ecnomic development of Pakistan. In 1954 Pakistan signed the Mutual
Defense Agreement with the United States, concluded a defense
agreement with Turkey, and became one of the signatories to the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In 1955 Pakistan signed
the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization—CENTO).
During September and October 1954 a chain of events culminated in a
confrontation between the governor general and the prime minister. The
prime minister tried to limit the powers of the governor general through
hasty amendments to the operating constitution. The governor general
enlisted the tacit support of the army and the civil servants and dissolved
the Constituent Assembly. He then formed a new cabinet: Bogra, a man
without a personal following, remained prime minister but without
effective power; Iskander Mirza, who had been a soldier and civil servant,
became minister of the interior; General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the
army commander, became defense minister; and Chaudhuri Mohammad
Ali, former head of the civil service, remained finance minister. The main
objective of the new government was to end disruptive politics and to
form one province of West Pakistan. Support from the Punjab was easily
obtained, and opposition in Sind and the NWFP was silenced by
dismissing opposing ministers and extracting supportive resolutions
from pliable assemblies. In March 1955 the governor general issued an
ordinance amending the Government of India Act of 1935 to invest
himself with the power to create the province of West Pakistan and to
provide the country with a constitution. The Federal Court, however,
declared that a new constituent assembly must be called. The now
seriously ill Ghulam Mohammad was unable to persuade the army to
execute a coup and so circumvent the order. The new Constituent
Assemly, elected by the provincial assemblies, met for the first time in
July 1955.
The second Constituent Assembly differed in composition from the
first. In East Pakistan the League had been overwhelmingly defeated by
the United Front coalition of the Awami League led by Hussain Shaheed
Suhrawardy and the Krishak Sramik Party (Peasants and Workers

37
Party) led by Fazlul Huq. Provincial autonomy was the main ingredient
of the coalition platform. The new assembly had only twenty-six
members from the League (compared to sixty in the first, thirty-three of
whom had been from East Bengal). A larger share of speeches came from
the opposition, but the opposition was a shifting one. Prime Minister
Bogra was replaced by Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali of West Pakistan, and
Governor General Ghulam Mohammad was replaced by Mirza.
The first important enactment ofthe second Constituent Assembly was
the Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, passed in September 1955. The
debate on the bill was long and acrimonious; attacks focused on motives
and the methods by which One Unit, the term frequently applied to the
new province, was brought into operation. Representatives from East
Pakistan were most vocal in their criticism; they suspected that the
Punjab's agreement to underrepresentation in the new provincal
legislature and disclaimer of key governmental positions for ten years
was merely part of a strategy for eventual domination of the country. The
heavy Punjab representation in the government services in East
Pakistan was a continuing cause for concern to Bengalis.
In 1956 the assembly adopted a new constitution that proclaimed
Pakistan an Islamic republic and contained directives for the establish
ment of an Islamic state. A kind of romantic Islam had infused the Muslim
separatist movement in India and the ordinary people of Pakistan.
Islamic state, Islamic government, and Islamic constitution were the
slogans of the last years of British India and the first years of
independence, but there was no consensus as to what these terms meant.
The intense expectation of the Muslim people was not matched by a
comparable intellectual effort to resolve the problems of creating an
Islamic state in the twentieth century. The lawyer-politicians who had
led the Pakistan movement had used the principles of British parliamen
tary democracy and, although they had advanced the idea of Muslim
nationhood as an axiom, they were guided in their political activities by
facts, figures, and legal precedents of a nonreligious nature. To a large
extent they represented a liberal movement in Islam. They saw the basis
for democratic process in the Islamic concepts of ijma (consensus of the
community) and ijtihad (the practice of continuing interpretation and
judgment). East Pakistan's intelligentsia and Westernized political
leaders belonged to this group of "ijma modernists" (see ch. 5).
In contrast stood the traditionalist ulema, whose legalistic position was
based on the unity of religion and politics in Islam. The ulema asserted
that the Quran, the Sunna, and the bodies of laws that had grown up
around the Quran provided the general principles of all aspects of life if
correctly interpreted. The government's duty, therefore, was to
recognize the function of the ulema in guiding and uniting the Muslims of
Pakistan by interpreting law. The ulema enjoyed great influence among
the people. Politicians could not afford to be denounced as anti-Islamic
and so dared not ignore the ulema. Nevertheless, constitution makers
were unwilling to give the ulema substantial powers of legal interpreta
tion; lawyer-politicians almost without exception preferred the British-
style courts as interpretive institutions.
Another viewpoint was presented by a new fundamentalist movement
in Pakistan. Its most significant organization was the Jamatt-i-Islami
(Union of Believers), which gradually built up support among refugees,
the urban lower middle class, and students. Unlike the traditional ulema,
the fundamentalist movement was derived from modern Islamic
romanticism as much as the "ijma modernists," but it developed an
intellectually rigorous logic. The Jamaat-i-Islami played a crucial role in
constitutional controversies because it pressed toward its goal of an
Islamic constitution and forced the political parties to face the questions
involved. The Jamaat-i-Islami was never a strong group among the
Bengali Muslims, however; its small membership in East Pakistan was
drawn mostly from the Bihari community (see ch. 6).
The leader of the movement was Maulana Abu-1 Ala Maududi, who
continued to be its most prominent spokesman in 1974. Maududi had at
first opposed the League, but by 1945 he supported the idea of an Islamic
state although he questioned the League's competence to establish one.
After partition Maududi pressed the politicians, not the ulema, to build an
Islamic state on the principles of the sharia (see ch. 5). He vigorously
rejected pleas for secularism and demanded unequivocal declarations of
intention from the Constituent Assembly. He won a partial victory when
the Objectives Resolution of 1949 proclaimed Allah's sovereignty over
the universe and declared Pakistan a state "wherein the Muslims shall be
enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in
accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy
Quran and the Sunna." The 1956 Constitution came halfway in meeting
Maududi's demands for an Islamic constitution.
The 1956 Constitution made other provisions for an Islamic state. A
section called the Directive Principles of State Policy attempted to define
ways in which facilities for understanding the Islamic way of life and
methods of promoting Islamic moral standards could be pursued. The
principles, which were nonjusticiable, contained injunctions against
consumption of alcohol and the practice of usury and provided for the
establishment of Islamic religious schools and endowments. There were
also justiciable clauses dealing with laws that might be "repugnant" to
Islam and entitling the government to establish an Islamic organization
for instruction and research. A minimum consensus had been reached
among various groups on the religious issue and, although discussion of
Islamic principles continued and gained depth, the substance of the 1956
clauses reappeared in the 1962 Constitution.

Collapse of the Parliamentary System: 1956-58

The system outlined in the 1956 Constitution could not be implemented
without consolidated and disciplined political parties, which did not exist.

39
The prestige of the League continued to decline in West Pakistan, where
it had lost half its members to the new Republican Party formed by the
provincial chief minister. Sind and the NWFP were resentful of the
Punjab and hostile to the One Unit, although Pathans were the second
most influential group in the West Wing, as West Pakistan was called,
and in the armed forces. Political leadership in the Punjab was hopelessly
divided along personal rivalries. No political party offered a platform of
social and ecnomic reforms with mass appeal. Opposition was usually a
matter of expediency, and support was available through patronage.
Corruption was believed to be widespread and entrenched.
In East Pakistan the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party,
which had eliminated the League, were engaged in a bitter struggle for
power. Smuggling was a recognized method of evading taxes, and in 1957
the army was sent in to conduct an antismuggling campaign that touched
politically influential elements, especially among the Hindu commercial
classes. Political leaders in East Pakistan did attempt to formulate
issue-oriented parties and launch movements of social and economic
meaning, however; land reforms were carried out and, on the whole, a
higher level of political consciousness prevailed in the east than in the
west. But political developments were impeded by internal feuding and
by interference from the central government.
In 1956 Suhrawardy formed a coalition cabinet of Awami League and
Republican Party members. He had a considerable reputation in the East
Wing and was respected for his prepartition association with Gandhi but
inspired little confidence in the West Wing. Suhrawardy had ambitions of
long leadership in a strong and democratic government, and he sought to
unite major groups in the East Wing and the Punjab, a plan that had
never before been tried. Suhrawardy took a strong position against
abrogation of the One Unit, however, and so alienated support in Sind
and the NWFP. He used emergency powers to prevent the formation of a
League provincial government in West Pakistan and so lost much of the
Punjabi backing he had gained. Moreover, his open advocacy of speedy
elections and reliance on votes of confidence from the assembly as the
proper means of forming governments aroused the suspicions of
President Mirza. Mirza had great drive and ambition, and in 1957 he used
his considerable manipulative expertise to oust Suhrawardy from the
prime ministership. The drift toward economic decline and political chaos
continued.
In East Pakistan the political impasse culminated in 1958 in a violent
scuffle in the provincial assembly between members of the opposition and
the police force, in which the deputy speaker was fatally injured and two
ministers badly wounded. In West Pakistan Chief Minister Khan Sahib
was assassinated in early 1958, and attempts were made to implicate
political leaders in a murder plot. Ghaffar Khan in the NWFP (Khan
Sahib's brother and erstwhile leader of the Red Shirts) said that he had
turned his back on Pakistan politics and would dedicate his energies to

40
realizing provincial autonomy. In Baluchistan the khan of Kalat declared
himself independent. Pakistan indeed seemed in danger.
On October 7, 1958, President Mirza suspended the 1956 Constitution
and imposed martial law. Elections scheduled for January 1959 were
canceled. The president was fully supported by the army, which moved
units into position around the cities in case of opposition. The coup was
also supported by the bureaucracy, which resented the constant
interference and inefficiencies of the politicians, and to some extent it
seemed that the politicians also acquiesced. Not only had their own
mishandling of power led directly to martial law, but by 1956 even the
genuine believers in democracy were questioning the moral fiber of the
nation and the applicability of parliamentary institutions to Pakistan.
Moreover, General Charles de Gaulle's actions in France and other
worldwide assertions of authority in 1958 offered prestigious precedents
to those who argued that presidential rule was the only alternative to
anarchy and collapse.
On October 27 the apparent unity of the presidential group was
shattered. President Mirza was alleged to have sought the support of
younger army officers against the army commander in chief. Three senior
generals escorted Mirza from the President's House to the airport and
sent him into exile on the first available London-bound aircraft. General
Ayub assumed control of a military dictatorship.
THE AYUB KHAN ERA: 1958-69
In January 1951 Ayub succeeded General Sir Douglas Gracy as the
commander in chief of the Pakistan army, becoming the first Pakistani to
serve in that position. Although Ayub's military career had not been
particularly brilliant and he had not held a combat command, he was
promoted over several officers senior to him who had served with
distinction in combat in World War II. Both Pakistani and foreign
observers believed that Ayub was selected because of his known
competence as an administrator, his seeming talent for acting as a
mediator between opposing factions, his presumed absence of political
ambition, and his known lack of a political base. As a member of a humble
family of an obscure, weak, and only marginally Pathan tribe, Ayub
lacked affiliation with any major power bloc, and he was, therefore,
acceptable to all elements.
Within a few months of his promotion, however, Ayub had become a
potent political figure. Probably more than any other single Pakistani, he
was responsible for Pakistan's seeking and securing military and
economic aid and assistance from the United States and for aligning
Pakistan with the United States in international affairs. In 1954 he
served for a time as minister of defense, and throughout the 1950s he
possessed and used a veto over proposed government policy that, in his
judgment, was inimical to the interests of the armed forces.
There is little doubt that by mid- 1958 Ayub and his fellow military

41
officers were thoroughly disgusted with the political chaos and were
receptive to suggestions that the military should intervene to "turn the
rascals out." General Ayub, however, had an additional interest in
leading a coup d'etat. In January 1959 he would complete his second tour
of duty as commander in chief, and it was assumed that, in keeping with
one of the British customs that governed many aspects of the military,
Ayub would be replaced. By leading the coup in 1958, Ayub continued to
direct the military until 1969.
Ayub's complex and reserved personality and his training and
experience as an army officer in the British tradition predisposed him
toward authoritarianism, albeit benevolent. Nevertheless, in the early
years of his rule he was politically senstive and shrewd enough to realize
that he would benefit from public support. He tried to devise political
institutions that he considered more appropriate to the "genius" and
experience of Pakistan than parliamentary democracy. He viewed
himself as a reformer rather than a revolutionary, and at times he cited
Kemal Ataturk as a model. Ayub tried to use Pakistan's strengths, the
army and the bureaucracy, as a frame within which national weaknesses
could be rectified. His philosophy meshed with the Mughal and viceregal
traditions and shared their drawbacks by being too personalized. Ayub
justified his assumption of power by the need for stability; when internal
stability broke down in the 1968-69 period, he was still contemptuous of
lawyer-politicians and handed power over to his brothers in arms.
During Ayub's first few years in office, two main approaches were
used. One was directed toward consolidating power, intimidating opposi
tion leaders, and popularizing new leaders; the other was aimed at
establishing the groundwork for future long-run security through
amendment of the economic, educational, legal, and constitutional
institutions of the country.
The imposition of martial law in 1958 was to accompany a rooting out of
administrative malaise and antisocial practices. Accordingly, military
courts imposed heavy penalities for such antisocial actions as black-
marketeering, smuggling, hoarding, and the abduction of women and
children, all of which were prevalent. Suspension of the usual civil rights
effectively prevented the legal process from being used to advantage by
the accused. Thousands of officers in the civil and police services were
investigated for corruption, misconduct, subversive activities, and
inefficiency. Punishments ranged from dismissal or compulsory retire
ment to reduction in rank or curtailment of increments. The public found
these proceedings salutary, senior administrators became alarmed at
their demoralizing effect on the services, and the drive was softened to
retain the support of the bureaucracy for the military.
More resolute measures were initiated against politicians. The Public
and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA) prescribed
fifteen years' exclusion from public office for those found guilty of
corruption. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance (EBDO)

42
authorized special tribunals to try former politicians for "misconduct";
prosecution could be avoided by those agreeing not to be a member of, or
a candidate for membership in, any elective body. Approximately 7,000
individuals were "Ebdonians." In 1960 the ordinance was amended to
include ex-government servants. Also in 1960 the government amended
the Press Publications Ordinance to include press measures issued in
1959 that specified conditions under which newspapers and other
publications could be commandeered or closed down. The conditions were
broad and included anything tending to bring contempt for government.
Various newspapers were closed, and others were brought under new
government-controlled management; Dawn, an English-language daily
in Karachi, and some other leading dailies were allowed to continue
because they broadly supported the government line and refrained from
criticism of martial law. Trade organizations were closely controlled, and
mosques were warned to exclude political discussions from their religious
meetings. In 1962 writs of habeus corpus were denied for political
detainees, and former Prime Minister Suhrawardy was arrested.
On the whole, however, martial law administration was lenient and
nonpunitive. The army maintained a low profile, and by early 1959 army
units had resumed their usual duties. The Ayub regime, with few
exceptions, left administration in the hands of the bureaucracy. Though
perhaps one of the most modern elements in the country, the army did not
act as a revolutionary force and was content to uphold the traditional
social order.
Muzzling the opposition went hand in hand with efforts to popularize
the new regime. Ayub undertook extensive "meet the people" tours in
both wings, and in appearance, manner, and philosophy he filled the
image of the impartial benevolent ruler, an image that remained strong in
the tradition of West Pakistan. Ayub chose two stong men to be
governors of the two wings—Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh
in the west, and General Azam Khan in the east. The former, who was a
wealthy and powerful landlord, evoked obedience and fear; the latter, an
army officer, gained remarkable popularity before Ayub forced his
resignation in 1962.
The government also addressed itself to the regional grievances of
East Pakistan. East Pakistani members of the civil services were posted
only in the East Wing; the Planning Commission and other bodies were
instructed to hold regular sessions in Dacca, which was to be built into
another national capital; public investment in East Pakistan was
increased dramatically; and an impression was given that genuine
provincial autonomy was contemplated. The overall structure of Ayub's
administration was highly centralized, however, and in the absence of
parliamentary democracy East Pakistan continued to feel oppressed.
Ayub used the facilities of martial law to initiate some progressive
reforms. The Land Reform Commission was set up in 1958 and, on the
basis of its recommendations, the government imposed a ceiling of 500

43
acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres of unirrigated land in the west and
raised the ceiling from thirty-three to 120 acres of irrigated land in the
east. Other measures sought to prevent the continuing subdivision of
inherited land and placed final limits on claims of land by refugees.
Government assertions that the power of the great landowners had been
broken were not sustained in practice, however. Landowners retained
their dominant positions in the sociopolitical hierarchy, and lands
released for public acquisition on payment of compensation tended to be
sold to civil and army officers, thus creating a class of middle-level
landowners but not benefiting the peasants directly.
In 1955 a legal commission had been set up to suggest reforms of the
family and marriage laws of Islam. Ayub examined its report and in 1961
promulgated the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which among other
things restricted polygamy and equalized conditions of divorce between
men and women. A humane and mild measure, it could not have been
passed if the vehement opposition to it from the ulema and fundamen
talist Muslims had been allowed political expression. Like the new steps
taken in favor of family planning, the family laws ordinance was a mild
measure of reform rather than a revolutionary transformation. Similarly,
no sweeping changes were introduced in education.
An energetic approach toward economic development evolved. Land
reform, consolidation of holdings, and stern measures against hoarding
were combined with rural credit schemes and work programs, higher
procurement prices, and augmented budget allocations for agricultural
development to put the country on the road of self-sufficiency in food.
Loans from the United States, especially the 1961 Agricultural
Commodities Agreement, financed imports of new equipment and such
rural development projects as the work project academies in Comilla,
East Pakistan, and Peshawar, West Pakistan. The increased purchasing
power of the farmers stimulated other sections of the economy as well.
In 1960 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD, commonly known as the World Bank) formed a consortium of the
major countries to supply aid and technical assistance. Pakistan's
determined campaign to attract foreign capital also brought in private
foreign investment and scores of foreign advisers, technicians, and
managers who contributed significantly to the economy. At the same
time, the government encouraged indigenous entrepreneurial talent
through liberalization of controls and imports, separate allocations of
foreign exchange, a system to encourage exports, and a shift of emphasis
to medium-scale and small-scale industries. The Pakistan Industrial
Development Corporation was revitalized and undertook high-risk
projects, such as the paper mills in East Pakistan. The Planning
Commission was made directly responsible to the president, who
personally made announcements connected with the second plan. In
short, a successful combination of private enterprise and government
intervention ensured a high rate of economic growth for the 1960s.

44
 The defects of the pattern of economic development only became
apparent later. Extreme poverty remained the norm, and economic
inefficiency and corruption were not eradicated. Most important, serious
regional and social inequality remained. East Pakistan scarcely shared in
the accretion of private investment—foreign and domestic—which
accounted for 85 percent of the industrial sector. In the western province
both urban and rural wealth were concentrated in an estimated
twenty-four families. The Memons, Chiniotis, Bohras, and Khoja Ismailis
were especially prominent in commerce and industry, and the Syeds and
Yusufzai Pathans were important as wealthy landowners and traders.
Ayub's own family, particularly his eldest son, accumulated great wealth,
largely as a result of government favors. Inequitable income distribution,
visibly expressed in consumption patterns, aggravated the grievances of
the urban poor and so contributed to the disorders of the late 1960s.
Ayub based his claim to be a great reformer mainly on his plan for a bold
new political system. In 1959 he inaugurated the Basic Democracy
system, and in 1962 he promulgated a new constitution. Both were
predicated on Ayub's belief that a sophisticated British kind of
parliamentary democracy was unsuitable for Pakistan. The basic
democracies, as the individual units were called, were intended to initiate
and educate the largely illiterate population in the workings of
government, by giving them limited representation and associating them
with problems of administration and development at a level "commensu
rate with their ability." They were expected to provide effective local
government, step up rural development, and bring about gradual social
changes through participation of hitherto backward groups. By relying
on the established bureaucracy and bypassing the urban intelligentsia
and former politicians, Ayub hoped to provide a stable governmental
system.
The Basic Democracies Order set up five tiers of institutions. The
lowest but most important rung was composed of union councils, one each
for groups of villages having an approximate population of 10,000. Each
council was composed of ten directly elected members and five appointed
members, all called basic democrats and known as BDs. They were
responsible for local agricultural and community development, main
tained law and order through rural police, tried minor cases in conciliation
courts, and were empowered to impose local taxes for local projects. In
1960 the union councils confirmed by vote the presidency of Field Marshal
Ayub, and under the 1962 Constitution they formed the electoral college
to elect the president, the Parliament, and the provincial assemblies.
These powers, however, were more than balanced by the fact that the
controlling authority for the union councils was the district deputy
commissioner (referred to as the DC), whose high status and traditionally
paternalistic attitudes generally elicited obedient cooperation rather
than demands.
The next tier consisted of tehsil (subdistrict) councils, which performed

45
coordination functions. Above them district councils, chaired by the
deputy commissioners, were composed of nominated official and
nonofncial members including the chairman of union councils. The district
councils were assigned both compulsory and optional functions pertaining
to education, sanitation, local culture, and social welfare. Above them the
divisional advisory councils coordinated activities with representatives of
government departments. The highest tier consisted of one development
advisory council for each wing, chaired by the governors and appointed
by the president. Although the analogy was not drawn publicly, the Basic
Democracies Order read like the early documents of British crown
colonies.
The Basic Democracy system was not allowed the time to demonstrate
its potentialities for fulfilling Ayub's intentions. Whether the rural
populations could have been mobilized, a new class of political leaders
provided with some administrative experience, or a process of national
integration developed and implemented was never discovered. The main
emphasis was on economic development and social welfare, not political
mobilization. The authority of the civil services was in fact augmented.
Although the union councils in the East Wing utilized the powers they
had, they resented the system as such, which was designed to bypass the
urban intelligentsia and party politics. Above all, the noble sentiments of
"good government" offended the numerous Pakistanis, especially the
Bengalis, who were convinced of their capacity for self-government.
The 1962 Constitution
On coming to power in 1958 Ayub promised a speedy return to
constitutional government. In February 1960 an eleven-member con
stitutional commission was established to prepare proposals for a
constitution based on Islamic principles and national unity. The
commission's recommendations of direct elections, strong legislative and
judicial organs, free political parties, and definite limitations on
presidential authority went against Ayub's known philosophy of
government. Accordingly, he ordered other committees to make
revisions. The new constitution had a stormy genesis reflecting existing
differences of opinion and possible opposition to Ayub.
The 1962 Constitution, which was promulgated on March 1, 1962,
retained the Islamic nature of the republic. The president was to be a
Muslim, and the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and the Islamic
Research Institute were established to assist the government in
reconciling all legislation with the tenets of the Quran and the Sunna.
Their functions were advisory and their members appointed by the
president, so that no real base of power was allotted to the ulema.
The 1962 Constitution created a presidential form of government in
which the traditional powers of the chief executive were augmented by
his control of the legislature, power of issuing ordinances, right of
appealing to referendum, protection from impeachment, control over the

46
budget, and special emergency powers, which included the right to
suspend civil liberties. As the 1965 elections showed, the presidential
form of government was opposed by those who equated constitutional
government with parliamentary democracy. The 1962 Constitution did
relax martial law limitations on personal freedom and made fundamental
rights justiciable. The courts continued their historic function protecting
the rights of individual citizens against encroachment by the govern
ment, but the government made it clear that the exercise of claims based
on fundamental rights would not be permitted to nullify its previous
progressive legislation on land reforms and family law.
The Parliament of 156 members (including six women) elected by an
electoral college of 80,000 basic democrats was established as the federal
legislature. Legislature powers were divided between the central and
provincial assemblies. The Parliament was to hold sessions alternately in
Islamabad (the recently established national capital) and Dacca, the
latter being desingated a second capital of the republic where the
Supreme Court would also hold sessions. The ban on political parties was
in operation at the time of the first elections to the Parliament, as was the
prohibition against disqualified politicians, so that the groups that
emerged from the election were new. They proved to be factions formed
on the basis of personal or provincial loyalties. Despite the ban, political
parties functioned outside the legislature, and in late 1962 political
parties were again legalized. Thereupon the factions crystallized into
governmental and opposition groups.
The president named the Muslim League as the official government
party; he became a member in December 1962 and president of the party
in December 1963. He seemed to sense a waning of his personal power
and sought an instrument of political support and legitimacy through the
League. Older members of the League still participating in politics left in
protest and formed another party, the Muslim League (Councillors).
The presidential elections of 1965 resulted in a victory for Ayub, but
they demonstrated the growing appeal of the opposition. Four political
parties joined to form the Combined Opposition Party, nominating
Fatima Jinnah (the sister of the Quaid-i-Azam and known as Madar-i-
Millet—the mother of the nation) as their presidential candidate. The
parties included the Muslim League (Councillors), strongest in the
Punjab and Karachi; the Awami League, strongest in East Pakistan; the
National Awami Party (NAP), which had a small following in East
Pakistan and was strongest in the NWFP, where it stood for a breakup of
the One Unit arrangment; and the Jamaat-i-Islami. They produced a
nine-point program combining their different platforms, and they argued
mainly for a complete restoration of parliamentary democracy.
Fatima Jinnah waged a moving campaign against "dictatorship," but
she made the tactical error of giving the impression that the basic
democrats who formed the electorate would lose their power in a new
regime. Ayub also expended considerable effort on the election

47
campaign. His public meetings were well organized and were used as
opportunities for discussion of tangible issues; they also provided
accessibility to the source of power. He won 63.3 percent of the electoral
college votes, though his majority was larger in the West Wing (73.6
percent) than in the East Wing (53.1 percent).

1965 War with India

Notwithstanding Pakistan's efforts to improve its international
position through an independent foreign policy, no benefits had accrued
to it on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's alliance with the United States and
its receipt of Western military equipment were being matched by India's
growing defense budget and industrial base. For reasons that a decade
later were still obscure, various elements in the Pakistan government
and armed forces seem to have decided in the mid-1960s that military
initiatives might be in the best national interest. A series of border
incidents between troops of the two countries occurred along the
cease-fire line in Kashmir and also in the southwest near the swampy
Rann of Kutch. These incidents escalated into a major engagement in the
Rann of Kutch in April 1965, the two countries disputing the legal
boundary in that inconsequential and undemarcated territory. By mutual
consent and under British sponsorship, a cease-fire was called at the end
ofJune, and the border dispute was referred to international arbitration.
In Kashmir UN observers and India reported increased activities of
"infiltrators" from Pakistan; in August India took Pakistani-held
positions in the north. Pakistan retaliated in the Chhamb sector of the
south, and on September 6 Indian troops attacked near Lahore and
Sialkot in the Punjab. Both countries had limited objectives, and neither
was economically able to sustain a long war. Both were adversely affected
when the United States and Great Britain cut off military supplies and
economic aid—Pakistan more seriously because of its greater depen
dence on them. On September 23 a cease-fire was reached through the
efforts of the UN Security Council. Public reaction to the news in Karachi
and Lahore was violently expressed, mainly against the United States.
The government also felt the effects of national frustration at the
expenditure of lives and funds without the attainment of any declared
objective.
In January 1966 President Ayub met with Prime Minister Lai Bahadur
Shastri of India at Tashkent under the auspieces of Soviet Premier Alexei
Kosygin and signed an agreement formally ending the hostilities of 1965
through the mutual withdrawal of forces. This objectively statesmanlike
act elicited an adverse reaction at home, especially in the West Wing.
Demonstrations featuring students as well as politicians, many of whom
were arrested, occurred in urban centers. On the whole, however, the
government treated the opposition leniently.
The political leaders were not satisfied. In February they called for a
national conference in Lahore where all parties could discuss their

48
differences and come to some agreement on basic issues. But for West
Pakistani politicians the central issue was the agreement reached at
Tashkent, in which few East Pakistanis were much interested. Of the 700
delegates who attended the conference, only twenty-one were from the
East Wing. They were led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who presented a
six-point program itself a summary of East Pakistan demands in 1954 for
complete autonomy of the provinces and a preview of the demands of 1970
that led to secession. The six-point program consisted of: a parliamentary
form of government having a central parliament directly elected by adult
suffrage and an executive responsible to parliament; powers of the
federal government to be restricted to defense and foreign policy, leaving
all others to the constituent units; separate fiscal policies or currencies to
be permitted if necessary to stop the flow of capital from the East Wing;
limited powers of taxation for the federal government; each province to
have authority to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries and
full control over its earned foreign exchange; and the provinces to have, if
necessary, their own military or paramilitary forces. In the cir
cumstances, no national goals or unified public platform emerged from
the national conference.
Ayub lost the services of Foreign Minister Bhutto, who resigned.
Meanwhile, opposition from leftist elements swelled, and the govern
ment hesitated to take prohibitive action. By 1968 it was becoming clear
that only the military-civil services establishment stood against the
challenge of the articulate urban opposition. Thus the open disaffection of
members of that establishment, such as Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the
former commander in chief of the air force, and former ChiefJustice S. M.
Murshed, was most significant. But though they could rally public opinion
against the corruption, nepotism, and incompetence of the government,
as political amateurs they had no real grip of the situation and lacked
viable alternatives to propose. Ayub's serious illness in February 1968
undermined his control.
In West Pakistan Bhutto organized the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
to lead a "revolution"; in East Pakistan the Awami League's six points
became a rallying cry of opposition. The government declared that it had
uncovered a conspiracy and accused forty-four people of plotting
secession of the East Wing, with India's connivance. Mujib (as Mujibur
Rahman is called) and thirty-four others were charged with treason.
Their trial dragged on in an atmosphere of mounting tension.
On October 1968 the government sponsored a "decade of development"
celebration. Instead of reminding people of the achievements of the
regime, the festivities highlighted the frustration of the urban poor
affected by inflation and the costs of the 1965 war. For the mob Ayub
became the symbol of inequality, of all that had gone wrong. Bhutto
capitalized on this emotion and challenged the president to the ballot box.
In the East Wing dissatisfaction with the system went deeper than its
opposition to Ayub, and in January 1969 opposition parties formed the

49
Democratic Action Committee with the declared aim of restoring
democracy through a mass movement.
Ayub reacted using alternative methods of conciliation and repression.
Disorder spread. The army was moved in to Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar,
Dacca, and Khulna to stem mob rule. In the countryside of the East Wing
curfew was relatively ineffective; local officials sensed the ebb of
government control and began retreating from the peasant revolt and
carnage that was beginning. In February Ayub released political
prisoners, invited the Democratic Action Committee to meet him in
Rawalpindi, promised a new constitution, and declared that he would not
stand for reelection in 1970. Still in poor health and now lacking the
confidence of his generals, Ayub sought a political settlement. Violence
continued.
On March 26, 1969, martial law was once again proclaimed; General
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army commander in chief, was
designated chief martial law administrator. The 1962 Constitution was
abrogated, the president announced his resignation, and on March 31
Yahya Khan assumed the presidency. He soon promised early elections
on the basis of direct adult franchise to the Parliament, which would draw
up a new constitution, and he ordered investigations into such existing
institutions as basic democracies for the purpose of reform. He also
entered into discussions with leaders of political parties.
YAHYA KHAN AND BANGLADESH
To carry out the new administration a committee of chief martial law
administrators was formed. It functioned above the entire civil
machinery of government. The generals were now overtly in power, no
longer merely the supporting arm of civilians—elected or
bureaucratic—as they had been throughout the country's history. Every
significant change of government had relied in large part on the allegiance
of the army. Now they were determined to take the credit as well as do
the work. But Yahya Khan and his military advisers proved no more
capable of overcoming the nation's problems than their predecessors.
Indeed, the new administration displayed some peculiar failings, and
Yahya Khan lacked the national vision and capacity for dedicated hard
work that Ayub had possessed.
The two generals closest to him, Lieutenant General S. G. M. Peerzada
and Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan, competed with each other
and also cut Yahya Khan off from the rest of his staff. The attempt to
establish a military hierarchy running paralled to and supplanting in
authority the civilian administration inevitably ruptured the
bureaucratic-military alliance on which efficiency and stability depended.
An already existing tendency to center on personalities rather than
issues was exacerbated. Little effort was made to propagate a national
program; the relationship of means to objectives was never clarified.

50
Most important, perhaps, the dissolute habits of the president and his
associates not only diminished their ability to make decisions or formulate
policy but cost them the respect of the nation.
These weaknesses were not immediately apparent but became more
and more obvious as events moved quickly toward crisis in East Pakistan.
On November 28, 1969, Yahya Khan made a nationwide broadcast
announcing his proposals for return to constitutional government.
General elections for the Parliament were set for October 5, 1970,
although they were subsequently postponed until December. The
Parliament would be obliged to draw up a new constitution within 120
days. Maximum provincial autonomy compatible with effective federal
government would be permitted, and the One Unit of West Pakistan
would be dissolved into the four original provinces.
In 1960 an intense election campaign took place. Bhutto campaigned in
the West Wing on a strongly nationalist and leftist platform with little
appeal for conservatives. The slogan of his party was "Islam Our Faith,
Democracy Our Policy, and Socialism Our Economy." The Awami
League in the East Wing gained widespread support for its six-point
program.
The first general elections on the basis of one man, one vote ever to be
conducted in Pakistan were held on December 7, 1970, though in some
districts of East Pakistan the elections were postponed untilJanuary 17.
In all, twenty-three parties put forward 1,237 candidates for the 291 seats
in the Parliament. There were also 391 independent candidates. There
was heavy polling, and the atmosphere was generally free and fair. The
Awami League secured an overwhelming victory in the East Wing,
where it won 167 of the 169 seats. The PPP won a large majority in the
West Wing, especially in the Punjab and Sind.
Any constitutional settlement clearly depended on agreement between
Mujib representing the East Wing, Bhutto representing the West Wing,
and Yahya Khan representing the military government in power. The
president had placed a 120-day time limit on drafting a new constitution,
and everybody was anxious to prevent repetition of the delays that had
crippled the constitutional process in the 1950s. In January 1971 Yahya
Khan and Mujib met to discuss how the demands of the West Wing
political victors, the PPP, could be reconciled with the Awami League's
six points on provincial autonomy. Mujib adhered to his six points and to
his rights as majority leader to form a government in the Parliament. His
earlier willingness to trust the president was eroded, and Yahya Khan
accused Mujib of a lack of sincerity.
Yahya Khan then held talks with Bhutto, who questioned the right of
the Awami League to form a government and draft a constitution for
Pakistan when its base was confined to East Pakistan. On February 17
Bhutto publicly declared that it was pointless for the PPP to attend the
inaugural session of the Parliament unless it was previously assured of a

51
hand in framing the new constitution. On March 1 the president dissolved
his civilian cabinet and declared an indefinite postponement of the
Parliament, which had been scheduled to convene on March 3.
There was violent reaction to this announcement in the East Wing.
Strikes, public demonstrations, and civil disobedience amounted to open
revolt. In response to a series of directives issued by Mujib, the Bengalis
paid no taxes or revenues, ignored martial law regulations on press and
radio censorship, and reduced public services to a minimum. For all
practical purposes the writ of the central government ceased to run in
East Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the well-liked governor, Admiral Ashan Khan, had been
recalled. The provincial chief martial law administrator, Lieutenant
General Sahabzada Mohammad Yakub Khan, also expressed a desire to
resign if a political solution to the Bengal problem were not pursued with
greater vigor. Yahya Khan, however, tended to the opposite view, and
General Tikka Khan was sent to Dacca as chief authority; he was well
known for his reliance on armed force as the answer to problems. The
lines of confrontation became clearer.
A last effort to resolve the crisis peaceably was made between March
15 and March 25, 1971. Yahya Khan held a series of talks with Mujib in
Dacca, where they were joined by Bhutto on March 21. Negotiations
were also conducted between their three teams of "experts." Simultane
ously, Tikka Khan prepared emergency plans for a military takeover and
called for troop reinforcements via Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). Reports to
the press of a compromise formula proved unfounded. Though there was
very little difference in the Awami League and government drafts, each
side stood firm. Perhaps the unwillingness of the leaders to share power,
or to trust each other in the exercise of it, was too great to be papered
over by their drafting experts.
On March 25 the president and Bhutto flew back to Islamabad. Tikka
Khan's emergency plans went into operation as roadblocks and barriers
appeared all over Dacca. Mujib proclaimed the coming into existence of
the "sovereign independent People's Republic of Bangladesh" and called
on his people to prepare for supreme sacrifice for their cause. Sheikh
Mujib was arrested in his house on the night of March 25. But other
Awami League leaders escaped and established the Provisional Govern
ment of Bangladesh under the leadership of Tajuddin Ahmed at
Mujibnagar, near the Indian border, where the independence of
Bangladesh was proclaimed on April 17, 1971. Mujib, who by that time
was in a prison in West Pakistan, was named president of the republic,
and Syed Nazrul Islam was designated vice president.
On March 26 Yahya Khan outlawed the Awami League, placed a ban on
political activity throughout Pakistan, and reimposed complete press
censorship in both wings. Fierce fighting broke out in the major cities of
the East Wing. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force,
"mutinied" and joined the rebel forces that were beginning to form. The

52
Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) forces in East Pakistan were formed
around a nucleus of regular troops and received equipment and training
from India in the course of the summer (see ch. 14). Nevertheless, the
Pakistan army maintained a heavy offensive and in early April retained
control of many of the towns in East Pakistan. More than 250,000
refugees crossed into India during the first few days of war. The influx
continued over the next six months to reach an overwhelming total of
about 10 million people. No accurate estimates could be made of the
numbers killed, but it was soon obvious that a particularly brutal civil war
was raging. The international community responded only slowly to the
horrors; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees assisted
India in the task of providing minimal shelter, food, and medical facilities
to a homeless mass of humanity.
Relations between Pakistan and India, already tense, deteriorated
sharply as a result of the crisis. On March 31 the Indian Parliament
passed resolutions in support of the "people of Bengal." Pakistani and
Indian deputy high commissions in Calcutta and Dacca, respectively,
were closed down. The Indian government made repeated declarations
that the refugees must be allowed to return to their homes under safe
conditions and rejected Pakistan's assurances that the refugees could
return.
In the fall military and guerrilla operations increased, and Pakistan and
India reported escalations of border shelling. On the western border
military preparations were also in evidence. On November 21 the Mukti
Bahini launched an offensive on Jessore, and the Provisional Government
of Bangladesh was announced there on November 29. Yahya Khan had
declared a state of emergency in Pakistan on November 23 and asked his
people to prepare for war. On December 3 the Pakistan air force attacked
military targets in northern India, and on December 4 India launched an
integrated ground, air, and naval invasion of East Pakistan. The Indian
army launched a five-pronged attack and began converging on Dacca.
India also recognized the Provisional Government of Bangladesh on
December 6, whereupon diplomatic relations were broken by Pakistan.
The Indian forces closed in around Dacca on December 15 and received
the surrender of the Pakistani forces on December 16. Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi declared a unilateral cease-fire in the west on
December 17. The most immediate effect of these events in Pakistan was
the occurrence of violent demonstrations against the military govern
ment. Yahya Khan resigned on December 20. Bhutto, who had been
pleading Pakistan's case before UN deliberations on the Bangladesh
crisis, flew to Islamabad to assume the presidency and to promise a
return to peace and constitutional government.
Bhutto released Mujib from prison on December 22, placing him under
house arrest at Rawalpindi. Talks between the two leaders brought to
Mujib's attention the events of the previous ten months but did little to
heal the rift. After receiving a degree of public assent, Bhutto ordered
the release of Mujib and his political adviser Kamal Hussain on January 8,
1972. They returned to Bangladesh via London and New Delhi, arriving
in Dacca three days later. As president of the republic, Mujib took steps
to set up a permanent government, and on January 12 he began work as
prime minister (see ch. 8).

S4
 CHAPTER 3
GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION
The distinguishing characteristic of both the geography and the
population of Bangladesh is uniformity. Although the area of land—
55,598 square miles, about the size of Wisconsin—is essentially fixed, the
population, already eighth largest and believed to be densest of the
countries of the world, was continuing to grow at the high rate of about 3
percent annually. These facts, coupled with the country's vulnerability to
natural disasters, its almost total dependence upon agriculture, and the
severe economic and political recovery problems confronting the new
state, produced by early 1975 a condition of crisis affecting all sectors of
the national life.
Formerly the province of East Pakistan, Bangladesh became indepen
dent in December 1971 (see ch. 2). The country is bounded on the west,
north, and east by a long land border with India, continued in the
southeast by a short land and water border with Burma. On the south is a
highly irregular deltaic coastline fissured by many rivers and streams
flowing into the Bay of Bengal. Internal administration is conducted
through four administrative divisions, which in turn are subdivided into
districts (see fig. 1; ch. 8).
Except for the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeast and the low hills
of Sylhet District in the northeast, the country is a flat alluvial plain. It is
part of the Plain of Bengal at the eastern end of the great Indo-Gangetic
Plain, running across the northern part of the South Asian subcontinent.
Broadly speaking, the country is almost entirely a delta of deposited soils;
the older alluvium is in the north. Most of these soils are highly fertile.
The dominant feature of the flat plain is the profusion of rivers, flowing
generally north to south. Chief among these, and lying like a fan on the
face of the land, are the Ganges-Padma, the Brahmaputra-Jamuna, the
Meghna, and the river junction stem and estuary on the Bay of Bengal.
These rivers and their innumerable tributaries and distributaries drain a
vast area of the subcontinent and the Himalaya Mountains on its northern
rim.
The climate of Bangladesh is warm—temperate to tropical—and
humid. Rainfall, averaging annually about eighty-five inches nationwide
and in places among the heaviest in the world, is brought mainly by the
southeast monsoon winds off the bay from June through September.
The life of the riverine country is keyed to a rough balance between the
enormous volume of water received from rain and the northern river

55
input and the capacity of the river system to handle this volume. During
the monsoon, winds from the bay may develop as cyclones loaded with
rain and blowing inland at high velocity, resulting in calamitous flooding.
As might be expected, an extensive program of water control
engineering projects, including river embankments, pumping and
irrigation, artificial canals, dams, and power stations, has long been
under way but is heavily dependent upon foreign assistance (see ch. 12).
The country has some known fuel and mineral resources but, except for
relatively large fields of natural gas in the northeast, these resources are
not extensive, and exploitation was not highly developed in early 1975.
For transportation, principal reliance is and has always been placed upon
the web of natural inland waterways. Railways, first laid down in the
nineteenth century when the land was part of British India, are a distant
second in importance to the waterways. Highway and air transport are
well behind both. All means of transport were heavily damaged in the
cyclone of November 1970 and again in the war of 1971.
The people of Bangladesh, over 98 percent of whom speak Bengali, the
official language, and about 85 percent of whom are Muslims, live mainly
in the 71,000 or more small agricultural villages dotting the landscape.
Only 4 or 5 percent are found in the cities and in the municipalities
classified as urban. Dacca, the capital, with a population of at least 1.5
million in 1974, was by far the largest of the few cities. The population of
the country is predominantly young, with nearly 50 percent under the age
of fifteen years. The total population was estimated to be about 79.2
million in early 1974 and about 81.6 million or more in early 1975. The first
census taken by the Bangladesh government, dated March 1, 1974,
accounted for 71,316,517 and was judged to have been seriously
underenumerated. Population control efforts under the former govern
ment of Pakistan were, on the whole, futile; and a revised program was
initiated under the Bangladesh First Five Year Plan (1973—78).

BOUNDARIES AND SUBDIVISIONS

International Borders
The partition of British India that took effect on August 14, 1947,
divided the subcontinent into the new, independent states of India and
Pakistan. This division, delineated by the Radcliffe Award of 1947, was
based mainly on the location of Hindu and Muslim majorities and created
the state of Pakistan in two parts separated by about 1,000 miles. The
province of East Pakistan, often called the East Wing, became the
independent state of Bangladesh as an immediate consequence of the
India-Pakistan War of December 1971.
The irregularly shaped, low-lying riverine country has a total area of
55,598 square miles, including river surface, according to government
figures in September 1974. (The earlier official area was 55,126 square
miles.) The longest dimension, from the northwest extremity on a line

56
southeast to the tip of Chittagong, is about 475 miles; the greatest
east-west distance is about 290 miles. On the south Bangladesh has a
highly irregular seafront of some 445 miles on the Bay of Bengal. From a
baseline at the depth of ten fathoms, territorial waters are claimed for
twelve nautical miles seaward. As an economic sea zone, however,
Bangladesh in mid-September 1974 officially announced a claim extend
ing 200 miles beyond the same baseline.
The boundary with India on the west, north, and east is about 1,500
miles long and almost surrounds the country. Although Pakistan voiced a
Muslim claim to somewhat expanded bounds for its eastern province, the
line remained that of the Radcliffe Award and had not been changed by
the time of the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. This line essentially
continued to be the boundary between the new state and India in 1974, as
laid down in a demarcation agreement signed by the prime ministers of
Bangladesh and India on May 16, 1974. This agreement was ratified by
the Bangladesh legislature on November 23, 1974, and the Constitution
was correspondingly amended.
In the southeast of the country, irregularly from the eastern end of the
Indian border at the India-Bangladesh-Burma tripoint down to the sea,
Bangladesh has a short land frontier of about 120 miles with Burma. This
line then extends about another fifty-five miles down the mid-channel of
the Naf River, separating Burma from Bangladesh's narrow Chittagong
peninsula, to a designated point at sea. This land and water boundary was
established in the separation of Burma from India in 1937. Changes in the
course of the Naf River subsequently made a revised determination
necessary, and a protocol between Pakistan and Burma in 1966
recognized the channel line as it then existed as the permanent boundary.
Bangladesh inherited this boundary at independence. Press reports in
September 1974, however, said that differences between the two
countries had arisen over areas of oil exploration off the Bay of Bengal
coast and were under discussion by the governments of Bangladesh and
Burma. Whether further boundary adjustments would result from these
discussions was not known in early 1975.
Internal Subdivisions
The national capital area is in the city of Dacca. For internal
government and administrative purposes, the country is organized into
four divisions: Chittagong, Dacca, Khulna, and Rajshahi. All are named
for their capitals. Each division is further divided into two or more
districts, totaling twenty-one in early 1975. These districts, except for
Ramgarh District, are also named for their administrative centers; the
administrative center for Ramgarh District is Khagrachari (see ch.
8). Districts, in turn, are broken down into units called subdivisions,
each of which is composed of a number of thanas. Associated with
each thana is a police post; the police function is part of the thana
operation, which also includes revenue administration (see ch. 14).

57
Within each thana are a number of unions and within each of them, a
number of villages—the lowest level of internal division.

REGIONS, RIVERS, AND HILLS

The physical geography of Bangladesh may be considered in terms of
two principal divisions: the rivers and alluvial plain comprising most of
the country and the much smaller area of Chittagong District and the
Chittagong Hill Tracts on the extreme southeast (see fig. 3). Coun
trywide, the most significant feature of the landscape is the extensive
network of large and small rivers that are of primary importance in the
economic and social life of the nation. This system, ever-changing in
detail, provides drainage, determines the kind and extent of agricultural
production, furnished vast supplies offish, forms an unparalleled grid of
inland waterways for cheap and convenient transportation, and continu
ally fertilizes much of the country by carrying away old soil and bringing
in new.
This great river system, although it makes road, bridge, and airport
construction difficult, is probably the country's principal physical
resource; at the same time it is the greatest hazard. Seasonal flooding
often brings widespread loss of life, crops, and property. Not only is
Bangladesh a country of heavy rainfall, but its rivers also carry down to
the Bay of Bengal runoff waters from the snows in the Himalaya
Mountains far to the north. Cyclones from the bay occasionally intensify
seasonal flooding to the point of major national disaster, as in November
1970. In 1974 winds and flooding contributed materially to the critical
food shortage of that year (see ch. 4; ch. 11; ch. 12).

The Bangladesh Plain

The alluvial plain of Bangladesh constitutes about 80 percent of the
greater Plain of Bengal—also called the Lower Gangetic Plain, because it
is the terminus of the 1,500-mile-long Indo-Gangetic Plain. It lies
between the Indian foothills of the Himalaya Mountains on the north and
the Bay of Bengal on the south; this plain is often regarded as deltaic in its
entirety, making it the largest delta in the world. By common usage this
is an acceptable definition, but in a stricter geographical sense the true
delta is smaller and harder to define. Generally, it lies south of 24°N
latitude—that is, to include the junction of the Padma and Jamuna rivers,
the Dacca area between the Padma and the Meghna rivers, and the rest of
the plain to the south. The country to the north is often called the
paradelta.
The land characteristics of the Bangladesh Plain from north to south
have sometimes been summed up by geographers as "old mud, new mud,
and marsh." To this succinct, if oversimplified, description should be
added the word flat. Most elevations are less than thirty feet above sea
level, although altitudes up to 350 feet occur in the northern part of the
plain and some even higher elevations are found along the eastern

58
 Boundary representation is no1 necessarily authoritative

Source: Based on information from William S. Ellis, "Bangladesh: Hope Nourishes a New
Nation," National Geographic, September 1972, p. 305.

Figure 3. Bangladesh, Principal Regions, Rivers, and Hills

59
borders with the Indian states of Meghalaya and Tripura. General
elevation decreases from north to south; below the Padma and Meghna
rivers the terrain is essentially sea level.
The River System and Relief in the Plain
If the level of the plain were thirty feet lower, most of it would be under
water. The essential importance of the river system, not simply for
economic and communications reasons but for the very existence of the
country, is illustrated by separate estimates that this same amount of
water—thirty feet covering the plain—is actually the amount carried off
annually by the rivers. Bangladesh is a country that exists by virtue of a
rough balance between water input and output.
The river network of the plain moves generally from north to south but
includes untold numbers of feeder and effluent streams, like capillaries,
flowing east, west, southeast, and southwest in such profusion as to be
virtually unique. The medium and smaller streams are by no means all
tributary to the larger rivers. Great numbers of them especially in the
true delta, are distributaries from the larger rivers.
Accurate, detailed description of this riverine labyrinth with its
associated proliferation of lakes (bhils or haors) and marshes is made
practically impossible not only by its magnitude but because many rivers,
large and small, modify or change their channels from time to time. Some
streams "die," and their courses dwindle to low capacity or none at all;
others are "born," and the process is continuous. Description is further
complicated by the fact that rivers often have different names along
different segments, taking up new names after merger with other rivers
or according to different usages from one area to another.
This highly complex river system is based upon three major rivers: the
Ganges-Padma, the Brahmaputra-Jamuna, and the Meghna. The
Meghna is deepest and swiftest; the other two, by contrast are broader
and much longer. The outline of these rivers is in diagram roughly like a
fan lying on the plain, the line of the Ganges-Padma running to the
southeast, the Brahmaputra-Jamuna running south down the middle of
the plain, and the Meghna coming from the northeast to the southeast.
The flared handle of the fan is their junction stem and the estuary
channels on the Bay of Bengal. The strategic and developmental
significance of this river system is illustrated by the fact that Dacca, the
capital and principal city, lies centrally within it, a few miles north of the
Padma-Meghna junction and inside the apex angle formed by it.
The Ganges-Padma
The Ganges (also called the Ganga) River of India, flowing southeast
ward, comes to the boundary of Bangladesh in the northwest of the
country. A distributary, the Bhagirathi-Hooghly River of India, then
turns south. Formerly this was the main channel of the Ganges. By the
late eighteenth century, however, if not earlier, the upper Bhagirathi
channel had become heavily silted, and the Ganges took up its main

60
channel to the southeast. Oskar H. K. Spate, a prominent geographer, has
observed that "the cardinal factor in the later history of the Delta has
been the eastward shift of the Ganga waters." For about ninety miles the
Ganges is the boundary between India and Bangladesh; it then continues
to the southeast across the alluvial plain. In Bangladesh the Ganges—
particularly in its lower course—is more commonly called the Padma.
East of the boundary with India and south of the Padma, elevations do
not exceed twenty-five feet; most are lower. The hundreds of rivers and
streams in this true delta segment of the plain are virtually all
distributary from the Padma and flow south. Principal among them are
the Madhumati River, which leaves the Padma west of its junction with
the Jamuna, and the Arial Khan (also known as the Bhubanswar), which
exists to the east of that point. This network dissects the lower delta in a
multiplicity of channels entering the Bay of Bengal through a crumbled
seacoast. These channels have names but are sometimes collectively
referred to as "the many mouths of the Ganges." The delta land and
islands along the coast from the Indian border east to the Padma-Meghna
estuary and extending five to twenty-five miles inland are called the
Sundarbans. This is a forested, tidal-flushed, salt-marsh region, much of
it so shifting, low, and swampy as to preclude permanent habitation.
The western part of the true delta, between the Indian border and the
Madhumati River, is sometimes called the old delta, since it contains the
beds of many dead or dying rivers. Here drainage projects have been
undertaken in an effort to create more croplands. The new delta, east of
the Madhumati, is somewhat lower than the old and is being slowly built
up by silt and mud from the younger, swift-flowing streams and seasonal
floods, but in forms subject to frequent change by deposit and erosion.
The Brahmaputra-Jamuna
Like the Indus River of Pakistan and the Ganges of India, the
Brahmaputra River rises in the high Himalayas. It flows east across the
southern Tibetan region of the People's Republic of China (PRC), turns
abruptly south and then west, and rushes through the Assam Valley of
India roughly opposite to its former direction across Tibet. Upon
reaching the northern border of Bangladesh, the river turns due south
and enters the country in multiple, narrowly separated channels. Within
the next twenty-five miles the river receives two principal tributaries:
first the Dharla River and then the larger Tista River, both coming from
the northwest. Below the Tista junction the Brahmaputra becomes
known as the Jamuna (not to be confused with a river of a similar name, a
tributary of the Ganges, in India). The wide Jamuna, in often-shifting
subchannels, flows south to its junction with the Padma about forty-five
miles west of Dacca. Shortly before this junction the Jamuna receives
from the northwest two large tributaries: the Karatoya River and then
the Atrai River.
The northwest segment of the Bangladesh Plain, lying between the
Padma and Jamuna rivers, is the internal governmental division of

61
Rajshahi. This has been called by geographers the paradelta; it is an
extensive plain falling from about 300 to 350 feet general elevation in the
north to about 100 feet centrally and down to about thirty feet in the
south. It is cut by many old river courses as well as by newer, active
rivers and, like the rest of the country, is subject to disastrous flooding.
The central two-thirds of this area is called the Barind, a large land island
of older, firm alluvial soils marked by ravines and low ridges. Earth
quakes are not a major hazard in Bangladesh, but some have occurred in
the Barind, and the detection of seismic vibrations is most common here.
After their junction, the combined waters of the Jamuna and Padma
continue southeast for about sixty miles to the even wider junction with
the third of the great rivers, the Meghna, flowing from the northeast.
The Meghna
In the northeast corner of Bangladesh, about forty miles east of the
town of Sylhet, two branches of the Barak River enter the country from
India. The larger, the Surma, moves west and then south; the second, the
Kusiyara, turns southwest and then west. These rivers, with smaller
tributaries, form the Kalni River about thirty-five miles southwest of
Sylhet. After a short run to the southwest, the Kalni becomes the upper
Meghna and is soon reinforced by a major tributary from the north, the
Baulai. From this point the Meghna continues southwest in a twisting,
multichanneled course to the junction with the lower Padma about
sixty-five air miles away. Until the early 1800s the Meghna's main
channel did not join the Padma but ran separately east of the Padma down
to the Bay of Bengal.
In its lower course, before joining the Padma, the Meghna receives two
distributaries from the Jamuna: the Old Brahmaputra River and its
branches and the Dhaleswari (sometimes called the Burhi Ganga). Like
those of the Ganges-Padma and the Meghna, the main channel of the
Brahmaputra-Jamuna changed in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth
century. In northern Bangladesh, about thirty-five miles down the
Jamuna from the border, the Old Brahmaputra exits to the southeast,
approximately along the old channel of the Brahmaputra. West of the
town of Bajitpur the river divides into two branches. The first of these,
the Lakhya, receives the Banar River from the northwest and then
continues south to join the Dhaleswari at Narayanganj. The second and
smaller branch moves southeast and is caught by the Meghna at the town
of Kalipur.
Between the Banar River and the Jamuna is another slightly elevated
tract—somewhat like the Barind—of firm soil, with elevations of fifty to
100 feet above sea level. This area, south of Mymensingh and north of
Dacca, is called the Madhupur Jungle. Some geographers have suggested
that it should be called the Madhupur Tract; its vegetation is not of true
jungle character, and much of it has been cleared for cultivation. Below
the Madhupur Tract, including Dacca at an elevation of about twenty

62
feet, the country along both banks of the lower Meghna is much like the
new delta to the south of the Padma.
The upper drainage area of the Meghna lies to the east of the Old
Brahmaputra. This is an extensive flatland with a few low hills north and
east of Sylhet that exceed 300 feet in elevation. South of the Kusiyara
River six low hill ranges project northward into Sylhet District from the
Tripura Hills of India. In these ranges the maximum elevation, near the
Bangladesh-Indian border, is about 1,100 feet. Generally, in this
northeast corner of Bangladesh, enclosed on the north and east by the
hills of eastern India, plain elevations decline southward from about 150
feet to about thirty feet. Around Sylhet the country is known as the
Sylhet Plain, or the Surma River Plain. Here, and throughout the upper
Meghna-Surma drainage area, the most distinguishing feature is the
profusion of large and small lakes, abounding in fish. The whole northeast
quadrant of the Bangladesh Plain is even more vulnerable to flooding than
the other parts of the country. Spate has noted that "the Meghna-Surma
embayment is perhaps the most amphibious part of Bengal during the
rains."
Far to the south of the Brahmaputra, the Dhaleswari River, the second
principal distributary of the Jamuna, leaves the parent river above its
junction with the Padma. It flows southeast, below Dacca and roughly
parallel to the lower Padma, receives the Lakhya at Narayanganj, and
then joins the Meghna a few miles above its junction with the Padma.
Thus the branches of the Jamuna also illustrate the general drainage of
the plain. Those branches on the west bank are inputs; those on the east
bank are effluents, eventually caught by the Meghna.
The Padma-Meghna Stem and Estuary
From the wide Padma-Meghna junction, the combined rivers move
south in an S-shaped stem channel for about forty miles and then spread
out into the Bay of Bengal through one of the largest estuaries in the
world. This triangular estuary has a seaward base, from the shores of
Khulna northeast across to Chittagong, of more than 100 miles long. In
this huge triangle are a number of permanent islands, including many
that surface only at low tide and many that are temporary or that shift in
outline from time to time. Many of these are chars, land forms built up by
silting that may become permanent or erode. They are not limited to the
Padma-Meghna estuary; chars occur in many places along the larger
rivers and have frequently been the subject of dispute as to ownership.
In the estuary the largest of the permanent islands, from west to east,
are Shahbazpur, North Hatia, South Hatia, and Sandwip. Separating
them are the estuary channels of the Padma-Meghna. Some have several
names. Principally, however, from west to east, these channels are the
Tetulia, the Shahbazpur, the Hatia, and the Bamni-Sandwip.
The Meghna experiences tidal currents more strongly and further
inland than any other South Asian river. The tides from the Bay of Bengal

63
are effectively felt on the Meghna up to Kalipur (also called Bhairab
Bazaar) and are noticeable for as much as thirty to forty miles farther
upriver. In the stem ofthe Padma-Meghna and in the estuary, the regular
rise of the tide is from ten to eighteen feet. Tidal waves called bores recur
from time to time in the estuary and the stem rivers. Bores tend to form
high waves with abrupt fronts when the incoming surge of water at flood
tide encounters a resistance, such as a sandbar or a defile. The funnel
shape of the Padma-Meghna estuary and the many channels between the
islands are highly favorable to bore formation. A typical bore rushes in
with thunderous noise as a wall of water that may be twenty feet or more
in height. Velocity and height are magnified if the bore is backed by
strong winds from the south. Regularly, bores impede or prevent
navigation at the time of the equinoxes. When they are backed by winds
of hurricane force, disastrous flooding results.
The three main rivers of the Bangladesh Plain drain a total area of
about 600,000 square miles; within Bangladesh, about 45,000 square
miles. The annual sediment load carried down to the estuary has been
estimated at 2.4 billion tons; and the annual peak flood in the Padma-
Meghna stem discharges water at about 5 million cubic feet per second—
twice the rate of the Mississippi River.
Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts
The districts of Chittagong, Ramgarh, Rangamati, and Bandarban,
together constituting roughly one-sixth of the country, provide some
geographical variation from the plain and the only significant hill system.
Administratively the Chittagong Division also includes the districts of
Noakhali, Comilla, and Sylhet, curving northward along the eastern
boundary with India, but these three are part ofthe Bangladesh Plain and
are mostly in the Meghna River and estuary stem drainage system.
Chittagong District proper, along the Bay of Bengal and southeast of the
estuary, is only in small part deltaic. East of it the Ramgarh, Rangamati,
and Bandarban districts lie on the border with Burma and India.
On the western fringe of the north-south mountain ranges of Burma
and eastern India that meet the Himalayan extremities far to the north,
the Chittagong Hills are a series of narrow, roughly parallel, forested hill
chains. These hills rise steeply to narrow ridge lines, generally no wider
than 120 feet and 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea level. Individual ridge
lines, except at their northern and southern extermities, do not vary
greatly in height within themselves; those closer to the 200-mile-long
eastern border with Burma and India are higher. The greatest elevation
in Bangladesh is 4,034 feet at Keokradong, in the southeast extremity of
the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Between the generally north-south hill lines
lie fertile valleys devoted almost entirely to rice cultivation.
West of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, in Chittagong District, is a broad
plain, cut by rivers draining to the Bay of Bengal, that rises to a final chain
of low coastal hills with a maximum spot elevation of 1,152 feet but mostly

64
below 700 feet. West of these hills is a narrow, wet coastal plain,
narrowest to the north of Chittagong city and to the south of Cox's
Bazaar, where the low coastal hills in some stretches form precipitous sea
cliffs. The coastal strip is widest and lowest at the ports of Chittagong and
Cox's Bazaar and to the east of both of them.
Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts are high rainfall areas and
have numerous rivers but not in the proliferation of the river system of
the plain. None is of the size or importance of the three great rivers of the
Bangladesh Plain or their major tributaries and distributaries. The
Karnaphuli, the most important river of the area, originates in the
east-central Chittagong Hill Tracts from inputs coming from both north
and south and proceeds west and southwest to the Bay of Bengal at its
inlet. On the Karnaphuli, some thirty air miles inland from Chittagong,
the Karnaphuli Dam and the associated power plant are installations of
national importance. The dam impounds the river's input waters in a vast
reservoir lying up two of the longitudinal valleys to the north of the dam.

CLIMATE AND RAINFALL

Bangladesh is often characterized as having a humid, tropical monsoon
climate. Geographers, however, maintain that only the southeastern
coastal stretch of Chittagong is truly tropical and prefer to describe the
climate in terms of equable, humid, warm-temperate conditions. Climatic
differences from place to place in this fiat country are minor by
comparison with regions of more varied terrain. Within the overall
equability, nevertheless, variations occur. Some descriptions delineate
six seasons but, in terms of temperature, Kazi Ahmad, a prominent
geographer, cites only two: a summer from April through September and
a winter from October through March. Three periods within the year,
however, are usually recognized: a hot "summer' season of high humidity
from March to June, a somewhat cooler but still hot and humid monsoon
season from June through September or early October, and a cool, drier
"winter" season from mid-October to early March.
January is the coolest month; the hottest months are April and May.
Temperatures between 100°F and 105°F are occasionally recorded, but
these are unusual and of short duration. Daily temperature ranges are
moderate to minor, seldom exceeding 30°F in the cool months and usually
not more than 20°F during the other months of the year (see table 1).
Winds are a highly significant element of weather and climate in the life
of the country. They occur in three principal categories: rain-bearing
monsoon winds, including cyclonic storms, or hurricanes, off the sea; the
violent thunderstorms called "nor'westers"; and the more infrequent
tornadoes. The southwest monsoon, constituting a whole season of the
year in itself, is the most important of these. (The word monsoon is
derived from mawsim, an Arabic word meaning season.)
A monsoon results from the contrasts of low and high air pressures
produced by differential heating of land and water. During the hot

65
months of April and May hot air rises over the Indian subcontinent,
creating low-pressure areas into which rush cooler, moisture-bearing
winds from the Indian Ocean. This is the southwest, or summer,
monsoon, commencing in June and lasting usually through September.
Dividing against the Indian landmass the monsoon flows in two branches:
one, moving up the Arabian Sea, strikes India on the west; the other
travels up the Bay of Bengal and over eastern India and Bangladesh,
crossing the plain to the north and northeast before being turned to the
west and northwest by the foothills of the Himalayas. About three-
quarters of the country's annual rainfall comes from the southwest
monsoon.
The onset of the southwest monsoon along the coast is often dramatic,
with strong winds, lashing rain, and a quick drop in temperature. These
winds, from off the Bay of Bengal, build up to cyclone force six to eight
times a year. September through October, especially the latter month, is
the time when cyclones are most likely to occur, although they may occur
in November or even December. They are least likely from January
through April.
The heavier cyclones are national disasters. Their central track is
typically over Khulna, the estuary stem, and out over Sylhet; the width of
the path may cover the whole lower delta, decreasing to about 100 miles
in the northeast. Winds over the delta and estuary may exceed 100 miles
per hour, decreasing to about fifty miles per hour northward and on the
flanks of the path.
The first half of the twentieth century was comparatively free from the
devastation of the supercyclones recorded in earlier centuries, but since
then a heavier pattern has resumed. Two particularly severe storms hit
the country in October 1960; the worst in modern times occurred on
November 12, 1970 and was followed by an extremely high tidal bore on
the next day. The estuary region was hardest hit, but the whole country
suffered incalculable damage. Lives lost were estimated at 300,000 or
more. The southwest monsoon period is thus one of hazard, since it brings
the cyclone danger. At the same time, if there are no rains in this period,
the country's agriculture suffers, and a failure of the monsoon, as in 1972,
also results in widespread disasters.
By mid-October or early November, the prevailing winds reverse. As
higher pressures form over the landmass, the southwest monsoon is
replaced by land winds blowing in the opposite direction toward the sea.
This is the much weaker northeast, or winter, monsoon—sometimes
called the withdrawing, or retreating, monsoon. Its winds are generally
light and dry; are felt less distinctly in Bangladesh than in southeast
India; become lighter, warmer, and drier as the season advances; and
decline by the end of December.
Land-based wind and thunderstorm squalls occur during the premon-
soon months of March through May, and this period is sometimes
referred to as the preliminary, or minor, rainy season. Called

66
 Table 1. Bangladesh, Temperature at Selected Locationsi
(in degrees Fahrenheit)

Dacca-
Narayangary Chittagong Jessore Mymensingh Dinajpur

Elevation in
feet above
sea level 20-26 87 26 62 131
Hottest Month2
Minimum3 74.0 75.5 73.6 71.1 70.0
Maximum3 92.4 88.9 96.6 91.1 94.3
Coolest Month4
Minimum3 55.6 56.0 49.2 53.6 49.6
Maximum3 77.9 78.6 78.6 76.1 75.4
Annual Mean
Minimum . 70.5 69.3 67.9 68.9 67.2
Maximum 86.5 85.1 87.6 85.3 86.1

1 Data are from observations recorded from 1947 to 1970.

2 Hottest month in Chittagong is May; in all other cases, April.
3 Minimum and maximum temperatures shown are means for the month.
4 Coolest month in all cases is January.
Source: Based on information from Kazi S. Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, Karachi,
1972, pp. 33-40 and 224-225; Nafis Ahmad, An Economic Geography of East
Pakistan, New York, 1958, pp. 41-57; and Pakistan, Ministry of Finance,
Planning and Development, Central Statistical Office, 25 Years of Pakistan in
Statistics: 1H7-1972, Karachi, 1972, p. 1.
"nor'westers" by the British and still so referred to by foreigners, these
storms usually approach local areas from the northwest but may, in fact,
approach from any direction. Their onset is sudden and is usually
accompanied by a quick local drop of five or six degrees in temperature. In
Bengali these phenomena are known as kal Baisakhi (the calamities of
Baisakb month of April—May in the Bengali calendar).
The nor'westers bring the country about one-fifth of its annual rainfall;
they occur mainly in the central, western, and northeastern regions and
virtually not at all in the northwest and far southeast. On the average,
five or six occur in each of the months of April and May. Maximum wind
velocities are thirty to eighty miles per hour, and considerable damage to
property and crops may occur, although not on the scale of cyclonic
devastation.
Occasional tornadoes occur in the central, flatter areas of the country
during the hot months and are, like the nor'westers, land based. Their
frequency is much less than that of the nor'westers, and their duration
and the areas affected by them are also much less. They are, however, for
their duration and areas, the most destructive of storms. Distinguished
by a dark, inverted funnel-shaped cloud that touches down to earth, the
path of a tornado is typically not more than one-half mile in width and only
from twenty to 100 miles along the ground. Airflow in a tornado is circular
and, at the same time, has directional movement. A tornado moves along

67
its path at about fifty miles per hour; but its circular, or peripheral, wind
speeds are much higher and may exceed 300 miles per hour.
The average annual rainfall varies from between fifty and sixty inches
in the west to 100 inches or more elsewhere. The far northeastern strip of
Sylhet District lies along the border at the foot of India's Khasi-Jaintia
Hills, the heaviest rainfall area in the world. Here, in Sylhet, annual
precipitation is 200 inches and more. Countrywide the highest annual
rainfall is at Lalakhal in Sylhet, which gets 226 inches; the lowest is at
Lalpur in Rajshahi District, with forty-eight inches (see fig. 4).
Throughout the year, humidity is high. During June and July, the most
humid months, relative humidity across the country ranges from 84 to 90
percent. September and October are also noted for sticky heat, and even
during the cooler months of November through February the humidity
range is 75 to 80 percent. The lower delta in Khulna and the Chittagong
coast are the most humid regions, but the rest of the country is not far
behind.
SOILS, VEGETATION, AND WILDLIFE
Generally, the soils of Bangladesh belong to the group called
pedalfers—those lacking hardening properties of accumulated
carbonates—and are alluvial deposits resulting from river action. Three
broad classifications can be made; old alluviums, new alluviums, and hill
soils. The old alluviums in the northern part of the country are dark
brown and loamy, containing little sand but considerable clay. Newer
alluvial soils occur mainly in the delta south of the Padma River and along
the other large rivers, where they are annually renewed. These are
lighter in color and contain more sand than the older soils. Chemically,
alluviums are deficient in nitrogen, but the potash and lime contents are
usually sufficient for agriculture. The hill soils of southern Sylhet and the
Chittagong Hill Tracts are characterized by a base of shale, sandstone,
and clay. Humus is found in forested areas, especially in the marsh forests
of the Sundarbans, but is deficient in the western and northwestern
areas; organic fertilizer is needed over large parts of the country (see ch.
12).
The forests cover about 16 percent of the country. At least half of the
forestation lies in four main areas: the districts of Sylhet and Chittagong,
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Sundarbans, and the Madhupur Tract. In
addition, local groves of bamboo, cocunut, and betel nut palms are found
almost everywhere. Extensive grasslands, or savannas, do not occur,
however, because almost all of the plain is under cultivation.
In Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts the evergreen and
deciduous forests cover about 1,800 square miles. The evergreen stands
are lush tropical rain forests, most common in the area of 110 inches or
more of annual rainfall. Tree trunks are commonly covered with orchids,
mosses, ferns, and climbing plants. Deciduous trees, especially the
valuable teak and garjan, are most common in the higher hill ground

68
Source: Based on information from Nans Ahmad, An Economic Geography of East
Pakistan, New York, 1958, p. 43.

Figure 4. Bangladesh, Mean Annual Rainfall

where the rainfaill, although still at least 100 inches annually, is
somewhat less than in the evergreen areas. Teak is particularly prized for
heavy construction and boat building. Cane grows generally throughout
the Chittagong area, and rubber plantations have been developed.
In the Sundarbans the delta tidal forest covers about 2,300 square
miles. Mangrove and sundari trees furnish timber, and the gewa, or
gengwa, is important for softwood. Leaves and foliage of the golpatta tree
provide thatching for dwellings, and the goran tree is extensively used
for firewood and in tanning. Great quantities of naval stores are also
levied from the Sundarban forests.
The sal tree, useful in construction, is the main wood of the Madhupur
Tract. In the northeast of the country the Sylhet forest covers more than
300 square miles. Its chief tree is thejarul . On the margins of the forest in
the low hills south and east of Sylhet are extensive tea plantations.
The country abounds in fish and wildlife. Great quantities of fish are
caught in the coastal waters and at sea but much more in the inland
waters, where at least 725,000 tons are taken annually (see ch. 12).
Because of the climate and lack of refrigerated packing plants, fishing is
mainly for local consumption, although some preservation and commer
cial marketing of sun-dried, salted fish is carried on. A preferred fish in
the coastal waters is the pomfret, or rupchanda; inland, a favorite is the
hilsa, an anadromous herring poetically extolled as "the silver harvest of
the rivers."
Wildfowl, water and land birds, and wild game are abundant. There are
numerous varieties of wild pigeon and pheasant and over 100 species of
songbirds. In Sylhet the rhinoceros is found. In the Chittagong Hill
Tracts there are elephants, tigers, leopards, wild oxen of the bison
family, bears, and several varieties of deer, including the swan deer, the
muntjac, or barking deer, and the large, dark-brown Indian deer called
the sambar. The Chittagong rain forests contain reticulated pythons,
king cobras, and other reptile varieties. Monkeys, gibbons, golden
langurs, and the intelligent Blyth's macaque are found around Cox's
Bazaar and in southeast Chittagong. Across the estuary the royal Bengal
tiger roams the Sundarban forests, and the mangrove swamps are
infested with crocodiles.
FUEL AND MINERAL RESOURCES
With the exception of natural gas, fuel and mineral resources are not
extensive. Identification of known deposits has almost entirely taken
place since 1947. Exploration and development projects were under way
in 1974, but neither overall known reserves nor their degree of
exploitation was yet sufficient to constitute a major factor of national
wealth as compared to agriculture (see ch. 11; ch. 13). The three principal
mineral-bearing regions are Sylhet-Comilla, for natural gas and peat;
Sylhet-Mymensingh, for coal, lignite, limestone, and clay; and
Rajshahi-Bogra, for coal and limestone. Since the mid-1960s findings near

70
the towns of Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar suggest that this may become a
fourth mineral area of importance.
Natural gas, used chiefly for thermal power and in the manufacture of
urea fertilizer, was first discovered near Sylhet in 1955. Later, seven
more gasfields were discovered, all lying from northeast Sylhet south to
Jaldi, near the coast and about twenty-five miles south of Chittagong.
Altogether the national resources were estimated in 1974 to be about 20
trillion cubic feet. Gas from the early Sylhet field is used in the
nitrogenous fertilizer plant at Fenchuganj; from the Chhatak field, for
power at the Chhatak cement factory; from Titas, for industry in Dacca;
and from Habiganj, for nearby power-generating plants. As exploitation
proceeds, the country's natural gas reserves will probably become its
most important fuel and mineral resource. Prospective new uses in the
petrochemical industry as well as liquefaction for export were under
study in the mid-1970s.
In contrast to the abundant gas reserves, only traces of oil have been
found; the refinery at Chittagong used imported petroleum. Bangladesh
has laid out at least seven blocks, of about 5,000 square miles each, for off
shore oil exploration in the Bay of Bengal. Bids were solicited from
internationally known petroleum companies, and six contracts had been
signed by October 1974 (see ch. 13).
Good quality bituminous coal has been found in Bogra District. The
seam was described as up to 170 feet wide and was estimated to contain at
least 700 million tons. This field, however, is at depths of 2,600 to 3,700
feet. Other deposits of about 3 million tons, lie northwest of the town of
Sylhet near the Indian border. In early 1975 significant coal production
had not yet been developed. Related resources include at least 3 million
tons of subbituminous lignite in Sylhet District and the equivalent of 143
million tons of dry peat in eight locations in Sylhet, Faridpur, and Khulna
districts. Iron ore in sufficient quantities for a steel industry had not been
located by 1975, although some magnetite has been found near Cox's
Bazaar and some hematite ore in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Limestone occurs in two main areas, one northwest of Sylhet and the
other northwest of Bogra. These reserves total about 200 million tons.
The mines at Takerghat, in Sylhet District, provide limestone to the
cement factory nearby at Chhatak. Other sources have been identified on
Saint Martin's Islands in the Bay of Bengal off the southern tip of
Chittagong. About 20 million tons of china clay of commercial value lies in
the Mymensingh District. Salt is not mined but manufactured, mainly as
a local cottage industry, at many thousands of evaporation sites.
Production, inhibited by the humidity and long rainy season, is
expensive, and much salt has to be imported. Radioactive minerals have
been detected in heavy sand distributions along the beaches south of
Cox's Bazaar. Survey estimates indicate that in this region are about
657,000 tons of sand with a heavy mineral content of 10 to 30 percent.
Although these deposits might in the future become a valuable resource,

71
insufficient analysis had been completed by early 1975 to warrant any
conclusion.

TRANSPORTATION AND WATER CONTROL:

MAN-MADE FEATURES
The Transportation System
Because of the country's flat terrain and labyrinth of rivers,
transportation continues to be mainly by water. Coastal and inland water
transport, although slower than railway, road, or air, accounts for about
75 percent of the movement of goods and people. During flood seasons
large areas are completely dependent upon water transport. There are no
bridges over the Padma River below its junction with the Jamuna, and
the new delta is at all times largely dependent upon connections by water
with the rest of the country.
Terrain and drainage not only favor water transport but inhibit the
development of other transportation. Generally airport runway and
bridge construction is difficult in the wet, sticky soil, and bridge siting
and design are complicated by the continual minor shifting of channels in
the multichannel rivers. Embankments for roads and railways may block
natural drainage and cause disastrous flooding, and an average of six
bridges or culverts per mile of rail line has been required along much of
the trackage.
When Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the existing transporta
tion system in both wings of the country was deficient and in need of
rehabilitation. In the following years expansion occurred, but develop
ment in East Pakistan was much slower than in West Pakistan. All
transport facilities suffered heavy damage in the November 1970 cyclone
and even more in the 1971 war. Many bridges, berthing and launch
facilities, and inland watercraft were destroyed or left inoperable, as well
as much of the railway rolling stock and mileage. In consequence, after its
own independence Bangladesh faced the major problem of restoring
facilities to the prewar capacity before further expansion could be
undertaken. In 1974 most available data on transportation reflected
conditions existing before 1971 but were regarded as still reasonably
descriptive because of the necessity to rebuild back to those levels during
the first three years after the war. Shortages of maintenance personnel
and spare parts were serious problems in all forms of transport.
In early 1971 the extent of navigable inland waterways was about 5,000
miles, a figure that had been increased by only about fifty miles since
1961. About 3,300 miles were usable year round, the balance being
seasonal. Regular river steamers operated along some 2,600 miles of
these waterways, with some variation for seasonal differences. The
principal types of craft included about 2,500 registered steamers, motor
launches, ferryboats, and barges and an unregistered category, number
ing more than 300,000, called "country boats." The registered catagory in

72
1970 had a total capacity of about 156,000 passengers and about 295,000
tons of cargo. Country boats vary upward in size from dinghies (the word
is of Bengali origin), which are used as family vehicles by all who can
afford them, through the sampanlike pulwars, to the larger putelees—
single-sail boats capable of carrying thirty-five tons and used extensively
in moving jute to baling-press sites. Country boats are estimated to move
17 million tons of cargo yearly.
The inland waterways system, under the Bangladesh Inland Water
Transport Authority, has at least 1,400 launch landings and five major
river ports: Dacca, Narayanganj, Chandpur, Barisal, and Khulna.
Coastal shipping and ferryboats operate between Chittagong, Cox's
Bazaar, Narayanganj, and Khulna. Movement of bulky agricultural
products to Chittagong is an important element of this trade, but coastal
shipping traffic as a whole, because of navigational hazards in the Meghna
estuary during most of the year, is much less than the inland river traffic.
Bangladesh had only an embryonic merchant marine in early 1973,
having four oceangoing vessels of minor tonnage acquired from the Soviet
Union. By late 1974 seven more of about 10,000 tons each were acquired
from various sources. By the end of 1978 the Bangladesh Shipping
Corporation expected to have thirty cargo ships. Ocean shipping is
serviced at two seaports: Chittagong and Chalna. On the north bank of
the Karnaphuli River, Chittagong, the principal port, has an excellent
natural harbor and anchorage about nine miles from the Bay of Bengal.
Port facilities were developed after 1947, and by 1970 Chittagong could
berth twenty ships at a time and handle 4 million tons of cargo annually.
Chalna is on the Pusur River about forty miles south of Khulna. This
port development, undertaken to relieve pressure on Chittagong, was
first started at Chalna, only twenty miles south of Khulna. Later, it was
shifted downstream to Mongla, becoming known either as Chalna Port or
Mongla Port. In 1970 it had fifteen ship moorings and eight more berths
under construction and was handling almost 2 million tons of cargo
annually. The importance of Chalna Port was expected to be increased by
the 3%-mile Mongla-Ghasiakhali Link Canal commissioned in February
1974 to shorten the inland water route between the port and
Narayanganj. Both Chittagong and Chalna are directed by government
port authorities.
Railway construction was initiated in the second half of the nineteenth
century during the British rule of India. By 1894 rail lines had been in
operation for several decades between Dacca, Narayanganj, and
Mymensingh, and construction between Chittagong and Sylhet as well as
other points was under way. The resulting system as developed up to
1939 was heavily used during World War II and was badly in need of
rehabilitation in 1947. The route mileage was then 1,615 miles, a figure
increased only to 1,776 miles by 1971. Passenger cars numbered 1,208-
freight cars totaled 20,523. The former provincial government of East
Pakistan was hard put to it even to provide maintenance for existing

73
lines, and this problem was greatly magnified for the new government by
the damage of the 1971 war. Pre-1971 rail services, however, were
essentially restored by September 1973 with the reopening of the
Bhairab (King George VI) railway bridge across the Meghna River at
Kalipur (Bhairab Bazaar).
About 32 percent of the railway route mileage is broad gauge, which is
found in the northwestern and western parts. Elsewhere in the country,
the track is meter gauge. Lines of these different widths intersect at only
a few points; the broad-gauge north-south line in Rajshahi Division,
however, crosses the Padma River over the Hardinge Bridge, about
twenty-three miles northwest of Pabna, and continues south to Khulna.
Along the Bangladesh-Indian borders are eight points of connection
between the rail systems of the two countries.
Under British India railway siting in Bengal was determined
economically by the objective of service to Calcutta and geographically by
the course of the rivers. As a result, most rail lines in Bangladesh run
north-south because the river system runs that way, and many freight
and passenger journeys include a combination of rail and water
movement. Important lateral, east-west lines exist but are a minor part
of total mileage (see fig. 5). In 1970 all rail services handled 960 million
freight ton-miles and 2.1 billion passenger-miles; and in 1974 railways,
although far behind the waterways, continued to be second most
important means of transport.
Road construction and direction are governed by the same major
factors affecting rail development, that is, by the river and drainage
geography. There is no unified, national road system as such; and road
transport, except in a limited, local sense, is not a principal means in
comparison with waterways and rail. Proportionately, however, the
most significant overall expansion in the transport system since 1947 has
occurred in road development. There were then only 240 miles of
hard-surface road; by 1971 this figure had been increased to 2,398 miles.
Most of this increase, however, took place between 1960 and 1965. Since
then progress had been slow and decreasing. In 1973 a new highway
between Dacca and Chittagong was being developed with external
assistance. Unmetaled roads, totaling about 1,400 miles, are of low
capacity and reliability. Frequently dirt roads and even surfaced roads
simply break off at riverbanks, and crossings must be made by ford or
ferry.
After 1971 road transport operations in the public sector were
expanded to include a trucking division in the government-owned
Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation that was intended to supple
ment private sector operations. Trucking was not highly developed in
1974, however, and the industry faced difficult problems of managerial
and technical shortages, as well as labor unrest and rising oil prices.
Similarly, bus transportation is not an extensive means of passenger
movement. In the early 1970s, three-quarters of ail registered motor

74
 92

Source: Based on information from William S. Ellis, "Bangladesh: Hope Nourishes a New
Nation," National Geographic, September 1972, p. 305.
Figure 5. Bangladesh, Principal Railways and Roads

75
vehicles were based in only three districts—Dacca, Chittagong, and
Sylhet. Countrywide the number of licensed motor vehicles in 1961 was
19,481. In 1970 this total had grown to 68,057, of which there were 5,676
buses, 9,355 trucks, 23,074 passenger cars, and 29,952 others (mostly
motorcycles and autocarts).
After World War II air travel became increasingly important,
especially in the conduct of government and business. Pakistan
International Airlines (PIA), which was based in West Pakistan, linked
the western and eastern wings of the country across the gap separating
them by about 1,000 miles. PIA flights to Bangladesh were suspended
after the 1971 war but were resumed in 1974.
The principal airport is at Dacca, where international connections are
made by seven international carriers. Other airports, for in-country
service, are at Chittagong (the second largest facility), Cox's Bazaar,
Comilla, Shamshernager, Sylhet, Jessore, Thakurgaon, and Ishurdi.
There are also a number of lesser airstrips for small aircraft. Further
development of civil aviation was under way in 1974, but this means of
transport was as yet important only for limited passenger traffic. Air
Bangladesh (Bangladesh Biman) is the national airline; in late 1974 it
operated one DC-8 and eight Fokker Friendship aircraft.
Water Control
In such a flat riverine country, water control is an essential concern, for
which the government has taken chief responsibility. The administration
of this responsibility was formerly under the Water and Power
Development Authority. This agency was divided in late May 1972,
placing the Water Development Board under the Ministry of Flood
Control and Water Resources.
The agricultural economy, adapted to the use of a vast volume of water,
depends upon a balance between two little and too much. In the dry
season, local areas without irrigation may have a water shortage. During
the monsoons, however, the saturated drainage system overflows,
causing frequent and often disastrous flooding. Throughout the country,
clusters of tube wells and thousands of low-lift pumps are used in local
irrigation to stabilize groundwater supply and control its distribution.
Almost all of Sylhet District was under irrigation reclamation. Major
water control projects, however, are commonly multipurpose in nature,
providing, in addition to irrigation, such other services as flood
protection, aids to river navigation and road construction, and power.
Because of the flat terrain, hydroelectric sites are few, and the generation
of electricity is not so often found associated with water control
engineering as in countries whose rivers flow on steeper gradients. By
1974 major water control projects had been undertaken and were in
various stages of completion. Others were in the planning stage. Most of
these projects were delayed, in one way or another, by the disaster of the

76
 Table 2. Bangladesh, Major Water Control Projects

Project Name

Ganges-Kobadak-Kushtia . . Gravity canal and flood control irrigation system to cover

2.6 million acres in Kushtia, Khulna, and Jessore
districts.
Tidal Embankments Coastal embankments of 2,600 miles to exclude seawater
and provide roads; Khulna, Barisal, Noakhali, and
Chittagong districts.
Coastal Rehabilitation and
Cyclone Protection To repair docks and provide communications system and
personnel shelters around estuary.
Jamuna Embankments Completed 1968. West bank of Jamuna River embanked
135 miles to protect Rangpur, Bogra, and Pabna districts.
Old Brahmaputra Water diversion from Jamuna into Old Brahmaputra for
irrigation and power stations in Mymensingh District.
Tista Barrage Completed 1968. Multipurpose barrage system on Tista
River in northern Rangpur, to serve 1.9 million acres.
Southern Rajshahi Irrigation and flood control scheme for Rajshahi and Pabna
districts.
Dacca-Narayanganj-Demra . .Completed 1968. Irrigation and flood control. Dual-purpose
pump system evacuates or furnishes water as needed.
Tippera-Chittagong and
Little Feni Multipurpose irrigation and drainage for about 200 miles
along the Chittagong coast and in Noakhali and Comilla
districts.
Karnaphuli Multipurpose; principal function hydroelectric generation.
Earthfill dam 153 feet high on Karnaphuli River about
twenty-five miles from Chittagong. Creates vast reser
voir up parallel valleys of Chittagong Hills. Country's
most important completed hydroelectric project.
Sanghu Dam on Sanghu River in southern Chittagong Hill Tracts,
for power and irrigation. To be linked eventually with
Karnaphuli.

Source: Based on information from Kazi S. Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, Karachi,

1972, pp. 68-78.

November 1970 cyclone and the damage of the December 1971 war and
are heavily dependent upon foreign assistance (see table 2).
Except for the Meghna, the great rivers of Bangladesh originate
externally and enter the country from India. Water control questions,
therefore, sometimes have international aspects. The most serious such
question in 1974 was that of the Farakka Barrage, a dam built by India on
the Ganges (Padma) River only twelve miles from the Bangladesh
border. The purpose of this dam, scheduled to be put into full operation in
December 1974, is to divert water down the Hooghly River (the old main
channel of the Ganges) in order to flush out the silted Indian port of
Calcutta. Bangladesh authorities, however, fear that this diversion by
India will cause the Padma to run low or even dry in Bangladesh,

77
especially during the dry season, with accompanying economic disaster in
at least seven districts in the southwest. Discussions on this subject were
under way in 1974, but an official Indian statement in August further
alarmed Bangladesh by indicating an Indian intention to proceed
unilaterally. In early 1975 this problem was not yet resolved.

POPULATION
The Census
Bangladesh has a long history of census taking, established during the
time when it was part of British India (see ch. 2). The first census,
confined to what were then called the Northwestern Provinces, was
taken in late December 1852. Between that time and 1871 separate and
uncoordinated censuses were taken in most of the other provinces of
British India. The 1871—72 census, although it did not fully cover all
provinces and contained many irregularities, was taken under central
government direction and is regarded as the first general census.
After 1871 the count was made regularly and with increasing
effectiveness at ten-year intervals. By tabulating results from the
districts making up Bangladesh, demographers can determine earlier
census results corresponding to the present country. The quality of the
count from 1901 onward is regarded as generally good, except for the
census of 1941 when the population of the Bangladesh area was inflated
by about 1.3 million as a result of the troop and refugee camps of World
War II. This factor is taken into account in most tabulations.
After independence in 1947 the new government of Pakistan conducted
its own census in 1951 and again in 1961. Data for Bangladesh are found in
the Pakistan census records for those years under the heading East
Pakistan. The census of 1961 is generally regarded by demographers as
having been underenumerated by as much as 9 percent. Between 1962
and 1965 the government of Pakistan commissioned several extensive
analytical studies collectively called the Population Growth Estimate.
From these calculations, data and forecasts pertinent to Bangladesh can
be found, again, under the heading East Pakistan, but these must be used
with care because some faulty assumptions were employed.
Because of turbulent political conditions during 1971, no census was
taken by Pakistan in that year. The new state of Bangladesh then
initiated census planning and conducted its own count between February
10 and March 1, 1974, with reference date of March 1. Preliminary
results, by sex and district, were published in late 1974, but complete and
adjusted results, to include age and sex data, were not yet available in
early 1975. The total population of Bangladesh according to the census of
1974 was 71.3 million. Conservative statistical projections had pointed to
at least 73.9 million; other projections had been well in excess of that
figure. Many demographers believed that the census of 1974 was
underenumerated by 7 to 11 percent and that the male-female ratio

78
indicated by it was too great. The preliminary 1974 figures remained the
best available official data at the end of that year; nevertheless, estimates
ranged from 79 million to 81 million or more in early 1975.

Population Structure and Trends

Census records show that between 1901 and 1974 the population
increased by 147 percent, or from about 28.9 million to 71.3 million. From
1901 to 1931 the increase was comparatively slow, adding only about 7
million. During the next thirty years about 15 million were added and, in
the fourteen years from 1961 to 1975, about 30.7 million (see fig. 6). All
three of these periods were affected by "extra deaths," or mortality
circumstances not ordinarily to be expected. The influenza epidemic of
1918 and 1919 took some 393,000 lives, and during the famine of 1943 an
estimated 1.9 million people died. The cyclone and floods of November
1970 produced a death toll of 198,000 by official records; most estimates,
however, are higher and run from 300,000 up to 600,000. Operations of
the Pakistan armed forces in Bangladesh from March through December
1971 resulted directly or indirectly in a death toll officially given as 3
million, although this figure is probably far too high. These individual
disasters, however great, have had only temporary, limited effects on the
long-term experience.
The 1974 preliminary census total of 71,316,517 was divided between
36,949,033 males and 34,367,484 females, an apparent male-female ratio
of 108 to 100—a high and unlikely ratio, although consistent with earlier
censuses and probably resulting from underreporting of females. Based
upon the complete (if underenumerated) data of the 1961 census,
demographic analysts calculated that in 1974 the annual birthrate was
forty-nine or fifty per 1,000 people; the death rate, eighteen or nineteen
per 1,000; and the annual growth rate (including allowances for
migration), about 3 percent. Some observers believed the growth rate to
be as high as 3.2 or even 3.5 percent. Life expectancy at birth in the
mid-1960s was estimated to be forty-six years, having risen from only
twenty-eight years in the mid-1940s. In the 1901-11 decade this
expectancy figure was only twenty-two years. The data on rates and
expectation may be altered somewhat by calculations from the final
adjusted data of the 1974 census, when available, but were nevertheless
believed to be fairly reliable as indicators of the situation in the
mid-1970s.
Birth and mortality figures are drawn mainly from partial records,
partial surveys, and mathematical analyses, since there is no regular,
comprehensive system of vital statistics registration. Within the overall
decline in mortality, the infant mortality rate was still high, being
indicated by some surveys as about 125 per 1,000 live births. Other
estimates place the rate in the range of 130 to 140 per 1,000. The marriage
rate is extremely high, and unions are generally entered into at early
ages. For example, the census of 1961 showed that 95.4 percent of all

79
women in the age bracket of twenty to twenty-nine years were or had
been married.
In 1974 Dacca was the most heavily populated of the four political-
administrative divisions, followed in order by Chittagong, Rajshahi, and
Khulna divisions. With 1,786 people per square mile, Dacca Division also
had the greatest density. The overall national density was 1,283 people
per square mile, a figure believed to be the highest among the nations of
the world (see table 3; fig. 7). These density figures are distinctly
conservative because the 1974 census, from which they are taken, was
strongly believed to have been underenumerated.
The magnitude of the population problem and the rate ofits growth on a
constant area of land are also apparent from a comparison of the three
most recent censuses. In 1951 the enumerated total was 42.1 million,
indicating an annual growth rate (excluding the extra deaths in 1943) of
1.21 percent. This total constituted an increase from the previous census
of only 3.5 percent. In 1961 the intercensal increase was 21 percent; the
enumerated total, 50.9 million; and the annual growth rate, 2.16 percent.
Using the apparently undercounted figures of 1974, the next intercensal
increase was 40 percent, and the annual growth rate was at least 3
percent. By the year 2000, if the trends indicated in 1974 continue,
demographers estimate that the country's population will be 150 million
or possibly more.
The 1974 population was predominantly young. Although age data
from the census of that year were not available at the year's end, the
census of 1961 showed that almost 50 percent of the total were under the
age of fifteen years and that the population base in the lower years had
expanded (see table 4; fig. 8). In 1951, for example, children nine years of
age and younger formed 27 percent of the population, and this figure had
increased to 37 percent by 1961.
The high rate of increase resulted from a fairly steady crude birthrate
since World War II coupled with a decreasing crude death rate. The
overall decline in mortality rates, despite the extra deaths of 1970 and
1971, was attributed to antibiotics and better public health measures to
combat epidemics since World War II and overmatched the slight drop in
fertility claimed by some demographers in the late 1960s. In any case, the
extremely high annual rate of increase, the uneven age distribution
weighted heavily in the dependent early years, increasing longevity, and
declining mortality have created serious problems for both the short- and
long-range future in food supply, medical services, housing, education,
and employment (see ch. 4; ch. 12). Implied in this conclusion is the
observation by the analyst John Stoeckel that continued improvement in
"death control" without at the same time correspondingly greater
progress in birth control will simply perpetuate the high population
growth rate.
Migration
Outward movement from what is now Bangladesh has historically been
80
 1901 1911 975
Note—Data for 1901 through 1941 are from censuses of British India; data for 1951 and
1961 are from censuses of East Pakistan; Bangladesh census of March 1, 1974, was
believed undercounted by 7 toll percent; estimate for early 1975 was based on
assumption of 11-percent undercount in March 1974 and 3-percent annual growth
rate.

Source: Based on information from Masihur Rahman Khan, "Bangladesh Population

During First Five Year Plan Period (1973-78): An Estimate," Bangladesh
Economic Review [Dacca], April 1973, pp. 186-198; and Bangladesh, Ministry of
Home Affairs, Census Commission, Bangladesh Census of Population, 1974,
Dacca, 1974, pp. 2-3.
Figure 6. Bangladesh, Population Growth, Selected Years, 1901-75

81
 24

Dinajpur
2 Rangpur 1467
3 Bogra 1482
4 Rajshahi 1,168
5 Pabna 1476
Persons per square mile 6 Kushtia 1403
7 Jessore 282
~2 100 to 999
8 Khulna 767
] 1,000 to 1,499 9 Patuokhali 889
10 Bar isa1 1,399
1,500 to 1,899 I I Faridpur 1,516
12 Dacca 2,641
1,900 and above 13 Mymensingh 1,493
I4 Tangail 1,583
15 Sylhet 985
16 Comilla 2,241
—.— International
District boundary
boundary
17 Noakhali 1,589
18 Chittagong 1.552
19 Chittagong Hill Tracts 100
88 32

Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Ministry of Home Affairs, Census

Commission, Bangladesh Census of Population, 1974, Dacca, 1974, p. 20.
Figure 7. Bangladesh, Density of Population by District, 197U

82
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 FEMALES

Note-- This depiction is a demographic analysis derived from the censuses of 1951 and 1961 in
East Pakistan. The dominant young-age characteristic of the population appeared to
be continuing in 1974.

Source: Based on information from W. Henry Mosley and Monowar Hossain, "Population
Backgrounds and Prospects," Disaster in Bangladesh, New York, 1973, p. 11.
Figure 8. Bangladesh, Approximate Age-Sex Pyramid, 1960 and 1970
mainly to India. After 1921 this emigration was about 600,000 per decade
until the period of World War II. From 1941 to 1951 the number increased
to about 1.9 million, reflecting part of the massive movements of peoples
caused by the division of British India in 1947 along religious lines.
Millions of Muslims in newly independent India fled to Pakistan, while in
the opposite direction millions of Hindus moved into India. The West
Wing of Pakistan was the principal destination of Muslim refugees, but in
the East Wing (present-day Bangladesh) the refugees still formed about
1.7 percent of the total population in 1961. During the 1951-61 decade,
emigration from Bangladesh, for all causes, was about 1.1 million.
The operations of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan commenced in
March 1971, and during 1971 an estimated 10 million refugees crossed the
border into India in one of the great mass movements of modern times. In
India they were maintained in camps by the Indian government; in the
first six months after the independence of Bangladesh in December 1971,
most of the refugees returned to Bangladesh. An undetermined number,
however, remained in India.
Some 600,000 to 900,000 Muslims who had fled from the Indian state of
Bihar in 1947 were left in Bangladesh at the end of the 1971 war. Over the
years these non-Bengali Muslims declined to support the Bengali
demands for provincial equality and autonomy (see ch. 2). After the 1971

84
 Table U- Bangladesh, Age-Sex Distribution, 1961 Census

Age Male Female

Under 1 year 691,759 692,500 1,384,259

1^ 3,888,005 3,991,972 7,879,977
5-9 4,868,737 4,659,749 9,528,486
10-14 2,610,351 2,036,533 4,646,884
15-19 1,922,017 1,984,453 3,906,470
20-24 1,824,616 1,988,564 3,813,180
25-29 2,001,928 1,998,252 4,000,180
30-34 1,692,814 1,544,890 3,237,704
35-39 1,558,337 1,254,154 2,812,491
4<M4 1,253,974 1,113,330 2,367,304
45-49 1,015,818 801,549 1,817,367
50-54 946,939 800,739 1,747,678
55-59 610,688 434,698 1,045,386
60 and over 1,462,860 1,190,009 2,652,869

TOTAL 26,348,843 24,491,392 50,840,235

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Develop
ment, Central Statistical Office, 25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics: 19^7-1972,
Karachi, 1972, p. 8.

war most of them were concentrated in camps while their petitions for
emigration to Pakistan were under consideration by the Pakistan
government. Pakistan recognized the state of Bangladesh in February
1974, and the subject of the Biharis was one of the main topics at the
conference of foreign ministers of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan held
at New Delhi in April 1974. In the tripartite agreement signed on April 9,
Pakistan declared its willingness to accept large numbers of Biharis. By
late 1974 approximately 120,000 Biharis had been moved to Pakistan,
fewer than Bangladesh—and the Biharis—had hoped (see ch. 10). At the
same time over 100,000 Bangalees had been repatriated to Bangladesh.
The return of the Bangalees from Pakistan was expected roughly to
balance the outward flow of Biharis from Bangladesh. Considering all
forms of migration, Masihur Rahman Khan, a research demographer at
the Bangladesh Institute of Development Economics, estimated in 1973
that the net emigration from Bangladesh after 1961 was at the rate of
about 150,000 per year.
Economic troubles as well as political conditions are a recurring cause
oftemporary or permanent migration, both external and internal. In 1974
there was an increased movement of people fleeing from Bangladesh to
India because of the food shortages of that year. By August their number
had reached 10,000 and, according to Indian sources, was growing. In
response, the Bangladesh government asserted that most of these were
Indian nationals who were in Bangladesh as a result of previous
dislocations and who were endeavoring to return to their own country.
Earlier in 1974 a presidential ordinance had restricted exit from

85
Bangladesh because of lack of foreign exchange. This ordinance,
however, was repealed in late October. In any case, observers did not
believe that emigration was likely to become an important factor in
solving the country's critical problem of overpopulation and runaway
growth.
Internal migration by 1974 showed several recognizable trends. First,
because of the increasing pressure of population density, people were
moving into areas of relatively light habitation in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts and in parts of the Sundarbans previously considered only
marginally habitable. Second, the recent growth, as shown by the 1974
census, had been greatest in the districts of Rajshahi, Kushtia, and
Jessore, where the increases since the 1961 census were, respectively,
51.7, 61.4, and 51.3 percent. These three districts lie astride the Padma
River on the country's western border with the Indian state of West
Bengal; the notable increase in this region probably resulted from both
internal and external migration and remigrations associated with the
1971 war. Third, although the Bangladesh population remained over
whelmingly agricultural and rural, movement to urban areas—especially
Dacca—was increasing because of the severe food shortages and
economic distress occasioned by the disasters of 1970 and 1971,
compounded by the floods of 1974.

Settlement Patterns and Rural-Urban Distribution

The people of Bangladesh are predominantly dependent upon agricul
ture, and in 1961 the proportion of the population in rural settlements was
94.8 percent. During the mid-1960s the trend, if any, appeared to be
toward an increase in the rural percentage. Movement to urban areas
increased, however, in 1972; but by 1974 the figure of 94 percent for the
rural population was still considered reliable. The location of rural
communities is directly affected by climate and rainfall, soil fertility,
topography, and ease of communication by water and land. In
Bangladesh, in contrast to most other countries, these factors are
remarkably similar throughout the land. The flat terrain, proliferation of
large and small rivers, and agricultural economy have produced a fairly
uniform pattern of small villages, numbering in excess of 71,000, that do
not tend to grow together easily. This profusion of villages is the basic
characteristic of settlement patterns in Bangladesh (see ch. 4).
Urban areas are defined by size, by the nature of employment of the
population, and by the kind of administration. They include, generally,
municipalities and any identifiable collection of houses inhabited by 5,000
or more people. Places of fewer than 5,000 people may also be classed as
urban at the option of the census director if they have substantial urban
characteristics, such as good roads, sanitation facilities, schools, and a
significant nonagricultural working force.
In the early 1970s only eighteen places were classed as municipalities,
and only four—Dacca, Narayanganj, Chittagong, and Khulna—as cities.
For communications and economic reasons, cities and municipalities have
mostly been located on or near major rivers. Dacca, the capital and by far
the largest city, along with its companion city, Narayanganj, lies
centrally and strategically within the junction of the Meghna and
Dhaleswari rivers and has relatively good access to other parts of the
country. River junctions themselves, however, do not necessarily
determine urban locations, for it may be noted that no large city has
grown up at the junction of the Padma and Jamuna rivers.
In early 1974 the enumerated populations of the four cities were:
Dacca, 1,310,976; Chittagong, 416,733; Khulna, 436,000; and Narayan
ganj , 176,879. These figures, however, are only indications of size; all had
increased substantially by the end of 1974 because of the movement from
rural sectors to the large urban areas occasioned by food and work
shortages. In September 1974 press reports asserted that the population
of the Dacca-Narayanganj area had increased by 400,000 in the preceding
three months, victims of what was called "the most severe famine to
strike the Indian subcontinent in three decades." Unable to absorb this
influx of destitutes into urban housing and employment, the government
maintained thousands of them in camps adjacent to the large urban
centers, where they were fed minimally from government relief kitchens.
Throughout the country, thousands of these kitchens were reportedly in
operation by the end of 1974.
Religions and Language Distribution
The provisional results of the 1974 census did not provide a tabulation
by religion. According to the 1961 census, Muslims constituted 80.4
percent of the population; Hindus, 18.4 percent (caste Hindus, 8.6
percent and Scheduled Castes, 9.8 percent); Christians, 0.3 percent; and
others (mostly animists), 0.9 percent (see ch. 5). The most noticeable
characteristics of the overall distribution were that the heaviest
concentration of Christians was in the capital division of Dacca and that
by far the largest number of "others" was in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,
the location of various tribal groups (see ch. 6). After the census of 1961
large numbers of Hindus left Bangladesh in the dislocations of 1965 and,
more particularly, of 1970 and 1971 . By 1974 informed observers believed
that the percentage of Muslims had increased to about 85 and that of
Hindus had declined to about 14 percent.
In language, as in weather and terrain, Bangladesh is a highly uniform
country. Over 98 percent of the people speak Bengali, the official
language, loved by the people and rich in both ancient and modern
literature (see ch. 7). English is widely used, especially in government
and business and among the well-educated elite (see ch. 6). Literacy,
denned as the ability to read a short statement on everyday life in any
language, was estimated in 1961 at 21.5 percent among persons five years

87
of age and older, the rate for males being about three times that for
females. In 1974 United States government sources estimated literacy at
20 percent (see ch. 4).

The Working Force

The working force expanded significantly in the late 1960s and early
1970s because of the sharp upturn in the country's population in the 1950s
and despite the extra deaths of 1970 and 1971. This expansion occurred
coincidentally with the periods of economic distress and stagnation
attendant upon Pakistan's 1965 war with India, the political disturbances
of the 1967-69 period, the supercyclone of 1970, and the 1971 war.
Because of the questionable validity of the 1974 census and the
availability of only partial and tentative data from it by early 1975, basic
data on the nation's working force continued to be derived or projected
from the 1961 census. Under that enumeration the working force
included 34.3 percent of the population, or about 17.4 million people (not
including the armed forces). An attribute of this force, characteristic of
developing nations, is the much higher economically active proportion of
males below fifteen and over sixty-five than in industrialized societies. In
fact, the broad definition of the working force included all persons over
ten years of age.
In practice, however, the work force was predominantly male, men
constituting in 1961 about 86 percent, or more than six times the
percentage of women. (This estimate ignores the high incidence of female
workers in farm families.) The number and proportion of women in the
work force was increasing slowly by the early 1970s. The countrywide
unemployment rate, according to government statistics, was less than 1
percent during the 1960s, but some analysts suggested that, if all those
gainfully employed for less than forty hours per week were included, the
percentage of unemployed might have been 15 to 20 percent of the
working force. By early 1974 the work force was estimated to be 26.2
million, of whom 22 million were men (58 percent of the male population)
and about 4.2 million were women (about 12 percent of the female
population), indicating an 84-percent male composition. Unemployment
in mid- 1974 was estimated at about 30 percent of the force. Bangladesh in
1974 continued to be predominantly a rural and agricultural country, and
the part of the force in the agricultural sector continued to be about 85
percent, although not all were gainfully employed (see table 5).
It was expected by demographers that the working force would more
than double tween 1974 and the year 2000. The average annual addition to
the force between 1974 and 1980 was expected to be about 1.15 million
people, on the assumption that 11 percent of females would participate
and counting only males between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four. The
combination of rapid working-force growth, extremely high population
density, low growth of per capita income, and earlier disaster recovery,
problems, along with current floods, famine, runaway inflation, and high

88
 Table 5. Bangladesh, Distribution of Employed Persons, 1963 and 1968
(in percent)

Category 1963' 1968'

Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, and Fishing 76.45 79.62

Industry
Mining and quarrying 0.15 0.01
Manufacturing 5.81 5.38
Construction 0.92 1.09
Total 6.88 6.48
Services and Trade
Public utilities 0.07 0.15
Commerce 6.45 6.13
Transport, storage, and communication 1.91 2.61
Professional and other services 7.50 5.00
Total 15.93 13.89
Unclassified 0.74 0.01

TOTAL 100.00 100.00

Percent of Total Population Employed 34.82 34.45

1 The estimates for 1963 reflect conditions in the early 1960s.

2 The estimates for 1968 approximate the situation at the end of the decade.
Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Develop
ment, Central Statistical Office, 25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics: 1947-1972,
Karachi, 1972, pp. 27-29.

unemployment, confronted the government in 1975 with a national crisis

in which the working force—as the active sector of the population—could
become the focus of a high level of social unrest (see ch. 14).
Population Control
The rapid growth of population was seen by planners in both wings of
Pakistan in the 1950s to be in foreboding contrast to the amount of land
available, the realities of climate and environment, and the time
necessarily required for industrial expansion and other development
projects, such as education, urbanization, mineral exploration, land
recovery, and the intensification of agriculture. Consequences of these
interrelated factors were foreseeable future crises of food supply,
housing, employment, and medical and other services of vital importance
to the life of the nation. The need for a program of population control was
accordingly recognized by the government in the succession of five-year
plans of national development launched in 1955.
The Central Family Planning Council was formed under Pakistan's
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and an objective was set for
reduction of the birthrate from about forty-eight or fifty per 1,000
annually in 1961 to forty per 1,000 in 1970. Provincial and district councils
were set up; training programs and more than 4,000 clinics were

89
established; doctors, welfare workers, and village midwives were
enrolled; the distribution and easy availability of condoms and other
conventional contraceptives were greatly expanded; monetary incen
tives were provided for doctors and midwives who performed or
arranged for vasectomies or intrauterine devices (IUD) insertions; and
statistical collection and program evaluations were increasingly stressed.
The strategy of the overall effort, according to government sources,
placed emphasis on "motivation, environmental encouragement, public
ity and easy availability of contraceptive materials, and medical advice."
The objective of a birthrate reduction to forty per 1,000 inhabitants
annually was not reached, or even approached, in either East or West
Pakistan. Writing on the situation, the analyst Mohammad Afzal ob
served that "the impact of the ambitious family planning programmes
which have been in operation throughout this period seems, unfor
tunately, to be insignificant." About the best that could be said was that
the program probably was one factor in keeping the birthrate from rising
even higher.
Demographers and political economists have identified a number of
reasons for the failure of population control through the early 1970s, but
they have agreed that the principal reason for failure was the almost
exclusive reliance upon volunteerism. Authorities in Bangladesh esti
mate that awareness was created in 85 percent of the target population by
the earlier programs but that only 5 to 8 percent of these actually
accepted and used birth control measures. The strategy of the program,
its scope and execution, and the level of acceptance were, in sum,
inadequate for attainment of the objective.
Public opposition to family planning and birth control in Bangladesh
has been typical of that occuring in many developing nations where the
society remains predominantly rural, traditional, and overwhemingly
male dominated—general characteristics of Muslim countries, although
not limited to them. Deep-seated prejudices and inhibitions rooted in
custom and religion hampered acceptance of the government's program.
Children are needed for farmwork and for security in the parents' old age,
and a high infant mortality rate means that many children are needed.
Studies showed that seven children were necessary to ensure that two
sons would reach adulthood.
The new government of Bangladesh was from the outset keenly aware
of the critical need for population control. Its planners clearly recognize
the errors of strategy and the unrealistic goals that had caused the failure
of the earlier efforts. A new population planning program was therefore
drawn up as one of the nine principal divisions of the First Five Year
Plan. The National Population Council of eleven senior officials, headed
by the prime minister and supported by a secretariat and three staff
coordinating committees, was established, and a five-year outlay of
Tk700 million (for value of the taka—see Glossary) was proposed. The
primary cabinet responsibility rests with the Ministry of Health and

90
Family Planning. The overall objective, ambitious but more rational than
the earlier goals, is "to reduce the rate of population growth, now
estimated to be 3 percent annually, by at least .2 of a percent by the end of
the plan period."
Some observers maintained that the government's approach was still
excessively elitist and volunteerist. Public information and making birth
control devices available were still prominent features of the plan, but one
working objective was stated to be the formation of trained teams, each
headed by one male and one female, on the basis of one team for every
8,000 people in the population. In some sections the plan recommended
consideration of restrictive and even punitive measures against exces
sively productive couples in the future. By late 1974 the impact of the
1973-78 program was not known. Restrictive or punitive measures had
not been taken, and the plan for formation of a population control team for
every 8,000 people was in its infancy. Theoretically, at least, the number
of such teams would be on the order of 10,200; the likelihood of full and
effective implementation of this objective within the plan period'
appeared to be slim.
According to Shahid Javed Burki, a respected social scientiest, family
planning practices based on birth control information and voluntary
contraception can only be useful adjunct to three more general but
ultimately more effective means. Infant mortality, economic well-
being, and literacy have all been known to have a definite relationship to
fertility. The argument of Burki and other political scientist-
demographers holds that, if infant mortality is reduced, a corresponding
degree of popular assurance should be generated that young children
would survive, thereby reducing the need to have more. Similarly,
economic well-being—a rise in the standard of living and some assurance
of old-age security—would modify attitudes in the direction of desiring
smaller families. Control group studies have pointed to the same effect
from a rise in literacy, especially among women, coming from expanded
life interests, better perception of the problem, and better ability to
understand family planning methods.

91
 CHAPTER 4
EDUCATION AND LIVING CONDITIONS
In the minds of people throughout the world, the name Bangladesh
had, in early 1975, become almost synonymous with misery. A series of
man-made and natural disasters unparalleled in recent history taxed the
country's already frail ability to provide its people even secure
subsistence. Even compared to conditions of the late 1960s, which the
government characterized as "dismal proverty," the mid-1970s rep
resented a drastic deterioration. War, flood, famine, and pestilence, each
in turn and within a period of only a few years, scourged a once pleasant
and relatively prosperous country and combined with overpopulation to
reduce the majority of the people to abject poverty and many to death by
starvation and preventable disease.
Health, welfare, and educational services continued to be inadequate.
Some communicable diseases once relatively under control have resurged
in epidemic proportions. Nutrition, which even in "normal" times was
inadequate to support good health, was in many cases barely adequate to
support life. Destruction of residential communities has created a huge
backlog of homeless and ill-housed people and complicated already diffi
cult sanitation conditions. Destruction of facilities and disruption of serv
ices have hampered the outdated educational system, which serves the
well-to-do and only a minority of the poor. In the face of these
circumstances the ominous growth of the population nevertheless
continues unabated, rendering hopes and plans for amelioration highly
problematical.
The government has struggled with the problems both of basic survival
and of reconstruction and improvement of all services with the help of a
variety of international agencies and foreign countries (see ch. 13). Close
to 6,000 feeding stations, known as "gruel kitchens," were instituted to
provide at least some of the hungry with free food. A system of rationing
of staple foods has been undertaken. Plans for reorientation and
reconstruction of both the medical and the educational systems have been
enunciated; the government hopes to increase literacy from the
present-day 20 percent and to emphasize training students for the
existing economy.
Observers agree, however, that the outlook for the average Bangalee
is far from bright. Even if the government were to achieve the goals of the
First Five Year Plan (1973-78), a far from likely outcome, conditions
would essentially return to the inadequate level of the late 1960s. Failing
this, the future appears to hold some improvement in the desperate
circumstances of the mid-1970s but continuation of a generally depressed
level of life.

LIVING CONDITIONS
A lack of reliable information and statistics made a comprehensive
picture of living conditions impossible in early 1975. In general, however,
authorities agree that Bangladesh appeared to experience a gradual
decline through much of the Pakistan era, exacerbated by the calamitous
disruptions that accompanied and followed independence. The standard
of living, unsatisfactory even in "normal" times, reached a nadir in early
and mid-1970s when only international relief operations averted
enormous loss of life. In September 1974 foreign observers predicted that
deaths by starvation in the following months would equal or exceed those
during the famine of 1943, in which an estimated 1.9 million died. By early
1975, however, it appeared that perhaps 20,000 to 50,000 had starved.
Per capita consumption of many important commodities declined
significantly between 1970, the last "normal" year, and 1973 (see table 6).
The decline doubtless continued into 1974 and 1975.
The root cause of Bangladesh's problems is overpopulation; by any
standard, the population has far exceeded the land's ability £o support it
in anything approaching decent conditions using the traditional
techniques (see ch. 3). Economist Austin Robinson writes of Bangladesh,
"For the past 20 years it has been one of the saddest cases of Malthusian
poverty and near starvation .... [Its people] live imprisoned in their
poverty with no hope of escape." Some observers have even indirectly
ascribed the terrible destruction of the 1970 cyclone to overpopulation;
had they not been desperately short of land, people would not have
settled the affected regions, which are known to be particularly
susceptible to such storms (see ch. 3). A climate and topography
characterized by periodic natural disasters also heavily tax the country's
ability to improve or even maintain its standard of living; repeated
reconstruction or extensive repair of capital facilities consumes re
sources.
A particularly poignant legacy of the 1971 civil war are the thousands of
women euphemistically known as "war-affected" who, as victims of rape
during the war, have been rendered socially unfit for respectable
marriage and have been abandoned, along with their illegitimate
children, by their families (see ch. 6). The government, which estimates
that about 250,000 women and girls were raped, has attempted with only
limited success to promote marriage to or care of these women as a
patriotic duty; many thousands remain destitute and dishonored, lacking
any hope of eventual reintegration into their original communities. For
their assistance the government has established the National Board for
the Rehabilitation of Women, with a projected budget of Tk10O million
(for value of the taka—see Glossary) over a five-year period, to train them

94
Table 6. Bangladesh, Per Capita Consumption of Selected Commodities, 1970 and 1973

Commodity Unit 1970 1973

Food grain . ounces per day 17.10 15.4

Sugar pounds per year 4.22 3.00
Cigarettes . . number per year 65.00 139.00
Textiles .... yards per year 7.50 4.96
Tea pounds per year 0.14 0.16
Gas cubic feet per year 5.27 4.93
Electricity . . kilowatt-hours per year* 1.63 1.64

* Household use.
Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Planning Commission, The First Five
Year Plan, 1973-78, Dacca, 1973, p. 21.

in handicraft skills and aid them in marketing their handicrafts so that

they can support themselves apart from their families.
Quite apart from the uneven distribution of damage during the various
disasters of the 1970s, evidence exists that the distribution of income has
shifted, to the detriment of the majority of the population. In 1960 per
capita income in the nation at large constituted 44 percent of average
urban income; in 1964 this figure had fallen to 37 percent. Even among
urban residents, workers have suffered a loss in real income since
partition; only the small middle-class group appeared to have gained.
Authorities also suggest that the 1974 food crisis, which reportedly
forced the sale of animals and land by peasants at low prices in the worst
hit regions, increased the well-to-do urban element's hold on the nation's
scarce wealth.

Nutrition
Among the country's greatest immediate problems is an inadequate
food supply, in terms both of quantity and of kinds of food available. Even
before the war for independence and the famine of 1974, the majority of
Bangalees subsisted on diets inadequate in many important nutrients. At
least half the population suffered from malnutrition to some degree;
because of their special needs, young children and child-bearing women
suffered the most. At least since the late 1940s diet has gradually
worsened; available calories per capita, for example, declined by 3
percent between 1950 and 1960, although the 1950 figure was only 90
percent of medically recognized requirements.
Even before the early 1970s, food represented the largest single item in
the average family budget. Substantial inflation since that time has made
adequate nutrition for the average Bangalee an impossibility. The
University of Dacca estimated in 1973 that at prices then prevailing a
barely acceptable diet almost wholly lacking in animal protein would cost
an average family of five 150 percent of its annual income. Since 1973 very

95
substantial increases in the cost of staple foods have taken place,
unaccompanied by offsetting increases in income.
Based primarily on rice, the diet supplies insufficient quantities of
protein, colories, fat, and many important vitamins and minerals and is in
many cases almost devoid of animal protein. Cereals supplied at least 70
to 80 percent of the calories and about 70 percent of the protein year
round in the early 1960s. More than half of the remaining protein came
from pulses. The major source of animal protein was fish. Because of
social customs reserving most of the scare delicacies, such as eggs or
infrequent bits of meat, for the adult men, the women and children are at
greatest risk of nutritional deficiency diseases.
In usual times at least 26 percent of the children die before their fifth
birthday, mostly from diseases exacerbated by poor nutrition. Not even
breast-fed children receive sufficient protein, according to authorities;
the children's supplementary diet after about six months of age usually
emphasizes grain rather than animal foods. Researchers have found that
many village mothers consciously avoid giving milk or other protein foods
to young children, at least in part because they associate these foods as
being the cause of various kinds of severe diarrheas, which rank among
the main killers of young children. Apparently accurate village
observation that those fed on animal foods, which provide better media
than grain for the growth of microorganisms, tend to sicken and die more
frequently than others therefore stands in the way of adequate nutrition.
Of the surviving children, many suffer from malnutrition serious enough
to affect physical and, in conditions of famine, mental development. The
government estimated that in the early 1970s almost 4 million children
under ten years of age suffered from moderate to severe malnutrition, a
figure undoubtedly increased by the 1974 food shortage. Government
officials expressed concern about the possibility of mental retardation in
many of these children.
In addition to protein and calorie deficiencies, lack of other nutrients
has serious effects on health. By government estimates, at least one-
third of the population suffers from anemia caused by poor diet and blood
loss to parasites. This is particularly important as a cause of the high
maternal mortality rate. A survey in the early 1960s found about one-
quarter of the population studied suffering from visible goiter, a problem
exacerbated by the widespread use of mustard oil; sufficient dietary
iodine would, however, counteract this effect.
Vitamin A deficiency shows itself in eye diseases. Among the most
severe is keratomalacia, which leaves 75 percent of its victims dead or
permanently blind and, according to a survey in the early 1970s, afflicted
an estimated three or four out of every 500 boys under five years of age.
Less serious vitamin A deficiencies were found in 43 percent of the
children surveyed. Thiamine, riboflavin, vitamin C, and vitamin D are
also deficient in the diet because of a combination of factors, including
improper cooking methods and brief seasonal availability of fruits and
vegetables.
96
 In usual times the diet of rural Bangalees consists of two main meals
and a small breakfast of leftover rice and tea, if the family can afford it. In
the late morning and in the evening, rice is served with whatever else the
family has on hand, mainly curried vegetables or fish. A proper Bangalee
meal always includes rice. The amount of food available generally varies
throughout the year, the monsoon season and winter presenting the
severest hardships. Meat appears in the diet only rarely, mainly as part of
the distributions by the well-to-do in celebration of festivals such as
Qurban Id (see ch. 5). At this time, when animals are sacrificed and
distributed as a religious duty, even the poorest residents of a village can
expect to share in whatever meat is available.
Hindu dietary concepts affect the diet in the form of the distinction
between "hot" foods, such as meat, eggs, honey, fish, and oil, and "cold"
foods, such as rice, vegetables, and fruit. Various illnesses and physical
conditions are also classed as "hot" and "cold" and are treated by giving
food from the opposite category in order to return the body to its
"normal" temperature. Fevers and childbirth, for example, are classified
as "hot" conditions and call for total avoidance of "hot" foods. Authorities
believe that these theories can sometimes aggravate illness by depriving
the patient of needed nutrients.
Health and Health Facilities
In part because of poor nutrition, Bangalees suffer from a number of
infectious and other diseases. Poor sanitation helps infection spread, and
the medical services available are inappropriate to the health problems of
the country. Young children suffer disproportionately from diseases; in
usual years they account for 40 percent of deaths annually, and half die
from diseases directly linked to bad sanitation. The major killers of young
children are various severe diarrheas; authorities estimate that these
may take 250,000 lives annually. Another important childhood killer is
neonatal tetanus caused by unsanitary treatment of the umbilicus.
Maternal deaths during childbirth are also high, numbering thirty per
1,000 births in the 1960s. Authorities link both this and child mortality in
part to poor prenatal nutrition and general debilitation of pregnant
women.
Infectious diseases afflicting significant numbers of Bangalees include
malaria, which has been brought under a measure of control by an
eradication program begun in 1960, and tuberculosis, which may strike as
many as five persons per 1,000 and causes an estimated 100,000 deaths
annually. Tuberculin tests show positive in about 80 percent of adults.
Leprosy victims number an estimated 100,000. Typhoid and paratyphoid,
kalaazar (visceral leishmaniasis), filariasis, venereal disease, dengue,
brucellosis of both animals and humans, yaws, poliomyelitis, measles,
and diphtheria are common. Rabies is endemic throughout the country,
as is dropsy, which is exacerbated by the widespread use of mustard oil.
Intestinal parasites, characterized by observers as "ubiquitous," include
hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, and pinworm.
97
 In the early 1970s probably the greatest health problems were
epidemics of smallpox and cholera. The former had been nearly
eradicated in 1970, but civil strife interrupted the immunization program,
and a major epidemic erupted in 1972, apparently brought from India by
returning refugees. Bangladesh lies in the zone that contains the world's
main area for smallpox, and the disease appears to recur roughly on a
five-year cycle. An epidemic in 1968 produced an estimated 70,000 cases.
Cholera is a yearly occurrence in as many as half the villages, cases
affecting a range of a few people to large segments of the community. The
first outbreaks usually occur in September and October in the northern
part of the country; the disease moves south, reaching Dacca in
November or December and Khulna and Jessore in the spring. The
mechanism of this cycle is not understood, but highly effective
treatments for cholera have been developed. The disruptions and
extreme economic difficulties, however, as well as the dislocations of
large numbers of people occasioned by the events of the early 1970s have
impeded the moderate usual medical efforts, and many thousands ofcases
have gone untreated, resulting in death.
In the face of these problems, Bangladesh depends on a health care
system the government has characterized as "unsuitable." Adherents to
several recognized systems of medicine, including homeopathy, the
Hindu ayurvedic, the Greek-based Muslim Unani, and the Western
allopathic, practice in Bangladesh. For most villagers, the most
accessible medical practitioner is the kobi raj, or village curer. Modern
medical care reaches an estimated 5 percent of the population.
The modern medical care system derives from British efforts continued
in the Pakistan period. It thus emphasizes a curative approach of the kind
familiar in the West and largely ignores preventive medicine and the
serious environmental and public health problems that are the main
causes of suffering in Bangladesh. Training, which is said to be of good
quality, concentrates on hospital-based techniques and on adult condi
tions common in the West, such as heart disease. "The result," according
to public health expert Robert S. Northrup, "is a competent physician
suited better for practice in Western countries than at home, as indicated
by the fact that half the graduates leave the country."
In addition to being inappropriately trained, Bangalee medical
personnel are few and unevenly distributed. In 1973 the country had
7,000 doctors, or one to every 11,000 people. The shortage of trained
nurses was even graver, with one nurse to every eight doctors, as
opposed to a ratio of two to five nurses per doctor common in developed
countries. Thus, despite the bias toward hospital-based treatment,
patient care in existing institutions was hobbled by lack of proper nursing
care. Specialists numbered only 295 in 1973, and some specialties had no
practitioners at all.
Of the country's 12,000 hospital beds in 1973, about 85 percent
belonged to the government health services. Only 1,400 beds were

98
devoted exclusively to maternity cases. The shortage of hospital beds
naturally caused crowding and a severe strain on facilities; in some cases
hospitals resorted to makeshift beds in hallways or to doubling up
patients in beds. Other facilities, such as pharmacies, laboratories, and
X-ray, also fell far short of need, as did the trained personnel needed to
man them.
Maldistribution of existing medical facilities further complicated the
situation. In the early 1970s all but about 1 , 100 hospital beds were located
in urban areas. The countryside had one physician to every 40,000 people,
one hospital bed to every 65,000, and only 250 trained midwives. The
government has characterized attempts to correct the imbalance as
"half-hearted." A plan exists to establish 150 regional health care centers
under the government medical service, but the authorities concede that
those created "were not properly manned or equipped to serve rural
people satisfactorily," and only about 300 government hospital beds exist
in the countryside. Furthermore, of the 450 projected subcenters to feed
into the regional centers, only about 185 had been established by 1973.
The government health service appears to attract and retain qualified
personnel only with difficulty; numerous physician vacancies exist, and
the doctor-nurse ratio is even less favorable than in the country at large.
Additional problems include the shortage of medicines and supplies.
Drug quality is unreliable and supply uncertain. Even relatively simple
items are often unobtainable. An easy and highly effective treatment for
cholera has been developed and used successfully. For example,
intravenous administration of large doses of fluid combined with
antibiotics has saved close to 100 percent of those treated. During the
cholera epidemic of 1974, however, many died because of a shortage of
this relatively simple but bulky material, the difficulty of transporting
sufficient quantities of it over flooded land, and the shortage of people
trained to administer it intravenously. An even simpler treatment, based
on oral administration of a solution made from readily available materials,
has been developed to try to overcome these problems.
The government hopes to restructure and reorient the medical system
to emphasize the needs of the rural population and, eventually, to be able
to cope with the recurrent disasters. Observers doubt, however, that
growth in personnel can even keep pace with the population growth. In
the early 1970s the nation's eight medical schools graduated about 1,400
physicians a year. In 1972 the nation's five nursing schools increased their
previous capacity of 325 graduates a year to 775.
Housing
In the mid-1970s the housing available to the average Bangalee family
provided neither adequate protection from the elements nor sanitary
conditions conducive to good health. By far the most common kind of
housing was the rural kutcha (raw or rough) house, composed of bamboo,
straw, or reed walls and roof over a mud floor. The 1960 housing census

99
showed that 90 percent of rural houses had walls of these materials and 65
percent had roofs of this kind as well. About one-third of the rural houses
have galvanized corrugated iron or corrugated asbestos cement roofs.
Only about 1 percent were yucca houses of stone, concrete, or baked
brick. Although built of the only readily available materials, the kutcka
houses are deficient in several important respects, according to
authorities. They require constant repair and provide inadequate
protection from the severe storms common to the country.
Urban housing conditions were worse. In 1960 only 27 percent of the
urban houses were classified as "permanent or semipermanent"; 72
percent fell into the category of "temporary and unclassified." Many of
the latter were bustees, squalid shanties crowding the squatter districts
around the urban centers.
According to the 1960 census, more than half the households lived in
one room. The number of rooms per household, however, averaged 1.77,
with an average of 3.2 individuals per room. Thirty-one percent of the
people lived five or more to a room; and 13 percent, four or more to a
room.
The series of calamities starting with the 1970 floods, however,
damaged or destroyed a substantial portion of the country's already
inadequate housing stock. In 1970 the floods destroyed an estimated
80,000 houses and damaged almost 250,000 more. The cyclone of
November of that year destroyed at least 100,000 additional houses; this
was followed by the war of 1971 , which left 2 million families homeless. By
August 1972 relief organizations and government efforts had constructed
an estimated 250,000 houses. The floods of 1974, however, affected 36.6
million people, destroyed 500,000 houses, and damaged 1.2 million
others, according to government figures. The famine of the fall of 1974
brought a reported 100,000 or more people a month to the capital in
search of food (see ch. 3). At that time the press began to describe people
living in abandoned buildings, in the streets, and in the most rudimentary
shelters.
EDUCATION
Like the medical system, formal education in Bangladesh is based
primarily on Western models and does not meet the needs of the country.
Literacy probably slightly exceeded 20 percent in the mid-1970s,
although current data were not available in early 1975. In 1961, 21.5
percent of those over five years of age were literate in that they could
read a short statement on everyday life in some language. A 1968 survey
reported a rate of 25.7 percent, but it tested skills against a lower
standard. Education, rather than permitting social mobility by the poor,
has been characterized by authorities as "a great discriminator." Social
background is the primary determinant of school attendance, and the
available institutions favor the well-to-do and tend to slight the needs of
the rural masses.

100
 Originally established by the British to train a small corps of civil
servants for the colonial administration, the educational system that
continued during the Pakistan period and was inherited by Bangladesh
emphasized Western knowledge and a highly academic approach to
learning. According to government sources, "The small section of people
who were educated under this system acquired a set of values which, on
the one hand, alienated them from their own people, and on the other,
developed in them a distaste for all forms of manual labor." Thus the
schools tend to produce liberal arts graduates who suffer from chronic
unemployment or underemployment while industry lacks sufficient
skilled labor.
The condition of the educational system in early 1975 was not entirely
clear. Of the approximately 34,800 schools existing in 1974, at least 18,000
were damaged in the 1974 floods and thousands more in the war and
earlier disruptions. Supplies were known to be inadequate in many
schools, and the percentage of properly trained teachers was low.
Preindependence Background
The earliest schools known to have existed on the Indian subcontinent
were the Hindu Brahman schools. They were opened originally only for
priests, but some time before 500 B.C. members of the warrior,
merchant, and farmer castes began to receive instruction related to their
vocations. Gradually, three types of institutions emerged: the assemblies
of the elders, composed almost excusively of priests; the schools for
future priests; and the primary schools open to all Hindus except the
Untouchables. Primary schools existed in most large villages, were
composed of twelve to twenty students and their teacher, who was also
the village priest, and were held in the open or in any convenient building.
The teacher was regarded as a public official and was supported by the
community through rent-free land or a share in the harvest.
The goal of Buddhist education was primarily preparation for a life of
meditation as a monk. The Buddhist schools were open to all boys and
were usually located in monasteries. Youths who intended to pursue the
monastic life remained in these schools from the ages of six to twenty.
Those who were destined for lay life left school at the age of twelve.
The Muslims brought with them their own educational system. Schools
were generally attached to mosques, and the Quran and other Arabic and
Persian literature formed the basis of the curriculum. Although
government patronage was extended only to the Muslim schools, Hindus
and Buddhists were permitted to continue their traditional forms of
education.
Muslim children could receive instruction in the Quran from the imam
(spiritual leader), or they could attend the maktab (a primary school
attached to the mosque), where they would learn the rudiments of
reading and writing Arabic. In the madrasahs, or secondary schools, the
older children studied intensively the various branches of Islamic

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learning in both Arabic and Persian, as well as rhetoric, grammar, logic,
geometry, algebra, astronomy, natural philosophy, medicine, theology,
and poetry. The madrasah prepared the young student for the life of an
Islamic scholar or teacher. Children of the wealthy were often tutored
privately in their homes; this was the only way in which women could be
educated.
Madrasahs decreased in number and standards with the decline of the
Mughal Empire in the eighteenth century. Muslims expressed their
hostility toward the British by withdrawing into their own communities;
their schools were strictly theological and did not help the individual
adjust to the changes brought about by westernization (see ch. 2). A
leader of the Muslim community, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, urged his
countrymen to emerge from their isolation and avail themselves of the
opportunities that British schools offered. Sir Syed saw much of Western
technology that was compatible with Islam, and his program of education
for Muslim youth stressed the use of English for teaching and the
importance of science in the curriculum. Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental
College (present-day Aligarh Muslim University), which he founded in
1875 at Aligarh, southeast of Delhi, helped to increase the number of
educated Muslims in the civil service. It also helped to ease the
adjustment of the younger generation from the conservative madrasah to
the increasing pace of the modern world. Many leaders of the Muslim
separatist movement in India were products of the college.
By the end of the nineteenth century Muslims had begun to enter the
educational system established by the British; some had reached high
levels of scholarship. A sharp distinction arose between the education of
the traditionalists and that of the modernists. Modern education in
English opened the doors to economic and social advancement under
British rule and, therefore, came to be more valued by the modern
oriented than traditional madrasah education; the ulema (Islamic
scholars) began to lose influence. Although attempts were made to bridge
the gulf between the traditionalists and the modernists, they were not
successful.
The system introduced by the British in the mid-nineteenth century
included primary and secondary schools, colleges, and universities.
Although it gave many Indians excellent preparation for civil service
positions, it supplied little preparation for anything else. Except in rural
primary schools, the language of instruction was usually English; more
recently, however, Bengali had begun to replace English, even at
advanced levels. The desire for universal compulsory education was
prevalent, and the primary school system was expanded. Because of a
lack of trained teachers and adequate facilities, however, the quality of
education was poor.
World War II and the upheavals of partition distracted attention from
education to more pressing problems, and it was not until 1958 that

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adequate time and money could be devoted to educational planning. A
survey of the existing system was made by the newly established
Commission on National Education, which was set up as an advisory
body. Its 360-page report, published in 1960, covered all aspects of
education in both East and West Pakistan. Although the report did not
make proposals for allocations or relate to the economic process, it
suggested the roles of higher and religious education and outlined some
reforms in curriculum.
In a discussion of the goals of primary education, the commission stated
its objectives: to provide education that will develop all aspects of a child's
personality, moral, physical, and mental; to equip him according to his
abilities and aptitudes with basic knowledge and skills he will require as
an individual and in pursuing further education; to awaken in him a
feeling of citizenship, a sense of responsibility, love for his country, and a
willingness to contribute to its development; to foster in him the habits of
industry, personal integrity, and curiosity; and make him aware of the
role of sports and games in physical well-being. In accordance with the
commission's recommendations, the educational system was reorganized
in the early 1960s.
The principal changes were the expansion of the secondary stage
(classes six through ten for children aged eleven through fifteen) to
provide extra courses in agricultural, commercial, and technical subjects
and the addition of one year to intermediate college (classes eleven and
twelve for ages sixteen and seventeen). The change in intermediate
college was rescinded in 1962, however, after demonstrations and riots
by students who saw their goal of employment after twelve years of
schooling postponed another year. Thus in academic year 1970 primary
education covered a single five-year period; secondary education covered
a five-year cycle, subdivided into middle or lower secondary school of
three years and high school of two years. Classes eleven and twelve,
called intermediate college, were viewed as preparation for college
rather than the conclusion of high school. Examinations given at the end
of each stage of education determined which students passed to the next
stage.
Religious Education
Madrasahs are maintained by both public and private funds for training
in Islamic law and literature. The graduates usually assume posts as
imams at mosques, or they may become teachers (see ch. 5). Often they
do both, since many of the primary schools are located in the village
mosques. Advanced education in Islamic studies is also available at the
university level. Both foreign and local observers have criticized the
madrasahs for maintaining a one-sided curriculum that does not prepare
graduates for positions in the secular world. One of the proposals of the
New Educational Policy of the Pakistan period was to modernize and

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integrate religious education by creating the provincial Madrasah
Education Board in each wing to set standards and regulate the
curriculum. In 1969 there were nearly 600,000 madrasah students.
Although separate schools are maintained privately by the Hindus for
the teaching of Sanskrit, there are no institutions of higher learning
devoted to it. The University of Dacca, however, maintains a combined
department of Bengali and Sanskrit and offers higher degrees for studies
in either language.
Schools for the study of Pali are maintained by the Buddhists. There
are no institutions of higher learning devoted to Buddhist studies, and
Pali is not currently offered in the universities. Buddhist students
wishing to continue their education usually attend the University of
Rangoon in Burma or the University of Calcutta in India.
The Educational Career
For the average Bangalee youth, attendance at school is a brief and
relatively uninfiuential experience. Authorities suggest that no more
than 10 to 15 percent of rural young people retain from their schooling a
permanent ability to read and write. For most, such skills as are
developed during a year or two of primary education later atrophy
through disuse.
Academic training consists of three levels before the university or
equivalent degree college. Five years of primary lead to seven years of
secondary, divided into two levels. The five years of lower secondary
(grades six through ten) lead to a secondary school certificate examina
tion, passage of which entitles the student to proceed to two years of
higher secondary or intermediate training, which culminate in a higher
secondary school examination after grade twelve.
Students may enter a technical course after eighth grade and then
proceed to a certificate course for training to become a skilled worker.
Those with a secondary school certificate may enter a polytechnic or
commercial institute for a diploma course. Those with a higher secondary
certificate may enroll for university degree courses in engineering.
Throughout the system, a high dropout rate exists. The government
claims that 58 percent of the primary-age cohort was enrolled in the
30,000 primary schools in 1972, but authorities believe that this estimate
is too high. In any case, many of those ostensibly enrolled do not attend
regularly. One-half or more of the primary students might be absent at a
time, especially when farmwork conflicts with school. About one-half of
the students drop out after the first year, and three-quarters drop out
while still in the primary grades. The dropout rate for girls is especially
high, in part because of the belief that women do not need education, in
part because girls are needed to help at home with younger siblings, and
in part because only about 3 percent of the primary teachers are women,
creating problems for parents who wish their daughters to avoid contact
with men.
In many cases, education at the primary level is of low quality. At least
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one-third of all primary teachers have no pedagogic training at all, and
most ofthe rest have attended primary training institutes that emphasize
rote methods of instruction.
The government claims that in the early 1970s about 17 percent of the
appropriate age cohort was enrolled in the nation's 6,000 secondary
schools, although this figure may to be too high also. The government
acknowledges that the curricula of these schools have been "inordinately
tilted toward humanities"; in 1973 only 770 offered both humanities and
science. About 220 offered vocational subjects as well. An estimated 10
percent of the boys and 3 percent of the girls who begin schooling finish
the lower secondary course, and the higher secondary schools enroll
about 6 percent of the relevant age-group.
Conditions in many of the lower secondary schools are little better than
those in the primary grades. Only about 30 percent of the teachers have
any pedagogic training, and less than 10 percent are women, again
creating problems for female students. Classes are often very crowded;
fifty to seventy-five students per room are not uncommon, and supplies
are scanty. In the words of a government document, "Classroom work is
very academic, bookish, consisting largely of parroting of the text." In
addition, secondary schools charge tuition of about Tk5 to Tk7 a month,
unlike the free primary schools; additional costs, including clothing,
books, and lost income of the student, place secondary education out of
the reach of most families. Furthermore, because secondary schools are
less numerous than primary, some students have to board away from
home, thereby further increasing costs.
At the postsecondary level, the student can enroll in six universities
and over 600 degree and intermediate colleges, of which thirty-four were
run by the government in 1973. Of the universities, those at Dacca,
Rajshahi, Chittagong, and Jahangirnagar offered a number of curricula,
including studies in the highly sophisticated Bengali literary and artistic
tradition. Universities at Mymensingh and Khulna specialized in
engineering and agriculture, respectively (see ch. 7).
Education and Society
Most observers, both Bangalee and foreign, agree that the system does
not meet the needs of Bangladesh. The heavy emphasis on examinations,
memorization, and liberal arts subjects prevents the schools from
producing graduates who can be easily absorbed into the existing labor
market. Like many developing countries, Bangladesh has a serious
problem of unemployment among the educated, alleviated in part by
emigration of some graduates, especially those who have studied abroad.
Thus, the country loses an important portion of its scarce but unwisely
invested social capital. Talented rural youths also attempt to use
education as a means of escaping life in the countryside; the vast bulk of
graduates cluster in the urban areas, and most refuse to live in rural areas
if they can avoid it.
This factor, as well as the low pay and the fact that most primary
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schools are located in rural areas, makes recruitment of good-quality
teachers very difficult. Primary teachers do not enjoy high social status in
the villages. The government has stated, in fact, "The social image of
teachers has been gradually eroded. It has now become extremely
difficult to recruit young school leavers to the teaching profession." The
high proportion of improperly trained teachers had resulted in what the
government has called "deterioration in the quality of instruction." The
number of untrained teachers went from 62,000 in 1947 to 88,000 in 1972.
Female teachers tend to teach in the urban areas and at the secondary
level, where they compose 8 percent of the profession, as opposed to 3
percent at the primary level. Educated women generally come from a
relatively high social origin and often seek teaching positions in schools
for girls. Very few women with the requisite training live in villages,
where their freedom of movement would be more constrained.
Because of many factors, education in Bangladesh has traditionally
served to consolidate the social position of the well-to-do rather than to
permit mobility by the masses. Although the vast majority of families do
not keep their children in school for any significant length of time, the
minority who take advantage of the educational system do so with
consistency. Thus, of the 30 percent of families with primary-age children
whose offspring attended school in the early 1970s, 80 percent had all
their children in school. These families had two to three times the annual
mean income of the nonenrolling families. The discrepancy increases at
the more advanced stages of education. To keep a student in college, even
with government subsidies, cost his family the equivalent of about
US$280 a year in the early 1970s, a figure about four times the national
per capita income.
Although characterized by the government as "elitist and formal" and
"disproportionately" costly, the postsecondary institutions have been by
far the fastest growing sector of the educational establishment. In 1951,
according to government statistics, college students numbered 18,000; by
1972 they had increased to 328,000. During this period the number of
colleges expanded from fifty-nine to nearly 500. The fiscal year ending in
June 1973 alone saw a 30-percent increase in the number of colleges.
Much of this increase represents the founding of low-quality private
institutions to absorb jobless young people and to exploit their desire to
gain further credentials to help in later competition for employment. In
the words of the government, this expansion "has facilitated the
Secondary School Certificate holders to continue academic activities
which are of negligible value from the point of view of national manpower
requirements."
Because secondary and higher education benefits the small middle and
upper classes and because the government defrays a portion of the costs
of private institutions through grants, the poor in effect subsidize the
education of the well-to-do. This situation is most marked at the

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university level, where 0.3 percent of the students consume 14 percent of
the education budget.
The technical education sector, which experienced some growth in the
1960s, nevertheless fails to provide the numbers and kinds of personnel
required by the economy. On the one hand, many of the 140 engineers
graduating annually at the degree level are too highly trained to be
readily useful in the relatively unsophisticated industrial plants. On the
other hand, many of the 2,800 diploma graduates and the 1,500 certificate
holders produced annually lack appropriate on-the-job experience to
compete with nongraduates who demand lower pay and often require no
more training by their employers.
Government documents also suggest that much university training
may be unproductive. Many enter university because of lack of
employment rather than any dedication to scholarship and higher
studies. This, combined with the bleak future that many university
students foresee, creates a highly political atmosphere on university
campuses, often interfering with serious academic work (see ch. 9).
Cognizant of the many problems it had inherited from the Pakistan
period, the government in 1972 established the Education Commission to
study the situation and make recommendations to meet the country's
future needs. The final commission report was not complete in early 1975,
but the First Five Year Plan incorporated recommendations of an interim
report that was made in June 1973. The plan states the pressing need to
reorient the educational system toward mass literacy, technical training,
coordination of curricula with manpower needs, increased access to
education for the poor, and vastly increased adult and nonformal
education. Critics point out, however, that the plan fails to suggest a
realistic strategy for achieving these goals in the face of the shortage of
teachers, the serious budget deficits of the government, and the political
pressures of the educated classes. Indeed, the fact that the plan calls for a
63-percent increase in university enrollments despite severe unemploy
ment for graduates has been cited by some as evidence that the
government's approach remains, at least in practical terms, unchanged.
Furthermore, observers point out that the plan emphasizes expansion
of the existing system rather than changes that would improve the
quality of instruction significantly. Even admitting that the obstacles
faced by the government are formidable indeed, the fact that it hopes to
bring secondary class size to the "optimum" level of fifty students does
not presage an early improvement in student performance.
Realization of the plan's goals depends on a corps of educational
administrators characterized by the government as "weak." The plan
states, "Efficiency in the management of the institutions is extremely
poor, mainly due to lack of training of the administrators (principals,
headmistresses, development officers) in financial management and
institutional planning. Unless a concerted effort is made to increase the

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efficiency of administrators in this regard, an enormous wastage in
financial and manpower resources will take place during the First Five
Year Plan and thereafter."

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 CHAPTER 5
RELIGIOUS LIFE
A secular, predominantly Muslim state with a substantial non-Muslim
minority, Bangladesh derives an important measure of its national
identity from its religious character. The size and cultural influence of the
Hindu element, along with certain peculiarities of the country's history,
make the commitment to Islam uniquely Bengali. Features of Bengali
Hinduism, which for its part differs in some respects from Hinduism as
practiced in other parts of the subcontinent, have influenced both the
content and social structure of Bengali Islam.
Observers estimated the 1971 Hindu population at 12 percent, down
from 20 percent in 1961; steady emigration throughout the decade
accounts for most of the difference. Other minorities include several
hundred thousand Buddhists and a combined total of several hundred
thousand adherents of Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and tribal religions
usually grouped under the rubric of animism. The Constitution
guarantees all minorities the right to practice their religion and to enjoy
full civil rights and, unlike many predominantly Muslim states,
enunciates secularism and nonestablishment of religion as governing
principles of the new republic.
Although loyalty to and pride in Islam are widespread, the degree of
observance varies with social position, geographic location, and personal
predilection. Especially among the uneducated and rural populations,
furthermore, both belief and practice tend to incorporate elements that
vary from, and in some cases conflict with, the teachings of orthodox
Islam.

ISLAM
Tenets
In A.D. 610 Muhammad (later known as the Prophet), a merchant
belonging to the Hashemite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the
Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations
granted him by God through the Angel Gabriel. Muhammad denounced
the polytheistic paganism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's
economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the shrine
called the Kaaba and numerous pagan shrines located there, his vigorous
and continuing censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of the
town's leaders. In A.D. 622 he and a group of his followers were accepted

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into the town of Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (the city)
because it was the center of Muhammad's activities. The move (hijrah),
known in the West as the Hegira, marks the beginning of the Islamic era
and of Islam as a force on the stage of history; the Muslim calendar, based
on the lunar year, begins in A.D. 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued
to preach, eventually defeated his detractors in battle, and consolidated
both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of all Arabia in his person
before his death in A.D. 632.
After Muhammad's death his followers compiled those of his words
regarded as coming directly from God as the Quran, the holy scripture of
Islam; others of his sayings and teachings and the precedents of his
personal behavior, recalled by those who had known him during his
lifetime, became the Hadith. Together they form the Sunna, a
comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the
Muslim.
The creed (shahadah; in Bengali, kalima) succinctly states the central
belief of Islam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his
Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual
occasions, and recital in full and unquestioning sincerity designates one a
Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad was not one previously
unknown to his countrymen, for Allah is the Arabic word for God rather
than a particular name. Instead of introducing a new deity, Muhammad
denied the existence of the many minor gods and spirits worshiped before
his ministry and declared the omnipotence of the unique creator, God.
God is invisible and omnipresent; to represent him in any visual symbol is
a sin.
Islam means submission to God, and he who submits is a Muslim.
Muhammad is the "seal ofthe Prophets"; his revelation is said to complete
for all time the series of biblical revelations received by the Jews and the
Christians. God is believed to have remained one and the same
throughout time, but men had strayed from his true teachings until set
aright by Muhammad. Prophets and sages of the biblical tradition, such
as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (known in Bangladesh as Ibrahim, Musa,
and Isa), are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam,
however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's
deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels,
the Day of Judgment ("last day"), general resurrection, heaven and hell,
and eternal life of the soul.
The duties of the Muslim form the five pillars of the faith. These are the
recitation of the creed; daily prayer (salat, in Bengali namaj); almsgiving
(zakat, in Bengali jakat); fasting (sawm, in Bengali roja); and haj, or
pilgrimage. The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after
purification through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon,
sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations are to
accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward
Mecca. Whenever possible men pray in congregation at the mosque under

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a prayer leader, and on Fridays they are obliged to do so. Women may
also attend public worship at the mosque, where they are segregated
from the men, although most frequently those who pray do so at home. A
special functionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire
community at the appropriate hours; those out of earshot determine the
proper time from sun. Public prayer is a conspicuous and widely practiced
aspect of Islam in Bangladesh.
In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed a tax on personal
property proportionate to one's wealth; this was distributed to the
mosques and to the needy. In addition, free-will gifts were made.
Almsgiving, however, although still a duty of the believer, has become a
more private matter. Properties contributed by pious individuals to
support religious activities are usually administered as religious
foundations.
The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramazan, a period of
obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt of God's
revelation, the Quran. During the month all but the sick, the weak,
pregnant women, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and
young children are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual
intercourse during the daylight hours. The pious well-to-do usually do
little or no work during this period, and some businesses close for all or
part of the day. Since the months of the lunar calendar revolve through
the solar year, Ramazan falls at various seasons in different years. A fast
in summertime imposes considerable hardship on those who must do
physical work. Ramazan is widely observed throughout Bangladesh.
Finally, all Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if possible,
make the haj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in special rites held
there during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. The Prophet
instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom to emphasize
sites associated with Allah and Abraham, founder of monotheism and
father of the Arabs through his son Ishmael (Ismail). The pilgrim,
dressed in a white seamless garment (ihram), abstains from sexual
relations, shaving, haircutting, and nail paring. Highlights of the
pilgrimage include kissing the sacred black stone; circumambulating the
Kaaba, the sacred structure reputedly built by Abraham that houses it;
running seven times between the mountains Safa and Marwa in imitation
of Hagar, Ishmael's mother, during her travail in the desert; and standing
in prayer on Mount Arafat. The returning pilgrim is entitled to the
honorific hajji before his name. Qurban Id, celebrated worldwide, marks
the end of the haj month; in many Muslim societies the festival is known as
Id al Adha.
The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on earth,
the jihad, represents an additional general duty of all Muslims. Many
uneducated Bangalees believe this to be one of the five pillars, in place of
recitation of the creed. Although this has in the past been used to justify
holy wars, modern Muslims see it in a broader context of civic and

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personal action. In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code of
ethical conduct encouraging generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect
and forbidding adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of
carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol.
A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is neither
intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Those who lead prayers,
preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by virtue of their superior
knowledge and scholarship rather than because of any special powers or
prerogatives conferred by ordination.

Early Development
During his lifetime Muhammad was both spiritual and temporal leader
of the Muslim community; he established the concept of Islam as a total
and all-encompassing way of life for man and society. Islam teaches that
Allah revealed to Muhammad the rules governing decent behavior, and it
is therefore incumbent on the individual to live in the manner prescribed
by revealed law and upon the community to perfect human society on
earth according to the holy injunctions. Islam traditionally recognized no
distinction between religion and state. Religious and secular life merged,
as did religious and secular law. In keeping with this conception of
society, all Muslims have been traditionally subject to the sharia, or
religious law. A comprehensive system of law, the sharia developed
gradually during the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the
accretion of precedent and interpretation by various judges and scholars.
During the tenth century A.D., however, legal opinion began to harden
into authoritative doctrine, and the figurative gate of interpretation (bab
al ijtihad) gradually closed. Thenceforth, rather than encouraging
flexibility, Islamic law emphasized maintenance of the status quo.
In A.D. 632, after Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim
community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law
and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time some
persons favored Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his favorite
daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat Ali, or party of
Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs,
Umar, who succeeded in A.D. 634, and Uthman, who took power in A.D.
646, enjoyed recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally
succeeded to the caliphate in A.D. 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria,
rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing
civil war, Ali moved his capital to Mesopotamia where in a short time he
too was murdered.
Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates and
the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized a single
caliphate. Muawiyah then proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The
Shiat Ali, however, refused to recognized Muawiyah or his line, the
Umayyad caliphs; they withdrew in the first great schism and established
a dissident sect known as the Shiah, or Shiites, in support of the claims of

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Ali's line to a presumptive right to the caliphate based on descent from
the Prophet. The larger faction of Islam, the Sunni, claims to follow the
orthodox teaching and example ofthe Prophet as embodied in the Sunna.
Orginally political in nature, the differences between the Sunni and
Shiite interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical
overtones. Ali's two sons, Hasan and Husayn, killed in the wars following
the schism, became martyred heroes to the Shiites and repositories of the
claims of Ali's line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis
retained the doctrine of leadership by consensus, although Arabs and
members of the Quraysh, Muhammad's tribe, predominated in the early
years. Reputed descent from the Prophet still carries great social and
religious prestige throughout the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the Shiite
doctrine of rule by divine right became more and more firmly established,
and disagreements over which of several pretenders had the truer claim
to the mystical power of Ali precipitated repeated further schisms. Some
Shiite groups developed doctrines of divine leadership far removed from
the strict monotheism of early Islam, including beliefs in hidden but
divinely chosen leaders and spiritual powers that equaled or surpassed
those of the Prophet himself.
The early political rivalry remained active as well. Shiism gained
political dominance in Iraq, Persia, and Yemen; Shiites are also numerous
in Syria and are found in all Muslim countries. Almost all Muslims in
Bangladesh, however, are Sunni.
Worship
There is a mosque (masjid—literally, place of prostration) in nearly
every village. Pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina are annual events. Since
the development of railway, air, and steamship lines, the number of
pilgrims has greatly increased. Returned pilgrims who have seen the
more austere Islam of the Arab world tend to become promoters of
orthodoxy at home. Whereas formerly the long pilgrimage was the
prerogative of the wealthy, low transportation fares make it possible for
the relatively poor to set aside enough to fulfill their pious dreams. For
those who cannot travel to the Arabian centers of Islam, the tombs of
local Muslim saints serve as alternative sites.
Although no formal ecclesiastical organization exists in Islam, and in
theory the existence of special access to God conflicts with Muslim
teachings, in fact a learned quasi-priestly class known as the ulema (those
possessed of religious knowledge) has grown up to interpret and
administer religious law. At the lower levels are imams of individual
mosques; maulvis, who have completed ten years of basic religious
training; mullahs and munshis, who have completed fewer years; and
maulanas, who have received some advanced training in Muslim law and
theology. A fakir is a religious mendicant, believed possessed of barakat
(special spiritual powers), and a pir is a Muslim spiritual guide (see
Muslim Insitututions and Leadership, this ch.).

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 South Asian Islam has been affected by Hindu forms of caste, and social
distinctions analogous to those among the higher and lower castes are
made, although less strictly than in other parts of the subcontient.
Circumcisers, for example, whose function is required by Islam but is
regarded as possibly polluting in Hinduism, form a special low caste in
some areas.

Conversion
Islam has always been a proselytizing religion. In the earliest days of
Muslim rule there was some incidence of conversion by the sword, but on
the whole forcible conversion was not pursued by later Muslim rulers.
Powerful economic pressure in the form of a special tax imposed on
unbelievers (jizya), however, occasionally brought whole areas to the
Islamic fold. This tax provided a strong economic incentive to conversion.
Conversion was generally collective rather than individual, although
individual Hindus who were ostracized for any reason often became
Muslims. Many were converted by the Muslim missionaries and mystics
who wandered about the villages and towns, some of whom were
subsequently regarded as saints.
Possibly because of the presence of large numbers of non-Muslims,
Muslims in the territories that became Bangladesh have not traditionally
emphasized the absolute purity of doctrine and practice that concerns
Muslims in some other parts of the world. Some authorities have even
suggested that the difference in attitude on this point between the former
east and west wings of Pakistan contributed to the ferocity of the fighting
during the war for independence (see ch. 2). Marta Nicholas and Philip
Oldenburg write, for example, "The closeness of the relationship of Islam
with Bengal, and of Hindu and Muslim in Bengal, has been partially
responsible for the atrocities of the Pakistani army in Bangladesh. For
the Muslims of the West say that Bengali Islam is somewhat tainted
because of its association with Hinduism, and holy war for the purpose of
purification of the faith is justified in the Islamic tradition."
Muslim Groups and Sects
The Sunnis are the majority who follow the Sunna, developed and
interpreted by the early recognized leaders and jurists of the community.
The Hadith and the Sunna were further developed into four schools of
law. All four are equally orthodox; but a Sunni usually follows one of
them, and one generally prevails in a particular country. Bangalees
usually follow the Hanafite school. There are, of course, numerous
groups, divisions, and movements within the Sunni fold. In some areas
followers of particular mullahs or prayer leaders form worship and
fellowship groups known as mallot, samaj, or majhab. These groups,
which resemble those prevalent among Bengali Vaishnava Hindus, also
function to settle disputes and channel mutual aid (see Hinduism, this
ch.).

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 The vast majority of Bangladesh villagers consider themselves Sunnis;
Bangalee Shiites generally live in towns. Partisanship for Ali was not
only political but also came to involve the doctrine that the divine light
(nur), which had been transmitted from prophet to prophet since the
time of Adam, did not cease shining after Muhammad but passed on to Ali
and thence to a line of Ali's descendants. According to Shiah doctrine,
these descendants were the rightful leaders of the Muslim community
and the sole interpreters of religious doctrine; some Shiah sects have
attributed to them various forms of mystical or divine authority. The
most characteristic Shiah observance, Muharram, commemorates the
martyrdom of Ali's sons Hasan and Husayn. Some Shiah doctrines and
the practices that went with them greatly influenced the early Sufis
(mystics) of Islam, but orthodox Shiism has generally been hostile to the
formation of Sufi brotherhoods.

MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERSHIP

Orthodox Islam does not differentiate among believers. The Quran
recognizes no communion of saints to intercede for sinners, no holy
orders, and no priesthood. The religious commemorations in the Muslim
calendar are not analogous to the high days and holy days of the Roman
Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christian ecclesiastical years. Although
many mosques and tombs have a sacred atmosphere about them, they are
not hallowed or consecrated places. In sum, there is no Muslim church.
Although there are no ordained priests in Islam, there are two groups
of men who provide religious leadership and often function, in effect, as
priests. In addition to the ulema, the loose collection of men often called
pirs is associated with the mystical or devotional side of Islam known as
Sufism. Both traditions and kinds of leadership—the law and the ulema,
and Sufism and the pirs—are important in popular Islam.
The Law and the Ulema
The leadership of the ulema is the leadership of a community that
follows the law of God as revealed through the Prophet and interpreted
by him. The authority of the ulema is thus based on their knowledge of the
sharia. The science of law is usually defined as "the knowledge of the
rights and duties whereby man may fitly conduct his life in this world and
prepare himself for the future life." There was never a full separation
made between law in the sense of the limits on human freedom and law in
the sense of duty. Because the basis of the law is the word of God, to
violate or neglect it is not simply to infringe a rule of social order, it is an
act of religious disobedience and involves a religious penalty. Because the
sharia or "highway" of divine command never became a single formal
code, it is sometimes construed simply as the essential principle or spirit
of Islam. More often, it is construed as the injunction embodied in the
Quran and Hadith, interpreted and developed historically in response to
the needs of the rapidly expanding Muslim community.

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 The development and preservation of this law came to require a high
degree of scholarship. If a matter was not explicitly covered in the Quran,
the early Muslim scholars turned to the oral Hadith for guidance, and
complicated methods were devised to separate the large number of
spurious traditions from the genuine teachings and to rank the latter in
order of authenticity. To the Quran and Hadith were applied various
forms of analogical reasoning (kiyas) to derive further interpretations.
Sometime in the second century of the Islamic era the scholars accepted
the principle that a consensus of the community (ijma) had binding force.
In practice, this meant the consensus of the ulema, because only they
possessed the required knowledge (Um). "As the Tradition was the
integration of the Quran," wrote the late H.A.R. Gibb, a noted Islamic
scholar, "so the consensus of scholars became the integration of the
Tradition" and, in effect, underlies the whole imposing structure of
Muslim law and doctrine.
Once the consensus of the community was exercised, the decision was
regarded as irrevocable. The right of individual interpretation or
judgment (ijtihad) was confined to points on which no agreement was yet
reached. These diminished in time, and the majority of the ulema held
that after the first three or four centuries of Islam the "gate of
interpretation" was permanently closed. Adjustment, elaboration, and
refinement, continued, and the four schools of law were developed, but
the basic canon law has remained essentially the same. Thus the function
of the ulema has become that of expounding and preserving a system of
law and practice that was already formulated. Their conservatism has
had its virtues, for historically they have acted as the "sheet anchor" of
Islam, maintaining the unity of the Muslim world and withstanding
successive challenges from Hellenism, mysticism, indigenous popular
cults and, on the Asian subcontinent, Hinduism.
The combined total of the great effort of traditionalism and reasoned
interpretation makes up the corpus of Muslim law known as the fiqh
(understanding). In effect, the sharia is thus contained in books,
documents, and legal decisions (fatwahs), the methodical knowledge of
whch constitutes thefiqh. Sometimes thefiqh is denned as positive law,
in contrast to the sharia, or moral law.
In Bangladesh there are no official sharia courts; the British kind of
legal system operates (see ch. 8). In matters of personal law, however,
there are local judges or lawyers known as qazis (also kazis), whose
advice is often sought and followed. Apart from this, the ulema do not
perform the official juridical functions they perform in some other Muslim
countries.
Their function, as they conceive it, is still that of teaching and
preserving the Islamic way of life in the face of outside challenge,
specifically from modern sociopolitical ideas based on both western
Christianity and communism. The problem of adjustment involves deep
religious issues; if one starts compromising and throwing out portions of

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the fiqh and Sunna, it is exceedingly difficult to establish, on logical
grounds, the point at which the revision should stop.
Despite their considerable prestige, members of the ulema generally
do not enjoy a high material standard of living. A prayer leader's income
is not secure; he may be paid out of voluntary contributions, funds from
trust property, or a conventional share of village produce at harvest time.
He looks after the mosque, collects its revenues, leads the prayers, and
delivers the weekly sermons. He also acts as a consultant on points of
Muslim law and is usually called upon to participate in religious functions,
marriages, and funerals in exchange for gifts or cash. When a mosque is
also used as a school, the imam is the teacher, the studies being confined
to the learning of the Quran. The office of imam is accorded by the
consensus of the community, and in practice it may become hereditary.
In the larger mosques of the cities the imam is ordinarily a maulvi or
maulana and may be highly respected as a person of some learning and
distinction, but in most of the villages he has rarely received any higher
training. He has studied long enough to learn by rote the prayers that he
recites. He may know the Arabic script well enough to read Quranic
verses but with limited or no comprehension of what he is reading, and
the sermons he delivers are usually a mumble of stock phrases in Arabic
and the vernacular. In such cases his authority often stems less from his
learning than from the magical powers he is believed by the uneducated
to possess by virture of his familiarity with the Quran. These imams are
popularly called mullahs, as distinguished from the learned ulema.
The term mullah may be used to refer to a maulvi or to a local imam of
some natural wisdom and dignity, but usually it is a rather derogatory
term that connotes a semiliterate, backward, often bigoted village imam.
As the recognized religious leader of the community the mullah may be
very influential and possess considerable authority in some villages; in
other villages he may be regarded with friendliness and indulgence but
little respect.
The villagers call upon the mullah for socioreligious functions and may
also consult him to determine whether a particular kind of behavior is
permissible, although in important matters of this sort they may travel
some distance to consult someone of higher reputation. More commonly
they come to him for amulets and charms consisting of Quranic phrases
written on bits of paper that are believed to cure sickness, snakebite, and
sexual impotence; to ward off evil jinns; to ensure the birth of sons; and to
bring good luck in projected undertakings. Many villagers have implicit
faith in such cures for disease and appear to benefit from them. Some
mullahs derive a significant portion of their income from such sales.
Sufism and the Pirs
Sufism
The tradition of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism is common
throughout the Islamic world and is especially prevalent, in a bewildering

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variety of forms, in the subcontinent. It appeared early in Islamic history
and has developed in various forms in all branches of Islam. As it spread it
became essentially a popular movement emphasizing love rather than
fear of God—a direct, personal devotion to God rather than the more
mechanical outward observance of communal discipline. The orthodox
ulema claimed that truth could be found only through detailed knowledge
of the arduously developed science of law, whereas the Sufis sought truth
through the living experience of God culminating in momentary union
with him. Sufism gave an emotional release to the religious fears and
longings of the people that were often ignored by the dry scholasticism of
the ulema.
In the first four of five centuries of its existence, several non-Islamic
elements (such as celibacy and saint worship) became a part of Sufism,
and the ulema countered with increasing pedantry and repression. A
compromise was brought about largely through the teachings of a famous
Sufi, Ghazali, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This marked a
revolution in the history of Islam.
The changes were roughly of two sorts. On the one hand, men were led
back from scholasticism to living contact with the Quran and Hadith,
which were brought within the range of the ordinary mind, and a new
vigor and warmth were infused into the orthodox religious discipline.
Many gifted poets and orthodox legal scholars of both Sunni and Shiah
persuasions have been inspired by the higher Sufi ideas without formally
becoming Sufis themselves. Refreshed and strengthened, Islam was
brought to large new areas, including the Indian subcontinent, where the
men most active in winning converts to the Quran and Sunna were the
Sufis or those inspired by Sufism.
On the other hand, the emotional side of religion and the "way" of the
mystics became an integral part of Islam, "stamped with the approval of
ijma and accepted as orthodox," and this had some unforeseen
consequences. Within the ranks of the Sufis there were and remain wide
gradations, ranging from men of great intellect and character whose
mysticism strengthened and enriched their understanding of Islamic
doctrine, to those who found mystical cults emtionally satisfying and
were ready to admit non-Islamic ideas and practices if they produced
results. Some of the Hindu elements that were retained upon conversion
to Islam have disappeared over the years, but many others have been
modified rather than eliminated. In addition, there are numerous purely
local indigenous practices, not necessarily Hindu or Muslim, which are
still fully observed by Hindus and Muslims alike.
Sufism prevails in Bangladesh to a greater extent than in most other
Muslim countries. Observers cite two main reasons: the tremendous
influence of Sufis in converting the Bengalis and the convergence of Sufi
beliefs with the concern for mystical ways of knowing long influential in
South Asian religions generally. Both the fakir and the pir are familiar

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figures on the village scene, and in some areas the shrines of saints almost
outnumber the mosques.
The Sufi Orders
The followers of Sufism believe that a man cannot pursue the path to
spiritual salvation or communion with God without the help of a murshid
(preceptor) who has amassed sufficient spiritual power and merit to help
his murid (disciple). From the time Sufism swelled into a popular
movement to the present day, pious men of outstanding personality,
reputed to have the gift of miraculous powers, have found followers
crowding to them. The murid can be a kind of lay associate, earning his
living in secular occupations, consulting the murshid at times, participat
ing in the ceremonies, or dhikr, and making offerings contributing to the
support of the murshid; or he may be initiated into a brotherhood that
pledges its devotion to the murshid, lives in close association with him,
and spends its time in pious exercises to bring about mystical
enlightenment.
These brotherhoods of "poor men," or "mendicants," grew out of loose,
voluntary associations and developed into organized monastic orders
somewhat similar to those of Christianity and Buddhism. The center of
the community would be the residence of the murshid, and monasteries
would be established by supporters. When the murshid died, he was
venerated as a saint, his tomb functioning as a shrine, and his place was
taken by his son or, if celibacy were enforced, by a disciple elected to
leadership. The pursuit of mystical experience came to involve successive
stages of discipline and enlightenment. When a murid had reached the
higher stages of initiation he might go out to preach his master's "way,"
gain new disciples at another center, and found a subsidiary monastery.
In this way, from about the twelfth century on, networks of Sufi orders
were spread throughout the Islamic world.
There are several major Sufi orders in South Asia and a large number of
small, irregular orders, but neither the geographical distribution nor the
size of their respective followings is known with any accuracy. Their
many subsections vary widely according to whether they were initially
urban or rural orders, the nature and degree of organization, the extent
to which their beliefs and practices conform with those of the ulema,
their litany and ceremony, and their methods of inducing the mystic
state. The Qadiri, Naqshbandi, and Chishti orders are among the most
widespread in Bangladesh. The beliefs and practices of the first two are
quite close to those of orthodox Islam; the third, founded in Ajmer, India
is peculiar to the subcontinent and has a number of unorthodox practices,
such as the use of music in its litany. It has included many musicians and
poets in its ranks. Perhaps as many as two-thirds of the Muslims of
Bangladesh are under the influence of one ofthe Sufi orders, although this
influence often involves only occasional consultation or celebration rather
than formal affiliation.

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The Pirs and Saint Worship
Bangalees usually call the murshids pirs, a term commonly used to
cover the combined meanings of teachers and saints. In some regions the
termsfakir and pir are used interchangeably, but in general the former
connotes an itinerant holy man and the latter connotes an established
murshid with a larger following and higher sanctity.
There is no standard procedure for succession; a pir may pass through
discipleship himself and then gain his own following or he may inherit his
sainthood. Generally, saints are believed to possess barakat, a transfera
ble quality of personal sacredness and spiritual power. This may inhere in
the saint's tomb after his death as well as pass to one or another of his
disciples. The surest proof of the possession of barakat is the ability to
perform miraculous or exemplary acts, and these acts often serve to
validate the standing of a pir or shrine.
A number of the most notable pirs in the past, many of whom were the
Sufi missionaries who won converts to Islam, founded what have aptly
been called dynasties of saints. Along with sainthood a pir might inherit
property contributed over the years by his ancestor's followers (whom he
would visit periodically to receive offerings and grant spiritual merit) and
be a landed aristocrat at thead of a sizable establishment. The birthright
pir, his household subordinates, and the murids initiated into his order
usually reside near the tomb of the original saint, which serves as a holy
shrine for the community.
Innumerable tombs of the saints function as chapels or shrines in the
subcontinent. At some a descendant of the pir functions as the living
saint. At others there is no living pir descended from the original one, but
there is a hereditary official who looks after the tomb and administers its
property and revenues. Where there is also a resident Sufi order, a
certain rivalry or hostility sometimes develops between the brotherhood
and this family of officials. Many others are simply wayside shrines
visited occasionally (especially by women) in times of need; and still
others have fallen into disuse. Certain shrines specialize in the treatment
of particular conditions and have widespread reputations for efficacy.
Persons may make pilgrimages to the shrines to make personal prayers,
give offerings of food or money, make vows, burn oil lamps, and engage in
similar forms of veneration.
Behind this worship at the tombs of saints lies the belief that their
barakat enables them to intercede for the devout with God, a notion that
is anathema to the purist ulema. The observance of the pir's death
anniversary (urs) is held to be an especially propitious time for seeking
his intercession. Large numbers of devotees take part in these
ceremonies in their best and gayest attire and often with more
enthusiasm and faith than they display in observing the official
commemorations. The ceremonies often appear to be quite similar in
form, content, and timing to the Hindu festivals of the agricultural year.
The fairs, dancing girls, and general festivities are attended and enjoyed
by the followers of the pir and orthodox Muslims alike.
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 The Mullahs and the Pirs
At times the functions of the pirs and the ulema overlap and merge—an
important pir may be the leader of his community in every way, or the
local mullah may combine the functions of pir and imam—but it is possible
to make a rather general distinction between the kinds of religious
leadership provided by the two. The qualifications for leadership are
different; the maulvi undergoes formal training in Islamic law, whereas
the pir gains his powers through various mystical experiences and may
have no formal education at all. The maulvis and maulanas may carry on
an independent profession, whereas the pir usually spends all of his time
in religious devotion. The maulvis are ordinarily proponents of one of the
four Sunni schools of law or one of the Shiah sects, whereas the message
of the pir transcends such divisions. The maulvis or mullahs are usually
the most orthodox Muslims in the village, whereas the local pir may not
observe the ordinary rules of the community because, by virtue of his
special relationship with God, such rules do not apply to him.
The office of imam may in practice be hereditary, but it is formally
conferred by the consensus of the community as a whole. No such
consensus is necessary for a pir, and he may be highly venerated by some
members of the village and ignored or scoffed at by others. The religious
leadership of the mullah is the leadership of the community as a
community; the guidance of the pir is the guidance of persons more as
individuals. A Muslim may go to the pir for personal inspiration and
advice and be highly impressed by his magical prowess, but he neither
wants nor expects the pir to lead the communal prayers or deliver the
weekly sermon.
In many areas the mullahs and the pirs, although they may not be
friendly with each other, are quite compatible because each ministers to
different religious needs. In a number of cases they are not so compatible.
Although Sufism was recognized as an integral part of the Sunni code,
many aspects of it have remained suspect to the ulema. In villages where
a pir has come in and taken over some of the mullah's functions and
following, it is understandable that the mullah would regard him with
disfavor or hostility, especially if he preached a message and followed
customs that a purist would consider un-Islamic.
That the messages and practices often are un-Islamic by such
standards should be obvious: no sainthood is recognized in the Quran, but
there are saints; Muhammad proclaimed that there would be "no
monkery in Islam," but there are, in effect, monks; and a doctrine of
divine attributes of human beings and intercession with God violates the
unity of God, but such beliefs are widely held. Some of these attitudes and
beliefs are closely akin to those of Hinduism and the many purely local
cults that go under that name. In the past there was sometimes little to
distinguish the Muslim pir from the Hindu guru or the itinerant fakir from
the wandering sadhu, and the holy men themselves may have been only
vaguely aware of such distinctions.
The first object of attack in the purist Muslim reform movements of the
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nineteenth century was saint worship and what went with it. It appears
that the mullahs were especially active in spreading these movements in
the villages. The forms that Sufism took in India, and mysticism itself,
were regarded by the purists as corruptions produced by the Hindu
environment. The movements for internal purification tended to become
movements for the external preservation of Islam from Hindu encroach
ment, with increasing political overtones. Under the leadership of the
ulema they made a significant contribution to the growth ofthe communal
sentiments that led ultimately to the creation of Pakistan in 1947 (see ch.
2).

Other Elements of Popular Worship

The orthodoxy of Islamic worship varies markedly in different regions.
The coastal districts of Noakhali and Chittagong, for example, among the
earliest to accept Islam, are also among the most orthodox (see fig. 1).
Noakhali is said to supply ulema to the rest of Bangladesh out of
proporation to its population. Communitywide rites underscore the
importance of the community of Islam in Muslim thought.
Nonorthodox beliefs and practices or, more probably, nonorthodox
interpretations of orthodox beliefs and practices, pervade popular
religion and have even influenced Muslim intellectuals; a considerable
body of religious poetry exists using Hindu-inspired images and forms
(see ch. 7). Numerous authorities have mentioned the strong influence of
popular Hinduism on the Islam of the common people. The belief in jinns,
invisible beings composed of fire and capable of doing harm to human
interests, although sanctioned by the Quran, tends to merge into the
Hindu belief in bhats (spirits). Many villagers in fact use the Hindu term
to refer to them. The Muslim treatment of the cow, one of the holiest
symbols of Hinduism, combines both imitation of, and reaction to,
non-Muslim forms. An anthropologist reports that Muslim villagers view
the sacrifice of a cow, the slaughter of which is strictly forbidden in
Hinduism, as a religious necessity at Qurban Id. Muslims in other parts of
the world generally sacrifice a lamb or goat at this time. Bangladesh
villagers, however, are said to believe that the ingestion of beef is an
especially meritorious act, possibly because it differentiates them so
markedly from their Hindu neighbors. In the acquisition and daily
treatment of cows, however, certain Hindu symbols prevail among
Muslim villagers.
Further effects of Hindu influence can be seen in the practice of
illumination of the village for the celebration of the Prophet's birthday,
the Id al Milad un Nabi. Although unknown elsewhere in the Muslim
world, this South Asian custom probably derives from similar Hindu
practices at Diwali, the festival of lights. Rituals to exorcise jinns from
possessed persons also incorporate Hindu elements. Villagers often fail,
furthermore, to distinguish between Hindu and Muslim holy men and

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shrines. A particularly intriguing mixture of Hindu and Muslim beliefs is
the concept of Olabibi, the supposed consort or shakti of Allah, an obvious
analogy to the consorts of Hindu gods.
HINDUISM
The word Hinduism applies to a large number of extraordinarily
diverse creeds and practices. As practiced by the great majority of its
adherents, the religion can only be understood in a regional context.
Although some elements common to other areas exist, the caste systems,
beliefs, rituals, and festivals of the Hindus in Bangladesh are Bengali.
Unlike Islam, Hinduism lacks a single authoritative scripture and a
historically known founder. In a sense it is the totality of the religious
expression of the subcontinent rather than a particular creed.
Characteristics
Hindus are characterized by close social exclusiveness and conformity.
Traditional Hinduism developed virtually no historical sense of scholar
ship because the temporal history of society and of individual lives had no
religious significance. Specific beliefs and practices are not essential to
Hinduism, but certain values and attitudes are common within it. There
is also, in a sense, a ranking of values and customs as well as of the groups
that hold or practice them, so that the lower groups often emulate the
practices of the higher ones.
A distinction has sometimes been made between the higher religion
and the lower, or popular, religion. The form varies widely with the caste,
the village, and the linguistic region. The higher religion, called the great
or Sanskritic tradition, is, by comparison, more uniform in the
subcontinent. Sometimes called Brahmanism, the great tradition
developed under the leadership of Hinduism's highest caste group, the
Brahmans, who, as the custodians of this sacred lore, are the traditional
priests, teachers, and astrologers and enjoy marked social privileges.
In any particular region the great and local traditions merge into a
whole. The great tradition also contains or merges into a highly refined
and abstract philosophical tradition that, though it may vary widely from
one individual thinker to another, exhibits the least degree of regional
variation. The three levels are more or less harmonized by an emphasis on
the concept of unity in diversity and a pervasive attitude of relativism.
On its highest level Hinduism recognizes the Absolute (Atman or
Brahma) as eternal, unbound by time, space, and causality and
consisting of pure existence, consciousness, and bliss. The highest end is
the union of one's own soul with the absolute Atman and consequent
attainment of moksha (release from the cycle of birth and rebirth). To
attain it, one may follow one of several methods of yoga ("yoking"),
depending on one's own temperament or capacity. The various methods
are regarded as several alternative means to attain a single end; such

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discipline represents not simply methods of enlightenment but embodies
a basic value in Hindu society, the exercise of will to achieve spiritual
ends.
Five major types of yoga exist. The raja, or kingly, path is that of
consciousness in which union is achieved by will; it is a combination of the
other types in their advanced states. Jnana yoga stresses union by
knowledge. Karma is the yoga of disinterested right action: the
performance of one's duty—the function of one's caste or sex, service to
others, and so on—from the highest motives and without personal
involvement in the consequences of the act. Bhakti is the yoga of devotion
and union by love; its essence is a complete and, sometimes, passionate
faith in a personal deity, a faith that closely corresponds to what
Christians understand by the term. Hatha yoga is the method of physical
control, involving successive exercises to gain such complete mastery of
mind over body that all physical processes become voluntary.
To some extent each form of yoga partakes of the others and,
especially, of hatha. In the West yoga and its practitioners, the yogis, are
usually known only by the more debased forms of hatha yoga, but on the
subcontient this extreme mortification of the flesh is looked down upon.
The main purpose of hatha yoga is to improve physical strength and
health so that the consciousness can be free, and many persons active in
society practice it less for their psychic evolution than for the physical
well-being that it brings.
The different forms of yoga, particularly spiritual knowledge,
disinterested action, and devotion, are major values or ideals of human
conduct in Hindu society. Renunciation also occupies a high place in the
Hindu value system, less for its own sake than as a means to a spiritual
end. It is generally felt that if a person wishes to attain the highest
spiritual levels, he must devote his whole time to this end; he must
renounce society—all its attachments, desires, and obligations—and
devote himself to the rigorous discipline of gaining self-mastery and
self-knowledge.
At the middle level, for the great majority of adherents, Hinduism
operates as a variety of devotions and sects that center on one or more of
the great gods and are expressed at least partly in a regional context. The
great tradition recognizes a trinity of gods who are actually forms of
Brahma, the supreme godhead: Brahma, the creator; Vishnu, the
sustainer; and Shiva, the destroyer. Brahma intercedes at the beginning
of each of the huge successive cycles of the universe but otherwise
receives little notice. Creative powers center on Vaishnava and Shaiva
traditions, that is, they emphasize Vishnu and Shiva, both of whom are
known by a variety of names, as are their respective consorts.
Shiva is, among other things, the Lord of the Cosmic Dance, the god of
the ascetics and of fertility and destruction; the bull is sacred to him, and
his symbol is the phallus or lingam. His wife, Parvati, the universal

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mother of great antiquity, can be either benign or, when known as Kali, a
destructive and terrifying goddess of disease and death. They have two
main sons—Ganesha (usually depicted as an elephant), who removes
obstacles, and Karttikeya, god of war and of some ancillary categories.
Vishnu, whose most important wife is Lakshmi, the goddess of
prosperity, is usually worshiped in his incarnations, or avatars, who have
appeared at various times to rescue the creatures of the earth. There are
nine or ten of them (including the Buddha), and the major ones are
Krishna and Rama (see Buddhism, this ch.). Krishna, the divine flute
player, bucolic hero of the land around Mathura near the Jamuna River,
and lover of the milkmaids, is the god who recited the lofty, well-loved
poem called the Bhagavad Gita (Song ofthe Blessed One) in the epic poem
Mahabkarata. Rama is the hero of the other great epic, the Ramayana.
When his wife Sita was abducted to Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) by
the demon Ravana, Rama rescued her and killed Ravana with the help of
animal allies led by the monkey general Hanuman. Sita is the epitome of
Hindu wifehood and Rama of kingship; pious Hindus pray for the return
of the golden age of Ram Raj, the Rule of Rama.
On its lowest levels Hinduism admits worship of spirits and godlings of
rivers, mountains, vegetation, animals, stones, disease, and virtually
anything else. It fosters many holy men and ascetics conspicuous for their
bodily mortifications. Ritual bathing, vows, and pilgrimages to the sacred
rivers, mountains, shrines, and cities are important in this practice. An
ordinary Hindu will often worship at any holy place, including the shrines
of Muslim pirs, without being concerned with the religion to which that
place is supposed to be affiliated. People who can only see the bodily form
of a great holy man or political leader (called taking his darshan) also
believe themselves to be benefited.
On all but the most refined philosophical levels, Hinduism makes wide
use of images, which the sophisticate may recognize as symbols but many
others may regard as the deities themselves. Highly imaginative, it is a
faith that has inspired a rich art. Islam, on the other hand, shuns graphic
representation.
Hindu ethics genergally center on the principle of ahimsa, noninjury to
living creatures—especially the cow, which is held sacred. The principle
is expressed in the dietary rule against the eating of beef, which is almost
universally observed. By no means are all Hindus vegetarians, but
abstinence from all kinds of meat is regarded as a "higher" practice.
High-caste Bengali Hindus, unlike castes elsewhere, will ordinarily eat
fish.
Religious rituals, which vary widely from caste to caste and region to
region, permeate the lives of the great majority of Hindus. Most
observances occur in the home, which usually has some sort of shrine or
alcove containing the image of a god. The women are usually more
devout, meticulous, and conservative about such matters than the men.

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There is little about the lives of the women that has not been invested
with religious meaning by some group at some time or place. Many other
observances are castewide affairs.
There is little or no emphasis placed on common, communitywide
observances. Hindus generally go to their temples individually or in small
groups, the distance to which they may approach the central shrine being
determined, in theory, by the status of their caste. If a whole village takes
part in a festival, the roles of the different castes are prescribed more or
less clearly by custom.
There are no beliefs that are essential to Hinduism. Nevertheless,
most Hindus attach religious significance to the old Sanskrit texts known
as the Vedas; the later Upanishads; the Shastras; the two long epic poems
Mahabharata and Ramayana; and the works known as Purana. The two
great epics (of which a number of versions exist in the vernacular
languages) are especially popular. Their ballads, legends, and teachings
become an intrinsic part of the ordinary Hindu's life.
A second common element is the acceptance of the caste system as the
structure of society. For virtually all Hindus, even those in revolt against
some aspects of the system, caste is taken for granted as the way of life.
To be considered Hindu, a group must identify itself in some way as a unit
in the caste hierarchy. One cannot join a caste; one is born into it, lives,
marries, and dies in it. Similarly, an individual cannot join Hinduism by
conversion, but the entire group into which he is born can be absorbed
into it as a caste. The kind of conformity expected of castes in the Hindu
system is, in turn, outward rather than inward, a matter of social
practices rather than of orthodox beliefs and observances. This is shown,
for example, in rules concerning the acceptance of food and water from,
and the conventions of speech and deportment toward, other castes.
The social and religious aspects of Hindusim cannot be fully separated.
The caste rules are not simply social restrictions but are expressions of
positive religious duty (dharma). Certain religious customs are consi
dered higher or more desireable. The most common procedure adopted
by low castes desiring to establish their claim to a higher status is to adopt
the socioreligious practices of the higher castes—such as abstinence from
certain foods and drinks, marriage customs, and relatively greater
seclusion of women—thus making themselves "better" Hindus and more
worthy of respect.
The religious sanction, or rationale, of the caste system is the joint
doctrine of rebirth and right action. A person who dies passes on to
another life in this world unless he is one of the rare individuals who
realizes ultimate Truth and identifies with the Absolute Soul and thus
succeeds in saving himself from rebirth. His status and some of the things
that happen to him in his new existence are determined by the acts and
desires of his previous life (or lives), and his future condition is to be
determined by what he does now. Thus he deserves to be where he is. If

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he is to rise to a better state in his next life, he must live righteously,
endure his hardships and disabilities with equanimity, unquestion-
ingly fulfill the occupation and duty of his particular caste, and adhere to
the caste conventions for respect toward higher castes and freedom from
contamination by lower ones.
The doctrine of karma (right action), the concept of pollution, and the
attitude of relativism are, among other things, expressions of the sense of
a religious hierarchy that permeates the Hindu social-system and
differentiates it from that of Islam. At the same time the Hindu social
order, although immutable in theory, has always been flexible in practice
and is especially so today. Although an individual must ordinarily be born
again to raise his caste status, castes and subcastes can gradually rise in
the hierarchy, for rank is fixed not by law but by regional social
convention. In Bengal the caste system is less divided into small, discrete
units, the castes are less hierarchically ranked, and the social distance
between them is smaller and less clearly expressed than in many other
parts of the subcontinent. In addition, the application of the doctrine of
karma to justify the imposition of exaggerated disabilities on the lowest
castes has for many years been condemned on religious grounds by
promient Hindus.
Hinduism in Bangladesh
The history of Hinduism in Bengal, part of which became Bangladesh,
is quite unlike that of any other region in the subcontinent and accounts,
in large part, for the forms of the religion today. Buddhist rule over the
region was not overthrown by a Hindu dynasty until about 1100, and the
Muslim armies and missionaries entered only a century later. One of the
Hindu rulers, Ballal Sen, made a vigorous attempt to impose Brahmani-
cal supremacy and control but, in the area that now forms Bangladesh, his
efforts were impeded by the general lack of communications and the
resistance of the local inhabitants. The limited Brahmanical teachings
that managed to infiltrate soon succumbed to the influence of local
tradition known as tantrism, which appears to be neither Hindu nor
Buddhist in origin.
Out of the teachings of the Buddha had emerged the notion that reality
consists of two main principles: compassion and absence of emotion—
under tantric influence these became consciousness and activity and were
identified with the male and female principles, respectively. By this
interpretation reality was construed as a drama in which these two
principles interact. Under Hinduism the basic dualism of the male and
female principles gave rise to the Shakta and Vaishnava traditions that
predominate in present-day Bangladesh.
These two traditions, taken together, may also be seen as expressing a
sort of trinity—the supreme deity, his energy, and his incarnation—that
is widespread in Hinduism. This, rather than Brahma-Vishnu-Shiva, has

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sometimes been called the true Hindu trinity. Thus one Bengali tradition
centers on the deity and his female energy and the other on the divine
incarnation and his consort.
Shakta
In the Shakta tradition the male and female principles are identified as
Shiva and Shakti. Originally, powerful cults grew up around each of
them, but the Shakta cult, which emphasizes the universal mother,
eventually became the more popular. From the notion of activity as the
female principle came the identification of Kali, the destroyer. In her two
most popular forms, Kali and Durga, Shakti symbolizes the dreadful
destructive forces of nature and is also construed as the destroyer ofevil.
In her most common representation, Kali is probably the ugliest
goddess of the Hindu pantheon. Worship of Kali appears to have been
originally a Brahmanical refinement of local animist cults, and now, like
all of the popular great gods, she is worshiped in many ways under a
variety of forms. The Kali rites, unlike those of the other great gods,
sometimes involve the sacrifice of living creatures, for she is appeased by
blood. During the independence movement young political radicals in her
service, often with marked courage and selfless religious devotion,
engaged in terrorism against the British, the victims of assassination
being her sacrifices. Her major festival, a much less violent affair, is the
Kali-puja or Diwali, when she is worshiped as primeval energy with a
festival of lights.
Durga is commonly represented as an eight- or ten-armed goddess
slaying a buffalo demon that caused terror in the world. Known also as
Uma or Gauri, Durga is the daughter of Himalaya and the wife of Shiva
and is both a destroyer of evil and an autumnal deity bearing some
resemblance to the Greek goddess Persephone. Her major festival, which
comes twenty days before Diwali, is Durgapuja. It commemorates both
the slaying of the demon and the happy annual visit Durga makes to her
father's house. It is traditional for family members, especially daughters,
to return to their paternal homes during the four-day holiday and visit
with friends and relatives. The high point comes at the end when an image
of the goddess is dramatically escorted to a river or tank and immersed
there as a symbol of her return to her husband.
Vaishnavism
Vaishnavism in Bengal expresses the dualism of the male and female
principles in a tradition of love and religious devotion. Its origins are
unclear, but it underwent an important revival and expansion in the
sixteenth century, probably as a popular movement away from excessive
Brahmanical control of rites and worship. Cutting across caste lines, it
taught the fundamental oneness of man in spirit. Vaishnavism identifies
the male principle as Krishna and the female principle as Radha (the chief
milkmaid). The longing of the lovers for union and the drama of their
eternal lovemaking symbolize the relation that every devotee should
have with Vishnu. The highest value in existence is attained in those

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moments when the devotee-beloved achieves mystical union with the
deity-lover. This form of Vaishnava Hinduism and the Sufi tradition of
Islam have influenced and interacted with each other in Bengal. Both
were popular mystical movements away from the dry, stereotyped
discipline of the traditional religious leaders and emphasized the personal
relationship of religious leader and disciple. Like Bengali Islamic
practice, Vaishnava worship frequently takes place in a small worship
group {somaj). Both use the language of earthly love to express
communion with the divine. In both traditions the Bengali language is the
vehicle of a large body of erotic and mystical literature of great beauty
and emotional impact (see ch. 7).
Another development in Vaishnavism led to the postulation of the deity
as residing in the hearts of men and the spiritualization of ordinary human
relations. Devotion became oriented toward the divine element in man
and away from theism. Human love became the vehicle for the attainment
of the divine mystical bond, a notion that has influenced many Bengali
poets.
The major festival centered on Vishnu is Holi (or Dol Yatra), a festival
of fun and rejoicing in the middle of March. As with spring festivals the
world over, the element of fertility rites is present, and in them Krishna
and Radha are the chief deities. The most conspicuous feature of Holi is
the happily uninhibited behavior of the participants; colored water and
powder are thrown over everyone in sight, and many caste and social
restrictions on men and women alike are eased or ignored.

BUDDHISM
In the early 1970s there were probably about 400,000 Buddhists in
Bangladesh. Buddhism in various forms appears to have prevailed at the
time of the Muslim conquest in 1197. The invading armies apparently
found numerous monasteries that they destroyed in the belief that they
were military fortresses, and with the destruction of its centers of
learning, Buddhism rapidly disintegrated. Nearly all the surviving
Buddhists now live in the easternmost region, around Chittagong, which
was not fully conquered until the time of the British. In the Chittagong
Hill Tracts the Buddhist tribes form the majority of the population, and
their religion appears to be a mixture of tribal cults and Buddhist
doctrines.
The essentially ethical teachings of the Buddha (ca. 563-483 B.C.)
stress the principle of a middle path between physical indulgence and
ascetic mortification and the view that what exists is only what is
perceived. If there is no perception there is no existence, and as man
cannot be demonstrated to have an immortal soul, his concern should be
with his salvation rather than with metaphysical speculation. Salvation
consists of freeing oneself from the cycle of rebirth into a life of evil, pain,
and sorrow; to accomplish this, man must renounce society and live a
simple life of self-discipline.

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 The men who renounced society became organized into many monastic
orders. There are several monasteries in the Chittagong region, and in
most Buddhist villages there is a school (kyong) in which boys live and are
taught to read Burmese and some scriptures in Pali. It is common for men
who have finished their schooling to return at regular intervals for
periods of residence in the school. The local Buddhist temple is often an
important center of village life.
Essentially tolerant, Buddhism outside the monastic retreats has
absorbed and adapted indigenous popular creeds and cults of the regions
to which it spread. Although its earliest form has been characterized as a
religion without a god, popular Buddhism contains a whole galaxy of gods
and godlings, of whom the chief deity is the Buddha. In most areas
religious ritual centers around the image of the Buddha, and the major
festivals observed by Buddhists in Bangladesh commemorate the
important events of the legends of his life.
CHRISTIANITY
Christianity has about 150,000 adherents, mainly Roman Catholic. Its
first contact with the subcontinent is attributed to the Apostle Thomas,
who is said to have preached in southern India. Although Jesuit priests
were active at the Mughal courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the first Christian settlements in what is now Bangladesh
appear to have been established by the Portuguese, coming from their
center in Goa in India.
When the Portuguese established themselves at Goa in the sixteenth
century, they made vigorous efforts to win converts to Roman
Catholicism and had a policy of intermarrying freely with the local
population. In the same century they settled in the vicinity of Chittagong
port, which for some time was their base of operations in Bengal, and they
were active in piracy and slave-trading. In the seventeenth century some
of them moved to Dacca.
Protestant missionary efforts began seriously only in the first half of
the nineteenth century. The Baptist mission, active since 1816, the
Oxford mission, and others have been active mainly among the tribal
peoples of the Garo Hills in the northern part of Mymensingh and Sylhet
districts. Many of the Christian churches, schools, and hospitals were
initially set up to serve the European community. They subsequently
became centers of conversion activities, particularly among the lowest
caste Hindus.

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 CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL SYSTEM
By the mid-1970s Bangalee society had not emerged from its traumatic
past sufficiently to have developed stability at the rural level or an
effective social elite at the national level. Truncated by repeated political
upheavals, the national social structure reflected the complex history of
conflict between the Bengali-speaking Muslim community and its former
countrymen, first the Bengali-speaking Hindus and later the Pakistani
Muslims. In its current form, an ethnically uniform Bengali-speaking
society including only minor non-Bengali groups and dominated by
indigenous Muslim elements, it has lacked sufficient opportunity to
develop a consistent and widely shared stratification system, although a
new and highly influential elite of political functionaries has apparently
been rapidly forming.
Only scantily known by social scientists, rural society seemed to
exhibit some of the same characteristics of fluidity and imprecision as the
urban sector. Observers were divided concerning the extent of the
influence that the exodus of the mainly Hindu rural elite a generation ago
may have had on this situation. Scattered reports, especially from the
northwestern part of the country, indicated that the drought of the fall of
1974 appeared to have increased concentration of landholdings in some
areas, but the extent and permanence of this trend could not be
accurately gauged (see ch. 12). In general, however, disparities in
landholdings, the predominant factor in rural stratification, remained
relatively small by Asian standards. The minute size of many of the
holdings, nonetheless, kept the majority of cultivators on the edge of
subsistence and in constant debt and resulting economic dependency.
In the aftermath of the war of independence and the unrelenting series
of natural disasters that preceded and followed it, knowledge of the social
organization of Bangladesh remains insufficient to form a clear or
cohesive picture of society at any level, national, urban, or rural. Only
rough sketches, based partially on extrapolation from known prein-
dependence and postindependence trends, are possible with information
available in early 1975. A leading authority stated in 1974 that "the truth
of the matter is that no one really knows the extent or underlying reasons
for the dangerous state of affairs that exists in this country. The planners
are groping in the dark for basic knowledge needed for planning, and the
social sciences are not fulfilling their potential ability to supply this
knowledge." It can be definitely stated, however, that the establishment

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of an independent Bangalee state profoundly affected the society at the
level of national and local elites.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Probably more than most countries, Bangladesh can be understood
only in a historical perspective. Especially during the crucial formative
years of the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, as well as during the British and
Mughal periods, political and policy considerations rather than indigen
ous social forces profoundly affected Bangalee society. The roots of
present-day problems and, indeed, of the movement for independence
appear to lie in ethnic and religious imbalances introduced because of
political considerations (see ch. 2).
Until the achievement of independence, the geographic and demog
raphic entity that is now Bangladesh had not existed or functioned as an
independent and self-contained society (see ch. 8). During the British
period the region now constituting Bangladesh- formed part of the
hinterland of Calcutta; after the establishment of Pakistan, it lived under
the hegemony of the non-Bengali Muslim elites of the West Wing. The
establishment of the new Bangalee state therefore both implied and
accompanied the formation of a new social unit and consequently
precipitated significant social realignment.
Many consequences can be traced to what the social scientist Abu
Abdullah has termed "the uneven development of the Hindu and Muslim
bourgeoisies" under the British. Although similar in social structure
before the British period, the Hindu and Muslim communities of Bengal
(which then included territory in present-day India as well as that of
modern Bangladesh) were able, because of various factors, to take
unequal advantage of the opportunities offered by the colonial regime.
Thus, during the nineteenth century, the Hindus developed a command
ing lead in all areas of modern endeavor, including education, govern
ment, business, and landholding, the last in part encouraged by the
Permanent Settlement of 1793, which established a system of hierarchi
cally organized landlords and tax collectors, most of whom were Hindus.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the urban middle and
professional classes consisted largely of Hindus. Nevertheless, the
countervailing force of pan-Bengali cultural identity prevented serious
divisiveness on religious grounds. During the late 1800s, however, the
British began to favor Muslims for modern education and government
posts in order to counter rising Hindu-oriented nationalism, but the
incipient Muslim middle class was unable to overcome the well»
established Hindu advantage in numbers and influence. Modern activity
in Bengal centered on Calcutta, thus, in the words of Ramkrishna
Mukherjee, "West Bengal (with its Hindu stronghold) held East Bengal
(with its Muslim stronghold) as its hinterland."
The early decades of the twentieth century saw the growth of the
Indian independence movement and the concomitant emergence of

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religious communalism as a potent political and social force throughout
India. Fearing the disadvantages they might suffer in a Hindu-dominated
state, Muslims throughout the subcontinent turned to the Muslim
League (League), with its program of Muslim independence, as their
medium of political expression. By the late 1930s, for example, the middle
class of Bengal had aligned itself with the League, although many of its
leaders expressed serious reservations.
When the Lahore Resolution calling for the establishment of a Muslim
state to be known as Pakistan was passed by the League in 1940, Bengal
was included in Pakistan almost as an afterthought (see ch. 2). Reliable
evidence exists that leaders of neither the eastern nor the western
Muslim communities had seriously envisioned this partnership, which
seemed unlikely even at its establishment and proved totally untenable in
the long run. From a social standpoint, however, the most immediate
effect of the actual partition in 1947 was the massive and tumultuous
population exchange that saw millions of Hindus and Muslims fleeing in
opposite directions across the new borders and that effectively removed
from East Bengal the Hindu economic elite and cut the territory's ties to
its urban focus of Calcutta.
Until partition, according to estimates, Hindus had controlled about
four-fifths of all large rural landholdings, city real estate, and govern
ment jobs in East Bengal and had dominated finance, commerce, and the
professions. Even into the late 1950s about three-quarters of nonagricul-
tural business remained in Hindu hands. The general trend, however,
was toward emigration of Hindus with the means to do so. Between 1947
and 1961 over 3 million Hindus left East Pakistan, vacating large
numbers of responsible positions in industry, the professions, and
commerce.
Muslims moved quickly into these positions, creating for the first time
in Bengal a modern economy and government predominantly in Muslim
hands. Bengali Muslims, however, probably hampered by lack of
high-level experience, by the pro-West Pakistan and big-business bias of
the government, and by their insufficient capital, tended to take over
middle-level positions, while West Pakistanis and Muslim refugees from
northern India—the so-called Biharis—came to dominate the upper
levels. Non-Bengalis, including Hindus, thus reaped most of the vastly
increased profits made possible by partition. At the same time the land
reform program of the early 1950s effectively ended the dominance of the
traditional landlord class in the countryside. Upper level positions
became, in Mukherjee's words, "virtually the monopoly of West
Pakistanis posted to Bengal from the center of gravity of Pakistan in Sind
and West Punjab." Thus, control and policymaking in East Bengal
remained in non-Bengali, albeit this time in Muslim, hands. Abdullah
concludes, "It is not difficult to see why East Bengal, from being the
hinterland of Calcutta, should now have become the colony of West
Pakistan."

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 During the first years following partition the vastly increased
opportunities for Bengalis in the formerly Hindu-dominated middle-class
occupations masked the economic and political disparity between Bengali
and non-Bengali Muslims. Eventually, however, the vacant oppor
tunities were filled by upwardly mobile Bengalis, but the expanding
educational system continued to produce new - aspirants for now
nonexistent middle-class jobs. By the late 1950s the Bengali professional
middle class had begun to find its path into higher level jobs and
large-scale commercial enterprise blocked by non-Bengalis who had
staked their claims first.
At this point a linguistically based Bengali Muslim nationalism began
forcefully to articulate the grievances of the frustrated middle class. The
Awami League, drawing much of its support from students facing an
increasingly dreary job market, eventually emerged as the dominating
voice in this movement (see ch. 9). As frustration increased, the language
issue became increasingly salient, although the basic struggle concerned
power rather than speech. Abdullah states of the language issue: "It was
an ideal adjunct to the political and economic struggle of the Bengali
middle class, and served the same integrative and tension-reducing
functions that Islam did for the Pakistan movement. It supplied the
masses a simple and appealing criterion for identifying enemies against
whom violence is legitimate and just."
Although most authorities agree that an absolute improvement
occurred in the economic position of the Bengali middle class during the
"decade of development" of the 1960s, the relative discrepancy did not
diminish, and frustration became, if anything, greater. A number of
factors contributed to the spread of linguistic nationalism beyond the
classes whose direct interest it served, and well-known events forced the
conflict to a showdown in the early 1970s.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIETY
Bangalee society emerged from the war for independence shorn of its
non-Bengali economic and governmental elite and once again replete with
opportunity for advancement into hastily vacated positions, which
included high-level government posts and leadership of large-scale
industry. The 1972 nationalization of large industry in non-Bengali hands
and sale of smaller non-Bengali enterprises to Bengalis who could
document their ethnic identity speeded the transfer of influence to the
indigenous community. Except for members of small non-Bengali
castelike Muslim groups known as "trading communities," such as the
Khojas and Bohras, private owners of middle-sized and small industrial
and commercial enterprises were overwhelmingly Bengali. Government
operation of large-scale enterprises necessitated the creation of a new
industrial bureaucracy.
The Awami League, which gained immediate control of the new
government, from the outset has controlled access to these unpre

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cedented new opportunities for advancement. Party affiliation, political
contacts, and documented revolutionary service became the main
prerequisites for admission to the rapidly expanding new elite of political
and industrial functionaries. The facts that fulfilling political obligations
often required the hiring of people without substantive qualifications to
run industries and government agencies and that many more jobs than
required by good administrative practice had to be created in the already
overstaffed government services to absorb the party faithful contributed
significantly, according to authorities, to the breakdown of industry and
government services by the mid-1970s (see ch. 13).
The early and mid-1970s have thus witnessed the initial stages of the
development of indigenous Bengali upper elements composed in large
measure ofthe beneficiaries of Awami League favoritism. Both in the city
and in the countryside, this trend has been evident. For example, an
important new means of accumulating wealth, the import license, giving
exclusive rights to deal in scarce imported goods within a certain locality,
came under the control of local elected officials. As the 1970s progressed,
both foreign and domestic observers increasingly wrote of widespread
corruption and favoritism that enriched the loyal followers of the ruling
party. This group has not yet settled into a cohesive and self-conscious
upper class, however.
Although highly influential and increasingly wealthy, the new elite in
the mid-1970s formed a minutely thin crust at the top of Bangalee society,
less than 6 percent of which was urban. The vast majority of the people
eked out their living in agriculture and lived in farming villages. Other
nonagricultural elements were neither sizable nor influential. In the late
1960s approximately 300,000 people, about 20 percent of them Hindus,
earned their living in "intellectual" occupations such as teaching and
government work, and in the mid-1970s roughly the same situation
probably prevailed. The influence of this potentially highly articulate
group was to some extent limited by two factors. The majority were
"first-generation" white-collar employees in a society in which par
ticularistic and family interests continue to outweigh class identification
and loyalty. And the cream of the Bangalee intelligentsia, including
scores of eminent professors and writers and hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of lesser known scholars and intellectuals, were systemati
cally slaughtered during the war of independence. Sieges such as that of
the University of Dacca campus in 1971 took a large and tragic toll of
intellectual talent.
Probably 1 million artisans and 500,000 small merchants ply their
trades largely outside the modern economy, frequently in rural market
centers. Many members of the industrial working class, which numbers
about 600,000, also maintain personal ties to the villages, despite a
relatively high percentage of skilled workers in this group. According to
observers, as many as 15 percent of the industrial work force returns to
the villages at harvesttime to help relatives with the work.

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 The fact that about one-fifth of the workers in railways and other heavy
industries were so-called Biharis (non-Bengali-speaking Muslim refugees
from northern India, but not necessarily from the state of Bihar) helped
disrupt industrial production in the immediate postwar period. The
Bihari population, numbering about 1 million in 1971, stood to lose from
Bangalee independence and sided with Pakistan during the war.
Atrocities occurred on both sides, according to observers, and after the
war considerable bitterness against the Biharis existed. Some of the
wealthier Biharis were able to emigrate during and after the war and,
according to government sources, the community numbered about
680,000 in 1972. Little could be accurately determined about their
circumstances in mid-1975, although the majority were reportedly living
in wretched conditions in government-run camps. Various proposals for
the disposition of this group have caused conflict between India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Over 100,000 were "repatriated" to Pakistan,
a country they had probably never seen, but the problem continued
unresolved in mid-1975.
Other significant groups outside the remarkably uniform Bengali
Muslim population are the approximately 11 million Hindus and several
hundred thousand so-called tribals. About three-fourths of the Hindus
remaining in Bangladesh belong to the Namashudra caste, one of the
lowest groups, and many of the remainder belong primarily to other
formerly untouchable groups; generally, these Hindus continue to
occupy low social and economic positions in such despised trades as
fishing. Some members of higher castes belong to the middle or
professional class, but there is no Hindu upper class. Concentrated
mainly in areas bordering India, such as Khulna, Jessore, Sylhet, and
Dinajpur, Hindus reportedly constitute 25 percent of the population of
these regions (see fig. 1). They also formed the bulk of the 10 million
refugees who streamed into India during the war. Although they have
since returned to Bangladesh, many settled in cities instead of returning
to their former rural homes.
The tribal peoples live mainly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where
they practice shifting cultivation but leave trade entirely in the hands of
outsiders (Bengalis) (see fig. 9). The tribes are racially and culturally
more akin to the peoples of Burma than to the Bengalis, although some of
them reflect increasing Bengali influence. They speak Tibeto-Burman
rather than Indo-European languages and, although every tribe contains
adherents of more than one religion, they are predominantly Buddhists.
Several thousand are Hindus, only a handful are Muslims, and many have
animistic beliefs. Baptist, Roman Catholic, and Seventh-Day Adventist
missions have made converts in all the tribes, and some are predomi
nantly Christian.
The four largest tribes are the Chakmas, the Marmas (Maghs), the
Tipperas (Tipras), and the Mros (Moorangs); the other tribes are quite
small in number. The tribes have tended to intermingle to some extend

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 INDIA

Source: Based on information from Stanley Maron (ed.), Pakistan: Society and Culture,
New Haven, 1957.
Figure 9. Bangladesh, Major Tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts

137
and are distinguished from one another more by their peculiarities of
dialect, dress, and custom than by their tribal cohesiveness. Only the
Chakmas and Marmas display formal tribal organization, although all
groups contain definitely recognized clans.
The Chakmas, with a population of about 250,000, are by far the largest
tribe. Nearly all of them are officially Buddhists, but Hinduism and
animism are popular. The Chakmas are of mixed and obscure origin but
reflect more Bengali influence than any other tribe. Unlike the other
tribes, Chakmas and Marmas usually live in the valleys.
Marma means Burmese, and the members of the tribe dislike the more
popularly used Magh, a term that has come to be synonymous with
pirates. They are of Thai origin and are believed to have come to the hill
tracts by way of Arakan after their ancestors were driven out of China.
Although several religions are represented among them (they are the
only tribe with any Muslim members), nearly all of them are Buddhists.
They continue to regard Burma as the center of their cultural life, but
they live on good terms with the local authorities.
The Tipperas are nearly all Hindus and account for virtually the entire
Hindus population of the tracts. They migrated gradually from the
Tippera hills in the north, and the northern Tipperas have been
influenced by Bengali culture. A small southern section known as the
Mrungs show considerably less Bengali influence.
The Mros are considered to be the original inhabitants of the tracts.
They live on the hilltops and often fortify their villages. The Mros have no
written language of their own, but some of them can read the Burmese
and Bengali scripts. Most of them claim to be Buddhists, but their
religious practice is largely animistic.
Tribal groups in other parts of the country include about 50,000
Santalis in Rajshahi and Dinajpur, and about 40,000 each of the Khasi,
Garo, and Khajon tribes in Mymensingh and Sylhet. Primarily poor
peasants, these people all belong to groups that number at least 300,000
each in the adjoining tribal-dominated areas on India.
Little is known in detail about the social organization of rural
Bangladesh. Most of the country is thought to be ethnically uniform, in
the sense of being occupied by Bengali-speaking Muslims, but regional
differences are known to exist. In cultural terms the country (excluding
the tribal areas) may be divided into three main regions (see fig. 10). Of
these, the Deltaic region dominates the country socially, culturally, and
politically. The generally accepted picture of Bangalee rural life as
presented in this chapter largely reflects this region. The trans-Meghna
region has been described by Ralph W. Nicholas as similar in structure
but "more religious . . . more enterprising . . . more adventurous." The
language of this region varies somewhat from the national "standard" of
the Dacca area. Chittagong and Sylhet districts of this area have
traditionally supplied a disproportionate share of emigrants. The
northern region, a land of less dense settlement than the vastly fertile

138
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92

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Social Problems in Bangladesh, Washington, 1974, p. 3.
Figure 10. Bangladesh, Cultural Regions

139
delta and surrounding areas, displays a far higher degree of both nuclea-
tion of settlement and concentration of landholdings. Social differences
apparently tend to be greater there than in other parts of the relatively
egalitarian countryside. Stereotypes attach to many regions and tend to
express the major unit of "ethnic" loyalty, an area corresponding to the
former district. These distinctions, although firmly implanted in the
popular mind, do not represent true ethnic groups and tend to break
down after some years in a city.
Despite its importance in nearly all other areas of the subcontinent,
caste does not appear to figure prominently in the countryside of
Bangladesh. Most observers of the rural scene indicate that, although
stratified into several hierarchically arranged groups, Muslim village
society has few sharp or impenetrable hereditary social distinctions.
Rather, fairly permeable "classes" of rural people appear to exist in
villages, based on considerations of wealth and political influence.
Caste continues to hold strict sway among Hindu villagers, and
castelike distinctions are strongest among Muslims in lowly service or
artisan occupations. These groups tend to be more endogamous than
others. Among farmers, however, the status of families appears to rise
and fall over the generations along with economic standing. The
traditional Muslim distinction between the ashraf (highborn) and ajlaf
(lowborn) has no particular importance in Bangladesh, in part because of
the widespread adoption during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
of the symbols and titles of ashraf status.
Bangalee society, like all societies, represents an adaption to the
ecological conditions, and in most of Bengal the central ecological facts
are omnipresent water and flat landscape relieved only by intermittent
hillocks and rises (see ch. 3). At least once a year large parts of the
country are inundated by the floods that renew the remarkably rich
deltaic soil. In normal times this flooding is not severe, and the scattered
hillocks, both natural and man-made, provide adequate protection to life
and property. Thus, topography rather than social organization deter
mines the settlement pattern, which Peter J. Bertocci describes as
"socially random." Although local residents clearly distinguish commun
ity boundaries, such distinctions often seem invisible to outsiders; rather
than clusters of houses, Bangalee villages consist of scattered home
steads interspersed among the fields.
The basic social unit is the bari (homestead), consisting of a cluster of
houses on a rise of land. The group inhabiting the bari, known in different
villages as the gusthi or the paribar, generally consists of a complete or
incomplete patrilineally extended household. The individual nuclear
family is often submerged in the larger unit and may be known as the ghar
(room).
Above the bari level, patrilineal kin ties ramify into larger and larger
groups based on real, fictional, or assumed relationship. These groups

140
apparently vary considerably from locality to locality, both terminologi-
cally and structurally. Groups of agnatically related bans, also known in
various areas asparibars or gusthis, form one or several intermediate
levels of solidarity between the bari and the para (neighborhood), which
may or may not be coterminous with the gram (village). A gram may also
contain several paras.
The groups of kinsmen function to some extent as corporate entities. It
is not clear, however, that the village unit has significant corporate
functions, structure, or identity. Beyond a focus of loyalty for boys'
athletic teams and for very infrequent community prayers, few authors
indicated specific functions or manifestations of gram solidarity. The
situation is further complicated, at least terminologically , by the fact that
para and gram boundaries do not correspond to those of a similar, if
obsolete, unit, the mauza (tax district).
From a functional standpoint, a significant unit larger than that of close
kin is the voluntary religious and mutual benefit association known as the
samaj or mallot. Such organizations may in some areas consist of several
groups of the followers of various wealthy or influential men, usually the
heads of dominant kin segments. These constituent segments may be
known as reyais and often consist of a lineage (gusthi) with an outer fringe
of other followers. The membership of the samaj may or may not
resemble that of the specifically kin-based groups because the smallest
unit of samaj membership in some areas is the ghar, and constituents of
the same household sometimes belong to different reyais. Membership in
this case also fluctuates according to the convenience of members, and
some people belong to more than one.
Among the functions ofsamaj may be the maintenance of a mosque and
support of a mullah. Some, however, do not appear to emphasize religious
activities. Sardars (the leaders of the constituent reyais) form an often
informal council of samaj elders, which may act on an ad hoc basis to
settle disputes. Such mediation appears to be a major function of the
samaj. Factional competition between sardars is a major dynamic of
interaction.
Informal social integration also exists at the level of the market area, a
group of villages serviced either by a hat, a periodic market held weekly
or twice weekly, or by a bazaar, a permanently established market open
daily. Men from all the surrounding villages gather in the market areas to
avail themselves of the opportunity to discuss politics, catch up on news,
or share opinions.
Except for this rather informal authority structure, there appear to be
no recognized social leaders at the village or higher levels in many areas.
The sardars, furthermore, base their authority on their leadership of
relatively large, wealthy, or influential lineages and on their personal
qualities of leadership. Authorities suggest that, before the exodus of the
Hindu landlords in the late 1940s and the land reform of the early 1950s,

141
the zamindar elite provided some framework for a relatively stable, if
inequitable, social organization. Since that time, however, comparable
elements of stability have not been able to develop.
Even during the 1960s observers noted increasing dissatisfaction
among villagers with their lot. Most people seemed to perceive a
worsening economic situation; some even believed that such natural
disasters as flooding had become worse since partition. Observers
suggest, however, that this feeling may accurately reflect the gradual
deterioration of irrigation and water control works built under the
zamindars but not properly maintained since the late 1940s (see ch. 12).
Although farming has traditionally ranked among the most desirable
occupations, villagers have recently begun to encourage more of their
children to leave the increasingly overcrowded countryside to seek more
secure employment in towns. Such traditional sources of prestige as
landholding, distinguished lineage, and religious piety have begun to lose
their hold in the countryside and to be replaced by modern education,
high income, and steady work.
Furthermore, although only scattered indications existed in mid-1975,
it appeared that the rural areas of the north especially were becoming
increasingly stratified as a result of the drought and severe food crisis of
1974. According to observers, as many as 100,000 transfers of land
occurred in that area during the fall of 1974, with Awami League figures
prominent among the buyers profiting from forced sales by destitute
peasants. Although apparently not as drastic, a similar trend reportedly
exists in other parts of the country because of rapid inflation and tight
credit.
FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD, AND KINSHIP
Family and kinship form the core of social life in Bangladesh. A family
group residing in a bari functions as the basic unit of economic endeavor,
landholding, and social identity. In the eyes of rural people, the cula
(common hearth) defines the effective household, a group exploiting
jointly held property and eating from a jointly operated kitchen. A
homestead may comprise one or more such functional households,
depending on the circumstances of family relationship. Married sons
generally live in their father's household during the older man's lifetime.
Although they usually construct separate houses to shelter their own
nuclear families, they remain under their father's authority, and their
wives, under the authority of their mother-in-law.
Death of the father usually precipitates the separation of adult
brothers into their own households. Such a split generally causes little
change in the physical layout of the homestead, however. The brothers
simply divide the fields and other property their father held and used for
their common benefit and establish individual hearths where each wife
cooks for her own small household. As the brothers' sons grow and marry,
the cycle repeats itself. Families at different stages of the cycle display

142
different configurations of household membership; villagers tend to view
these changes in household composition as a natural function of family life
rather than as alternations of a pattern.
The ability of the extremely densely settled land to support constantly
increasing numbers of people and the high death rates of all ages are
important limiting factors to household development. Family members,
especially men, frequently seek employment away from the homestead,
often leaving their wives and children in the care of relatives who remain
at home. Population estimates indicate, furthermore, that at least 25
percent of women aged thirty-five to forty-four are widows, with the
precentage rising to 50 percent by the age of fifty. These figures imply
that large numbers of men do not live long enough to head the fully
developed extended family household and that many young men assume
household leadership at an earlier stage in their own lives.
Patrilineal ties dominate the ideology of Bangalee family life, but in
practice matrilineal ties are also important. Married women provide
especially important links between their husbands' families and their
brothers'. Brothers and sisters often retain close ties far into adulthood,
and women avail themselves of their right to visit their brothers'
households, which are in fact the households of their deceased fathers in
which they spent their girlhood. Women inherit a share of their fathers'
property under Islamic law and thus own a claim on the often scanty
fiields worked by their brothers. By not excercising this claim, however,
they do their brothers the important service of keeping the family lands in
the patrilineal line and thus ensure themselves a warm welcome and
permanent place in their brothers' households. Although a woman joins
the samaj of her husband, she retains residual ties to the group of her
father and brothers.
Beyond the bounds of close kin, recognition of kinship is relatively
elastic and subject to considerations of political, economic, factional, or
other factors. Thus, in the words of Jean Ellickson, "An individual in
government office with whom one could trace kinship ties, no matter the
type . . . nor how far removed, was recognized as a clansman, and one
hoped that the recognition was reciprocated." This flexibility permits the
manipulation of relationships within the relatively fluid social structure.
Such advantage, both economic and political, is a frequent motive in
marriage arrangements. Marriage is a civil contract rather than a
religious sacrament in Islam, and the parties to the contract represent
the interests of families rather than the direct personal interests of the
prospective spouses. Parents ordinarily select the spouses of their
children, although men frequently exercise some influence on the choice
of their wives and in middle-class urban families often negotiate their own
marriages with the bride's parents. Only in the most sophisticated
university circles, however, does a woman take a hand in her own
marriage arrangements.
Marriage generally takes place between families of similar social

143
standing, although a woman may properly marry a man of somewhat
higher status. Marriages probably take place more often within status
groups than between them, but such marriages, although less common,
are by no means rare. Financial standing has come to outweigh family
background in recent years in any case. Bertocci quotes a villager as
saying, for example, "Nowadays if one's economic position is good, one's
lineage status is also good."
One of the functions of the marriage negotiations is to balance any
status discrepancy through financial arrangements. The groom's family
ordinarily pledges the traditional Islamic mehr (a cash payment), part or
all of which is deferred to fall due in case of divorce of the bride by the
groom or if the contract is otherwise broken. Some families have also
adopted the Hindu custom of providing a dowry for the bride. Found in
many Muslim countries, the mehr attempts to provide the woman some
protection against the summary divorce permitted by Islam. Until the
passage of a 1961 law, however, women in what is now Bangladesh had no
right to initiate divorce.
Divorce, especially of young couples without children, is by no means
rare in Bangalee villages. Several village surveys found that approxi
mately one in six marriages ends in this fashion. A smaller number,
between 6 and 10 percent, were reported as polygynous.
The typical marriage takes place between a girl recently past puberty
and a man as much as ten years older. A 1961 study estimated that about
half the women had married by thirteen and almost all by nineteen; these
ages seem to have risen somewhat by the mid-1970s. Early marriage
nevertheless remains the rule even among the educated. Women
students frequently marry in their late teens and continue their
university studies as wives.
Typical spouses know each other only slightly, if at all, before
marriage. Although marriage between cousins and other more distant
kinsmen occurs frequently, especially among families of higher status,
the all-pervasive segregation of the sexes generally keeps young men and
women of different households, even relatives, from knowing each other
well. Marriage functions to ensure the continuity of families rather than
to provide companionship to individuals, and the new bride's relationship
with her mother-in-law is probably more important to her well-being than
her rather impersonal relationship with her husband.
A woman only begins to gain respect and security in her husband's (or
his father's) household as she produces boys. Mothers therefore cherish
and indulge their sons, while daughters experience discipline and heavy
household chores from an early age. In many families the closest, most
intimate, and most enduring emotional relationship is that between
mother and son. The father is a more distant figure, worthy of formal
respect, and the son's wife is a virtual stranger for a considerable period
of time after marriage.
Practice of purdah (the traditional seclusion of women) varies widely

144
according to social milieu, but even in relatively sophisticated urban
circles the core of the institution, the segregation of the sexes, persists.
Traditionally a mark of high status and still a source of prestige in
traditionally oriented circles, full purdah requires the complete seclusion
of women from the time of puberty. Within the home women inhabit
private quarters that only male relatives or servants may penetrate;
women must properly avoid or treat with formal respect even such family
members as husband's father and husband's older brother. Outside the
home, a woman in purdah wears an enveloping tentlike garment, the
burka, which an observer has termed "portable seclusion."
The trappings of full purdah requires both a devotion to traditional
practice and the means to dispense with the labor of women in field work.
For most rural families a lack of the latter makes full observance
impossible, although the ideal remains. In some areas, for example,
women go unveiled within the confines of the para or gram but don the
burka for trips farther afield. In any case, contact with men outside the
immediate circle is avoided. An observer has noted that village women
tend to speak only the local village dialect of Bengali, whereas men, who
trade in market centers, generally speak a town or market dialect as well.
This segregation of the sexes extends into social groups who have
rejected full purdah as a result of modern education. Although the city
woman may enjoy more physical freedom and the opportunity to pursue a
professional career, she moves, according to A.K. Nazmul Karim, in a
"different social world" from her husband and often works at her
profession in a specifically feminine milieu, such as a women's college or a
maternity hospital.

145
 CHAPTER 7
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS
The people of Bangladesh, independent in their own right only since
late 1971, continued in early 1975 to be distinguished by a strong sense of
pride in the Bengali language and art. Fear of the denigration of that
language and culture was a leading cause of the dissent that led to their
insurgency and final victory in 1971. Although the literacy rate is low, the
level of articulate expressiveness is high. The Bangalees, as a people, are
not a monochrome mass but tend to act and speak freely as individuals.
Bangalees, in a land of violent weather, mighty rivers, and verdant
vegetation, are in general highly musical, romantic, and poetic. Life is
difficult, and the interaction with nature has historically seemed to be the
main struggle as well as inspiration. Art and literature are traditionally
humanist, gentle, and lyrical; and observers have often commented, only
half in jest, that "at heart all Bengalis are poets." Men of arts and letters,
notably the Bengali Nobel Prize winner for literature (poetry) in 1913,
Rabindranath Tagore, are held in high esteem; and in villages, the folk
culture of the people in drama, music, and crafts is rich and varied.
Bengali culture is a syncretic compound. It includes: the influence of
nature and animism expressed in ancient folkways; the successive
influences of Hinduism and Buddhism, followed by Mughal Islam from
the medieval period until about 1800; the impact of Western modernism,
especially as conveyed by the British presence to 1947; and the national
experience since that time.
After the early part of the twentieth century, literature and the other
art forms increasingly took up the cause of social reform, speaking for
independence from Great Britian, then for cultural preservation and
independence from Pakistan and, in the present day for secular
progressivism and the amelioration of the life of the common man.
Writers, poets, and painters have tended away from the earlier lyricism
of love and nature to stronger expressions of realism, calls for social
action, and a search for new meanings in relation to old values and the
changes of the modern world around them. Among the masses, motion
pictures from the active national films industry are a favorite form of
entertainment. In these films, as in much of the more serious art and
literature, the theme of the Banglaee independence struggle, in many
variations, is most prominent.
National preoccupation with the arts, whether at the folk or formal
level, is evidenced by the support given by the government to the Bangla

147
Academy and other centers. Severe economic distress, food shortages,
demographic pressures, and political crises gripped the new nation in
1975, and to many observers the gloomy aspects of the country's situation
seemed to be brightened only by the beauty of its much-loved arts. This
national sensitivity to cultural presentation and exchange was further
illustrated by the fact that, in 1974, in addition to programs of the United
States Information Service in Bangladesh, fourteen other nations,
notably the Soviet Union and Great Britain, maintained cultural and
information centers in Dacca and at various branch locations.
Among the media the press has been longest established, and it
expanded rapidly after 1971 despite the shortage of government-
controlled newsprint, the requirements of registry, and government
allocation of most of the advertising. Newspapers in both Bengali and
English—possibly numbering more than the country needs—continued
to be the most influential means of affecting opinion because of their
impact on the literate. Television, nationalized as was radio, was still
limited in 1975 to a small, elite audience in the Dacca area. The national
telecommunications system, obsolescent and damaged by war, was
overloaded and in serious need of rehabilitation. Second to the personal
exchange of news among the loquacious Bangalees themselves, however,
public radio was probably the chief agency for the dissemination of
information.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS
Public communications systems in eastern Bengal were minimally
established before World War II but were well below the standards of the
more developed countries at that time and served principally to facilitate
the operations of British rule. After the partition of British India
following World War II, some expansion and development took place in
East Pakistan but was given a lower priority than in West Pakistan, the
seat of national government (see ch. 2). Such development as did occur
was inhibited by the series of disorders and natural disasters and by the
economic distress that plagued the country before and after it became the
independent country of Bangladesh in December 1971.
Historically, mass communications have been principally by word of
mouth. About 95 percent of the people of Bangladesh are rural villagers
living at high population densities in small communities that are closely
located to each other but that often have little or no electrification. News
moves quickly, however, along the vast web of inland waterways that
have always been the main mode of transport (see ch. 3). In early 1975
personal contacts and verbal exchanges, augmented by battery-operated
radio, continued to be the chief means of communication. Village elders
and local government officials in the present day are still important
sources of information, although the credibility allowed to the latter
group was diminished by the severe economic difficulties of 1974 and
1975. Muslim imams, village mullahs, and other Islamic leaders are also

148
influential as opinion makers and often function as teachers (see ch. 5). In
fact, in a country having only a 20-percent literacy rate, anyone able to
read a newspaper to a group of villagers becomes an agent of
communications and a potential influence, particularly if, by age or office,
the reader is a person of local repute.
Although their literacy rate is low, Bangalees in general tend to be
articulate and talkative, proud of their Bengali language and sensitive to
its use. These characteristics contribute largely to and are evident in the
importance of personal exchange as the main means of communication.
In the larger towns and cities telecommunications, the press, radio,
and television are more in evidence and have a more important role than
in the small villages. Requirements for capitalization in a crisis economy,
however, along with scarcity of newsprint and other publishing stock,
costs of modern equipment, shortages of skilled technicians, and
maintenance problems were all general factors of constraint on media
operations. Also, all media, especially the press, were vulnerable to the
hazards of terrorism carried out by rival political factions.
Nationwide, communications and information media activities fall
within the purview of either the Ministry of Information and Broadcast
ing or the Ministry of Posts, Telephones, and Telegraphs (see ch. 8).
Officially, unless provided for under emergency conditions, there is no
censorship. Indirectly, however, there are a number of ways by which
restraints and controls over the media may be exercised by government
agencies. These include allocation of newsprint, film, and other supplies;
allocation of advertising from government-controlled companies; and
registry licensing.
Freedom of speech was established as a right, subject to law, in the
Bangladesh Constitution. During the state of emergency proclaimed in
late 1974 and the subsequent assumption on January 25, 1975, of full
powers by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as president, however, such rights
were suspended. The extent of new controls on the media that might be
imposed by executive order was not yet known in early 1975 but was
indicated by an official announcement made by the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting on March 17, 1975. This announcement
stated that Mujib's government might reduce the number of newspapers
in the near future and establish stronger central press controls. This plan
reportedly would include elimination of about twenty smaller newspap
ers and the merger and reallocation of a number of larger ones. The new
press system, according to reports of the plan, would resemble that of the
Soviet Union in that the government would directly control several large
newspapers and several more would be managed by the new single party
decreed by Mujib on February 24, 1975 (see ch. 8; ch. 9; ch. 14). A number
of other publications would be allocated to the management of
occupational or functional groups in the society, such as trades, labor, and
the armed services.
Following the emergency proclamation and change in government

149
form, information and news from Bangladesh were extremely limited
and, after the initial reports, came mostly from government-controlled
sources. Censorship and martial law were not formally in effect when the
emergency was declared, but the subsequent lack of news emanating
from the country suggested that strict surveillance of the press was in
effect.
Telecommunications
Countrywide, telecommunications services directed and managed by
the Ministry of Posts, Telephones, and Telegraphs in 1975 continued to be
deficient in both quality and quantity. Bangladesh then had a ratio of less
than one telephone per 1,000 of the population, one of the lowest
telephone densities in the world. The local telephone system in late 1973
had 250 exchanges (of which 230 were manual), handling about 65,000
lines. Telegraph services were available at ninety-six telegraph offices
colocated with the postal system, including direct international teletype
(and telephone) connections in Dacca and Chittagong to six foreign
countries.
Commencing at the local level, all facilities were heavily overloaded.
The resultant delays and poor quality of service were further worsened
by the obsolete or obsolescent state of much of the equipment in place in
1973 and 1974, by the damage the existing system incurred in the 1971
war, and by the ponderous bureaucracy responsible for operations and
maintenance. In the Bangladesh crisis economy, funding needed for
improvement was not available from government internal revenue.
Under the First Five Year Plan (1973-78), however, extensive projec
tions, dependent upon outside aid, were made for rehabilitation and
expansion of the telecommunications system. These plans included
establishment of a ground satellite station at Bethbunia in the Chittagong
Hills. This situation was scheduled to be commissioned in January 1975
and when fully operational would provide 5,000 direct, two-way radio
circuits connecting Bangladesh with Great Britain, the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany), India, Singapore, Hong Kong, Italy, and
Japan.
The Press
The press is the oldest and best developed of the mass media. In early
1975 radio had become the most pervasive formal medium for the
transmission of information and entertainment; but the press, because of
its impact on the leadership and the literate at all levels, continued to be
the most influential of the media in affecting the formation of opinion. The
press was one of the main agencies in the movement for independence,
first from Great Britain and later from Pakistan; and in 1975 its influence
continued to be far greater than would be surmised from newspaper sales
and circulation and the prevailing low rate of literacy—estimated
variously between 18 and 22 percent and usually given as 20 percent. This

150
literacy rate, however, was at least comparable to that in neighboring
countries. Single copies of newspapers and magazines were usually
passed from person to person, and it was common for literate persons to
read to groups of those unable to do so.
On the subcontinent, Indian-owned newspapers in Indian languages
began publication early in the nineteenth century. The Indian press,
however, received its impetus from and contributed to the freedom
movement, which was gaining impetus at the end of that century. For a
variety of reasons, Muslims in British India began entering the
profession ofjournalism at about that time, organizing around a platform
based on equalization of Muslim social and political rights with those of
their Hindu counterparts (see ch. 2).
A strictly partisan Muslim press emerged when Mohammad Ali
Jinnah, as president of the Muslim League, undertook the movement for
a separate Pakistan in the 1930s. The Muslim press focused attention on
the dual Muslim struggle to win independence from Great Britain and to
counter the supremacy of the far more developed and wealthy Hindu
press of the all-India freedom movement, which was opposed to the
formation of a separate Muslim state. Among others during this time, the
Muslim newspaper Azad began publication in Calcutta in 1936, becoming
the first politicized modern newspaper in the Bengali language. The
English-language newspaper Morning News appeared in Calcutta in
1942. Some Muslim newspapers failed, as circulation was meager
compared to the Hindu press, and by the end of World War II, on the eve
of independence, there was no major Muslim-owned newspaper in any of
the areas that would constitute the new state of Pakistan. Nevertheless,
the Muslim press had managed to consolidate and maintain itself
sufficiently to become an effective medium for influencing Muslim public
opinion and convincing readers of the desirability and feasibility of
partitioning the subcontinent. This principal effort made the press
markedly political in character, to the near exclusion of other news and
features—a characteristic that abated slowly in succeeding years.
The material situation of the Muslim press was not improved by the
two-way migration that followed partition and independence in 1947.
Although West Pakistan inherited Lahore, one of the leading publishing
centers of British India, the majority of those engaged there in
journalism, publishing, and printing were Hindus or Sikhs who then
migrated to India. Some of the best presses were transferred to India
also, and the number of Muslim presses that were moved to West
Pakistan and East Pakistan was insufficient to cover the loss. Present-
day territories constituting Pakistan and Bangladesh were among the
least industrialized of British India and, as a result, the problems of press
maintenance and spare parts quickly became serious. Also, there was no
newsprint factory anywhere in Pakistan, and at first all newsprint had to
be imported, a situation not alleviated by domestic manufacture until the
early 1960s. Because of the shortage, newsprint was rationed and allo

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cated by the central government, a practice providing a simple means of
influencing publishers and one that continued in Bangladesh in early 1975.
All the difficulties faced by the press in West Pakistan in the first years
after independence were magnified in East Pakistan, where resources
and allotted priorities were even lower. Between 1947 and 1950,
however, enough machinery was imported to permit the leading
newspapers of Pakistan to be printed separately. During this period,
Azad and the Morning News moved from Calcutta to Dacca, and a new
English daily, the Pakistan Observer (later renamed the Bangladesh
Observer), was founded there. Gradually, more newspapers in the
Bengali language appeared in East Pakistan; for example, Ittefaq was
established in Dacca in 1955.
Extensive evidence has been adduced by the government and
historians of Bangladesh to support their claim that suppression of
Bengali culture, press, and language was undertaken as a deliberate plan
by the central government of Pakistan. Jinnah stated in March 1947 that
Urdu only would become the official language. Jinnah died in September
1948, but in early 1952 the Pakistani head-of-state restated the intention
to make Urdu the only official, national language. Riots, especially by
students in Dacca on February 21, broke out in East Pakistan and were
bloodily suppressed. Since then, that date has been annually observed as
Martyrs Day. Because of continuing dissent on the language issue,
Bengali was later confirmed as an official language along with Urdu. By a
variety of means, however, both direct and indirect, measures to limit or
eliminate Bengali cultural nationalism continued.
During the two decades after 1951 the demands of East Pakistan for
federal autonomy, economic equality, and safeguarding of its identify
grew stronger and stronger. The cultural gap between East Pakistan and
West Pakistan, bridged only by a surface commonalty in Islam, was, in
the end, more divisive than the 1,000-mile physical gap. Finally, the
struggle for autonomy became an independence movement. To the extent
possible in the increasingly repressive public environment, most of the
press in East Pakistan, except for the newspapers of the Press Trust of
Pakistan and a few others, worked for the Bangalee cause and received
general public support. When repressive measures and constraints were
imposed on the pro-Bengali papers, their popularity rose. Circulation of
Ittefaq, for example, increased whenever the editor was arrested. Also,
nationalists burned the government Press Trust offices during the
agitation of 1969 against Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan.
On March 25, 1971, the Pakistan army launched a crackdown
throughout the East Wing to reassert central government control.
Newspaper offices supporting the Bengali opposition were destroyed or
seized. In the war that followed, political leaders, journalists, students,
and intellectuals initially appeared to be the main targets of the Pakistan
army but, as the insurgency became general, the suppression attempt

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 Table 7. Bangladesh, Major Daily and Weekly Newspapers and Magazines, 1974

Approximate
Circulation Orientation
(in thousands)

DAILIES1
Azad 15 Government administered
Azadi2 15 Independent, often supports government
Bangladesh Observer ... 40 Government administered
Bangladesh Times 15 Progovernment organ of Awami Jubo (Youth)
League
Banglar Bani 25 Do.
Dainik Bengal 45 Government administered
Ganokantha 30 Opposition organ of National Socialist Party
Ittefaq 110 Independent, often in opposition
Janopad 10 Independent, pro-Indian
Morning News 20 Government administered
People's View2 10 Independent, usually supports government
Purbodesh 40 Government administered
Sangbad 20 Supports government; often pro-Soviet
The People 10 Independent, often critical of government
WEEKLIES
Begum 15 Women's magazine, nonpolitical
Bichitra 40 Government administered
Chitrali 75 Movie magazine
Desh Bengla2 10 Opposition; National Socialist Party organ
Holiday 25 Opposition
Wave 8 Do.

1 All located in Dacca unless indicated otherwise; newspapers with English names are published in English, all
others in Bengali.
2 Located in Chittagong.
Source: Based on information from The Far East and Australasia, 1974: A Survey
and Directory of Asia and the Pacific, London, 1974, pp. 186-187.

became general. After intervention by India in December 1971,

Pakistan's forces were defeated. In the last days of the battle at Dacca,
however, many Bengali writers and other intellectuals were rounded up
and killed before the Pakistani forces surrendered on December 16 (see
ch. 2). Bangladesh was now free.
Bengali was the undisputed official language, the press was quickly
reconstituted and, in the next three years, numerous new newspapers
and magazines appeared despite the continuing shortage of newsprint.
By late 1974 there were, nationwide, some thirty-one dailies, 138
weeklies, thirteen fortnightlies, and seventy-six monthlies (see table 7).
Daily readership was estimated to be more than 1.5 million. A Bangalee
spokesman, commenting on the highly expressive nature of the society,
observed, "We probably have too many newspapers and magazines for
the economy and present level of literacy. But you must remember, in my
country everyone has a point of view—and wants to tell it!"

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 In addition to their own reporters, the newspapers of Bangladesh have
available the services of three commercially operated news agencies—
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), Eastern News Agency (ENA),
and Bangladesh Press International (BPI). These agencies are affiliated
with a number of international wire services. In addition, the Press
Information Department of the Ministry of Information and Broadcast
ing is an important news source.
Dacca is the principal center for press and publication activities of all
kinds; Chittagong is a distant second. Leading dailies, in Bengali and
English, usually have eight to ten pages and are sold for the equivalent of
US$0.05. In general, the Bengali press is more colorful and lively and
carries more local news than the English-language newspapers, which
have more international coverage. In early 1975 about one-third of the
leading dailies and weeklies were in English. Experienced observers
believed, however, that the use of English in Bangladesh had crested and
was beginning to decline. For example, the increasing availability of
typewriters with Bengali script has further stimulated use of the
indigenous language in journalism, government, and business.
All publication activity is subject to the Press and Publications Act of
1973. In continuation of the practice instituted under the British Raj, in
order to start a new newspaper or undertake a publishing venture of any
kind, a registry number must be secured by application to the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, accompanied by evidence of sufficient
capital to get started and a pledge to obey the laws of the land. This
registry number must be shown on all copies of newspapers and other
publications; without it allocations of newsprint and other stock paper
cannot be secured, and publication is illegal.
Under the First Five Year Plan a program was drawn up to expand and
modernize the Khulna Newsprint Mills to attain a production of 63,000
tons annually. This quantity, it was estimated, would take care of the
country's needs and leave a valuable surplus for export. The precarious
state of the economy in 1975 left this and other goals of the plan in doubt,
however. It was considered likely that government allocation of paper
would continue, since this practice, along with the requirements for
registry and the award of advertising by government agencies or
government-owned companies, provided an effective indirect means for
handling the press.
In early 1975 some newspapers and journals in Bangladesh were
individually or group owned and had independent editorial policies that
might or might not always be in accord with the position of the
government or a particular faction. Other publications were owned or
supported by certain political parties and functioned as their party
organs. Still others operated with management appointed by the
government. This distribution would be greatly changed, however, if the
press control plan announced on March 17, 1975, were to be implemented.

154
 Under the Pakistani regime, two newspapers—the Morning News and
Dainik Bangla—in what was then East Pakistan were owned and
directed by the Press Trust of Pakistan, an outright central government
agency. When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, the managers of
these newspapers fled or were seized. The new government assumed
control of these facilities and appointed a director general over them. In
1975 these newspapers remained under the policy guidance of the
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. In a similar manner the
so-called Observer group of newspapers, consisting of the Pakistan
Observer, Purbodesh, and the motion picture magazine Chitrali, passed
to Bangladesh government control. The former owner, also head of the Al
Hilal Publishing House, having supported the Pakistani rather than the
Bangalee side in the war, departed the country in haste just before
independence.
During 1972, particularly because of the immense personal popularity
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the prime minister, criticism of the new
government's performance and opposition to its policies were almost
nonexistent. During 1973 and 1974, however, economic conditions
worsened, public unrest developed, and press criticism began to appear
(see ch. 14). Although the independent newspapers from time to time
might express criticism of specific aspects of government affairs, two
main voices of opposition by late 1974 were identifiable—the Bengali
daily Ganokantha and the English weekly Holiday, both published in
Dacca. Ganokantha is the house organ of the National Socialist Party
(Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal—JSD) (see ch. 9). Holiday, the most important
opposition voice and one at times suspended during 1973 and 1974, speaks
for the young, leftist-intellectual faction that broke off from the
pro-Peking branch, led by Maulana Abdul Hamid Bashani of the National
Awami Party (NAP). This party had earlier divided between pro-Peking
and pro-Moscow advocates. The original NAP had emerged even earlier
from a preindependence split of the Awami League. Three much smaller
Bengali-languages weeklies were also often in opposition in 1974; these
were Desk Bangla, Abhimat, and Sonar Bengla.
According to informed observers, the opposition press until early 1975
had not actually caused serious trouble for the government. No new
newspapers taking an opposition line were started in the latter part of
1974, but in July of that year the progovernment Bangladesh Times
appeared in Dacca under owner-editor Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, a
nephew of Mujib; by the end of the year, its circulation was reported to be
rising rapidly. In general, the country's press had either voluntarily
tempered or restrained itself or actively supported the government,
especially in view of the government's armory of powerful, indirect
controls. After the assumption of all-encompassing emergency powers on
December 28, 1974, the government was able to exercise any form or
degree of control it desired.

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 Radio and Television
In early 1975 radiobroadcasting continued to be exclusively a state
activity. Radio Bangladesh (Bangladesh Betar), with its director general
and main offices in Dacca, functioned under the Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting. The main volume of broadcasting for the internal
audience emanated from seven mediumwave stations transmitting
independent programs (see table 8). Their present-day programming
objective, according to government sources, is to convey "a comprehen
sive picture through reports, commentaries, features, discussions, music
and other cultural presentations."
These stations do not follow exactly the same schedule. Dacca
broadcasts continuously; the others are on the air from 12:30 A.M. until
5:30 P.M. except for short intervals. Music accounts for about half of the
programming. News reports and commentaries in Bengali are broadcast
at least seven times daily, and news in English is broadcast four times
daily. Historical and political commentary is heavily oriented to the
accomplishments of the war for independence from Pakistan in 1971,
stressing the role played by Bangalees and tending to diminish the critical
role of India in the December phase of the war. Increasingly, amid the
growing civil unrest in 1974, radio commentary was directed against
"miscreants" and "antisocial elements" said to be conspiring to undo the
victories of the independence struggle. The seven mediumwave stations
are supplemented by several shortwave and frequency modulation (FM)
stations.
Radio Bangladesh also has an active overseas service. Shortwave
transmitters in Dacca, utilizing eight frequencies on scheduled times,
broadcast for about twelve hours daily, at various times, in Bengali,
Hindi, Nepali, Punjabi, Pushtu, Urdu, Arabic, English and, on occasion,
in other languages. These broadcasts are beamed to Southeast Asia, the
Middle East, and Europe with the purpose of "communicating Bangalee
thoughts and ideals, culture, heritage, progress and development to the
people abroad."
The number of radio receivers among the general population in late
1974 was estimated at about 500,000 licensed sets and 200,000 unlicensed
sets. The density was low compared with western Europe and was
estimated to be not more than one set per 100 people or, possibly, less.
Radio is a more pervasive factor of information, education, and influence
in the large cities and towns than in the small, rural villages but is
nevertheless a mass communications means of major importance. The
estimated daily listening audience is 10 million. Radio receivers are found
in some number in almost every locale and, in both villages and cities, one
set—in a marketplace shop or teahouse, for example—may serve a large
number of people, especially for news broadcasts. Frequently, addresses
to the nation by radio are made by the president or prime minister.
Television broadcasting commenced in December 1964 as a small
government-supported commercial venture that became fully

156
 Table 8. Bangladesh, Radio Stations, 1974

Power
Location Frequency (in kilowatts)

Mediumwave (in kilohertz)

Chittagong 870 10
Dacca 690' 100
Dacca 1170 5
Khulna 1345 10
Rajshahi 1080 10
Rangpur 1050 10
Sylhet 1140 2
Frequency Modulation (FM) (in megahertz)
Chittagong 105.5 2
Dacca 100, 101.5, 102.5 2
Dacca 104.0 1
Rajshahi 103.0 2
Sylhet 106.5 2
Shortwave2

1 A new transmitter to operate on 690 kilohertz and 1,000 kilowatts was being installed in Dacca in 1974.
2 Principally for overseas service. Three transmitters in Dacca; power output in watts is: 100, 10, and 7.5.
Frequencies utilized, in kilohertz, are: 4790, 4890, 6015, 7250, 9580, 11650, 15455, 15520, and 17690.
Source: Based on information from World Radio and TV Handbook: 1974, Hvidovre,
Denmark, 1974, p. 140.

nationalized by the new government in December 1971. By 1975 a new

center was operational in the Rampura quarter of Dacca with new
equipment, multiple studios, and a large auditorium. Transmission has
been limited to 3 % hours in the evening, but plans called for a gradual
extention of air time. Programming generally consisted of news, cultural
and educational presentations, and straight entertainment features.
Television films from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and other sources as well as those of indigenous origin were utilized. The
government-controlled station has a coverage radius of about sixty miles,
to be extended by six satellite and three relay stations scheduled under
the First Five Year Plan for completion by the end of 1978. The goal,
according to government sources, is to bring 95 percent of the country
within national television coverage. In early 1975, however, television
still largely appealed to the elite. The number of sets in the country was
estimated at not more than 40,000 and the daily potential audience at only
200,000 people.

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

Place and Promotion of the Arts
To an outside observer looking only at the existing political and
economic scene, Bangladesh in early 1975 presented a picture of nothing
but disaster and distress: a government beset by difficulties of

157
organization, administration, factionalism, and law and order; food and
financial crises at high emergency levels; recurring natural calamities of
winds and floods; and unchecked population growth in a country already
the most densely populated in the world. But these gloomy aspects of the
national life were brightened by another facet—one of highest impor
tance to people at all levels and closely related to the struggle for
independence—that is, the strong consciousness of the people's own
cultural identity as expressed in their art and, above all, in the Bengali
language.
The issue of language as a main cause of the revolt against Pakistan and
the Bengali characteristic, among both literate and illiterate, of articulate
expressiveness have been identified (see Mass Communications, this
ch.). More sweepingly, the anthropologist Ralph W. Nicholas has
summed up the national cultural personality, attitudes, and outlook as
follows:
Bengalis talk freely and easily about the current problems of their society, and
they do so in dramatic terms. But these problems are not at the center of their
universe. Most Bengalis who are more than minimally literate can show you their
poetry if urged a little. Among both educated and uneducated there is a
remarkable number of gifted singers ... of the songs of Rabindranath Tagore or
Kazi Nazrul Islam or the earthy, vigorous village lyrics (palli gitti) drawn from
one of the world's richest stocks of folk music. The rural areas are the source of
many actors of heroic proportions, their talent going mainly to entertain other
villagers in magnificent, all-nightjatra dramas. The most ordinary peasants often
display a refined capacity for melodrama, depicting their own unhappy situation
with a painful, mordant wit and wry irony.

Bengali culture, as expressed in its various art forms, is so strongly

rooted in folkways and folk participation that it would, in all likelihood,
flourish even without extensive formal promotion. The importance of the
arts in the life of the nation, however, is shown by the variety of
institutions and schools for artistic advancement operated or subsidized
by the government, despite its severely limited financial resources.
The Bangla Academy, located in Dacca, in financed by the government
and is managed by an appointed director general and board of directors.
General membership is open to all interested persons. The objective of
this official national academy is to set literacy and scholarship standards;
to publish works of merit that might not otherwise be printed; to
encourage talented youths; to prepare references, such as dictionaries;
and to do historical research. One of the prinicpal projects engaging the
staff of the academy in 1975 was the continuing task of compiling an
exhaustive official history of the war for independence of March-
December 1971.
The Bul-Bul Academy of Fine Arts in Dacca was founded in
1955—named in honor of Bul-Bul Chaudhury, the foremost national artist
of the dance, who died in 1954 after career of international repute in
ballet. The academy, subsidized by the government, has five component
schools in dance, instrumental music, vocal music, arts and crafts, and

158
drama. The schools of music and dance are the most prominent. Other fine
arts centers include the Dacca College of Music, the Jago Art Center, the
Bangladesh College of Arts and Crafts, the Performing Arts Center
(Nikkon Lalitkala Kendra), the Nazrul Academy, and the cultural
organization called Chhayanaut. All but the last are government
subsidized.
The Bangabandhu Sanskritisebi Kaylan Foundation, formed by the
government in late 1974, is directed by a chairman appointed by the
prime minister and a board of trustees. The purpose of this foundation is
to provide financial assistance and rehabilitation to writers, artists, and
their families,and to award scholarships to talented youths. Still another
important arena for the preservation and promotion of the arts is in the
universities, where programs of study in fine arts and student
presentations in music, dance, and drama make a continuing contribution
(see ch. 4).
The respect and veneration accorded artists and intellectuals by all
levels of society were strongly evidenced in the nationwide birthday
observances in 1974, on May 7 and May 25, respectively, for the two most
esteemed men of Bengali letters, Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and
Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899- ). The Bangla Academy, the universities, the
major cultural organizations, and many smaller, local groups conducted
special seminars, exhibits, poetry readings, musical soirees, and other
events in honor of these Bengali literary giants. Mohammadullah, then
president of the republic, and his wife personally called upon the aging
Kazi Nazrul Islam to congratulate him on the occasion.
Literature and Publishing
Bengali is the easternmost of the broad grouping called Indo-European
or Indo-Aryan languages. More closely, it is a derivative of the eastern
Prakrit subgroup of languages stemming from Sanskrit. The Bengali
language and its script are identifiable about A.D. 1000, although some
views favor a date about two centuries earlier. The oldest texts in
recognizable Bengali are a group of forty-seven Buddhist lyrics found in
Nepal early in the twentieth century. The consensus among scholars
holds that these manuscripts must fall between A.D. 1000 and 1150, and
the date of 1000 is usually given as the earliest identification of the ancient
period of Bengali literature. The esoteric religious poems found in Nepal
reflect the yogic practices of the school of Buddhism called sahajiya ; they
are distinctly non-Brahmanical in character and appear to be animated by
a belief in the commonalty of mankind.
Buddhist domination in the Bengal region was displaced about 1100 by
a Hindu dynasty, itself challenged a century later. One of the
determinant historical experiences of the Bengali people occurred in 1200
with the onset of substantial Muslim incursions. During the next 150
years, the religion of Islam spread and, along with conflict, accomoda
tions began between Bengali Hinduism and Bengali Islam. In literature,

159
the 150 years after 1200 are called a "dark age" or "blank age," because no
written manuscripts remain from this period. Many Buddhist monas-
taries were destroyed, and Hindu Brahman scholars were dispersed.
Nevertheless, literary works were undoubtedly produced but have not
survived the centuries of heat and insect attack. Many tales and poems
were probably preserved orally and written down later. Writers of the
next period display a firm pattern of style and, as the orientalist T. W.
Clark has observed, "must have been heirs of established tradition."
The medieval period in Bengali literature, beginning in about 1350 and
extending to 1800, is entirely represented in verse. Prose forms do not
appear in Bengali until the nineteenth century. This total formulation of
literature in poetry until after 1800 accounts in great part for the
continuing preoccupation of Bengalis with poetry as the preferred form.
Early in the medieval period eulogistic poems called mangal,
sometimes running to tens of thousands of lines, appeared. Also written
about this time were the series of sensual lyrics describing the love of
Radha and Krishna, female and male deities from the Hindu pantheon
(see ch. 5). Most of the medievel literature is concerned directly or
indirectly with religion and includes works by both Bengali Hindu and
Muslim writers, the former predominating. Much of the Hindu writing
shows a preference for the female character, and the complex narratives
of Hindu deities assert the theme of final absorption and subjugation of
male power by female power. The favored, elite language of court culture
during the Buddhist and Hindu eras was Sanskrit, and, during the later
Muslim rule, Persian. The court language that evolved became one of
highly stylized literary conventions, and the writing was often tiresomely
repetitive. Songs and proverbs from the rural culture, in the common
Bengali vernacular of the time, are more distinctive and colorful in
portraying personalities and realistic experiences of life and nature.
Medieval Muslim writing shows the influence of the Islamic mystical
school of belief called Sufism. Sufi interpretations, on the whole, were not
greatly different from some indigenous Bengali beliefs of Tantric
Buddhism, Shakti Brahmanism, and rural fertility cults, (see ch. 5).
These similarities and the fact that both Hindu and Muslim poets were
Bengalis caused in numerous instances an exchange of renamed imagery
and more accommodation between Hindusim and Islam than ever would
be possible in what subsequently became West Pakistan. There, the more
uncompromising "desert Islam" prevailed, and a belief—still enduring in
1975—became widely held that the Islam of Bengal was corrupted by too
close association with Hinduism.
Three themes were particuarly favored by medieval Bengali Muslim
poets: the teachings and legends, called Hanifa, of a primitive, universal
monotheism; the elaboration of the historical events commemorated by
Shiah Muslims in the annual observances called Muharram; and the tale of
Jelekha (Zuleika), the wife of Potiphar the Egyptian, and Iuchaf (Yusuf
or Joseph). In the Judaic version of this story as given in the Old

160
Testament (Genesis 39), Iuchaf spurns the advances of Potiphar's wife. In
the Bengali Muslim recounting, however, apparently drawn from the
Quran but more particularly from Persian extrapolations, Iuchaf finally
succumbs. The imagery of the inverted version employs a setting and cast
of characters out of Islam but is compatible in tone with much of the
Hindu quasi-religious literature; in the end, female power prevails.
Not all of medieval literature was written on religious or quasi-
religious themes. A substantial body of verse survives on secular
subjects—extolling regional or local rulers or, in some cases, berating
them and their tax collectors, both Hindu and Muslim, or protesting the
treatment of lowly people by certain Brahmans.
The next determinantal stage, with a lasting impact on Bengali
literature and other art forms, was the eighteenth century advent in
Bengal of the British presence and control. The modern period begins
about 1800 and continues to the present day. The British brought with
them European-style education, Christianity, and the English language,
all of which were received with enthusiasm. After an initial surge, the
spread of Christianity subsided, but the popularity of English education
and language became firmly established. Authors began working in the
prose forms of the novel and the short story and in journalism. As
analysts Marta Nicholas and Phillip Oldenburg have remarked,
"Whether Bengali writers write today in Bengali or in English, western
literary forms and values are an intrinsic and inescapable part of the
intellectural life of Bengal."
Despite the communal differentiation that did develop, Hindus and
Muslims in the medieval period were not seriously separated by language
differences. The partial, forced differentation of communal vocabularies
came about later. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however,
the acceptability of Bengali as a literary language had declined. Persian
(the language of the old Mughal rule), English, and Sanskrit (among
scholars) were favored. The revival of Bengali as a literary instrument
was championed from 1800 onward by the British linguist and
missionary, William Carey, in Serampore and at the College of Fort
William near Calcutta. In 1815 and 1816 Ram Mohan Roy wrote two
religious books in Bengali; and in 1818 a Bengali newspaper appeared and
prospered. Both Carey and Roy have been cited by various critics as the
fathers of modern Bengali literature.
Reacting against the new trend started by Carey and Roy, a number of
Sanskrit academicians asserted that Bengali was nothing but a spoken
vernacular too "barbaric" for formal literature. In response, Roy
produced a detailed grammar. The conservative scholars countered by
developing a heavily Sanskritized, pedantic Bengali from which numer
ous familiar words of Perso-Arabic origin were purged, thus offending
some Muslim writers who promptly increased the Perso-Arabic content
of their work.
This dispute, between extremists in both camps, contributed to the

161
communal differentiation of Muslims and Hindus in Bengal. The common
people, nevertheless, continued speaking the well-known vernacular.
Newspapers, a modern innovation, increased in number; the name of the
publisher Isvarcandra Gupta is closely associated with the rise of Bengali
literary journalism. By the middle of the nineteenth century it became
clear that the two languages in which a commercial press could expect to
prosper were Bengali and English, in distinct preference to Urdu,
Persian, or Hindi. The written form of Bengali that received general
acceptance by 1850 proved to be a middle way between the extremes of
pedantry and the vernacular, in a form grammatically sound and at the
same time easily comprehensible to the average person.
In the cultural renaissance that followed, the medieval literature of
Bengal was rediscovered. Gupta, among others, sought to bridge the gap
between city and village by reminding educated Bengalis—many of
whom had eagerly sought an English-style education in order to find jobs
within the British Raj—of the rich culture of their own that remained
preserved in rural folkways. An era of intellectual stimulation and free
thinking began, and a consciousness of cultural identity developed from
self-rediscovery in the light of expanded horizons of learning and
experience. The quantity of new writing in Bengali increased, and the
quality improved, stimulated by the work of the Hindu author
Bandimcandra Chatterji. Theological debate, especially on the tenets of
Hinduism and Christianity, revived. As English-style education and
language spread among the elite, informed criticism of the British Raj
began to appear. Cultural revival began to merge with incipient
nationalsim—an identification that was to become increasingly strong as
the years passed. By 1870, according to T. W. Clark, the modern Bengali
language "was ready for the pen of Rabindranath."
Rabindranath Tagore, the first figure of Bengali letters, was born in
Calcutta in 1861, the son of Maharshi (Great Sage) Debindranath Tagore,
the social and religious reformer, who had succeeded Ram Mohan Roy as
head of a Hindu reformist movement of universalist outlook. Rabin
dranath Tagore, carefully educated under the influence of his father and
Roy, began writing at an early age in both verse and prose about "humble
lives and their small miseries." This theme and his ecstatic love for the
Bengali land of rivers and lush vegetation are the main characteristics of
his work. In 1901 he founded a school in Satiniketan in West Bengal,
which in 1924 became the Visva-Bharati University, a center of
international culture. In 1913 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his
poemGitanjali (Tribute in Song) and in 1915 was made a British knight.
This latter honor, however, he returned in 1919 to protest against the
incident known as the Amritsar Massacre, during the Punjab Rebellion of
that year, when British Indian troops killed 379 and wounded 1,208
people while dispersing a mob.
After World War I, Tagore continued to publish extensively for some
years, and he lectured frequently in Asia, Europe, and the United States.

162
He died in Calcutta on August 7, 1941. His song, "Our Golden Bengal," is
the national anthem of Bangladesh.
Kazi Nazrul Islam became well established as a young writer during
Tagore's later years and stands with him in general esteem. Known as the
"rebel poet" and the "voice of Bengali nationalism and independence," he
wrote fearlessly in the cause of social justice and the common man and
was imprisoned for a time during the British rule. He has also written on
Islamic themes. Ill for several decades, Nazrul Islam continued in 1975 to
reside in Dacca, where he had moved from Calcutta after Bangladesh
became independent. A new school of numerous authors in poetry,
drama, the novel, and other forms developed, and they were being
succeeded in 1975 by still another generation.
Modern Bengali writers created original works concerning all the
broad themes of man's history and existence. Their work is characterized
by a high level of social content and strong awareness of Bengali identity.
Realism and a sense of self-identity in the world-universal environment
animated the work of many younger poets and writers. Lyricism was not
dead but was less sought after for its own sake than in earlier eras.
Summarizing the main directions of Bengali literature during the World
War II period and later, a Bengali spokesman has stated that as the
communal division deepened between Muslims and Hindus in the 1930s
simultaneously with the impetus for independence, the principal motif of
Bengali literature was independence and, for Muslims, the separate
establishment of Pakistan. After 1947, as the language issue between
Urdu and Bengali arose, the main theme became that of cultural
preservation and separate independence as Bangladesh. Since 1971, the
literary focus has been on secularism, social conditions, and aspirations
for progress and improvement for the whole nation.
Book publishing and other publication activity outside the press field is
concentrated in Dacca, where in 1974 at least fourteen private publishing
houses were in operation. Most of these publish in both Bengali and
English, and some have capabilities of publishing in other languages as
well. The trade organization called the Bangladesh Publishers and
Booksellers Association publishes books in its own name and operates
certain library services. The government-directed and government-
funded Bangladesh Academy is a major publisher, especially of new or
unusual works that might not be commercially feasible to produce. Under
the academy, the National Book Centre and the internal information
agency called the Bangladesh Council are active in book promotion and
library services. The best libraries in the country are those of the
universities, especially that of the University of Dacca (see ch. 4).
Theater, Films, Music, and Dance
As in other forms of literature, Bengalis have made notable
contributions as playwrights. Both Tagore and Nazrul Islam wrote
several dramas in addition to their better known poetry, novels, and

163
translations. Few Muslims wrote drama before independence. This
situation changed in the years after World War I, however, as the work of
Musharraf Husain appeared. His play Zamindar Darpan (The Landlord
Exposed), depicting the inequities of the system of landholding, was the
first drama of social consciousness by a Muslim. Thereafter, as the tides of
nationalism and communal rivalry rose in the 1930s, both Muslim and
Hindu writers increasingly used the dramatic form to promote the cause
of independence as seen from their communal viewpoints.
After 1947 Nurul Momen and Munir Chaudhury became recognized as
leading dramatists, both noted for wit, sharp and forceful dialogue, and
clear delineation of character. Chaudhury has also gained recognition for
his translations into Bengali of English dramas. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the verse-plays of the poets Farrukh Ahmed and Jasimuddin
and the unusual plot lines of Syed Waliullah had attracted much
attention. By early 1975 a list of established Bengali dramatists, both old
and young, most of whom also wrote in other forms, would have included
several score names.
After 1971 drama production revived. By 1974 three well-established
drama socieites were presenting plays regularly in Dacca on a
quasi-professional basis in addition to the productions at university and
arts academy centers. Also, at least two well-organized amateur groups
were working in Chittagong. The kinds of plays used, mostly by Bengali
authors, covered a wide range of modern and historical subjects, the
theme of the independence struggle being the most favored. Adapta
tions, in translation, from the English, American, and other foreign
theaters have also been used. No national theater had as yet been
endowed, but government interest in such a project was expressed as a
future goal. Rise of interest in modern, dramatic art forms has been
stimulated by radio and, for a limited audience in the Dacca area, by
television. No medium or form of dramatic performance, however,
except the village folk-drama, has as wide a following as motion pictures.
Bangladesh has a flourishing film industry, with two major studios and
several smaller ones in Dacca. Filmmaking is monitored and protected by
the government and is coordinated by the Bangladesh Film Development
Corporation (FDC). The FDC allocates and leases studio faciliites to
commercial filmmakers; conducts training programs in production and
acting; organizes film festivals and awards; and deals with matters of
licensing, allocation of materials, and promotion of export markets. A
censor board certifies pictures for public exhibition and may reject
certification on such grounds as infringement of national security,
immorality, and defamation. About forty feature-length films are made
each year. News reels and documentaries, usually on subjects of public
information and culture promoted by the government, are made under
government contract.
The people of Bangladesh are avid film-goers. In late 1974, coun
trywide, there were about 210 licensed theaters or exhibition areas, with

164
a total seating capacity of about 117,000. Annual attendance has been
estimated at 125 million. Filmmaking, especially after 1971, became a
highly profitable enterprise. According to informed observers, any
producer with the necessary minimum capital and resources to make a
film was almost certain of a handsome return in a ratio of as much as ten to
one over his investment. As a result, many journalists and other writers,
as well as musicians and actors, were moving into work with the film
industry.
The country's films and other forms of public entertainment by the
modern media emphasize the positive aspects of Bangalee contributions
to independence and tend to minimize the role of India. For this reason,
and also to prevent the Bangalee industry from being overwhelmed by its
giant Indian counterpart, few Indian actors or technicians are used and
few Indian films are shown. The writing, production, and acting of most
films are by Bangalees. Two theaters in Dacca and one in Chittagong
showed English-language or English-dubbed films in 1974, but few
American-made films were being used.
The indigenous film is likely to be a three-hour epic melodrama,
probably on the theme of the nation's independence struggle. Production
and acting are often of mediocre quality, the film's appeal being directed
usually to the mass audience that has enthusiastically supported the
industry. Quantitative development and distribution has been great but,
in 1975, the FDC and other cultural agencies showed continuing interest
in raising the quality of production and performance as well.
The country's music is emotional and ecstatic, reflecting the relation
ship of the Bengali to nature, romance, religion, and nationalism.
Broadly, it falls into three categories: traditional, classical music of the
Indian style, still loved by many; folk or country music; and the modern
form influenced strongly by contemporary popular (pop) music of Europe
and the United States. The chief form of expression is vocal rather than
instrumental, but song is usually supported by instruments. The favored
instruments include the sitar, the violin (including the violin of traditional
design), and the flute. The bamboo flute is especially popular in the rural
areas where country songs of herdsmen and boatmen are much loved. In
the 1970s the guitar was increasing in popularity. The drums called baia
and tabla are used in all concert and classical music; the country drum, or
dhole, is found in village music.
By 1975 several recording studios in Dacca were making records,
especially of folk and tribal songs as well as popular songs of nationalism
and romance; but this industry was not yet highly developed compared
with filmmaking. The wars since 1947, especially that of 1971, gave birth
to thousands of songs in modern form, most often commemorating
national heroes and martyrs. Pop music of 1975 was strongly influenced
by European and American styles, especially by radio dissemination, and
in the nightclubs in Dacca and Chittagong only Western-style music was
likely to be heard. The cacaphony of rock music had exerted a substantial

165
appeal among the young but was usually denigrated as barbarous by their
elders.
Dance forms are virtually all of Hindu or village-tribal folk origin, since
this mode of expression is not featured in Islam. Basically, Hindu dance
began as prayer propitiation of Hindu gods. Classical ballet is popular
and, as seen in Bangladesh, is a mixture of Western and Hindu styles in
the patterns formed by Bul-Bul Chaudhury, who was influenced by the
Russian-trained Indian master, Uday Shankar. Chaudhury's ballets
habitually had a social message to convey, often protesting the
exploitation of farmers or other workers by oppressive landlords, who
were assisted by the police or army. Several new ballets have been
performed portraying the atrocities attributed to the Pakistani army in
the war of 1971. Another type of ballet is called the Nrittya Nattya, from
the works of Tagore. In this form, one or more singers sing a story of
poem from Tagore's works, while dancers enact it. Two other kinds of
traditional dance are the hatha kali and bharat nattyam, which are
drawn from the Hindu lore of Radha and Krishna. Men as well as women
participate in traditional dancing. These dance forms may be seen from
time to time on Dacca television but more often are performed in recitals
at the arts academies, such as the Bul-Bul Academy of Fine Arts and the
Nazrul Academy.
The performing arts in Bangladesh, despite the development of
modern theater and television and the pervasive dissemination of radio
and films, are most strongly rooted in and expressed by the old, syncretic
folk culture of the villages. The villagejatra plays, orjatragan, probably
the most distinctive indigenous form of the drama, preserve tales of
comedy, tragedy, and melodrama and are usually performed outdoors at
night. These performances often include local actors, singers, and
dancers of notable ability and may be elaborately organized to include
stage settings, costuming, and make-up. Also traditionally popular is the
kabiagn, a poetry contest in which two contestants, supported by one or
two musical instruments, debate alternately in extemporized verse. In a
variation, each contestant has the support of a vocal chorus, which
repeats his offerings.
Folk dances symbolizing the seasons and events of rural life have
numerous forms, often with both men and women participating. The
dance called moni puri, for example, is an elaborately costumed
community celebration at full moonlight after the harvest. Other kinds of
tribal or folk dances are those of the Santali, Moorang, and Mong people
in the Chittagong Hills. These dances show a definite Burmese influence.
Among the most popular country songs are those called bhatiali, or
boatmen's songs. The music, featuring long, drawn-out notes, is
suggestive of the endless flow of the rivers; the words usually tell of a
boatman's love for a distant woman. The bhawaiya, conversely, are
emotional, undulating, high-pitched women's songs of longing and
assurances for the absent boatman, cart driver, or herdsman. Among the

166
boatmen, the sarigan is another, more vigorous and rhythmic song timed
to the oar stroke and often heard at boat races.
Religious devotional songs and chants are numerous in form and
subclassifications. They include readings from the Muslim Quran; the
chant, called milad sharif, by a leader and chorus telling of the life of the
Prophet Muhammad; and other Muslim categories, such as the naate
rasul and kawali chants. Hindu songs of praise to the gods are called
kirtan and are similar in form, and sometimes in content, but addressed
to a different faith.
Village culture in story and song may be distinctive to certain sects or
ways of belief. For example, folk beliefs and rituals of the Baul fertility
cult are characteristic of most people (who may be either professed
Muslims or Hindus) who work in the weaving trade in Jessore, Kushtia,
and Pabna districts. Symbolism and some words survive here from the
ancient Nath Dharma way, whose outcaste yogis became weavers. Baul
beliefs are at least in part derived from these folk memories. Among the
weavers, Baul singers remind the listeners of the ancient concept of bliss
through ritual body purification. Another distinctive case is that of the
Nagarchi community of Brahmanbaria, whose group profession is singing
and dancing. Although professing Islam many of these people's rituals
are Hindu, but their way of life is not truly either. Young women of this
community wear the Hindu sindur (red mark) on their foreheads but,
before starting their entertainments, the women pray to Allah and then
salute Basumati, the earth mother.
Painting, Sculpture, and Art-Crafts
The prominence of famous men of letters tends to obscure the
accomplishments and recognition attained more recently by painters.
Since the 1950s a substantial number of Bengali artists have become
nationally acclaimed, and some have achieved international note. The
leading painters in 1975 were generally considered to be Zainul Abedin
and Qamrul Hasan, but a number of younger artists were becoming well
known. Group and solo exhibitions were held in Dacca in 1970, and
interest revived after 1971.
The artists of Bangladesh, like its individualistic people in general,
practice the right to be different. In 1975 these artists tended more
toward the development of individual abilities and the expression of
personal style than toward a particular school of expression. Many artists
paint realist still-lifes, landscapes, and other representational forms,
including works imbued with strong social commentary and passion.
Other modernist artists paint in the impressionistic, surrealistic, or
abstract modes. Most artists also work in sculpture; Novera Ahmad has
gained particular recognition, not only as a woman sculptor, but as a
leading figure among all artists. In both painting and sculpture, according
to a government summary of artistic endeavor since the 1960s, "a basic
feature has been that products have moved away more and more from the

167
representational idiom to that of abstraction and the regrouping of visual
perceptions, from mirroring the outer world to reflecting the inner
response to the outer world."
Folk crafts are particularly distinctive in weaving and pottery,
although the basketry and cane furniture of Bangladesh also display
much skill. Bengali art in weaving and embroidery, often in complex,
kaleidoscopic designs, is traditionally of superior quality. Before the
British rule, muslin of an extraordinarily gossamer quality was made in
the Dacca region. According to folklore, it was so nearly transparent that
more than seven layers were required to conceal the body, and it was so
fine that eleven yards could be wadded in one hand. This art declined after
1800 because it was discouraged by British mercantile policy. A high level
of weaving capability still remained in early 1975, however, whether the
product of modern textile mills or individual spinning wheels. The sari of
cotton or silk from the small home industry of central Bangladesh is
prized all over the Indian subcontinent. The best Dacca muslin is called
jamdani and is woven in garments of intricate and colorful floral or
geometric design.
In pottery crafts, the painted earthen plates called the lakhir shara are
a traditional folk art form; the painted pottery bowls distinctive of
Rajshahi District are also well known and of artistic merit. Most pottery
is still made on the ancient potter's wheel and depends on form as much as
on decoration for effect. A particular black pottery is characteristic of
Khulna; and glazed work in earth colors, of Dacca. Terra-cotta figurines
may be found, exquisitely capturing in clay the fluid grace of the folk
dances. As in the case of painting and sculpture, the College of Arts and
Crafts in Dacca is the main agency for experimentation in new pottery
forms.
Archaeology
Violent winds, torrential rains, river action, flooding, and dense
vegetation, in addition to the ravages perpetrated by people, have worked
against the preservation of old structures, artifacts, and records in
Bangladesh. The same climatic factors have impeded archaelogocial
research. Nevertheless, some ancient architecture remains from the
Buddhist-Hindu era and has been investigated. Considerably more
examples of mosques, palaces, and forts from the later Mughal-Muslim
period survive. Some of these mosques, such as the Chawkbazar Mosque
in Chittagong, are noted for the delicate terra-cotta filigree of their
architectural ornamentation, a style contrasting sharply with the more
severe, traditional mosque architecture of the Arab Middle East.
In Bogra District, the ruins of the fort of Mahasthan recall its
importance in the ancient history of the country when this region was
called Pundranagar. Excavation there has identified ten cultural layers
dating back to the fourth century B.C. Further study is expected to

168
establish the chronology of these levels and to assist materially in the
more accurate reconstruction of ancient history.
Many funerary mounds (stupas) of the old Buddhists and the remains
of their monasteries have been found at Mainamati in Comilla District
along an eleven-mile range of hillocks. Excavations, including the
discovery of inscribed copper plates, have enabled the genealogy of
several Buddhist dynasties to be corrected and have added knowledge of
another dynasty in the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. Another
important Buddhist site is the Paharpur Monastery in the Rajshahi
District, one of the largest such monasteries south of the Himalayas.
Hindu temple architecture exists in eight districts of central and northern
Bangladesh, the oldest example, in Dinajpur, dating from about A.D.
450.
By 1971 five archaeological museums had been established in
Bangladesh, including a special ethnological museum at Chittagong.
Expansion of the National Museum at Dacca and of the others was a goal
of the government's Department of Archaeology in 1975.
Scientific Research
Scientific and technological research was minimally established before
1972. Agencies of several commissions and institutes formed by the
Pakistan central government were set up in the East Wing, but these
branches had low priority in funding and manpower as compared with the
West Wing. After the independence of Bangladesh, existing facilities had
to be reorganized as national institutions.
The principal targets of research in 1975, according to government
sources, were developed in: the textile industry; agriculture, to include
the application of radiation methods in high-yield seed production; pulp,
paper, and fiber processing; rubber and plastic products; food preserva
tion; and ceramics and stonewares. The First Five Year Plan set forth a
series of steps to be incorporated into a national science policy. Chiefly,
these called for centralization of controls and facilities, careful selection of
priorities, and upgrading of scientific research and education standards.
The principal scientific agencies, other than the science departments of
the larger universities (with whom they are necessarily in close mutual
liaison by contract and consultation), are the Bangladesh Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research (BCSIR), started as a regional
laboratory at Dacca in 1955 and, also in the capital, the Bangladesh
Atomic Energy Center (BAEC), which includes a multipurpose nuclear
laboratory and nuclear medical center. Two new branches of the latter
center, in Chittagong and Rajshahi, and a new institute of nuclear
agriculture at Mymensingh were under construction in the mid-1970s.
Both the BCSIR and BAEC are supported by the Bangladesh National
Scientific and Technical Documentation Center in Dacca, where a
scientific information library collects and distributes such material.

169
 Under the five-year plan, the equivalent of about US$22.4 million was
to be allocated for direct scientific and technological research, with
another US$82.9 million for science-related development in transport,
communications, water control, housing, health, and power, in addition
to agricultural and industrial processes. The severe economic and political
crises of 1975, however, and the acute shortage of scientifically and
technically trained manpower made attainment of the goals of the
five-year plan appear doubtful, as noted in early 1975. In any case, aid
from other countries, the United Nations, and other international
agencies was certain to be needed for further scientific progress on a
substantial scale.

170
 SECTION II. POLITICAL
CHAPTER 8
THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
On April 17, 1971, a few refugees from the Pakistan military
authorities issued a proclamation that "confirmed" the independence of
Bangladesh in a small village that was renamed for the occasion
Mujibnagar (Mujib's place). The proclamation noted that the government
of Pakistan had held elections in December 1970 to select representatives
to the National Assembly, that the Awami League of East Pakistan had
won an absolute majority of the representatives, but that the govern
ment had failed to convene the assembly to discharge its stated functions
of drafting a new constitution and forming a new government. The
proclamation further noted that on March 26, 1971, the leader of the
Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had therefore declared
Bangladesh independent. The document then declared that "till such time
as a Constitution is framed, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall
be President of the Republic," and granted to Mujib total executive and
legislative power.
By April 10, however, Mujib was in a prison in West Pakistan, where
he remained until released on December 22, 1971, by which time the
Indian armed forces and the Bangalee guerrilla forces had defeated the
Pakistan military (see ch. 2; ch. 14). Mujib arrived back in Dacca on
January 11, 1972, and he exercised his presidential power to issue an
interim constitution, the Provisional Constitution Order, the preamble of
which stated that "It is the manifest aspiration of the people of
Bangladesh that a parliamentary democracy shall function in Bang
ladesh." The next day Mujib, who in various speeches noted that the
recently concluded civil war had been fought at least in part to relieve the
Bangalee people of the rigors of presidential tyranny, resigned from the
presidency and assumed the powerful position of prime minister. Under
his guidance a constitution that provided for parliamentary government
was drafted and on November 4, 1972, was adopted by the Constituent
Assembly.
On January 25, 1975, Mujib again assumed the presidency after his
Awami League followers in Parliament (Jatiyo Sangsad—House of the
Nation) amended the 1972 Constitution to grant the president powers
that are, at least potentially, more sweeping than those exercised by the

171
presidents of Pakistan during the periods of martial law (see ch. 2).
Among other things the constitutional amendment—the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act of 1975—assigned to the president seemingly
unchallengeable executive authority, plus the power to dismiss justices of
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and judges and magistrates of the
lower courts on the general grounds of incompetence. The president is
the commander in chief ofthe armed forces and also controls an extralegal
paramilitary force, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force)
(see ch. 14). Pursuant to another provision of the Fourth Amendment
Mujib, in February 1975, renamed the Awami League the Krishak
Sramik Awami League (Peasants, Workers, and Peoples League) and
declared it to be the sole legal political party or organization in the
country. Members of Parliament were required to join the party or forfeit
their parliamentary seats, and members of the government services—
presumably including the military and civil services—were also urged to
join (see ch. 9). Mujib reserved to himself all important decisionmaking
powers within the party.
Although the 315-member Parliament was not abolished, it was
rendered impotent. In early 1975 Mujib ruled through a Council of
Ministers, whose members were individually and collectively responsible
only to him; in the immediate aftermath of Mujib's assumption of
seemingly total power, it was too early to discern how and to what
purpose he intended to use that power. All that was certain was that the
government was no longer a parliamentary one, nor was it any longer a
democracy; it was a monocracy (see fig. 11).
BACKGROUND
The government system inherited by Pakistan from British India had
been fashioned under constitutional formulas adopted in 1919 and 1935.
The Government of India Act of 1919, a major landmark in the
constitutional evolution of British India, aimed at the gradual develop
ment of self-governing institutions for Indians by decentralizing powers.
Thus, it transferred the responsibilities for education, local self-
government, health, and agriculture from the central government to
provincial ministries that were accountable to partly elective and partly
appointive single chamber assemblies. These assemblies were chosen by
an electorate constituting only 2.8 percent of the total population. Laws
passed by the assemblies could be overruled, however, by British
governors who were responsible to the governor general and, ultimately,
to the secretary of state for India in London, rather than the provincial
electorate. The governors had exclusive control over finances, the courts,
and the police.
Indian demands for a greater measure of self-government culminated
in 1935 in the adoption by the British Parliament of another constitutional
reform that was to become the model for the Pakistani and Indian
constitutions, and—although to a lesser degree—for Bangladesh's 1972

172
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173
Constitution. The Government of India Act of 1935, the last and most
important step in the evolution of self-government in the subcontinent
before 1947, granted full provincial autonomy by making elective
assemblies and their ministries responsible for all provincial functions,
including those that had been reserved for the provincial governors. It
contained, however, sufficient reservations and checks to ensure the
continued preeminence of the governor general and the provincial
governors.
The 1935 act provided for a federal and semiparliamentary political
system. It divided powers between the central and provincial govern
ments by specifying the sphere of legislative competence into shared
central, provincial, and concurrent categories. The central government
had exclusive control of defense, foreign relations, and religious and
tribal affairs; residual powers were vested in the office of the governor
general, not with the central or provincial government.
In an effort to bring about a more effective political integration of the
subcontinent, the 1935 act also sought to establish a federated India. The
federation was to consist of eleven British-administered provinces on the
one hand and more than 560 princely states on the other. This goal was
not realized because of the reluctance on the part of the princely states to
surrender any of their powers and privileges to the British authorities.
Another feature of the 1935 act was the continuation of a system of
communal representation designed to safeguard the interests of such
minority groups as the Muslims, Christians, and Scheduled Castes by
reserving a fixed number of seats in provincial assemblies for these
groups (see ch. 6). In addition, there were separate constituencies for
such special groups as landlords, laborers, and women. To make the
assemblies more representative of cross-sectional opinions and interests,
the franchise was extended to about 18 percent of the total population.
Elections for the provincial assemblies were held in 1937 and in 1945-46
period.
Under the British partition plan of June 1947 and the India
Independence Act of July 1947, a separate Constituent Assembly was
formed for Pakistan in late July and met on August 10. The following day
Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the architect of Pakistan, was
unanimously elected president of the assembly. The Constituent
Assembly was authorized under the India Independence Act to function
dually as the federal legislature and as the constitution-drafting body.
Until a new constitution was framed , the Government of India Act of 1935
was to serve as an interim constitution with necessary modifications.
The founding fathers established a parliamentary and federal form of
government, with Jinnah as the first executive head-of-state. He was
assisted by a cabinet under a prime minister who was answerable to the
Constituent Assembly. Administratively, the country was divided into
East Pakistan, which was recognized as a single province; three
relatively advanced provinces, or governor's provinces as they were

174
called, with elected assemblies; the relatively backward province of
Baluchistan, with no elected assembly and administered by an agent of
the governor general; a number of princely states; the tribal areas
between the settled districts and the Afghan border; and the federal
capital region of Karachi.
The task of framing a constitution proved to be complicated. After
more than seven years of deliberation, the Constituent Assembly was
unable to agree on the form and substance of the state, although it was
generally in accord that Pakistan should be an Islamic state.
Many factors contributed to the difficulty. Although an able and
respected leader, Jinnah was an ailing man overburdened with executive
duties and unable to steer the assembly as effectively as he had hoped.
Upon his death in September 1948, and without his unifying influence and
charisma, internal dissentions multiplied, particularly within the ruling
Muslim League (League). The parity of representation between West
and East Pakistan also troubled the assembly. West Pakistanis argued
for the principle of representation based on territorial size (West
Pakistan was more than five times the size of East Pakistan), whereas
East Pakistanis insisted on a scheme of representation proportionate to
the size of population, in which they outnumbered the West Pakistanis.
The proposition that minority religious groups vote as a separate
electorate for a fixed number of reserved seats as before 1947 proved to
be highly controversial. Finally, an attempt by the representatives of
West Pakistan to have Urdu adopted as the sole national language
aroused the Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan to widespread
civil disturbances.
The prestige of the Constituent Assembly declined rapidly after the
March 1954 election of representatives to the Provincial Assembly in
East Pakistan—an election in which almost all candidates associated with
the ruling League were defeated. Because the Constituent Assembly was
made up largely of members of the League, this defeat in a province that
contained a majority of the population led to the charge that the
Constituent Assembly was no longer representative of popular will.
The political chaos precipitated by this electoral setback prompted
Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to declare a state of emergency
throughout the country and dissolve the Constituent Assembly in
October 1954. The constitutional machinery, he declared, had broken
down, and the assembly had lost the confidence of the people.
Although the first assembly had failed, its preliminary work helped to
pave the way for the success of the second assembly. The Aims and
Objects of the Constitution, known as the Objectives Resolution, which
had been accepted by the first assembly in March 1949, was written into
the preamble of the 1956 Constitution. In broad outlines the Objectives
Resolution emphasized the primacy of Islam as the ideological foundation
of society. Although it did not seek to establish a society run by the ulema,
the resolution declared nonetheless that "the principles of democracy,

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freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam
shall be fully observed." In addition, the basic agreement reached in
October 1953 concerning the principle of representation based on
population and a formula for linguistic balance between the two wings of
the country also proved useful in the preparation of the 1956
Constitution. In fact, most of the deliberations of the first assembly were
incorporated into the 1956 version with only minor changes.
In the summer of 1955 a new Constituent Assembly was elected
indirectly on the basis of the principle of regional parity, despite a protest
by East Pakistanis who had insisted on representation based on
population. Functioning in both legislative and constitution-making
capacities, the assembly consisted of eighty members, forty from each
province. No single political party commanded a majority in the new
assembly.
The second Constituent Assembly was inaugurated in July 1955. A
draft constitution bill, based largely on the groundwork of the first
assembly, was presented to the second assembly in January 1956. It was
formally adopted the following month and went into effect on March 23,
1956. Under the new constitution, Pakistan ceased to be a dominion but
remained within the Commonwealth of Nations as the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan.

The 1956 Constitution

The constitution defined Pakistan as an Islamic republic and provided
for a federal, parliamentary system of government. The head-of-state
was to be the president, elected for a five-year term by an electoral
college composed of the members of both central and provincial
assemblies. Although the executive authority of the republic was vested
in the president and was to be exercised directly by him on the advice of
the cabinet or indirectly through offices subordinate to him, the real
intent of the framers of the constitution was to place effective power in
the cabinet and Parliament.
The manner in which the cabinet and Parliament were to function was
spelled out in detail in the constitution. The cabinet, collectively
responsible to a single-chamber legislature, was headed by the prime
minister and represented the dominant political grouping or a coalition of
groupings in the legislature. The prime minister was to hold office during
the pleasure of the president but could be removed only when he was
deemed to have lost the confidence of a majority of the legislature.
Legislative power was to be exercised by the National Assembly of 300
members, 150 from each province but, since no general elections were
held under the 1956 Constitution, the eighty-member Constituent
Assembly continued to act as the federal legislature. Legislative items,
totaling 153, were divided into three enumerated lists of jurisdiction:
federal (thirty), provincial (ninety-four), and concurrent (nineteen); the
comparable figures under the Government of India Act of 1935 had been

176
sixty-one, fifty-five, and thirty-seven. Unlike the pre-1947 pattern,
however, the residual power was vested in the provinces. The devolution
of power as envisaged under the 1956 Constitution prompted one
prominent East Pakistani political leader to remark that the new division
of power would allow "98 percent" provincial autonomy. Among the
major items outside the provincial jurisdiction were defense, foreign
relations, currency, foreign and interprovincial trade and commerce,
minerals, oil, communications, and federal-provincial and interprovincial
disputes.
In actuality, however, the central government retained an array of
powers sufficient to obtain provincial compliance with its broad
legislative and executive guidelines. Central government supremacy was
buttressed by powers to take over the executive and legislative functions
of provincial governments in times of emergencies caused by internal
disturbances, financial crisis, or the breakdown of constitutional
machinery. The paucity of financial resources at the provincial level and
the consequent dependence on the center for grants and shared taxes also
rendered provincial autonomy ineffective in most instances.

The 1962 Constitution

The successful working of federalism and the parliamentary method of
state management as laid down in the 1956 Constitution was contingent
on a stable party system and on the existence of a broad consensus on
national purposes. Such was not the case, however; because of instability
and divisive forces at work in the political arena, martial law was declared
in October 1958, party politics banned, and the Constitution abrogated.
Upon assuming full power in October, General Mohammad Ayub Khan
promised the nation a new constitution. In February 1960 he named an
eleven-member Constitution Commission, directing it to examine the
circumstances surrounding the failure of parliamentary politics and
government in Pakistan and to submit constitutional recommendations
aimed at securing "a democracy adapted to changing circumstances and
based on the Islamic principles of justice, equality and tolerance; the
consolidation of national unity; and a firm and stable system of
government." The commission's recommendations, submitted in May
1961 and extensively revised in several versions, formed the basis of the
new law of the land that was promulgated on March 1, 1962. The new
constitution, which introduced a presidential form of government, went
into effect in June 1962, when the newly elected National Assembly held
its first meeting.
The purpose of the 1962 Constitution was declared by then President
Ayub to eliminate what he called the disruptive influence of politicians
upon government and achieve stability, unity, and efficiency. He
asserted that the presidential system as entertained in the new
fundamental law was simpler to operate and better suited to the talents
and conditions of the nation than the old parliamentary one which, he

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said, had proved too complicated, a complaint Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
was to paraphrase in early 1975. Ayub maintained that the nation's
economic development efforts and such divisive forces as regional,
ethnic, and linguistic rivalries called for a strong executive or presidential
leadership.
The governing powers were divided into executive, legislative, and
judicial jurisdictions, with an elaborate scheme of checks and balances.
The new format left little doubt, however, that the president was the
center of the political system; an impressive array of powers was vested
in the president, who was accountable only to the limited electorate and
who functioned for all practical purposes independently of the National
Assembly. The president and the members of both central and provincial
assemblies were chosen by an electoral college consisting at first of only
80,000 electors, or basic democrats as they were officially called. Under a
constitutional amendment passed in December 1967, the electoral college
was to consist of 120,000 members after the election of basic democrats in
late 1969, an election that was never held.
Legislative powers were divided between the center and the
provinces. The center was responsible for matters of national importance
as enumerated in the constitution; all other matters were placed under
provincial responsibilities. At the center the National Assembly
consisted of 156 members, seventy-eight from each province. Six of the
seats were reserved for women. In order to allay the frequently
expressed fears of political domination by one province over the other a
precedent was established in 1962 that the speaker of the National
Assembly and the president ofthe republic would not come from the same
province.
The constitution contained provisions designed to ensure, as nearly as
was practicable, parity between the two provinces through equitable
participation in the conduct of national affairs. Thus, Dacca was
designated as a "second capital of the Republic," in which occasional
sessions of the National Assembly were to be held. The Supreme Court,
temporarily seated in Lahore until the new capital was constructed in
Islamabad, was to sit at least twice a year at Dacca. Urdu and Benagli
were both declared as "national languages," and English was to be used
as the "official language" of the government at least until 1972.

Provisional Constitution Order of 1969

Upon the reinstitution of martial law on March 25, 1969, the 1962
Constitution was abrogated and the national and provincial assemblies
were dissolved, as were the central and provincial cabinets (see ch. 2). On
April 4, however, the chief martial law administrator, in a proclamation
called the Provisional Constitution Order of 1969, partially restored the
1962 Constitution, retroactive to March 25. The order stated, "Not
withstanding the abrogation of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan . . . and subject to any regulation or order from time to time by

178
the Chief Law Administrator, the state of Pakistan shall, except as
otherwise provided in this order, be governed as nearly as may be in
accordance with the 1962 constitution." In order to assure administrative
continuity, the order also provided: "Unless the Chief Martial Law
Administrator otherwise directs, all other officers and authorities
appointed, constituted, or established under the constitution shall
continue and shall exercise and perform all power and functions which
they would have exercised and performed had the constitution not been
abrogated."
The Provisional Constitution Order also authorized the chief martial
law administrator to assume the presidency retroactively and to perform
"all functions assigned to the president by or under the 1962 Constitution
or by or under any law." Unaffected by this restoration order was the
section dealing with fundamental rights, most of which remained
abrogated and unenforceable. Thus, the order declared that proceedings
pending in any court, insofar as they concerned the enforcement of these
rights, would be considered ended.
The Provisional Constitution Order established the finality of a martial
law order or regulation. It stipulated that no judgment, decree, writ,
order, or process whatsoever should be made or issued by any court or
tribunal against the chief martial law administrator, deputy chief martial
law administrator, or any martial law authority exercising powers or
jurisdiction under the authority of either.
In 1970, as one of the several steps that had been announced for the
termination of martial law and the institution of representative
government, the martial law authorities conducted a general election for
members to the National Assembly. In deference to East Pakistani
demands, a majority of the seats were assigned to East Pakistan. The
Awami League, which under the leadership of Mujib was outspoken in its
demands for extensive provincial autonomy, won virtually all of the East
Pakistan seats. It therefore had an absolute majority and, had the
National Assembly ever been convened, the Awami League could, and no
doubt would, have drafted a new constitution that would have been
acceptable to it, but would have been an anathema to the West Pakistani
politicians and, most importantly, to the incumbent military rulers. The
dominant political party in West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party,
and the president, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, were agreed
that the National Assembly should not be convened until Mujib agreed to
be "reasonable" in his demands for provincial autonomy.
The Awami League, in response to the refusal to convene the first
freely elected National Assembly in Pakistan's history for the purpose of
formulating a new constitution, declared East Pakistan independent of
West Pakistan (see ch. 2). Mujib and a few colleagues were immediately
arrested. The Awami League organized a provisional government to
which it elected Mujib president with Tajuddin Ahmed serving as prime
minister. Under the leadership of the prime minister and his cabinet

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Bangladesh won its independence from Pakistan after nine months of civil
war and the brief but bloody India-Pakistan War of December 1971. With
the conclusion of hostilities Mujib was released from prison in West
Pakistan and allowed to return to Dacca, the new capital of Bangladesh.
THE 1972 CONSTITUTION
On January 11, 1972, President Mujib promulgated the Provisional
Constitution Order replacing the Revolutionary Government; the
following day he relinquished his legislative powers in favor of a
parliamentary system and resigned to become prime minister of the
Provisional Government of Bangladesh. Abu Sayeed Choudhury,
formerly a justice of the East Pakistan High Court, was made president
to act on the advice of the prime minister.
Instead of holding elections to fill the seats of the provisional
parliament, the Constituent Assembly was composed of members of the
Pakistan National Assembly from East Pakistan and members of East
Pakistan's Provincial Assembly, who had been elected in the 1970-71
elections. Of the 469 who had been elected, only 430 members had
survived the war and the politics of revolution; of these, thirty-four were
selected on April 11, 1972, to draft a constitution under the direction of
Kamal Hossain, then minister of law and parliamentary affairs and, in
1975, the foreign minister. The Constitutional Drafting Committee
completed its draft on October 11, 1972, and presented it to the
Constituent Assembly the next day. Following public as well as
parliamentary debate, the Constitution of 1972 was approved by the
Constituent Assembly on November 4, 1972.
The Constitution was conceived and enacted by virtue of the Awami
League's control of the draft committee (it had only one member of an
opposing party) and of the Constituent Assembly, which had less than 2
percent independent or opposition members. The draft was not seriously
opposed by opposition parties, however, who realized the need for
governmental stability, recognized their minority positions and, with
reservations and caveats, accepted the Constitution's fundamental
principles of democracy, socialism, nationalism, and secularism. These
principles are frequently described collectively as Mujibism (see ch. 9).
The opposition complained that the Constitution did not go far enough in
assuring any of the principles but acquiesced to it as a beginning.
The Constitution provided for an almost classic parliamentary system.
Executive actions were made in the name of the president by the prime
minister and his cabinet members who were individually and collectively
responsible to the single-chamber Parliament (Jatiyo Sangsad—House of
the Nation). Three hundred members of Parliament were elected in
direct, universal, adult suffrage elections; an additional fifteen women
were elected by the 300 directly elected members. Although the
procedure was never used, a determined Parliament had the power to
force the resignation of a prime minister and the cabinet. Legally,
Parliament was supreme.
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 The Constitution enumerated a long list of fundamental rights, a sort of
bill of rights that were to be enforced by an independent Supreme Court
and a three-tiered judicial system. The justices of the Supreme Court
could be removed by the president only with the concurrence of two-
thirds of the members of the Parliament and then only on the grounds of
incompetence or incapacity.
The Constitution contained seemingly innocuous caveats and provisos
with respect to fundamental rights and presidential powers, however.
Among these loopholes was the following statement: "Nothing in this
Constitution shall invalidate any law enacted by Parliament which is
expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and
preservation of the State in times of war, invasion, or armed rebellion."
Article 63 further specified that "armed rebellion" is a legitimate reason
for extraordinary legislation.
In mid-1974 Mohammadullah, then president, with Parliament's
consent and at Mujib's direction, promulgated the Emergency Powers
Ordinance of 1974. This ordinance gave the president the power to adopt
unusual measures and to issue special rules and laws during a period of
extreme emergency. On December 28, 1974, Mohammadullah, again
acting at the direction of Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman, declared a
state of emergency and, on January 3, 1975, issued the Emergency
Powers Rules of 1975. The concept and scope of the rules provide an
impression of martial law, but in this instance the military was neither
openly nor directly involved.
Between January 3 and January 25, 1975, Mujib engaged in a series of
meetings with his lieutenants in the Awami League, whose members
filled all but seven seats in Parliament. The opening of the winter session
of Parliament occurred as scheduled on January 20 with a presidential
address by Mohammadullah that contained hints of change but no
specifics. On January 25, at its second meeting, Parliament, without
debate and in a 290 to 0 vote, amended the Constitution to provide for
presidential rule. The Parliament, having voted away its powers,
adjourned sine die.
GOVERMENTAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE
AMENDED CONSTITUTION
In a speech to Parliament in which he outlined his reasons for
requesting that the Constitution be amended, Mujib asserted that the
constitutional change was the nation's second revolution, which "aimed at
bringing smiles on the faces of teeming millions" (see ch. 9). The changes
were indeed revolutionary. The role of the president was changed from
that of constitutional figurehead—the rough equivalent to Great Britian's
constitutional monarch—to that of literal monocrat possessed of
potentially unlimited power.
The Fourth Amendment provides that the president shall be elected
for a five-year term in a direct election. On January 25, 1975, Mujib
assumed the presidency for a five-year term "as if elected to that office."
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The Parliament, which was elected for a five-year term in March 1973,
also was granted a new five-year term that began January 25, 1975. It
need only meet twice yearly for brief sessions, however, and any
legislation it may pass may be vetoed by the president, and his veto may
not be overridden.

Local Government
Pakistan Period
During the late 1960s—the period immediately preceding the civil war
and the secession from Pakistan—local government in East Pakistan was
composed of four divisions, nineteen districts, over 400 thanas (revenue
collection areas and police stations), and over 4,000 union councils. Each
division was headed by a commissioner, who coordinated the activities of
the various provincial ministries and departments that had projects and
programs within the division. The commissioners also supervised the
administration of the districts within their divisions, particularly in
revenue matters.
Each district was headed by a deputy commissioner (known as the DC);
with rare exceptions, the commissioners and deptuy commissioners were
members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), an elite and very
powerful civil service corps that was a direct descendant of the Indian
Civil Service (ICS), which had, in effect, ruled British India (see ch. 2).
Under the direction of the deputy commissioner, the district administra
tion was in charge of such functions as police, agriculture, animal
husbandry, public works and irrigation, health and sanitation, industries,
forestry, education, food, revenue, postal affairs, social welfare,
cooperatives, and a system of local administration called basic democ
racies. The deputy commissioner was the most important representative
of government at the local level. Among his major duties were the
collection of land revenue, maintenance of law and order, and the
development and coordination of developmental and welfare activities.
He also heard appeals from subordinate magistrates and tried criminal
cases (see ch. 14).
The system of local administration and self-government was officially
called Basic Democracy. Inaugurated in October 1959 by the martial law
regime of President Ayub, it was intended to stimulate mass participa
tion, especially in the rural areas, in the process of local self-government
and in community development programs. The system was based on the
official assumption that democracy, to be viable and effective, should be
built from the grass-roots level upward by progressively expanding the
area of mutual trust and self-help.
Basic Democracy consisted of four-tier councils: union councils in the
villages and town committees in semiurban areas; thana councils
immediately above the village level; district councils; and divisional
councils. The union and district councils had specific operational

182
functions, but those at the thana and divisional levels were confined to
coordinate activities; in late 1969 the provincial authorities took steps
aimed at strengthening the thana and divisional councils by assigning
some operational responsibilities to them.
The union councils and the town committees were responsible for
matters dealing with village police, health, water supply, agricultural
and community development, levying and collection of taxes, and
administration of family laws. They also handled minor civil and criminal
cases through conciliation courts without resorting to formal judicial
channels. District councils formulated and recommended to the divisional
councils development plans for their respective areas and reviewed the
status of these plans under implementation. They also had the power to
disburse expenditure on the Rural Works Programmes. The district
councils had two kinds of functions: compulsory and optional. Compulsory
functions pertained to such matters as primary schools, public roads and
bridges, regulation of traffic, health, promotion of agriculture, and
industrial development. Optional ones included secondary education,
cultural activities (information centers, public radio sets, civil education),
social and economic welfare, promotion of agricultural credit, irrigation,
cooperatives, public works, and religious and moral advancement.
Divisional councils, each headed by a division commissioner, had broad
review and coordinative responsibilities for administrative as well as
developmental matters. They were composed of the chairmen of all
district councils (deputy commissioners), representatives of provincial
departments assigned to the divisional level, and about an equal number
of nonofficial members elected from among the chairmen of union councils
and union and town committees.
In the urban areas local government was the function of the union
committees and municipal committees. An area with a population of over
15,000 was declared a municipality and was authorized to have one or
more union committees with elected members, as in the union councils.
Municipal committees were organized with membership consisting of the
chairmen of the union councils. Presided over by an official, the municipal
committee was responsible for roadbuilding and road maintenance,
housing development, city planning, public health and sanitation, water
supply, fire fighting and fire prevention, education and libraries, civil
defense, and coordination of union committee activities. It had the power
of taxation but had no separate police force; the maintenance of law and
order in the municipalities was usually the function of the deputy
commissioner.
By 1970 local government had become almost exclusively a civil service
operation. The commissioners and deputy commissioners, particularly
the latter, had throughout retained and exercised considerable authority,
and this authority increased as the prestige and effectiveness of the union
and thana councils declined. Generally, the public came to view the

183
councils as puppets of the few East Pakistani politicians «'1--
supported—and in turn were the puppets of—the 1
dominated central government.
Bangladesh Period
In the immediate aftermath of the 1971 civil war and the
of independence, local governments can scarcely be said to In
The civil service was a shambles, and in many areas it was wee.
months before formal liaison with the central government
authorized officials was reinstituted. During this early per
members of the Awami League who had been elected either
national parliamentary election of December 1970 or in the East Pat.
Legislative Assembly election of early 1971 tended to gain control of lov
government bodies. For better or worse, these political figures continued
to exercise considerable influence upon the civil service administrators.
Frequently, what Mujib's government ordered the civil servants to do
was frustrated or nullified at the local level by Mujib's Awami League
colleagues.
In December 1973 elections were held throughout the country to select
members of the union councils. The election was viewed as the first step in
the implementation of Article 11 of the Constitution, which included the
proviso that "effective participation by the people through their elected
representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured." The
reestablishment of the elected union councils also was an effort to
duplicate the relative success of such councils in the mid-1960s. The
evidence available in early 1975, however, indicated that the councils
were generally ineffective during 1974, the one year of their existence.
On the one hand the continued influence of the local Awami League
politicians tended to nullify the efforts of both the civil servants and the
elected local representatives. On the other hand there was a tendency for
virtually all decisionmaking to be done at the highest level; very little
authority was relinquished by the officials in the central government to
those in the field.
The status and functioning of local government institutions was, in
early 1975, unclear. Chapter III of Part IV of the Constitution was
entitled Local Government, and the first sentence of the chapter read:
"Local government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be
entrusted to bodies composed of persons elected in accordance with law."
Other parts of the chapter stipulated that the local bodies would be
involved in the maintenance of public order, the imposition of taxes, the
preparation of budgets, and the disbursement of funds.
The Fourth Amendment not only deleted the clause in Article 11 that
guaranteed elected representation at all levels but also deleted the whole
of chapter III, part IV. In other words, elected local government was
abolished. In early 1975 it was unclear whether Mujib intended to restore
the nearly absolute power of the deputy commissioner and his
subordinates—the system developed by the British Raj and continued by

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the government of Pakistan in the 1947-71 period—or whether he
intended to allow the local government machinery to atrophy from
neglect and inattention.

The Civil Service

At independence the new government had two major administrative
civil service corps: the CSP and the Provincial Civil Service of East
Pakistan. The CSP was particularly important; its members served as
commissioners and deputy commissioners and as the secretaries in the
various provincial ministries. When the civil war broke out in March
1971, however, the most senior and experienced Bengalis in the CSP
were serving in the central government ministries at the capital,
Islamabad, in West Pakistan. Most of these officials were either
imprisoned or placed under house arrest, and most of them were unable
to return to Dacca until 1973 or 1974.
In the meantime, the government had established two study groups to
make recommendations as to the organization and pay scale for the civil
service. The Services and Administrative Reorganization Committee
recommended a unified, ten-grade civil service corps, and the National
Pay Commission recommended that the monthly salary for the top grade
be Tk2,000 (for value of the taka—see Glossary), the salary ceiling that
the government had already imposed. As of early 1975, the question of
reorganizing the civil service corps had not been resolved, however, even
to the point of providing a name to replace that of CSP.
A number of training institutions for government officials have been
established. Three institutions—the National Institute of Public Ad
ministration, the Civil Servants Training Academy, and the Gazetted
Officers Training Academy, all in Dacca—were in the process of being
merged into a single academy in late 1974. The government also created a
training center for public sector employees, the Management Develop
ment Centre.
The most significant change in government service has been the extent
to which the members have been made directly susceptible to political
influence. The civil servants who had served in the CSP had been trained
and schooled to discharge their duties in an apolitical fashion. In exchange
for political neutrality, the members of the CSP were, generally
speaking, immune from political pressure and reprisal.
This tradition was not maintained by the Bangladesh government,
however. From the outset, Awami League politicians demanded and,
according to both foreign and Bangalee observers, received preferential
treatment from civil service officers in the allocation, for example, of such
economically valuable items as import licenses and export permits (see
ch. 11). In 1974 the government issued President's Order No. 9, which
provided that the president could dismiss any government official "in the
interests of the People's Republic of Bangladesh" and that such dismissal
was not subject to appeal or review by any court or government agency.

185
According to Talukder Maniruzzaman of the University of Dacca, by late
1974 the senior civil service officers had lost their "elan, esprit de corps
and efficiency because of the continuous interference by Awami League
leaders and workers in the day-to-day administration and because of the
President's Order No. 9."

The Judicial System

In most important respects, the framers of the Constitution retained
the basic judicial system of the Pakistan period, which in turn had been
retained without significant change from British India. In essence, this
system entailed a considerable overlap between the administrators of the
law and the magistrates and judges at the village, thana, and district
levels but provided for fully independent courts at the higher levels.
The Constitution provides for a Supreme Court of Bangladesh, which is
composed of the Appellate Division and the High Court Division. The
Supreme Court consists of a chief justice and "such number of other
judges as the President may deem it necessary to appoint to each divi
sion"; in early 1975 there were eleven other judges. All are presidential
appointees and they, in common with all other judges, are subject to
dismissal by him under the terms of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution. Supreme Court judges may serve until the age of
sixty-two.
The High Court Division has original and appellate jurisdictions, and
until the Fourth Amendment was passed, the High Court had the power
of enforcement of the enumerated fundamental rights. The Fourth
Amendment withdraws that right from the High Court Division and
provides that when fundamental rights are again enforceable, a special
tribunal will be established to hear cases involving those rights and that
the decisions of the special tribunal will not be subject to appeal either to
the High Court Division or to the Appellate Court Division. As of March
1975 this special tribunal had not been established, nor had fundamental
rights been restored.
The Constitution states that the Appellate Division's primary
jurisdiction is "to hear and determine appeals from judgments, decrees,
orders, or sentences of the High Court Division." In addition, the
Appellate Division may, at the request of the president, provide him with
an opinion on a question of law. The Parliament may also request an
opinion from the Appellate Division. There is no indication that such
opinions in any way bind the president or the Parliament, nor was there
any indication as of early 1975 that such an opinion had been solicited.
The subordinate courts consist of district and sessions courts at the
district level and three levels of magistrates' courts (see ch. 14). The
Constitution as written provides that "the control (including the power of
posting, promotion and grant of leave) and discipline of persons employed
in the judicial service and magistrates exercising judicial functions shall
rest in the Supreme Court." The Fourth Amendment transfers this very

186
important power to the president and thus further restricts the
independence of the judiciary at all levels.
In 1974 special tribunals were created under the provisions of the
Special Powers Act, which was promulgated in February 1974. These
tribunals hear cases involving acts that the government deems
"prejudicial to national interests." The decision of these tribunals, which
may include the death penalty, may not be appealed to any court.

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 CHAPTER 9
POLITICAL DYNAMICS
In early 1975 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman remained the overwhelmingly
dominant political figure. He was personally revered as the Bangaban-
dhu, the friend of Bengal, and his charismatic personality and unusual
oratorical ability retained for him the adulation of the masses. As a result
of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of 1975, Mujib as president
gained dictatorial powers, and neither the courts nor the legislature
retained enough power to thwart or interfere with his executive acts (see
ch. 8). In conformity with authority granted him in the Fourth
Amendment, Mujib banned all political parties except his own Awami
League, which he renamed the Krishak Sramik Awami League
(Peasants, Workers, and Peoples League).
Mujib's party, however, was viewed by many Bangalee and foreign
observers as corrupt, venal, and a major obstacle to political democracy
and economic development. Historically, political opposition in Bengal
has included violence, and this remains so in Bangladesh. According to
Bangalee authorities, an estimated 3,000 Awami League politicians were
assassinated between January 1972 and December 1974, and most of the
assassinations were categorized as political (see ch. 14).
In the process of establishing a one-party state, Mujib declared illegal
any opposition to his policies. Such interest groups as students, labor
unions, intellectuals, businessmen, and civil servants were provided the
options of joining the national party and thus subscribing to its guiding
philosophy of Mujibism (nationalism, socialism, democracy, and sec
ularism), of remaining silent, or of joining an underground opposition
group (see ch. 14). Politicians could either join the party or forfeit then-
elected or appointed positions. In most aspects, Mujib's control over
Bangalee society was far more stringent and extensive than that of the
military regime that ruled Pakistan in the late 1950s and again in the late
1960s (see ch. 2).
During the 1950s and 1960s most politically active East Pakistanis
were united in a desire for increased provincial autonomy and, with some
exceptions, were dedicated to the goal of participatory parliamentary
democracy. Under Mujib's leadership a confrontation over these issues
with the political and military leaders of West Pakistan resulted in the
1971 civil war and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. Mujib at
once established a parliamentary system, but by mid-1974 he had lost
faith in his own creation and in January 1975 instituted a presidential

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system. In the immediate aftermath of the change of the political and
governmental system, it appeared that the people in general remained
entranced with Mujib, but their support of his policies was, in the opinion
of foreign and Bangalee observers, less enthusiastic. Politics and
government were centered on Mujib and, should he depart from the
scene, Bangalee politics would lose its only discernible cohesive force.
BACKGROUND
Political developments from 1947 to the mid-1970s divide into five
general and sometimes overlapping phases: the creation of governmental
institutions and the struggle to survive (1947-51); the attempt by
politicians to establish a parliamentary system of politics and government
(1951-58); the prominence of bureaucratic politicians who owed their
favored status to military and civil service positions (1958-69); political
struggle resulting in a political impasse, the secession of East Pakistan,
and the establishment of an independent Bangladesh (1969-71); and the
ensuing Bangalee struggle for survival and reconciliation as a secular,
democratic, socialist republic, first under a parliamentary form of
government and, beginning in early 1975, under a kind of directory.
During the first few years after the establishment of Pakistan in 1947,
the most influential and important political organization was the Muslim
League (League). The organization owed its preeminence to the
leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was its president and, for all
practical purposes, symbolized the country itself. Jinnah's death in
September 1948 proved a serious blow to the nation and to the party.
Without the unifying force of his personality, various political groups
with conflicting objectives and ideologies asserted themselves. Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's successor as leader of the country,
did his best to maintain stability and unity but, after his assassination in
October 1951, the nation was without a leader acceptable to all
contending groups.
The League's decline and its failure to reconcile regional demands for
participation in the decisionmaking process were dramatically illustrated
in 1954 when it was crushed in an East Pakistan provincial election. The
League was toppled by the United Front, an electoral alliance of several
opposition parties, including a group of dissidents from the League itself.
In this election the League's provincial chief minister was unseated by an
eighteen-year-old Bengali student.
The Constituent Assembly was dissolved in October 1954 on the
grounds that it no longer represented East Pakistan (see ch. 2; ch. 8). In
the central and provincial governments the League faced growing
difficulties in sustaining itself in power. The outcome was the formation of
a series of short-lived, unstable coalition cabinets in which East
Pakistanis rarely held key positions (see table 9). Disruptions were so
pervasive that the parliamentary system of politics and government fell
into disrepute. The situation was further complicated by the growing

190
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East Pakistani demand for provincial autonomy and for equality with
West Pakistan in determining major national policies.
In October 1958 martial law was declared by President Iskander Mirza,
who abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the central and provincial
legislatures, banned party politics, and appointed General Mohammad
Ayub Khan chief martial law administrator. Later in the month Ayub
forced Mirza out of office into exile in London on the grounds that he was
as much responsible as other civilian politicians for the deterioration of
the political climate.
Ayub's martial law government initiated some moderate reforms but,
with the exception of the suspension of open political activities,
government went on much as before, that is, under civil service control.
An innovation of the Ayub regime was the introduction in October 1959 of
a political system called Basic Democracy, which reflected Ayub's
political assessment that the electorate was too backward and illiterate to
form an independent judgment when electing the president and
legislatures based on direct voting and adult franchise. The basic
democrats functioned in two ways: as members of the administrative
bodies at the village level and as members of the electoral college for
presidential elections (see ch. 8). In February 1960 they confirmed Ayub
in office for a five-year term (1960-65) in a referendum called by the
government.
The transfer of power to an elected government became official in June
1962 when martial law was lifted at the time the 1962 Constitution went
into effect and the National Assembly, elected two months before,
convened. In July the government permitted political parties to resume
activities under the Political Parties Act. This statute imposed a number
of restrictions on party activities aimed partially at bringing about what
Ayub called "party-less democracy."
After mid-1962 the Muslim League, the government's political
organization, became known officially as the Pakistan Muslim League but
more commonly as the Conventionist Muslim League. Ayub was
reelected in January 1965 for a second five-year term (1965-70), despite
spirited challenges at the polls by an electoral alliance called the
Combined Opposition Party (COP); he polled nearly 74 percent in West
Pakistan and, as a result of strong government efforts, 53 percent in East
Pakistan.
In May 1967 five major opposition parties—the Muslim League
(Councillors), the Awami League, the Nizam-i-Islam (Rule of Islam), the
Jamaat-i-Islami (Union of Believers), and the National Democratic
Front—formed a united front called the Pakistan Democratic Movement.
They issued a number of demands aimed at restoring democratic
processes and called for the repeal of the Defence of Pakistan Rules,
which had been promulgated during the September 1965 conflict with
India. These rules empowered the authorities to detain without trial any
person deemed likely to endanger national security or make prejudicial

192
speeches against the government. In December 1967 Ayub warned: "if
the opposition had their way, Pakistan will cease to exist."
The political confrontation between the Ayub regime and the
opposition became more intense during 1968. In January 1968 the
government announced the arrest in East Pakistan of more than thirty
people, including Mujib, on charges of plotting the secession of East
Pakistan. Because some of the arrested were alleged to have visited
Agartala in India to discuss their secessionist scheme with Indian
officials, the episode became known as the "Agartala conspiracy case."
In January 1969 opposition leaders decided to boycott the presidential
and parliamentary elections then scheduled for early 1970, on the
grounds that the Ayub system of indirect voting would not permit fair
and free elections. Student and labor unrest, accompanied by mounting
violence, increased in both provinces, and in East Pakistan a series of
general strikes in protest against alleged police excesses paralyzed many
urban areas.
In a conciliatory move, Ayub invited opposition leaders to meet with
him in mid-February to seek a peaceful settlement of the situation; he
terminated the state of emergency promulgated in September 1965 (thus
automatically nullifying the Defense of Pakistan Rules) and released
Mujib from military custody. Antigovernment violence and strikes
persisted, nevertheless.
The crisis came to a climax in late February when Ayub announced that
he would resign from the presidency in 1970 and expressed the hope that
the country could evolve an arrangment under which free and fair
elections might be held for a new president. Ayub's decision to step down
had the unintended effect of paralyzing the government, the economy,
and law-and-order efforts, especially in East Pakistan, where anti-Ayub
sentiments were most pronounced. On March 19, 1969, the government
deplored the fact that "there is no law and order in the country and mob
rule is the order of the day."
With the nation on the brink of anarchy, Ayub resigned from his office a
year early, on March 25, and announced the transfer of power to General
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army commander in chief. Im
mediately proclaiming martial law, Yahya Khan asserted that his
government would be nonpartisan and transitional. During April and
May he held meetings with party leaders to pave the way for the
restoration of normal political life, while emphasizing that the basic
principles of political activities should be agreed on before party politics
could resume on a full scale. He promised that free and open elections
based on the prinicple of one man, one vote would take place within
eighteen months of his assuming office.
Fifteen political organizations were recognized by the government in
January 1970 and began preparations for October elections, but weather
conditions delayed them until December and, in parts of East Pakistan,
until January 1971. The outcome of the election was a surprise. The

193
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won approximately 60 percent of West
Pakistan's seats in the National Assembly, and the Awami Party won
almost 99 percent of the seats in East Pakistan. Because East Pakistan
had been awarded the majority of seats in the legislature, the Awami
League's smashing victory meant that it could vote through any
legislative act that it wanted, including a constitution.
Under Mujib's leadership the Awami League had in the mid-1960s
developed a six-point program calling for a degree of regional autonomy
that would have left the central government nearly powerless. Yahya
Khan was willing to give some autonomy to East Pakistan, but he was
unwilling to impair what he viewed as national integrity and solidarity. A
constitution was to be drawn up within a period of 120 days after the first
sitting of the National Assembly, and at first Yahya simply delayed the
meeting of the assembly, but finally he denied the Awami League's right
to draft a constitution. The Awami League then declared the indepen
dence of Bangladesh, and civil war erupted. The conclusion of hostilities
came on December 16, 1971, when Pakistani troops surrendered to
Indian and Bangalee forces in Dacca (see ch. 14).

POLITICAL GROUPS AND POLITICAL EVENTS:

1972-APRIL 1975

As of April 1975 the Krishak Sramik Awami League was the nation's
only legal political party. All elected and appointed members of the
government had to join the party or resign their positions. The principles
and organization of the party remained incomplete, but during the
interim the structure of the Awami League was continued.
The Awami League government has consistently rejected requests to
allow a wider range of opinion in government. Mujib refused to share the
government, nor did he feel sufficiently secure to allow open opposition.
A working arrangement formed with two pro-Moscow parties—the
Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPBD) and the National Awami
Party-Muzaffar (NAP-M)—served to reduce some opposition but failed
to give a voice to the other parties. Unable to participate in the ruling
process, the numerous opposition parties found their only political
expression through street demonstrations.
The parties that existed before 1975 were the remnants of former
parties dissolved by internecine squabbles into splinter groups repre
senting narrowly defined ideologies. Their appeal was limited as much by
parochial interests as by the Awami League's dominance. The social and
economic philosophies of these splinter parties were without exception
left wing, but their political views covered all areas of political thought.
They agreed on what Bangladesh needed but could not agree on how it
should be provided. Pressed by famine and lawlessness, Mujib found it
expedient to abolish organized opposition and parliamentary democracy
rather than engage in endless debate.

194
 Awami League
Since the Awami League was formed in 1949, it has played a major role
in the politics of Pakistan and then Bangladesh. The party was at the
forefront of anti-Ayub politics and sought to secure support from both
West and East Pakistan, but its strength came mostly from East
Pakistan. The league's demand for regional autonomy for East Pakistan
was prompted at first by the growing Bengali suspicion of West Pakistani
discrimination against the eastern province, but in the 1960s the league
maintained the position that its demand for autonomy for East Pakistan
was as desirable as for any region in West Pakistan. One of its more
essential political demands pertained to the principle of representation
based on population instead of provincial parity. Thus it continued to
oppose the formation of a bicameral central legislature on the argument
that an upper house composed of unit representation would actually
reintroduce parity "through the back door."
The Awami League stood left of center. In the 1950s its policies
included demands for expropriation of land without compensation to the
owner and for the nationalization of the jute and tea industries. After
crushing the Muslim League in the 1954 elections, the Awami League
formed coalition cabinets with other members of the United Front in both
provincial and central governments, but once in power it showed little
disposition to implement the programs it had enunciated in opposition. It
was against this background that in 1957 an ultraleftist group led by
Maulana Abdul Hamid Bashani seceded from the league to form the
separate National Awami Party (NAP). In 1969 the Awami League ruled
out the possibility of any political alliance with the splinter group.
Mujib defended his brand of socialism as national and Islamic, but
during the parliamentary elections of 1970 and 1971 he shifted his
emphasis from Islamic to secular in an attempt to broaden the party's
political base. His six-point program called for the creation of two
autonomous provinces with separate currencies and the nationalization of
major industry, all transportation, and most banks. Mujib began
implementing the program of nationalization within a month of becoming
prime minister in January 1972. The elections in March 1973 confirmed
the party's popularity by awarding it 98 percent of the seats in
Parliament.
The Awami League's social and economic programs—important
aspects of Mujibism—have been well received, but its administration of
these has been severely criticized. The size of the party has made it
unwieldy and subject to corruption. Mujib frequently announced that he
wanted to cleanse and revitalize the party, but his order in 1975 creating a
new national party, the Krishak Sramik Awami League, and abolishing
all other political parties simply retained the Awami League under a new
name.
As of early April 1975 very little was known about Mujib's plans for the
new party beyond what he had announced in an Independence Day

195
speech on March 26, 1975. Mujib declared that his immediate priorities
were to eradicate corruption, increase agricultural and industrial
production, control population growth, and create a sense of national
unity; and he stated that it was "only for the cause of national unity" that
he had introduced a one-party system. He asserted that "all of us will
have to join hands," and he again noted that civil servants could join the
party.
Mujib stated that the party would have five branches: workers,
peasants, youths, students, and women. He noted that administrative
councils would be established in each district and thana and that a party
official would direct the work of the councils. The other members of the
council would include technicians—sanitary engineers, agricultural
specialists, and population control workers—and representatives of the
five branches of the party. Observers of Bangalee politics concluded that
Mujib's proposals would effectively eliminate the civil servants from
administration unless they joined the party (see ch. 8). In most one-party
states the party supersedes the government, and in early 1975 this
appeared to be Mujib's goal.
National Awami Parties
The original National Awami Party (NAP) was formed in 1957 as a
left-wing secessionist group from the Awami League, The organizer of
the NAP was Bashani, and for several years he was the primary
spokesman. By the late 1960s, however, the party had split into two rival
groups, one pro-Peking led by Bashani and one pro-Moscow led by Khan
Abdul Wali Khan of the frontier region of West Pakistan.
After Bangladesh became independent in 1971, the pro-Peking branch
became known as the National Awami Party-Bashani (NAP-B) and the
pro-Moscow branch as the National Awami Party-Muzaffar (NAP-M)
after its leader, Muzaffar Ahmad. The leaders of the NAP-M supported
the Awami League's government-in-exile in 1971 and generally sup
ported the Awami League in the postindependence period.
The policies of the NAP-B have reflected the erratic personality of
Bashani, the party's nonagenarian leader. An orthodox Muslim, Bashani
advocates what might be called populist socialism with elements of
Maoist communism. The Bangalee public is generally aware of the
diplomatic support of Pakistan by the People's Republic of China (PRC)
during the 1971 war and of the PRC veto in 1972 of Bangalee admission to
the United Nations; the party's pro-Peking policies have damaged its
reputation.
During part of 1974 Bashani was ordered to remain in his village and to
desist from all political activities. He remained something of a folk hero,
however, because of his long career of opposition to government,
whether British, West Pakistani, or Mujibist, reflecting an attitude
endorsed by many Bangalees. Bashani also supported political accommo

196
dation, however, and when Mujib visited Bashani's village in March 1975,
the latter delivered the welcoming speech.

Communist Parties
Even before political parties other than the Awami League were
banned in early 1975, the five radical-left, pro-Peking communist parties
were underground organizations dedicated to mass movements and
armed struggle. The parties were the Bangladesh Communist Party/
Marxist-Leninist; Bangladesh Communist Party/Leninist; East Bengal
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist; Banglar Communist Party; and
Proletarian Party of East Bengal. Their differences were primarily
based on personalities rather than ideology. They agreed with most of
Mujib's socialist program but opposed his form of government.
The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPBD) was the only pro-
Moscow communist party in the country. Its members were left-wing
moderates who saw an advantage in forming a coalition with the Awami
League and the NAP-M. Some observers described the NAP-M as a
front organization for the CPBD.
National Socialist Party
The 1973 elections raised the National Socialist Party (Jatiyo Samaj-
tantrik Dal-JSD) to second place among the nation's parties. Although
its political showing was small in comparison to that of the Awami
League, its membership was increasing. This increase reflected the ac
tivity of the JSD among students, workers, and peasants, whose
separate but affiliated organizations were widespread and active in their
support of the JSD.
The party's pro-Peking leanings caused Abdur Rab, general secretary
of the party, to protest the presence of the Soviet navy in the Bay of
Bengal and to call for closer relations with the PRC. The party tends to be
anti-India. On January 20, 1974, the government thwarted a "people's
resistance day" scheduled by the JSD, and demonstrations in March 1974
resulted in eight deaths and many injuries. Abdur Rab was imprisoned,
and the party was dispersed. In October and November JSD's remaining
leaders joined the government's finance minister, Tajuddin Ahmed, in
calling for national unity with an all-party government. The government
responded by arresting the remaining members of JSD's executive
council.

United Front Parties

In late 1973 Bashani persuaded five other parties to join the NAP-B in
a united front coalition. In April 1974 Bashani, as permanent president of
this united front, issued a manifesto calling upon the government to
release all political prisoners; repeal the legislation that granted
extraordinary powers to special tribunals and to a paramilitary force that

197
was responsible solely to Mujib; introduce grain rationing throughout the
country; eradicate corruption and other kinds of lawlessness; and cancel
all unequal foreign pacts (see ch. 14). The government took no official note
of the manifesto.
Students
Youths and students have been in the forefront of political activity and
agitation since the early twentieth century, when the demonstrations
were against the British. After the partition of British India in 1947, the
University of Dacca, established by the British in 1921 , became the hub of
Bengali culture. When political parties were banned and the civil service
and military positions were closed to East Pakistanis, thwarted hopes
and ambitions found expression in academic work. University politics
were national politics, played small but just as earnestly, both reflecting
and shaping public opinion. The role of academics in the establishment of
Bangladesh is reflected in the composition of President Mujibur
Rahman's cabinet in early 1975, which may have had a higher number of
Ph.D.'s than any other comparable body.
When in March 1971 the central government in West Pakistan
postponed the scheduled meeting of the Constituent Assembly to draft a
constitution, a student strike at the university quickly spread beyond the
university, and riots broke out in the streets. Momentum built up as the
Awami League made efforts to form an autonomous government, and the
increased presence of military forces and supplies spurred opposition.
When the Pakistan armed forces began its repression on March 25-26,
the university became a prime target for military action. Students and
professors were rounded up and executed en masse (see ch. 6).
Both old and new political parties formed affiliated organizations to
attract students to their ranks. The Awami League and the JSD were the
most successful in winning student support. One of the Awami League's
student organizations—the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL)—
instituted the first open challenge to Mujib in May 1972 when the BCL
split into pro-Mujib and anti-Mujib wings during a university election.
The election was won by the anti-Mujib group, which was supported by
leaders of the JSD. The students of the pro-Mujib faction were supported
by Tofael Ahmed, Mujib's political secretary, but this organization was in
turn fiercely opposed by the Awami Youth League (Awami Jubo
League-AJL) supported by Mujib's nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni.
Clashes between the BCL and the AJL had been frequent, and on April
5, 1974, seven students of the BCL were machine-gunned at the
University of Dacca. Nevertheless, leaders of the BCL were put on trial
instead of the reportedly guilty AJL members. The government
instituted close surveillance of the university after the incident to
prevent further lawlessness and to stem any anti-Mujib activity.
Mujib's Reaction to Opposition
Throughout the civil war Mujib and his political adviser, Kamal
198
Hossain, were held incommunicado and under threat of execution in a
West Pakistan prison. At the conclusion of hostilities Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
assumed the presidency of Pakistan and in early January arranged for the
return of Mujib and Hossain to Dacca. On January 12, 1972, Mujib
resigned the presidency in favor of Abu Sayeed Choudhury, who then
named Mujib prime minister to replace Tajuddin, who became the new
minister of finance. From that time onward, the narrative of political
events tends to be a political biography of Mujib.
Since assuming power in early 1972, Mujib's government has been
highly sensitive to criticism and opposition, and has frequently retaliated
with violence. For example, throughout 1972 the pro-Moscow NAP-M
supported the Awami League government on such key issues as the
adoption of a constitution and special legislation to curb lawlessness. In
January 1973, however, the NAP-M decided to assume the role of "loyal
opposition." In retaliation Awami League supporters stormed the
NAP-M party headquarters, manhandled party workers, and burned the
building. The Awami League workers subsequently disrupted political
meetings by the NAP-M and other political parties.
During the March 1973 parliamentary elections the Awami League
easily defeated almost all of the candidates fielded by the thirteen
opposition parties, which were really little more than political splinter
groups. Despite its overwhelming parliamentary majority, or perhaps
because of that majority, the Mujib government became even more
intolerant of political opposition. In December 1973 President Abu
Sayeed Choudhury resigned in protest. Choudhury, who had served as a
chief justice of the East Pakistan High Court and who was highly
respected by the legal community and the intellectuals, complained about
the indiscriminate use of government power to silence critics charged
with antistate activity and about increasing and widespread corruption
by government and party leaders. Choudhury's resignation was
accepted, however, and he was sent abroad as a "special representative"
of the government. A party regular, Mohammadullah, was elected
president.
In June 1974 Mujib began to discuss altering the system of
government, arguing that a presidential form was preferable to
parliamentary democracy. Tajuddin opposed him, but not openly. On
July 7 six ministers and three ministers of state—all supporters of
Tajuddin—were forced to resign. In early October Tajuddin openly
began to oppose Mujib's intentions to change the Constitution. Tajuddin
pointed out to his audiences the failures in food supply and distribution
and called for changes in the performance of government rather than in
its form. Stressing the need for national unity, Tajuddin called on the
government to hold meetings with all political parties, including the
underground organizations, in an effort to create unity and end famine.
He even suggested releasing political prisoners.
His pleas for unity were picked up and expanded upon by the JSD. The
party's acting president, Bidhan Krishna Sen, in a speech delivered on

199
October 22, 1974, called upon the opposition parties "to unite and start a
movement to demand the resignation of the present government and the
formation of an all-party coalition government." The general secretary of
the party told the same crowd: "I demand the resignation of this
government. If it does not resign we will agitate.for its resignation. ... If
our demands are not met by 31 October, nationwide agitation will start on
1 November." The demands in part called for the release of political
prisoners, the withdrawal of outstanding arrest warrants, and the
implementation of a program to provide the population with basic
essentials.
Mujib responded on October 26. Tajuddin was dismissed as minister of
finance "in the greater interest of the nation." Persecution of the
opposition went ahead full force. On December 28 Mujib—through
President Mohammadullah—declared a state of emergency and sus
pended the Constitution in accordance with a recent amendment. Civil
liberties were also suspended (see ch. 8; ch. 14). During December 1974
and January 1975 Mujib instructed the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National
Defense Force), commonly known as the Rakkhi Bahini—his own
paramilitary force—the army, and the police to crush the "anti-state and
anti-people miscreants" who he claimed were willing to destroy the state
and its citizens for their own ends. Late in the month he presented
Parliament with an amendment to the Constitution setting up a
presidential form of government and abolishing all opposition political
parties. This was the Fourth Amendment.
The limited open opposition ceased altogether, and some of the parties
established clandestine apparatuses. According to President Mujibur
Rahman, over 3,000 Awami League members had been assassinated
between March 1972 and December 1974, and he expressed determina
tion to crush the terrorists who were committing these acts. In pursuit of
that goal he granted ever increasing funds and authority to the Rakkhi
Bahini (see ch. 14). Many Bangalee and foreign observers thought that in
all probability the Rakkhi Bahini would continue to seize or kill an
occasional underground leader but that the excesses of the Rakkhi
Bahini's methods would drive more and more Bangalees into armed
opposition.

200
 CHAPTER 10
FOREIGN RELATIONS
In early 1975 the government's major foreign policy objective
continued to be the acquisition of economic aid from foreign governments
and international organizations. In the most literal sense, the survival of
the government and the people depends upon the continuation of very
large foreign grants of money and foodstuffs; and the chief-of-state and
head-of-government, President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and his
minister of foreign affairs, Kamal Hossain, direct most of their foreign
policy efforts to that end (see ch. 11).
By far the largest amount of economic aid and assistance that
Bangladesh has received since achieving independence from Pakistan in
December 1971 has come from the United States. The United States has
provided part of its aid unilaterally, and the rest has been channeled
through such international organizations as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, commonly known as the World
Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). During the first few months of independence
India was the most important aid donor, and it has continued to provide
assistance, as have various other members of the Commonwealth of
Nations, which Bangladesh joined in April 1972. The Soviet Union also
has been a source of extensive economic aid and technical assistance.
Mujib continued to be the chief spokesman on foreign affairs, although
he relied upon Foreign Minister Hossain as an important consultant and a
key negotiator (in early 1975 Hossain also headed the Ministry of
Petroleum and Minerals). One of Mujib's earliest statements on foreign
policy contained the assertion that he desired "friendship with all and
malice toward none. I want to make [Bangladesh] the Switzerland of the
East." Mujib's advocacy of neutrality has been tempered by pragmatic
considerations, however. For economic as well as cultural reasons, Mujib
immediately sought to establish close relations with the Islamic states of
the Middle East, particularly the oil-producing states, and adopted a
staunchly anti-Israel position. Most of the Middle Eastern states
maintained close relations with Pakistan, however, and for some time
were reluctant to recognize the secession and independence of
Bangladesh. Nevertheless, in early 1974 several Islamic nations
persuaded Bangladesh and Pakistan to exchange diplomatic recognition,
and by April 1975 all but Saudi Arabia had established diplomatic
relations with Bangladesh.

201
 The only other important country that had not extended recognition
was the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC vetoed the Bangalee
application for admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1972, but it posed
no objection when Bangladesh was admitted in September 1974. In early
1975 diplomatic observers believed that diplomatic relations would be
established between Bangladesh and the PRC in the immediate future.
RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOUTH ASIAN STATES
Bangalee (see Glossary) relations with the smaller states of the Indian
subcontinent—Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (formerly
Ceylon)—continued in early 1975 to be cordial but of relatively minor
importance. Bangalee relations with India and Pakistan were of major
importance, however. The three states, which are the successor states to
British India, are frequently described as forming the South Asian
Triangle, not only because of their geographic juxtaposition but also
because of the three-party aspect that frequently characterizes the
region's intergovernment relations.
More than any other foreign power, India made possible the emergence
of Bangladesh as an independent state. During the civil war nearly 10
million Bengalis took refuge in India, and the Indian armed forces trained
and equipped the East Pakistani guerrillas and then provided the
deciding force in the defeat of the Pakistan armed forces (see ch. 2; ch.
14). In addition, the Bangalee government-in-exile operated in India
throughout the civil war: -
Moreover, within the context of South Asian regional affairs, India is
a giant—economically, geographically, demographically, politically, and
militarily. The Bangalee and Indian constitutions and governments
espouse secularism, in both domestic and foreign affairs; but many,
perhaps most, Bangalees tend to view their country as a small Muslim
island surrounded by a huge India, which—despite its millions of
Muslims—Bangalees tend to view as monolithically Hindu.
Bangalee-Indian relations contain an undercurrent of latent Bengali
nationalism, that is, the possibility of a merger of Bangladesh with the
adjacent Indian state ofWest Bengal, which has a predominantly Bengali
population. A shared linguistic and cultural heritage and allegiance seem
to pull the Bengali people toward political unity as well, but in early 1975
the basic rivalry between Hindus and Muslims argued against such a
merger in the foreseeable future; the Hindu Bengalis of West Bengal
would form a minority in a unified Bengal, and the Muslim Bengalis of
Bangladesh would probably come under the economic dominance of the
Calcutta business community, which is controlled by Hindus.
Shortly after the last Indian troops departed Bangladesh on March 12,
1972, representatives of the two countries signed a treaty of friendship
and cooperation. This agreement began a period of close and intertwining
ties between the two countries, especially in the areas of bilateral
problem-solving and security for "the next twenty-five years." Among
the joint problems they identified to be solved were those involving
economic cooperation and trade, border demarcations, the implications of
the Farakka Barrage project, and the repatriation of Bengalis to
Bangladesh (see ch. 12; ch. 13). Frequent subsequent visits between the
leaders and cabinet ministers of both countries have established even
closer ties.
India continues to give financial assistance. This assistance is intended
not only to relieve the pressures of the human crisis in Bangladesh but
also to promote the development of a viable nation. At the same time,
many of the controversies that were present between India and East
Pakistan have been resolved. Notably, the border demarcation problem
was settled through an agreement on May 16, 1974. Moreover,
agreements have been formulated to promote cooperation on the
development of the jute industry and the Farakka Barrage project.
An important element in Bangalee-Indian relations has been the
occasional role of India as a third party in negotiations between
Bangladesh and Pakistan. In the wake of the secession of Bangladesh
from Pakistan, there remained a host of controversies involving all three
states. The primary issue concerned the status of some 90,000 prisoners
of war, about 73,000 of whom were members of Pakistan's armed forces
and all of whom had surrendered to India's military commander and were
in prison camps in India. The prisoner-of-war issue was further
complicated by Mujib's announcement that his government would try 195
Pakistanis on such charges as rape, genocide, and other war crimes.
Other Bangalee-Pakistani issues concerned the repatriation of Bengalis
in Pakistan; the status of Biharis (non-Bengali Muslims) in Bangladesh
who desired to go to Pakistan; the division of assets and the sharing of the
external debt of undivided Pakistan; and Bangalee claims of reparations
(see ch. 3; ch. 13). In addition, the Bangalee-Pakistani problems were in
some instances—such as with the prisoners of war—indirectly related to
the postwar disputes of India and Pakistan.
Not until almost seven months after the December 17, 1971, cease-fire
did India and Pakistan achieve the formal resolution of some of their
bilateral problems. The meeting of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
and Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Simla, India,
resulted in what is popularly known as the Simla Agreement of July 2,
1972. The agreement focused on outstanding issues between the two
countries but, in the conversations between the two heads-of-
government, Bangalee-Pakistani problems were discussed. During the
next several months representatives of the Indian government
served—unofficially—as something more than messengers, but less than
negotiators, for the Bangalee government.
The first significant step toward Bangalee-Pakistani reconciliation
came, however, in February 1974 during the Lahore Islamic Summit
Conference, over two years after the cease-fire. The secretary general of
the conference issued an invitation to Mujib, who declined, stating that he

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could attend only if Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. Bhutto expressed a
willingness to extend recognition but claimed that he could not do so as
long as Mujib threatened to try the 195 Pakistani soldiers on charges of
war crimes.
As the various heads-of-state were gathering in Lahore for the
conference, a delegation of seven Islamic leaders flew to Dacca for
consultation with Mujib; the next day, February 22, 1974, they returned
to Lahore with Mujib, who was greeted at the airport by Bhutto.
Diplomatic recognition was exchanged, but as of April 1975 diplomatic
relations had not been established.
Within two months of the conference in Lahore, and facilitated by
Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh, representatives of the governments
of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan met in New Delhi from April 5 to
April 9, 1974. As agreed beforehand, the primary purpose of the
meetings was to seek the "resolution of humanitarian problems arising
out of the conflict of 1971." First, the questions of repatriation were
resolved by all sides, the single exception being the status of Biharis in
Bangladesh. Second, Bangladesh announced its decision as an act of
clemency not to proceed with the trials of the 195 prisoners of war, and
Pakistan stated that it "condemned and deeply regretted" any crimes its
soldiers "may have committed" during the civil war. Finally, it was
announced that the prime minister of Pakistan would visit Bangladesh.
On April 9 these and other items of agreement were written into the
Tripartite Agreement of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan and signed by
the foreign ministers of the three countries.
All of these actions set the scene for the state visit of Bhutto to
Bangladesh in late June 1974. Unfortunately, although the meeting was
another step forward, it did not result in a significant improvement of
relations between the two countries. Foremost among the failures
reported were the decisions not to establish any level of formal diplomatic
relations and, perhaps more important, not to agree to plans for another
meeting.
The last of the Pakistanis captured in Bangladesh during the 1971
conflict (73,908 military and 16,413 civilians) were repatriated to Pakistan
on April 30, 1974. During 1973 and 1974 Bangladesh and Pakistan carried
out the repatriation of Bengalis from Pakistan and of non-Bengalis from
Bangladesh. On July 1, 1974, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees announced that repatriation had been concluded by both sides,
noting that 121,500 Bengalis had returned to Bangladesh and about
110,000 non-Bengalis had been accepted by Pakistan.
In early 1975 Bangladesh and Pakistan accepted their individual shares
of the external debt of pre-1972 Pakistan, thus putting both countries in a
better position with the world financial community. This left the
important question of the division of the former assets remaining to be
resolved in the area of their economic relations.

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 RELATIONS WITH ISLAMIC STATES OF
THE MIDDLE EAST
Bangladesh is the world's second most populous Islamic nation and the
most recent addition to this group of nations. The efforts of Bangalee
foreign relations have been especially significant with these countries
and, although by early 1975 considerable progress had been made, a few
problems did remain.
As prime minister, Mujib was active in establishing relations with the
Islamic world. Frequent visits with the leaders of many of these states
produced some easing of tensions. Diplomatic relations have been
established with most of the Islamic nations; and Bangalee foreign policy
has supported many of the immediate concerns of the majority of Islamic
states, such as their support of the Palestinians in opposition to Israel and
of Turkey concerning the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, many of the
Islamic states, such as Turkey and Iran, have had long treaty
arrangements with Pakistan, and they have been loath to take any action
vis-a-vis Bangladesh that might offend Pakistan. In addition, Mujib's
commitment to secularism has offended some Islamic leaders, particu
larly the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.
The diplomatic visits between Bangalee officials and those of other
Islamic states during 1974 resulted in specific pledges of help to
Bangladesh, particularly by Iran, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates. These pledges included supplying oil under favorable terms,
cash grants, and financial aid in building fertilizer and cement plants. Iran
and Kuwait became members of the Bangladesh Aid Group, and the
United Arab Emirates participated as an observer at the October 1974
meeting of that group in Paris (see ch. 11). According to some
correspondents, economic aid committed by Islamic nations to
Bangladesh during 1974 amounted to the equivalent of at least US$150
million.
The future of Bangalee-Islamic world relations should generally
remain cooperative, with some Islamic nations closely aligned and others
somewhat hesitant. If any overriding issue will determine Bangalee
relations with these countries, it will probably be the progress and nature
of future reconciliation between Bangladesh and Pakistan.

RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS OTHER STATES

The United States
During the 1971 civil war the United States government supported the
position of the central government of Pakistan. Many Bangalee and
foreign observers therefore anticipated that the new government of
Bangladesh would adopt a cool, if not antagonistic, diplomatic posture
toward the United States. Mujib chose to ignore the official acts of the

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United States, however, and focused instead on the open and overwhelm
ing support of "the people of the United States of America." Moreover, he
noted that, as soon as peace had been restored, large amounts of both
official and nonofficial aid had been received from the United States and
the American people.
Bangalee expectations of an early establishment of diplomatic relations
were heightened on March 21 when the United States Senate passed a
resolution calling for recognition of Bangladesh. On April 4, 1972, the
United States did grant diplomatic recognition, but it was not until May
18 that formal diplomatic relations were established; and the first
American ambassador did not arrive in Dacca until April 1974.
Nevertheless, between the end of the war in December 1971 and the
granting of diplomatic recognition, the United States provided more than
US$115 million to Bangladesh through the UN. The officers of the
American consulate general in Dacca and the officials of the Agency for
International Development (AID) had been in close, if informal, contact
with Bangalee officials and, as soon as diplomatic relations were
formalized, rapid progress was made in the provision of extensive
economic aid and assistance. In early 1975 the United States continued to
be by far the largest provider of such assistance (see ch. 11).
The Soviet Union and the East European States
The communist states of Eastern Europe were among the first to
grant recognition to the new government, for which the Bangalee
government was, and in 1975 remained, grateful. The German Democra
tic Republic (East Germany) and Bulgaria fortuitously made their
announcement on January 11, the day that Mujib arrived in Dacca from
his imprisonment in West Pakistan. Poland—and the Mongolian People's
Republic (Mongolia)—granted recognition on January 12; the Soviet
Union, on January 24; Czechoslovakia, on January 25; and Hungary, on
January 26. Romania extended recognition some months later, but as of
early 1975 Albania had not, in keeping with its policy of alignment with
thePRC.
The first visit to a foreign capital by Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman
was to the Soviet Union in March 1972, and he returned to Moscow, in a
special Soviet aircraft, for three weeks of medical treatment in the spring
of 1974. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the 1972 visit
noted the unaminity of "concern at the continuing Israeli occupation of
Arab territories" and the mutual support for the Provisional Revolutio
nary Government of South Vietnam. In the communique and in
subsequent specific agreements, the Soviet Union agreed to provide
various kinds of aid, ranging from setting up and supporting for ten years
an infectious-disease hospital to clearing mines from the port of
Chittagong and other coastal areas. In 1975 the Soviet Union re nained an
important donor of aid.

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 The Commonwealth of Nations
Bangladesh applied for admission to the Commonwealth of Nations in
February 1972 and was admitted on April 18, 1972, despite the strong
objections of Pakistan and its subsequent withdrawal from the associa
tion. By the time Bangladesh was admitted, it had established diplomatic
relations with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, the United
Kingdom, and over half of the other members of the Commonwealth.
MECHANICS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
The major foreign policy decisions are made by the president and his
minister of foreign affairs, but the operations of the ministry are directed
by a senior career diplomat known as the foreign secretary. In early 1975
the ministry was composed of six directorates headed by directors
general; the chief of protocol, who had the rank of a director general; and
the Directorate of Research, which was supervised by an "officer on
special duty" who was scheduled to be upgraded to the rank of director
general in the near future.
The four geographical directorates were East Asia, Pacific, and the
Americas; the Subcontinent; Europe; and Economic Affairs, Inter
national Organization, the Middle East, and Africa. The last named was
scheduled for bifurcation in 1975, to form the Directorate of the Middle
East and North Africa and the Directorate of Economic Affairs and
International Organization. The two other major branches of the foreign
ministry were the Directorate of Administration and the Directorate of
External Publicity.
Apparently as a function of Mujib's desire for neutrality, Bangladesh
has been highly flexible in its policy of diplomatic recognition. It
exchanged diplomatic recognition with East Germany; the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany); the Republic of Korea (South
Korea); the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam); the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; and the Khmer Republic
(Cambodia). Although Bangladesh maintained an embassy in Phnom
Penh, in February 1975 the Bangalee government was host to the foreign
minister of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia
(Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchea—GRUNK),
Prince Norodom Sihanouk's government-in-exile in Peking. In April 1975
Foreign Minister Hossain held further conversations with the GRUNK
foreign minister in New Delhi.
In early 1975 Bangladesh maintained diplomatic missions in seventy-
one countries, a large number for a government with such limited
resources and far more, for example, than such countries as Indonesia,
Iran, and Tunisia. Most of the missions are small, however; the embassy
in Washington, one of the larger Bangalee missions, had eight officers in
early 1975.

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 The foreign ministry and the diplomatic missions were staffed by
career diplomats, most of whom had served in the Pakistan Foreign
Service but opted for Bangladesh. In common with all other civil
servants, Bangalee foreign service personnel were free to join the new
national party (see ch. 8). In the immediate aftermath of the
establishment in February 1975 of the new party, it was impossible to
predict either how many diplomats would voluntarily join or how much
pressure—if any—would be exerted to encourage their membership.
Bangalee observers, however, opined that most of the career diplomats
would refuse to enlist and might even reject a draft.

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 SECTION III. ECONOMIC
CHAPTER 11
CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE
ECONOMY
In early 1975 Bangladesh continued to be desperately poor. Average
per capita income was the equivalent of about US$70 a year; the poor
majority of the population had substantially less on which to live (see ch.
4). If there were an adequate measurement by which a country's
resources could be compared with population, Bangladesh would
probably be at the bottom of such a list. Escape from grinding poverty
was one of the goals of independence, but the population was
economically worse off by 1975 than it had been before independence.
The root of Bangladesh's poverty is the rapidly expanding population,
which has overwhelmed the productive structure. For generations
farming techniques and yields remained relatively unchanged. When
there was no more new land that could be cultivated, the output of the
land had to be shared with more and more people. Within the lifetime of
older Bangalees, the area has gone from one with a food surplus to one
where nearly one-fifth of the grains consumed, which make up the bulk of
the inadequate diet, must be imported.
During the years when the area was East Pakistan, an effort was made
to promote economic growth through a series of five-year plans. Multiple
cropping and irrigation expanded the cropped area, for example, and a
small modern industrial sector was added although it provided relatively
few jobs and was heavily dependent on imports for machinery and raw
materials. The economy did grow, in fact, but at best at about the same
pace as the population, and the growth did not benefit most Bangalees.
The rural population became poorer between 1947 and 1970.
The Pakistan development strategy was based on industrialization.
There were special problems with such strategy in East Pakistan,
however, particularly the lack of natural resources to support industries
and the need to find productive employment for the many annual
additions to the working force. The problems of declining rural incomes, a
heavy dependence on imports, and an unfavorable balance of payments
were partly hidden by the flow of goods between West and East Pakistan
carried on in a common currency and largely exempt from outside
competition. East Pakistan imported increasing quantities of food and
consumption goods for its expanding population and raw and construction

209
materials for the expanding industrial sector, partially paying for the
import bill with increasing exports of manufactured goods to West
Pakistan. The import dependence and balance-of-payments problems
became immediately apparent in the 1970s when the special relationship
with West Pakistan no longer existed and foreign trade was conducted in
world markets.
Independence in 1971 gave the Bangalees their first chance to set their
own economic policies. The First Five Year Plan (1973-78) attempted a
new emphasis to counteract the deficiencies of the Pakistan development
strategy. Growth of the agricultural sector was seen as most important
because it accounted for over 78 percent of the working force, it was the
only sector capable of absorbing the large annual additions to the work
force, and greater food production would reduce the need for imported
grains. Moreover, a sharp advance in rice technology had occurred in the
late 1960s on which agricultural development could be based. Emphasis
was also given to small-scale industry, which means mostly processing
local materials for a small market with labor-intensive methods.
The break with past development strategy was limited, however.
When it came to investment funds, the plan laid down priorities for
several large capital-intensive and import-intensive industrial plants and
several large and costly water control projects, even though this kind of
investment had shown a poor return in the 1960s. The plan also required a
concentrated effort to mobilize domestic resources to meet the invest
ment goals.
The plan was realistic in setting modest goals and frank in
acknowledging the policy and institutional changes necessary to
accomplish even these goals. The gross domestic product (GDP) was to
grow at an annual average rate of5.5 percent, and per capita consumption
of such basic commodities as grain, meat, sugar, and cloth was to be only
marginally higher in 1978 than in 1970. The plan anticipated employment
for the estimated 3.9 million net additions to the working force during the
five-year plan period, and the 37 percent of the agricultural work force
estimated to be unemployed and underemployed in June 1973 was to be
reduced to 32 percent by July 1978.
Nature and circumstance did not favor the new country. Even mature
governments with well-run economies would have had difficulties with
the problems that beset the Banglaee society. There were some 10 million
war refugees to resettle and help with a new start (see ch. 3). Extensive
repair and reconstruction were necessary to get the infrastructure,
particularly the transportation network, back to normal after the civil
war. The government had to expand from what had been a provincial to a
national administration even though many of its best and most
experienced administrators were detained in West Pakistan until fiscal
year (FY) 1974 (see ch. 8). Staffing requirements were tremendously
increased when the government nationalized most industry, modern

210
transport, banking, insurance, foreign trade, and the distribution of
important commodities, in part because the West Pakistani owners and
operators of many of the businesses had fled during the civil war. In
addition, there were floods and droughts. Perhaps the most difficult blow
of all for the economic growth plan, however, was the severe adverse
shift in the terms of trade (see ch. 13).
Exports were largely limited to jute products, which furnished about
80 percent of the foreign exchange earnings in the early 1970s, and export
prices and earnings had advanced only slowly by 1975. Foreign aid was
becoming more difficult to obtain and was shifting toward projects rather
than the raw materials and consumption goods of which the economy was
still desperately short. When import prices shot up, an estimated
increase of 65 percent between FY 1973 and FY 1974, the volume of
imports had to be reduced, compounding the problems of industrial
production, bringing inflation under control, and providing relief for flood
victims during the food crisis of 1974.
By June 1974, the end of the first year of the First Five Year Plan, the
picture was bleak. Agricultural production had not exceeded prein-
dependence levels, and industrial production was below the level of FY
1970. Neither sector had approached plan targets. Per capita income was
below that of FY 1970, and prices increased 90 percent in FY 1973 and FY
1974 for a Dacca worker's cost of living. Economists studying the figures,
particularly the impact of the much higher import prices and the need to
lower the quantum of imports during the plan, projected economic
growth of a little above or below population growth during the plan
period, depending on government policy decisions and the level of foreign
aid.
The policy options concerned governmental and legal changes to build
institutional structures for development and to mobilize domestic
resources to pay for development. The government budgets showed a
failure to mobilize domestic savings, however, relying instead on foreign
aid and deficit financing for the investments that had been made. A group
of relatively large farmers and wealthy merchants had escaped effective
taxation in spite of the improvement of their economic position since
independence, but their capital accumulation mostly fled the country or
went into conspicuous consumption.
The government attacked some of the problems with vigor during 1974
by raising interest rates, considereably increasing the scope for private
investment, and reducing some government subsidies. The year was
climaxed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's assumption of one-man rule,
ostensibly in response to the deteriorating economic and internal security
conditions (see ch. 14). It was not clear by early 1975 what the
government intended to do about the economic situation, but the economic
data indicated that the population would sink deeper into poverty unless
strong action reversed the trend, (see Preface).

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 A SKETCH OF THE ECONOMY
Sonar Bangla, the Golden Bengal of Rabindranath Tagore's poem,
which is the national anthem, described the rich and plentiful Bengal of
yore. By 1900, even with a population of about 30 million, the country
impressed travelers with its prosperity. By 1975, however, with a
population of about 81 million, the country was one of the poorest in the
world.
The turnaround from prosperity to poverty came as a traditional
society experienced rapid population growth. Agricultural techniques
changed little, but modern medicine, particularly after World War II,
brought a twentieth-century death rate to a society that still had a
nineteenth-century birthrate (see ch. 3). By the 1970s the population was
growing at about 3 percent a year, doubling in less than twenty-five
years. Every year about 2 million more people needed to be fed, clothed,
and housed. The economy had to grow by about 3 percent per year just to
keep the population from becoming poorer.
Each year the task of economic growth becomes more difficult. It
would have been simpler earlier in the twentieth century before
population pressure on resources became so intense, but the Bangalees
were not their own masters. Economic policy was formulated
elsewhere—in London and Calcutta during colonial rule and in West
Pakistan between 1947 and 1971. Development of the area that is
present-day Bangladesh was not a priority before independence in 1971.
Not only was valuable time lost, but severe dislocations and some waste
of investments followed each change in economic orientation.
The relentless growth of population forced people to farm every
available bit of land. Additional land that could be cultivated was almost
nonexistent by 1970 (see ch. 12). The cropped area was 150 percent of the
arable land because of multiple cropping. The marginal land, which
farmers had formerly avoided, was now tilled, subjecting its cultivators
to extensive crop damage and loss of life when heavy flooding occurred, as
it usually did about every fourth or fifth year.
In 1975 only natural gas—as a power source and for processing into
fertilizer and petrochemical products—and possibly limestone to supply a
larger cement industry were available for a quick expansion of the
industrial base. Moreover, the physical infrastructure that had been
developed did not particularly suit a predominantly agricultural economy
with a rapidly growing population. The modern industry that existed by
early 1975 provided fewer than 300,000 jobs, and it was heavily
dependent on imports because ofthe lack of natural resources (see ch. 13).
The transportation network had been oriented primarily to linking
various parts of the country; this had political significance but insufficient
economic impact. Improvement in the small inland waterways, village
electrification, and other development of rural areas would have
facilitated the movement and processing of agricultural commodities,
shifting the industrial focus from capital-intensive and import-intensive

212
production processes in urban enclaves to the rural areas where
small-scale processing could have provided investment opportunities and
jobs for the predominantly rural population. Manpower is Bangladesh's
most important resource, but little attention had been given to using it
productively (see ch. 3).
The economy of East Pakistan stagnated between 1947 and 1971. The
GDP increased at an annual average rate of only 3.3 percent (in constant
prices) between FY 1950 and FY 1970. Statistical recording in
Bangladesh before and after independence has not been extensive nor
completely reliable; so precision should not be assigned to any particular
set of numbers. It is obvious from many indicators, however, that growth
of the economy was at best about the same as the population, and some
economists, after studying demographic data and procedures for
estimating GDP, believe that the economy grew more slowly than the
population.
The labor force remained primarily in the rural areas during the
Pakistan years. Employment was essentially in agriculture because few
new industrial or service jobs became available. The growth of the rural
labor force without sufficient remunerative employment caused a decline
in rural incomes. A shift of income distribution also occurred in favor of
larger merchants and the small group of workers in the large, modern
plants, who resided in urban centers.
The industry that existed at independence was predominantly cottage
industry—largely involving the production of handloomed textiles—that
provided workers only a bare existence. Most of the modern industry had
developed in a highly protected environment, and a significant part was
oriented toward West Pakistan. This modern industry had substantial
unutilized capacity even in its most productive year, FY 1970.
Independence exposed many of these industries to new conditions
requiring adjustments, many of which were still not completed in 1975,
and industrial output had yet to recover to the level of 1970.
Agriculture had to be the primary focus for economic growth because it
was the dominant element of the economy. The share of GDP contributed
by agriculture (including livestock, forestry, and fishing) amounted to 56
percent; industry, 8 percent; trade, 10 percent; transport, 6 percent; and
all other services, 20 percent in FY 1973.
Rice cultivation, the most important crop, accounted for nearly 80
percent of the cropped area in FY 1973; it provided a bright prospect for
relatively quick production increases based on the advance of rice
technology in the late 1960s. The high-yield varieties of rice seeds had two
additional advantages; they required more labor than traditional
varieties, thus increasing rural employment opportunities, and the
higher yields would enable Bangladesh to become self-sufficient in food
grains thereby eliminating grain imports, which had accounted for
upwards of one-fourth of the import bill since independence. Efforts were
made to expand the use of the modern techniques. The FY 1975 rice crop

213
was the largest ever for Bangladesh, the preliminary estimate amounting
to 12.3 million tons (milled basis). Continued larger harvests seemed
likely with at least average weather.
Jute, the other major agricultural crop, was Bangladesh's primary
export, accounting for about 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings
since independence. Improved techniques were not available for raising
production of jute sharply. In fact, the high price of rice prompted many
farmers to raise rice instead of jute, forcing a sharp fall in the FY 1975
jute crop. The jute industry had other problems as well, which made the
prospects for exports not very promising (see ch. 12).
The damage and disruption to the economy during the civil war created
a scarcity of goods that from the moment of independence pushed the
economy into an inflationary situation. Imports and domestic production
remained low, continuing the scarcity of goods, and deficit financing
further fueled inflation. By mid-1974 the cost-of-living index for a Dacca
worker had increased by more than 225 percent since 1970.
The inflationary situation benefited particular groups. A number of
large merchants, particularly those with import licenses, had gathered
excess profits from the high demand for the small quantity of goods (see
ch. 6). Another group included a little more than one-third of the rural
households, those owning more than 2.5 acres, that had a substantial
marketable surplus above the family's needs. This marketable surplus
had increased considerably in monetary value by 1975, because the costs
of agricultural inputs had risen more slowly than such food prices as rice.
These groups had a vested interest in perpetuating their favored
position, and they mounted much more political influence within the
single political party than the landless agricultural workers and the urban
poor, who suffered most from the inflation (see ch. 8; ch. 9).
By June 1973 the GDP amounted to Tk30 billion (for value of the
taka—see Glossary) in FY 1970 prices, probably about 12 percent below
the FY 1970 level, and per capita GDP was probably more than 15 percent
lower than FY 1970. National price indexes were not available, but the
cost-of-living index for a Dacca worker, which rose 50 percent in FY
1973 and 40 percent in FY 1974, indicates the magnitude of inflation.
Nature and circumstance had not given the Bangalee planners an easy
task in plotting a way out of the economic stagnation that had mired the
population in "dismal poverty," as the planners phrased it.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The First Five Year Plan
The new leaders of independent Bangladesh were anxious to break the
economic stagnation of the Pakistan years, and they instructed the
Planning Commission to prepare an economic plan to start in July 1973
that would provide direction and an ordering of priorities. The
economists would have preferred more time because statistical data and

214
empirical investigations were not sufficiently comprehensive and reliable
for the needs of planning, but they met the deadline. The First Five Year
Plan, covering July 1973 through June 1978, was published in
November 1973.
Basically, economic plans are political documents, and the Planning
Commission has been headed by high-level politicians. Mujib was
chairman until early 1975 when, during the restructuring of the
government, he gave the position to the new vice president, Syed Nazrul
Islam. The Planning Commission was given unique status within the
government administration. The deputy chairman had the position of
minister without cabinet rank, and three members were at the level of
ministers of state. Several prominent economists responded to Mujib's
request to serve on the commission, and many of the top positions were
filled outside the usual civil service channels. The status of the Planning
Commission provoked controversy within the administrative hierarchy
of the government, and it was still being debated in 1975.
The main work of the Planning Commission is the preparation of
long-term and annual development plans. In conjunction with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the commission also negotiates foreign aid
agreements and processes major policy papers for the cabinet. In early
1975 the commission had a staff of more than 600 professionals.
Projects for inclusion in the plan were submitted by the ministries. A
project approval committee, which included senior members of the
Planning Commission, had to approve project proposals above Tk2.5
million, after which the cabinet-level National Economic Council
reviewed the project proposal. Projects under Tk2.5 million were
approved by the responsible ministry.
The plan that emerged included some projects that had been proposed
in the 1960s; new project studies reflecting conditions of an independent
Bangladesh were not possible by the time the plan had to be prepared.
The plan had strong policy recommendations that, if followed, would
result in relatively efficient resource allocation within the socialist
environment specified as national policy. As of early 1975 the plan had not
had general acceptance as "the government's plan" with all sections of
government identifying with it and taking responsibility for its
implementation. A need for interministerial coordination at the working
level became apparent from the preparation of the plan.
Statistical inadequacies emerged as the preparation of the plan
progressed. The Bureau of Statistics had a staff of 1,200 that collected
masses of data but processed a relatively small amout of it. Measures
were started to upgrade the data available for planning purposes.
The First Five Year Plan was a remarkable accomplishment and a
sophisticated document considering the rush to produce it, the unsettled
conditions, and the disarray of the economy in 1971 and 1972. It
realistically analyzed the country's problems and described them with
rare candor. The plan acknowledged that unprecedented effort and

215
sacrifice would be required and implied that part of the effort would have
to be to upgrade the performance of government substantially over that
achieved during the 1960s. The plan spelled out many of the policy and
institutional changes required, many of which needed action by the
political leadership. Fiscal measures particularly required strong and
quick political action.
The plan listed over a dozen goals, the primary one being "to reduce
poverty." The basic framework appeared to build from four quantitative
issues: to have per capita consumption of essential commodities in the
terminal year at least as high as FY 1970; to provide jobs for the additions
to the working force with as great a reduction of unemployment and
underemployment as possible; to reduce the annual population growth
from 3 percent to 2.8 percent by 1978; and to reduce dependency on
foreign aid by import substitution, largely through self-sufficiency in food
production and developing synthetic fibers to replace cotton as the raw
material for the textile industry.
Because economic conditions were too disturbed to use FY 1973 as a
base year, the plan used a benchmark as the point of departure for
economic measurements. The benchmark was FY 1970 production and
consumption levels adjusted for population growth and additions to
productive capacity, primarily in the industrial sector.
The plan projected an annual growth for GDP of 5.5 percent over the
benchmark (in constant FY 1973 prices) and an annual growth of per
capita income of 2.5 percent. The difficulty of the planned growth
becomes more apparent when measured against the FY 1973 actual GDP;
to achieve the target level of output in FY 1978; GDP would have to grow
at an annual rate of 8.8 percent over FY 1973, sustantially higher than the
economy had ever achieved before. The annual average growth rates for
the individual sectors over the benchmark were: agriculture, forestry,
and fishing, 4.6 percent; manufacturing, 7.1 percent; construction, 12.1
percent; power and gas, 11 percent; housing, 4.1 percent; and trade,
transport, and other services, 6.2 percent.
The plan projected an impressive rise in employment of 5.4 million
man-years, substantially more than the plan's estimate of 3.9 million
additions to the working force during the plan period. The planners
estimated that perhaps only 4.1 million additional jobs would be created,
the remainder of the man-years resulting in greater periods of
employment for persons already employed part of the year. If the
additions to the working force amount to over 1 million people a year, as
some demographers believe, then the new jobs created will fall
considerably short of need. Modern agricultural techniques, which
require more labor than traditional farming, and rural works programs
were scheduled to create most of the new job opportunities. Urban
employment was to increase by less than 2 million man-years.
The plan provided physical production targets for the terminal year for
some forty-two major commodities. Some targets, such as 15 million tons

216
 filled basis), were reasonable and might be met, but others, such
as n.l million bales ofjute and 450,000 tons of steel, will be difficult if not
impossible to achieve.
The plan projects a rise in per capita consumption of about 18 percent,
implying only a marginal annual increase over the levels of FY 1970. Per
capita rice consumption would be 1.2 percent higher, for example, and
textiles about 8.5 percent higher. The limited rise in consumption implied
a very steep rise in savings as a percent of GDP—from a negligible level in
FY 1973 to about 13 percent in FY 1978—a rate well above the highest
level achieved in the past. The plan did not indicate how consumption
would be restrained or how the savings would be channeled into
investments. Because the bulk of the funds would be invested in the
public sector, the implication was that the government would channel the
funds primarily through taxes.
Observers were generally agreed that the fiancial side of the plan was
the weakest, partly because it was initially based on physical production
targets. As financial aspects were added, constraints appeared likely, but
the planners felt that reduction of the size of the plan would impair basic
objectives, which were very modest in terms of the population's needs.
The planners spelled out some policy changes, assuming prompt action by
the government, such as the introduction of a graduated land tax,
realistic pricing of some public sector commodities, and higher interest
rates, which would have facilitated achievement of the financial targets.
By early 1975 some changes had been implemented slowly and others not
at all, allowing potential investment funds to go to other uses.
Planned investment outlays were to be stepped up and more
concentrated in the public sector than the investment of the 1960s. Total
planned investments amounted to Tk50.4 billion (in constant prices) for
the five years, including Tk5.8 billion nonmonetized investment, largely
accounted for by rural development projects undertaken by groups of
farmers. About 80 percent of the monetized investments were scheduled
for the public sector. Agriculture and water control had the highest
priority but, when categories were grouped, agriculture and water
control were to receive 24 percent of total investments; industry, 20
percent; physical infrastructure, 38 percent; social sectors, 14 percent;
and all others, 4 percent.
Domestic resources would finance 61 percent of monetized invest
ments, leaving 39 percent to be financed by external sources. The plan
had 41 percent of public sector investments generated by the sector,
largely through the budget; 12 percent financed by channeling private
savings to the public sector through bonds, savings accounts, and life
insurance funds; 4 percent from deficit financing; and 43 percent from the
counterpart of foreign aid. Private investment (monetized) would be
financed largely by private savings and borrowing from the banking
system and from sources abroad.
The strategy of the plan was to develop the agricultural sector, mostly

217
by exploiting the advances in rice technology, with large investments in
new seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides; such quick-return irrigation
facilities as pumps and wells; and extension and cooperative services.
Most employment creation would result from the labor-intensive nature
of the cultivation of high-yield rice seeds, although rural works programs
would provide employment for agricultural workers in slack periods.
Some employment would result from the growth of transportation and
processing of the larger agricultural output, as more peasants abandoned
subsistence agriculture and became commercial farmers.
The plan assigned greater importance to the development of cottage
and small-scale industry, which had been neglected for a generation or
more. The help was partly institutional; that is, agencies were to be
created to make financing, information, and other services available.
Specific measures were set forth to provide yarn for handloomed textiles,
which constituted by far the largest industry in terms of employment and
output.
Because of the time pressure, or perhaps other reasons, the plan
included very large allocations of investment funds to a few large
capital-intensive and import-intensive industrial and water control
projects, that had been discussed since the 1960s. Some of these projects,
such as fertilizer plants, were justified, but not all. These large allocations
added to the financing problems of the plan and greatly diluted its
professed break with past development strategy.
Government Budgets
The bulk of investment in the First Five Year Plan was to be in the
public sector, and the government's budget, therefore, became a major
instrument for mobilizing domestic resources and their allocations. The
budget is prepared yearly by the Ministry of Finance after consultation
and coordination with other ministries and the Planning Commission,
which prepares the annual development plan. Development expendi
tures, from the annual development plan, form part of the annual budget
presented by the finance minister to Parliament near the start of each
fiscal year. (July 1).
The shift of the Ministry of Finance from a provincial organization
before independence to a national administration after 1971 created
problems; a much larger organization was required, and there was a lack
of data and experience by which revenues and expenditures could be
estimated with any precision. In addition, bookkeeping procedures were
so slow that accounts lagged many months behind events. Figures on
actual full-year revenues and expenditures have not been available. The
Ministry of Finance released revised budget estimates near the close of
the fiscal year that were based on less than full year data. The revised
budgets were believed to differ appreciably from actual full-year figures
in FY 1973 and FY 1974.
The newness of the staff of the ministry may not be the whole

218
explanation for the failure of actual receipts and expenditures to
approximate proposed budgets. According to foreign experts, the East
Pakistan provincial financial administration was notoriously weak.
Independence should have encouraged a strenuous government effort to
upgrade financial organizations and personnel, but the record suggests
that many of the former weaknesses may have remained after 1971.
Revenues
Budget revenues were derived primarily from regressive, easily
collected commodity transaction taxes. Proposed revenues for FY 1974
consisted of 35 percent from custom duties, 24 percent from excise duties,
11 percent from sales taxes, 4 percent from income taxes, 4 percent from
nationalized enterprises, 1 percent from the land tax, and 21 percent from
all other revenue sources. The level of imports strongly influenced the
government's revenue position. In the proposed FY 1973 budget, for
example, over 80 percent of revenues were derived from custom duties,
almost entirely on imports, sales taxes, of which 80 percent were directly
on imports, and excise taxes, which also depended heavily on imports.
A characteristic of revenues in FY 1973 and FY 1974 was the shortfall
in revenue collections between the proposed and revised budgets (see
table 10). Full-year collections appeared to be even lower than the
revised budgets. The explanation for the shortfall in collections was
probably the result of fewer imports and less business activity, which
provided the bulk of revenues. Failure of Parliament to enact new or
higher taxes, which had been included in proposed revenues, also
contributed to the shortfall.
The tax structure had been lenient to the better-off groups who were
best able to contribute to development financing. The individual income
tax, which has progressive rates, exempts those with incomes below
Tk6,000 annually, effectively excluding most of the population. Parlia
ment exempted from the land tax all landholdings under 8.3 acres, the
bulk of all holdings, and suspended payment of the land tax by all owners
until FY 1975, at least. Parliament also refused to integrate the
agricultural income tax with the general income tax and this, combined
with the exclusion of the land tax, left agriculture relatively free of
taxation. Parliament maintained the subsidies on government-supplied
fertilizers, pesticides, and water charges for irrigation facilities above the
level recommended by the Ministry of Finance and the Planning
Committee. Some Bangalee and foreign economists have argued from the
incident of tax structure, along with other factors, that upper income
groups had used their power in Parliament, that is, in Mujib's political
party, to improve their economic position by early 1975 at the expense of
the poorer farming and laboring groups.
Recurrent Expenditures
Budget expenditures consist of recurrent costs for the operation of the
government and annual development expenditures. The recurrent
expenditures in the proposed budget for FY 1975 were made up of 24

219
percent for civil aaministration, 17 percent for defense, 17 percent for
education, 4 percent for health services, and 38 percent for an extended
number of expenditure categories.
Recurrent expenditures, showing the opposite tendency of revenues,
consistently increased between proposed and revised budgets in FY 1973
and FY 1974. Moreover, the upward costs of government were reflected
in the doubling of the recurrent budget between FY 1973 and FY 1975.
The high rate of inflation pushed up the costs of government. Some
modest salary raises have been given to government employees, but they
were substantially less than the rate of inflation. Government expendi
tures also increased because of interest payments on the government's
growing debts and of the repatriation costs of the Bangalees from
Pakistan. Government expenditures did not contain subsidy costs for the
food rationing program or the operating losses of nationalized businesses
because they were financed by the banking system.
Annual Development Expenditures
The government's capital budget is called annual development
expenditures and includes relief and reconstruction costs, such as those
following the civil war (see table 11). The plan assigned priority to
agriculture and rural institutions in development expenditures, but
without actual full-year expenditures it was difficult to determine how
closely priorities have been followed.
Annual development expenditures have consistently fallen short of
targets, probably a deliberate government policy because of insufficient
revenues. The shortfall in FY 1973 appeared to be at least 20 percent, or
about Tkl billion. The rejection by Parliament of some revenue
measures, the lower production of petroleum products and cigarettes
causing excise duties to fall short of estimates, and a slowing down of
capital expenditures to reduce the need for deficit financing all pointed to
development expenditures in FY 1974 at about the same level as the
previous year, or a shortfall of about 20 percent from the FY 1974
proposed budget. The quantum of investments has been declining
because of the price inflation.
The shortfalls in development expenditures posed a threat to the plan's
growth targets. The plan phased investments to dovetail with other
elements of the economy, and projects that lag behind will throw off
production schedules in other sectors later on. Moreover, a country so
short of materials and financial resources can ill afford to have capital tied
up in uncompleted projects any longer than absolutely necessary.
The Banking System
At independence the banking system consisted of two branch offices of
the State Bank of Pakistan and seventeen large commercial banks, two of
which were controlled by Bangalee interests and three by foreigners
other than West Pakistanis. There were, in addition, fourteen small
banks. Banking facilities were concentrated in urban or semiurban
localities, leaving most of the rural area without adequate service.
As of January 1, 1972, the Dacca branch of the State Bank of Pakistan
was designated as the central bank and renamed the Bangladesh Bank.
By presidential order, its main functions are the regulation of currency
issue, the control of credit and monetary policy, and the administration of
exchange control and of the official foreign exchange reserves. At
independence the West Pakistan authorities had control of the bulk of the
country's foreign exchange reserves, and the Bangladesh Bank inherited
only the small working balances of those banks located in Bangladesh. In
early 1975 Bangladesh still claimed that Pakistan owed it a fair share of
the foreign exchange reserves it held at the time of independence as well
as Bangladesh's share of joint assets in national airlines, shipping
companies, and life insurance companies. The division of assets remained
unsettled and an irritant inhibiting relations between the two countries.
The banking system, excluding non-Pakistani-owned foreign banks,
was nationalized as of January 1, 1972. During 1972 the various banks
were reorganized and renamed. By early 1975 there were two industrial
development banks, one agricultural development bank, an agency to
finance home building, and six commercial banks with many branches.
Small savings and small loans in rural areas were largely handled by the
cooperative credit systems and postal savings offices. The nationalized
insurance business, primarily the life insurance companies, also gener
ated potential investment funds.
Foreign-owned banks were still permitted to do business in
Bangladesh. In early 1975 there were seven in operation: American
Express International Banking Corporation; Australasia Bank (eight
branches); Chartered Bank (one branch); Commerce Bank (five
branches); Grindlays Bank, formerly National and Grindlays Bank (nine
branches); State Bank of India (three branches); and United Bank of
India.
The Ministry of Finance was responsible for monetary policy with
guidance from the central bank, and the bank was responsible for
implementing this policy. A cash reserve of 5 percent was required for
demand and time deposits and a liquidity ratio amounting to 25 percent of
deposits. Other monetary policy instruments included selective credit
controls, quantitative limits on particular kinds of credit, and control of
the bank rate and interest rates. In June 1974 the bank rate was raised
from 5 to 8 percent and the bank lending rate from about 10 to 13 percent
to begin correcting the former rates that had become negative in real
terms because of the high rate of inflation.
The Bangladesh banking system started from a difficult financial
position. ,In the final months before liberation, credit policy in East
Pakistan had been liberalized, which helped finance a massive outflow of
funds from East to West Pakistan. Moreover, some—perhaps most—
assets of banks, life insurance companies, and other enterprises were
located in West Pakistan. Immediately after liberation, bank transac-

221
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223
tions were suspended, and when resumed in January 1972 a very
restrictive credit policy was maintained for several months. The
Bangladesh Bank provided help to the commercial banks that were
experiencing a severe liquidity squeeze because of the transfer to, or
location of, some assets in West Pakistan.
A very rapid growth of bank deposits occurred during 1972, partly
because of the low level of economic activity, the scarcity of goods, and
particularly the security situation that made it more prudent to keep
funds in banks rather than in cash. Demand and time deposits continued
to grow in FY 1973 and FY 1974, largely because the banking system
financed the government's budgetary deficits and subsidy costs.
The demand for credit by the private sector was small up to early 1975
and, in fact, the evidence suggests contraction of private sector credit
after independence. Another undesirable feature associated with the
banking system was a decline in financial discipline—a tendency not to
repay debts. The practice was widespread until at least the end of 1974
and included relief loans to farmers as well as borrowing arrangements
between government agencies. The banking system lacked adequate
staff in many cases to attempt serious collection efforts. The lack of loan
repayments would have created problems for the banking system if
there had been a high level of credit demand.
Financial Problems
By early 1975 the financial side of the five-year plan was in a shambles.
The anticipated budget surplus of current revenues over current
expenditures had failed to materialize, largely because revenue collection
had been less than planned. The accounts were balanced by reducing
development expenditures, relying on foreign aid, and deficit financing.
Development expenditures were apparently cut about one-fifth in FY
1973 and FY 1974. Deficit financing appeared to exceed Tk3 billion in FY
1973 and FY 1974. The deficit financing in FY 1974 alone probably
exceeded the amount of deficit financing scheduled in the plan for the
entire five years.
The money supply, consisting of currency in circulation and demand
deposits, grew rapidly and consistently between independence and
mid-1974. The money supply stood at Tk3.9 billion on December 17, 1971,
and Tk8.3 billion on June 30, 1974, an increase of 112 percent. Demand
deposits increased by 160 percent while currency in circulation grew only
60 percent. The minister of finance acknowledged in June 1974 that the
government's deficit financing was increasing the money supply too fast,
thus fueling inflation considerably. The increase in the money supply in
FY 1974 was nearly three times the rate considered desirable in the plan.
The public sector was saving at a negative rate in FY 1973 and FY
1974. Savings in the private sector were small and perhaps negative also.
Bangladesh was essentially making investments from foreign aid with

224
little contribution from domestic resources. The aid dependence was
increasing instead of diminishing.
STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE PLAN
By early 1974 economists estimating the impact of the inability to
mobilize domestic resources thought that investment expenditures
would fall short of plan targets by more than one-quarter and that
domestic savings would be less than one-half of the amount planned, even
with optimistic assumptions. Larger domestic savings might be obtained
if subsidies were reduced, agriculture effectively taxed, efficiency in
nationalized enterprises increased, and private savings and investment
stimulated. Valuable time had been lost, however, and the scope of the
plan would have to be scaled down because of the inability to mobilize
domestic resources.
The tremendous rise in import prices in 1973 and 1974 also was forcing a
reduction of planned goals. There was very little hope that enough
foreign aid would be forthcoming to bring the quantum of imports to the
level the economy needed, and there was even less hope that exports
could be raised sufficiently to make an appreciable impact. The increase in
domestic rice prices that had forced farmers to plant rice instead of jute
threatened the future of the commodity on which the bulk of the country's
export earnings depended. Reduced volume of imports meant industrial
recovery and growth would be slowed, and the scarcity of goods and price
inflation would take longer to remedy.
Economists attempting to quantify the impact of developments found
the prospects for growth bleak in 1974. The lower volume of imports and
the shortfall of investments pointed to an economic growth rate less than
that of population. Such a result would be undesirable to Bangalee
authorities. The alternative would be to mount a greater effort to
establish an effective program of population control, to make a
substantial shift of resources from capital-intensive uses in urban-
industrial sectors to labor-intensive uses in the rural agricultural sectors,
and to promote more efficient use of scarce domestic and foreign
exchange resources. Policy changes could increase the rate of growth of
the economy slightly above that of population growth and finally break
the trend toward greater poverty. Policy changes combined with
strengthening development institutions would provide a base for future
growth that was lacking when the First Five Year Plan was formulated.
Some difficult policy changes were made during 1974. Interest rates
were raised, subsidies reduced, taxes increased, and a compulsory rice
procurement program instituted, for example. Perhaps related, the 1972
Constitution was amended and the government reorganized in part to
cope with the deteriorating economic situation at the end of 1974. In early
1975 Mujib had given no indication of a program to improve the economy.
Economic development experts studying the data saw only two main

225
alternatives. The government had not been effective in carrying out the
plan's policy recommendations. Continued failure to mobilize domestic
resources combined with a much larger import bill would reduce
investments, leading to greater poverty as economic growth fell below
the rate of population increase. Conversely, strong action by the
government could set the economy on a growth path, however slow and
distant the economic improvement for the population might be.
 CHAPTER 12
AGRICULTURE
Agriculture is central to the nation's economy and society. Nearly 95
percent of the population lived in rural areas in early 1975, and most were
engaged in either growing, marketing, transporting, or processing
agricultural products. About 80 percent of the working force depended
directly on agriculture (including animal husbandry, fishing, and
forestry) for employment, and agriculture was by far the most important
sector of the economy, contributing 56 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) in fiscal year (FY) 1973.
Food production is the most glaring weakness of agriculture. Since
independence in 1971, the country has depended on large, aid-financed
imports of grain to supplement domestic production to feed the
population even at low caloric and very deficient nutritional levels.
Agriculture in the 1975 setting primarily meant the growing of rice and
jute, the two crops accounting for 87 percent of the cropped area.
Observers agree that if output of these crops is not substantially
improved, Bangladesh will be able to subsist only through massive
foreign aid or a series of famines that would reduce the population to
match the production of food.
This is the harsh reality of a pleasant land with industrious people and
rich soil. At one time a food surplus region, it now has too many people on
too little land, the densest population of any country except the
city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong (see ch. 3). Additional arable
land is practically nonexistent. Increased production must be achieved by
farming the land already cultivated more intensively and more
efficiently. By 1970 the land was being farmed at nearly 150 percent,
meaning that about one-half of the available acreage was cropped more
than once. Production increases can come from some additional multiple
cropping, but in the future primary reliance will have to be on higher
yields. Success in raising yields largely depends on rainfall and the
wisdom and efficiency of the government in providing the environment
and ingredients for the growth of agriculture.
Most Bangalee crops are rain fed. The timing and amount of rain
account for the difference between famine and relative plenty. Rainfall
also affects the nation's rivers, which drain huge areas on either side of
the Himalayas (see ch. 3). Flooding occurs every year and is part of the
agricultural pattern. Occasionally, however, as in 1970 and 1974,
disastrous floods ravage the land, wiping out homes and crops. Control of

227
the rivers would require the cooperation of India and of the People's
Republic of China (PRO involving large-scale and immensely costly
projects in those countries sometime in the future. Much more modest
projects, primarily irrigation rather than flood control, are needed
quickly to permit more miltiple cropping and to ensure adequate water
during the main growing season of April through November.
The government's goals of establishing a socialist economy and
providing an organization to aid, assist, and improve the very small farms
of Bangladesh, make the role of government perhaps as crucial as that of
the farmers in lifting agriculture out of its stagnation (see ch. 11). The
government plans to implement many programs to achieve its goals,
including the priority goal of self-sufficiency in food by 1978. Similar plans
with similar goals have failed in the past. The agricultural sector grew at
an average annual rate of 2.2 percent in constant prices, substantially less
than population growth during the years the area was part of Pakistan.
Foreign and Bangalee observers are agreed that to avoid future
catastrophes, Bangladesh must radically improve on the performance of
earlier governments in implementing agricultural programs.
An optimistic note somewhat relieves the gloomy outlook. Rice-
growing technology has advanced rapidly in recent years, including very
useful research in Bangladesh itself. Improved seed strains for use under
local conditions are now available that substantially raise yields over
traditional varieties. Improved seeds for the main crop were available for
extensive plantings in 1973, contributing, with good weather, to an
apparent record rice harvest. The higher yields make self-sufficiency in
food grains a possibility by 1978. Relatively easy jumps in production are
not available for the rest ofthe agricultural sector. Jute in particular faces
a troublesome future, threatening the country's overwhelmingly impor
tant foreign exchange earner (see ch. 13).
Even if the weather is more favorable than usual, the government
efficient and wise, and the farmers productive and cooperative,
agricultural output by the end of the First Five Year Plan (1973-78) will
be able to raise per capita availabilities only a little because of the high
rate of population growth. In the judgment of the Banglaee government,
dismal poverty will still prevail. Food grains per person will barely
exceed the level of 1970; meat, fish, and other protein sources will not
have relieved the extreme protein deficiency in the diet; and agricultural
per capita income will be only slightly higher than the level of 1970 (see
ch. 4). Yet, achievement of these goals would be a very remarkable
success, and even less than full attainment of plan goals could be a success
considering the nation's problems and resources.
THE 1974 FAMINE AND FOOD BALANCES
Bangladesh suffered a severe food crisis in the fall of 1974, following
summer floods that officials have called the worst in twenty years. The
preliminary estimate of the damage was the equivalent of US$3.5 billion.

228
The floods affected eighteen out of nineteen districts and nearly one-half
of the population. Extensive damage was inflicted on the spring rice crop
and the jute crop. The additional imports of food grains that were
required because of the flood were initially estimated in October 1974 at
more than 1 million tons.
As damaging as the floods appeared to be, the famine that ensued did
not cause the loss of life that might have been expected. Certainly the
reports by early 1975 had not indicated a famine on the scale of 1943, when
an estimated 1.9 million people died. The government may have
effectively held down the death toll through its relief efforts, limited
though they were.
Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ordered the government on
July 7 to prepare for disaster relief. The government was in a particularly
bad position because its grain stocks were down to only a one-or-two-
month supply for the usual rationing program. A low price had caused
farmers to avoid selling to the rice procurement agencies, keeping
domestic grain out of government channels. The government depended
almost exclusively on imported grain for its stocks. Import orders
scheduled for delivery in the summer and early fall were slowed or
postponed, however, after foreign exchange reserves dropped sha:-ply in
the early months of 1974. As the severity of the floods became apparent,
cash orders and aid requests were sent abroad asking for rush shipments,
but very little grain reached Bangladesh before late October, near the
start of a new harvest in mid-November.
Nearly 6,000 relief kitchens were established throughout the country
to feed flood victims. According to various international newspapers,
daily rations per person were much less than 1,000 calories. Flooding
made transportation extremely difficult. Costly, inefficient helicopters
frequently made the food deliveries. Relief centers ran out of food from
time to time. Some of the starving were turned away from the food
kitchens because sufficient food was not available to feed everybody.
Administration was not faultless, and bungling occurred. Some food
undoubtedly was diverted to the black market. Nonetheless, it is
remarkable that the famine caused relatively few deaths. The govern
ment and the international agencies apparently succeeded in spreading
the available food. Although many remained hungry, still relatively few
starved.
The people who had to buy food on the open market had a hard time
also. The usual rationing program, which provided subsidized grain to a
part of the urban population, had to be at least partly abandoned as the
government channeled its small stock of grain toward flood relief. Rice
prices rose nearly 50 percent in the early months of 1974 and continued
soaring as more people had to buy on the open market and as supplies
dwindled after the floods. The poor, particularly the workers who lost
their employment because of rising water, were reduced to begging,
which meant death for some.

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 The farmer's struggle for survival during the famine has some ominous
implications for the future. In October and November 1974, the prices for
meat dropped precipitously in some areas, indicating that farmers were
disposing of their draft animals for slaughter. At the same time, some
land registration offices reported greatly increased title changes as
farmers sold land to get money to buy food. These changes may have
profound social and economic consequences, if widespread, since a
potential shortage of draft power for land preparation and a large number
of landless agricultural laborers existed before the famine.
Rumors attributed the famine to the smuggling of rice to India. A
potential for smuggling existed because rupees earned from rice sold in
India could be converted into Bangladesh takas (for value of the
taka—see Glossary) on the black market at double the official exchange
rate. Some rice smuggling probably occurred, but how much is not clear.
It was hardly possible, however, that the Bangladesh government's
stocks were smuggled in any significant quantity because they were so
small. Furthermore, the difficulties of clandestinely transporting
significant quantities—perhaps several hundred thousand tons, which
would be enough to affect grain availabilities in Bangladesh—across the
border to India suggest that the rumors may have exaggerated the
importance of smuggling (see ch. 13).
The basic fact is that food production has not kept pace with population
growth. Production of rice—the most important crop by far, which
furnished about 85 percent of the population's caloric intake—grew at an
annual average rate of about 2.5 percent during the Pakistan years, 1947
to 1971, while population grew at about 3 percent per year. A growing
volume of imports was needed to make up the food deficit. Grain imports
averaged 500,000 tons a year between 1955 and 1960 compared with an
average of 1.1 million tons between 1965 and 1970. Since independence in
1970 grain imports have averaged 1.9 million tons yearly. Even with the
larger imports, per capita grain availability declined from 17.1 ounces
daily in 1970 to about 15.5 ounces in FY 1973 and FY 1974.

WATER: TOO MUCH AND TOO LITTLE

Bangladesh agriculture suffers a double problem—too much and too
little water. During the summer monsoon, heavy rains and drainoff from
the Himalayas flood at least one-third of the agricultural land each year.
The other part of the year, rain seldom falls. Agriculture largely ceases
for lack of water although other conditions favorable for crop growing
exist. Spreading the availability of water throughout the year would add
tremendously to the output of Bangladesh agriculture.
Water control is a tricky concept. Control of the severe flooding that
occurs nearly every fourth to fifth year, such as in 1970 and 1974, is a
difficult technological feat because high, large-scale embankments must
withstand the force of vast volumes of water, and maintenance is crucial
and expensive. Few of the materials needed for water control are

230
available in quantity in Bangladesh. To make matters worse, when local
rainfall is heavy, embankments can prevent normal drainage and cause
local flooding, a reason farmers breach embankments. The usual yearly
flooding, however, puts water in myraid small feeder channels, streams,
and ponds on which inland fishing and water transport depend, as do
many farmers.
Three basic strategies exist for coping with the country's water
problems. One strategy would emphasize large international flood control
projects that would tame the rivers and provide year-round water flows.
The second strategy would concentrate on medium-sized projects within
Bangladesh that would provide some flood control and some irrigation.
The third scheme would focus on small-scale irrigation projects to provide
year-round cultivation but little protection from flooding. Each strategy
has its advantages and supporters.
Taming the great rivers emptying into the ocean through Bangladesh
was considered visionary until recently. Bangladesh is much too flat for
large flood control measures to be taken within the country. Construction
must take place in the mountainous regions where most of the rivers of
Bangladesh have their origins—in India, Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and
Bhutan. It was almost inconceivable earlier that agreement could be
obtained from the riparian nations for such projects, but the indepen
dence of Bangladesh fostered hope that agreements could be reached at
least for some measures in India and its northern neighbors.
The advocates of large-scale projects realize that construction is far off
and benefits much further in the future, but they want agreements and
planning to get started now while- the international climate appears
favorable. Critics point to the technological feats required, the huge costs
involved, and the difficulties of obtaining money for such large projects.
Both sides appear to agree that flood control will have to be undertaken
eventually to protect the dense populations living along these mighty
rivers.
One large-scale river project was undertaken by India with the
construction of the Farakka Barrage to divert water from the Ganges
River, just before it enters Bangladesh, into rivers flowing only through
India. The barrage was to be inaugurated in December 1974. The barrage
provoked controversy between India and Pakistan when it was proposed
in the 1960s. The controversy still rages because the Bangalees fear that
the diversion of water will so slow the Ganges in the dry season that
salinity will creep upstream from the Bay of Bengal and affect large
farming areas in southern Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh formed a
Joint Rivers Commission, which met periodically on the Farakka issue;
but an agreement had not been reached by early 1975 (see ch. 10). The
commission was expected eventually to examine control measures of
mutual benefit.
During the Pakistan period, planners and consultants designed
projects of medium size for construction within East Pakistan's borders.

231
More than US$500 million had been spent on these projects by 1973. The
projects tended to have high costs, long gestation periods, and low impact
on agricultural production; they generally required technology, equip
ment, and materials not available in quantity in Bangladesh, imposing a
heavy foreign exchange burden. The projects emphasized flood control on
major rivers and coastal areas rather than irrigation. Five projects, for
example, provided some flood protection to about 3 million acres by 1973
but irrigated only 80,000 acres. The Ganges-Kobadak Phase 1 project,
the largest of the five, illustrates the difficulties of this kind of
construction. When it was designed the project was estimated to cost
US$10.5 million and to irrigate 350,000 acres when completed. Nearly
twenty years later and completed ten years behind schedule, less than
70,000 acres had been irrigated, and costs had exceeded US$130 million.
The East Pakistan government also inaugurated irrigation programs
during the 1960s using low-lift pumps and tubewells. Low-lift pumps,
used primarily during the dry season, pump surface water from ponds,
streams, and channels that need yearly flooding to have water available in
the dry season. Tubewells pump groundwater from wells, some of which
are shallow and use simple pumps and equipment from local sources.
Deep tubewells use larger, more complex imported pumps and
equipment and are usually dug with power rigs. Farmers must organize
into a pump group for both kinds of pumps and develop a plan and
construct the facilities to distribute the water from the government-
supplied pump or well. These kinds of irrigation work well on small areas,
the technology is relatively simple, and the economic return is quick and
high. Nearly 1.4 million acres were irrigated, primarily by low-lift
pumps, by 1973, making possible a dry-season rice crop that accounted
for over 20 percent of all rice production in FY 1973.
The five-year plan reveals continuing debate about water resource
priorities. The plan continues four larger projects while greatly
accelerating the use of pumps for irrigation. More than one-half of
planned expenditures on water measures is for the larger projects that
had such a poor record during the 1960s. It is clear that the planners
favor, and more importantly depend on, expansion of irrigation using
pumps, however, to obtain the necessary growth in food production for
self-sufficiency and to create jobs for the large number of people that will
enter the labor force in the next few years. A significant new feature is
extensive irrigation for the highly important summer-fall rice crop that
formerly depended on the vagaries of the rain.
The plan anticipates irrigation to expand by 2.7 million acres, almost a
200 percent increase, which would be extremely difficult to achieve under
the best conditions. A number of problems have plagued the use of pumps
to date. The plan incorporates several programs for rural institutions as
corollaries for the expanded irrigation and to correct some of the past
problems (see Role of Government, this ch.). Many observers agree with
the strategy but doubt that all of the pieces will fall into place so that the

232
planned expansion or irrigation can be fulfilled within the five-year
period.
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
The government began to exert pervasive influence over agriculture
soon after partition in 1947 with the introduction of land reform and the
direction of investment and growth on the basis of a central plan.
Government administration and implementation of measures during the
Pakistan period were generally poor in the view of most impartial
observers.
Bangladesh has extended the government's role in an effort to build a
socialist economy. The chaos after the civil war also required the
government to step in. As a consequence, the government has become
perhaps the crucial ingredient for lifting agriculture to higher levels of
productivity. This raises the question—can a poor agrarian nation
achieve the fastest growth for agriculture by decentralizing decisions to
foster local initiative and solutions or by centralizing control so that a few
may make decisions on the many complex and interrelated issues that
affect farmers?
The present government's decision is for central control despite the
fact that it will be carried out by politicians new to governing and by
administrators with more authority than experience. Moreover, the
problems the government had had to cope with since independence would
severely test a more established regime. Nevertheless, the burden of
providing for the growth of agriculture rests by choice with the new
government. The margin against disaster is so small that few mistakes
are affordable. The problems require a discipline and wisdom by the new
government far greater than the administration and implementation that
characterized the former government.

Land Tenure and Taxation

Major land reforms began in Bangladesh shortly after partition in 1947,
and adjustments were completed before independence from Pakistan.
The new nation has been spared the additional burden of completely
revamping the land tenure system.
The British had created a group of very wealthy landlords in Bengal
under the Permanent Settlement of 1793. The landlords received wide
discretionary powers along with responsibility for revenue collection.
Subletting by the landlords became the norm, with often five to ten and
sometimes as many as fifty subtenants between the cultivators and the
government. Although minor adjustments were made, the need for
major reforms was apparent during the nearly two centuries the British
pattern remained in effect. Because the landlords were largely Hindus,
partition provided the impetus and opportunity for the basic overhaul.
The present-day land tenure system in Bangladesh owes its origin to
the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1951. This act
abolished the landlord system, established the cultivators as proprietors,
and set up the state as sole collector of rent and in theory the ultimate
owner of land. Tenancy was discouraged. The minimum limits of
subsistence and economic holdings were fixed at three and eight acres,
respectively, and partition of such holdings was forbidden, although this
provision was dropped in 1964. Originally, the maximum holding was set
at thirty-three acres, but it was increased to 125 acres in 1961.
Bangladesh has reinstituted the thirty-three acre limit.
Land reform has made Bangladesh a country of small farmers.
Owner-cultivators owned 66 percent of all farms and tilled 58 percent of
all farm land in 1968. Only 3 percent of all farms were farmed by tenants
who owned no land. The average size of a farm was 3.1 acres, but more
than one-half of all farms, encompassing only a little more than 20 percent
of the cultivated land, were less than 2.5 acres. Land holdings have
become extensively fragmented partly as a result of inheritance under
Islamic law. Very few farmers have a unified plot to cultivate but till small
parcels here and there. Nearly 40 percent of the farmers rented some
land, and it was not uncommon for a farmer to rent out as well as to rent
land for his own use in order to have the land he tilled in one area. The
practice of renting land is acceptable to farmers and introduces a desired
flexibility into land-use patterns, which tends to fuller utilization of land.
Inequalities in landholdings, and therefore incomes, are substantially
less in Bangladesh than in most parts of the world, but rich farmers still
generate resentment even though a rich farmer in Bangladesh is not too
much better off than his poorer neighbors. Nearly one-half of all farms,
those with more than 2.5 acres, used nearly 80 percent of the cultivated
land in 1968. A further indication of inequality is that only 5 percent of all
farms were over 7.5 acres, but they commanded over 20 percent of the
cultivated land. The appearance of a rural elite with larger land holdings
generated pressure for further land reform from very small and landless
farmers. The Awami League won the 1970 elections partly because of a
promise of reforms of land tenancy and agricultural taxation (see ch. 9).
Following up their campaign pledge, the Awami League-controlled
Parliament suspended collection of the land tax at least until FY 1975,
and a political commitment exists to continue to exempt holdings below
8.33 acres (25 bighas—see Glossary) from taxation. The change appears
to be based as much on practicality as political philosophy. The land tax
during the Pakistan period produced little net revenue for the East
Pakistan government, the cost of collection having consumed most of the
funds collected. Exempting the many small farms should reduce
collection costs and increase revenues that the government desperately
needs over the next several years. The government can use the land tax
to make more changes in the landownership patterns and probably with
less disturbance than with land reform legislation. The land tax in early
1975 was a flat rate per unit of land. If progressive rates were introduced
to charge larger owners at successively higher rates, larger holdings
would be discouraged and government revenues temporarily increased.
234
 Further changes in the landownership pattern will depend on the
Awami League's view of key elements in the current agricultural
situation. Small farms have been advocated for economic as well as
egalitarian reasons. Field surveys in the 1960s showed that small farms
under five acres had higher productivity than farms over five acres
because families intensively cultivated the small holdings. The small
farmers introduced modern techniques easily and more readily than
operators of larger farms. The latter were hampered in adopting modern
techniques by several factors, the most important of which was a
shortage of labor at peak periods in the cropping cycle. Farmers on larger
farms continued to use seeds and cropping patterns that lessened their
demand for hired labor when it was in short supply. Thus, small farms
might be chosen as the vehicle for promoting more intense use of the land
while partly satisfying expectations for more land by many very small
farmers.
Reducing the size of landholdings confronts three intractable prob
lems, however. The first is the essential need to keep agricultural
production as high as possible. Significant changes in land tenure usually
disrupt production for a considerable period of time. Secondly, the upper
limit of landholdings would have to be set at about 6.5 acres to obtain
sufficient acreage to raise the size of very small farms to about two acres
according to data published in the 1968 East Pakistan Master Survey of
Agriculture. A 6.5 acre limit would mean that about 10 percent, or about
750,000 farmers, would lose part of their land. Widespread and effective
opposition would almost certainly follow, and the opposition would be
from the rural power elite who provided an important part of the Awami
League's strength (see ch. 9).
The third problem is the substantial pool of landless laborers, probably
amounting to more than 2 million people, who primarily depend on the
large farms for employment at least during the peak periods of the
cropping cycle. Eliminating large farms would deprive these laborers of a
substantial part of their yearly income, requiring huge and costly
programs for alternative employment. In the mid-1970s such programs
did not appear to be feasible or possible.
Pricing Policy
The long border with India makes relative prices on either side an
important factor affecting agriculture. If prices on either side vary too
greatly, commodities will be exchanged that may be counter to the
desires of one or both governments. Smuggling from Bangladesh of rice,
jute, fertilizers, and pesticides has been reported since independence,
indicating that relative prices have diverged sufficiently to promote
undesired, illegal trade. In 1975 the Bangalee government was
examining prices and probably the exchange rate for corrective action.
Some agricultural prices in Bangladesh have been kept artificially low,
maintaining a subsidy program begun by the Pakistan government.
Fertilizer and irrigation facilities were supplied at a fraction of their cost
235
to encourage use of modern inputs by the poorest farmer. Pesticides were
free. The government has largely maintained these subsidies although
some officials recognized that they no longer served the purpose
intended. A black market developed in fertilizer, for example, because
some farmers found they could make more money selling the subsidized
fertilizer than using it on their fields when supply was inadequate. The
richer farmers, the rural elite with connections, were primarily the ones
who benefited, whereas poorer farmers had to pay premiums to obtain
black-market fertilizer.
The planners have attempted to rectify some anomalies of subsidies.
The five-year plan sets forth charges for water and fertilizer that will
gradually reduce these subsidies over the plan period. The plan does not
include corresponding revenues derived from the higher water charges,
however, suggesting that the planning officials did not expect parliamen
tary approval. Perhaps confirming the plan's expectations, the Parlia
ment in FY 1974 failed to raise fertilizer and water rates. Thus, by 1975
little change had occurred in the subsidy structure.
Government internal prices for rice and jute have not accomplished
their objective. The government, in the interest of keeping the price of
food cheap for low-paid workers, extended the rice rationing program but
set the buying price for rice too low. Farmers sold their rice on the open
market, and the government was unable to obtain domestic rice for
rationing and emergencies. To remedy the situation, the government
established a compulsory rice delivery system in November 1974. The
procurement prices that were announced appeared low, which suggests
that the compulsory system may lessen farmers incentives to produce
more than their own needs. Government jute prices had this stultifying
effect during the 1960s (see Cropping Patterns, this ch.). Since
independence, the government's buying price for jute has been less than
private traders offered farmers, making the government's intent to
protect the interest of the grower ineffectual. Rational pricing of the two
most important crops is a major imperative to increasing output during
the five-year period.
Agricultural Inputs
Officials planning the strategy to increase agricultural production
emphasize the role modern inputs must play. They have planned more
than a 200 percent increase in fertilizer use, a 50 percent increase of
low-lift pumps, more than a 600 percent increase in tubewells, and a
substantial jump in the use of high-yield seeds in just five years. The
government has the responsibility of obtaining these inputs either at
home or abroad and distributing them to farmers in time for planting. The
government also has responsibility for operating the pumps, siting wells,
and maintaining equipment. Government officials, moreover, oversee
the various programs to ensure their proper implementation. The

236
staffing problems for such an extensive operation are formidable without
considering the overlapping administrative tangle. Observers point out
that the development of the mechanisms for distributing the inputs will
be a tough challenge and that as of early 1975 little progress has been
made.
Research and development is an adjunct to modern inputs. The
Bangladesh Rice Research Institute is considered the most successful
agricultural research organization. With some financial and technical help
from international organizations, it has developed several promising
high-yield varieties of rice specifically adapted to conditions in
Bangladesh; some of the seeds will increase yields by more than 200
percent over traditional strains. Farmers tended to distrust government
seeds, however, because in early 1975 the management and quality
control of seed farms remained inadequate. ,
Jute research needs improvement quickly because higher yields and
(or) lower costs of converting fiber to woven goods are necessary if
Bangladesh jute products are to compete in international markets (see
ch. 13). Jute seed strains currently available were developed before
World War II and provide little improvement in yields over traditional
varieties from Bangladesh. Nonetheless, pilot programs have shown that
yields can be doubled by such relatively simple measures as timely
sowing, line sowing instead of casting seeds, proper and timely applica
tions of fertilizer, and plant protection. These techniques need to be
geared to specific soil and climatic conditions and disseminated to
farmers.
Rural Development
In preparation days the large Hindu landowners, as an accident of
British rule in Bengal, had the prestige, power, and interest to organize
farmers in mutual self-help projects (see ch. 2). Such water control
projects as building and maintaining local costal embankments and sluice
gates to keep down salt water intrusion, digging and maintaining water
tanks to supply dry season water to a village, and constructing and
maintaining channels and embankments on local waterways were
undertaken by these landowners. The departure of many of them after
partition left their replacements, the small farmers of East Pakistan,
without an organized force. Many projects fell into temporary disuse
because the numerous small farmers could not get together, and the
operation and maintenance were too large for an individual farmer.
The East Pakistan government attempted to fill this organizational
need. A number of rural programs were pushed with mixed success. The
Rural Works Programme, for example, had promising beginnings but
faltered when extended too fast and altered in focus. The Bangladesh
government is elaborating on the East Pakistan efforts, planning some
fifty rural programs for implementation during the five-year plan. In the
opinion of most observers, the programs face the same obstacles that

237
plagued East Pakistan, obstacles such as the shortage of trained and
competent local officials, political focus versus economic objectives, and
disproportionate benefits to the rural elite.
Integrated Rural Works Programme
The Integrated Rural Works Programme (IRWP) is designed to
channel the initiative of rural people to build the projects they need.
IRWP is based on a program developed and tested by the East Pakistan
Academy for Rural Development which, among other things, evolved
into a highly successful effort to build roads in East Pakistan between
1962 and 1966. Bangladesh has shifted priority to irrigation and water
control projects. It will be a major accomplishment if the government can
provide the technicians, local officials, funding, and focus for the develop
ment anticipated during the five-year plan. Foreign observers fear that
IRWP might become a patronage mechanism to reward the political
faithful if sufficient care is not exercised.
Planning rural construction begins at the lowest governmental level,
the union council, where local members develop project plans for the
infrastructure they need (see ch. 8). The project plan must be approved at
several higher administrative levels to make sure the project conforms to
the overall goals of the senior units. Approval at the higher levels results
in funding flowing back to the union council. The misuse of funds is
controlled primarily by requiring that public information on the size of
each council's allocation and the amount spent for each project be made
readily available, usually on bulletin boards. By engaging the rural
people themselves in designating needs, planning projects, and imple
menting the construction, the IRWP offers a rapid and relatively
inexpensive means of constructing and improving the infrastructure and
creates a large number of employment opportunities during the slack
agricultural season when unemployment is as high as 60 percent among
rural workers. The planners expect IRWP to absorb a large part of the
million or so annual additions to the working force during the 1973-78
period.
Thana Irrigation Programme
The Thana Irrigation Programme (TIP), the primary vehicle for
expanding irrigation, establishes the rules and procedures for the rental
of low-lift pumps or tubewells for irrigation. Farmers who want to
irrigate organize themselves into a pump group, register as a coopera
tive, and plan the small-scale distribution system from the pump or well.
The plan is submitted to the union council, the thana (the lowest major
administrative entity), and the district administrative unit to make sure
the project fits into the long-range plan of these units. If approved, the
pump or well is supplied or sited by an agency of the government, which
supplies the operator and maintenance for pumps and charges substan
tially less than cost for the equipment provided. The TIP has been
included as part of the IRWP under the five-year plan.
TIP achievements have been impressive. TIP acreage more than
doubled from FY 1968 to FY 1970 with nearly a 100-percent increase in
the use of high-yield seeds on the acreage. TIP acreage produced 1 million
tons of rice during the dry season of FY 1970 and created about 42 million
man-days of employment. The program also proved that farmers were
willing to pay for water to get results. TIP has not lacked faults, however.
The number of acres irrigated per pump has declined, indicating that
pump groups were not as large as registered or that some pumps were
diverted from their intended project. Observers assert that maintenance
of equipment needs to be upgraded, and proper siting and supervision
need improvement for the ambitious expansion to produce the agricul
tural growth expected.
Integrated Rural Development Programme
According to the plan and the enabling legislation, the purpose of the
Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) is to build rural
institutions. One aspect is to organize rural people into village-level,
multi-purpose cooperative societies to take on such functions as credit,
marketing, machinery use, and organizing rural works. The coopera
tive's management committee, which is made up of proportional repre
sentation of widely diverse interest groups, may become a handicap in
organizing cooperatives. "To plan the control of so many vital village
activities under such a body would be a feat of social engineering perhaps
unparalleled in history" is the way one cooperative expert described it.
Another aspect of IRDP places officials at thana level to remedy
weaknesses and bolster administration of programs serving agriculture.
They can play a big role in developing rural institutions because they have
no responsibility for programs of a particular ministry. They also
introduce a decentralizing element because most programs serving
agriculture are organized vertically from the minister downward. In
early 1975 there was a consensus that IRDP needed a much larger and
better trained staff than was then available.
Agricultural Credit
Several studies during the 1960s showed that agricultural credit was
relatively unimportant in financing the modernization of farming. These
studies indicated that farmers borrowed about 52 percent of the credit
from relatives and friends, about 30 percent from moneylenders, and only
10 to 15 percent from banks, cooperatives, and other institutional
sources. Less than 5 percent of farmers' short-term borrowings were
used to purchase agricultural inputs; the rest was used for consumption,
gifts, and other purposes (see ch. 6). Only a small part of agricultural
input purchases was financed by credit.
As these findings imply, institutional credit has played a minor role in
agricultural development. Moreover, the agricultural credit institutions
were in financial trouble by 1973, limiting their effectiveness for the
immediate future. The financial difficulties largely stemmed from a poor
repayment record, particularly in the years since independence. These
were hard years for farmers to make repayments, but the lenders had

239
such small staffs they could not make adequate efforts to recover overdue
loans. The five-year plan projects a major expansion of agricultural
credit, largely through cooperatives, which have become the fastest
growing and most important source of agricultural credit. If the plan
goals for credit are not met, a shortfall is not likely to be a significant
constraint on agricultural growth although greater credit would facilitate
higher production.
LAND UTILIZATION
Population pressure has brought nearly all of Bangladesh's cultivable
land under the plow. Crops took up 22.5 million acres or nearly 64 percent
of the 35.6 million acres of land area in FY 1972. Forests occupied about
16 percent of the land area. Another 18 percent of the land was used for
towns, schools, factory sites, or other purposes that precluded cultiva
tion. Only 730,000 acres remained that were potentially cultivable, and
this land was marginal, requiring costly improvements before it could be
cropped. Bangladesh had run out of unused land for agricultural
purposes.
More and more the Bangalees have had to farm intensively. Cultivated
land amounted to 22.3 million acres in FY 1950 and 22.5 million acres in
FY 1972. By multiple cropping, however, the total cropped area rose
from 25.6 million acres in FY 1950 to 32.8 million acres in FY 1970.
Multiple cropping is usually expressed by the percentage ratio of total
acres cropped (including multiple cropped areas) divided by the land area
cultivated. Thus, the intensity of land use was 128 percent in FY 1950 and
146 percent in FY 1970. This was very intensive use of land by
international standards.
The turmoil following independence lowered the intensity ofland use to
130 percent in FY 1972 and 135 percent in FY 1973. Recovery to former
levels should be relatively easy if there is a year without a crisis. Further
intensification of land use will follow as additional irrigation and drainage
programs promote multiple cropping, but more intense land use will
become increasingly costly and difficult. Bangladesh is nearing the upper
limits of intensity of land use.

CROPPING PATTERNS
Rice
The deltaic nature of most of Bangladesh, combined with a favorable
climate, created the physical basis for rice growing in ancient times.
Society and the economy evolved through the centuries focused on rice
cultivation, and this pattern still remains. Nearly 80 percent of the
cropped area was used to grow rice, and 63 percent of agriculture's
contribution to GDP was rice farming in FY 1973. Rice is so important in
the economy that it functions as money; labor, rent, and village supplies

240
can be paid for with rice. Nearly 85 percent of the daily caloric intake of
the population comes from grain, which is primarily rice, and a poor crop
has often meant starvation for part of the population.
It is a measure of the country's problems that with so large a proportion
of the land and the population devoted to rice cultivation, Bangladesh is
not self-sufficient in foodgrains. The dependence on imported grain has
grown since partition in 1947 as rice harvests increased more slowly than
population growth. Rice production expanded from 6.7 million tons (on a
milled basis) in FY 1948 to 11.8 million tons in FY 1970, an annual average
increase of 2.5 percent. The acreage devoted to rice went from 19 million
acres to 25.5 million acres for the same years, accounting for most of the
increase in production. Output per acre improved significantly only
during the early 1960s.
Production fell after independence, reaching a low point of 9.8 million
tons in FY 1972. Good weather and greater use of high-yielding seeds
pushed production in FY 1974 to 11.8 million tons, which the Bangalees
called a record harvest. The extensive flooding in the summer of 1974
probably caused a decline in FY 1975 rice output.
The country has three separate rice crops for the different seasons and
two different methods of planting rice. These distinctions play a role in
the strategy to expand rice production. The aman rice crop is the main
one, accounting for 58 percent of rice acreage and 59 percent of rice
output in FY 1970. Aman is planted during the spring and harvested in
the November-January period. Broadcast seed is used in low-lying areas
subject to deep flooding. It is the so-called floating rice that elongates as
much as twenty-five feet with rising water. High yields are hardly
possible with this variety of rice and kind of planting, but it is used on only
about one-third of the aman acreage. Transplanted aman is grown on the
other two-thirds, and much higher yields are possible with improved seed
strains developed in the 1970s.
Aus rice accounted for 33 percent of rice acreage and 25 percent of
production in FY 1970. It is usually sown with the early rains of April and
May and harvested in July and August. Aus and aman rice are primarily
rainfed to date, and output varies as much as 20 percent from year to year
because of the amount and timing of the rains. Boro rice, the dry season
crop, is dependent on irrigation. It is planted after the aman crop and is
harvested in April and May. This crop has had spectacular growth, with
production increasing by 200 percent and yields doubling between FY
1948 and FY 1973 because of more irrigation, fertilizer, and high-yielding
seeds. Much of the growth has occurred since 1966.
Rice yields in Bangladesh have been among the lowest in the world,
mainly because traditional farming practices still predominate. The
country's rice yields are about the same as such major rice producers as
Burma, Thailand, India, and Cambodia, all of which have yet to introduce
modern techniques on the scale that Japan and the Republic of China

241
(Nationalist China) have. If Bangladesh had the controlled water,
fertilizer, and seeds used in Japan, rice production would be on the order
of 40 million tons instead of 12 million tons a year.
A start in the direction of modern technology was made in the 1960s and
reflected in the growth of the boro rice crop. The five-year plan
accelerates the movement in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food
grains by 1978. The target goal is 15 million tons of rice in FY 1978.
According to the plan, achievement of the target will depend primarily on
much greater irrigation, particularly for the aman and to a lesser extent
the boro crop; greater yields in both irrigated and rainfed areas by use of
high-yield seeds will contribute most of the remainder. Some experts
doubt that irrigation can proceed as rapidly as planned. Nonetheless,
they foresee rice production approaching the target as farmers introduce
the improved seed strains more quickly than the planners anticipated.
Acceptance of new techniques has generally been very good.
Despite their lack of trust in government seed programs, farmers,
including those on very small farms, have readily introduced new seeds
and used large quantities of fertilizer, even paying premium prices on the
black market to get it. Bangalee farmers selected the alternatives that
benefited them economically. The government's role of supplying inputs,
setting realistic prices, and implementing programs probably will
become the decisive factor affecting the rate of expansion of rice
production over the next few years.
Jute
Jute is almost as critical as rice to the society's economic health. Jute is
about the only Bangalee product that has a large, ready international
market. The quality of the fiber is superior to that from other countries,
and it is grown almost completely for export as fiber or woven goods. Jute
products supplied nearly 70 percent of East Pakistan's earnings from
commodity exports in FY 1970. Some 45 percent of the farmers grow
jute, and it is the economy's main cash crop. Jute is second to rice in
acreage, and it contributed 6 percent of agriculture's share of GDP in
FY 1970. Production is concentrated on the smallest farms, where,
among other things, labor is plentiful, providing a livelihood for about 4 to
5 million of the poorest farm families in the world.
Jute farming stagnated during the Pakistan years, 1947 to 1970
although with sharp yearly variations. Jute acreage amounted to 2.1
million acres in FY 1948 and 2.3 million acres in FY 1970. Production
increased from 6.8 million bales of about 400 pounds each in FY 1948 to 7.2
million bales in FY 1970. Stagnation was induced partly by the low price
the Pakistan government set on raw jute fiber to encourage Pakistani
private investment in jute mills. In effect, the farmers were taxed so that
a subsidy could be given to investors to build the plants to process the
fiber before export. Stagnation also resulted from inadequate research in

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techniques and seed strains. A technology to increase jute production
quickly, comparable to that available for rice, did not exist in early 1975.
Jute competes with rice for land, and the farm price for rice at the end
of one year strongly influences the area planted in jute in the spring of the
next year. Cultivation of jute requires much more labor than rice
although the yield per acre is usually much higher than rice. In the 1960s
the farm price for jute needed to be about 50 percent higher than rice to
encourage farmers to plant jute instead of rice where a farmer could grow
both. The responsiveness of jute farmers to price was illustrated in FY
1973 when production of jute rebounded to 6.5 million bales from 4.2
million bales in FY 1972. Although rice prices were quite high in 1972, an
international shortage of jute and devaluation of the Bangladesh taka in
early 1972 greatly improved the price of jute relative to rice, causing
farmers to increase jute acreage more than 30 percent for the crop
harvested at the beginning of FY 1973. Rice prices have continued to rise,
but international jute prices jumped very rapidly in late 1974 as the floods
affected marketing ofjute. In early 1975 it was too early to determine the
impact of the latest price movements on jute production.
Bangladesh jute competes with Indian jute, with a smilar fiber from
Thailand, and with synthetic fiber. The international demand for
Bangalee jute is closely related to its price, placing the Bangladesh jute
industry in a vise. To increase production, the domestic jute price needs
to be higher and to keep pace with rice prices, but jute export prices need
to be lower, particularly if Bangladesh attempts to increase its share of
the international market because of increased production. Devaluation is
the only easy solution to this price squeeze, which will probably persist
throughout the five-year plan.
Smuggling of jute to India became a serious problem after indepen
dence. Statistics of the Bangladesh Jute Board indicated that the
quantity of jute unofficially reaching India in FY 1972 may have been
more than twice the official Bangladesh jute exports to the world. If
smuggling was actually on that large a scale, it implies official connivance
and little border control. Bangladesh can ill afford such a loss of foreign
exchange (see ch. 13).
The smuggling stemmed partly from the government's effort to impose
official jute prices that were too low and a public marketing system that
consisted of only a few buying centers. Because expertise and
transportation were lacking for a public system that would extend down
to the grower, small private traders filled the gap, buying jute from
farmers for resale to government centers. Many of the traders appar
ently sold their jute across the border to Indian buyers. The Indian
buyers paid approximately the same price at the official exchange rate as
the Bangladesh government offered, but the Bangalee jute trader appar
ently made substantial profits in spite of the extra cost of smuggling by
converting their Indian rupees into takas on the black market at double

243
the official exchange rate. International and Bangalee commentators
were agreed that devaluing the taka would be the quickest and most
effective remedy for this kind of smuggling.
The five-year plan anticipates a large increase ofjute production, to 9.8
million bales by 1978. This level of production implies a very substantial
jump in yields and assumes an international demand for jute that exceeds
likely market conditions. There is little reason, from the perspective of
early 1975, to think that jute can depart so radically from historical
trends. On the contrary, the internal rice-jute price ratio and the external
prices for jute products may well move adversely, causing more of a
squeeze on the industry. Bangladesh's main export earner faces a very
uncertain future.
Other Crops
Only about 15 percent of the cultivated area is used for crops other than
rice and jute. The minor crops included tea, sugarcane, oilseeds, fruits,
vegetables, spices, wheat, potatoes, tobacco, cotton, and fodder, and
they contributed 13 percent of agriculture's share of GDP in FY 1970.
Each one of the minor crops was small in acreage and output. Wheat
production, for example, did not exceed 100,000 tons until FY 1970 and
was usually far below that in earlier years. The acreage and production of
many minor crops tended to shrink during the 1950s and 1960s, partly
because of the expansion of rice acreage. The future for those crops that
compete with rice for land will largely depend on their profitability
compared to rice. Additional acreage for some other crops, such as
peanuts and pulses, can be worked into existing rice cropping patterns to
increase output.
Tea is one of the more important minor crops. It is grown on 147 large
estates, many of which were foreign owned. The government had
nationalized some of the estates by 1973. Most of the estates exceeded 125
acres, substantially in excess of the present government's thirty-three
acre limit, but the estates may be left intact because the larger ones were
the more productive. The tea industry did not keep pace with
developments in other countries during the Pakistan period. During the
struggle for independence, equipment was lost and damaged, workers
and managers dispersed, weeding and upkeep stalled, and the protected
West Pakistan market lost. Tea production was 53 million pounds in FY
1973 compared to its peak of 69 million pounds in FY 1970. The bulk of tea
production was processed and exported—exclusively to West Pakistan
after 1966. Exports since independence have been limited by many
causes, particularly the adjustments required to compete again in world
markets. When adjustments are accomplished, Bangladesh should have
a surplus of 40 to 50 million pounds of tea for export each year.
Sugarcane is another important minor crop. Although per capita
consumption of sugar in Bangladesh is one of the lowest in the world,
sugarcane provides the raw material for the important Bangalee sugar

244
industry (see ch. 13). Acreage planted in sugarcane increased from
300,000 acres in the early 1960s to 400,000 acres in FY 1970, while
production of cane increased from about 4 million tons to 7.5 million tons.
Production of cane dropped to 5.3 million tons in FY 1973. The bulk of the
cane is processed in primitive village mills into gur (a crude brown sugar),
which is the only sugar product consumed by the great majority of the
population. Greater production of sugarcane is possible during the
five-year plan through better strains of seeds and other yield improve
ments already available. Constraints, particularly the difficulty of
quickly transporting fresh-cut cane to modern large-scale mills, probably
will limit expansion for several years, however.

LIVESTOCK
Livestock are raised as part of overall farming activity. Cattle and
buffalo are raised primarily as draft animals although their milk and meat
are consumed as food, the skins sold for processing and export, and the
manure used as fertilizer and fuel. Goats are kept, scavenging for food, in
order to increase the cash income and to provide the bulk of the farm
families limited meat consumption. The skins bring premium prices on
the international market. Sheep are relatively few in number and are
kept in the wet areas of the south as substitutes for goats. Most farms
have some poultry for eggs and meat. Animal husbandry contributed 5
percent to GDP in FY 1970. Commercial livestock farms are nonexistent
except for a few small poultry flocks at government and university farms.
Cattle and buffalo increased from 14.9 million in 1945 to 18.5 million in
1970, an annual average growth of about 1 percent. Goats and sheep fared
somewhat better on the restricted feed situation, increasing from 4.3
million in 1945 to nearly 8 million in 1970. Poultry fluctuated from 19
million to 20 million between 1960 and 1970. The 1970 cyclones and the
war for independence in 1971 killed a substantial number of livestock, a
probably loss of 2 million cattle and buffalo, more than 3 million sheep and
goats, and more than 1 million chickens. The floods of 1974 added to the
livestock loss, but in early 1975 the extent was not yet clear.
The limited availability of feed has caused the slow growth in the
livestock population in the past. Feed is almost exclusively food crop
residue, such as rice stalks, bran, and husks. Poultry subsist on fallen
grain, insects, and household scraps. One study indicated that the feed
available in 1970 was insufficient for the number of cattle and buffalo; the
size of the herd had been achieved at the expense of health, body weight,
and productivity. Feed constraints will continue in the future, and the
five-year plan growth targets appear overly optimistic. Per capita
consumption of meat, milk, and eggs at the end of the plan will probably
be significantly less than it was in 1970, when protein intake was already
seriously inadequate.
The weakness of the draft animals is a potential constraint on future

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agricultural growth. Land preparation time with the usual Bangalee plow
is two to three weeks per acre; based on country averages, a pair of
bullocks cultivate six to seven acres. Land preparation time becomes
important a few times a year, between the summer harvet of rice or jute
and the planting of the aman rice crop, for example. New seed varieties
may make land preparation time more critical. Plows with a different
configuration could speed up plowing, but they require more power than
most local draft animals furnish. Moreover, some experts think that the
local plow, although very good for rice, "is the worst possible instrument
for other crops in all but the easiest soil conditions." Plows that would dig
deeper for other crops also require too great a pull for most Bangalee
draft animals. The plan calls for an improvement of the health of draft
animals with supplementary feeding and by ridding them of parasites and
the development of a modified plow that is faster and can be pulled by the
draft animals available.
FISHING
Bangladesh, with its many waterways and ponds, began fish culture in
ancient times; and its fisherman, with a background of centuries of trial
and error experience, are credited with skill and ingenuity in their
profession. Fishing in such a setting is certain to be an important
economic activity. Perhaps as many as 5 million people depend on fishing
or related activities for their livelihood, and fishing contributed 6 percent
to GDP in FY 1970, nearly 50 percent more than modern industrial
manufacturing. More than 80 percent of the animal protein in the diet
comes from fish (see ch. 4). Fish exports have been an important foreign
exchange earner. In FY 1970 the inland fish catch was 727,000 tons, and
the marine catch was 83,000 tons.
Commercial fishing is not a respected occupation among Bangalee
Muslims even though nearly all rural families do some fishing. Most
commercial fisherman are low-caste Hindus who eke out a bare
subsistence (see ch. 6). The lease holders of the fishing rights and the fish
merchants have controlled the conditions of work, leaving little incentive
for the fisherman to improve their equipment or increase their catch. Past
governments have had little interest in the fishermen's problems or the
fishing industry. Government neglect stemmed from ignorance of the
need for managing fisheries, of the grave danger of declining fish stocks,
and of the feasibility of raising the size of the catch.
Despite the richness of the resource and the importance and value of
fish in the economy, the fish catch increased only 1.3 percent annually
during the 1960s in contrast to the population, which grew about 3
percent annually. Injudicious fishing practices, government neglect, and
the status of commercial fishing have caused the slow expansion ofthe fish
catch and a worsening of the serious protein deficiency in the diet of the
population.
The new government in its five-year plan attacks some ofthe problems.

246
One measure has transferred control of fishing rights in inland waters
from the Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reform, which is
primarily interested in collecting revenue, to the Fisheries Department
of the Ministry of Forest, Fisheries, and Livestock, which has
responsibility for, and interest in, the long-term development of fisheries
as a natural resource. This is a step toward unsnarling the bureaucratic
tangle that hampered development of fisheries during the 1960s and the
over-fishing inherent in the previous leasing system. Of more doubtful
value is the proposal to establish a public marketing system for fish that
may seriously disrupt the present marketing system, which does work in
spite of all its faults. The difficulties and extended disruptions brought
about by the establishment of a public marketing system for jute are
likely to be repeated if public marketing of fish is attempted.
The plan calls for the inland fish catch to increase 3.2 percent a year, a
reasonable goal; but the goal for marine fishing, which will primarily
supply fish for export, is projected very optimistically at a growth rate of
14.7 percent annually. Even if both goals for the fish catch are met, per
capita levels offish would be less than twenty-six pounds per year by 1978
compared to about twenty-seven pounds per year in the early 1960s.
Meeting these goals will be difficult because of the extensive damage to
boats and equipment in 1970 and 1971. Little data are available for fish
production from 1971 to 1973; but the fact that domestic fish prices have
trebled suggests that the fish catch was low in these years, probably not
reaching the levels on which the plan was based.
FORESTRY
Bangladesh has few forests. Only about 5.5 million acres, less than 16
percent of the land area, is wooded. The main forest areas are located in
the districts of Chittagong, Rangamati, Ramgarh, Bandarban, Khulna,
Sylhet, Dacca, and Mymensingh (see fig. 1). The small amount of forested
land combined with low productivity has resulted in an output of wood
products per person that is among the lowest of the world. Forestry
contributed less than 1 percent to GDP during the late 1960s.
Production of timber reached a peak of 37 million cubic feet in the
mid-1960s because of over-felling in some government forests. Produc
tion in FY 1970 dropped to 32 million cubic feet, about the same level as in
FY 1961. Cutting of firewood also peaked in the mid-1960s at more than
51 million cubic feet but declined to 38 million cubic feet in FY 1970,
nearly one-fifth lower than in FY 1961. Cutting of bamboo amounted to
149,000 tons in FY 1970 compared to 182,000 tons in FY 1961. Although
these are official statistics, the government acknowledges serious
deficiencies in forestry statistics and includes estimates of unknown
reliability.
Extensive deforestation has accompanied the growth in population.
The pressure on the land resulted in tree cutting to clear fields for crop
cultivation. The expanding population also needed more wood for boats,

247
houses, and implements as well as for cooking fires. Development of
industries based on wood, such as paper and matches, intensified
demand. Serious over-cutting of government forests, in villages, and
along roadsides and embankments occured in the mid-1960s. Over-
cutting probably followed the extensive damage in 1971 as the
population, including armed bands, sought wood to replace homes and
equipment.
The limited forests with past over-felling impose severe restrictions on
exploitation of wood products. The five-year plan recognizes that
probably the best the government will be able to do is undertake studies,
improve management of forested areas, and upgrade the operation of
government organizations responsible for forestry programs. Per capita
availability of wood products is not likely to increase during the plan
period and, in fact, is likely to continue the decline that began many years
ago.

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 CHAPTER 13
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
In the mid-1970s industry and domestic and foreign trade remained
small although important elements of the Bangalee economy. Commerce,
excluding transportation, contributed 10 percent to gross domestic
product (GDP) in fiscal year (FY) 1973 and industry, 8 percent. Both
sectors provided a substantial number of jobs but still far fewer than
agriculture. Trade and manufacturing in the mid-1970s, however, failed
to provide the goods at stable prices that the population so badly needed,
contributing to the unrest throughout the country.
Commerce and industry were the fastest growing sectors of the
economy of East Pakistan between 1950 and 1970, reflecting the Pakistan
government's determination to move away from an agricultural way of
life. Growth meant interdependence—interdependence of sectors as
commerce marketed goods between agriculture and industry, between
rural and urban areas, between producers and consumers, and between
East and West Pakistan as the parts of the total economy began to be
integrated. The interdependence was greater than the Bangalees
realized when independence came in December 1971.
Even an experienced government with a smooth-running economy
would have had difficulty in adjusting to the changes and solving the
number and magnitude of problems that have beset the government of
Bangladesh. The government complicated its own difficulties by setting
too many tasks for itself. With few trained personnel or experienced
administrators, the government attempted to run some businesses and to
control others that it did not operate directly in the commercial and
industrial sectors. The interdependence that had grown during the
Pakistan years meant that failure to accomplish tasks in one part of the
economy affected other parts.
Foreign commerce did not provide the flow of imports that industry
and consumers needed and that foreign aid would allow. Industrial
production was unable to recover to the level of FY 1970. The low level of
imports, the inadequate output of industry, and the slow growth of
agricultural production created shortages of goods that caused prices to
rise steeply in spite of the elaborate measures the government of
Bangladesh had established to keep prices stable. The failures of trade
and manufacturing since 1971 contributed to the unrest that caused
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to arrange the amendment of the Constitution in
January 1975. The amendment gives Mujib as president unprecedented

249
and virtually unlimited powers to direct and control economic as well as
political affairs (see ch. 8; ch. 9).
By 1975, as a result of interaction between internal and external
events, Bangladesh was becoming more dependent on foreign aid at a
time when other countries were becoming less willing to provide aid. FY
1975 may be the first of several years when foreign financial assistance
falls short of need. The import starvation of recent years is likely to grow,
holding down industrial output and continuing the scarcity of goods for
distribution to the population. The minimal improvements in the dismal
poverty of the population projected in the First Five Year Plan (1973-78)
appeared further out of reach by 1975 than when proposed in 1973.

DOMESTIC COMMERCE
The Pattern of Domestic Trade
Trade in urban areas is much like that anywhere in Asia. There are
many shops, usually tiny; stalls, often with temporary cover; and street
vendors selling from their carts. Merchandise turnover tends to be small
and profits even smaller except for a few large merchants who engage in
wholesale trade extending into the countryside. The government
believes that these large merchants extract excessive profits from their
activities and has attempted to diminish their activities.
Trade in rural areas is largely conducted in local markets and bazaars.
Village markets usually meet only once or twice a week for part of the
day. The markets are within easy walking distance of most farmers, who
carry what little they have to sell or barter. There may be no fixed
buildings, and most of the trade is conducted by farmers and local
artisans. Petty merchants whose stock is not bulky may attend a different
market each day in a small area. Barter prevails at the local market.
Bazaars attract more people and a wider variety of goods, including some
imported items. Some bazaars are quite large, meet every day, and have
fixed shops operated by merchants. If credit is required by small
merchants, it is generally furnished by relatives, a local prosperous
artisan, or a larger merchant. A rural resident who needs supplies such as
cement or corrugated roofing travels to a nearby town to buy from a
dealer.
A more complex commercial system exists for such key commodities as
rice, jute, and imported goods. A hierarchy of merchants, trade centers,
and financial organizations carries on this trade. The jute business is the
most complex and involves the country's main cash crop. A 1958 survey of
jute marketing, although dated, provides information applicable in a
general manner to the rest of domestic trade. This survey found that the
cost of marketing, including transportation, amounted to nearly 30
percent of the jute export price in 1958.

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 Most jute growers sold their fiber at home or at the village market to
petty traders or agents for larger merchants. The traders moved their
purchases by small boat to primary centers for resale to larger
merchants. The primary centers might handle twenty tons a week during
the peak of the season. The jute then moved to secondary centers, of
which there were 250, for resale to larger merchants, who often had
primitive presses for loosely baling the fiber. Loose bales or raw fiber
from the secondary market was sold to mills or the terminal centers of
Chalna, Narayanganj, and Chittagong, where the fiber was trimmed,
sorted, graded, and tightly baled for export.
The petty traders and agents who made the initial purchase of the
farmers' jute were usually farmers themselves most of the year. They
were not particularly skilled in the jute trade, handled generally less than
forty tons a year, and usually hired no workers although they might have
partners. They were either self-financed or used credit from friends,
larger merchants, or the grower, who waited for payment. The traders
generally had no storage facilities and probably no other capital
investment. There were about 41,000 petty traders and agents in 1958.
The loose balers in the secondary markets were fair-sized business
houses, some with branch offices. Their average yearly business was
about 200 tons. They had substantial investments in presses and
warehouses and borrowed from banks when in need of credit. They
generally held jute longer than other parts of the marketing chain, kept a
close watch on marketing conditions, and sometimes speculated on future
price movements. There were about 1,500 of these firms in 1958.
The export balers and shippers were large trading companies and hired
a number of workers. The companies had substantial investments in large
presses, warehouses, other buildings, and equipment. They tended to
buy against prospective sales and did little speculative buying. They
borrowed a substantial part of their working capital from banks. There
were 110 of these firms in 1958.

Role of Government
The government began life in 1971 with high goals for commerce. One
objective was to ensure that commodities that play a large part in the
consumption of the poor were available at an affordable price. The
government also wanted to have a strong influence on the allocation of
resources for the benefit of all the population. From these objectives
grew an extensive array of commercial agencies and control measures.
By 1975 the goals were still far from being realized.
Government Marketing
Many government organizations engage directly in marketing. The
Consumer Supplies Corporation (CSC) was established in 1972 to
distribute essential consumer commodities at fair prices throughout the
country. The CSC in the mid-1970s operated about 4,000 fair price shops.
In 1973 cloth discribution was taken away from middlemen and assigned

251
to CSC, giving it control over most imported and about 90 percent of
domestically produced cloth. The corporation lacked effectiveness
because its supply of goods was too small to influence prices in the open
market. The availability of cloth in the country in FY 1974 was only about
four yards per person, half of what it had been in FY 1970, for example.
The Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation was responsi
ble for distributing major agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers,
pesticides, pumps, and seeds. Other government agencies distributed
cotton yarn, imported and domestically produced, to cottage and
small-scale industries. Jute marketing was a public enterprise although
private dealers still conducted part of the business. Rice distribution
from grower to consumer became a government operation in October
1974.
Price Controls
In 1975 the government continued to establish prices directly in
connection with business activity in the public sector, which includes all
public utilities, nationalized corporations, and certain commodities the
government is responsible for distributing, such as food, fertilizer, seed
grain, and cloth. In addition, the government set wages for all
government employees, including those in the many agencies and
nationalized corporations. A government commission also set wage scales
for the private sector. The government's direct control of prices covered
the main agricultural products—rice, jute, sugarcane, and tea—more
than 80 percent of imported commodities, and most of industrial output.
For private sector transactions, the prices of more than thirty
"essential" commodities were currently fixed and controlled by the
government. The list covered anything of importance and could be added
to by simple notification in the Bangladesh Gazette. The established
prices theoretically were based on cost plus a 10-percent allowance for
producers' or importers' profit and cost plus a 5-percent profit allowance
each for the wholesaler and the retailer. Many of the prices were rarely
changed, however, and in fact the fixed prices frequently bore no relation
to actual costs. The government licensed the dealers handling controlled
commodities.
Obviously price controls had not worked. The Dacca price index for
workers had increased by more than 225 percent since independence in
spite of the government's controls and efforts.
Rationing
Bangladesh vastly extended the rationing system after independence.
The system in effect in early 1975 had two forms. Statutory rationing
covered the four major cities of Dacca, Narayanganj, Chittagong, and
Khulna, where everybody had a ration card. The other form, modified
rationing, applied outside the main urban areas to low-income earners as
determined on the basis of their income tax liability. The government
stated that 45 percent of the population was under rationing, but other
data suggest that it may have been closer to 25 percent of the population.

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Rice, wheat, edible oil, and sugar were the rationed commodities, which
were distributed through ration shops or appointed dealers. During the
height of the 1974 food crisis, the city ration was five pounds of wheat and
one pound of rice per week per person, and the price was one-quarter of
the open market price.
For the rationing system to work, the government needs to have the
commodities to distribute. This frequently has not been the case. The
government obtained little rice from domestic growers, relying almost
completely on imported wheat, which was constantly under the control of
government agencies. In late 1974 the government started to force
farmers to sell rice to government agents; the results of this measure
were not yet known. The government attempted to shorten the sugar
ration in 1974 in order to export sugar to ease its desperate shortage of
foreign exchange while the world price was high.
The costs of the rationing program have been substantial (see ch. 11).
With the high rate of inflation in Bangladesh, procurement prices kept
running away from the fixed selling prices. The government had to choose
between raising procurement prices to obtain supplies, which added to
the budget drain, or not having enough of the rationed commodities. The
decision appeared to have been an ineffective compromise, because costs
for the ration program increased but supplies remained insufficient.
Impact of Government Marketing Controls
Although the system of controls on pricing and distribution aimed at
ensuring the availability of reasonably priced commodities to the poor, as
of early 1975 the effect had been the opposite. The cost of rice had
quadrupled since independence. The price of cloth increased faster than
that of rice; the cost of workers' clothing in Dacca in May 1974 was more
than four times higher than in 1970. In early 1975 salt cost about forty
times the price in neighboring India and red peppers for curry powder
about seven times as much as in India. The cost-of-living index for a Dacca
worker increased by 50 percent in FY 1973 and by 40 percent in FY 1974.
A major cause of runaway price inflation was the scarcity of goods.
Damage and disruptions from the 1971 civil war, floods and droughts,
worldwide scarcities of some commodities, and transportation difficulties
at home and abroad contributed to scarcities in Bangladesh, but
government agencies were partly to blame, as the authors of the First
Five Year Plan acknowledged. Imports were hampered by the extensive
controls and poor administration. Government prices were unrealistic; so
farmers sold rice, jute, and sugar to private dealers, who legally or
illegally kept the supplies out of government channels and smuggled
some to India (see ch. 12). Electric power was highly irregular,
interrupting production. The corporation that was responsible for
distributing cotton yarn to cottage textile producers failed to pick up the
yarn from government plants in 1974, forcing the plants to slow
production until the large inventory was moved out. Other examples
abounded.

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 The costs of the government controls have been high. The budget costs
of direct subsidies, such as the difference between the costs and the
rationed prices of rice and wheat, the actual cost of fertilizers and pumps
and the charges to farmers, and the price paid for jute and its export
price, have been a heavy drain on the government's budget. In addition,
the economic loss from controls has been significant. Dealers have
accumulated excessive profits from the scarcity of goods, and many tried
to get their funds out of the country instead of reinvesting them in
productive endeavors. The political cost was also high. The sociopolitical
system was undermined by corruption and seeming governmental
ineptitude, and this weaking of the system was an important contributing
factor in Mujib's decision to amend the Constitution in January 1975 (see
ch. 8; ch. 9). Mujib, as the new president with emergency powers, was
given unlimited authority and opportunity to revamp the system of
controls so as to relieve the scarcity of goods. The results, however, were
not yet apparent in April 1975.
FOREIGN COMMERCE
In the mid-1970s Bangladesh's import needs were staggering. Except
for natural gas, there was scarcely a commodity that could not be
imported to the benefit of production and consumption. Because products
that could be sold to foreign nations were few and the amount of foreign
assistance limited, imports had to be restricted to the most essential
commodities. The nature of the economy placed foreign trade in a pivotal
role in contributing to the welfare of the population. Because of internal
and external developments, however, foreign trade was not meeting the
country's needs by 1975.
The Shock of Independence
Independence forced brutal changes on Bangladesh's foreign com
merce. The country immediately needed a new currency. The monetary
unit was called the taka (see Glossary), and its external value was tied to
the British pound at Tk18.97 per pound sterling on February 11, 1972.
This value yielded a cross-rate of Tk1 per one Indian rupee and Tk7.27
per US$1. This value of the taka appeared to represent a substantial
devaluation from the 4.76 Pakistan rupees per US$1 used when the
country was part of Pakistan. Actual devaluation was far less, however,
because Pakistan had employed measures that extensively modified the
official exchange rate of the Pakistan rupee. The modification depended
on the commodity involved. In FY 1969, for example, the average
effective exchange rate for manufactured exports was 7.66 Pakistan
rupees per US$1—close to the external value adopted for the new taka.
The currency value established for the taka provided little stimulation for
Bangladesh's export industries, and domestic inflation soon negated even
that benefit.
Bangladesh has kept the taka at the same fixed rate with the British

254
pound and the Indian rupee. When world currencies were allowed to
float, the taka's value in terms of United States dollars became subject to
change. The taka averaged 8.1 per US$1 (12.3 cents) in 1972, 8.2 per
US$1 (12.2 cents) in 1973, and about 8.0 per US$1 (12.5 cents) in 1974.
New Institutional Framework for Foreign Trade
Independence caused an exodus of West Pakistanis who had been
operating many businesses in various sectors of the East Pakistan
economy, including foreign trade. The Bangladesh government re
sponded by nationalizing many economic activities, one of which was
foreign trade. Nationalization switched the emphasis from private
entrepreneurs during the Pakistan regime to direct government
operations in Bangladesh as the primary vehicle for economic develop
ment.
Control of imports is the core of the government's system for directly
governing the allocation of the limited resources throughout the
economy. Bangladesh built upon and extended the control system used in
East Pakistan. The first step was to abolish the old Pakistan
four-category list of imports, which had been used to modify the exchange
rate to encourage private business, and to install a single import list,
which in effect forms the import plan of Bangladesh for each six-month
period after its publication.
The import plan attempts to match import requirements by broad
groupings with available means of payment, such as foreign exchange,
bilateral trade and payment agreements, and foreign aid. Government
officials, then, determine who should import what, when, how much, and
financed from what sources. Import licenses, which are required for all
imports except some items imported by the government, such as food and
defense equipment, are issued to the various importing groups to fulfill
the import plan.
The Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB) has been the most
important importer since independence. It is the nationalized trading
corporation that primarily handles bulk commodities, because of the
savings on large purchases, and trade with nationalized trading firms in
other countries, particularly the communist nations. Nationalized
industries receive import licenses for their needs of raw materials and
spare parts, often based on only one-shift operations. The government
may reduce the import allocation below the requirements of an industry
or several industries because of the shortage of foreign exchange or other
reasons.
Private traders handle only a small part of Bangladesh's foreign trade.
Allocations to private traders in FY 1974 amounted to only 10 to 15
percent of total imports, for example. The number of approved private
importers has been greatly expanded since independence, however,
partly as a device to replace those importers who left the country but also
as a means of distributing the scarcity profits more widely—particularly
to political supporters of the government. At least until the change of

255
government in early 1975, the local member of Parliament designated the
importer for his area. From July through December 1973 there were
29,000 registered private importers. Most private importers were
limited to one commodity, although some handled as many as four. The
import licenses were issued for the same value of imports to each qualified
importer. Thus each importer had a very small business, but the scarcity
of commodities since 1971 made most importing business profitable.
The importing procedure was further complicated by a series of
reviews. Private importers were required to deal with several banks to
get their import licenses and letters of credit to make payment.
Nationalized industries have nearly as complicated a procedure as
private traders to obtain licenses and the foreign exchange to pay for
imports. In addition, foreign purchases over Tk1 million (approximately
US$125,000) require approval by three cabinet ministers. Any of these
stages could hold up or cancel the import. These complex controls had not
kept down corruption, according to reports from Western observers, but
they certainly had impeded the flow of imports, contributing to soaring
domestic prices and low industrial production.
In the First Five Year Plan the government acknowledged in
adequacies in foreign trade operations and the difficulties caused in other
sectors of the economy by shortages of imported commodities. An initial
problem in foreign trade operations, caused by the inexperienced
personnel newly assigned to foreign trade activities, had been partially
resolved by the experience gained since 1971. Minor changes in the
import system had been attempted, such as switching jurisdiction over
commodities between TCB and private traders. In addition, the
government intended to reduce the number of private traders to 10,000
so that their individual operations would not be quite so small. The
Bangladesh Aid Group, which has been trying to provide the aid to help
solve Bangalee economic problems, obviously felt the changes were not
sufficient, for they suggested in October 1974 that Bangladesh review its
import procedures to make more effective use of the imports the
consortium members were furnishing (see Foreign Aid, this ch.).
Terms of Trade
Even a healthy, well-managed economy would have been seriously
disrupted by the adverse shift in the terms of trade that Bangladesh has
experienced. The prices of almost all imported commodities have soared,
led by petroleum and grains. The average of import prices was 65 percent
higher in FY 1974 than in FY 1973. Expressed another way, the volume
of estimated imports of US$875 million in FY 1974 was substantially
smaller than that of actual imports in FY 1973 that cost US$650 million.
In contrast, export prices had risen by less than 6 percent by 1974.
International jute and tea prices improved during 1974 but not enough to
offset the rise in import prices. In overall terms of trade, the volume of
Bangladesh's exports that would purchase imports worth US$1 before
independence purchased imports worth only about US$0.60 by mid-1974.

256
 Imports
During the 1960s imports into East Pakistan, including those from
West Pakistan, rose by nearly 10 percent a year in value (based on a
valuation that takes into account the multiple exchange rates used during
that period). About one-third of the increase was caused by greater
imports of food grains. Larger imports of textile materials and machinery
caused most of the remaining growth. By the end of the 1960s food grains
accounted for about 25 percent of the total value of imports. Imports of
cotton textile materials (raw cotton, yarn, and cloth, mostly from West
Pakistan) and machinery each accounted for about 15 percent of the value
of all imports. The remaining imports were a wide range of commodities,
such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, vegetable oilseeds for proces
sing, cement, and other materials for the industries located in East
Pakistan.
Two important changes have occured in the import pattern since
independence. Imports of food grains have increased substantially,
averaging over 2 million tons per year. Estimated food grain require
ments for FY 1975 were 2.3 million tons valued at US$485 million, which
constituted about one-third of the value of all imports.
The second important change was the decline in imports other than
food grains because of the adverse shift in terms of trade, the tortuous
import procedures, and the limits of foreign aid. The economy continues
to need nearly all of the goods that were imported during the 1960s, and
the quantities of most should be higher because of population growth. The
volume of imports of cloth, cement, raw materials and parts for industry,
and other commodities besides food grains have been substantially less
since independence, however, contributing greatly to domestic inflation
and the unstable economic conditions. The availability of cloth in 1974 was
about four yards per person, compared with about eight years in FY
1970, for example. An estimate of the import requirements of industry for
one-shift operations for January 1972 to June 1973 indicated that the
actual quantum of imports was less than one-fifth of the amount needed
over the eighteen months.
One of the major goals of the First Five Year Plan was to reduce the
country's dependence on foreign assistance. The most important target
was to raise domestic rice production rapidly so that grain imports could
be eliminated (see ch. 12). Other imports (in constant prices) were
expected to grow through FY 1977 and then decline sharply in FY 1978
as new industrial plants begin producing commodities formerly
imported. Imports of raw cotton and cotton yarn were planned to drop by
about one-fourth and one-third, respectively, and cloth by more than 80
percent, for example, as a result of building a synthetic fiber plant using
natural gas as the raw material. Import substitution in other industries
was to be less dramatic but still appreciable. The plan expected to
maintain a modest rate of growth for the volume of imports, raw
materials and other commodities growing as grains diminished.

257
 By early 1975 events appeared to have upset the plan completely,
however. The extremely rapid rise in import prices that had already
occurred added tremendously to the import bill. The floods of 1974 that
affected jute and rice production seriously undermined key assumptions
of the plan. The inability of the economy to recover to the FY 1970 level of
output made the planned growth more difficult to achieve. It appeared
highly unlikely that the synthetic fiber plant could be brought into
production by 1978 since work had not yet begun; thus import
requirements for cotton textile materials probably would remain high
through 1978, negating much of the anticipated savings from import
substitution. Consequently, import costs over the plan period were
likely to be considerably higher than envisioned, suggesting a need for a
high level of foreign aid.

Exports
The value of exports from East Pakistan averaged an annual growth of
6 percent during the fourteen years ending in FY 1970. More than
one-half of the growth came from the higher earnings from exports ofjute
manufactures compared with the lower earnings from exports of raw
fiber. The rest of the growth in the value of exports was largely the result
of the increasing volume of manufactured goods sent to West Pakistan.
Tea, paper and paperboard, leather, and matches were the most
important commodities, but a number of other manufactured minor
products were also exported, encouraged by the high protection afforded
interwing trade in Pakistan development strategy.
Exports were dominated by jute. Exports of all jute products
accounted for about two-thirds of the value of East Pakistan exports
during the late 1960s. Since the jute crop did not increase appreciably
between 1950 and 1970, larger exports of woven jute were at the expense
of raw jute exports (see ch. 12).
Exports since independence have been substantially less than the
value in the late 1960s. The figures set forth here are estimates based on
various sources that may have differences in coverage and valuation, but
they provide the trend of developments. East Pakistan exports,
including those to West Pakistan, amounted to the equivalent of US$480
million in FY 1969 and US$510 million in FY 1970 after adjustments for
the multiple exchange rates used in those years. Bangladesh's exports
were the equivalent of US$385 million in FY 1973, probably about
US$360 million in FY 1974, and projected at about US$410 million for FY
1975.
The fall in the value of exports after independence was caused
primarily by an initial inability to find foreign markets for the products
formerly exported to West Pakistan. Inexperienced foreign trade
personnel also contributed to the general problem. The other part of the
problem stemmed from the difficulties of bringing costs of production
down below world market prices. Some seventy-nine "slow-moving"
items received a subsidy of 30 percent of the export price. Even with
258
subsidies, some products had not been able to compete abroad. Tea was
an example until international prices began to rise during 1974. Frozen
shrimp and fish were among the minor exports that have been
competitive and sold well abroad, but a limited supply has hindered
expansion. The government was attempting to export about 10,000 to
20,000 tons of sugar in 1974, at the expense of already low domestic
consumption, to take advantage of the high world price.
Jute exports have amounted to about 80 percent of the value of exports
since 1971. The volume of woven jute exports held up relatively well in
FY 1973 and FY 1974, declining less than 15 percent from the peak in FY
1970. The tonnage of raw jute exports was forced down more than 20
percent from the volume in FY 1970, however, because the amount of
jute grown had declined since 1970 (see ch. 12). The worldwide economic
slump dampened the international jute market in late 1974, causing
unsold stocks of manufactured jute products to pile up at Bangalee mills.
Some workers were laid off, and one mill closed at the beginning of 1975,
creating pessimism for the immediate future.
The plan optimistically projects an average annual 11-percent growth
rate for exports (over FY 1973 in constant prices) through 1978. The
planners anticipate an increase in jute growing, an increase difficult to
achieve in view of high internal rice prices, and exports ofjute in excess of
probable world demand. Jute exports face difficult competition from
synthetic fibers, a declining market as a packaging material, and tariffs
and quotas on woven jute goods. Thus jute has serious problems on both
the supply and the demand sides.
Prospects for leather and fish exports are better if the Bangalees can
increase the amount available for export, but these products constitute
less than 10 percent of the value of planned exports in FY 1978.
Resumption of trade with Pakistan might result in a significant boost for
exports along the lines of the former interwing trade of the late 1960s if
the two countries can settle various outstanding issues (ch. 10). Foreign
economists have been much more pessimistic about export prospects
than the Bangalee planners. They expect a substantially slower growth
of exports through FY 1978.

Direction of Trade
Before independence West Pakistan was by far the most important
trading partner of East Pakistan. During the latter half of the 1960s about
30 percent of the value of East Pakistan exports went to West Pakistan,
and about 40 percent of the value of imports came from West Pakistan.
This interwing trade was promoted by the Pakistan development
stragegy, the prevalence of West Pakistan business and industrial firms
in East Pakistan, the highly protective measures against competitive
imports, and the common currency in the two wings. Sudden severing of
this relationship at independence required prolonged and difficult
adjustments in East Pakistan.
Many Bangalees firmly believe that West Pakistan economically
259
exploited the East Wing. Mujib's six-points manifesto was partly built
upon such a belief (see ch. 2). The issues are complex, involving detailed
economic measurements covering more than twenty years. More
statistics, some of which may not have been collected, and more analyses
were still needed in 1975 to resolve the issue. Benefits accrued to both
East and West Pakistan, but that is not to say that East Pakistan
necessarily had equal status with West Pakistan in the relationship.
Data on Bangladesh's foreign trade by countries since independence
were not available in early 1975, but some general remarks can be made.
India had become an important trade partner although the level of trade
between India and Bangladesh had been considerably less than what each
had expected. Western Europe and the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Japan buy most of Bangladesh's jute exports and supply a
substantial portion of imports, partly through aid programs. These same
countries were also important trade partners in the 1960s. A number of
bilateral trade and clearing agreements have been arranged with
communist countries, but the level of trade with each is small, except
with the Soviet Union.
In addition to official trade, there had been substantial unofficial trade
between India and Bangladesh. Although cross-border trading has gone
on for many years, special factors emerged after independence to
increase smuggling. The political unrest in Bangladesh caused a flight of
capital that, because of exchange controls, turned to smuggling of goods
to India to be sold for rupees. The official import program of Bangladesh,
which concentrated on necessities because of the shortage of foreign
exchange, created shortages of some items of middle-class consumption,
notably textiles. Bangalees with high incomes were willing to pay the
high prices to have goods smuggled from India. Furthermore, the
differences in relative prices on either side of the border, lower in
Bangladesh for jute, rice, fertilizers, and pesticides and higher for such
manufactures as textiles, razor blades, and transistor radios, produced
large profits when exchanging the former for the latter. Halting
smuggling is not easy, but continued smuggling on a large scale meant a
loss of resources Bangladesh could ill afford.
Balance of Payments
Bangladesh has severe balance-of-payments problems (see table 12).
Even the limited imports of the early and middle 1970s substantially
exceeded earnings from exports, requiring foreign aid to finance about
one-half or more of all imports. The increases in the unfavorable balance
on current account in FY 1974 and FY 1975 largely reflected the adverse
shift in the terms of trade because there was relatively little change in the
quantum of imports.
Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves have gone through violent
swings. At independence the country had no reserves except what it was
able to borrow. A deliberate policy of accumulating reserves combined
with slowness in ordering imports caused reserves to build to a peak of
260
 Table 12. Bangladesh, Estimated Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1973-75
(in millions of United States dollars)

1974 1975
1973
Estimate Estimate

Imports -650 -875 -l AW

Exports 340 360 410

Trade balance -310 -515 -1,000

Other current account transactions (net) . 40 -35 0

Balance on current account -270 -550 -1,000

Aid and credits (net) 322 495 500

Changes in reserves -16 95 0
Clearing accounts and errors -36 -40 0
Aid gap 0 0 5002

1 Estimate based on 2.3 million metric tons of grain, a modest amount of machinery for economic development, and
about a 10-percent increase in the quantity of other nonfood imports. These imports were priced at estimated 1975
prices.
2 New aid of about US$300 million to US$400 million had been committed by late 1974, suggesting an uncovered gap
of about US$150 million to US$200 million, which probably required a reduction of imports by a similar amount.

about US$270 million in December 1972. Reserves were drawn down in

1973, standing at about US$140 million at the end of the year. When it
became apparent near the end of 1973 that more grain imports would be
needed and particularly after domestic rice prices spurted up in early
1974, the government began placing orders abroad for grain. The
composition of available aid was such that most of the grain imports had to
be financed from the government's own cash resources. Foreign
exchange reserves fell sharply during the first half of 1974 to a level of
about US$60 million at the end of June, not enough for a month's import
payments. Foreign exporters reportedly refused to accept Bangalee
letters of credit during this period unless the letters were guaranteed by
third parties. Reserves recovered during the fall, as more aid became
available, and reached about US$125 million at the end of November
1974.
Some slight easing of balance-of-payments pressure may accrue to
Bangladesh from its participation in the Asian Clearing Union formed
under United Nations sponsorship in December 1974 in Bangkok. The
members can use their own currencies instead of foreign exchange for
imports from each other, providing temporary relief when foreign
exchange is short. There were only six members, primarily those of the
subcontinent, which limited the usefulness of the union to Bangladesh. If
Far Eastern countries, particularly Japan, were to join the clearing
union, its usefulness would improve.
FOREIGN AID
Foreign assistance has supported Bangladesh since independence. The
equivalent of more than US$2 billion had been committed by June 1974.
261
Many countries committed additional aid after the 1974 floods, the
amount probably approaching US$400 million; by the end of 1974
Bangladesh had received aid from more than forty countries and
international agencies. The United States had contributed by far the
largest amount, the total exceeding US$560 million by the end of 1974.
Indian aid neared US$300 million by 1975. The Soviet Union had pledged
at least the equivalent of US$138 million not including some military
equipment (see ch. 14). Aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD,
commonly known as the World Bank) probably exceeded US$350 million
by early 1975; o-nly incomplete data were available for the aid
commitments of other countries.
Under the aegis of the World Bank, an aid consortium called the
Bangladesh Aid Group was established in October 1974, consisting of
twenty-six participating governments and institutions. The objectives
were to mobilize resources and coordinate aid to Bangladesh. The
consortium noted an immediate need for new commitments of rapidly
dispensed aid for FY 1975. The consortium also reviewed the progress of
past aid programs and concluded that Bangladesh needed to revise
procurement and disbursement procedures that had kept the flow of
imports below what could have been imported under the foreign aid
available.
The consortium's call for additional aid commitments for 1975 was
related to the huge uncoverd gap in Bangladesh's balance of payments for
FY 1975. Detailed and current figures on foreign aid were not available in
early 1975, but probably about US$500 million of aid previously
committed remained to be disbursed during FY 1975. Much of this aid in
the pipeline was for projects such as industrial plants; only a minor part
was for food and raw material imports. New aid commitments
substantially above US$500 million were needed in addition to aid in the
pipeline in order to finance import needs for FY 1975. According to press
announcements, new aid totaled less than the amount needed, however,
indicating that imports in FY 1975 may have been reduced by about
US$150 million to US$200 million from estimated requirements and
increasing the import starvation with consequent adverse effects on
industrial production and prices.
The First Five Year Plan laid down measures to reduce the country's
dependence on foreign aid by 1978. External factors, such as the shift in
the terms of trade, and the 1974 floods tremendously altered the
situation. The inadequate flow of imports and the lack of sufficient change
in the economy have kept agricultural and industrial production from
expanding as rapidly as planned. Savings from import substitution
seemed difficult to achieve. In brief, few of the plan's goals to reduce
dependence on foreign aid by 1978 had been met by early 1975.
A reduced dependence on foreign aid may be forced on Bangladesh,
however. Many of the countries supplying foreign aid were experiencing
economic difficulties. In addition, aid suppliers were sharply critical of

262
the poor performance of the Bangalee government. The criticism was
partly aimed at the corruption that reportedly existed everywhere, but
the inefficient government administration immediately after indepen
dence had not improved as expected. Foreign advisers did not think that
the country had made the most of the aid provided. As a result,
Bangladesh may find aid harder to obtain in the immediate future, leading
necessarily to less dependence by 1978. Achieving the goal this way,
however, will slow economic growth and be costly in terms of human
misery.

INDUSTRY
Bangladesh is-one of the least industrially developed of the populous
nations. Annual per capita consumption of steel is only about nine pounds
(compared with twenty-four pounds in India), cement about twenty
pounds (fifty-nine pounds in India), and electric power twenty kilowatt-
hours (112 kilowatt-hours in India). Industry contributed only 8 percent
to GDP in FY 1973. This was a substantial improvement, nonetheless,
from the 4 percent that industry contributed to the GDP in FY 1950—an
annual average rate of growth in the value added by manufacturing of 6
percent. The growth was achieved by substantial investments in plant
and equipment during the years that the area was part of Pakistan.
Industry was not always so poorly developed. Until about the 1800s
industry was an important part of the economy, and the workers were
highly skilled. East Bengal had an extensive and proficient cottage
industry turning out extremely fine handloomed muslin, silk,, and
brocade worn by the artistocracy in Asia and Europe. The dyes, yarn,
and cloth were the envy of much of the world. Traders from all over the
world came to Bengal for the products of these industries. The
introduction of machine-made textiles from England in the late 1700s
spelled doom from the costly and prolonged process in spite of its superior
quality. Cotton growing in East Bengal died out, and the textile industry
became dependent on imported yarn. More and more people were forced
to turn to agriculture for a living, and industry became unimportant as a
way of life except to a few remaining cottage producers.
Pakistan rekindled interest in industry in East Pakistan. By early
1975, however, Bangladesh industry was in serious trouble and not
making the contribution to the welfare of the population that was needed.
Government, as the key factor affecting industrial investment and
output, faced a formidable challenge in remedying the problems and
raising industrial production to the level of its potential contribution to
the economy.
Many of the industry's current problems stem from an earlier time. In
the colonial period the British treated East Bengal as a hinterland to
supply raw materials, largely jute, to Calcutta and to receive the
manufactures from Calcutta and Great Britian. Industrial development
was suppressed.
As East Pakistan, the area was still largely a "poor relation." Policy
263
was formed in West Pakistan by West Pakistanis for West Pakistan
conditions, many of which differed sharply from conditions in East
Pakistan. Economic and financial centers were also in West Pakistan,
automatically creating difficulties for anyone doing business in East
Pakistan. As a consequence the industrial pattern that evolved was
not one particularly suited to an independent Bangladesh. In addition
geography created many problems of its own. The flooding has made it
difficult and costly to build the plants and the transportation and other
services on which modern manufacturing depends. Bangladesh is distant
from most customary maritime routes, hampering international com
merce. Natural resources are also inadequate.
Natural Resources
A major handicap to industrial development has been the lack of
resources (see ch. 3). Alluvial deposits over most of the area hide the
limited natural resources that exist and hinder their commercial
exploitation. Most of the natural resources that have been found resulted
from geological surveys during the 1950s and 1960s. Until more
exhaustive geological surveys of Bangladesh have been completed, the
existence of additional natural resources remains only as a hope in
Bangalee minds (see ch. 3).
The most important natural resource found to date, is natural gas. Nine
fields have been discovered with proven reserves of at least 9 trillion
cubic feet (some sources use estimates as high as 20 trillion cubic feet),
sufficient at the current low rate of consumption to last more than 150
years. In the mid-1970s gas was used by two fertilizer plants, one cement
plant, and several thermal power plants. Geologists think more natural
gas fields are likely to exist, and there are some indications that oil
deposits may exist on and off shore although as of early 1975 test drilling
had been negative.
Substantial coal deposits exist in Bogra and Rajshahi districts, but
they are quite deep—requiring sophisticated and costly mining
techniques that may prevent commercial exploitation. Limestone
deposits exist that can support cement production, but exploitation has
barely begun. White clay deposits are being mined for the ceramic
industry. Glass sands support a small domestic glass industry. Large
deposits of hard rock for use in construction were discovered in 1966 but
as of 1975 had not been mined because of their depth underground.
Monazite (which contains strategic minerals), zircons, and iron and
titanium minerals have been found in the beach sands near Cox's Bazaar.
A pilot plant was contemplated in early 1974 to determine the feasibility
of extracting these minerals from the sands.
Power Base
Inadequate power has also limited industrial development. At
partition in 1947 East Pakistan had only twenty-one megawatts of

264
generating capacity, a minuscule amount for the population of some 40
million. A substantial expansion occurred during the Pakistan period,
generating capacity reaching 535 megawatts in 1970. This capacity
served only about 230,000 customers, however, 70 percent of whom were
industrial, 15 percent commercial, 10 percent household, and 5 percent
agricultural users. Electrification was limited largely to developing
industry, but there was some distribution in the main cities. By 1974
capacity had expanded to 605 megawatts. Over half of the generating
capacity used natural gas as the heat source, 36 percent used imported
oil, and 13 percent depended on hydropower. An additional costly,
inefficient 150 megawatts existed as main or supplemental power
generators at the larger industrial plants.
Two kinds of imbalances have developed in the power base because of
geography, poor planning, and the predilection of foreign aid suppliers
for generating instead of transmission facilities. In 1974 nearly
three-quarters of generating capacity, 439 megawatts, was located in the
eastern grid (east of the Padma River), where natural gas and the limited
hydroelectric potential of the Chittagong Hill Tracts can supply the
energy source (see fig. 1). In this zone a severe imbalance exists between
too much generating capacity and inadequate primary and secondary
distribution facilities, resulting in very poor service to important
industrial centers. A lack of generating capacity and a suppression of
demand exist in the grid west of the Padma because the thermal power
plants there must depend on costly imported fuel oil or imported coal for
their heat source. Disruption of the electric power supply created multi
ple problems for industry after 1971. Nearly one-third of the extensive
idle textile capacity in FY 1973 was caused by power shortages, for
example.
An adequate power supply for industrial development depends on
correcting these imbalances. The solutions are easy but costly.
Additional transmission and distribution lines were being added to the
eastern grid. A decision on the western grid was not yet apparent. An
atomic generator, use of imported Indian coal, a tie-in to the Indian
electrical grid, and a difficult link between Bangladesh's eastern and
western grid across the ten-mile-wide Padma River were the main
alternatives being considered for adding capacity to the western grid.
Providing electricity to agriculture remained a distant prospect. By
1974 only about 250 villages out of approximately 71,000 were electrified,
and only about 300 electric pumps were being used. The plan projects the
electrification of 1,000 additional villages, a very ambitious target.
The Pakistan Legacy
At partition East Pakistan had only a handful of large- and
medium-scale industrial enterprises, largely cotton textile mills. Over
the next two decades large-scale industrial manufacturing grew at an
annual average rate of over 14 percent (in constant prices), reflecting the

265
substantial investments in industry resulting from the development
strategy of the Pakistan central government. The strategy was to create
an atmosphere conducive and rewarding to private investment in
manufacturing. The government used the exchange rate, foreign
exchange allocations, tariffs, taxes, financial assistance, subsidies, and
price controls to encourage investment, and the East Pakistan au
thorities built some plants when the encouragement to private investors
proved insufficient.
The overall effect was to price machinery, interest, and raw material
imports low and labor, manufactured exports, and selected manufactured
imports relatively high. This environment stimulated investment in
capacity (instead of fuller utilization), located capital-intensive plants in
an area of excess labor, and protected inefficiency from competition.
Engineering industry products, for example, sold at a price almost double
the landed price for competing imports. The induced price distortions
went a long way toward solving the investment problem, but they formed
the basis for future problems.
Full use of the invested capital was one of the problems. Capacity
utilization in many important industries hovered near 50 percent even
before independence, and capacity in many instances was measured on
the basis of one-shift daily operations. The steel plant at Chittagong,
dependent on imported ore, coal, and manganese, had yet to achieve
50-percent utilization on a sustained basis by early 1975. Production of
cotton cloth, diesel engines, cement, and a number of processed foods was
less than one-half of capacity in FY 1970. Production of jute goods and
cotton yarn, accounting for more than one-third of the value added by
large-scale manufacturing in FY 1970, was below three-quarters of
capacity. The pricing pattern that had been laid down did not encourage
production nearly as well as it did investment. The import allocation
system, in particular, worked as a major constraint on output.
Independence and After
Independence exposed two more serious problems inherited from the
Pakistan development strategy. Bangladesh lost the protected West
Pakistan market that had absorbed significant proportions of East
Pakistan's manufactured exports of tea, paper, paperboard, matches,
and steel plate and had been an important source of imports that did not
require foreign exchange. Markets for the export products were still
difficult to find in 1975 even with subsidies. New sources of some imports
proved hard to find, and foreign exchange for purchases was limited when
supplies were available. These foreign trade problems slowed industrial
production.
The other problem was the exodus from Bangladesh in 1971 ofthe West
Pakistani owners and managers of industrial plants, often accompanied
by a flight of capital. Of the seventy-four jute mills in 1970, for example,
forty-four were owned mostly by West Pakistanis. The Bangladesh

266
government took over these "abandoned" plants. In addition, all jute,
large cotton textile, and modern sugar mills were nationalized irrespec
tive of ownership at the same time, thus following up commitments made
by the Awami League before independence (see ch. 9). The government
was suddenly responsible for managing and operating some 313 units that
totaled nearly 85 percent of the value of industrial assets in medium- and
large-scale plants.
Management of Nationalized Industry
Management of the nationalized industries was lodged in ten public
corporations for jute mills; textile mills; sugar mills; steel; paper and
paperboard; fertilizer, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals; engineering and
shipbuilding; minerals, oil, and gas; food and allied products; and forest
products. The public corporations were established as overseers for their
particular industries. The corporation heads were largely drawn from the
ranks of senior management in one of the large enterprises within the
corporation. Above the public corporation was the Nationalized Indus
tries Division of the Ministry of Industries, which coordinated policy.
Below the public corporation was the individual enterprise whose
managers were drawn from the ranks in the plants, the bureaucracy, and
the Awami League. The managerial talent varied except in their general
lack of experience. The First Five Year Plan was outspoken in
acknowledging that industrial management had not been good and that
tremendous improvement was necessary if the plants were to be run
properly and output increased.
Poor management was not all the fault of the newly elevated managers.
The supply of electric power had been very erratic, and transportation
bottlenecks affected the flow of materials to and from plants. Some plants
had to hire excess workers, and wage scales were partly out of the hands
of managers. The flow of imports, such as raw materials and parts, had
been less than needed and uncoordinated with production needs. Many of
the former West Pakistani-owned plants were saddled with heavy
financial liabilities, and securing working capital was difficult. In some
cases closure or severe reduction in capacity utilization was necessary
because of the financial problems. Pricing of output had been beyond most
of the plant managers; only in 1974 did corporations receive authority to
make some adjustments in output prices because of production costs.
With so little control over the elements affecting production, managers
were only partly to blame for not bringing production up to the FY 1970
level or earning profits for the government's budget.
Labor
Industry has a huge pool of potential laborers on which to draw. These
laborers are characterized by a lack of education and training, a general
unfamiliarity with machinery, and little discipline or motivation. Skilled
labor is scarce. Efforts since independence to enlarge employment have
resulted in adding workers to already overstaffed public sector
industries. A high rate of worker absenteeism has also contributed to

267
lowering worker productivity sharply. Unemployment and undere
mployment remained high and were probably increasing rapidly in the
mid-1970s (see ch. 11).
Workers in Bangladesh readily form labor unions. There were about
1,700 registered trade unions in the industrial field in 1973, and
frequently a single plant may have three or more unions. The labor
organizations have traditionally been founded on political, regional, and
even personal loyalties, resulting in many bitter inter- and intra-union
struggles. Industrial output has been severely hampered since indepen
dence by strikes, slowdowns, and violent acts. Corruption, or at least
widely believed rumors of corruption, in many government agencies
contributed to labor agitation. These "labor problems" have been fueled
by the high rate of price inflation, poor employment prospects,
incompetent administration, income inequalities, a mounting feeling of
social insecurity, and certain specific workers' demands.
The government responded to labor problems with a presidential order
in 1972 that banned strikes and unfair labor practices in nationalized
industries, reiterated the objective of workers' participation in the
management of public plants, and sought to reduce the role of labor
unions to welfare and educational functions. In 1973 open strikes were
replaced by organized and unorganized slowdowns as the labor unions
fought the order that took away their main weapons—strikes and
collective bargaining. Subsequently the government established wage
commissions that laid down wage and fringe benefits for the whole
country, largely removing wage negotiations from labor union activities.
In early 1975 the government amended the Constitution and began to
rule under emergency powers, an act aimed in part at stopping labor
unrest, which still persisted, and the economic sabotage that existed
throughout the economy (see ch. 8; ch. 9). Under the emergency powers
the government prohibited strikes and lockouts. The government also
assumed the power to refer any labor dispute for conciliation or
adjudication and to disband any organization including labor unions.
Output of Nationalized Industry
Industrial output of most commodities fell sharply after independence,
and by early 1975 few industries in the public sector had regained the
level of FY 1970 (see table 13). Where production exceeded FY 1970 it
was primarily in industries with new producing units, such as fertilizer,
diesel engines, and pumps. Large-scale industrial output in FY 1974 was
about 17 percent less than in FY 1970.
Production in FY 1974 rose about 15 to 20 percent over FY 1973
although about 10 percent less than the planned goal. Higher output was
recorded for many commodities. The increased production resulted
primarily from a more adequate flow of imports, although an improved
electric power supply and fewer labor problems helped. Stocks of imports
for processing were short for many industries at the beginning of FY
1975, however, forecasting a slowdown of industrial processing if imports
did not pick up quickly.
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 Table 13. Bangladesh, Industrial Production in Nationalized Industries,
Selected Commodities, Fiscal Years 1970, 1973, and 1974

Capacity
Utilization
Industry Unit 197D 197:1 1974'
in 1973
(in percent)

Jute thousands of metric tons 587.0 446.0 500.0 56.0

Textile
Yarn millions of pounds 106.0 81.0 91.0 60.0
Cloth millions of yards 59.0 59.0 79.0 49.0
Sugar thousands of metric tons 94.0 19.0 88.0 11.0
Fertilizer, urea2 . —do— 96.0 236.0 279.0 62.0
Steel ingot —do— 54.0 68.0 74.0 27.0
Diesel engines . . . thousands 1.3 1.4 1.8 45.0
Newsprint thousands of metric tons 44.0 28.0 26.0 55.0
Paper —do— 31.0 21.0 24.0 69.0
Cement —do— 40.0 32.0 55.0 21.0
Pharmaceutical
Tablets millions 397.0 119.0 198.0 13.0
Injections millions of ampules 3.5 0.9 0.9 15.0
Edible oils thousands of metric tons 11.0 10.0 19.0 27.0
Fish processing . . millions of pounds 2.5 1.1 3.0 16.0

i Preliminary statistics.
1 Large new plant completed between FY 1970 and FY 1973.
Source: Based on information from Bangladesh, Planning Commission, The First Five
Year Plan, 1973-78, Dacca, 1973, p. 196.

Survey of Industries
Small-Scale Industry
East Pakistan and Bangladesh statistics use more than one definition of
small-scale industry. In national accounts, small-scale industry appears
to include cottage industry, defined as mainly conducted by family
members either full time or part time, and small industries, defined as
hiring fewer than ten workers. In national accounts, small-scale
industry's contribution to GDP has been assumed to grow at the same
rate as the population. Another definition appears to include in
small-scale industry all processing with fixed assets under the top limit
for private investment of Tk2.5 million. The increase in the limit in
mid-1974 may further muddy the definition of small-scale industry. The
definition used here includes manufacturing units up to Tk2.5 million.
Cottage industry is by far the largest segment of all industry, probably
numbering more than 400,000 units and furnishing employment for about
1.5 million people. Cottage industry is largely handloomed textiles, the
remnant of the highly skilled cottage industry or two centuries ago.
Statistics have not been kept on cottage industry, but it has largely
stagnated since 1947.
Cottage and small industries are characterized by the absence of
machinery and mechanical power, and very low output per worker. This
segment of industry produces, largely on handlooms, perhaps as much as
269
80 percent of all of the domestically produced cotton textiles. Other small
industries are food processing, such as salt and gur (crude brown sugar)
production, and metal and wood fabrication, producing simple tools and
furniture. Workers in these industries barely eke out a living, and they
probably would shift to other employment if it were available.
More efficient and productive are the industries that might be called
medium sized, that is, hiring more than ten workers but not large enough
to be nationalized. This portion of small-scale industry, perhaps
numbering close to 3,000 plants in 1973, often uses mechanical power,
frequently adapts cast-off machinery from larger scale industry, and
produces a useful product from local materials for a small market. This
kind of industry usually has had relatively good labor relations, has been
labor intensive, and has been relatively free of dependence on imports.
The private entrepreneurs have profited, often reinvesting in other
productive enterprises. Many economists view this kind of industry as
the best vehicle in the short run for increased employment, increased
production, and accumulation of investment funds.
The First Five Year Plan projects much more government interest and
assistance for small-scale industry than occurred in the past. When the
plan comes to specifics, however, fund allocations and other measures
emphasize large-scale, nationalized industries. One very encouraging
signal to medium-sized industries was the raising of the limit on private
investments from Tk2.5 million to Tk30 million in mid-1974. Extensive
bureaucratic difficulties and financing problems remain to impede
development of small industry, however.
Large-Scale Industry
Large-scale industry is not clearly defined. In FY 1969 there were
3,130 registered industrial units (hiring more than ten people), of which
791 were in textiles, 576 in chemicals, 406 in food manufacturing, 257 in
metal products, and over 1,000 in other industries. This definition took in
a lot of units that were village operations rather than in the usual sense
large-scale manufacturing plants. The 313 factories that were
nationalized in 1972 are much closer to the Western idea of a large-scale
factory, and it is these plants that are usually meant when the term
large-scale is used.
These large-scale plants probably provided employment for fewer than
250,000 workers in 1970, but they had brought about a substantial growth
in industry's contribution to GDP. Large-scale industry grew at an
annual average rate of over 14 percent in constant prices. Most industries
are dependent on a wide variety of imported materials in the production
process. Jute and cotton textiles account for 43 percent ofthe value added
by large-scale manufacturing, and food, beverage, and tobacco account
for another 30 percent.
Jute. Producing jute goods is the most important industry, encompassing
some seventy-four plants with approximately 25,000 looms in 1975. All of
this capacity was built after partition in 1947, when India inherited all of

270
the mills and East Pakistan was left with most of the jute-growing area. A
race ensued in which India grew jute to feed its mills while Pakistan built
mills to process East Pakistan jute. The competition for a limited foreign
market continues as both countries export the bulk of theirjute products.
Export ofjute fiber and woven goods has furnished Bangladesh with over
80 percent of its foreign exchange earnings since independence. The jute
industry is not scheduled for major investments during the First Five
Year Plan. Production costs, partly increased by power shortages and
labor troubles, were nearly 10 percent above selling prices in FY 1973,
and the industry was expected to require a substantial government
subsidy throughout the five-year plan.
Textiles. The textile industry, based on West Pakistan cotton, grew
rapidly increasing from 110,000 spindles and 2,700 looms in 1947 to
830,000 spindles and about 7,000 looms in forty-four mills in 1972. The
mills were set up to use West Pakistani cotton, and shifting to other kinds
of cotton created some problems. Spindles grew in number more rapidly
than looms in order to produce yarn for the handlooms of cottage
industry. The whole textile industry supplied only about half of cloth
requirements in the 1960s, imports of cloth from West Pakistan supplying
the rest. Large-scale cotton mills supplied 10 to 15 percent of the yearly
domestic production of cloth.
Despite the substantial underutilization of capacity, 400,000 additional
spindles and 4,000 looms are scheduled to be installed during the First
Five Year Plan. An inadequate supply of imported cotton has been the
biggest constraint on production. The plan expects to reduce dependence
on cotton fiber and yarn by 1978 with completion of an acrylic fiber unit as
part of a petrochemical plant using natural gas. The synthetic fiber
component is costly (about US$220 million in 1973 prices) and involves a
chemical process of considerable complexity. It was unlikely that the
fiber plant would be producing in 1978 because contractual arrangements
had not been completed by early 1975.
Fertilizer. Urea, using natural gas as the raw material, was produced at
two plants, the larger having been completed since independence. Both
plants were probably out of production during much of FY 1975. The
larger plant was damaged by an explosion in September 1974, requiring
more than six months to repair, and the older plant required a shutdown
for maintenance.
Total annual capacity was listed as 440,000 tons. These plants supplied
nearly two-thirds of the fertilizer used by farmers in FY 1973. An
additional plant, with a capacity of 450,000 tons per year, was being
negotiated as an aid project in early 1975. Completion of the project by
1978, as anticipated in the plan, appeared doubtful because contractual
arrangements had not been completed by early 1975. There was
discussion of increasing urea capacity with additional plants in order to
export to India, but firm plans had not been announced by early 1975.
Bangladesh had triple superphosphate plants at Chittagong (150,000

271
tons per year total capacity), one of which was completed in FY 1974 but
could not start production because of the worldwide shortage of
phosphate rock. The plan calls for another such plant to be built at
Khulna. A small ammonium sulfate plant produced fertilizer for use on
the tea plantations.
Steel. Bangladesh has one steel plant, with a rated capacity of 250,000
tons per year, at Chittagong based on imported raw materials. The mill
has facilities for bar, sheet, and heavy plate production. Part of the
capacity, particularly for heavy plate, was established for an integrated
Pakistani market. Despite the underutilization of this plant and the high
transport costs in recent years of importing all the raw materials, the plan
includes a heavy investment to build another steel mill with a capacity of
300,000 tons per year to try to relieve the shortage of steel products.
Cement. West Pakistan formerly supplied the bulk of the East Pakistan
cement requirement, and since independence there has been a shortage
of cement in Bangladesh. An old plant with a rated annual capacity of
150,000 tons (but because of some obsolete equipment capacity is
probably less than 100,000 tons) furnished between 5 and 10 percent of
domestic needs. Arrangements have been made for India to supply
limestone from just across the border from the plant in FY 1975, which
should permit the plant to run at full capacity. A plant in Chittagong
(capacity of 300,000 tons per year), dependent on imported clinker, began
trial operations in mid-1974. Allowing time for breaking in equipment,
the plant may produce about one-half of capacity in FY 1975 if imported
raw materials arrive regularly. The planners want to build another plant
or two to make use of local limestone deposits that are beginning to be
mined, thereby easing the domestic shortage of cement.
Sugar. In 1975 Bangladesh had fifteen sugar refineries with a total
capacity of about 180,000 tons per year. Production was small because the
quantity and quality of cane from farmers were inadequate. Much of the
cane, including the better grades, is used by farmers to turn into gur in
primitive village mills because of the low prices paid for cane by the large
refineries. Some of the modern mills are located away from cane-growing
areas, increasing the transportation costs and prohibiting delivery of
very freshly cut cane, which raises the efficiency of the refining process.
The industry also suffers from inefficiency because of old equipment.
Nonetheless, the high international price for sugar in FY 1974 gave a big
boost to the industry, and production went from 19,000 tons in FY 1973 to
88,000 tons in FY 1974. If prices remained high, production in FY 1975
was expected to be good. No new refineries are contemplated in the plan,
only some modernization. Technology exists in cane growing to improve
yields significantly, and excess capacity exists in the refineries for
producing sugar, providing the sugar industry with bright prospects if
prices remain favorable and transportation of the cane from the fields to
the mills can be improved.

272
 Investment Policy
The government tightly controls investments. All industrial invest
ment must fit into the priorities laid down by the Planning Commission,
which draws up in considerable detail the kinds of new facilities needed in
the various parts of industry. Proposed investments are judged against
these priorities and further checked during reviews of import requests,
licensing applications, and financial documents.
The nationalization orders provided additional control. The govern
ment reserves exclusive development in several industries considered
particularly important, such as armaments, fuel and power, jute, and
sugar, and greatly limits private investment in many more industries,
such as steel. Private investment was further restricted by the limit on
total fixed assets, which was set at not more than Tk2.5 million. The
upper limit of initial total assets of private investors was raised to Tk30
million in mid-1974, apparently in an attempt to encourage more private
investment. At the same time the ten-year guarantee of immunity
against nationalization for private investors was extended to fifteen
years.
The government also slightly liberalized the restrictions on foreign
private investments in mid-1974. This enables foreign private investors
to join with private Bangalee investors in projects up to the Tk30 million
limit, whereas foreign investors were previously restricted to joint
ventures with the government. Liberalization also took place on
remitting posttax dividends, investments, and the salaries of foreign
nationals working in Bangladesh. Foreign private investors were still
limited to a maximum of 49 percent of any business they entered, and
generally they must cover the foreign exchange cost of a project in which
they invest.
The emphasis on the public sector was carried through in anticipated
investments in industry in the First Five Year Plan. Planned public
sector investments amounted to 85 percent of total industrial outlays
compared with less than 50 percent in the late 1960s. The plan placed
heavy emphasis on new projects, among which were a few rather large
capital-intensive projects in petrochemicals, cement, and cotton textiles.
The petrochemical complex was particularly important for meeting
several of the plan's goals, but construction work had not started by 1975,
making it unlikely that it would be in production by 1978. Two dockyards
and two engineering plants accounted for nearly 60 percent of investment
in ongoing projects. Private industrial investment was expected to be
only 15 percent of all additions to manufacturing during the plan period.
The higher limit allowed private investors after mid- 1974 may reflect a
shift away from emphasis on nationalized industry. The government had
been unable to make the scheduled public sector investments set forth in
the plan by the end of FY 1974.
A number of economists have been critical of the plan because it

273
emphasized large investments in capital-intensive manufacturing. They
believe that greater benefits can be achieved in the short run by
concentrating on improving efficiency in existing plants and promoting
private development of small-scale industry.
The critics suggest that, before investing more money in large new
plants, the output from existing factories should be near full utilization of
capacity on more than a one-shift basis. This would require reorganizing
and improving management of nationalized industries, altering prices to
give the proper signals to the economy, and providing adequate and
timely imports of the materials and parts on which industry depends.
The critics see immediate benefits from emphasis on small and
medium-sized industries rather than the plan's stress on large-scale
industry. Smaller scale manufacturing provides many more jobs per unit
of investment capital than large capital-intensive plants, and increasing
employment opportunities rapidly is necessary to accommodate the huge
additions in the labor force forecast in the plan during the 1970s and
1980s. The intermediate-sized, private industries would reduce demands
on the government's overextended budget, reduce dependence on
imported machinery and materials, reduce investments in such support
ing infrastructure as transportation and power supply, and reduce the
time lag between investment outlays and production. A larger supply of
goods is needed quickly to relieve the domestic scarcities and ease the
upward pressures on prices.

274
 SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY
CHAPTER 14
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY
When Bangladesh became independent in December 1971, its new
government was immediately confronted with the essential tasks of
creating governing institutions, armed forces, and security agencies to
establish public order in a country shattered by war and recurring natural
disasters. The administration was initially sustained by the charismatic
personal popularity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the exultation of the
Bangalee people in their newly won independence.
The social environment, however, was conducive to crime and the
proliferation of both open and clandestine political factionalism. At large
in the population were great quantities of arms and ammunition, in
cluding those held by the now-unemployed guerrilla forces, called the
Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army), who had fought the Pakistanis. Respect
for law was, on the whole, casual in a population emerging from an
insurgency war and among whom habits of active or passive
resistance—first against the British and then against the Pakistanis—
went back as far as the early 1900s or even to the uprising of 1857, known
as the Mutiny of 1857 or the Sepoy Rebellion (see ch. 2).
The organizational forms and methods adopted for the armed forces
and police and the codes of criminal law and procedure, like those of India
and Pakistan, were essentially the same as those used under the British
Indian administration (with amendments and modifications). By early
1975 the regular armed forces consisted of an ill-equipped army of about
25,000, a navy of about 700, and an air force of about 1,000 men. Both the
likelihood of these services' being called upon to perform their primary
mission of defense against external attack and their capability of doing so
were extremely low, but these forces—especially the army—were
capable of internal security duties. Service was voluntary, and recruiting
presented little difficulty in a depressed economy in which the availability
of military-age manpower was vastly in excess of the manning levels
permitted by the low armed forces budgets. The police service and the
complementary border security force called the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)
together were estimated not to exceed 30,000 in numbers.
Serious crime, in such nonpolitical forms as murder and armed robbery
and in such political forms as sabotage and factional killings, emerged at a
high level immediately after independence and increased throughout

275
1973 and 1974. Economic conditions progressively worsened and were
further crippled by widespread corruption, black-marketing, and
smuggling (see ch. 11). The efforts of security agencies to control crime
and establish order, often hampered by political interference and
cumbersome administration, were insufficient to overcome the growth of
disorder. A new paramilitary security force, therefore, and one not built
directly on a British Indian model, was organized by Mujib separately
from the armed forces and police in 1972. Called the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini
(National Defense Force or National Protection Force) or more
commonly Rakkhi Bahini, it soon became known to critics as "Mujib's
private army," and its arbitrary methods often aroused resentment and,
before 1975, elicited occasional judicial rebukes. The strength of this
force—recruited initially from among former Mukti Bahini fighters—had
grown to about 30,000 by early 1975, and it was reportedly planned to be
increased further to at least 130,000 and possibly even 150,000 in
countrywide brigade dispositions.
The levels of crime, destructive conflict among political factions, and
economic calamity led to the successive promulgation in December 1974
and January 1975 of a national emergency condition, the installation of
Mujib as president with virtually unlimited powers under a constitutional
amendment, the formation of a new national party based on Mujib's old
Awami League, and the simultaneous dissolution of all other parties (see
ch. 8). These drastic moves to stabilize the government and country were
seen as depending for success largely upon the effectiveness of
enforcement by security forces. Coordination between these separate
bodies, however, was not well established, and they had common
command only in the person of the president himself. For various
reasons, at least partly political, Mujib appeared to favor the Rakkhi
Bahini, and it was expected by analysts that this organization—loyal to
and dependent upon him—would increasingly become the main force for
establishing internal security (see Preface).

REGULAR ARMED FORCES

Military Background
The military history of Bangladesh before 1972 is part of that of the
Indian subcontinent, particularly of British India and then of Pakistan,
from 1947 through 1971. The period having the greatest influence on the
military establishments of the subcontinent began with the arrival of the
Europeans at the start of the sixteenth century and, more particularly,
with the British government's charter to the British East India Company
in 1600. As trading posts were established, native guards or watchmen
were trained in the use of arms for the protection of company trade and
for ceremonial purposes. As the number of trading posts increased, the
guards were organized into companies and battalions and trained along
British lines under the overall command of British officers. The three

276
independent forces that emerged became known as presidency armies,
and the troops as sepoys. Regular troops sent out by the British
government were also incorporated into the presidency armies. In 1748
the three armies were grouped under a single commander in chief and
organized, armed, uniformed, and trained by British officers.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of
British control was accompanied throughout India by mounting tension.
Political, social, religious, and ethnic causes resulted in sporadic
outbreaks by the people against British rule (see ch.2). There were four
eruptions in the army in the years between 1844 and 1857, although these
incidents were considered minor by the British authorities. The long
pent-up discontent of the sepoys then broke out into open revolt at
Meerut on May 10, 1857, starting the uprising known variously as the
Sepoy Revolt, the Sepoy Rebellion, or the Indian Mutiny.
The uprising, regarded by the British as a mutiny but by later South
Asian commentators as a struggle for freedom, was largely confined to
elements of the Bengal army in the upper Gangetic provinces and parts of
central India. The Punjab, including its Sikh chiefs, remained loyal to the
British. The Madras army took no part. Although the revolt began as a
military mutiny, it was not confined entirely to the army, and it marked a
turning point in the history of British India. A proclamation by Queen
Victoria terminated the government of the British East India Company,
India became a British colony, and the role of Indian forces was
reevaluated. The Bengal army was disbanded, and a complete reorgani
zation of the Indian forces followed. By 1895 the army was put under the
central authority of the army headquarters at Delhi and was divided into
four territorial commands of Punjab, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, each
commanded by a lieutenant general.
After the Mutiny of 1857 British recruitment policy became based
increasingly upon the "martial races" notion, according to which the
inhabitants of certain areas or members of certain castes or tribes were
reputed to make more fearless and disciplined soldiers than others. The
popularization of this concept is usually attributed to Lord Roberts of
Kandahar, who was commander in chief of the British Indian Army from
1885 to 1893. Lord Roberts believed that the best soldier material was to
be found in northwestern India, including the Punjab and the North-
West Frontier Province of what is now Pakistan. The period from 1890 to
1914 is sometimes referred to as "the Punjabization of the army." Lord
Roberts also favored manning certain units or subunits with members of
the same caste, tribal, or religious group from within the martial races,
and this practice became fairly common. These methods produced a
regular, apolitical, professional force responsive to British command, but
one that accentuated regional and communal distinctions. Nevertheless,
according to various military historians, the British never organized a
combat unit of battalion size or larger that was entirely composed of
Muslims.

277
 During World War I more than 1 million volunteer soldiers of the
expanded British Indian Army were sent out of the country, and more
than 100,000 were killed. By World War II Indian nationalism had gained
considerable strength since its birth late in the eighteenth century, and
support for Great Britain in this war was not as uniform as during World
War I (see ch. 2). The viceroy of India, without consulting Indian political
leaders, nevertheless declared India to be at war with Germany on
September 3, 1939. Between 1939 and mid-1945 the British Indian Army
was expanded from about 175,000 to over 2 million—entirely by
voluntary enlistment. The small navy and air force were also employed,
under British command, in Africa, Italy, the Middle East and,
particularly, in Burma and Southeast Asia.
The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 to form the new states of India
and Pakistan also entailed the division of the armed forces and equipment
of British India. Under a partition formula announced on July 1 , 1947, the
existing forces were divided on the basis of religious identification; units
with a Muslim majority were transferred to Pakistan more or less with
their records and unit designations intact. Individual Muslim servicemen
who were from the areas that were to become India were given the option
of remaining with the Indian armed forces or going to Pakistan. Hindus in
the Muslim majority units were given the same option. In both states the
newly formed armed forces continued to be organized, trained, and
employed along the familiar lines of British practice. Gradually, however,
the old term sepoy as a designation for the soldier in the ranks became
replaced by the word jawan in the armies of India, Pakistan and, later,
Bangladesh.
The forces that Pakistan inherited in 1947 from the division of the
British Indian Army contained some Bengali Muslims, and some were
always present as a small minority in the new Pakistani armed services.
These Bengalis served with their units as a matter of course in the
1947^8 and 1965 wars with India and in the numerous internal security
operations in which the regular forces of Pakistan were engaged up to
1971 (see ch. 2). The population of East Pakistan was about 55 percent of
the total of the East Wing and the West Wing at the time of the partition
of British India, and this majority ratio continued thereafter. In the
armed forces, however, the low degree of representation of East
Pakistan was a prime illustration of and major factor in the dispute that
developed between the two wings of the country.
Despite the fact that the majority of the country's population lived in
the East Wing, the seat of power was in the West Wing. West Pakistanis
dominated the government's executive branch, the legislature, the civil
service, and the police, not only in holding more important positions but
also in occupying by far the greatest number of positions. Similarly
management controls in commerce and industry were predominantly
held by West Pakistanis; and in time the Bengalis of East Pakistan
became convinced that the East Wing was being exploited economically

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for the benefit of the West Wing. Furthermore, extensive evidence has
been adduced by the government and historians of Bangladesh to support
their claim that suppression of the Bengali culture, press, and language
was deliberately undertaken, using both direct and indirect means, by
the central government (see ch. 2; ch. 7). Nowhere, however, was
evidence of inequality of representation and influence more pronounced
than in the armed forces, dominated by the Punjabis and Pathans of West
Pakistan.
A number of reasons were advanced for the low level of participation of
Bengalis in the military services. It could be pointed out that in the 1920s
the Punjab area, with about 20 million people, contributed some 350,000
recruits to the British Indian Army, whereas Bengal, with a population
base at least twice as large, had contributed in the same period only 7,000
men. Pakistani recruiting officers claimed difficulty in securing volun
teers in the East Wing; and it was widely held, at least in West Pakistan,
that the volatile, artistic, humorous, poetry-loving Bengalis were not
martially inclined in comparison with West Pakistanis—especially in
comparison with Punjabis and Pathans, among whom military orienta
tion was deeply embedded.
Behind these observations lay the traditions that had developed after
the Mutiny of 1857. Because the mutiny, or rebellion, was limited almost
entirely to the Bengal army and to the regions of north-central India and
Bengal, the British not only disbanded the Bengal army but also became
distrustful of Bengalis and concentrated military recruitment elsewhere.
Conversely British commanders and administrators were grateful to the
Punjabis, who had not mutinied, and extolled their military qualities. By
World War I the Punjabization of the regular British Indian forces was
well established; and it continued, particularly among the career cadre in
all ranks, up through World War II. Given this record of historical
events, accepted doctrines, tradition, and practices of a century or more
—all coupled with the further weight of bureaucratic inertia—there was
little wonder that the forces of Pakistan in the division of 1947 were
overwhelmingly West Pakistani in composition and that, both from
custom and self-interest, they remained that way.
East Pakistani spokesmen vigorously denounced their province's lack
of military representation and influence in military policy. All senior
military headquarters were located in West Pakistan, and almost all
Pakistani forces were stationed there. No ordnance factories or military
academies were located in the East Wing. Defense expenditures from
indigenous revenue and foreign military aid in the 1950s and 1960s
constituted the largest single item of the country's budget. Because of the
force-stationing policy and associated allocation practices, the economic
benefits from defense spending, in contracts, purchasing, and military
support jobs, redounded almost entirely to West Pakistan. Pay and
allowances to members of the armed forces also went largely into West
Pakistani hands. Until these inequities were redressed, according to the

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East Pakistani view, attempts to establish economic equality between
the East Wing and the West Wing by action in other fields would be
grossly inadequate.
From the political point of view, East Pakistanis asserted that as
citizens they had a right and obligation to participate more extensively in
the armed forces and should be represented in about the same ratio as
their numbers in the total population. With reference to Bengali
characteristics, they assailed the old, entrenched doctrine of the martial
races as ridiculous and humiliating. From the security aspect, they
pointed out that the force-stationing policy left East Pakistan virtually
defenseless and that no planning was under way to remedy this situation.
All these arguments, although frequently and eloquently advanced,
had little effect from 1947 up through the presidential regime of
Mohammad Ayub Khan (1958-69) (see ch. 2). Ayub held that East
Pakistan was indefensible without the prior development of strong forces
and bases in West Pakistan. On this principle, ostensibly, he continued
existing practices, although a slow increase in East Pakistani participa
tion did occur. In 1956 Pakistan's army had a total of 894 officers in the
grades of major through lieutenant general. Of this number only
fourteen, or 1.6 percent, were of East Pakistani origin. Of these only one
was of brigadier rank—the highest grade held until then by a Bengali
officer. At the same time naval officers of all ranks numbered 593, only
seven of whom, or 1.2 percent, were of Bengali origin. The air force then
had a total of 640 officers, forty ofwhom, or6.3percent, had origins in the
East Wing.
By 1965 the participation ratios had slightly improved, although they
were still far from East Pakistani desires and expectations. Among the
total of 6,000 officers, 5 percent were East Pakistani—one of them had
become a major general. In the navy and air force, with officer totals of
800 and 1,200, respectively, the overall percentages of Bengalis had
increased somewhat more than in the army but were still at a distinct
minority level. In general, although this was not exclusively so, Bengali
officers in the navy and air force were in technical or administrative
rather than command positions.
The issue of representation in the forces and in military policy
remained an active element in the struggle of East Pakistan for
autonomy, economic equality, and the safeguarding of its identity. In
February 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, head of the East Pakistani
Awami League, announced a six-point program calling for reconstitution
of Pakistan as a federation of the two wings. Mujib's pronouncement was,
in effect, a summary statement of East Pakistan's position in its dispute
with the national government, and it became the political platform of the
Awami League. Significantly, the sixth point of this program, or
manifesto, held that the federating units should each "be empowered to
maintain a militia or paramilitary force in order to contribute effectively
toward national security." This point was, at times, expanded to

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encompass the attainment by East Pakistan of self-sufficiency in defense
matters. Specific actions called for under the sixth point included
establishment in the East Wing of an ordnance factory, a military
academy, and the federal naval headquarters.
Mujib's six points were never accepted as a package by the central
government. On July 28, 1969, however, President Agha Mohammad
Yahya Khan, who had succeeded Ayub earlier that year, announced a
major policy decision. The recruitment of East Pakistanis into the
military services was to be doubled. This announcement was acclaimed
by all political groups in East Pakistan; on October 27, 1969, the Pakistan
Observer in Dacca commented: "The myth that the East Pakistani does
not make a good soldier is long exploded. General Yahya Khan's directive
that recruitment to the army should be doubled is therefore very
welcome news."
Among other steps taken, the minimum height for enlistment was at
last reduced from five feet six inches to five feet four inches. Bengalis are,
on the average, smaller than Punjabis and Pathans, and the old height
requirement had long operated to exclude Bengalis from military service.
Under these various stimuli, East Pakistani participation in the forces
increased, but it had not even closely approached a percentage
comparable to the ratio in the population at large when the civil war
erupted in March 1971. At that time, according to the Pakistani military
historian Fazal Muqeem Khan, the East Pakistani element in all officer
and enlisted ranks constituted "only about 20 percent of the total strength
of the army." This figure was believed by other analysts to be a very high
estimate; about 10 percent, in their contention, was a more likely, but still
generous, approximation.
By early 1971 there were only two military organizations specifically
indentified with East Pakistan. One of these was the East Bengal
Regiment (EBR) of the regular army; the other was the lightly armed
paramilitary border security force called the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR).
When the British Indian Army was divided in 1947, the infantry units
inherited by Pakistan were composed entirely of men from West
Pakistan. Soon afterward, the EBR was established. In keeping with
British organizational practice—upon which the forces of Pakistan, India
and later, Bangladesh were all based—an infantry regiment does not
operate as a unit or with a fixed number of battalions. Instead, a
regimental center is established. Here any number of battalions, all
thereafter identified with the regimental origin, are raised, trained, and
then sent out separately to serve with other units at various locations.
The 1st Battalion of the EBR was raised in February 1948 and the 2d
Battalion in December of the same year. Thereafter six more battalions
were formed. The 9th Battalion was being raised at the EBR center in
Chittagong when the civil war broke out in March 1971.
From 1947 onward the problem of smuggling, particularly of jute,
along the border with India was acute. To prevent this traffic and other

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forms of illegal entry or egress and to maintain law and order along the
borders, the EPR was established in 1949 and in the next few years was
gradually increased in numbers and effectiveness. This force was
deployed along the border at key points in platoon-and squad-size
outposts that could be collected into company- and even battalion-size
formations on order. Usually the EPR functioned under the Ministry of
Home Affairs in close liaison with the East Pakistan police. The EPR
could, however, be attached to the army by presidential direction. This
occurred, for example, in 1953, when the central government directed the
army to conduct an antismuggling campaign and placed the EPR under
army command for this operation. At that time the army in East Pakistan
consisted of one division, composed almost entirely of West Pakistanis.
In December 1970 the elections in East Pakistan returned an
overwhelming endorsement for Bengali nationalist candidates of the
Awami League. The central government of Pakistan, however, rejected
the demands of the Awami League, and on March 1, 1971, President
Yahya Khan postponed the scheduled National Assembly session—in
which the Awami League representatives would have held a distinct
majority.
During the autumn of 1970 a number of factional paramilitary bands
appeared on the scene in East Pakistan. Among the groups were several
sponsored by offshoot elements of the splintered East Pakistan
Communist Party. During the war of 1971 these small communist groups,
dedicated to a revolution more or less in Maoist terms, fought against
each other and everyone else, often degenerated into mere terrorism and
banditry, and exerted little or no influence on the final outcome. The
strongest of the new paramilitary bands and the one that would have the
most effect on future events was organized under the noncommunist
Awami League's military committee headed by Colonel M. A.G. Osmany,
a retired officer of the Pakistan army. This band was raised as the
league's action arm and security force, with the view that it could be
expanded into a guerrilla force and even into conventional military
formations.
Osmany recruited his force at first from the Awami League's youth
branch, called the East Pakistan Students League; from the security
militia called ansars and mujahids, who were trained, respectively, by
the police and army; and even from the urban, strong-arm toughs known
throughout the subcontinent as goondas. As the base of recruitment was
expanded, stocks of arms and ammunition were clandestinely collected.
Contacts were made also among those officers and men of East Pakistani
origin in the regular Pakistani forces and the EPR. Initially Osmany's
Awami League band was called Sevak Bahini (Service Force); after its
expansion, it became known as the Mukti Fauj (Liberation Force—more
loosely, Freedom Fighters). In turn, this name gave way to a more
proper Bengali usage having the same meaning—Mukti Bahini, the name
of the indigenous guerrilla forces in the civil war of 1971.

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 By December 1970 the East Pakistani plan of action took form under
three sequential headings: to attain objectives by political negotiations, if
possible; if these negotiations failed, to seize power and declare
independence in a militant uprising; if this failed, then to withdraw the
leadership and all possible forces to the Indian border areas, rebuild, and
conduct a long-term guerrilla war of political and military attrition.
Yahya Khan's postponement of the National Assembly session on
March 1, 1970, was a clear signal to the Bengali nationalists in East
Pakistan that negotiations with the central government were not going to
succeed, and this date is ascribed by some analysts as the start of the
revolt. Terrorist strikes by the Mukti Bahini against central government
offices and agencies began. Supplies to Pakistan army units from local
sources were interrupted. In early March Mujib called for a hartal, or
work stoppage and general civil disobedience, that paralyzed the conduct
of government and business. The already existing condition of civil unrest
became worse in Dacca and throughout the country, not only in political
activism but also in crimes of violence and banditry accompanying the
general breakdown of law and order.
The central government had increased its regular forces in East
Pakistan to about 60,000. President Yahya Khan endeavored to reassert
government authority and to solve the East Pakistan problem by a
massive use of force; and on the night of March 25-26, 1971, the Pakistan
army launched a major planned offensive against the Bengali nationalists
and any of the civil population even remotely suspected of supporting
them. This operation was under the overall direction of Lieutenant
General Tikka Khan, who on March 7 had become the provincial governor
and martial law administrator and also the general officer commanding,
Eastern Command. Mujib declared a war of independence to be in effect
on the night of March 25; later that night he was seized and flown to West
Pakistan, where he was imprisoned for the rest of the war. Most other
members of the Awami League leadership escaped, however, and at a
place near the Indian border, thereafter called Mujibnagar, proclaimed
the independence of Bangladesh on April 17, 1971.
In the month after the Pakistani crackdown of March 25, 1971, military
operations spread throughout the country. The EBR, the EPR, and
most of the East Pakistani police and their auxiliaries joined in the revolt.
The Pakistan high command apparently never adequately considered
that those units composed mainly of Bengalis might not only defect but
also participate actively in a revolt; their wholesale, planned defection in
the early weeks of the war was a surprise to the Pakistani command and
of supreme importance to the Bangladesh cause. West Pakistani officers
serving with these units were killed or seized. The Bengali units, after
fighting numerous actions against the West Pakistani regulars, gradually
withdrew and merged into the Mukti Bahini, where they provided the
essential core of leadership and organizational bases for the rest of the
war.

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 A number of retired officers and men also added their skills in training.
On April 14 Osmany officially became commander in chief of the Mukti
Bahini as a unified force. In the succeeding months, a general insurgency
war developed. Civilian casualties mounted into hundreds of thousands;
the official Bangalee estimate is that 3 million were killed. An estimated
10 million refugees (reported to have been 90 percent Hindu) poured
across the border into India. Some Pakistani sources assert that the
figure of 10 million is highly inflated, but this approximation of the
number of refugees has received wide acceptance.
The initial operations by the Pakistani army failed to destroy the Mukti
Bahini or to prevent its expansion and development. By late May,
however, Pakistani authority had been widely reasserted. Tikka Khan
relinquished the post of general officer commanding, Eastern Command,
to Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi on April 11 but remained as
governor and martial law administrator. Rebel forces were largely
confined to the border areas of the Indian states of West Bengal, Assam,
and Tripura. India permitted the Mukti Bahini to use these areas for
bases and sanctuary and provided substantial materiel and training.
In early July 1971 the expanded, better organized, and better equipped
Mukti Bahini undertook what was called the monsoon offensive.
Pakistan's forces had, however, been reinforced, and a paramilitary
border security force called razakars had been raised in Bangladesh by
the Pakistani administration. The weary Pakistani regulars, fighting a
strange war in a strange land, contained the monsoon offensive, and by
mid-August Mukti Bahini activity was again at a low ebb. With objectives
believed to be accomplished, Tikha Khan was permitted to return to West
Pakistan in August, being relieved as governor by A.M. Malik and as
martial law administrator by Niazi.
The Mukti Bahini had gained valuable experience and shown increased
capability. Back in their border base area, they regrouped again.
Recruitment was never a serious problem, and numerical losses were
easily replaced. Indian aid and participation materially increased; the
tempo of fighting again picked up by October, and Pakistan formed two
more divisions in the east during that month and November, raising its
troop strength there to about 80,000. Border clashes between Indian and
Pakistani forces became frequent.
Niazi's forces in East Pakistan were dispersed for border security and
antiguerrilla operations and, despite the growing threat of all-out war
with India, were not in a defensive posture suitable to engage large,
conventional military formations. In November 1971 Pakistan's major
units included, altogether, two armored divisions and fourteen infantry
divisions, plus supporting forces, and paramilitary organizations. By
contrast, India's recently reequipped armed forces had substantial
advantages in overall numbers and other factors. Major units included
the equivalent of two armored divisons, thirteen infantry divisions, ten
mountain divisions, and at least eight independent brigades.
In response to Indian military incursions into East Pakistan in late
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November, Pakistan on December 3, 1971, launched a series of
preventive air strikes against Indian airfields and on December 4
declared war. The initial Pakistani air strikes were ineffective, and the
Indian air force attained air superiority within the next twenty-four
hours and held it. The Pakistan air force detachment in the east was
destroyed, and supply and escape routes were cut off; in the west the
Indian air force systematically struck aircraft and airfields, base
installations, communication centers, and troop concentrations. At sea an
Indian navy task force immobilized the port facilities of East Pakistan and
landed an amphibious force to cut off escape routes to Burma. At the
same time a task force in the west contained Pakistani fleet and damaged
port installations at Karachi.
On the ground the Indian strategic plan was aimed at East Pakistan as
first priority, while simultaneously containing Pakistan in the west. The
Indian force that immediately invaded East Pakistan consisted of nine
infantry divisions with attached armor units and supporting arms. This
force advanced rapidly, bypassing intermediate cities and obstacles and
pressing relentlessly toward the capital at Dacca. At the same time,
guerrilla attacks were intensified by some 50,000 or more of the Mukti
Bahini. In addition to these, at least three brigades of Mukti Bahini in
conventional formations were with the Indian forces. Surprised by the
speed and power of the Indian advance, Pakistan's four divisions and
smaller separate units fought a number of hard actions but were soon
bottled up, with escape cut off and without air support. On December 16
Dacca fell, and Niazi, the Pakistani commander, surrendered with about
75,000 men to Lieutenent GeneralJ. S. Aurora, the Indian commander of
the combined Indian and Bengali forces. In the west India's forces had
effectively contained attacks in Punch, Chhamb, and Rajasthan and had
elsewhere made limited advances into West Pakistan. After the fall of
Dacca, India declared a unilateral cease-fire on December 16 that was
accepted by Pakistan on the following day.
Pakistan's president, General Yahya Khan, resigned on December 20,
1971, and was simultaneously replaced as president and chief martial law
administrator by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who released Mujib. The Awami
League leadership returned to Dacca on December 22, 1971. Mujib
himself returned by way of London, arriving in Dacca on January 11,
1972, to a hero's welcome amid tumultuous popular acclaim.
The state of Bangladesh was now established. It was a land revaged by
war and natural disasters and heavily dependent upon foreign aid. A
climate of disorder still prevailed, and a period followed of revenge-
taking by footloose members of the Mukti Bahini against razakars
and other collaborators with Pakistan. Given the enormous popular
support for Mujib, however, the new government he headed in
stalled itself without opposition. Indian forces initially remained in
Bangladesh to consolidate their victory and to assist in stabilizing the new
government, but they completed their withdrawal on March 12, 1972.
A difficult residual issue was that of the prisoner exchange. India held
285
about 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees, while
Bangladesh retained 195 Pakistanis (mostly military) with the intent—
later put aside—of bringing them to trial for war crimes. Pakistan also
held some prisoners, but in far lesser numbers. Under agreements finally
reached by the governments of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan in
August 1973 and April 1974, prisoner release and repatriation in all
categories were completed by April 30, 1975 (see ch. 10).
New public institutions had to be created in Bangladesh after
independence, either from scratch or from the remnants of the former
provincial organizational forms. Regular armed forces were quickly
established but, because of budgetary constraints, on an extremely
limited scale. The organizational patterns and practices of these forces
reflected not only the background from the days of the British Indian
Army, especially as continued under the army of Pakistan, but also the
experience of the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war of independence. Most of
these guerrilla, freedom fighters, still holding their arms, had to revert to
civilian status. Countrywide, after the civil war, vast but unknown
numbers of small arms and automatic weapons remained at large in the
population, presaging trouble in the years ahead (see Security Environ
ment, this ch.).
Mission and Roles of the Armed Forces
The 1972 Constitution provides that "the supreme command of the
defence services of Bangladesh shall vest in the President and the
exercise thereof shall be regulated by law." The Constitution also pro
vides that the Parliament may legislate for the establishment and
regulation of the services but that, until it did so, the president of the
republic could by order direct any such matters not covered by existing
law. Similarly, the assent of the Parliament is required for declaring and
participating in war, but the president was authorized to "take whatever
steps he considers necessary" in case of actual or imminent invasion,
subject to later parliamentary assent. Further, in a highly elastic
clause, the Constitution states that "nothing in this Constitution shall
invalidate any law enacted by Parliament which is expressed to be for the
purpose of securing the public safety and preservation of the State in time
of war, invasion, or armed rebellion."
By these provisions the definition, organization, and control of the
armed forces are clearly placed in the hands of the executive, with
virtually no limitation on a president supported by a compliant
parliament. Any doubts on this score were effectively removed by the
emergency proclamations of December 28, 1974, and January3, 1975, and
confirmed by the action of the Parliament on January 25, 1975, in a
constitutional amendment act that placed all governing powers in the
hands of Mujib and, in effect, set up a presidential dictatorship (see ch. 8).
The primary mission of the armed forces is the classic one of defending
the country's territorial integrity by land, sea, and air; the secondary
mission is participating with the civil police and paramilitary forces in
establishing and maintaining public order and internal security. All
forces may be used, according to their capabilities, for emergency relief
and rescue missions and for specific enforcement operations, such as the
recurring government campaigns against smuggling.
In practice, in 1975 the mission of internal security was more important
and immediate than the inherent role of defending the country against
overt invasion. For the navy and the air force the primary task was that of
their own organization and development, since both were so small and
minimally established as to have little, if any, operational significance.
Organization and Administration
Headquarters of the three services were at Dacca, where the principal
army and air force bases are located. The navy's main operational base is
at Chittagong. In early 1975 there was no joint staff or uniformed joint
commander. As president, Mujib was commander in chief and, through
the presidential secretariat, he acted as defense minister. The senior
active officer of the three services was Major General K. M. Safiullah,
chief of staff of the army—the dominant and by far the largest of the
three regular services. He and the army deputy chief of staff, Ziaur Rah
man, were promoted to the temporary grade of major general in October
1973, becoming the only active duty officers in this or equivalent rank.
After the 1971 war most older officers were retired or assigned to
diplomatic or other government posts rather than in the military forces.
For example, Lieutenant General Khwaja Wasiuddin, the only Bengali
ever to attain this rank in the Pakistan army and in 1975 still a relatively
young man, was stationed in the West Wing at the outbreak of the war.
After the war he returned to Bangladesh in the exchange that began in
the fall of 1973. He joined the new Bangladesh army but was at once sent
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later sent as ambassador to
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan. Osmany, already retired before taking
command of the Mukti Bahini, held various cabinet posts after the war
until his resignation in mid-1974.
In all three services, rank structure and uniforms continued, in
somewhat simplified form and with differences in emblems and badges, to
be essentially the same as those of the British Indian services. Because of
the small size and newness of the Bangladesh regular forces, not all
grades in the full rank structure used by India and Pakistan were used in
1975 by Bangladesh, but presumably all could be utilized in the event of
force expansion.
The pay and allowances, however, of the military grade structure were
fixed by the National Pay Commission, whose report was accepted by the
government and made effective on July 1, 1973. In this action all
government employees, both civil and military, were to be classified into
ten parallel grades with a total of seventeen steps, or pay scales. This
formal classification had not been completed by 1975, but personnel were

287
being paid on the seventeen-scale basis. The maximum monthly salary, in
grade one, was set at Tk2,000 (for value of the taka—see Glossary);
the minimum, in the lowest scale of grade ten, was Tkl30. Active duty
officers holding the rank of brigadier (or higher) or assigned as a chief or
deputy chief of staff were classed as grade one. For those not occupying
government quarters, housing allowances by grade were authorized. A
revision of retirement benefits was also accepted in principle, although
not then implemented. Since 1973, because of rapidly rising prices, some
minor cost-of-living pay increases have been made.
The administration of military justice and the military court system are
based on three separate but substantively similar service laws: the Army
Act of 1952 (a modification of the Indian Army Act of 1911); the Air Force
Act of 1953; and the Navy Ordinance of 1961. These statutes, as amended
since their enactments and modified in terminology by Bangladesh, are
administered by the respective services. The nomenclature and composi
tion of military courts vary slightly according to the service; but court
procedures, types of offenses, scales of punishments, jurisdictional
authority, appeal and review procedures, and procedures for commuta
tion and suspension of sentences are almost identical for all the services.
The military justice system is regularly applicable in the management
of the armed forces in peace or war and is separate from the functions of
military personnel in the administration of martial law. Under the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of 1975, all governing powers—
including control of all courts and the administration of justice—were
placed in the hands of the president. Under the 1972 Constitution the
president was already commander in chief, but he—rather than
Parliament—then became responsible for propounding the laws and
regulations governing the armed services. Observers believed that for
purposes of routine administration the existing system of military justice
would simply continue to operate. Serious problems of military law and
its relationship to civil law, however, could now only be finally resolved
by presidential authority, and it was not yet clear in early 1975 how
existing codes and legal processes would be affected in detail by the
change in form of government.
Military organizational forms and nomenclature, training and tactical
doctrine, and administrative practices continued, on the whole, to follow
or be guided by the old patterns of British Indian days. By and large, all
forces were ill equipped in 1975. In December 1971 Pakistani troops lost
or surrendered all their arms and equipment. The new Bangladesh
regular forces got little of it, however, since most of this military
hardware was taken back to India by the Indian forces who had captured
it or received it at the surrender.
In early 1975 the army had a total strength of about 25,000 men and was
basically still a light infantry force and deficient in transport. The old
EBR was no longer in existence, although some of its members remained
on duty in the new army. Principal army formations included five infantry

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brigades with a total of seventeen battalions, one tank battalion, three
artillery battalions, three engineer battalions, and one signal battalion.
The heaviest equipment items on hand were 105-mm howitzers and
obsolete, mostly nonoperational, light tanks of United States origin.
The 700-man navy, with bases at Chittagong, Chalna, and Dacca, had
three armed river steamers and one Soviet (Poluchat class) seaward
patrol boat, all displacing about 100 tons. The navy's function, in
consequence, was limited to coast guard patrol duties and training. In
1975 plans called for expansion in the future to 1,000 and then to 3,000
men and for upgrading vessels to the frigate class and possibly later to the
destroyer category.
The air force was established, like the navy, in 1972. By 1975 it had a
total strength of about 1,000 men and about twenty combat aircraft
consisting of Soviet MiG-21s and F-86 Sabre jets of United States origin.
The MiG-21s, secured in 1973, were the most modern major item held by
any of the armed services. After their receipt, the older Sabre
jets—salvaged from the Pakistan air force—were used as operational
trainers. Other aircraft on hand included a DC-6, a Caribou, and several
other transports; a few Alouette and Wessex helicopters (of French and
British origin, respectively); and a few miscellaneous light aircraft.
Manpower and Recruitment
In early 1975 all armed forces continued to be manned by volunteers;
there was no compulsory service system. The availability of military-age
manpower in the predominantly young, rapidly growing population far
exceeded the small armed forces requirements in the early 1970s; and the
economic attractions of employment in a critically depressed economy
assured an ample supply of recruits for such vacancies as became
available. The number of men in the regular armed forces was so small in
relation to the overall working force of the nation as to be almost
insignificant, but their employment in the military services did contribute
economically in a minor way by removing them from job competition and
by the return of their pay to the economy (see ch. 3).
The excess availability of manpower and recruit applicants permitted a
high degree of selectivity, although in some instances posts requiring
skilled technicians were hard to fill. Most of the officers and noncommis
sioned officers have a background of training and experience in the
military services of Pakistan and, in the case of the army, in the Mukti
Bahini. In the pre-1971 Pakistan navy and air force, the proportion of
Bengalis had been greater than in the army and, in general, these men
tended to occupy technical and administrative positions. For example,
the first Bangladesh chief of naval staff, appointed in March 1972, was
trained at Great Britain's Royal Naval Engineering College and served
as an engineer officer in the Pakistan navy. Such officers and
noncommissioned officers formed the competent core of the Bangladesh
forces in 1975.

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 These new forces continued to be limited not only by severe budgetary
restrictions but also by the capacity of this small core of trained
professionals to handle any substantial increase of the military services in
men and materiel. The development of expanded leadership and technical
cadres was, therefore, a matter of highest priority for all services. In
January 1975 the Bangladesh Military Academy established at Comilla
was training the first class of army officer cadets.
Military Expenditures and Foreign Aid
During the first half year of its national life, or through June 1972, the
Bangladesh government budgeted for current, nondevelopmental de
fense services expenditures some Tk136.5 million, or about Tk273 million
on an assumed annual basis. For the next fiscal year (FY), 1973, the
amount initially budgeted was Tk400 million, later revised downward to
Tk250 million. In FY 1974 the initial budget was Tk470 million, revised
upward to Tk600 million and followed by an initial budget for FY 1975 of
Tk710 million. These amounts as part of total government current
expenditures were as follows: FY 1972, 13.8 percent; FY 1973 (revised),
11.1 percent; FY 1974 (revised), 16.5 percent; and FY 1975, 15.1 percent.
Details of defense expenditures were not reliably known; the foregoing
figures cover only current outlays, such as pay and allowances,
consumable supplies, and maintenance costs. They do not include foreign
military aid in kind or credit, or capitalization from indigenous revenue of
major items of equipment or property. Value amounts in these latter
categories, however, were low. The downward revision of current
expenditures in FY 1973 was a retrenchment measure caused primarily
by the worsening economic conditions. The upward revision, however, in
FY 1974 and again in FY 1975 reflected, at least in part, an increase of
about 8,000 men in the army and rising costs caused by local and
worldwide inflation.
In several speeches during December 1974, Mujib declared that the
armed services would be strengthened and that both the defense and
police forces would be reorganized. By early 1975, however, as shown by
the size of the regular services and the scope of military expenditures,
outlays for the regular forces were, at best, modest. Bangladesh could
neither afford nor manage a major military expansion. Foreign aid, on
which the country was heavily dependent, was directed mainly to civilian
economic purposes and humanitarian relief (see ch. 11).
The Indian military intervention in the war of 1971 represented
military aid in its most direct form, without which Bangladesh would not
have come into existence as an independent state in December of that
year, if at all. Since then Bangladesh has received some military aid from
India in the form of training and minor equipment items, and it has a
mutual security alliance with that country included in the Indo-
Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of March 19, 1972.
By the end of 1973 total military aid received by Bangladesh was

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estimated to be valued at only about US$47 million. Contributions from
India and other countries, none of which was a major world arms
supplier, were valued at US$18 million. The Soviet Union was the only
major arms producer involved and accounted for the balance of about
US$29 million. Most of this value was believed by analysts to be
represented by the MiG-21 squadron acquired by Bangladesh in 1973.
Four minesweepers of the Soviet navy provided operational aid during
1972 and 1973 by sweeping coastal waters for mines remaining from the
1971 war. In late 1974 Egypt provided Bangladesh with approximately
thirty T-54 tanks. The most likely future suppliers to Bangladesh appear
to be India and the Soviet Union.

POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES

The Police and the Bangladesh Rifles
As in most government services, the basic organizational and
administrative system of the Bangladesh police is a modified continuation
of that prevailing in the country when it was the province of East
Pakistan. This sytem, in turn, stemmed directly from that of the British
Indian service developed and codified by colonial administrators during
the long period of the British Raj. The general system is embodied in the
Police Act of 1861, as amended. After the rapid political division of the
subcontinent in 1947, it was almost inevitable that the new states of
Pakistan and India—both by inclination and by the pressures of
necessity—should continue to use these familiar forms and methods,
subject to minor regional variations and necessary changes in nationalist
nomenclature.
In the East Wing senior police posts were held by officers of the elite
Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), most of whom were from the West
Wing. Lower ranking officers, however, and the police rank and file were
Bengalis. When the war for independence broke out in March 1971, most
of the East Pakistani police defected and eitherjoined the Mukti Bahini or
simply disappeared, and the police system quickly broke down. When the
war ended, there was, in effect, no police system except that which had
been maintained by the combatant armies in the areas they controlled.
Police services, therefore, had to be reconstituted and rebuilt by the new
government of Bangladesh. This process was begun at once, but it could
not be quickly accomplished and was continuing in 1975. Once again, as in
1947 and for similar reasons, this rebuilding process utilized the familiar
forms of the previous system.
Police matters in 1975 were directed by the Ministry of Home Affairs
through an official called the home secretary. The senior uniformed
officer, or chief of Bangladesh police, is the inspector general at Dacca.
Under him, in what is for most purposes a national police service, are the
senior police officers and their men at the descending levels of local
goverment. There are no separate municipality police. In early 1975

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Bangladesh was still divided for local government into four divisions,
twenty-one (until 1975, nineteen) districts, sixty-two subdivisions, and
419 thanas (see ch. 3; ch. 8). Some reports suggested that the local
government units and names were to undergo further redesignation, at
least in part, after adoption of the presidental-executive form of national
government on January 25, 1975, but confirmation and details of any such
changes were not available early in the year.
Police officers are categorized as gazetted or subordinate, roughly
analogous, respectively, to commissioned and noncommissioned officers
in the military services. The subordinate grades are further classed into
upper and lower categories. The top four police grades, in descending
order, are those of inspector general, deputy inspector general,
superintendent, and assistant superintendent. Below these gazetted
ranks are the upper subordinate positions, in descending order, of
inspector, subinspector, and assistant subinspector. Below them are the
bulk of policemen in the lower subordinate grades of head constable and
constable.
The inspector general supervises staff departments concerned with
criminal investigation, identification, communications, administration,
and supply. He is further responsible for supervision over the police
ranges, divisions coterminous with the political divisions and each under
a deputy inspector general. Within the ranges, the districts form the
fulcrum of police operations. The district chief is a superintendent;
subordinate to him are one or more assistant superintendents and a
number of inspectors and other ranks. The senior subdivisional police
officer is an assistant superintendent; the thana, or station house, is
supervised by one of the upper subordinate grades, called the station
house officer, with about ten head constables and constables at the
station. The thana is also the seat of the lowest court and magistrate; its
territory consists of several unions, each consisting of several villages.
Assisting the regular police are part-time village constables called
ansars, who report violations to the nearest police station or apprehend
offenders on police orders. These village constables are recruited locally
and receive a pittance.
A new category of police was established by Article 16 of the
Emergency Powers Rules of 1975, published January 3, 1975, under
authority of the Emergency Powers Ordinance of 1974. Article 16 states,
in part, that "a district magistrate [that is the deputy commissioner, also
called the district officer] or any other officer of government authorized in
this behalf by the government may, by order, appoint persons to act as
special police officers for such time and within such limits as may be
specified in the order." The article also states that such officers shall have
the same powers and duties as ordinary police officers. Elsewhere the
1975 rules grant greatly extended powers of apprehension, search, and
seizure to the police; these extended powers also pertain, presumably, to
the new special police as well. Finally, Article 16 provides penalties,

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including imprisonment, for those refusing or abandoning appointment to
special police service without excuse. To what extend the special police
article had been or would be implemented was not yet known in early
1975.
At all levels the senior police officer responds to the chain of command
of police organization, but he is also responsible in many matters to the
general direction of designated civil government officials. These multiple
lines of command sometimes cause confusion and disagreement, but the
principle of ultimate civilian control was established in the Police Act of
1861 and continued thereafter. Thus, at the national level the inspector
general reports to the home secretary; at the division, or police range,
level the deputy inspector general answers to the divisional commis
sioner; and at the district level the police superintendent is subordinate to
the deputy commissioner—the district officer and magistrate—who is in
charge of tax collection, law and order, and administration of justice.
Although the deputy commissioner has no authority to interfere directly
in the internal organization and discipline of the police, an important
part of his duties is to inspect the police stations of his district at regular
intervals. In case the deputy commissioner and the police chief disagree
on issues relating to police functioning, the deputy commissioner's
judgment rules, but he is dependent upon police cooperation. In case of
serious differences, however, both may refer the disputed matter to
higher authorities for reconciliation: the deputy commissioner to his
commissioner and the superintendent to his deputy inspector general.
Under Mujib's government from 1972 onward, the processes of local
government and police administration became increasingly politicized
and subject to Awami League party interference. With the advent of the
authoritarian one-party state under the Fourth Amendment, it seemed
that the real direction of these processes in the future would be controlled
by party men appointed to office rather than a professional civil
service-police bureaucracy in the old manner.
Total police strength in 1975 was not accurately known but was
estimated not to exceed 18,000 to 20,000 men, excluding ansars and
paramilitary forces. The core of the force was composed of veteran
officers and men of the old East Pakistan police who had supported the
cause of Bangladesh and the Awami League. At Sardah, in the Rajshahi
District, a police training center, which had been the old provincial
center, provided training for new constables and certain courses for older
officers. Countrywide the regular police were overworked. In the lower
subordinate grades, whose numbers account for about 90 percent of the
police, the pay is poor, advancement is slow, and educational levels and
public acceptability are low. In general the police are often viewed in
public opinion as an oppressive arm of government characterized by
widespread petty corruption.
During the war of 1971 the long-established paramilitary border
security force called the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) defected from

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Pakistan and fought with the Mukti Bahini (see Regular Armed Forces,
this ch.). After the war, in view of the continuing border security
requirement, this force was reconstituted as the Bangladesh Rifles
(BDR), organized and directed much the same as the older body had
been. In 1975 total BDR strength was estimated at 13,000. Like the
police, the BDR is under the Ministry of Home Affairs and works in close
liaison with the police. For special operations the BDR may be attached
to the army by presidential directive.

The National Defense Force: Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini

In late February 1972, about two months after it became independent,
the Bangladesh government directed that all bahinis (nonregular armed
bands and forces), including the Mukti Bahini, were abolished and
thereafter prohibited from seizing or holding property and issuing orders
to the public. The intent of this ill-enforced directive was to stabilize and
regularize the new government's control by disestablishing the many
factional bands left over from the war of independence, discouraging
banditry, and promoting public security.
In the absence, however, of an effective police system (the police were
then being reconstituted from the larger cities and towns outward), the
urgent requirement for a stabilizing law-and-order force in rural areas
prompted Mujib's Awami League government to create in mid-1972 a
new bahini of its own—the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, (National Defense
Force), usually called simply the Rakkhi Bahini. Intended as a village
paramilitary security force, the Rakkhi Bahini was initially recruited
from former Mukti Bahini guerrillas, who were thereby, according to
apologists, provided with useful public employment in their psychological
transition from war to the civil pursuits of a society at peace and were
diverted from banitry—a course many of them had already taken. Many
Bangalee critics, however, quickly began referring to the Rakkhi Bahini
as a political enforcement body, applying to it such terms as "Mujib's
private army" or "storm troopers of the Awami League." Mujib insisted
that the Rakkhi Bahini was a "government militia" organized to help the
police. As the Rakkhi Bahini grew, however, both foreign and Bangalee
observers frequently noted that, although the Rakkhi Bahini might
officially be intended to protect villagers against crime and violence, it
was not at all clear how the villagers were to be protected from the
Rakkhi Bahini.
From the outset the Rakkhi Bahini was neither assigned to nor
controlled by either the regular armed forces under the Ministry of
Defence or the police and paramilitary forces under the Ministry of Home
Affairs. In 1975 the organization was reported as functioning under the
presidential secretariat; this meant, in effect, that the Rakkhi Bahini
commander reported directly to President Mujib Rahman.
Total strength of the Rakkhi Bahini in early 1975 was reported to be
about 30,000 men equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, and

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some heavier infantry weapons. The force's main base was in the Savar
quarter on the outskirts of Dacca. Recruiting was continuing on a
countrywide basis and, according to international press sources, plans
called for expansion to about 130,000 men organized in brigades of about
7,000 each, one brigade to be stationed in at least nineteen of the
twenty-one districts. Brigade-level organizations in this number and
strength, observers noted, would imply an overall Rakkhi Bahini
strength of perhaps 150,000 and a probable mission as central security
reserves rather than simply as village guards.
Budgetary allocations for development of the Rakkhi Bahini were
made at the expense of the regular armed forces, which were not
programmed for - any substantial expansion in FY 1976. India has
provided aid in training the Rakkhi Bahini through advisers in
Bangladesh, during 1972 and 1973, and at its own military school. In July
1974 Indian air force planes reportedly flew at least 100 Rakkhi Bahini
officer cadets to the famous Indian military academy at Dehra Dun for one
year's training. The extent, if any, of Indian aid in arms and supplies was
not known; but the resemblance of the Rakkhi Bahini uniforms to those of
the Indian army led to further speculation that the force was in receipt of
such aid.
The insignia, or flash, adopted by the Rakkhi Bahini was that of a
clenched yellow hand with one finger pointing skyward, on a red field.
The symbolism of the erect finger was a reminder of Mujib's favored
gesture in his speeches to the people of Bangladesh. Press services
quoted a Rakkhi Bahini officer as saying that the insignia stood for
"Mujib's order, which we are determined to carry out—absolutely."
During 1974 the Rakkhi Bahini's reputation for strong-arm constraints
against people (especially young men) or organizations critical of or
suspected to be in opposition to Mujib's government became increasingly
unsavory. In May 1974 the Supreme Court of Bangladesh took what was
regarded by many analysts as a position of great courage in the best
tradition of the independent judiciary. In a case involving questionable
restraint of an advocate (who had at one time represented Mujib in the
days of Pakistani rule), the court held that the Rakkhi Bahini was
"functioning without any rules of procedure or code of conduct. . . .Rakkhi
Bahini methods of operation have shown a complete disregard of the
procedural reforms enjoined by the Constitution as well as by the general
law of the country." By early 1975, however, the 1972 Constitution and
the court system at all levels were alike emasculated by the Fourth
Amendment, and there appeared to be no effective restraint upon the
burgeoning Rakkhi Bahini except the orders of its sponsor and prinicpal
political beneficiary, President Mujibur Rahman (see Preface).

CRIMINAL LAW AND THE EMERGENCY RULES OF 1975

In general the criminal codes and procedures in effect in Bangladesh in
1975 continued to be certain basic statutues from the period of British

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Indian rule, as amended during that time and later amended by Pakistan
and by Bangladesh. These basic documents include: the Penal Code, first
promulgated in 1860 as the Indian Penal Code; the Police Act of 1861; the
Evidence Act of 1872; the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898; the
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908; and the Official Secrets Act of
1911.
The major classes of crimes are listed in the Penal Code, which, as
amended, is the country's most important and most comprehensive penal
statute. Among the listed categories of more serious crimes are activities
called "offenses against the state"; the Penal Code authorizes the
government to prosecute any person or group of persons conspiring or
abetting in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. An
offense of this nature is also defined as "war against the state"; whether
the offense constitutes a conspiracy is determined by the "intent" of the
participant, rather than by the number of the participants involved, so as
to distinguish it from a riot or any other form of disturbance not regarded
as antinational. Section 121 of the code makes antinational offenses
punishable by death or imprisonment for twenty years. The incitement of
hatred, contempt, or disaffection toward a lawfully constituted authority
is also a criminal offense punishable by a maximum sentence of
banishment for life (life imprisonment).
Among other categories of felonies are offenses relating to the armed
forces (such as abetment of mutiny, abetment of desertion, or harboring a
deserter); offenses against the public tranquillity, meaning unlawful
assembly, rioting, and public disturbances; offenses affecting public
health, safety, and morals; offenses relating to religion; offenses against
the human body, such a murder, abortion, assault, kidnapping,
abduction, slavery, forced labor, and rape; and offenses against property,
such as theft, robbery, dacoity (robbery by a group of five or more
persons), or misappropriation of property.
Punishment is divided into five categories; death, banishment (ranging
from seven years to life), imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fine.
The imprisonment may be "simple" or "rigorous" (hard labor), ranging
from the minimum of twenty-four hours for drunk and disorderly conduct
to a maximum of fourteen years at hard labor. Juvenile offenders may be
sentenced to detention in reformatory schools for a period of three to
seven years; for minor infractions whipping (not exceeding fifteen lashes)
may be prescribed as an alternative to detention.
The Penal Code applies to all citizens except the president, duly
accredited members of foreign diplomatic missions, provincial governors,
and justices or judges of the Supreme Court and the courts of sessions,
sometimes called the district courts. The Penal Code also excepts from
criminal liability a judicial act of a judge done in good faith, an act likely to
cause harm done without criminal intent or to prevent other harm, an act
of a child under seven years of age, an act of a person of unsound mind, an
act of an intoxicated person if committed against his will or while the

2%
intoxication rendered him "momentarily incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong," and an act performed in self-defense.
Preventive detention may be ordered under the Security of Pakistan
Act of 1952, as amended, and under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure when, in the opinion of the authorities, there is a strong
likelihood of public disorder. Similarly, Section 144 of the same code,
which has frequently been invoked by magistrates in Bangladesh, India,
and Pakistan for periods up to two months, prohibits assembly of five or
more persons, holding of public meetings, and carrying of firearms. In
addition, the Disturbed Areas (Special Powers) Ordinance of 1962
empowers a magistrate or an officer in charge of a police contingent to
open fire or use force against any persons breaching the peace in the
distrubed areas and to arrest and search without a warrant. The
assembly of five or more persons and carrying of firearms may also be
prohibited under this ordinance.
Persons charged with espionage are punishable under the Official
Secrets Act of 1911, as amended in 1923 and 1968. As revised in May 1968,
this statute prescribes death as the maximum penalty for a person
convicted of espionage instead of imprisonment for a term of fourteen
years as orginally provided for. In 1966 the central government, to
prevent the leakage of information, had passed a regulation prohibiting
former government officials from working for foreign diplomatic
missions. In general, all persons seeking employment with foreign
embassies or any foreign government agencies were also required to
obtain prior permission.
The highest tribunal, the Supreme Court, has original, appellate, and
advisory jurisdictions, but its original, or first instance, jurisdiction does
not include criminal cases (see ch. 8). The criminal courts of first instance
consist of four categories: the courts of session at district headquarters
and three lower levels of magistrate courts in the district, subdivision,
and thana. All magistrates in a district are subordinate to the district
magistrate, who also has executive functions as the deputy commis
sioner.
A pretrial inquiry must be conducted by a magistrate if the police
investigative report shows sufficient evidence of criminality against the
accused. The magistrate has three options: to dismiss the case on the
grounds of insufficient evidence; to commit the case to the court of
sessions if he finds the offense is beyond his jurisdiction; or to try the case
himself if it is within his jurisdiction. Trials are classed in two categories:
summons and warrant. The summons cases, where a finding of guilt is
made, are punishable by a maximum of six months' imprisonment; the
warrant cases, by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding
six months. Prosecution is handled by police officers in magistrate courts
but by a public prosecutor in higher courts.
In summons cases the particulars of the alleged offense are stated
orally to the accused, and no formal charge need be prepared in writing. If

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the accused pleads guilty, his admission must be recorded "as early as
possible in the words used by him." The accused has the right to counsel,
but the court is not required to appoint a counsel if he fails to assert it. In
certain cases the magistrate may dispense with the personal attendance
of the accused and permit him to be represented by his counsel.
In a court of sessions the judge has the discretionary power to reject
the jury decision, even though it may be unanimous, if he is of the opinion
that the verdict is not supported by evidence and hence may constitute a
miscarriage ofjustice. This discretionary power may also be exercised in
relation to the verdict of a majority for the same reason. If the jury
verdict is not accepted, the sessions judge must refer the case to the high
court as an appeal without recording judgment of acquittal or of
conviction, and he must state the reason for his action. Upon review, the
high court may release the accused or pronounce such sentence as might
have been passed by the lower court.
In 1975 the foregoing procedures of criminal law and its administration
could be regarded as still in effect, subject to the modifications imposed
by the state of emergency and change of government form occuring in
December 1974 and January 1975. By the emergency proclaimed on
December 28, 1974 the enumerated fundamental rights included in the
Constitution, and with them the right of habeas corpus, were suspended.
The Fourth Amendment of January 25, 1975, establishes a presidential-
authoritarian state, making the judicial system subordinate to the
president by vesting in him the power to appoint and dismiss all judges
and removing enforcement of the fundamental rights from the High
Court Division of the Supreme Court (see ch. 8). The amendment
provides that a new constitutional tribunal for fundamental rights may be
set up, but this step was not known to have been taken by late March
1975.
In the worsening crisis of factional contention, public disorder,
corruption, and economic disaster, the government issued the
Emergency Powers Rules of 1975 by presidential proclamation on
January 3, 1975, under authority of the Emergency Powers Ordinance of
1974 and with many references to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898.
These rules commence with a section of definitions, particularly of the
term "prejudicial act" as used thereafter in the document. Sixteen
categories of prejudicial acts deemed to be contrary to the sovereignty,
security, public order, and public interest of the country and the
government are described.
In succeeding sections the rules delineate and allot to the government
and its security agencies broad powers to restrict, put under surveil
lance, document, and control suspected persons, corporations, and
organizations; to control and censor publication and public notices of all
kinds and at all stages; to restrict or prohibit the traffic, possession, and
use of arms and explosives; to control the production, stocking, and
distribution of essential commodities; to prevent smuggling and collusion

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in smuggling; and to require the provision of information and documents
to the government. New and extended powers of search, arrest, and"
detention and powers to appoint special police are awarded. Penalties for
violation of the rules are set forth, ranging from minor imprisonment and
fine in some cases of death in others, such as smuggling. The burden of
proof is upon any suspect claiming exemption or excusal from the rules to
show he was so excused. In fact, the formidable array of existing,
still-valid statutes dealing with public security and order covered the
matters contained in the Emergency Powers Rules of 1975 by many
provisions, both general and specific. The 1975 rules, however, for those
matters and offenses dealt with in their articles, took precedence over
older laws.
The custody and correction of persons sentenced to imprisonment are
regulated under the Penal Code of 1860, the Prisons Act of 1894, and the
Prisoners Act of 1900, as amended. The prison system has expanded but
in 1975 was basically little changed from the later days of the British Raj.
The highest official in jail administration is the inspector general of
prisons or, if this office is not separately assigned, the inspector general of
police. At the division, or police range, level the senior official is called
director of prisons; at the district level he is the jail superintendent.
Below the district jail level are the thana and village police lockups. The
central prison is the largest and most secure and has more extensive
facilities than those at the successive lower echelons. All installations are
manned by prison police usually permanently assigned to this duty.
In general, prisons and jails have low standards of hygiene and
sanitation and are seriously overcrowded. Rehabilitation programs,
inhibited by lack of funds and trained social workers, were rudimentary
or nonexistent. Overcrowding—the most serious basic problem—was
considered likely to become worse in 1975 in view of the law-and-order
crackdown under the Emergency Powers Rules and the shortage of funds
for new jail construction.
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
From time to time Mujib has attributed security difficulties in part to
"foreign agents," and some Bangalee newspapers have occasionally
speculated either that Pakistan had intentions to reabsorb Bangladesh or
that excessive dependence on India might lead to incorporation of the
state by its powerful neighbor. None of these charges and speculations
was known to have real validity. Bangladesh was not a world crossroads
and possessed no resources of such valuevas to attract predatory interest
but on the contrary was characterized chiefly by massive economic,
demographic, and political problems (see ch. 3; ch. 11). Diplomatic
relations were widely established and expanding, although as of early
1975 they did not yet include the People's Republic of China (PRC) (see
ch. 10). The mutual security arrangements of 1972 with India, to whom
Bangladesh was largely indebted for its independence, provided

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significant regional security. Relations with Pakistan, if not cordial, were
at least stabilized after their formalization in 1974 and the completion of
the repartriation of war prisoners and internees in that year. In short, no
grave international crisis, intractable dispute, or irredentist claims were
focused on Bangladesh in 1975, and external threats to its security could
not readily be preceived.
Disorder, Crime, and Internal Factionalism
The internal security environment and general disposition to disobey
the law have been conditioned in Bangladesh by certain important
historical factors as well as by the immediate political turmoil and
economic distress since the country's independence. By 1972 only an
extremely aged person could recall a time when widespread opposition to
imposed government had not been a usual, accustomed fact of life. In fact,
Bengalis have been in opposition to governments since those of the
Mughals in the sixteenth century (see ch. 2). From early in the twentieth
century onward the Hindu, and later Muslim, movements for independ
ence from Great Britain grew steadily stronger, culminating in the 1947
division of the Indian subcontinent. The Bengalis of East Pakistan,
however, found themselves still ruled by a distant government dominated
by interests and personalities foreign to them (see Regular Armed
Forces, this ch.) (see ch. 2). Dissatisfaction and opposition grew.
Resistance became organized in the Awami League and led to the
insurgency of 1971, climaxed by the large-scale Indian intervention and
final campaigns in December of that year.
The new country was exhausted by war and natural disasters; a
suddenly unemployed body of at least 50,000 armed guerrilla fighters, the
Mukti Bahini, was at large; and the new government, sustained mainly by
the charismatic personal popularity of Mujib, had to build police and
administrative institutions nearly from scratch. The general situation
was one of disorder, varying across a wide range of lawlessness from
outright banditry to a mere causal regard, rather than respect, for law
and its administration. Confronted from the outset with the urgent need
to secure public peace and order, the government was at least spared the
disorders of language usage disputes, since Bangladesh unlike India and
Pakistan, is linguistically homogeneous. Similarly, public disturbances
based on sectarian religious issues are rare; and Mujib on occasion has
spoken sharply against the potential dangers of divisive communalism.
Reliable countrywide statistics on a year-by-year basis were not
available in early 1975. It was known, however, that a high level of crime
developed at once in the postwar environment and mounted during 1973
and 1974. Government efforts to establish public security were
insufficient to catch up with the rise in crime and disorder. In 1974 the
analyst A.T.R. Rahman noted: "It is possible that the political climate
generated by the development of the Awami League and its affiliates may
not have been very effective in ensuring security and order .... law

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enforcement agencies were less effective in maintaining order during the
period following the liberation than in a comparable period in the late
sixties. While the agencies were under-staffed and under-equipped, the
performance was also affected by increased political interference,
delayed and often indecisive policy-making, and lack of administrative
leadership."
The proliferation of disorder was by no means limited to student
activism, labor disturbances, and unruly mobs and demonstrations—
although these occurred —nor to such minor crimes and misdemeanors as
ticketless riding on railways, bootlegging of public utilities, nonchalant
disregard of utility bills, and appropriation of abandoned property. The
security problem was, above all, characterized by a high and growing rate
of serious crimes: murder, especially political killing in interfactional
contestation; terrorism and extortion; theft, burglary, and ordinary
armed robbery, including bank robbery; dacoity, or banditry by a gang of
five or more persons; attacks on police stations; illegal arms traffic and
possession; smuggling, in such magnitude as to prejudice the whole
economy; and corruption, both minor and major, that reportedly became
rampant in government and government-administered activities.
In May 1973 statistics published for one subdivision cited increases
over the preceding year of 300 percent in apprehensions for armed
robbery, 900 percent for burglaries, and 200 percent for smuggling. In
the month of November 1973, 1 , 122 dacoits were arrested throughout the
country. In the same month a government source estimated that more
than 6,000 people had been slain since January 1972—many of them in
politically connected violence. In late April 1974 Mujib ordered the army,
the police, the BDR, and the Rakkhi Bahini to conduct a three-month
intensive campaign to "recover unauthorized weapons, stop smuggling,
apprehend antisocial and subversive elements, and prevent hoarding or
profiteering in foodgrains and other essential commodities." This
campaign met with some success, including the collection of about 20,000
unauthorized weapons and many thousands of rounds of ammunition but,
like other ad hoc operations of the "search and destroy" kind, had to be
repeated. In early November 1974 the army chief of staff directed the
army to move closer to the borders and shoot smugglers on sight. By
early February 1975 government sources claimed that the army had
virtually eliminated smuggling on the borders along the districts of
Jessore, Khulna, and Kushtia (see fig. 1).
Between March 1972 and May 1974 government figures showed the
number of those killed in political violence to be 4,925. In April, for
example, a factional feud between political party adjunct student groups
at the University of Dacca resulted in the slaying of seven students by
automatic weapons. By the end of December six members of Parliament
had fallen to political assassination, and the scope of factional conflict was
clearly shown by Mujib's claim that, since independence, 3,000 members
of the Awami League had been killed.

301
 Major crime was not necessarily political in nature. For example,
dacoit night raiding of rural villages was, in most cases, simple banditry.
(The shouting of radical leftist slogans, as sometimes reported, was as
likely to represent dacoit deception tactics as ideological motivation.)
Corruption, stimulated by the massive foreign aid that some critics
claimed had contributed much to the criminalization of politics, was also
based in greed. Mujib, however, did not make a sharp distinction
between ordinary crime and political crime or subversion but classed it all
in a broad political context as destructive to the country and government
of which he was the head. Customarily, he and his representatives spoke
of criminal and subversive elements as "antisocial forces" or "miscreants"
and frequently described them as composed of persons who had opposed
the independence movement and who wished to undo the state of
Bangladesh.
Before 1971 numerous political factions had already formed separately
or as offshoots of the Awami League. During the war some extreme
leftist bands had fought both the Pakistani forces and the Mukti Bahini,
as well as each other. After the war some of them held the ideological
belief that Indian intervention should not have been accepted (although
they did not specify how it could have been prevented) but that the
revolution against Pakistan should have been pursued to victory entirely
as an internal insurgency in the classical Maoist pattern. In this view the
new country was a bourgeois state obligated to India rather than a true
revolutionary socialist state. The Bangladesh government, however, was
established initially with a broadly democratic outlook, and all but the
most extreme elements of the badly splintered communist movement
were permitted to operate as legal parties.
The already existing, widespread factionalism continued and prolifer
ated in 1973 and 1974. As the economic situation deteriorated,
underground factions also grew, and both open and clandestine
opposition to the government increased. The Awami League itself was
internally divided, but not so seriously as to prevent its overwhelming
victory in the parliamentary elections of 1973. At least fifteen parties, not
counting independent candidates, contested this election. The Awami
League triumph resulted in large part from the fact that even though the
party had some internal stresses, the opposition was far more
factionalized and uncoordinated. The opposition defeat in these elections
did not, however, eliminate factionalism.
The principal parties in late 1974, in addition to Mujib's dominant
Awami League, were the pro-Moscow National Awami Party-Muzaffar
(NAP-M) led by Muzaffar Ahmad; the Maoist, if not necessarily
pro-Peking, National Awami Party-Bashani (NAP-B) led by octogena
rian politician Maulana Abdul Hamid Bashani—both these parties being
offshoots of the Awami League—and the pro-Moscow Communist Party
of Bangladesh (CPBD) headed by Moni Singh. Other communist groups
operating in the open included the Banglar Communist Party and the

302
Bangladesh Communist Party. In October 1973 the NAP-M and CPBD
supported the Awami League in a coalition aimed at political unity that
was fairly successful, although the open communist groups did not always
support the government. In the 1973 elections the best organized
opposition party had been the National Socialist Party (Jatiyo Samajtan-
trik Dal-JSD). This group was gravely weakened, however, in March
1974 when mass protest demonstrations instigated by its leadership were
suppressed with eight killed and fifty wounded, and the party's secretary
general, Abdur Rab, was imprisoned.
In the political underground the best known figure after 1972 was
probably Mohammed Toaha, who headed the clandestine Bangladesh
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist. In May 1974 a well-known army
hero of the liberation war, Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziaddin, went
underground and was rumored thereafter to be directing the military
training of opposition guerrillas. In January 1975 the clandestine end of
the political faction spectrum was illustrated by the commentator Denzil
Peiris:
The Bangladesh underground consists of about 12 parties with a babel of Marxist
titles. They often devour each other, as they did even during the struggle against
Pakistan. But each has a capacity for violence, sabotage, and other forms of
economic disruption. All of them claim to be revolutionary parties representing
true Marxism-Leninism. Most are pro-Chinese and irreconcilably opposed to the
Soviet Union and India.
The foregoing survey of legal and illegal parties and factions as of late
1974 is not complete, but it is intended to identify their main elements and
to indicate the complex and turbulent state of political and social disorder
confronting Mujib's government at that time (see ch. 9). Then, in the
swift series of moves commencing December 28, Mujib arranged for the
declaration of a state of national emergency, the suspension of the
fundamental rights that were enumerated in the Constitution, the
promulgation of the Emergency Powers Rules of 1975, and the passage of
the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of 1975. Prominent in that
amendment is the authorization for the president at his discretion to form
a single national party (see ch. 8). On February 24, 1975, Mujib, who had
become president on January 25, did decree that there should thereafter
be only one party—to be called the Krishak Sramik Awami League
(Peasants, Workers, and Peoples League). All other political parties thus
stood dissolved, and any activity by them was made illegal. The
organizational structure of the old Awami League, however, was to be
used initially and temporarily for the new national party.
This act of centralization was intended to clarify the political scene,
secure the government in power, and simultaneously reduce the violence
and disorder attending the rampant factionalism by both open and
clandestine parties. How well it would be enforced was not yet certain in
March 1975, but the rapid expansion of the Rakkhi Bahini indicated
Mujib's firm intentions to enforce it. Other indications lay in the arrest, in

303
January 1975, of a dissident barrister and a prominent labor leader on
grounds of corruption and in the capture of Siraj Sikdar, head of the
Proletarian Party of East Bengal (an extreme Maoist splinter group),
who was then killed while attempting to escape. The factional opposition
could not simply be stilled by edict, however, as the detonation of three
bombs in Dacca on the night of March 16, 1975, demonstrated.
Relationships of the Armed Forces, Police, and Paramilitary
All of the law enforcement agencies of Bangladesh were still deficient in
equipment, transport, and training in 1975. The main problem in their
employment against crime and subversion, however, appeared to be one
of coordination and operational methods. The police and the BDR, by
tradition and practice, were accustomed to working together, and both
answered to the Ministry of Home Affairs; but both have been faced
simultaneously with the task of organizational development and pressing
requirements to perform their primary functions. The regular armed
forces were not faced with an imminent requirement to perform their
primary missions and had almost no capability of doing so. The army, and
the small navy and air force as well, did have distinct capabilities for
internal security duties, including coastal patrolling and aerial surveil
lance. No joint command and staff arrangements, however, were known
to be formalized even within the regular establishments. The Rakkhi
Bahini was completely separate from both the Ministry of Defence and
the Ministry of Home Affairs. All these agencies found common command
and guidance only in the person of President Mujibur Rahman.
Mujib, according to observers' reports, has avoided giving higher
budget and developmental priority to the regular forces both for reasons
of their primary missions and for political reasons. Most of the senior
officers who had served in the Pakistan army and were not veterans of the
Mukti Bahini were retired, and rapid promotion was given to younger
officers. Even among them, according to some commentators, divisions
developed between pro-Indian and anti-Indian groups, the latter being
especially resentful of the Indian retention of most of the military
equipment seized from the Pakistani forces in December 1971. In the
antismuggling campaigns of 1974, the army achieved some substantial, if
temporary, successes. The army leadership had asked for overall
command of these operations, to include all police, BDR, and Rakkhi
Bahini units engaged. This request was rejected by Mujib, however, and
the army was required to cooperate with, rather than command, the
forces of other agencies.
The priority given to the expansion and role of the Rakkhi Bahini in
comparision to the regular services and police indicated a preference on
Mujib's part for a loyal force of his own creation, dependent upon him and
in superior numbers. The magnitude of the country's internal security
problems appeared to call for the specific allocation of areas and
responsibilities to the different law enforcement agencies, for the

304
establishment of a system of staff coordination between them, and for
some form of operational command below the person of the president
himself. None of these arrangements was known to have been made by
early 1975, and observers noted that, although this separation of forces
may have had political advantages, it also impeded effectiveness in the
employment of available resources against crime and disorder.

305
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Economic Review [Hong Kong], LXXXVII, No. 11, March 14, 1975,
30-32.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expendi
tures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973. (ACDA Publication, No. 74.)
Washington: Department of State, 1975.
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. World
Strength of the Communist Party Organizations—1973. Washington:
1975.
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Geographer. Geographic Note
GE-119: Bangladesh, Administrative Divisions. Washington: Sep
tember 17, 1974.
Weinraub, Bernard. "Bangladesh, at Age 3, Is Still a Disaster Area,"
New York Times, December 13, 1974, 14.
(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the
preparation of this section: Asian Recorder [New Delhi], January
1970-April 1975; Bangladesh: A Fortnightly News Bulletin [Bangladesh
Embassy, Washington], September 1971-April 1975; Economist [Lon
don], 1974-75; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 1974-75;
Wall Street Journal, January 1972-April 1975; and Washington Post,
1974-75.)

327
 GLOSSARY
Bangalee—Citizen of Bangladesh. Also used as adjective for Bangladesh,
as the Bangalee government and the Bangalee economy. About 98
percent of the Bangalees are Bengalis (q.v.).
Bengal—Area that in 1974 included Bangladesh and the Indian state of
West Bengal'. During British India period, a state and, earlier, a
presidency.
Bengali—Both the language and the native speaker. Also used as
adjective, as Bengali culture and Bengali literature,
bigha—Standard Bangalee unit of land measurement. Technically, 100
bighas equal 33.3 acres, or one equals 0.33 acres; in practice, size of a
bigha may vary extensively.
DC—Deputy commissioner, officer in charge of a district, usually
referred to as the DC.
DIG—Deputy inspector general, usually of police, referred to as the
DIG.
East Bengal—Eastern part of Pakistan from August 14, 1947, to
December 16, 1971. Another name for East Pakistan (q.v.). Also name
of state in British India 1905-11.
East Pakistan—From August 14, 1947, to December 16, 1971, the
eastern part, or East Wing, of Pakistan; on opposite side of India from
West Wing. Seceded in 1971 to become Bangladesh.
East Wing—See East Pakistan,
fiscal year—Bangalee fiscal year begins July 1, ends June 30. Throughout
this study, fiscal year 1974-75, for example, given as FY 1975.
FY—See fiscal year.
ijtihad—Individual and continuing interpretation of Islamic laws and
traditions by qualified religious authorities,
maulana—An individual who is, or who is reputed to be, learned in
Islamic theology. Not to be confused with mullah, a religious leader
who has little or no formal theological training or education.
Prophet—The Prophet Muhammad, through whom the Quran was
revealed. He is revered, but not worshiped, as the last or the "seal" of
the prophets, of whom Abraham, Moses, and Jesus are considered the
most important predecessors,
taka—Monetary unit of Bangladesh, abbreviated Tk and consisting of 100
paisa (poisha). Taka tied to British pound sterling at Tk18.97 per
pound. This yields a cross rate of one to one with the Indian rupee.
When the pound sterling was allowed to float in 1972, the cross rate to
the United States dollar varied daily. The taka's value averaged Tk8.1

329
 per US$1 in 1972, Tk8.2 per US$1 in 1973, and Tk8.0 per US$1 in 1974.
thana—District subdivision, encompassing revenue collection area, a
police subdivision, and the lowest level magistrate of the court system.
Tk-^See taka.
zamindars—Landlords, but particularly the group of landlords and the
zamindari system that emerged after the Permanent Settlement of
1793. In essence, the former tax collectors became landlords.

330
 INDEX
Abdullah, Abu: 132, 133, 134 sepoys): v, xiii-xiv, 275, 276-291; and the
Abdur Rab: 197 British, 275, 276, 277, 279, 286; and con
Abedin, Zainul: 167 spiracy of 1951, 35; courts, 288; deficien
Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology: 46 cies of, 304; and the executive, 286, 288;
Afghan kings: 15 expenditures, 290; military aid, 290-291;
Afghana: 26 pay, 287-288; volunteers, 289
Afghanistan: 26, 202 army (see also East Bengal Regiment
Afzal, Mohammad: 90 (EBR); Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini; Mukti Ba
Agency for International Development (see hini; security, national): xiii, 43, 275, 301,
also United States): 206 304; and the British, 30, 277, 278; forma
Agricultural Commodities Agreement: 44 tions, 288-289
agriculture (see also black markets; crops; Army Act of 1952: 288
dairy products; famine; farms and artisans: 135
farming; fertilizer; fish and fishing; floods; arts (see also culture; dance; drama; films;
food supply; forests; irrigation; livestock; folk art; literature; media; music; painting
rural society; soils; water control): 2, 5, 55, and sculpture; poetry): 147, 157-168; cen
86, 227-248; and credit, 239-240; and eco ters, 159; and independence, 147
nomy, 213, 214, 217-218, 220, 223, 225; Aryans: 14
and government, 233-240; prices, 235- Asghar Khan, Air Marshal: 49
236; research, 169 Ashan Khan, Admiral: 52
Ahmad, Kazi: 65, 76 Asia: 28
Ahmad, Muzafar: 196, 302 Asia, South: 202-205
Ahmad, Novera: 167 Asian Clearing Union: 261
Ahmed, Farrukh: 164 Asian Development Bank: 201
Ahmed, Tajuddin: 53, 179, 197, 199, 200 Asoka: 14
Ahmed Khan, Sir Syed: 23, 102 Assam: 21, 284
air force: xiii, 275, 287, 289; of Pakistan, 280 assassinations: v, 189, 190, 200, 301
Air Force Act of 1953: 288 Ataturk, Kemal: 25, 42
air transportation: xiii, 72, 76 Atlee, Clement: 29
Akbar, Emperor: ix, 15, 16, 17, 18 Atrai River: 59, 61
Albania: 206 Aurangzeb, Emperor: ix, 16, 18
Albuquerque, Alfonso de: 17 Aurora, General J. S.: 285
Aligarh Muslim University: 23, 102 authoritarianism. See Constitution (Fourth
Allah: 39 Amendment) Act of 1975; Mujibur Rah
Ambedkar, Dr. B. R.: 25 man, Sheikh
Amir Mohammad Khan, Malik: 43 Awami League. See political parties, Awami
Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College: 23, League
102 Ayub Khan, General Mohammad: x, 7, 37,
animism: 109, 128, 136, 138, 147 41-50, 280; and the Constitution of 1962,
ansars {see also armed forces): 282, 292, 293 177-178; election campaign of, 47-48; and
Arab merchants: 17 martial law, 182, 192; opposition to, 49-50,
Arakan: 17 152, 193
archaeology: 168-169 Azad: 151, 152, 153
area: 56-57 Azam Khan, General: 43
Arial Khan (Bhubanswar) River: 59, 61
armed forces (see also air force; army; Jatiyo Babur: ix
Rakkhi Bahini; jawan; Mukti Bahini; Baghdad Pact: 37

331
Bahawalpur State: 32
Bajitpur (town): 62
balance of payments: 209, 210, 260-261, 262
Balban: 15
Baluchistan: 26, 41, 175
Banar River: 59, 62
Bandarban District: xviii, 64
Bang tribe: 14
Banga: 14
Bangabandhu: 24, 189
Bangabandhu Sanskritsebi Kaylan Founda
tion: 159
Bangalees: v, xi, 1
Bangla Academy: 147-148, 158, 159, 163
Bangladesh Agricultural Development
Corporation: 252
Bangladesh Aid Group: 205, 256, 262
Bangladesh Atomic Energy Center
(BAEC): 169
Bangladesh Bank: 221, 224
Bangladesh Biman (Air Bangladesh): xiii, 76
Bangladesh Chatra League (Awami Jubo
League—AJL): 198
Bangladesh Council of Scientific and Indus
trial Research (BCSIR): 169
Bangladesh Film Development Corporation
(FDC): 164, 165
Bangladesh Gazette: 252
Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Au
thority: 73
Bangladesh Jute Board: 243
Bangladesh Military Academy: 290
Bangladesh National Scientific and Tech
nical Documentation Center: 169
Bangladesh Observer: 152, 153
Bangladesh Plain: 61-62, 63, 64
Bangladesh Press International (BPI): 154
Bangladesh Publishers and Booksellers As
sociation: 163
Bangladesh Rice Research Institute: 237
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) {see also police;
security, internal; security, national): xiii,
275, 294, 301
Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation: 74
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS): 154
Bangladesh Shipping Corporation: 73
Bangladesh Times: 153, 155
banks and banking: 4, 220-224; central bank,
221, 224; and debts, 224; foreign owned,
221
Baptists: 136
Barak Riven 62
bari (homestead): 140-141
Barind: 59, 62
Barisal District: xviii
332
Barisal (town): 73
Bashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid: 155, 195,
196-197, 302
Basic Democracies Order (see also democ
racy): 45-46
Basic Democracy: 45, 182, 192
Battle of Buxar: 19
Battle of Plassey: ix, 1, 19
Baulai River: 59, 62
Bay of Bengal: 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63-64,
66,71
Bengal (see also East Bengal, West Bengal):
11, 14, 15-16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 29
Bengali language (see also language): 56,
102, 149, 152, 153, 156, 158, 161, 163,
175, 178
Bengalis: v, xi, 34, 52
Bentham, Jeremy: 20
Bethbunia: 150
Bhagirathi-Hooghly River: 59, 60-61
Bhutan: 202, 231
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali: 13, 49, 51, 52, 53-54,
199, 203, 204, 285
Bihar: 15, 24, 29, 84
Biharis: 133, 136, 203
birth control: 80, 89-91; opposition to, 90
birthrate: 79, 80, 89, 212; infant mortality,
90, 91; reduction of, 90
black markets (see also smuggling): 42, 236,
243-244, 276
Bogra District: xviii, 71, 264; excavations in,
168-169
Bogra, Mohammad Ali: 37, 38
Bohras group: 45, 134
Bombay: 18
books: 163
bores, tidal: 64, 66
bourgeoisie (see also middle class): 132
Brahmaputra-Jamuna River: 55, 57, 59, 60,
61-62
British East India Company (see also Great
Britain): 1, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21-22, 276, 277
British India (see also Great Britain): ix-x,
10, 11-12, 19-26, 28, 56, 74; administrative
units, 11-12; and division of assets, 33;
and paramountcy, 22
British Indian Army: 2
British Raj (British Indian Empire): ix,
19-23; and culture, 162; legacy of, 30-31;
opposition to, 28, 162
Buddhism: xi, 11, 14, 109, 129-130, 136, 138;
and arts, 147, 159, 160; and education, 104;
and monasteries, 130, 169; and Pali, 104,
130; and stupas, 169
budgets: 211, 218-220, 222, 224, 254; ad
 ministrative problems, 218, 219; capital, civil service: v, 2, 3-4, 46, 182, 183, 185-186,
220; expenditures, 219-220, 223 196, 207; and civil war of 1971, 184; dis
Bul-Bul Academy of Fine Arts: 158, 166 missals, 185-186; and partition 29-30, 34;
Bulgaria: 206 Provincial Civil Service of East Pakistan,
bureaucracies (see also government): 31, 33 185; salaries, 185, 220; training for, 185
Burma: xviii, 55, 104, 136, 138, 241, 285; Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP): 2, 3, 33-34,
boundary with, 57 182, 185
civil wars (see also independence): of Hindus
cabinet. See Ministries; prime minister
and Muslims, 25; of 1971, 3, 13, 53, 184,
Calcutta: xviii, 12, 18, 22, 24, 29, 33, 74, 185, 282, 283, 285-286
76, 132 climate (see also cyclones; hurricanes; mon
calendars: vii, viii, 8, 16
soons; rainfall; thunderstorms; torna
Calicut: 17
does): xi, 55, 65-68, 240
Cambodia, Royal Government of National
Clive, Robert: 19
Union of: 207, 241
coal: 33, 71, 264
Carey, William: 161
Combined Opposition Party (COP) of 1965:
caste system: 174; and Hinduism, 123, 126,
47, 192
127, 128; Namashudra caste, 136; rural,
Comilla District: 44, 64, 70; excavations in,
140
169
cement: 272 Comilla (town): 44, 76, 290
censorship: 149, 150, 164
commerce (see also currency; trade, domes
census: 78-79; of 1974, 78-79, 86 tic; trade, foreign): 249-263
Central Family Planning Council: 89
Commission on National Education: 103
Chakmas tribe: 136, 137, 138 Commonwealth of Nations: xii, 207
Chalna Port: xiii, 73, 251, 289
communication, mass (see also media;
Chandpur (town): 73
newspapers; press; radio; telecommuni
channels: 59, 63
cation; telegraph; telephones; television;
chars: 63 word-of-mouth): 3, 147-157; and govern
Chatterji, Bandimcandra: 162
ment expenditures, 223; and politics, 156;
Chaudhury, Bul-Bul: 158, 166
satellite, 150, 157; and waterways, 148
Chaudhury, Munir: 164
communists and communism: 197, 206, 282,
Chhatak: 71
302-303; and Islam, 116, 260
Chawkbazar Mosque: 168
Conference of Nonaligned States: xii
children: 90, 95, 102; abduction of, 42; and
Congress. See Indian National Congress
working force, 88
(Congress)
China, People's Republic of (PRC): 202, 241-
Constituent Assemblies: 29, 34, 35, 36, 37-
242, 299; and political parties, 196, 197
38, 39, 175-176, 180; Constitution Com
Chiniotis: 45
mission, 177
Chinsura (town): 17
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of
Chittagong (city): xiii, xviii, 17, 71, 73, 76,
1975: 173, 181-182, 184, 186-187, 200, 288,
87, 154, 169, 251, 252, 287; Chawkbazar
295, 298, 303
Mosque, 168
Constitution of 1956 (see also Objectives
Chittagong District: xviii, 18, 58, 64-65, 67,
Resolution of March 1949): 39, 41, 175,
80, 83, 266, 271-272
176-177
Chittagong division: 57, 64, 70
Constitution of 1972: xi, 7, 180-181, 295;
Chittagong Hill Tracts: 5, 55, 58, 64-65,
and presidential powers, 171-172
68, 71, 86, 87, 129, 136, 137, 150, 166,
constitutions: x, 12, 13, 37, 50, 57; and the
265; wildlife, 70
British, 172-173; and Islam, 38-39; Pro
Choudhury, Abu Sayeed: 180, 199
visional Constitution Order of 1969, 178-
Christianity: xi, 17, 33, 87, 115, 116, 130,
179; Provisional Constitution Order of
136, 161, 162, 174; and missionaries, 20
1972, 171
cities: 56, 87
Consumer Supplies Corporation (CSC):
civil rights (see also Constitution (Fourth
251-252
Amendment) Act of 1975): 109; and Con
Conventionist Muslim League: 192
stitution of 1972; 181; suspension of, 42,
cooperatives: agriculture, 239, 240
47, 173, 200

333
Cornwallis, Lord Charles: 19
cost-of-living index: 214
cotton: 32, 257-258, 263; West Pakistan, 271
coups d'etat: v; in Pakistan, 7, 41, 42
courts (see also judges; judicial branch;
Supreme Court): xii, 7, 47, 186, 295; jury,
298; local, 183; and presidential powers,
172, 173; trials, 297-298
Cox's Bazaar (town): 65, 71, 76, 264
crime (see also black markets; courts; pris
ons and jails; smuggling): 3, 275-276, 300,
302; and assembly, 297; and criminal
codes, 295-296; and espionage, 297; in
creases, 301; and Penal Code, 196
Cripps, Sir Stafford: 28
crops (see also cotton; grains; jute; rice;
sugar; tea): 5, 227, 240-245
cula (family hearth): 142
culture (see also arts): 8, 9, 11, 15, 147,
148, 158; European, 17; government sup
port of Bengali culture, 147-148; homo
geneity of, 8
currency (see also taka): vii, xii, 224, 254-
255; regulation, 221
curriculum (see also education): 101, 105;
Muslim, 101
cyclones (see also hurricanes; tornadoes):
58, 66, 77, 79, 94, 100
Cyprus: 206
Czechoslovakia: 206
Dacca (city): xi, xiii, 16, 47, 52, 56, 57, 60, 73,
76, 80, 83, 154, 169, 185, 252, 283, 285, 289,
295; population, 5
Dacca District: xviii, 67, 71
Dacca division: 57
Dainik Bengal: 153, 155
dairy products: 245
dance (see also arts): 158, 159, 163, 166;
ballet, 166
Daud Shah: 15
Dawn: 43
death rate (see also birthrate): 5, 79, 80, 143,
212; infant, 90, 91
defense. See security, internal and security,
national
De Gaulle, Charles: 41
Delhi: 24
Deliverance Day: 27
democracy (see also Basic Democracy): 6-7,
177, 180, 182, 302; and Islam, 175-176; and
Mujib, 189; parliamentary democracy, 31,
38, 43, 45, 47, 171, 173, 189, 194; and
partition, 28, 31, 35
Democratic Action Committee: 50
334
Desh Bengla: 153, 155
Dhaleswari (Burhi Ganga) River: 59, 62, 63
Dharla River: 59, 61
Dianga (settlement): 17
Dinajpur District: xviii, 67, 136, 138; and
Hindu architecture, 169
disease: xi, 5, 79, 93, 96, 97; cholera, 98;
keratomalacia, 96: leprosy, 97; smallpox,
98; tuberculosis, 97
divorce: 44, 144
doctors (see also health): 98, 99; training, 98
drainage: 72, 76, 231
drama (see also arts): 158, 163, 164
drought: 29, 131, 142
Dutch. See Netherlands
duties: customs, 219; excise, 219
East Bengal: 11, 14, 15, 24, 32, 35, 38
East Bengal Regiment (EBR): 281, 283, 288
East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy
Act of 1951: 233-234
East Pakistan. See Pakistan, East
East Pakistan Academy for Rural Develop:
ment: 238
East Pakistan Communist Party: 282
East Pakistan Rifles (EPR): 52, 281, 282,
283, 293-294
East Pakistan Students League: 282
East Wing. See Pakistan
Eastern News Agency (ENA): 154
economy (see also agriculture; balance of
payments; banks and banking; budgets;
cost-of-living index; currency; employ
ment; First Five Year Plan; foreign aid;
foreign exchange; gross domestic product;
inflation; investments; natural resources;
population; poverty; revenues; taxation;
trade, domestic; trade foreign): vii, xii,
xiii, 44, 45, 209-226; assets in West Pakis
tan, 221-224; and colonialism, 212; former
prosperity, 212; growth in 60's, 44; and
independence, 213; National Economic
Council, 215; Planning Commission, 215,
218, 219; present growth rate, 225; prob
lems facing, 224-225
education (see also curriculum; primary
schools; schools; secondary schools;
students; teachers; technical schools;
tuition; universities and colleges): xi, 93,
100-108, 220; administration, 107-108; and
the British, 101; dropout rate, 104; expen
diture, 223; and social discrimination, 100,
106-107
Education Commission: 107
egalitarianism: 8-9
Egypt: arms aid, 291
Elective Bodies (Disqualification Ordi
nance—EBDO): 42-43
electoral system (see also suffrage): 192; in
Pakistan, 178
electric power: 253, 263, 264-265, 267;
hydroelectric potential, 265; hydroelectric
power, 65, 76
elephants: 16
elevations: 58-59, 61, 62, 63, 64-65, 67; hills,
64
elite: 134, 135, 142, 234, 236; and language,
87; and politics, 131, 135, 182
Emergency Powers Ordinance of 1974: .181
Emergency Powers Rules of 1975: 181, 292,
298, 299, 303
emigration (see also refugees): 80, 84, 85, 86
140
empires: ix
employment (see also underemployment;
unemployment): 89, 103, 210, 216, 218;
rural, 216; urban, 216
epidemics (see also disease): 79, 93
Europe and Europeans (see also Western
nations): 31; and colonization, 16-19; early
traders, 12, 14; and jute trade, 260
Europe, Eastern: 206
executive branch. See cabinet; president
exports: xii, 211, 225, 258-261; and the
British, 22; decline of, 258; fish and
shrimp, 259; jute, 242, 258
factionalism (see also violence): 9, .275-276,
300; and contention, 298, 301, 304; and
paramilitary bands, 282
family life: 142-145; matrilineal ties, 143;
nuclear family, 140, 142; patrilineal ties,
140, 143
famine: 4, 79, 85, 87, 96; and the British,
31; and floods of 1974, 228-230; and
smuggling, 230
Farakka Barrage project: 76, 203, 231
Faridpur District: xviii, 71
farms and farming: 140, 227; and famine, 229;
and jute trade, 251; size of, 235; and
socialism, 228; and taxes, 219; tenants, 234
Fenchuganj (town): 71
fertilizer: 58, 235-236, 242; industry, 271-
272
films (see also arts): 147, 149, 163, 164-165
First Five Year Plan (1973-1978): xii,
56, 90, 93, 107-108, 150, 154, 157, 169,
170; and agriculture, 228, 237; and econo
mic development, 209, 210, 211, 214-218,
250, 257; and foreign aid, 262-263; and
industry, 267; prospects for, 225-226
Firuz Shah: 15
fish and fishing: xii, 58, 63, 70, 136, 246-247;
marketing system, 247
floods (see also water control): 3, 29, 58, 63,
64, 72, 76, 79, 100, 140, 142, 212, 227,
228, 230, 231, 232, 241; and agriculture,
228-230; and famine, 228-230; relief
centers, 229
folk art (see also arts): 158; crafts, 168;
dance, 166; music, 165; weaving, 167
food supply (see also famine; fish and fishing;
grains; rice): 6, 85, 95, 100, 142, 227;
crisis of 1974, 228-230, 253; free food, 93,
229
foreign aid (see also India; Soviet Union,
United States): xiii, 201, 205, 206, 211,
215, 224, 260, 261-263; and corruption,
302; declining, 257; and imports, 257
foreign exchange: 211, 214, 221, 232, 253;
reserves in West Pakistan, 221
foreign relations: 201-208; Bengalee-Islamic
world relations, 205; directorates, 207;
neutrality, 201, 207
forests: 61, 68-70, 247-248
France: 17, 18, 19
freedom of expression (see also censorship;
civil rights; press): 43, 52, 149, 152-153,
154, 155; and the British, 32
freedom of religion: 109
French East India Company: 18
Gama, Vasco da: 17
Gandhi, Indira: 53, 203
Gandhi, Mahatma (Mohandas Karamchand):
10, 25, 28, 29
Ganges River: 59, 231
Ganges-Brahmaputra River: 11
Ganges-Kobadak Phase I project: 232
Ganges-Padma (Ganga) River: 55, 60-61
Ganokantha: 153, 155
Garo tribe: 138
gas, natural: 6, 70, 71, 212, 257, 264, 271
German Democratic Republic (East Ger
many): 206, 207
Germany, Federal Republic of (West Ger
many): 150, 207
Ghaffer Khan, Khan Abdul: 27, 40^1
ghar (see also family life; kinship: 141
Ghazali: 118
Ghiyas al-Din: 15
Ghulam Mohammad, Governor General: x,
36, 37, 38, 175
Gitanjali: 162
God: and Islam, 110, 112, 115, 118
Gopala: 14
government: xi, 171-187; in British India,
335
 172, 174; corruption, 263, 268; economic
controls, 251-254
government, local; abolition of, 173, 184;
deputy commissioner (DC), 182; districts,
182, 183, 196, 238; divisions, 182, 183;
thanas, 57-58, 182, 183, 186, 196, 238-239,
292; union councils, 182-183, 184, 238, 184;
urban, 183
Government of India Act of 1935; 25, 34,
174, 176-177; amendment to, 37
governor generals: and British India, 22, 34,
172, 174, 175
Gracy, Sir Douglas: 41
grains {see also rice): 6, 95, 213, 228; and
floods, 229; imports, 241, 257, 261
gram (village): 141, 145
Great Britain (see also British India; British
Raj): ix, x, xiv, 1, 2, 4, 7, 17, 48, 148, 150,
260; and administrative reforms, 20; and
Basic Democracy, 46; and media, 157
Great Mutiny of 1857 (Sepoy Rebellion): ix,
2, 21, 257, 277, 279
gross domestic product: 5, 6, 210, 213, 214,
216, 217, 227, 240, 263
guerillas (see also civil war of 1971; Mukti
Bahini): 3, 171, 202, 275, 282, 285, 294, 300,
303; antiguerilla operations, 284
Gupta Empire: ix, 14
Gupta, Isvarcandra: 162
gusthi (lineage): 140, 141
Habshi rulers: 15
Hamid Khan, Abdul: 50
Hanifa: 160-161
Harsha Empire: 14
Hasan Qamrul: 167
health (see also disease; famine; medical
care; nutrition and diet): xi, 93, 96, 97-99,
220; and religion, 98
higher education. See universities and
colleges
Himalaya Mountains: 55, 58, 61, 64
Hindu Brahman Schools: 101, 104; and San
skrit, 104
Hinduism (see also caste system): 123-129,
162, 167; and architecture, 169; and the
arts, 159, 160, 167; Atman, 123; in Bangla
desh, 127-129; Brahma, 124; Brahmanism,
123, 127, 161; dietary rules, 125; Durga,
128; Hatha yoga, 124; images, 125; Kali,
125, 128; Karma, 124, 127; Krishna, 125;
and the press, 151; Rama, 125; rebirth,
126-127, 129; renunciation, 124; rituals,
125; Sanskritic, 123; Shakta, 127, 128;
Shiva, 124-125; Upanishads, 126; Vaish-
nava, 127, 128-129; Vedas, 126; Vishnu,
336
124, 125; yoga, 124
Hindus: xi, 2, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 23, 25, 26,
27, 84, 87, 132, 136, 138, 140, 202, 246; and
armed forces, 278; and education, 101; and
Islam, 114, 118, 120, 121, 122
Hiyat Khan, Sikander: 27
Holiday: 153, 155
Hooghly: 17
Hooghly River: 18, 76
hospitals (see also health): 98-99
Hossain, Kamal: 180, 198-199; and foreign
policy, 201
housing: 99-100; bustees, 100; and govern
ment expenditure, 223; kutcha, 99-100;
pucca, 100
Hungary: 206
Huq, Fazlul: 27, 38
hurricanes: 65
Husain, Musharraf: 164
hydroelectric power. See electric power
Ilyas Shahi dynasty: 15
imperialism: Western, 25
imports: xii, 211, 225, 257-258, 260, 261,
262; and import license, 135; lack of, 249,
253; private importers, 255-256; and
revenue, 219
income, per capita: 209, 211, 216, 228
independence (see also civil wars): of Bangla
desh, 1, 2, 13, 52, 57, 158; and films, 165;
of India, 29; and religion, 132-133
India: vi, xii, xiii, xviii, 1, 3, 53, 55, 57, 68,
76-77,104, 150, 197, 221, 241, 303; and aid,
262; and flood control, 231; foreign rela
tions with, 202-203, 204, 302; and the free
dom movement, 151; and independence of
Bangladesh, 180, 202, 284, 290; as model
for self-government, 172, 174; partition of,
12, 28-30; and smuggling, 230, 243-244,
260; and trade, 260
India Independence Act of 1947: 29, 32, 34,
174
India-Pakistan War of December 1971: 53,
56, 171, 180
Indian Civil Service (ICS): 2, 22, 182; and
the British, 31; and partition, 33
Indian National Congress (Congress): 24, 25,
26; and partition, 28, 29
Indian Ocean: 66
Indian Police Service (IPS): 33
Indianization: 2
Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation of March 19, 1972: 290
Indo-Gangetic Plain: xi, 55, 58
industry (see also cement; coal; cotton; jute;
steel; sugar; textiles): 249, 263-274; and
 the British, 23, 31, 263; cottage, 252, 253, Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense
263, 269-270, 274; deterrents, 263-264; Force): vi, xiii-xiv, 7, 200, 294-295, 301,
and economic development, 209, 212, 223; 303, 304; and Indian aid, 295
large-scale, 270-271; small-scale, 210, 218, jatra plays: 166
252, 269-270, 274 jawan (sepoy): 278
inflation: 95, 214, 220, 253, 257, 268; and in Jessore District: xviii, 67, 86, 136, 301
terest rates, 221 Jessore (town): 76
Integrated Rural Development Pro Jinnah, Fatima: 47
gramme (IRDP): 239 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali: x, 12, 24, 26-27, 29,
intellectual expression: 157, 168-170 30, 32, 34, 151, 152, 190; and Constituent
intelligentsia: slaughter of, 135 Assembly, 174-175
International Bank for Reconstruction and judges: 186, 298; and the British, 30
Development (IBRD): vii, xiii, 44, 201, judicial branch (see also courts; Supreme
262 Court): xi, xii, 181, 186-187; and the
International Monetary Fund: vii, 201, 262 British, 20, 22, 30; Special Powers Act,
investments: 217, 218, 220; in industry, 266; 187
policy, 273-274; private, 273 Junagadh: 32
Iqbal, Sir Muhammad: 26 jute: vii, xii, 5, 20, 33, 227, 229, 236, 242-244,
Iran: 26, 205 246, 259, 266-267, 270-271; and economy,
irrigation: 76, 218, 232-233, 235-236, 238, 211, 214, 217, 250, 251, 252; and farm
239-240, 242 stagnation, 242-243; research, 237,
Ishurdi (town): 76 242-243
Islam (see also mosques; Muhammad; Mus
Kalipur (town): 59, 62, 74
lims; Quran; Sufism; ulema): ix, 11, 14,
27, 109-123; Allah, 110; amulets and Kalni River: 59, 62
charms, 117; barakat, 113; 120; caliphs, Kamal Hussain: 54
Karachi: 33, 47, 175
112-113; and communication, 148-149;
Karatoya River: 59, 61
fakirs, 113, 118, 120; Hadith, 110, 115
Karnaphuli Dam: 59, 65
116; Hegira, 110; and Hinduism, 160, 167;
Karnaphuli Reservoir: xviii, 59
ijma, 38, 39, 116, 118; ijtihad, 38, 166;
Karnaphuli River: 59, 65, 73
imams, 101, 113, 117, 121; and the Islamic
Kashmir: 26, 32, 35, 48
state, 38, 39, 46; jihad, 111-112; jinns, 122;
Kemal, Mustafa. See Ataturk, Kemal
maulvis, 121; Mecca, 109, 113; muezzin,
Keokradong (peak): 64
HI; mullahs, 114, 117, 122; murids, 119
120; and partition, 175-176; pilgrimage Khagrachari (town): 57
Khajon tribe: 138
(haj), 111, 113, 120; pillars of faith, 110-
Khan Sahib: 40
111; pirs, 113, 115, 118, 120-122, 125;
proselytizing, 114; Ramazan, 111; saints,Khasi tribe: 138
Khasi-Jaintia Hills: 68
120, 121, 122; sharia, 112, 115, 116; shiites,
Khilafat (procaliph) movement: 25, 26
112-113, 115; Sunnis, 113, 114, 115
Khmer Republic (Cambodia): 207
Islamabad: 3, 47
Islamic Research Institute: 46 Khoja Ismailis: 45
Khojas group: 134
islands: 59, 63
Khulna (city): 73, 252
Israel: 205, 206
Khulna District: xviii, 59, 66, 71, 80, 83,
Ittefaq: 152, 153
136, 272, 301
Jahingir: ix, 16 Khulna division: 57
Jalal al-Din Muhammad: 15 Khulna Newsprint Mills: 154
Jamatt-i-Islami (Union of Believers): 39, 47 kinship (see also family life): 140-145
192 kobi raj: 98
Jammu and Kashmir (state): 32 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Jamuna River: 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 72 (North Korea): 207
Japan: 150, 241-242, 260 Korea, Republic of (South Korea): 207
Jasimuddin: 164 Korean War: 33
jatiyo: vii Kushtia District: xviii, 86, 301

337
Kusiyara River: 59, 62, 63 Marat has: 18
Kuwait: 205 Marmas (Maghs) tribe: 136, 137, 138
labor force. See working force marriage: 79-80, 94, 143-144; polygyny, 144
labor unions: 268 Maududi, Maulana Abu-1 Ala: 39
Lahore: 151 Mauryan Empire: ix, 14
Lahore Islamic Summit Conference: 203-204 meat supply (see also livestock): 97
Lahore Resolution: 133 media (see also censorship; communication;
lakes (bhils or haors): 60 newspapers, press; radio; television): 149,
Lakhya River: 59, 62, 63 150-157
Lalakhal (town): 68 medical care (see also health): 98; amulets
Lalpur (town): 68 and charms, 117; drugs, 99; village, 98
Land Reform Commission: 43-44 Meghna River: 58, 59, 60, 62-63, 64, 74
land tenure: 233-235; and Aswami League, mehr (cash payment): 144
234-235; and the British, 233, 237; and Memons: 45
the Hindus, 233, 237; reform, 234 men: and family relationships, 142, 143
landownership (see also zamindars): 1-2, 44, merchants (see also trade, domestic): 17,
140, 141-142; and British revenues, 19, 135, 250
21; and Hindus, 133, 233; and Islamic law, middle class: 24, 39, 95, 134; Hindu, 132, 134,
234; small holdings, 131; and taxes, 219 136; Muslim, 132
language (see also Bengali language): xi, 8, Middle East: 201; Islamic States of, 205
10, 56, 87, 159, 161-162, 178; English, xi, military. See armed forces
20, 87, 102, 148, 154, 156, 161, 162, 165, mineral resources: 56, 70-72, 264
172; Hindi, 162; the language issue, 134, Ministries: vi, 173; Defence, 304; Finance,
163, 175, 176; Persian, 160, 161, 162; San 218-219, 221; Flood Control and Water
skrit, 159, 160, 161; Tibeto-Burman, 136; Resources, 76; Foreign Affairs, 207, 215;
Urdu, 152, 162, 163, 175, 178 Forest, Fisheries, and Livestock, 247;
League. See Muslim League Health and Family Planning, 90-91; Home
legislative branch. See parliament Affairs, 291, 294, 304; Industry, 267; In
Liaquat Ali Khan: x, 12, 34-36, 190; assassi formation and Broadcasting, 149, 154, 156;
nation of, 190 Land Administration and Land Reform,
libraries: 163, 169 247; in Pakistan, 176; Petroleum and Min
life expectancy: 79 erals, 201; Posts, Telephones, and Tele
Linlithgow, Lord: 27 graphs, 149
literacy: xi, 2, 45, 87-88, 91, 93, 100, 147, Mirza, Iskander: x, 37, 38, 40, 41, 192; and
149, 150-151, 158 martial law, 192
literature (see also arts; drama; films; Mohammad Ali: 25
poetry): 147, 159-163; and independence, Mohammad Ali, Chaudhuri: 37, 38
163; novels, 163 Mohammadullah, President: 159, 181
livestock: 245-246; buffalo, 245; cattle, 245; Momen, Nurul: 164
draft animals, 245-246; goats, 245; poul Mongla Port: 73
try, 245; sheep, 245 Mongla-Ghasiakhali Link Canal: 73
living conditions (see also cost-of-living Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia): 206
index; standard of living): 93, 94-100 Moni, Sheikh Fazlul Huq: 155, 198
Lucknow Pact of 1916: 24 monsoons (see also climate): xi, 56, 65-66
Morning News: 151, 152, 155
Madhumati River: 59, 61 mosques (see also Islam): 110-111, 113, 117,
Madhupur Tract: 59, 62-63, 68
119, 141, 168
Madras: 18 motor vehicles: 74-76
madrasahs: 101, 103-104
Mountbatten, Lord Louis: 29
Mahabharata: 128
Mros (Moorangs) tribe: 136, 137, 138
Mahmud Shah: 17
Mughal Empire: ix, 1, 9, 11, 15, 16, 18, 42
Malik, A. M.: 284
Muhammad (the Prophet): 109-110, 112, 113
mallot (see also religion): 141
mujahids (see also armed forces): 282
Maniruzzaman, Talukder: 186
Mujib. See Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh
manufacturing: 249
Mtyibnagar 171
Maoists: 282, 302, 304

338
Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh (Mujib): v, vi, x,
xi, 2-34, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13-14, 34, 49, 51,
52, 53-54, 149, 178, 198, 211; arrest of, 193,
283; assassination of, v; the Bangabandhu,
24, 189; and the Constitution of 1972,
180-181; and defense, 276, 280, 281, 287,
290, 294, 304; disaster relief, 229; and
economy, 215, 219, 225, 249-250, 254; and
foreign policy, 201, 205; and indepen
dence, 171-172, 179-180, 283, 285; and
local government, 184-185; Mujibism, 180;
opposition to, 198-200; and the press, 155;
and prisoners of war, 203-204; and
security problems, 299-300, 303; and
unlimited power, 181-182, 189-190, 194
Mukherjee, Ramkrishna: 132, 133
Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) (see also
guerillas): 3, 53, 275, 282, 283, 284, 285,
286, 291, 294, 300, 302; Mukti Jauj, 282;
Sevak Bahini, 282; terrorist strikes, 283
Murshed, S. M. 49
music (see also arts): 159, 165-167; Baul
singers, 167; religious, 119, 167
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance: 44
Muslim League (Councillors): 47, 192
Muslim League (League) (see also Conven-
tionist Muslim League; Pakistan Muslim
League): x, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 37, 39,
40, 47, 133, 151, 175, 190, 195; flaws of, 35;
United Front, 190, 195
Muslims {see also Islam): vi, vii, xi, 2, 8, 9,
15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 87, 109-123, 131, 132,
138, 174; and armed forces, 277, 278; and
education, 101, 102, 103, 104; governors,
78; and partition, 29, 32, 33, 38, 84, 133;
and the press, 151
Mustaque Ahmad, Khandakar: v, vi
Mutiny of 1857. See Great Mutiny of 1857
Mymensingh District: xviii, 67, 70, 71, 73,
138
Naf River: 57
Narayanganj (city): 59, 62, 63, 67„ 73, 87,
251, 252
National Board for the Rehabilitation of
Women: 94-95
National Population Council: 90-91
nationalism: 134, 152, 283; and the British,
23, 30; Indian, 23-26, 278; and Mujibism,
189
nationalization: 254-256; of banks, 6, 195,
221; of industry, 134, 195, 210-211, 267,
268-269, 270; ofjute and tea, 195; of media,
148; of transportation, 195
Nationalized Industries Division: 267
natural resources (see also coal; gas, natural;
mineral resources): 5, 6, 69-70, 264-265;
and economy, 209, 212, 223; manpower,
213
navy: xiii, 275, 287, 289; Pakistan, 280
Navy Ordinance of 1961: 288
Nazimuddin, Khwaja: x, 34, 36
Nazrul Academy: 159, 166
Nazrul Islam, Kazi: 9, 159, 163
Nazrul Islam, Syed: 52; and economy, 215
Nehru, Jawaharlal: 25, 27, 29, 30
Nepal: xiii, 159, 202, 231
Netherlands: 17, 18
newspapers: 43, 148, 149, 151-155, 162
Niazi, Lieutenant General A. A. K.: 284, 285
Nizam-I-Islam (Rule of Islam): 192
Noakhali District: xviii, 64
Nobel Prize: 147, 162
North Hatia (island): 63
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP): 26,
27, 36, 37, 40, 47, 277
Now or Never: 26
nurses and nursing (see also health): 98, 99;
midwives, 99
Nusrat Shah: 15
nutrition and diet: xii, 93, 95-97; fish, 246;
rice, 241
objectives Resolution of March 1949: 35, 39,
175
oil: 57, 71, 205
Old Brahmaputra River: 62, 63
One Unit (see also West Pakistan): 38, 40,
47,51
Orissa: 17, 19, 24
Osmany, Colonel M. A. G.: 282, 284, 287
Pabna District: xviii
Padma River: 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 68, 72, 76,
86
Padma-Meghna Rivers: 63-64
painting and sculpture (see also arts): 167-
168
Pakistan (see also India-Pakistan War of
December 1971): v, x, 1, 3, 4, 14, 26, 27,
28, 29, 32-50, 53, 85; and foreign relations,
202, 203, 204, 300; government leaders,
191; and holy war, 114; independence of,
31-41, 133, 147, 176; industry, 265-266;
Islamic Republic of, 176, 177, 178, 179; and
martial law, 178, 179; and 1965 Indian
War, 48-50, 285; and 1971 Indian War, 53,
56, 136, 171, 180; origin of name, 26; and
partition, 174; and political parties, 192,
193-194; and press, 151; and prisoners-of-
war, 202, 203, 204; and trade, 259; wings
339
 of, 12
Pakistan, East (see also Constitution of
1956): v, x, xi, 1, 2, 11, 12, 32, 33, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 49, 51, 133, 179, 185,
195; and armed forces inequities, 278,
279-280, 281, 283; and commerce, 249;
exploitation of, 259-260, 278-279; after
partition, 174, 175, 176; and provincial
autonomy, 179, 190, 194, 195; and water
control, 231-232
Pakistan Industrial Development Corpora
tion: 44
Pakistan International Airline (PIA): 76
Pakistan Muslim League: 192
Pakistan People's Party: 13, 49, 51-52, 194
Pakistan, West (see also One Unit): v, 2, 3,
36, 37, 40, 49, 133, 179, 196, 221, 224;
after partition, 174, 175
Pala dynasty: 14
para (neighborhood): 141
paradelta: 58, 62
paramilitary. See armed forces; Bangladesh
Rifles (BDR): East Pakistan Rifles (EPR);
Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini
paribar: 140, 141
parliament (see also democracy): v, xi, 6-7,
8, 47, 49, 51, 172, 173, 177, 186, 190;
collapse of, 39-41, 173, 181, 189-190; and
Constitution of 1972, 180, 181; and the
Fourth Amendment, 181-182; and the
National Assembly of Pakistan, 176-177,
178, 179; and provincial autonomy, 177
partition. Sec India; Pakistan
Pathan tribe: 41, 279
Patuakhali District: xviii
peasants: 142
Peerzada, S. G. M.: 50
Permanent Settlement of 1793: 102, 132, 233
Peshawar: 44
physicians. See doctors
Plain of Bengal: 55, 58
poetry: 9, 158, 159, 160-161, 163, 164;
contest, 166; mangal, 160
police (see also Bangladesh Rifles (BDR):
East Pakistan Rifles (EPR); Indian Police
Service; xiii, 33, 291-294; and the British,
30, 291; chain of command, 293; grades,
292; new special police, 292
Police Service of Pakistan (PSP): 291
Political Parties Act: 192
political parties (see also Muslim League
(League); Pakistan, political parties): xii,
9, 39, 40, 47, 49-50, 189, 194-200, 302-
303; Awami League, v, x, 2-3, 6, 7, 9, 13,
37, 40, 47, 49, 51, 52, 134-135, 142, 155,
340
171, 179, 180, 184, 185, 186, 194, 195-196,
198, 200, 234, 267, 276, 280, 282, 293, 294,
300, 301, 302, 303; Bangladesh Communist
Party/Leninist, 197, 303; Bangladesh
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist, 197,
303; Banglar Communist Party, 197, 302;
Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPBD),
194, 302, 303; East Bengal Communist
Party/Marxist-Leninist, 197; Krishak
Sramik Awami League (Peasants,
Workers, and Peoples League), x, 8, 172,
194, 195, 303; Krishak Sramik Party
(Peasants and Workers Party), 37-38, 40;
National Awami Party (NAP), 47, 155,
195, 196-197; National Awami Party—
Bashani (NAP-B), 196, 197, 302; National
Awami Party-Muzaffar (NAP-M), 194,
196, 302, 303; National Socialist Party
(Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal-JSD), 153, 197,
198, 199, 303; Proletarian Party of East
Bengal, 197, 304; United Front Parties,
197-198
political systems. See communists and com
munism; democracy; Maoists; nationalism;
socialism
polygamy: 44
population: vii, xi, 55, 56, 78-91; control,
89-91; density, 4-5, 80, 82, 227; and eco
nomy, 209, 212, 216, 225; estimated size of,
11; growth rate, 80, 81, 91; overpopula
tion, 94; potential for social unrest, 89-90;
trends, 79-80
Population Growth Estimate: 78
ports: xiii, 73
Portugal: 17; pirates from, 16, 130; and
Roman Catholicism, 130
poverty: 45, 93, 94, 209, 211, 212, 216, 226,
228; urban, 49
president: v, xi, xiv, 46-47, 173, 189-190;
and Constitution of 1962, 177-178; and
control of armed forces, 286, 287, 305;
impeachment of, 46; and judicial power,
187; powers granted in 1972, 172, 181-182
press (see also censorship; freedom of the
press; newspapers): 148, 150-155; and
government opposition, 155; and indepen
dence, 152; magazines, 151, 153, 155
Press and Publications Act of 1973: 154
prices: 235-236; and corporations, 267; im
port and export, 256-257, 258; jute and
rice, 243, 261; price index, 252
primary schools (see also education): 101,
103, 104-105, 106
prime minister: 173
prisoners of war (see also refugees): 285-286
prisons and jails: 299 mission, 231
Protestants: 130 roads: xiii, 72, 74-75, 238
Public and Representative Offices (Disquali Roberts of Kandahar, Lord: 277
fication) Act (PRODA): 42 Roman Catholics: 130, 136
Punjab: 27, 29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 47, 51, 277, Romania: 206
279; Rebellion of 1919, 162; West, 133 Roy, Ram Mohan: 161, 162
purdah: 144-145 rubber: 70
Purdodesh: 153, 155 rural society (see also agriculture; villages):
Pusur River: 73 5, 86, 131, 138-142; and agricultural de
velopment, 237-240; bazaars and markets,
Quit India movement: 28
250; culture of, 158, 162; and economy,
Quran (see also Islam, Muslims): 38, 46, 101, 212, 213, 217, 220, 221, 223; and education,
110, 111, 115, 116, 121, 122
104; elite, 234, 236; and social stability, 131
Radcliffe Award of 1947: 56, 57
radio (see also communication): 148, 149, Safiullah, Major General K. M.: 287
150, 156-157, 164 Saint Martin's Islands: 71
Radio Bangladesh (Bangladesh Betar): 156 salaries and wages (see also armed forces,
Rahman, Major General Ziaur: 287 pay; civil service; income per capita): 252,
Rahmat Ali: 26 267, 268
railways: xiii, 56, 72, 73-74, 75; and the samaj: 141, 143
British, 22 Samatata kingdom: 14
rainfall (see also cyclones; hurricanes; mon Sandwip (island): 63
soons; thunderstorms; tornadoes): xi, 55, Santalis tribe: 138, 166
58,65-70 Sardah: 293
Raja Ganesh: 15 sardars: 141
Rajputana: 32 Satgaon: 17
Rajputs: 18 Saudi Arabia: vi, 201, 205
Rajshahi District: xviii, 62, 68, 80, 83, 86, schools (see also education): 101; Buddhist,
138, 264; Paharpur Monastery, 169 130; early, 101-102; in mosques, 117
Rajshahi division: 57, 74 science: 169-170
Rakkhi Bahini. See Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini Second Revolution: 8
Ramayana: 125, 126 secondary schools (see also education, mad
Ramgarh District: xviii, 64 rasahs): 101, 103, 104, and tuition, 105
Rangamati District: xviii, 64 security, internal (see also Jatiyo Rakkhi
Rangpur District: xviii Bahini; Mukti Bahini; police): xiii, 275,
Rann of Kutch: 48 276, 287, 291-295, 296, 297, 298, 299-305
rationing: 252-253 security, national (see also armed forces):
razakars (see also armed forces): 284, 285 xiii, 220, 275-291, 294-295, 299-300,
refugees (see also civil wars; prisoners of 304-305
war): 32, 84-85, 136, 202, 210, 284 Security of Pakistan Act: 35
religion (see also Buddhism; Christianity; Sen, Bidhan Krishna: 199-200
Hindus, Islam; Muslims): xi, 8, 87, 109- Senas: 14
130; and education, 101, 102, 103-104; and Sepoy Rebellion (Great Mutiny of 1857): ix,
emigration, 84; and violence, 23 2, 21, 275, 277
Republican Party: 40 sepoys (jawan): 277, 278
revenues: 219-220 Seventh-Day Adventists: 136
revolutions (see also civil wars): 8, 49 Shah Alam: 19
reyais: 141 Shah Jahan: ix, 17
rice: 5, 65, 96, 97, 227, 230, 236, 240-242, Shahbazpur (island): 63
243, 253; aman rice, 241, 246; aus rice, Shamshernager (city): 76
241; boro rice, 241, 242; and economy, Shastri Lai Bahadur: 48
213-214, 217, 218, 225, 250, 252, 257; Shaukat Ali: 25
technology, 228, 232, 237, 238-239 ships and shipping: xiii, 72-73; river craft,
riots. See violence 72-73
rivers (see also floods; water control): xiii, 6, Sikander Shah: 15
55-56, 58, 60-€4; Joint Rivers Com Sikdar, Siraj: 304

341
 Sikhs: 18, 151, 277
Sikkim: 231
silk: 18, 263
Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972: 203
Sind: 26, 27, 37, 40, 51, 133
Singh, Moni: 302
Siraj-ud-Daulah: 19
smuggling: 42, 235, 260, 276, 281-282, 301;
and jute, 243, 253; and rice, 230, 253
social classes (see also bourgeoisie; egali-
tarianism; elite; peasants; Untouchables):
131-135; lack of information about, 131,
132; postindependence realignments, 132
socialism: 197; and agriculture, 228, 233;
and Mujibism, 189, 195
soils: 55, 58, 68, 140, 227
Sonar Bangla: 212
Sonar Bengla: 155
South Hatia (island): 63
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO): 37
Soviet Union: 148, 149, 260; aid, 201, 206,
262; and armed forces, 289, 291; and
media, 157; and political parties, 196, 197;
and underground, 303
Sri Lanka: 52, 202
standard of living (see also living conditions):
4,91
steel: 272
strikes: 268
students (see also education): 39, 103, 104,
134, 152, 193, 196, 198; and demonstra
tions, 103, 107, 198, 301; women, 144
subsidies (see also trade, foreign): agricul
ture, 229, 236; deficit financing, 224; in
dustry, 266, 271
Suez Canal: 22
suffrage: 3, 180
Sufism (see also Islam): 117-119, 120, 121,
122, 129, 160
sugar: 33, 244-245, 253; export, 259; gur,
245, 272; industry, 272
Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed: 37, 40, 43
Sundarbans: 59, 61, 68, 86; vegetation, 70
Surma: 38, 46, 110, 113, 114, 117, 121
Supreme Court: xii, 7, 173, 178, 181, 186,
297; Appellate Division, xii, 186; High
Court Division, xii, 7, 186
Surat: 18
Surma River: 59, 62
suttee: 20
Syeds: 45
Sylhet District: xviii, 55, 59, 63, 64, 66, 68,
70, 71, 136, 138
Sylhet Plain: 63
342
Sylhet (town): 62, 71, 76
Tagore, Maharshi (Great Sage) Debin-
dranath: 162, 212
Tagore, Rabindranath: 9, 147, 158, 159,
162-163, 166
taka (see also currency): xii, 254-255
Tangail District: xviii
taxation: 217, 219, 225; and agriculture, 225;
income, 219; and upper income groups
tea: xii, 5, 244, 258
teachers: (see also education): 105, 106, 107
teak: 68-69
technical schools (see also education): 104,
107
telecommunications: 150
telegraph: 150
telephones: 150
television: 148, 149, 156-157
textiles (see also cotton; industry, cottage;
silk; weaving): 6, 11, 213, 216, 218, 265,
270, 271, 273; and the British, 263; cloth
distribution, 251-252, 253; early trade, 16,
20, 263; imports, 257; muslin, 168, 263;
research, 169; synthetics, 258, 271
Thailand: 241, 243
Thakurgaon (town): 76
Thana Irrigation Programme (TIP): 238
thanas. See government, local
thunderstorms (nor"westers): 65, 66-67
Tibet: 231
Tikka Khan, General: 52, 283, 284
Tipperas (Tipras) tribe: 136, 137
Tista River: 59, 61, 77
Toaha, Mohammad: 303
topography. See elevations
tornadoes (see also cyclones): 67-68
trade, domestic (see also inflation; prices;
rationing; smuggling): 249, 250-254;
bazaars, 250; and government controls,
251-254; markets, 250, 251; shops, 250;
vendors, 250
trade, foreign (see also currency; exports;
imports): 249, 254-263; adverse shifts,
211; and inexperienced personnel, 258;
private traders, 255-256; and subsidies,
258-259
transportation: xiii, 3, 56, 72-76; and eco
nomy, 210, 223
tribal people: 136-138
Tripartite Agreement of India, Bangladesh,
and Pakistan: 204
tuition (see also education): 105
Tukharistan: 26
Turkey: 24-25, 37, 205
ulema (see also Islam, Muslims): 38-39, 44, Wasiuddin, Lieutenant General Khawaj: 287
46, 102, 113, 115-117, 118, 120, 121, 122 water control (see also drainage; Farakka
underemployment: 216, 268 Barrage project; irrigation): 56, 76-78,
unemployment (see also employment): 227, 230-233, 237, 238; and the economy,
88-89, 216, 267; and education, 101, 105 210, 217, 223; international, 231; pumps,
United Arab Emirates: 205 232, 236; tubeweUs, 232, 236
United Dutch East India Company: 17 Water Development Board: 76
United Kingdom (see also Great Britain): waterways: xiii, 58, 72
260 Wavell, Lord: 28
United Nations: xii, 32, 170, 206, 261; weaving: 2, 167
admission to, 202 weights: vi-vii; maund, vi; seer, vi; tola,
United Nations High Commission for vi-vii
Refugees: 53, 204 West Bengal: 1, 14, 15, 284
United Nations Security Council: 48 West Wing. See Pakistan
United Provinces: 27 Western nations (see also Europe and Euro
United States: xiii, 48, 162; aid to Bangla peans; France; Germany Federal Republic
desh, 201, 205-206, 262; aid to Pakistan, of; Great Britain; Netherlands; Portugal;
37, 41, 44; and culture, 165; foreign rela United States): cultural impact of, 20, 147,
tions with, 205-206; and jets, 289; and 161
media, 157; and trade, 260 wheat: 32
United States Information Service: 148 wildlife: 70
universities and colleges (see also educa women (see also purdah; suttee): 91, 94, 95;
tion): 23, 102, 105, 106-107, 162; and the abduction of, 42, 94; and the arts, 166,
arts, 159; expansion of colleges, 106; and 167; and childbirth, 97; and civil war, 3;
military, 290 and education, 104, 106; and the family,
University of Dacca: 95, 104, 135, 163, 198, 142, 143, 144, 145; in government, 47,
301 180, 196; and Hinduism, 125, 126, 160;
Untouchables: 25, 101, 136 and Islam, 111, 120; in working force, 88
urban society: 86-87, 131, 132; and economy, wool: 33
221; merchants, 250; municipal police, 291; word of mouth: 148
squatter districts, 100; women in, 145 working force (see also employment): 88-89,
1%, 213, 267-268; in agriculture, 213, 227,
vegetation: 62-63, 70 235; and taxes, 219; unrest, 193
viceroys: 22, 27, 29, 278 World Bank. See International Bank for
Victoria, Queen: 277 Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North
World War I: 24-25, 278
Vietnam): 207 World War II: 28
Vietnam, Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South: 207 Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad: x, 50-53,
villages (see also government, local): 56, 86, 179, 281, 282, 283, 285; and autonomy for
135-136, 140-142, 143, 144; and arts, 158, East Pakistan, 194; and martial law, 193
164, 166, 167; and communication, 148, Yakub Khan, Sahabzada Mohammad: 52
149, 156; cooperative societies, 239; folk- yoga: 123-124, 159, 167
drama, 164, 166; and Islam, 117, 121, youth (see also Bangladesh Chatra League—
122-123; and politics, 192 AJL; students): 80
violence (see also assassinations; faction Yusufzai Pathans: 45
alism; security, internal): 9-10, 12, 50, 52,
53, 152, 301; and nationalism, 25, 28, 29; Zamindar Darpan: 164
after partition, 32; and politics, 189, 193, zamindars: 2, 21, 142
194, 198, 301; rape, 3; and social unrest, Ziaddin, Lieutenant-Colonel M.: 303
249 Zoroastrianism: 109
Visva-Bharati University: 162
voting. See suffrage

Wali Khan, Khan Abdul: 196

Waliullah, Syed: 164

343
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If.-
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345
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346