G.R. No.

169604 March 6, 2007

NELSON P. COLLANTES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court in the land.1

What would happen, however, if two separate decisions, irreconcilably conflicting with each other, both attained finality? Quite clearly, to
hold that both decisions are immutable and unalterable would cause not only confusion and uncertainty, but utter bewilderment upon the
persons tasked to execute these judgments.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision2 dated 10 March 2005 and
the Resolution3 dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78092.

The undisputed facts of this case are summarized by the Court of Appeals:

Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter, Collantes) was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on 29 February 1996. Then President
Fidel V. Ramos accorded him the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on 10 February 1997. More than a year later, he was
appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).

With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received word from persons close to then President Ejercito Estrada to give up his
position so that the President could unreservedly appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG.

Thereafter, on 1 July 1998, President Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post – Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the
Department of National Defense (DND). As it happened, his stint in the DND was short lived. Collantes was supposedly ordered by then
Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee, General Orlando Soriano. In deference to the
President’s prerogative, he resigned from office believing that he will soon be given a new assignment.

Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he received a letter from President Estrada terminating
his services effective 8 February 1999. Consequently, on 24 March 1999, Collantes requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service
Board relative to the termination of his services as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND invoking his right to security of tenure
as a CESO.

The termination of Collantes’ services, notwithstanding, President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the CES ranking structure,
CESO Rank I, on 17 July 1999. But then, despite this promotion in rank, Collantes did not receive new appointment, and worse, the President
appointed Mr. Edgardo Batenga to the much coveted position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND.

Taking definite action on the matter, Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before Us on 29 January 2001,
docketed as C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874. Collantes maintained that he was constructively dismissed from work, without any cause and due
process of law, and thus, his position in the DND was never vacated at all. Accordingly, he prayed that the appointment of Mr. Edgardo
Batenga be nullified, and that he be reinstated to his former position with full back salaries. Notably, Collantes also sought for appointment to
a position of equivalent rank commensurate to his CESO Rank I if reinstatement to his former position is no longer legally feasible.

Meanwhile, on 13 August 2001, the CSC favorably acted on Collantes’ letter-request issuing Resolution No. 011364, and thereby holding
that Collantes’ relief as Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not given another post concomitant to his eligibility.

Then, on 30 August 2001, We rendered Our Decision in C.A. G.R. SP No. 62874 dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus
filed by Collantes. Significantly, We pronounced:

"By such actuations of the petitioner, the Court finds that he has (sic) effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND,
and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position.

xxxx
"In this case, petitioner has undoubtedly shown his intention to relinquish his public office, and has in fact surrendered such post to the Chief
Executive, who, on the other hand, has shown his acceptance of the same by appointing a new person to the position relinquished by the
petitioner.

xxxx

Quo warranto, it must be pointed out, is unavailing in the instatnt case, as the public office in question has not been usurped, intruded into or
unlawfully held by the present occupant. Nor does the incumbent undersecretary appear to have done or suffered an act which forfeits his
assumption. (Section 1, Rule 66, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Furthermore, it appears that the action for quo warranto, assuming it is
available, has already lapsed by prescription, pursuant to Section 11 of the pertinent Rule ...

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED."

The controversy reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 149883. Nevertheless, the case was considered closed and terminated when
Collantes manifested his desire not to pursue his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on Certiorari. Thereafter, Collantes moved for
the execution of CSC Resolution No. 011364, which was accordingly granted through CSC Resolution No. 020084 dated 15 January 2002
"directing the DND to give Collantes a position where his eligibility is appropriate and to pay his backwages and other benefits from the time
of his termination up to his actual reinstatement."

In a Letter dated 7 February 2002, the Legal Affairs Division of the DND, through Atty. Leticia A. Gloria, urged the CSC to revisit its
Resolutions which were entirely in conflict with Our 30 August 2001 Decision in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874, which has attained finality
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 149883.

Consequently, in complete turnabout from its previous stance, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021482 dated 12 November 2002 declaring
that had it been properly informed that a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was then pending before Us, it would have refrained from
ruling on Collantes’ quandary, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Leticia A. Gloria of the department of National
Defense (DND) is hereby GRANTED and CSC Resolutions Nos. 01-1364 dated August 13, 2001 and 02-0084 dated January 15, 2002 are
reversed. Accordingly, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals, Nelson P. Collantes is deemed effectively resigned from his position
as Undersecretary of the DND."

Forthwith, Collantes moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution, but was denied by the CSC in the second assailed Resolution No.
030542 dated 5 May 2003.4

On 18 July 2003, herein petitioner Collantes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the reversal of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions No. 021482 and No. 030542. Before the Court of Appeals can decide this case, however, petitioner
was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Retirement Authority on 5 August 2004. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari in the assailed 10 March 2005 Decision:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the Civil Service
Commission for rendering Resolution Nos. 021482 and 030542, dated 12 November 2002 and 5 May 2003, respectively. No pronouncement
as to costs.5

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in the assailed 31 August 2005 Resolution. 6

Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In
view of his 5 August 2004 appointment, however, petitioner’s prayer is now limited to seeking the payment of backwages and other benefits
that may have been due him from the time of his alleged dismissal on 8 February 1999 to his appointment on 5 August 2004. Petitioner
submits the following issues for our consideration:

A.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
DECISION IN CA-G.R. NO. 62874 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A BAR TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DATED AUGUST 14, 2001.

B.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS VERY OWN DECISION WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND
IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

C.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH HELD THAT PETITIONER MAY BE REMOVED FROM HIS
POSITION AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT THE CONCOMITANT
TRANSFER TO A POSITION EQUIVALENT IN RANK OR BE REMOVED THEN, BE FLOATED PERPETUALLY, WHICH IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS A CAREER
EXECUTIVE SERVICE ELIGIBLE.7

Both petitioner and herein respondents CSC and Department of National Defense (DND) invoke the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments.

Petitioner claims that the 13 August 2001 Resolution of the CSC, which held that petitioner "was illegally removed as Undersecretary of the
Department of National Defense and therefore x x x should be given a position where his eligibility is appropriate or sufficient," has attained
finality. Petitioner adds that, not only has there been no appeal or motion for reconsideration filed within the allowable periods, the CSC even
granted the Motion for Execution filed by petitioner in its Order dated 15 January 2002. Petitioner thereby invokes our ruling that, before a
writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding. 8 Petitioner also
faults the CSC for ruling on a mere letter filed by Atty. Leticia Gloria of the DND, which petitioner claims is fatally defective for failure to
comply with the procedural due process clause of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service which require notice to adverse parties.9

Respondents, on the other hand, invoke the same doctrine of immutability of final judgments, this time with respect to the 30 August 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by petitioner. This Court of Appeals
Decision became final and executory when petitioner withdrew the Motion for Extension to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari he filed
with this Court.10

Forum Shopping, Res Judicata, and Litis Pendentia

Our rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as conflicting final decisions as in the case at bar. We have ruled that
what is important in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who
asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.11

More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration.12

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal
is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).13 If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or
all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. 14

Petitioner disputes respondents’ claim, and the CSC’s ruling, 15 that he had lodged two separate actions. Petitioner explains that he never filed
a case before the CSC. He merely sought the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) in a letter-request dated 24 March
1999. Said letter-request, petitioner claims, did not ask for any ruling.

Petitioner claims that, considering that two years had already lapsed without any response from the CESB, he filed on 23 January 2001 his
Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner was surprised when he learned through the 8 February 2001
letter of the CESB that, on 29 November 2000, it referred petitioner’s request to the CSC for appropriate action. 16 Petitioner was not required
to submit any pleading in support of his request. Apparently, the CSC treated the letter-request as a complaint or petition over which it could
exercise its adjudicative powers, as it issued its 13 August 2001 Resolution declaring petitioner to have been illegally removed as
Undersecretary of the DND, and should therefore be given a position appropriate or sufficient for his eligibility. 17 As stated above, the Court
of Appeals Decision dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was rendered 17 days later, on 30 August 2001. Petitioner
filed with this Court a motion for an extension of time within which to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari, but he later submitted a
Manifestation for the withdrawal of this motion as he decided not to pursue his appeal. 18 Instead, petitioner filed with the CSC on 25 October
2001 a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,19 which the CSC granted on 15 January 2002.20

In repeatedly asserting that he did not file two separate actions, petitioner is arguing, without stating it categorically, that he cannot be held
liable for forum shopping. However, what one cannot do directly cannot be done indirectly. Petitioner had been aware, through the 8
February 2001 letter of the CESB, that his request for assistance was referred to the CSC on 29 November 2000 for appropriate action. From
that point on, he knew that two government agencies – the CSC and the Court of Appeals – were simultaneously in the process of reaching
their respective decisions on whether petitioner was entitled to reinstatement or to a position appropriate to his eligibility. Therefore, it cannot
be denied that petitioner knew, from the moment of receipt of the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB, that he had effectively instituted two
separate cases, and whatever original intention he had for his letter-request is, by then, forgotten. Petitioner subsequently proceeded to act
like a true forum shopper – he abandoned the forum where he could not get a favorable judgment, and moved to execute the Resolution of the
forum where he succeeded.

Petitioner’s above actuation is, in fact, a violation of his certification against forum shopping with the Court of Appeals, a ground for
dismissal of actions distinct from forum shopping itself. As petitioner knew from the receipt of the CESB letter that another claim was
pending in a quasi-judicial agency concerning these issues, he was bound by his certification with the Court of Appeals to report such fact
within five days from his knowledge thereof. This circumstance – of being surprised by the discovery of another pending claim with another
court or quasi-judicial agency – is the very situation contemplated by letter (c) in the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best
of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. (Emphases
supplied.)

Petitioner, however, further asserts that the issues brought in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals on 18 July 2003 and
the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed on 29 January 2001 are distinct, and that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the latter
cannot constitute res judicata with respect to the former.21 Petitioner claims that the issues, remedies and reliefs in the two cases are different,
citing as basis the textbook definitions of quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner further claims that:

There is a clear distinction between the right of petitioner to the position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations and his right to be re-
appointed to another position of equivalent rank, in view of his CESO I status. The former issue may have been resolved by the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that petitioner Collantes had "effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND, and the public
respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position." The latter issue, or the right of petitioner Collantes to be given a
new assignment fitting to his CESO I rank, arises from his right to security of tenure as a Career Executive Service Eligible, and not from his
appointment to the DND.22

This allegedly clear distinction springs from petitioner’s claim that he resigned from his position, but not from his rank as a Career Executive
Service Officer (CESO). Petitioner claims that, as a CESO, there is a "great difference between (1) resigning from one’s position and (2)
resigning or relinquishing one’s rank, as position is different from one’s rank. POSITION refers to the particular or specific office from
which one may be appointed. RANK, on the other hand, refers not to a particular position but to the class to which one belongs in the
hierarchy of authority in an organization or bureaucracy." 23 Petitioner cites Cuevas v. Bacal24:

[S]ecurity of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed --- a concept which is
applicable only to the first and second-level employees in the civil service --- but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.

xxxx

Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope with the exigencies of public service, is thus the distinguishing
feature of the Career Executive Service. x x x.

and General v. Roco25:

In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level
employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career
executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever
he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as
he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies.
While there is indeed a distinction between position and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred or reassigned from one position to
another without losing his rank, there can be no distinction between resigning from a position and resigning from a rank. The rank of a CESO
is deactivated upon separation from the government service, which includes the resignation of a CESO from his position. The CESB has
clarified this concept of being in the inactive status in its Resolution No. 554, series of 2002:

Rule II

xxxx

7. CESO in Inactive Status - is a CESO who no longer occupies a position in the CES as a result of any of the modes of separation from the
government service, provided that such separation is not due to dismissal from the service for cause.

xxxx

Rule IV

Section 1. Modes of Deactivating a CES Rank. – There are three (3) modes by which the CES Rank of a CESO may be deactivated from the
CES:

1. Acceptance of a position by virtue of an appointment outside the coverage of the CES;

2. Dropping from the rolls of government officials and employees; and

3. Other modes of separation from the CES, provided that separation from the CES resulting from dismissal from the service for
cause and after due process shall result in the loss of CES rank and shall not be considered as a mode of deactivation.

xxxx

Sec. 2. Effect of Deactivation of CES Rank. – A CESO whose CES rank has been deactivated by the Board loses all the rights and privileges
accorded to him/her by law on account of his/her CES rank.

Likewise, it would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from his position can compel the President to appoint him to
another position. Such a ruling would effectively derogate the discretion of the appointing authority, 26 as it will give the CESO the option to
choose which position he or she wants, by the simple expediency of resigning from the position he or she does not want.

In sum, there is an identity of issues in the two cases which resulted in the two conflicting final and executory decisions. But while, as stated
above, the second petition can be dismissed on the ground of either res judicata or non-compliance with the undertakings in petitioner’s
certification against forum shopping, these grounds can only be invoked when the case is still pending. As petitioner points out, the
Resolution of the CSC had already become final and executory.

The 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals, however, has also attained finality. Hence, we go back to the main issue in this
petition: which of the two final and executory decisions should be given effect, the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision dismissing the
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto, or the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution declaring petitioner Collantes to be illegally removed as
Undersecretary of the DND?

Two Conflicting Final and Executory Decisions

Jurisprudence in the United States offers different solutions to this problem:

Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has been decided contrarily,
the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an estoppel, it "setteth the matter at large" has been applied by some authorities, and in such
case both parties may assert their claims anew. Other authorities have held that, of two conflicting judgments on the same rights of the same
parties, the one which is later in time will prevail, although it has also been held that the judgment prior in time will prevail. It has been held
that a decision of a court of last resort is binding on the parties, although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared.27

There are thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar: the first is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the
second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last
resort.
As there are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is appropriate for this Court to adopt either the first or the third solution. The
first solution involves disregarding the finality of the two previous judgments and allowing the parties to argue on the basis of the merits of
the case anew. The third solution merely involves the determination of which judgment has been rendered by this Court, the court of last
resort in this jurisdiction.

Adopting the third solution will result in the denial of this Petition for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution
came about by the failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the proper reglementary periods, the finality of the 30
August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision was by virtue of the 12 November 2001 Resolution 28 of this Court which declared the case closed
and terminated upon the manifestation of petitioner that he decided not to pursue his appeal and was thus withdrawing the motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari.

The better solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits of the case anew, and decide the case on the basis thereof. We can do this
either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by resolving the issues in this disposition. The latter recourse is more appropriate, for three
reasons: (1) all the facts, arguments, and pleadings in support of the parties’ contentions are now before us, with the parties advancing the
very same contentions as those in this Petition; (2) a remand to the Court of Appeals would entail asking the latter to resolve the very same
issues it had passed upon twice; and (3) a remand to the Court of Appeals would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of
the case when the case is now ripe for adjudication before us.

The merits of the case are the focus of petitioner’s third assignment of error in the present petition. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave and reversible error when it upheld the resolution of the CSC which allegedly effectively held "that petitioner may be
removed from his position as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense without the concomitant transfer to a position equivalent
in rank or be removed then, be floated perpetually, which is tantamount to a constructive dismissal, in violation of his right to security of
tenure as a career executive service eligible."29

Petitioner’s arguments presuppose that he had been removed from his position as Undersecretary of the DND. He, however, did not present
any evidence to that effect, whether in this Petition or in his earlier Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. If
he is implying that he was removed from office by virtue of his account that he was approached by persons close to President Joseph Estrada
who asked him to relinquish his post, which he did, then this Petition must fail, for, by his own deliberate deed, he resigned from his position.

There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the President, by himself or through
another, requested for someone’s resignation does not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another position. A courtesy
resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation. There can be no implied promises of another position just because the resignation was
made out of courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the
discretion of the appointing power,30 and because its object is outside the commerce of man. 31 As held by the Court of Appeals in its 30
August 2001 Decision:

In the first place, petitioner has not established by any quantum of certainty the veracity of his claim that he was promised an equivalent
position in the government. Assuming, however, that such promise was true, petitioner, as a ranking member of the bureaucracy, ought to
have known that such promise offers no assurance in law that the same would be complied with. The time-honored rule is that public office is
a public trust, and as such, the same is governed by law, and cannot be made the subject of personal promises or negotiations by private
persons.32

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. L-15379 August 31, 1962

TEODORO L. URBAYAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., and JOHN GRAY, defendants,
JOHN GRAY, defendant-appellee.
Antonio Montilla for defendant-appellee.
Marcelino R. Veloso for plaintiff-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals, whence it was forwarded to us on the ground that it involves purely legal
questions.

The case originated in the municipal court of the City of Tacloban, where appellant Teodoro L. Urbayan filed a complaint against Caltex
(Philippines), Inc. and appellee John Gray for recovery of damages for breach of contract. John Gray filed an answer with a counterclaim for
damages in the sum of P2,000.00 and attorney's fees of P300.00. Caltex on its part, moved to dismiss. Its motion was granted by the
municipal court in an order dated September 7, 1954. The case was set for trial with respect to Gray on the following September 17.

On the last mentioned date appellant failed to appear and the complaint was dismissed as against Gray for nonsuit. Gray was thereupon
permitted to present evidence in support of his counterclaim, but a little later the same day the court issued the following order:

Within two hours after this case had been dismissed with respect to defendant John Gray for failure of the plaintiff to appear before
this Court and plaintiff declared in default on counterclaim against him; and after the said defendant presented his evidence in
support of his counterclaim plaintiff with his counsel Atty. Filomeno Montejo appeared before the Court and orally asked that the
order of dismissal of the complaint and default on counterclaim be lifted. The petition being in accordance with the Rules of Court it
was granted.

Nevertheless, instead of asking for a re-trial or a new trial plaintiff announced that he is not going to present evidence and
manifested his intention to appeal against the decision of this Court to the Court of First Instance.

The order of dismissal of the complaint against John Gray for non-suit and default of plaintiff on the counter-claim is hereby lifted
and the appeal of the plaintiff is hereby given due course.

SO ORDERED.

DONE at the City of Tacloban this 17th day of September, 1954.

The municipal court then rendered its decision, also dated September 17, 1954, ordering Urbayan to pay defendant Gray P200.00 as moral
damages, P100.00 as exemplary or corrective damages, P150.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. Copy of the decision was received by appellant
counsel on September 28, 1954. However, on September 17, that is, on the date of the decision and eleven days before appellant received a
copy thereof, he filed a notice of appeal worded as follows:

Comes now the plaintiff in the above-entitled case thru the undersigned attorney and this Hon. Court respectfully presents this
notice of appeal against the order dismissing complaint against defendant, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., and against the other
defendant John Gray.

Tacloban City, September 17, 1954.

On September 28, 1954, the municipal court issued order forwarding the case to the Court of First Instance of Leyte, where on the following
October 11 John Gray filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the same had been taken only from the order dismissing the
complaint with respect to Caltex but not from the decision on his counterclaim against appellant. On December 1, 1954 the Court of First
Instance granted the motion and dismissed the appeal as against Gray, but remanded the case to the court below for further proceedings in so
far as defendant Caltex was concerned. It this order dismissing the appeal with respect to Gray that is now before us for review.

The question as to whether or not the appeal was correctly dismissed depends upon how the notice of appeal filed by appellant on September
17, 1954 should be construed. The reference made therein is to the order of the municipal court "dismissing the complaint against defendant
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. and against the other defendant John Gray." At first blush it would seem that the appeal was ineffective as against
Gray, because on one hand the order of dismissal on the ground of non-suit had been set aside and the complaint reinstated by the municipal
court with respect to him, and on the other hand appellant had not yet received a copy of the decision. However, appellant's intention may be
clearly inferred from the court's order lifting the declaration of non-suit. It is there stated that the defendant waived presentation of his
evidence and announced instead that he would appeal from the decision, anticipating, with reason, that the decision would be adverse to him.
He must have been prompted to make the waiver because after all the effect of his appeal would be to vacate the judgment and to have the
case tried de novo in the Court of First Instance.

The circumstance that a copy of the decision was actually received by appellant only on September 28 does not necessarily militate against
his announced intention to appeal therefrom on September 17, as he was then already certain that any decision the court might render would
be adverse to him inasmuch as only the defendant Gray had presented evidence. The decisive fact is that appellant intended to appeal and did
so by filing the corresponding notice of appeal, and that the same could have been from no other action of the court than its decision.
Technicalities, such as the inaccurate reference in the notice of appeal to a non-existent order of dismissal of the complaint as against
defendant Gray, should give way to the realities of the situation.1äwphï1.ñët

In connection with appellant's contention, subject of the first error assigned by him in his brief, that the municipal court of Tacloban should
have been declared as without jurisdiction to take cognizance of appellee's counterclaim in view of the amount involved, it appears that the
same was not submitted either to the said court or to the Court of First Instance for resolution. Hence, the assignment of such error in the
present appeal is premature.

The order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

No costs.

[G.R. No. L-28056. August 31, 1970.]

ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. UY REALTY COMPANY, HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, and THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, Respondents.

In this special proceeding for prohibition, petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc. would impute a grave jurisdictional defect to an order of
the then respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel granting a motion of the other respondent Uy Realty Company for a writ of execution against
petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedes bond "covering rentals rightfully due" the other respondent as plaintiff in the
ejectment case. By its stress on the claim that the above order of August 26, 1967 was issued notwithstanding the finality of a previous order
of dismissal of the case by respondent Judge, it was enabled not only to have this Court give due course to such petition, but also to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction upon posting a bond of P1,000.00. The answer filed by respondents altered the picture thus sedulously sought
to be created by petitioner. It was apparent therein that previous to such order of dismissal, there was a motion by respondent Uy Realty
Company for the dismissal of the case and for the payment of the back rentals secured by the supersedes bond filed by petitioner. Respondent
Judge, however, limited his first order to ordering the dismissal, apparently overlooking the prayer for the payment of the back rentals
guaranteed by the supersedes bond. Thereafter, within the thirty-day period, respondent sought for an amendment of the above order to
include execution on the bond filed to cover the past rentals due. The order now challenged was the result thereof. It was issued at a time
when the matter was still subject to cognizance by respondent Judge. It would thus appear that this petition lacks merit. We find
for Respondents. The order granting the writ of execution by respondent Judge is sustained.

As shown by the petition itself, there was a complaint for ejectment dated August 12, 1966 filed by now respondent Uy Realty Company
against a certain Co Hing. 1 There was an answer by defendant on August 27, 1966, seeking dismissal of such a suit as well as a counterclaim
for reimbursement in the amount of P15,000.00 for alleged improvements made on the leased premises and for damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 for alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor. 2 The decision of the City Court of Manila of October 20, 1966 ordered the
defendant and those claiming under him to vacate the premises as well as to pay the sum of P4,100.00 representing rents in arrears plus the
sum of P1,500.00 a month beginning September, 1966 for the use and occupation of such premises. 3 Upon an appeal being taken, which fell
to the sala of respondent Judge, a supersedes bond was executed by such defendant as well as by the petitioner, the Economic Insurance Co.,
Inc. 4

During the pendency of such appeal, under date of July 31, 1967, a motion for dismissal of the case and for payment of the supersedeas bond
was filed by the plaintiff, respondent Uy Realty Co. It was alleged therein: "1. That on June 23, 1967, upon failure of the defendant to make
the required rental deposits to comply with the pro visions of Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Honorable Court, upon motion of
undersigned counsel, issued a Writ of Ejectment Execution against the defendant; 2. That counsel for the defendant did not raise any
objection to the enforcement of said writ of execution by the Sheriff of Manila whereupon said officer placed the plaintiff in possession of the
leased premises subject to this appeal; 3. That defendant having vacated the leased premises and possession thereof having been surrendered
to the plaintiff, the legal issues subject of this appeal have therefore become moot and the continuation of the trial set for August 2, 1967 will
not serve any purpose; 4. That defendant, upon surrender of the premises to the plaintiff, manifested that he has no longer any interest in the
further prosecution of this case and would have no objection to the dismissal thereof; 5. That on November 23, 1966, defendant filed
Supersedeas Bond No. 567 for P8,800.00 thru the Economic Insurance Company, Inc. to enter the action into this Honorable Court, said bond
having for its purpose to guarantee the payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals up to the time of judgment in the City Court of Manila,
including damages, attorney’s fees and costs; 6. That plaintiff is, as of right, entitled to the withdrawal of the amount covered by the
aforementioned supersedeas bond in view of the dismissal of this appealed case." 5 It sought in the prayer that" (a) this appealed case be
dismissed; and (b) that the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. be ordered to pay to herein plaintiff the amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by the
Supersedeas Bond No. 567 filed in this case representing rentals, damages and costs as adjudged by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 151874 in favor of plaintiff." 6

Then came this order of respondent Judge of August 2, 1967: "Upon motion of the plaintiff in view of the fact that the possession of the
property, subject matter of this litigation, has been restored to the plaintiff, the defendants having vacated the same, this case is hereby
ordered dismissed without costs." 7 It was noted in the answer that on August 22, 1967, the aforesaid order of dismissal of respondent Judge
being received by respondent Uy Realty Company only on August 15, 1967, there was a manifestation and motion to execute bond to this
effect: "1. That on August 1, 1967, the undersigned counsel filed with this Honorable Court their ‘Motion for Dismissal and For Payment of
Supersedeas Bond’; 2. That on August 2, 1967, this Honorable Court issued an Order dismissing the instant case as prayed for by
undersigned counsel but did not resolve the prayer for the payment of the amount represented by the Supersedeas Bond in this case; 3. That
the records of this case will show that on November 23, 1966, defendant filed with this Honorable Court through the Economic Insurance
Company, Inc. Supersedeas Bond No. 567 for the amount of P8,800.00 which represents accrued rentals due the herein plaintiff up to the
time of judgment in the ejectment case rendered by the City Court of Manila; 4. That considering the dismissal of this case, plaintiff is
entitled as of right to the payment of the amount represented by the aforementioned Supersedeas Bond as rentals due and owing to the
plaintiff before this case was elevated to this Honorable Court on appeal; 5. That the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. has been duly notified of
plaintiff’s Motion for the payment of the Supersedeas Bond as of August 1, 1967 and the undersigned counsel has not been served with any
opposition thereto" 8 The prayer was for a writ of execution to be issued against now petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedeas
bond covering rentals rightfully due respondent Uy Realty Company. That was the basis. The result thereof was the challenged order of
August 26, 1967, granting the prayer for a writ of execution against petitioner "for the amount represented by its Supersedeas Bond covering
rentals rightfully due to the plaintiff." 9

Petitioner does not deny, possibly because it could not deny, its liability on the supersedeas bond. It did not even oppose the motion for its
execution. Its objection is that the order of August 26, 1967 was issued at a time when the matter was outside the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge, the case having been dismissed. It is on the legal proposition, and that proposition alone, that it seeks to make out a case for
prohibition. If the motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. sought merely the dismissal of the case, the premises having been vacated, then
perhaps the case for petitioner, such as it is, would have been bolstered. As clearly pointed out, however, the motion precisely sought that
petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by the supersedeas bond. Unfortunately, through haste or inadvertence,
respondent Judge ignored that portion and merely ordered that the appealed case be dismissed. Within the period, however, before such order
attained the stage of finality, a modification thereof was secured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. to
execute on the bond filed by petitioner. Under the circumstances, what respondent Judge did was clearly within his authority, and the
challenged order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny. Hence, this petition should fail.

One last observation. It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the law
allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in
mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a
greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances, to crown with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just
obligation by perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor, 10
we have stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which would be to render illusory
substantive rights. We do so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate Language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the
situation." 11

WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us by virtue of our resolution of September 25, 1967 is set aside, and this petition
for prohibition is denied. With costs against petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in
Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the
trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery
especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica
M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony
Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's
testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since
Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision,
the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi
appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of
witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted
her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained
unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first
wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust
the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once
she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They
paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January
4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term
of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and
twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. 4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were
tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members voted three against two to deny the
motion,5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for
DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence 6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to
scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over
to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in
evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital
evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s
failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his
innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
 1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in
committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given
the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that
Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very
least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot
be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of
identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that
simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in
Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to
show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the
technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at
least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the
other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its
decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their
appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen
specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in
the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
"Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently
seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela
Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF
Homes, Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano,
Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer
and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out,
Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had just arrived
home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where
Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at
their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested
Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked.
Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had
arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue
where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed
Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group
about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad
trip").

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to
leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay."
They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at
Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached
Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang
transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied,
"O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the
garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang
ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the
kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going
out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at
the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the
garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark
but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked
him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta
maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door
but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like
a television that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise
came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela
while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket.
Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape.
Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the
sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house
just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they
could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue.
As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the
car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They
entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained
outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella.
Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela,
she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her.
Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him,
"Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We don’t know each other. We
haven’t seen each other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house. 12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or
friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool
pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of
lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR)
Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with
information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like
Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer.
Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights
in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told
Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to
bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as
well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?

xxxx

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of
the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

xxxx

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to
me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

xxxx

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not
and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
 Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."

xxxx

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang yan?"

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the
crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at
the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the
confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI
handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically
lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the
police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the
physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in
cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no
reason to smash her front door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone
and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s
narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid
detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that
they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at
another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned
Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the
front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene although
robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The
confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense
since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in
and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using
a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened
garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk
standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the
crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed
for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out
above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals
failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named
Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug
dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI
office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month
ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case. 13

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the
name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of
things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the
crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they
(including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s house, only
Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was parked on the street between Carmela’s
house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone
who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s
companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why
would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated
Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape
Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a
crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just
followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his
friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her
up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy
on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason
for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to
do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to
Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no
sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this,
Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone
other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not
want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her
business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame
of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped
Carmela on the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister whose bloodied
bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after
Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the
sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did
not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided
to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was
confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they
sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got
a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in
the master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set. 16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He
also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe
the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious
about their coming and going.

But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the
Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back
the second time in the direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet,
White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he
supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before
Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He
also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony about the movements of the persons
involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,17 White claimed it was the
Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a
resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first
week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at
the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy.
Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however,
that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his
ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without
being logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to challenge a Congressman’s son with
such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the
visitor’s entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not in recording the
visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb
at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at
about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret
door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day. 19

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb
household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember
any of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only
damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not
call the attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the
blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991,
testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to
collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from
the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to
the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the
hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong
playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted
him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he
washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out
a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet. 21

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly
came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if
he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose of
some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the
Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to
maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong's
acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected
suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on
finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-
going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen
door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had
been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not
around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around
with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a
relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship
or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page,
rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the
board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable
facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it
looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s
relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having
ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented
himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro,
the woman who made a living informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the
value of independence, hard work, and money. 22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco
via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel
plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave. 23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his
departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with
Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those
present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega. 24

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight
808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and
stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through.26 He
was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest. 27

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S.
Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9,
1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 28 the computer-generated
print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by
the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s house in
Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb,
Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock
and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the Philippines. 32

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California. 33 During his stay there, he occupied
himself with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control company.35 Webb
presented the company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991
he applied for a driver's license38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera. 39

On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto
Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside,
California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car. 41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb
looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor
Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations. 45

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon, 46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb
a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic. 49

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to
stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on
weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards. 51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack
Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and
stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure
from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry. 53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of
State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the
Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine
Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport
indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed
Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing
basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against
Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister.
Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but
denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi
is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically
dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the
accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to
quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness
can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually
based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about
something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime
as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the
Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took
advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front
door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had
Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its
scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to
darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their
turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible
to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro’s
story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were
practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue.
And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to
gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear
when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a
grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification
that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the
U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed
the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of
the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and
his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the local
immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure
speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger
manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S.
Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the
U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the
best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge
to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent, 59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with
the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.
Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no
less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for
the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is
a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it
is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true. 60

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They
have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their
trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of
such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no
record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals
Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of
Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim,
Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic
channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San
Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of
the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State
Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available
information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the
appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are
entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have
produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of
NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the
domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly
return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the
Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen
hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard
suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth
of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did
not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration
services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower
court’s minds.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada,
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place,
Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open
mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious
mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable
between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that
she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are
confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 452 March 18, 1905

In the matter of JOSE ROBLES LAHESA

Jose Maria Marcaida for Jose Robles Lahesa.

CARSON, J.:

Jose Robles Lahesa, a lawyer practicing before this court, was duly appointed counsel for the appellants in the case of the United States vs.
Julian Tulagan et al. on February 5, 1904, and on February 12, 1905, the Solicitor-General gave notice of motion to dismiss the appeal in said
case on the ground of abandonment and failure to prosecute the same. The said Lahesa was also appointed counsel for the appellant in the
case of the United States vs. Julio Liuag, on the 12th of August, 1904, and on February 11, 1905, this court, on its own motion, issued a rule
to the said Lahesa to show cause why the appeal in that case should not be dismissed on like grounds, and further, to show cause, if any he
had, why this court should not impose disciplinary punishment for grave neglect in the performance of his duty as a lawyer and officer of this
court.

Said motion and rule came on for hearing Monday, February 20, 1905, when Jose Maria Marcaida appeared on behalf of said Lahesa, and
said he had been instructed by said Lahesa to inform the court that he could not appear personally in response to its rule, because he found it
necessary to go elsewhere on the day and at the hour fixed for the hearing, that he had no ground on which to oppose the dismissal of the
appeals in said cases, and further, that he had taken no action in the said cases because, in his opinion, "there was no defense to be made on
behalf of any of the defendants for whom he had been assigned as counsel."

An examination of the record in the case of the United States vs. Julian Tulagan et al. shows that the appellants were sentenced in the trial
court to long terms of imprisonment for the crime of robo en cuadrilla, from which sentence they appealed, and it appearing that they were
too poor to employ a lawyer, this court, in accordance with the law provided in such cases, assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet
the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever in behalf of the defendants in said case, though more than a year has elapsed
since the date of said assignment. An examination of the record in the case of the United States vs. Julio Liuag shows that the defendant was
sentenced to seventeen years and four months' imprisonment for the crime of homicide, from which sentence he appealed, and it appearing
the he was too poor to employ a lawyer, this court assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take
any action whatever on behalf of the defendant in that case, though more than six months have elapsed since the date of his assignment.

Upon this statement of facts it can not be doubted that the said Jose Robles Lahesa has been guilty of grave negligence in the performance of
his duties as counsel, and as an officer of the court.

This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused
persons pending appeal. We are of opinion, therefore, that a fine of 200 pesos, Philippine currency, should be imposed upon the said Jose
Robles Lahesa, said fine to be paid to the clerk of this court within ten days of receipt of notice of this order. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 5098 April 11, 2012

JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1) violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve
confidential information received from his client;1 and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests. 2
In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the
preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr.
Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in
behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential
information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having
received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino
Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint
for this reason.

The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP
Commissioner opined:

In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up
inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Cañete, respondent’s present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the
sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of
the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete in
view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.

In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting
employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record. x x x

xxx

Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present.
There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that which his duty to another
client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
Such is the case with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true
and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)3

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. 4

The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules.5 The IBP Board of
Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty.

Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30,
2004.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:

Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.

"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the
same action or in an unrelated action."7 The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client
that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."8 To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the
opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients." 9

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case.

One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for
the other client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to
be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon
in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.10 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn [emphasis ours]

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as
established by the following circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The records show
that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s
favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At
that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from
Zenaida Cañete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions:
first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in
the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the
complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he also accepted a new
engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been
previously retained.

To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition. However, we
find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana
did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida
Cañete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse
claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the
complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Cañete. 11 Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain
the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We
likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This
penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting interests. 12
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his
alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the
latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are not
unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Cañete, to recover lands from Complainant,
including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.13 He also averred in his Answer that:

6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete was his
former client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter
(Annex "4") to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to
respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to
file the complaint against her.14 1âwphi1

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge against oneself and to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.15 These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.

All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.16 In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.
We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct,
have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. 17 This is all that we did in this
case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable
penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from
the practice of law.

Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point
when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 5704 : May 8, 2009]

WILLEM KUPERS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOHNSON B. HONTANOSAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas was triggered by a letter-complaint1 dated April 15, 2002 of
complainant Willem Kupers to the Court through the Court Administrator. The Court Administrator referred the letter to the Bar Confidant
on April 25, 2002.2 On May 7, 2002, the Acting Bar Confidant wrote complainant that for the court to take cognizance of an administrative
case against a lawyer, a verified complaint must be filed in nineteen (19) copies together with supporting documents. 3 Thus, complainant was
told to submit an additional thirteen (13) copies of his complaint. On May 25, 2002, complainant complied and submitted an additional
thirteen (13) copies of his complaint.

Complainant alleged that respondent4 had: (1) prepared and notarized contracts that are both invalid and illegal as these contracts violated the
limitations on aliens leasing private lands; (2) served conflicting interests since he performed legal services for adverse parties; (3) refused to
furnish copies of the contracts he notarized to the parties thereof; (4) notarized documents without keeping copies thereof and (5) failed to
properly discharge his duty to his client Karl Novak, particularly when respondent allegedly refused to accept his dismissal as counsel for
Novak, failed to turn over Novak's documents thereafter, handled legal matters without adequate preparation, betrayed Novak's trust and
refused to see Novak with a translator of Novak's choice.

Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had prepared a memorandum of agreement and a contract of
lease between the spouses Busse and Hochstrasser, a Swiss national. Under said agreement, Hochstrasser would lease Vivian Busse's
property in Alcoy, Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for another fifty (50) years. 5 Complainant added that respondent had acted despite
conflict of interest on his part since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were both his clients. Respondent prepared a similar agreement and
lease contract between the spouses Busse and Karl Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time the
lease contract was for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another forty nine (49) years. 6 All four (4) documents were notarized by
respondent. It was also averred that respondent drafted two deeds of sale over the leased properties of Spouses Busse to Naomie Melchior, a
Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German National.

The Court required respondent to comment on the charges.7 He answered that if anyone should be penalized, it should be respondent for
meddling in the affairs of his clients and otherwise making a mockery of the Philippine legal system by deceitfully passing as material facts
opinionated, baseless and false allegations as well as a falsified document. 8 Respondent also moved that complainant be made to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt.

Complainant filed a reply on November 6, 2002, in which he stated among other things that respondent is like Pontius Pilatus [sic].9

On February 10, 2003, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.10

In lieu of hearings, Commissioner Doroteo Aguila required the parties to file their respective memoranda due to the limited time period given
by the Court. The parties did. The Commissioner found that respondent had prepared and notarized contracts that violated Presidential
Decree No. 471 (P.D. No. 471) since leases of private lands by aliens cannot exceed twenty five (25) years, renewable for another twenty five
(25) years.11 Nonetheless, complainant failed to prove the other charges he had hurled against respondent as the former was not privy to the
agreements between respondent and the latter's clients. Moreover, complainant failed to present any concrete proof of the other charges. The
commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months.

Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the recommendation of the commissioner and dismissed the complaint on February
27, 2004.12 The Board of Governors ratiocinated that suspension was not warranted since respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The
act was not illegal per se since the lease agreement was likely made to reflect the agreement among the parties without considering the
legality of the situation. While admittedly respondent may be guilty of ignorance of the law or plain negligence, the Board dismissed the
complaint out of compassion.

We reject the Board's recommendation. We stress that much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a
duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 13 The lawyer's diligence and dedication to his work and
profession ideally should not only promote the interests of his clients. A lawyer has the duty to attain the ends of justice by maintaining
respect for the legal profession.14

The investigating commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors both found that the majority of the charges against the respondent lack
proof. Our own review of the records confirms that most of the charges are unsupported by evidence. Such charges are simply the
unsubstantiated accusations in the complaint with nary a whit of concrete proof such as affidavits of the clients whose trust respondents had
allegedly breached.

However, administrative cases against lawyers are sui generes and as such the complainant in the case need not be the aggrieved party. Thus
even if complainant is not a party to the contracts, the charge of drafting and notarizing contracts in contravention of law holds weight. A
plain reading of these contracts clearly shows that they violate the law limiting lease of private lands to aliens for a period of twenty five (25)
years renewable for another twenty five (25) years.

In his defense, respondent avers that the assailed contracts are valid under Republic Act No. 7652 (R.A. No. 7652), entitled "An Act
Allowing The Long-Term Lease of Private Lands by Foreign Investors." They add that these contracts should not be viewed purely as lease
contracts since they allow the leasor to nominate a Filipino citizen or corporation to purchase the subject property within the lease period.
Respondent's defenses are frivolous. Assuming that it can be duly established that his foreign clients are indeed "foreign investors" as
contemplated under R.A. No. 7652,15 said law allows the lease for the original period of fifty (50) years, renewable for another period of
twenty five (25) years, well below the periods of fifty (50) years renewable for another fifty (50) years, and forty-nine (49) years renewable
for another forty-nine (49) years respectively, stipulated in the two lease agreements.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements, caused his clients to violate Section 7 of R.A. No. 7652 which states:
Sec. 7. Penal Provision. ' Any contract or agreement made or executed in violation of any of the following prohibited acts shall be null and
void ab initio and both contracting parties shall be punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than
One million pesos (P1,000,000), or imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or both, at the discretion of the court:

(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a lease period in excess of that provided in paragraph (1) of Section 4;

(2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose contrary to existing laws of the land, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs;

(3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the lease of land in excess of the area approved by the DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of
the totality of the area leased is due to the acts of the lessee, the lessee shall be held solely liable therefor: Provided, further, That, in the case
of corporations, associations, or partnerships, the president, manager, director, trustee, or officers responsible for the violation hereof shall
bear the criminal liability. (Emphasis ours)

In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorney's Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the Philippines." This duty is enshrined in the
Attorney's Oath16 and in Canon 1, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at decreasing confidence in the legal systems."

The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the following:

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxx

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of hairness.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer's oath, the acts of respondents also amount to gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ― A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

We cannot accept, however, the plea of leniency expressed by the IBP Board of Governors in behalf of respondent. We also find that the
suspension for two (2) months recommended by the IBP Investigating Commissioner too light. We find six (6) months suspension to be a
sufficient sanction against respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the lawyer's oath and gross misconduct. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Respondent's suspension is effective upon notice hereof. Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent's record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4973 March 15, 2010

SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

– Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the South Cotabato-Sarangani-General Santos City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolved to refer to the IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for appropriate action and investigation,
the purported anomaly involving Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.1 Thus, on March 24, 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L.
Montefrio, the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed as Administrative Matter (AM) No. RTJ-98-1426 entitled Manuel C. Rafols and
Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro Dizon, Jr., RTC, General Santos City, Branch 37, 2 was resolved in a per curiam decision promulgated on
January 31, 2006,3 whereby the Court dismissed Judge Dizon, Jr. from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including
government-owned and government -controlled corporations.

In the same per curiam decision, the Court reiterated its resolution of October 21, 1998 for the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct
an investigation of the actuations of Atty. Barrios, Jr. (respondent), and to render its report and recommendation.

Hence, this decision.

Antecedents

The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter was narrated in the joint affidavit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses Manuel C.
Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols (complainants), 4 whose narrative was corroborated by the affidavit dated March 11, 1998 of Larry
Sevilla;5 the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Allan Rafols;6 and the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Daisy Rafols, 7 all of which were
attached to the letter of the IBP Chapter President. Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, referred for
appropriate action a copy of the letter and affidavits to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.

In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez filed with the Court an Administrative Matter for Agenda,
recommending in relation to Atty. Barrios, Jr., as follows:

xxx

5. The Office of the Bar Confidant be FURNISHED with a copy of the letter-note and its attachments so that it may conduct its own
investigation in the matter with respect to the actuations of Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr. 8

xxx

In the resolution dated October 21, 1998, the Court approved the recommendations, 9 and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to
investigate the actuations of the respondent, and to render its report and recommendation thereon.

Proceedings of the OBC

Only the respondent appeared during the hearing before the OBC. Denying the charges against him, he sought the dismissal of the complaint
and re-affirmed the contents of his comment. Despite notice, the complainants did not appear before the OBC. However, the complainants
and the respondent had testified during the administrative hearing involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose
Sabio Jr. as the Investigating Justice. Also testifying thereat were the complainants’ witnesses, namely: Allan Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry
Sevilla.
 A. Evidence for the Complainants

The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City, wherein they sought
the cancellation of a deed of sale. Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr. The complainants
were represented by the respondent, paying to him ₱15,000.00 as acceptance fee.

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the complainants at their residence and informed complainant Manuel that the
judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel’s coffee shop where Judge
Dizon, Jr. was already waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala.
The judge likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver
₱150,000.00 to him. As he had no money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce the amount. The judge then stated
that he would wait for the money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel left the coffee shop together with the respondent, who instructed
Manuel to come up with the money before noon because the judge badly needed it. The two of them went to a lending institution,
accompanied by Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that only ₱50,000.00 could be released the next day. From the lending institution,
they went to the complainants’ shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan’s wife, who offered to withdraw ₱20,000.00 from her savings account.

On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off the respondent at the hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr. that the
money was forthcoming. Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel withdrew ₱20,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 from their respective bank accounts, and went
back to the hotel with the cash. There, they saw the judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards the judge’s Nissan pick-up
then parked along the highway in front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and approached the judge. Manuel personally handed the
money to the judge, who told Manuel after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel entered the hotel’s coffee
shop and informed the respondent that he had already handed the money to the judge.

On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the complainants. He was on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up driven
by the judge’s driver. The respondent relayed to the complainants the message that the judge needed the balance of ₱100,000.00 in order to
complete the construction of his new house in time for the reception of his daughter’s wedding. However, the complainants managed to raise
only ₱80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day.

On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the complainants’ residence and instructed their son to request his parents to return his call,
leaving his cell phone number. When Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to see him in his office. During their
meeting in his chambers, the judge demanded the balance of ₱30,000.00. Manuel clarified to the judge that his balance was only ₱20,000.00
due to the previous amount given being already ₱80,000.00. The judge informed him that the amount that the respondent handed was short.
Saying that he badly needed the money, the judge insisted on ₱30,000.00, and even suggested that the complainants should borrow in order to
raise that amount.

On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the complainants to inquire whether the ₱30,000.00 was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied
that he was ready with the amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later arrived on board his Nissan
pick-up. Upon instructions of the judge’s driver, the complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until somewhere inside the Doña Soledad
Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There, the judge alighted and approached the complainants and shook their hands. At that point, Manuel
handed ₱30,000.00 to the judge. The judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the perpetuation of the testimony
of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the complainants to win.
The judge persuaded the complainants to give money also to that judge; otherwise, they should not blame him for the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared that the judge would be biased against them unless they gave
in to his demands. But when they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about their case, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their
mediamen friend, and narrated to Sevilla all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. They agreed that the details should be released
to the media. The exposẻ was published in the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.

Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts to appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a
portion of the money, but the complainants declined the offers.

According to the complainants, the respondent demanded ₱25,000.00 as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-
Provido in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the complainants to borrow ₱60,000.00
from the bank because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give ₱11,000.00 to his nephew who was due
to leave for work abroad.

B. Evidence for the Respondent

In his verified comment dated March 22, 2006, 10 the respondent confirmed that the complainants engaged him as their counsel in Civil Case
No. 6209. His version follows.
On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon, Jr. inside the East Royal Hotel’s coffee shop. The respondent
stayed at a distance, because he did not want to hear their conversation. Later, Manuel approached the respondent and gave him ₱2,000.00.
When the respondent asked what the money was for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of the former’s introducing the latter to the
judge. The respondent stated that Manuel did not mention what transpired between the latter and the judge; and that the judge did not tell him
(respondent) what transpired in that conversation.

Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their house in General Santos City on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up
driven by the judge’s driver, in order to receive the ₱80,000.00 from the complainants. The amount was being borrowed by the judge for his
swimming pool. Later on, the judge told the respondent to keep ₱30,000.00 as a token of their friendship. After Manuel handed the
₱80,000.00, the respondent and the judge’s driver headed towards Davao City, where, according to the judge’s instruction, they redeemed the
judge’s wristwatch for ₱15,000.00 from a pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining amount of ₱35,000.00 to the judge in his home.

On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the latter’s house to ask him to execute an affidavit. Declining the request at
first, the respondent relented only because the judge became physically weak in his presence and was on the verge of collapsing. Nonetheless,
the respondent refused to notarize the document.

In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998,11 the respondent denied that Judge Dizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants; and stated that he
did not see the complainants handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he was the one who had requested the judge to personally
collect his unpaid attorney’s fees from the complainants with respect to their previous and terminated case; and that the judge did not ask
money from the complainants in exchange for a favorable decision in their case.

On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants’ residence, but was surprised to find complainant Lolita crying aloud. She
informed him that the judge was again asking an additional ₱30,000.00 although they had given him ₱30,000.00 only the week before. She
divulged that the judge had told her that their case would surely lose because: (a) they had engaged a counsel who was mahinang klase; (b)
the judge hearing Civil Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had testified in Civil Case No. 6029 had not been presented; and (c) they
would have to spend at least ₱10,000.00 for said judge’s accommodations in General Santos City. 12

On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of the respondent, but the latter was not home. The judge left a note addressed to the
complainants, and instructed the respondent’s secretary to deliver the note to the complainants along with a gift (imported table
clock).13 According to the respondent, the complainants consistently refused to accept the gift several times; it was later stolen from his house
in Cebu City.

On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the complainants, but the latter refused to receive it, telling him that they
were no longer interested to continue with the case. At the same time, the complainants assured him that they bore no personal grudge against
him, because they had a problem only with Judge Dizon, Jr.

On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of Investigation Regional Office, Region XI, and the Philippine National
Police Regional Office, Region XI, both in Davao City, to request the investigation of the matter.14

On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the latter’s request. In that meeting, the respondent told the judge about
the refusal of the complainants to accept the judge’s gift and about their decision not to continue with the case. 15

On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to inform him that the judge had raised the amount that he had borrowed from
the complainants.16 The judge requested the respondent to tell the complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was going to return whatever he
had borrowed from them. However, the complainants informed the respondent that he should tell the judge that they were no longer
interested in getting back the money.

The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Offices in Davao City of his request for assistance after Manuel mentioned to
him that he (Manuel) knew of many armed men ready at any time to help him in his problem with the judge.

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 15, 2008, 17 the OBC opined that the administrative case against the respondent could not be
dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute due to the complainants’ failure to appear in the scheduled hearing despite due notice.

Based on the facts already established and identified, as rendered in the decision dated January 21, 2006 in Manuel Rafols and Lolita B.
Rafols v. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon,18 the OBC rejected the respondent’s denial of any knowledge of the transaction between his clients and
the judge.

The OBC recommended:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with a stern warning that a repetition of similar act in the future will be dealt more
severely."

Ruling of the Court

We approve and adopt the report and recommendations of the OBC, which we find to be fully and competently supported by the evidence
adduced by the complainants and their witnesses, but we impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which we believe is the proper penalty.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disbarment and suspension of attorneys, provides:

Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the
harsh penalty.19 As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is
proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. 20

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondent’s presumed innocence and the presumed regularity in the performance of his
duties as an attorney of the complainants. The evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.

To begin with, the respondent’s denial of knowledge of the transaction between the complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only
implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of introducing
the complainants to the judge strongly implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the
respondent’s clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly accept the aptness of the following evaluation made in the OBC’s Report and Recommendation,
viz:

xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants outside the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule
and that it can never be justified by any reason. He must have known the purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to meet the complainants-
litigants outside the chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and complainants- litigants in
the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must have allowed himself and consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask
money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon. 21

Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that he did not see the complainants’ act of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his
comment, the respondent even admitted having himself received the ₱80,000.00 from the complainants, and having kept ₱30,000.00 of that
amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the friendship between him and the judge. 22 The admission proved that the
respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge
of the delivery of the money to the judge.

Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the judge as a loan, far from softening our strong impression of
the respondent’s liability, confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the complainants’ attorney in the civil
case being heard before the judge, the respondent could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly irregular
and outrightly unethical. If he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should have desisted from having any part in the transaction.
Yet, he did not, which rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his explanation was his admission of having
retained ₱30,000.00 of the "borrowed" money upon the judge’s instruction.

And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent’s act of requesting the NBI Regional Office in Davao City to investigate was an
afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the complainants’ moves against
him and the judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had
suffered at the hands of the judge and their own attorney from the time that the complainants assured him that they were no longer interested
to get back their money despite their being very angry at the judge’s greed.

Overall, the respondent’ denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted evidence showing that he had not only
personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants the judge’s illegal
reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law
and insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters. 23

II

The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.24 The attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected
to

maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people’s
faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured. 25 Thus, he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at
large, as to be beyond reproach at all times.26 Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition on the
attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 27

Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
conduct.28 Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.291avvphi1

The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute
abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he
disregarded the vow to "delay no man for money or malice" and to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients" that he made when he took the Lawyer’s Oath.30 He also disobeyed the
explicit command to him as an attorney "to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business

except from him or with his knowledge and approval."31 He conveniently ignored that the relation between him and his clients was highly
fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character.32

Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment."33 Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and
is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the
admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. 34

The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against the former’s own clients, whom he was
sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this administrative case. And, being
conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the
dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Copies of the decision shall be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for record purposes; and to the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts nationwide.

SO ORDERED.