PROTECTION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE A Technical Reference (VOL III) - 01

FOR INTERNAL CORCULATION ONLY
DOC. NO.-D-2-03-20-03-00
POWERGRID
Protection System Maintenance

A Technical Reference
May,2017
Prepared by
Working Group ( WG-SS-I )
Vol-III
Protection System Maintenance- A POWERGRID Technical Reference
Table of Contents
1.Background………….........................................................................................................2
2. Applicability of Protection System Maintenance ..........................................................3
3. Relay Product Generations .............................................................................................3
4. Protection system maintenance program…....................................................................4
5.Time Based Maintenance (TBM) Programs....................................................................5
6. Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Programs...........................................................5
7. Time Based versus Condition Based Maintenance ........................................................6
8. Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals ...................................................................7
Table of Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals-1(a) ................................................10
Table of Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals-1(b) ................................................14
Notes for Table 1(a) and 1(b) ...........................................................................................17
8.1 Retention of Records .......................................................................................................18
9. Overlapping the Verification of Segments of the Protection System..........................18
10. Monitoring by Analysis of Fault Records ...................................................................19
11. Importance of Relay Settings in Maintenance Programs..........................................20
12. Self-Monitoring Capabilities and Limitations.............................................................20
13. Notification of Protection System Failures .................................................................21
14.Maintenance Activities……………………………………………..……………...…..21
14.1 Protective Relays..........................................................................................................21
14.2 Voltage and current sensing devices..............................................................................21
14.3 DC Control circuitry.....................................................................................................22
14.4 Batteries and DC Supplies............................................................................................22
14.5 Tele-protection equipment............................................................................................22
15. End to end testing of protection System……………………………………………..23
15.1 Background……………………………………………………………………………………. 23
15.2 Purpose………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
15.3 Challenges…………………………………………………………………………………….. .24
15.4 Requirements…………………………………………………………………………………. .24
15.5 Global Positioning System……………………………………………………………………25
15.6 Test system………………………………………………………………………………………26
15.7 Test preparation………………………………………………………………………………..26
15.8 Test execution…………………………………………………………………………………..27
15.9 Use of event and disturbance recorder……………………………………………………..27
15.10 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….28
Appendix A – Example of overlapping the verification of protection system
segments………………...…………………………………………………….29
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1. BACKGROUND
Protective relays have been described as silent sentinels, and do not generally demonstrate
their performance until a fault or other power system problem requires that they operate to
protect power system elements, or even the entire Bulk Electric System. Lacking faults or
system problems, the protection systems may not operate for extended periods. A
misoperation - a false operation of a protection system or a failure of the protection system
to operate when needed - can result in equipment damage, personnel hazards, and wide area
disturbances or unnecessary customer outages. A maintenance or testing program is used to
determine the performance and availability of protection systems.
Typically, protection systems are tested at fixed time intervals, unless they had some
incidental evidence that a particular protection system was not behaving as expected.
Testing has included system functionality, calibration of measuring relays, and correctness
of settings. Typically, a protection system must be visited at its substation installation site
and removed from service/being in service for this testing.
• Purpose: To ensure all Transmission Protection Systems affecting the reliability

of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are maintained and tested.
Components of Protection System :

Protective relays, associated communication systems necessary for correct operation of
protective devices, voltage and current sensing inputs to protective relays, station DC
supply and DC control circuitry from the station DC supply through trip coil(s) of the
circuit breakers or other interrupting devices.
• Requirements: The substation incharge must keep records of the test for at least
five(5) years.
It will still be required to have a documented maintenance program, with procedures and
records. The present document looks at setting maximum allowable time intervals and
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allowing continuation of existing programs conducted on a technically sound basis,

while opening new options for how this maintenance program can take advantage of
features of new relays. The newest relays have self-monitoring capabilities that open
new options for verifying relay performance with reduced on-site testing.
2. Applicability of Protection System Maintenance

Maintenance requirements and approaches presented in Sections 8 through 14 below are
intended to apply to all Transmission system Protection.
3. Relay Product Generations

The likelihood of failure and the ability to observe the operational state of a critical
protection system depend on the technological generation of the relays as well as how long
they have been in service. Unlike many other transmission asset groups, protection and
control systems have seen dramatic technological changes spanning several generations.
During the past 20 years, major functional advances are primarily due to the introduction of
microprocessor technology for power system devices such as primary measuring relays,
monitoring devices, control systems, and telecommunication equipment.
Modern microprocessor based relays have six(6) significant traits that impact a maintenance
strategy:
1. Self monitoring capability – the processors can check themselves, peripheral circuits, and
some connected substation inputs and outputs such as trip coil continuity. Most relay users
are aware that these relays have self monitoring, but are not focusing on exactly what parts
are actually monitored. As explained further below, every element critical to the protection
system must be monitored, or else verified periodically.
2. Ability to capture fault records showing how the protection system responded to a fault in
its zone of protection, or to a nearby fault for which it is required not to operate.
3. Ability to meter currents and voltages, as well as status of connected circuit breakers,
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continuously during non-fault times. The relays can compute values such as MW and
MVAR line flows that are sometimes used for operational purposes such as SCADA.
4. Data communication via ports that provide remote access to all the results of protection
system monitoring, recording and measurement.
5. Ability to trip or close circuit breakers and switches through the protection system
outputs on command from remote data communication messages or from relay front panel
button requests.
6. Construction from electronic components some of which have shorter technical life or
service life than electromechanical components of prior protection system generations.
4. Protection System Maintenance Program

An ongoing program by which protection system / components are kept in working order
and proper operation of malfunctioning components is restored. A maintenance program
can include:
• Maintenance – An ongoing program by which Protection System function is proved,
and restored if needed. A maintenance program comprises verification of
individual/total protection systems, which in turn is achieved by combination of
monitoring, testing and calibration /necessary rectification.
• Verification – A means of determining that the Protection System or component is

functioning correctly as per scheme/recommended setting.
• Monitoring – Observation of the correctness of routine in-service operation of the

Protection System or component.
• Testing – Application of signals to a Protection System or component offline/online,

to observe functional performance or output behavior.
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• Physical Inspection – To detect visible signs of component failure, reduced

performance and degradation.
• Upkeep - Routine activities necessary to assume that component remains in good

working order and implementation of any manufacturer’s hardware and software
service advisories which are relevant to the application of the device.
• Calibration – Adjustment of the operating threshold or measurement accuracy of a

Protection System measuring element to meet manufacturer’s specifications or an
application accuracy requirement.
• Restoration – The actions to restore operation of malfunctioning components.
5. Time Based Maintenance (TBM) Programs

Time based maintenance is the process in which protection systems are verified according
to a time schedule.
6. Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Programs

Condition based maintenance is the maintenance based on the information available from
modern microprocessor-based relays and other intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).The
information from these relays and IEDs is divided into two major categories:
• Results from background self-monitoring processes, programmed by the

manufacturer, or by the user in relay logic settings. The results are presented by
alarm contacts or points, front panel indications, and by data communication
messages.
• Event logs, captured files, and/or oscillograph records for faults and disturbances,
metered values, and binary input status reports. These are available either on the
relay front panel display or via data communications ports. These results comprise a
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mass of data that must be further analyzed for evidence of the operational condition
of the protection system.
Using these two categories of information, the user can develop an effective maintenance
program. This approach offers the following advantages:
• Non-invasive Maintenance: The system is kept in its normal operating state,

without human intervention for checking. This reduces risk of damage, or risk of
leaving the system in an inoperable state after a manual test.
• Virtually Continuous Monitoring: CBM will report many hardware failure
problems for repair within seconds or minutes of when they happen. This reduces
the percentage of problems that are discovered through incorrect relaying
performance. By contrast, a hardware failure discovered by TBM may have been
there for much of the time interval between tests, and there is a good chance that
some relays will show health problems by incorrect relaying before being caught in
the next test round. The frequent or continuous nature of CBM makes the effective
verification interval far shorter than any required TBM maximum interval.
7. Time Based versus Condition Based Maintenance

Time based and condition based maintenance programs are both acceptable, if
implemented according to technically sound requirements. Practical programs can employ a
combination of time based and condition based maintenance.
Maintenance and testing of a protection system must be carried out within a maximum
allowable interval that is appropriate to the type of the protection system and its impact on
the reliability of Power System. Accordingly, this proposes specific maximum allowable
intervals in Section 8. These maximum intervals define requirements for a time-based
maintenance program, and different intervals when specific types of condition monitoring
are used.
A key feature of condition-based monitoring is that it effectively reduces the time delay
between the moment of a protection failure and time the protection system owner knows
about it, for the monitored segments of the protection system.
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8. Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals
The Table of Maintenance Activities and Maximum Interval requirements shows how CBM
with newer relay types can reduce the need for many of the tests and site visits that older
protection systems require. As explained below, there are some sections of the protection
system that monitoring or data analysis may not verify. Verifying these sections of the
Protection Systems requires some persistent TBM activity in the maintenance program.
Maintenance Tests
Periodic maintenance testing is performed to ensure that the protection and control system is
operating correctly during O&M . These tests may be used to ensure that individual
components are operating within acceptable performance parameters.
Table of Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals

Table 1, below specifies maximum allowable verification intervals for various protection
systems and categories of equipment that comprise protection systems. The right column
indicates verification or testing activities required for each category.
The types of components are illustrated in Figure1 of this document. Figure 1 shows an
example of telecommunication-assisted line protection system comprising substation
equipment at each terminal and a telecommunications channel for relaying between the two
substations.
Level 1 Monitoring (Unmonitored) Table 1a

This table applies to electromechanical, analog, solid state and other un-monitored
Protection Systems components. This table represents the starting point for all required
maintenance activities. The object of this group of requirements is to have specific activities
accomplished at maximum set time intervals. From this group of activities it follows that
CBM or TBM can increase the time intervals between the hands-on maintenance actions.
Level 2 Monitoring (Partially Monitored) Table 1b

This table applies to microprocessor relays and other associated Protection System
components whose self-monitoring alarms are transmitted to a location where action can be
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taken for alarmed failures. The attributes of the monitoring system must meet the
requirements specified in the header of the Table 1b. Given these advanced monitoring
capabilities, it is known that there are specific and routine testing functions occurring within
the device. Because of this ongoing monitoring, hands-on action is required less often
because routine testing is automated. However, there is now an additional task that must be
accomplished during the hands-on process – the monitoring and alarming functions must be
shown to work.
However, fully monitored protection system may be difficult to establish eg. monitoring
also verifies the failure of the monitoring and alarming equipment . Without this important
ingredient a device that is thought to be continuously monitored could be in an alarm state
without being made aware. Hence, it has not been taken up further for maintenance
program.
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Table 1a — Level 1 Monitoring

Maximum Allowable Testing Intervals and Maintenance Activities for Unmonitored Protection Systems
General Description: Protection System components which do not have self-monitoring alarms, or if self-monitoring alarms are available, the alarms are not
transmitted to a location where action can be taken for alarmed failures.
Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Interval Maintenance Activities
Protective Relays 1 Year

Test and calibrate the relays (other than microprocessor relays) with
simulated electrical inputs. (Note 1)
Verify proper functioning of the relay input and outputs.
Verify that settings are as specified.
3 Years
Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Validation of Analog inputs to relays and instrument transformer circuit
grounding.
Inputs to Protective Relays
10

Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Interval Maintenance Activities
Protection System Control Circuitry (Trip 2 Years Perform a complete functional trip test for each protection system (
Circuits) including Bus differential/LBB etc. ) at once that includes all sections
of the Protection System trip circuit, including all auxiliary contacts
essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. However, in
case there is bay extension at the substation or the wiring of the
protection system has been modified, then the tests should be repeated.
Every operating circuit path must be fully verified & a breaker only
need to be tripped once per trip coil. Telecommunication associated
with line protection system may be verified either by end to end tests or
by simulating internal or external faults with forced channel signal.
Verify that each breaker trip coil, each auxiliary relay and each lockout
relay is electrically operated within this time interval. In case of busbar
protection for one and half breaker scheme the LBB tripping and Bus
bar differential trip to be verified by taking proper isolation for each
Bus. For DMT scheme the Bus Bar protection trip and LBB trip for
each Bus zone to be verified at the bus bar protection relay by trip
isolation. The trip channel from the Bus bar protection relay to the
breaker shall be verified during shutdown of that feeder.
Station dc supply (that has as a component 1 month Verify proper electrolyte level (excluding valve-regulated lead acid
any type of battery) batteries).
Verify proper voltage of the station battery.
Verify that no dc supply grounds are present.
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Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Maintenance Activities

Interval
Station dc supply 12 Months

(that has as a component any type of Verify proper voltage of each individual cell or unit in the station battery.
battery)
Verify that station battery charger provides the correct float and equalize voltages.
Verify continuity and cell integrity of entire battery.
Perform a visual cell inspection of all cells for “cell condition” (where cells are visible)
or measurement of cell/unit internal ohmic values (where cells are not visible).
Measure specific gravity and temperature of each cell so as to ensure that they are within
tolerance(where applicable)
Verify cell to cell and terminal connection resistance is within tolerance
Inspect the structural integrity of the battery rack.
Verify proper distribution of load i.e. to divide load equally to each set.
Station dc supply (that has as a component 3 Years Verify that the station battery can perform as designed by conducting a performance or
Valve Regulated Lead-Acid batteries) service capacity test of the entire battery bank. (3 calendar years)
and
and
3 Months
Verify that the station battery can perform as designed by evaluating the measured
cell/unit internal ohmic values to station battery baseline. (3 months)
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Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Maintenance Activities

Interval
Station dc supply (that uses a battery and 3 Years Verify that the battery charger can perform as designed by testing that the charger will
charger) provide full rated current and will properly current-limit.
Protection system communications 6 Months Verify that the Protection System communications monitoring and alarms reflect the
equipment and channels. intended communications system condition by means of a substation inspection.
Protection system communications 12 Months Verify that the performance of the channel and the quality of the channel meets
equipment and channels. performance criteria, such as via measurement of signal level, reflected power, or data
error rate.
Verify proper functioning of communications equipment outputs.
End to end testing 5 years To be done during relay/communication equipment replacement/ scheme modification.
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Table 1b — Condition-Based Maintenance - Level 2 Monitoring

Maximum Allowable Testing Intervals and Maintenance Activities for Partially Monitored Protection System Components
General Description: Protection System components whose alarms are automatically provided daily (or more frequently) to a location where action can be taken for
alarmed failures. Monitoring includes all elements of level 1 monitoring with additional monitoring attributes as listed below for the individual type of component.
Type of Component Level 2 Monitoring Attributes for Maximum Maintenance Maintenance Activities
Component Interval
Protective Relays Includes internal self diagnosis and alarm 5 Year Verify the status of relays is normal with no alarms indicated.
capability, which must assert for power
Verify proper functioning of the relay input and outputs.
supply failures. Includes input voltage or
current waveform sampling three or more Verify that settings are as specified.
times per power cycle, and conversion of Verify that the relay alarms will be received at the location
samples to numeric values for measurement where action can be taken.
calculations by microprocessor electronics
that are also performing self diagnosis and The digital binary input/outputs relay contacts to be
alarming. checked through software simulation in every two years.
Voltage and Current use Level 1 Maintenance Activities 5 Years Validation of Analog inputs to relays and instrument
Sensing Devices - Inputs transformer circuit grounding.
to Protective Relays
.
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Table 1b — Condition-Based Maintenance - Level 2 Monitoring

Component Interval
Protection System Monitoring and alarming of continuity of 2 Years Perform a complete functional trip test for each protection
Control Circuitry (Trip trip coil(s) system ( including Bus differential/LBB etc. ) at once that
Circuits) includes all sections of the Protection System trip circuit,
including all auxiliary contacts essential to proper functioning
(Refer Note 12)
of the Protection System. However, in case there is bay
extension at the substation or the wiring of the protection
system has been modified, then the tests should be repeated.
Every operating circuit path must be fully verified & a breaker
only need to be tripped once per trip coil. Telecommunication
associated with line protection system may be verified either by
end to end tests or by simulating internal or external faults with
forced channel signal. Verify that each breaker trip coil, each
auxiliary relay and each lockout relay is electrically operated
within this time interval. In case of busbar protection for one
and half breaker scheme the LBB tripping and Bus bar
differential trip to be verified by taking proper isolation for
each Bus. For DMT scheme the Bus Bar protection trip and
LBB trip for each Bus zone to be verified at the bus bar
protection relay by trip isolation. The trip channel from the Bus
bar protection relay to the breaker shall be verified during
shutdown of that feeder.
Verify that the relay alarms will be received at the location
where action can be taken.
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Table 1b — Condition-Based Maintenance – Level 2 Monitoring

Component Interval
Station dc supply Monitoring and alarming of the station dc
1 Month Verify proper electrolyte level (excluding Valve-Regulated
supply voltage.
(that has as a component Lead Acid batteries )
any type of battery) Detection and alarming of dc grounds.
Station dc supply Monitoring and alarming of the station dc 3 Years Verify that the station battery can perform as designed by
(that has as a component supply voltage. & conducting a performance or service capacity test of the entire
Valve Regulated Lead- Detection and alarming of dc grounds. 3 Months battery bank. (3 years)
Acid batteries) &
Verify that the station battery can perform as designed by
evaluating the measured cell/unit internal ohmic values to
station battery baseline. (3 months)
Station dc supply (that Monitoring and alarming of the station dc 3 Years Verify that the battery charger can perform as designed by
uses a battery and supply voltage. testing that the charger will provide full rated current and will
charger) Detection and alarming of dc grounds. properly current-limit.
Verify that the performance of the channel and the quality of
Protection system Monitoring and alarming of protection 4 Years the channel meets performance criteria, such as via
communications communications system by mechanisms that measurement of signal level, reflected power, or data error rate.
equipment and channels. check for presence of the communications Verify proper functioning of communications equipment
channel. outputs.
Verify proper functioning of alarm notification
End to end testing 5 years To be done during relay/communication equipment

replacement/ scheme modification.
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Notes for Table 1a and Table 1b
1. For some Protection System components, adjustment is required to bring measurement

accuracy within acceptable parameters. A calibration failure is the result if testing finds
the specified parameters to be out of tolerance.
2. Microprocessor relays typically are specified by manufacturers as not requiring
calibration, but power system input values must be verified as correct within the Table
intervals. The integrity of the digital inputs and outputs will be verified with the
Protection System Control Circuitry.
3. For electro-mechanical relays, adjustment is required to bring measurement accuracy
within the tolerance. Microprocessor-relays with no remote monitoring of alarm
contacts, etc, are un-monitored relays and need to be verified within the Table interval
as other un-monitored relays.
4. Microprocessor relays typically are specified by manufacturers as not requiring
calibration, but acceptable measurement of power system input values must be verified
within the Table intervals. The integrity of the digital inputs and outputs must be
verified within the Table intervals.
5. Any Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) function whose output is used in a protection
system or SPS (as opposed to a monitoring task) must be verified as a component in a
protection system.
6. Unlike most Protection System elements physical inspection of station batteries and
battery Charger for signs of component failure, reduced performance, and degradation
are required to ensure that the station battery and chargers are reliable enough to deliver
dc power when required.
7. Voltage & Current Sensing Device circuit input connections to the protection system
relays can be verified by comparison of known values of other sources on live circuits or
by using test currents and voltages on equipment out of service for maintenance. The
values should be verified to be as expected, (phase value and phase relationships are
both equally important).
8. Verify the protection system tripping function by performing an operational trip test on
all components contained in the trip circuit. This includes circuit breaker or circuit
switcher trip coils, auxiliary tripping relays , lock-out relays , and communications-
assisted trip scheme elements. Each control circuit path that carries trip signal must be
17
verified, although each path must be checked only once. A maintenance program may
include performing an overall test for the entire system at one time, or several split
system tests with overlapping trip verification. Trip coil continuity and aux-contact
verification may be accomplished by inspection for the proper annunciation/ flag
indication. A documented real-time trip of any given trip path is acceptable in lieu of a
functional trip test.
9. “End-to-end test” is any testing procedure that creates a remote input to the local
communications-assisted trip scheme. A documented real-time trip of any given trip
path is acceptable in lieu of a functional trip test.
10. Any verification may use relay front panel value displays, or values gathered via data
communications. Groupings of other measurements (such as vector summation of bus
feeder currents) can be used for comparison if calibration requirements assure
acceptable measurement of power system input values.
11. Individual relay testing shall be carried out as per the latest document “Testing
Procedure for Transmission System Protection Scheme, Vol-I (Doc no. D-2-03-20-01-
2)” for electromechanical/ static relays & “Testing Procedure for
Transmission System Protection Scheme, Vol-II ((Doc no. D-2-03-20-02-01)” for
Numerical relays, unless modified in this document.
12. Protection System control circuitry (Trip Circuits) operation shall be carried out in
consultation with respective RLDC. The timing/date shall be decided by the respective
RLDC.
8.1 Retention of Records
Records shall be kept at least for the last Five (5) years for auditing and verification.
9. Overlapping of the Verification of Sections of the Protection System
Table 1 requires that every protection system element be periodically verified. One
approach is to test the entire protection scheme as a unit, from voltage and current sources
to breaker tripping. For practical ongoing verification, sections of the protection system may
18
be tested or monitored individually. The boundaries of the verified sections must overlap to
ensure that there are no gaps in the verification.
All of the methodologies expressed within this report may be combined as appropriate, to
establish and operate a maintenance program. For example, a protection system may be
divided into multiple overlapping sections with a different maintenance methodology for
each section:
• Time based maintenance with appropriate maximum verification intervals

for categories of equipment as given in the Unmonitored or Partially
Monitored Tables;
• Opportunistic verification using analysis of fault records as described in Section 10.
An example of overlapping the verification of protection system segments enclosed at

Appendix-A.
10. Monitoring by Analysis of Fault Records

In microprocessor based relays, there is facility to retrieve fault event records and
oscillographic records by data communications after a fault which can be analyzed closely
for any apparent misoperation . The relay data may be augmented with independently
captured digital fault recorder (DFR) data retrieved for the same event.
Fault data analysis comprises a CBM program that is capable of reducing the need for a
manual time-interval based check on protection systems whose operations are analyzed.
For example, fault records may verify that the particular relays that tripped are able to trip
via the control circuit path that was specifically used to clear that fault. A relay or DFR
record may indicate correct operation of the protection communications channel.
What can be shown from the records of one operation is very specific and limited. In a
panel with multiple relays, only the specific relay(s) whose operation can be observed
without ambiguity in the record and the associated wiring paths are verified. Be careful
about using fault response data to verify that settings or calibration are correct. Unless
records have been captured for multiple faults close to either side of a setting boundary,
setting or calibration could still be incorrect.
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If fault record data is used to show that portions or all of a protection system have been
verified to meet Table 1 requirements, the fault records must be documented and retained
and the maintenance related conclusions may be drawn from this data and used to defer
Table 1 tests, for at least the retention time interval given in Section 8.1.
11. Importance of Relay Settings in Maintenance Programs
Manual testing programs depend on pickup value or zone boundary tests to show that the
relays have correct settings and calibration. Microprocessor relays, by contrast, provide the
means for continuously monitoring measurement accuracy.
However, incorrect settings may be a bigger risk with microprocessor relays than with older
relays. Some microprocessor relays have hundreds or thousands of settings, many of which
are critical to protection system performance.
Monitoring does not check measuring element settings. Analysis of fault records may or
may not reveal setting problems. To minimize risk of setting errors after commissioning, the
user should enforce strict settings data base management, with reconfirmation that the
installed settings are correct whenever maintenance activity might have changed under the
following conditions.
• One or more settings are changed for any reason.
• A relay fails and is repaired or replaced with another unit.
• A relay is upgraded with a new firmware version.
12. Self-Monitoring Capabilities and Limitations
Microprocessor relay proponents have cited the self-monitoring capabilities of these

products for nearly 20 years. Theoretically, any element that is monitored does not need a
periodic manual test. A problem today is that the community of manufacturers and users has
not created clear documentation of exactly what is and is not monitored. Some unmonitored
but critical elements are buried in installed systems that are described as self-monitoring.
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Until users are able to document how all parts of a system which are required for the
protective functions are monitored or verified (with help from manufacturers), they must
continue with the unmonitored or partially monitored intervals established in Table 1.
Going forward, manufacturers and users can develop mappings of the monitoring within
relays, and monitoring coverage by the relay of user circuits connected to the relay
terminals.
13. Notification of Protection System Failures
When a failure occurs in a protection system, power system security may be compromised
and analysis of the failure must be conducted and documented.
14. Maintenance Activities

Some specific maintenance activities are a requirement to ensure reliability. However, some
higher technology equipment can contain integral monitoring capability that actually
performs maintenance verification activities routinely and often; therefore manual
intervention to perform certain activities on these type devices may not be needed.
14.1 Protective Relays

These relays are defined as the devices that receive the input signal from the current and
voltage sensing devices and are used to isolate a faulted portion of the power system.
Devices that sense thermal, vibration, seismic, pressure, gas or any other non-electrical
input are excluded.
14.2 Voltage & Current Sensing Devices

These are the current and voltage sensing devices, usually known as instrument
transformers. These devices produce quantities that represent the primary values of voltage
and current.
The intent of the maintenance activity is to verify the input to the protective relay from the
device that produces the current or voltage signal sample.
The important thing about these signals is to know that the expected output from these
devices actually reaches the protective relay
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Therefore, the proof of the proper operation of these devices also demonstrates the integrity
of the wiring (or other medium used to convey the signal) from the current and voltage
sensing device all the way to the protective relay. The testing /Maintenance of these devices
are to be done as per the existing guidelines.
14.3 DC Control Circuitry

This component of Protection Systems includes the trip/close coil of the circuit breaker,
circuit switcher or any other interrupting device. It includes the wiring from the batteries to
the relays. It includes all the wiring to every trip/close coil. In short, every trip/close path
must be verified.
The dc control circuitry also includes each auxiliary tripping relay and each lock-out relay
in any given trip scheme. These electro-mechanical devices must be trip tested.
New technology is also accommodated here; there are some tripping systems that have
replaced the traditional hard-wired trip circuitry with other methods of trip-signal
conveyance such as fiber-optics.
14.4 Batteries and DC Supplies

The definition of a Protection System is “protective relays, associated communication
systems, voltage and current sensing devices, station batteries and dc control circuitry.” The
station battery is not the only component that provides dc power to a Protection System. In
the new definition for Protection System “station batteries” are replaced with “station dc
supply” to make the battery charger and part of the Protection System that must be
maintained. The testing /Maintenance of these devices are to be done as per the existing
guidelines.
14.5 Tele-protection equipment

This is also known as associated telecommunication equipment. The equipment used for
tripping in a communication assisted trip scheme is a vital piece of the trip circuit. Remote
action causing a local trip can be thought of as another parallel trip path to the trip coil that
must be tested.
Besides the trip output and wiring to the trip coil(s) there is also a communication medium
that must be maintained.
22
The actual tripping path(s) to the trip coil(s) may be tested as a parallel trip path within the
dc control circuitry tests.
Emerging technologies transfer digital information over a variety of carrier mediums that
are then interpreted locally as trip signals.
Evidence of operational test or documentation of measurement of signal level, reflected
power or data-error rates is needed.
Some newer installations utilize digital signals over fiber-optics from the protective relays
in the control house to the circuit interrupting device in the yard. This method of tripping
the circuit breaker, even though it might be considered communications, must be
maintained as per the dc control circuitry maintenance requirements
15. END TO END TESTING OF PROTECTION

SYSTEM
15.1. BACKGROUND
Digital Signal Processors and high-speed operating systems have revolutionized not only
protective relays, but protective relay testing as well. Modern microprocessor-based relay
test sets, combined with personal computers and GPS satellite receivers have provided the
means to dynamically test relay protection schemes end-to-end. The philosophy for testing
and maintenance of protective relays has dramatically changed against the above technical
advancement. The introduction of numerical distance relays, down sizing of maintenance
and testing personnel and requirement of ever increasing time between maintenance
intervals has been compelling to change how relays are tested. System reliability is the most
important concern, with increasing load and power wheeling requirements. Development of
modern communication technology and the need for selectivity of switched line faults in the
shortest time, have inspired Power System Protection Communications Schemes for zone
selection in the field of Line Protection. POWERGRID sites may vary in their application of
end to end testing of relays as per the scheme requirement.
23
15.2. PURPOSE
GPS-synchronized secondary injection end-to-end relay testing is to verify transmission

line protection schemes of newly installed relays, during relay/communication equipment
replacement/scheme modification and once in every five years. The objective is to perform
a complete check of the new system protection scheme, including verification of circuit
breaker operation, communication channel time and the effectiveness of relay settings
before the relays are placed in service.
15.3. CHALLENGES
The most important challenge in END-TO-END testing of line protection schemes is to

provide the test quantities at both the line terminal relays at the same time. A Distance
relay acquires the inputs from its own terminal only and based on the scheme employed, the
remote permissive trip/block signal is passed via various communication channels. In order
to determine the characteristic of both the terminal relays, those have to be provided with
varying impedances synchronously and each of the relays has to send the signal to the
remote ends in real time.
15.4. REQUIREMENTS
Modern relays are interconnected each other by PLCC/fiber optic system so transmitting the
trip or block decisions to the remote ends are performed extremely fast. In recent years the
advancements in the automatic digital relay test sets allow test the line relays in such a way
that simulates the real life processes in the Power System. The concept of testing the relays
is called “End-To-End” and has become rapidly implemented as a standard technique in the
industry. Basically the method requires two three phase test sets equipped with Global
Positioning System (GPS) receiver and antenna (not shown in the figure below:.
24
15.5. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
A Global Positioning System (GPS) consists of a number of satellites orbiting at high

altitude (approx. 11000 miles) and ground stations which monitor and control the system.
The system consists of 21 active satellites and 3 in-orbit spares each of which orbit the earth
twice per day. The design of the system is such that at least four satellites are in view at all
times from all places on the earth, thus providing continuous, worldwide, three dimensional
navigation capabilities. The satellites transmit encoded signals at either 1575.42 or 1227.6
MHz.
For End-To-End testing it is recommended that a minimum of 3 satellites must be tracked
simultaneously. However a precise time (the only important parameter for this application)
can be derived by tracking one satellite only. The GPS receivers are highly accurate with a
drift in the nanoseconds range. The satellites send “corrective” signals to GPS receivers
which allow the internal clock to be aligned to the high accuracy Cesium atomic clock of
the satellites. The programming of the system is simple since the tracking is performed
automatically when the unit is powered up initially. Basically the user has to set the
coincidence time (compared to the Universal Time Clock-UTC) when he wants to start the
test. The same coincidence time has to be set at both terminals. The time is usually
displayed with a resolution within microseconds.
A GPS antenna with flexible coaxial cable is used for the GPS clock receiver. The antenna
is run to the outside of the relay building and can be easily mounted on top of a parked
25
vehicle or on any support structure or platform. Care should be taken in handling and
placement of the GPS antenna in EHV yards
15.6. TEST SYSTEM
In the past, relay test sets were manually controlled and were used to evaluate the steady-
state response of relays. With advanced microprocessor-based relay test sets, dynamic or
multi-state testing of relays became possible. Under dynamic conditions, the relay is tested
by applying simulated pre-fault, fault and post-fault condition quantities using a pure sine
wave. With modern relay test sets, transient waveforms (which include dc offset and
harmonics) can be produced several ways:
1) disturbance of common zone to both ends.
2) using the replay of actual recorded faults from a Digital Fault Recorder (DFR)
3) using simulation data derived from running the Electromagnetic Transient Program
(EMTP),
4) Alternative Transient Program (ATP) files converted to the COMTRADE ASCII format,
5) The COMTRADE Standard makes it possible to playback digital fault records from
different manufacturers fault recorders.
15.7. TEST PREPARATION

Coordination is required between both ends to check the procedures and to define the
objectives. The points to be tied up are as follows:
• Protection Schemes (schematics and relay settings)
• Teams Definition ( at least 1 engineer at each end)
• Relay Test Set with Synchronization test
• Software and test modules for end to end test
• GPS receiver (Synchronization test)
• Test Definition (Internal Fault, External Fault, POTT, DTT etc)
• Sequence Definitions for both sides (Pre fault, Fault and Post fault)
• Teams communication channel definition (i.e PLCC, radio, phone, cell phone, etc)
26
15.8. TEST EXECUTION
The first phase of end-to-end testing involves setting up test equipment, performing the
planned sequence of test events, evaluating test results and taking corrective actions
when necessary. A typical step-by-step procedure can be specified as follows:
Connecting the test equipment to the protecting relays

Connecting the GPS receiver and look for the appropriate number of satellites
Preparing the test equipment software for starting the test at both sides
Coordination between testing teams regarding the first test and starting time.
Execute the first sequence and waiting for GPS trigger
Coordination between testing teams regarding the successful start.
When the first simulation is finished, coordinate with the other side regarding the
results of the test and eventually the arrangements about editing of the test sequence
( times, phase shift, etc)
Test results are immediately evaluated and compared to expected values or actions (
trip , block, transfer trip, etc)
Repeat this process for every fault simulation until getting the successful result
15.9. USE OF EVENT AND DISTURBANCE RECORDER

Modern relays have Sequence of Events and Disturbance recorder which monitors and
records the relay response. It is useful in determining the timing of relay operation and
27
tracking of events. Communication channel times are also readily determined from the
sequence of event
The post-test phase involves more in-depth analysis of test results, which is typically
performed when the results do not meet expectations. This is a situation when protection
engineers are to be involved in reviewing the fault study and investigating causes of
discrepancies. In this phase, test results are documented and reports are prepared when
required
15.10. CONCLUSION
In this era of POWER SYSTEM RESTRUCTURING, particularly when POWERGRID has

to account for line outages, Communication-assisted tripping technology and the end-to-end
tests should be applied more often to realistically recreate line events. End-to-End testing
verifies a complete protection scheme, including relays at different locations and the
communication link between them.
28
Appendix A — Example of Overlapping the

Verification of Protection System Segments
Figure 1 : Pilot or Unit Transmission Line Protection System Using Power Line
Carrier Blocking Channel
The following illustrates the concept of overlapping verifications and tests as summarized in
Section 10 of the paper. As an example, Figure1 shows protection for a critical transmission
line by carrier blocking directional comparison pilot relaying. The goal is to verify the
ability of the entire two-terminal pilot protection scheme to protect for line faults, and to
avoid tripping for faults external to the transmission line zone of protection bounded by the
current transformer locations.
In this example, verification takes advantage of the self-monitoring features of

microprocessor multifunction line relays at each end of the line. For each of the line relays
themselves, the example assumes that the user has the following arrangements in place:
1. The relay has a data communications port that can be accessed from remote locations.
2. The relay has internal self-monitoring programs and functions that report failures of
29
internal electronics, via communications messages or alarm contacts to SCADA.

3. The relays report loss of dc power, and the relays themselves or external monitors report
the state of the dc battery supply.
4. The CT and PT inputs to the relays are used for continuous calculation of metered
values of volts, amperes, plus Watts and VARs on the line. These metered values are
reported by data communications. For maintenance, the user elects to compare these
readings to those of other relays, meters, or DFRs. The other readings may be from
redundant relaying or measurement systems or they may be derived from values in other
protection zones.
Comparison with other such readings to within required relaying accuracy verifies
instrument transformers, wiring, and analog signal input processing of the relays. One
effective way to do this is to utilize the relay metered values directly in SCADA, where
they can be compared with other references or state estimator values.
5. Breaker status indication from auxiliary contacts is verified & status indications must be
consistent with the flow or absence of current.
6. Continuity of the breaker trip circuit from dc bus through the trip coil is monitored by the
relay and reported via communications.
7. Correct operation of the on-off carrier channel is also critical to security of the protection
system, so each carrier set has a connected or integrated automatic checkback test unit.
The automatic checkback test runs several times a day. Newer carrier sets with integrated
checkback testing check for received signal level and report abnormal channel attenuation
or noise, even if the problem is not severe enough to completely disable the channel.
These monitoring activities plus the checkback test comprise automatic verification of all
the protection system elements that experience tells us are the most prone to fail. But, does
this comprise a complete verification?
30
Figure 2 — Zones of Verification for the Line Protection System of Figure 1

The dotted boxes of Figure 2 show the segments of verification defined by the monitoring
and verification practices just listed. These segments are not completely overlapping, and
the shaded regions show elements that are not verified:
1. The continuity of trip coils is verified, but no means is provided for validating the ability
of the circuit breaker to trip if the trip coil should be energized.
2. Within each line relay, all the microprocessors that participate in the trip decision have
been verified by internal monitoring. However, the trip circuit is actually energized by the
contacts of a small telephone-type “ice cube” relay within the line protective relay. The
microprocessor energizes the coil of this ice cube relay through its output data port and a
transistor driver circuit. There is no monitoring of the output port, driver circuit, ice cube
relay, or contacts of that relay. These components are critical for tripping the circuit
breaker for a fault.
3. The check back (loop) test of the carrier channel does not verify the connections between
the
31
relaying microprocessor internal decision programs and the carrier transmitter keying
circuit or the carrier receiver output state. These connections include microprocessor I/O
ports, electronic driver circuits, wiring, and sometimes telephone-type auxiliary relays.
4. The correct states of breaker and disconnect switch auxiliary contacts are monitored, but
This does not confirm that the state change indication is correct when the breaker or
switch opens.
A practical solution for (1) and (2) is to observe actual breaker tripping, with a specified
maximum time interval between trip tests. Clearing of naturally-occurring faults are
demonstrations of operation that reset the time interval clock for testing of each breaker
tripped in this way. If faults do not occur, manual tripping of the breaker through the relay
trip output via data communications to the relay microprocessor meets the requirement for
periodic testing.
Utilities have found that breakers often show problems during protection system tests. It is
recommended that protection system verification include periodic testing of the actual
tripping of connected circuit breakers.
Testing of the relay-carrier set interface in (3) requires that each relay key its transmitter,
and that the other relay demonstrate reception of that blocking carrier. This can be observed
from relay or DFR records during naturally occurring faults, or by a manual test. If the
checkback test sequence were incorporated in the relay logic, the carrier sets and carrier
channel are then included in the overlapping segments monitored by the two relays, and the
monitoring gap is completely eliminated.
32

PROTECTION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE A Technical Reference (VOL III) - 01

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Protection System Maintenance

• Purpose: To ensure all Transmission Protection Systems affecting the reliability

Components of Protection System :

allowing continuation of existing programs conducted on a technically sound basis,

2. Applicability of Protection System Maintenance

3. Relay Product Generations

4. Protection System Maintenance Program

• Verification – A means of determining that the Protection System or component is

• Monitoring – Observation of the correctness of routine in-service operation of the

• Testing – Application of signals to a Protection System or component offline/online,

• Physical Inspection – To detect visible signs of component failure, reduced

• Upkeep - Routine activities necessary to assume that component remains in good

• Calibration – Adjustment of the operating threshold or measurement accuracy of a

• Restoration – The actions to restore operation of malfunctioning components.

5. Time Based Maintenance (TBM) Programs

6. Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) Programs

• Results from background self-monitoring processes, programmed by the

• Non-invasive Maintenance: The system is kept in its normal operating state,

7. Time Based versus Condition Based Maintenance

8. Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals

Table of Maximum Allowable Verification Intervals

Level 1 Monitoring (Unmonitored) Table 1a

Level 2 Monitoring (Partially Monitored) Table 1b

Table 1a — Level 1 Monitoring

Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Interval Maintenance Activities

Protective Relays 1 Year

Table 1a — Level 1 Monitoring

Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Interval Maintenance Activities

Table 1a — Level 1 Monitoring

Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Maintenance Activities

Station dc supply 12 Months

Table 1a — Level 1 Monitoring

Type of Component Maximum Maintenance Maintenance Activities

Table 1b — Condition-Based Maintenance - Level 2 Monitoring

Table 1b — Condition-Based Maintenance - Level 2 Monitoring

Table 1b — Condition-Based Maintenance – Level 2 Monitoring

End to end testing 5 years To be done during relay/communication equipment

Notes for Table 1a and Table 1b

1. For some Protection System components, adjustment is required to bring measurement

8.1 Retention of Records

9. Overlapping of the Verification of Sections of the Protection System

• Time based maintenance with appropriate maximum verification intervals

• Opportunistic verification using analysis of fault records as described in Section 10.

An example of overlapping the verification of protection system segments enclosed at

10. Monitoring by Analysis of Fault Records

11. Importance of Relay Settings in Maintenance Programs

• A relay fails and is repaired or replaced with another unit.

• A relay is upgraded with a new firmware version.

12. Self-Monitoring Capabilities and Limitations

Microprocessor relay proponents have cited the self-monitoring capabilities of these

13. Notification of Protection System Failures

14. Maintenance Activities

14.1 Protective Relays

14.2 Voltage & Current Sensing Devices

14.3 DC Control Circuitry

14.4 Batteries and DC Supplies

14.5 Tele-protection equipment

15. END TO END TESTING OF PROTECTION

GPS-synchronized secondary injection end-to-end relay testing is to verify transmission

The most important challenge in END-TO-END testing of line protection schemes is to

15.5. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM