Sabp-A-078 Htha PDF

Best Practice
SABP-A-078 5 June 2018

High Temperature Hydrogen Attack – Material Selection, Operation and
Inspection Guidelines
Document Responsibility: Corrosion Control Standards Committee
Contents
1 Scope……………………………………….. ………..2
2 Conflicts and Deviations …………………………….2
3 References …………………………………………...2
4 Abbreviations…………………………………………3
5 HTHA Characteristics ……………………………….4
6 Effect of Cladding …………………………………..11
7 General Material Selection ………………………..12
8 Operating Guidelines ………………………………13
9 Determination of Susceptibility to HTHA ………...17
10 Inspection Guidelines ……………………………...19
11 Repair/Replace Decisions…………………………26
12 Documentation…………………………………….. 26
13 HTHA Mitigation Checklist………………………... 26
APPENDIX A – HTHA Susceptibility Calculator..….. 28
Previous Issue: New Next Planned Update: TBD
Contact: Kermad, Abdelhak (KERMADAX) on +966-13-8809529 Page 1 of 28
©Saudi Aramco 2018. All rights reserved.

Document Responsibility: Corrosion Control Standards Committee SABP-A-078
Issue Date: 5 June 2018 High Temperature Hydrogen Attack -
Next Planned Update: TBD Material Selection, Operation and Inspection Guidelines
1 Scope
This best practice provides guidelines for material selection, operation, inspection and
risk mitigation of equipment and piping operating in high temperature hydrogen service
to prevent failure by High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). It addresses carbon,
carbon ½ molybdenum and low chromium-molybdenum steels. It is applicable for both
new and existing units in refineries, namely Naphtha Unifier/Hydrotreater, Catalytic
Reformer (Platformer CCR/Rheniformer), Diesel Hydrotreater, Hydrogen Plant,
Hydrocracker, Pressure Swing Absorber and Isomerization Plant) and Chemical Plants.
This document is based on Saudi Aramco’s experience and other oil majors, but is in
accordance with API RP 941.
2 Conflicts and Deviations
Any conflicts between this document and other applicable Mandatory Saudi Aramco
Engineering Requirements (MSAERs) shall be addressed to the EK&RD Coordinator.
3 References
This Best Practice is based on the below referenced documents:
3.1 Saudi Aramco References
Saudi Aramco Engineering Procedures

SAEP-343 Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) for Saudi Aramco
Facilities
SAEP-393 Integrity Operating Windows
SAEP-1161 Testing and Inspection (T&I) Reporting Procedure
Saudi Aramco Engineering Standards
SAES-D-001 Design Criteria for Pressure Vessels
SAES-L-132 Material Selection for Pipelines, Piping and Process
Equipment
SAES-L-133 Corrosion Protection Requirements for Pipelines,
Piping and Process Equipment
SAES-W-010 Welding Requirements for Pressure Vessels
Saudi Aramco Inspection Procedure
00-SAIP-78 Inspection Records/Filing Procedure
Saudi Aramco Technical Alert
Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

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TA600015927 Carbon Steel Degradation in High Temperature

Hydrogen Service Survey and Inspection Required
by Refineries, 2012
3.2 Industry Codes and Standards
American Petroleum Institute

API RP 581 Risk-based Inspection Technology
API RP 584 Integrity Operating Windows
API RP 941 Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures
and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and
Petrochemical Plants
API Technical Report 941 The Technical Basis Document for API
Recommended Practice 941
API Industry Alert Carbon Steel Degradation in High Temperature
Hydrogen Service, 2010
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CSB Alert Preventing High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
(HTHA), 2012
3.3 Technical Papers/Reports
[1] James McLaughlin, Joseph Krynicki, & Thomas Bruno, “Cracking of non-
PWHT'd Carbon Steel Operating at Conditions Immediately Below the
Nelson Curve,” ASME 2010 PV&P Conference, Paper No. PVP2010-2545,
Fairfax, VA, 2010.
[2] U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Investigation Report,
Catastrophic Rupture Of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes Refinery,
Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010.
4 Abbreviations
ABSA Angle Beam Spectral Analysis
AE Acoustic Emission
ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers
API American Petroleum Institute
AUBT Advanced Ultrasonic Backscatter Technique
CSD Consulting Services Department
ID Inspection Department
DMW Dissimilar Metal Weld
ERM Entreprise Risk Management
FFS Fitness For Service
FPT Fluorescent Penetrant Testing
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HAZ Heat-Affected Zone

HTHA High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
IOW Integrity Operating Window
MOC Management Of Change
NHT Naphtha Hydrotreater
PAUT Phased Array Ultrasonic Technique
PMI Positive Material Identification
PWHT Post-Weld Heat Treatment
RBI Risk-Based Inspection
SAIF SAP Applications for Inspection of Facilities
ToFD Time of Flight Diffraction
WFMPT Wet Fluorescent Magnetic Particle Testing
5 HTHA Characteristics
5.1 General
5.1.1 HTHA is an insidious condition that can occur in carbon and low-alloy steel
equipment and piping exposed to hydrogen at high temperature. Hydrogen
diffuses through the steel and reacts with unstable carbides in the microstructure:
 First hydrogen molecules dissociate at high temperature to form atomic
hydrogen which can diffuse through steel:
H2 ↔ 2 H (thermal dissociation of hydrogen)
 Then, atomic hydrogen combines with unstable metal carbides (MC) forming
methane (CH4) which cannot diffuse out of the steel:
4 H + MC ↔ CH4 + M
5.1.2 As a result, the loss of carbide causes irreversible loss in overall strength and
ductility of the affected component.
 Surface decarburization is characterized by a decrease in carbon content of a
shallow layer on the process-exposed surface of the steel. Its effects are a
slight reduction in strength and hardness and an increase in ductility. Surface
decarburization is the predominant damage mechanism at low hydrogen
partial pressures below 100 psia (7 bara) and high temperatures above 900 °F
(480°C).
 Internal decarburization/fissuring is the predominant damage mechanism at
lower temperatures between 400°F (205°C) and 900°F (480°C) and higher
hydrogen partial pressures above 100 psia (7 bara). Numerous fissures
represent an advanced stage of attack leading to a substantial deterioration of
mechanical properties such as tensile, hardness and ductility; potentially
leading to failure by brittle fracture.

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5.1.3 The addition of carbide stabilizers to the steel results in increased HTHA
resistance. Molybdenum (Mo) and Chromium (Cr) are the alloying elements that
produce the greatest benefit; these form more stable carbides than Iron (Fe)
carbides and have increased resistance to reaction with atomic hydrogen.
5.1.4 HTHA is a time-temperature-pressure function, meaning that the longer that a

piece of equipment is exposed to temperatures above its resistance limit in a
certain hydroprocessing environment, the more the damage to the steel will
accumulate; and the higher the temperature rises above the limit of the steel, the
more rapidly the damage will occur. Mn-½Mo steel has better resistance than C-
½Mo steel
5.1.5 Following the issuance of an API Industry Alerts and CSD Technical Alert in
2012, all Saudi Aramco domestic refineries (YRD, JRD, RRD, RTR) were
subjected to surveys to identify equipment and piping at HTHA risk. All assets
identified are being replaced with upgraded metallurgy through capital program
initiatives at the earliest available opportunity. Since this replacement program is
dependent on refinery shutdown windows, additional safeguards are being
implemented in the meantime via increased AUBT/TOFD/Replication inspection,
hydrogen partial pressure monitoring, operating at reduced temperatures and
installation of wireless contact thermocouples to closely monitor the metal
temperature, till replacement is implemented.
5.1.6 HTHA is always hazardous due to potential hydrocarbons/hydrogen mixture

leakage at high pressure/temperature. Several HTHA failures have historically
occurred in the refining industry, leading in extreme cases to fatalities and
significant property losses. At Saudi Aramco, HTHA was identified in the top
eight corporate operational risks in the Enterprise Risk Management system.
5.2 HTHA Damage Type

HTHA damage may be categorized as volumetric damage, crack‐like flaw damage and
combined volumetric damage, crack‐like flaw damage:
5.2.1 HTHA Volumetric Damage: Typically occurs in base metal and is widespread on
the component. An exception is local hot‐spot on high temperature components
where accelerated HTHA damage may occur locally because of the temperature.
This damage is characterized by internal decarburization, intergranular cavitation
or fissuring from the accumulation of CH4 at carbide matrix interface, and internal
or external surface blisters. Surface decarburization occurs where CH4 escapes
without causing fissures; refer to Figures 1 and 2.
5.2.2 HTHA Crack‐Like Flaw Damage: Typically associated with the HAZ or fusion
line of welds. This crack‐like flaw is usually planar and occurs in non-PWHTd
components.

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5.2.3 HTHA Coupled Volumetric and Crack‐Like Flaw Damage: Volumetric damage
to base metal and crack‐like flaws associated with the HAZ of welds; refer to
Figures 3 – 7.
Figure 1. Hydrogen voids at grain boundaries of C-½Mo Naphtha Hydrotreater charge

heater outlet manifold, 1000X magnification (Not a Saudi Aramco facility)
Figure 2. HTHA intergranular fissuring of C-½Mo Naphtha Hydrotreater charge heater outlet
manifold, 200X magnification (Not a Saudi Aramco facility)

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Figure 3. HTHA Blistering at C-½Mo JRD Platformer feed/effluent exchanger (Y13-E-8B)

channel inlet nozzle, 803°F (428°C) and 270 psia (18.6 bara) pH2, 400,000 service hours.
Note: Damaged material was machined out and nozzle weld-overlaid to restore thickness as a temporray
measure. Recommendation was made to replace the channel with upgraded metallurgy 1.25Cr-0.5 Mo at
the earliest available opportunity
Figure 4. HTHA cracking at non-PWHTd carbon steel (ASTM A106 Gr. B) light distillate
Hydrotreating piping base metal close to the weld, 550-600°F (288-316°C) and pH2 100-200
psia (6.9-13.8 bara), 300,000 service hours (Not a Saudi Aramco Facility)

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Figure 5. HTHA cracking at non-PWHTd carbon steel (ASTM A-515 grade 70) light
distillate Hydrotreating pressure vessel weld coarse-grained HAZ, close to the weld fusion
line, (similar conditions to above figure), 300,000 service hours (Not a Saudi Aramco
Facility)
Figure 6. Through-wall HTHA cracking at non-PWHTd carbon steel pipe weld HAZ
immediately adjacent to the fusion line in piping downstream zinc oxide guard beds,
Isomerization Unit, 540°F (282°C) and pH2 of 150 psia (10.3 bara), 110,000 service hours
(Not a Saudi Aramco Facility)

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Figure 7. Scanning Electron Microscopy showing fissuring and decarburization at weld metal
root pass at condictions similar to Figure 6. (Not a Saudi Aramco Facility)
5.3 Incubation Period
5.3.1 HTHA is preceded by a period of time when no noticeable change in properties is

detectable by normal inspection techniques. The incubation period is the time
period during which enough damage has occurred to be measured with available
inspection techniques and may vary from hours at very severe conditions to many
years.
5.3.2 The incubation curves in API RP 941 indicate that HTHA can occur in
approximately 1 year at temperatures as low as 9°F (5°C) above the Nelson Curve.
5.4 The Nelson Curves
5.4.1 API RP 941 “Nelson Curves” are used to predict material suitability; HTHA is
mitigated by proper alloy selection, i.e. increased alloy, i.e. Cr, Mo, Vanadium
(Va), content to form stable carbides; or adjusting operating conditions to below
Nelson curve. However, several cases where HTHA were found at operating
conditions below the Nelson curve; the 8th Edition of API RP 941 shows HTHA
should not occur below 400°F (205°C) and 50 psia (3.5 bara); refer to Figure 8.
5.4.2 The accuracy of temperatures used to plot the Nelson Curves is considered to be
+/- 18°F (10°C). The curves are reasonably conservative for carbon steel up to
about 10,000 psia (690 bara) hydrogen partial pressure.
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5.4.3 The hydrogen partial pressure is equal to the maximum mole fraction of hydrogen
times the maximum allowable operating pressure (absolute).
5.4.4 Many instances of HTHA in C-½Mo steel (e.g. ASTM A204) exposed to
operating conditions between the carbon steel and the C-½Mo steel Nelson
Curves have been reported to API. Some were located as much as 200°F (110°C)
below the C-½Mo steel curve and within 100°F (55°C) of the carbon steel curve.
The reason for this less-than-anticipated resistance of C-½Mo steel to HTHA is
not fully understood. However, some investigations have pointed to the effect of
the thermal history of the steel on the stability of the molybdenum carbides
formed. As a result, API RP 941 now discourages the selection of C-½Mo steel
for new equipment and piping in hydrogen.
5.4.5 As a result of the above problems with the C-½Mo curve, API Subcommittee on
Corrosion and Materials removed this curve from the main set of curves and the
material is not recommended for new construction in hot hydrogen services. Saudi
Aramco also prohibits this material for new construction in this service as per
SAES-L-132/L-133.
5.4.6 A safety margin of 50°F (28°C) / 50 psi (3.5 bar) above the maximum operating
conditions are adopted for material selection per SAES-L-132/L-133; refer to
Figure 9; other Operators use lower temperature margins, e.g. 25°F (14°C).
50 psia
205°C (400°F)
Figure 8. Simplistic representation of API RP 941 Nelson Curves, showing no HTHA below
400°F (205°C) and 50 psia (3.5 bara).
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Figure 9. Simplistic carbon steel Nelson Curve with 50°F (28°C)/50 psi (3.5 bar) safety margin
5.5 PWHT Benefits
5.5.1 Vessels undergoing PWHT are more resistant to HTHA due to reduced residual
stresses and improved carbide stability. Vessels with a thickness of less than 1½
inches (38 mm) are not required by the ASME code to be PWHT’d, but
considering the advantages, it is advised to PWHT these vessels if operated in a
hydrogen service. This requirement is also stipulated in SAES-D-001/W-010.
5.5.2 C-½Mo heat treatment will make a positive difference on HTHA resistance;
normalized steel has better resistance than annealed steel.
5.6 Inspection Methods

HTHA damage may occur randomly, making monitoring and detection extremely
challenging. Damage to weld/HAZ/base metal is usually undetectable by conventional
NDT during the incubation period. Advanced inspection techniques include AUBT,
PAUT, TOFD and field metallography.
6 Effect of Cladding
6.1 The permeability of hydrogen in steel is equal to the product of its solubility and
diffusitivity. The solubility of hydrogen in austenitic stainless steels is about an
order of magnitude greater than that for ferritic steels; but the diffusitivity of
hydrogen through the austentitc stainless steel is about two orders of magnitude
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lower than that for ferritic steels. Therefore, an austentic stainless steel
cladding/weld overlay would be expected to reduce the effective hydrogen partial
pressure acting on the underlying base metal. Ferritic or martensitic stainless steel
cladding would not be expected to provide a similar benefit.
6.2 Most Operators, including Saudi Aramco, do not take credit for the cladding/weld
overlay when selecting materials for HTHA service; similar approach is also taken
for long-term operation of existing equipment with respect to the Nelson Curve
limits. The fact that it is virtually impossible to assure complete integrity of the
cladding/weld overlay, both at the time of fabrication and after long-term service,
is a reason usually cited for not taking credit in the design for the potential hydrogen
partial pressure reduction associated with an austenitic stainless steel cladding/weld
overlay. Several cases of HTHA of base metal beneath austenitic stainless steel
cladding have been documented.
6.3 Some Operators do consider the austenitic stainless steel cladding/weld overlay
when setting HTHA inspection priorities
7 General Material Selection

7.1 Steel materials for new equipment and piping in hydrogen service shall be selected
in accordance with the most recent edition of SAES-L-132 and SAES-L-133, and
API RP 941. Saudi Aramco specifies a 50°F (28°C)/50 psi (3.5 bar) safety margin
to be added to the maximum operating temperature and hydrogen partial pressure.
7.2 For new equipment and piping, the incubation curves given in API RP 941 shall not
be used for material selection of components that intermittently operate (under
normal or upset conditions) above the limits for HTHA defined herein.
7.3 The maxium hydrogen partial pressure and maxium operating temperature for each
mode of operation should be used as the basis for material selection.
7.3.1 The hydrogen partial pressure must be calculated on an “absolute” pressure basis,
and is not necessarily equal to the maximum system pressure.
7.3.2 It must be assumed that the hydrogen dissolved in “all-liquid” hydrocarbon

streams exerts a vapor pressure equal to the partial pressure of hydrogen in the
gas with which the liquid hydrocarbon is in equilibrium.
7.4 C-½Mo steel (e.g. ASTM A204) shall not be specified for new equipment and
piping in hydrogen service operating at conditions above the carbon steel Nelson
Curve.
7.5 Consideration should be given to use a higher alloy steel where it is economically
attractive. For example, because of its higher design allowables, 2¼Cr-1Mo steel
equipment is sometimes more economical than 1¼Cr-½Mo steel equipment.
7.5.1 Thick forgings of 1¼Cr-½Mo steel have in some cases exhibited anomalous
impact toughness behavior. Therefore, 2¼Cr-1Mo steel should be specified for

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forgings greater than 3 inches (76 mm) thick even when the plate material is
1¼Cr-½Mo steel.
7.6 The base metal of alloy-clad or weld-overlaid pressure equipment or piping for
hydrogen service shall also be selected in accordance with SAES-L-132 and API
RP 941. No credit shall be taken for the presence of the alloy cladding or weld
overlay with regard to HTHA attack limits.
7.7 For cold-wall refractory-lined equipment or piping, there can be a risk of HTHA
when:
 Internal process conditions are above the carbon steel Nelson Curve.
 Refractory becomes degraded or there is gas bypassing behind the refractory

resulting in a hot spot on the outer shell.
7.7.1 Materials selection for the outer shell should consider the risk and possible
severity of metal hot spots due to refractory damage. The risk of hot spots is
greater if the refractory is known to experience erosion or other degradation
mechanisms in the specific service. The risk level may be “lowered” if there are
effective techniques of promptly detecting hot spots and efficient means of
keeping the hot spot areas cooled. Wireless contact thermocouples may also be
installed to monitor the outer skin temperature at known hot spot locations or areas
coincident with refractory degradation.
7.7.2 Refractory-lined applications with a risk of HTHA, select a material resistant to

the internal hydrogen partial pressure and predicted hot spot temperatures.
8 Operating Guidelines
In evaluating HTHA risks, the potential for the equipment to operate at temperatures,
pressures and hydrogen compositions outside the Integrity Operating Window should be
considered. Some situations may include:
 Fouling of exchangers (consider for example that the first exchanger in a bank is
completely fouled).
 Operation during cleaning of exchangers.
 Differences in flow rates or imblanced flow through sets of parallel equipment.
 Periodically used bypass piping.
 Special operating cases (e.g. heavier feeds).
 Start up, shutdown or upset conditions.
8.1 Process Equipment – Temperature Changes
8.1.1 Banks of feed/effluent exchangers where the process temperature changes across
equipment/piping and the exact temperature is not known are the most common
set of equipment where HTHA occurs and is not suspected. In these cases,
industry has relied on process modelling to design where the alloy specification
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change should occur. Failures occur near this alloy change because the
temperatures in the lower alloy were higher than expected.
8.1.2 The actual temperature profile may not match the model because the amount of
fouling or effect on temperature is not adequately predicted by simulations and
models or because operating conditions are different than predicted/modeled (e.g.,
flow, feed stock, heat transfer). Often temperature measurements are not
available near the point where the metallurgy changes (e.g. in a tightly fitted bank
of exchangers or in a single exchanger.
The failure depicted in Figures 10 and 11 occurred when the equipment was
believed to be not susceptible to HTHA, resulting in seven fatalities, Ref. U.S.
Chemical safety and hazard investigation board, Investigation Report,
Catastrophic Rupture Of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes Refinery,
Anacortes,Washington, April 2, 2010.
Figure 10. Schematic of the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery NHT Unit heat exchangers. There
were two banks of three heat exchangers: A/B/C bank and D/E/F bank. The E heat exchanger
catastrophically ruptured on April 2, 2010.
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Figure 11. Tesoro Anacortes Refinery NHT heat exchanger E HTHA catastrophic failure on
April 2, 2010.
8.1.3 Single equipment, e.g. Platformer vertical exchangers or Texas Towers, made of
mixed metallurgy, i.e. low-alloy steel at upper effluent inlet, where the
temperature is highest and carbon steel at the lower section, where the temperature
is lowest, may represent an HTHA risk. HTHA failure has occurred at a US
refinery at the 1¼Cr-½Mo low-alloy/carbon steel DMW, i.e. carbon steel side
(Figure 12) due to increased temperature as a result of internal fouling. The DMW
was subjected to highly localized stresses based on the geometry coupled with the
fact that this weld was selected as the “closure weld” during construction of the
Texas Tower. Additionally, an RBI study conducted at this refinery failed to
notice the mixed metallurgy construction aspect of this exchanger (shell was
assumed to be made entirely of low-alloy steel) and, as a result, HTHA was not
identified as a potential threat. Saudi Aramco no longer selects mixed metallurgy
for this type of exchanger for new projects. Existing company Texas Towers have
all been assessed and appropriate HTHA mitigation measures implemented.
8.2 Bypass Piping

HTHA failures have been observed at bypass piping and instrumentation due to
operating conditions and control schemes changing from the design premise. The
alloy was chosen on the design basis that the bypass would remain closed and would
not see process conditions, i.e. temperature. A change to use the bypass to control
flow or temperature caused the temperatures to be above the Nelson Curve or
periodically operate above the curve. Management of change practices have not
always caught this potential damage scenario.

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1¼Cr½Mo Carbon Steel
Figure 12. HTHA cracking at low-alloy/carbon steel DMW closure weld of Texas Tower.
8.3 Process Equipment – Hydrogen Pressure Changes

8.3.1 Not as common as above, but another scenario to consider is where the hydrogen
partial pressure has increased above those expected or predicted during design
because of process creep, feedstock changes, modifications to the process unit
(e.g., change in type of hydrotreater). When the potential error of calculation for
the hydrogen pressure places the operating conditions within 25 psia (1.7 bara) of
the Nelson Curve, then the calculation should be validated routinely.
8.3.2 To assess the risk of HTHA, site Process Engineers should identify hydrogen
containing equipment (including bypass lines) which operates or could operate
above 400°F (205°C) and hydrogen partial pressures above 50 psia (3.5 bara). In
addition to a review of process data, Corrosion Engineers should discuss fouling,
the use of bypasses and other abnormal or transient operations with operators.
Corrosion Engineers can then assess whether the worst case temperature and
partial pressure scenarios are within 50°F (28°C) or within 25 psia (1.7 bara)
hydrogen partial pressure of the Nelson Curves.
8.3.3 Once the potential HTHA situations are identified by the plant, they should be
reviewed by Materials and Corrosion Specialists to determine the risk and path
forward to mitigate the risk. Mitigation of HTHA risks may include:
 Installation of temperature measurement points to monitor that operation of
the most susceptible point remains within the IOW per API RP-584 and
SAEP-393; wireless contact thermocouples are now readily available on the
market to monitor existing equipement and piping considered at risk of
HTHA.
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 Additional analysis or modelling of operating scenarios to verify hydrogen

partial pressures.
 Inclusion of limits in IOW or Corrosion Management Dashboard to provide a
means to monitor if operating within 50°F (28°C) or within 25 psia (1.7 bara)
hydrogen partial pressure of the Nelson Curves.
 Changes in operating procedures.
 Updates to the inspection program to check for HTHA.
 Changing metallurgy of equipment.
8.3.4 An equipment could be susceptible to HTHA if it is operated over the Nelson
Curve limits for short time durations but for a large number of temperature cycles.
HTHA is not necessarily restricted to equipment operating above the Nelson
Curve for long durations. Periods of operation above the Nelson Curve, even of
short duration, may increase the opportunity for HTHA.
8.4 Effect of Thermal Stresses – Mixing Tees

A case history in API RP 941 Appendic C, Table C.1 and Figure C.1 may indicate
that highly stressed components can suffer HTHA at conditions below the Nelson
curve. In this case, a 2¼Cr-1Mo mixing tee was believed to be highly stressed by
thermal stresses due to the mixing of hot and cooler hydrogen. The operating
conditions of both the hot upstream hydrogen and the mixed hydrogen downstream
of the tee were found to be below the 2¼Cr-1Mo. Examination showed that , in
addition to thermal fatigue cracks, decarburization and fissuring were also found
along the internal surface of the tee. Piping downstream of the tee was also found
to have fissuring and internal decarburization.
9 Determination of Susceptibility to HTHA
An HTHA Susceptibility Calculator excel sheet is given in Appendix A. This tool may
be used to evaluate the position of representtaive operating conditions of an exisiting
equipment or pipe related to the appropriate Nelson Curve. Table 1 provides the
susceptibility criteria that can be used in the HTHA Susceptibility Calculator.
Table 1. HTHA Susceptibility Criteria

Susceptibility Level Conditions
High Susceptibility At or above existing Nelson Curve limits
Medium Susceptibility Up to and including 14°C (25°F) below existing Nelson Curve limits
Between 14°C (25°F) and 28°C (50°F) below existing Nelson Curve
Low Susceptibility
limits
Not Susceptible More than 28°C (50°F) below the existing Nelson Curve limits

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This tool is based on the 8th Edition of API RP 941 (2016) with the 50°F (28°C)/50 psi
(3.5 bar) safety margin. Screen shots from the excel tool are shown in Figures 13 and 14
below.
Figure 13: HTHA Susceptibility Calculator input data and results (Screen Shot 1)

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Figure 14: HTHA Susceptibility Calculator showing position of operating data vs. Nelson
Curves (Screen Shot 2)
10 Inspection Guidelines
Equipment and piping operating in high temperature, high pressure hydrogen service
should either be routinely inspected, e.g. every T&I, for HTHA and/or have the operating
conditions conclusively validated to show that they are not susceptible to HTHA.
If an equipment or piping is found to be operating above the appropriate curve, evaluation

and risk assessment should be performed immediately to determine the appropriate
mitigation. If equipment is found to have HTHA, then a fitness for service assessment is
to be performed to determine the appropriate mitigation. Note that at the time of
developing this best practice, no validated HTHA FFS techniques are available.
Accordingly, HTHA, if found, is mitigated via either machining out damaged material
followed by weld build-up to restore the thickness (with or without PWHT), grinding out
and repair of cracks and immediate replacement of the component at the next available
shutdown opportunity. Operational controls may also be implemented via installation of
wireless contact thermocouples to monitor the metal temperature and reduction in
temperature and/or hydrogen partial pressure.

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10.1 Inspection Techniques

10.1.1 Effective inspection techniques for detecting early stages of HTHA involve a
combination of various ultrasonic examination techniques including UT
backscatter, Phased Array (and related focusing techniques), ToFD (and related
imaging techniques).
10.1.2 Magnetic particle examination, conventional shear wave UT and conventional

time of flight diffraction (TOFD) or Phased Array can be used to detect the later
stages of HTHA in weldments where significant cracking is already present.
10.1.3 Radiography (RT) has not been found effective in inspecting equipment and
piping for HTHA because it is not effective in detecting fissures. RT may be
effective in verifying indications found by conventional UT shear wave or in
assessing cracking detected by some other technique.
10.1.4 Field metallography or replication can be useful for verification of potential

HTHA damage discovered by other nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques.
10.1.5 Acoustic Emission (AE) testing cannot identify HTHA microfissures but may be
useful in providing global inspection of a piece of equipment or a section of piping
with currently propograting HTHA cracking. Its effectiveness in detecting HTHA
is not proven and therefore not recommended.
10.2 On-Stream Inspection

Onstream HTHA inspections are typically not possible because the advanced UT
techniques required to detect and assess HTHA are difficult to use at high operating
temperatures. If onstream inspection is required for monitoring purposes, the
inspection plan should be agreed to with the field Inspection Engineer, ID NDE
Specialist and/or CSD Materials/Corrosion Specialist.
10.3 Internal Inspection
10.3.1 Internal HTHA inspections are not required each time internal access is available,
but should be considered. Internal HTHA inspection should be performed when
required by the RBI Inspection Plan. The inspection techniques and extent of
examination should follow the inspection plan. Internal inspection techniques for
non-clad or weld overlayed equipment include visual examination, WFMPT and
field metallography.
10.3.2 Equipment with internal cladding/weld overlay should be inspected visually for
cracking and bulging to verify the clad/overlay is sound. Samples areas should be
spot penetrant tested (PT) and straight beam UT, looking for cracking and
disbonding. If the clad/overlay is not sound, additional inspection plans should be

Page 20 of 28
determined with the assistance of the field Corrosion Engineer, ID NDE SME or
CSD Materials/Corrosion SME.
10.4 External Inspection

External HTHA inspections should be conducted at every T&I for assets with high
or medium susceptibility. These inspections should include AUBT/TOFD/PA
inspection of base metal and weldments by a qualified ID NDE Specialist or an
approved contractor. If external examination shows any signs of HTHA damage, an
internal inspection must be carried out to check for blistering and cracking. Field
metallography may also be carried out to categorize and confirm the damage found
by advanced NDT.
10.5 Positive Material Identification

Inspection for HTHA should include verifying that the metallurgy of the
components including the welds, matches the specifications. PMI should be
conducted using an alloy analyzer. Fixed equipment such as vessels and piping
should be verified once and the verification should be documented in the permanent
equipment files. Bolt-on components such as blind flanges and valves should be
verified any time these components are removed from and/or installed in the system
during repairs and replacements. Repair and modification welds should also be
verified. If a satisfactory PMI procedure is in effect at a site, then material
verifications may be performed using visual identifications.
10.6 Inspection Effectiveness
SAEP-343 Risk-Based Inspection provides guidelines for assigning HTHA

inspection effectiveness when conducting RBI studies, Table 2; it is noted that these
guidelines are adapted from the 2nd version (2008) of API 581 RBI Technology.
The user must always consult with ID RBI and NDE specialists when assigning an
appropriate effectiveness category. It must however be noted that the 3rd version
(2016) of API RP 581 states that “currently there is no Levels of Inspection
Effectiveness for HTHA damage”. It is understood that this statement was inserted
for “legal” reasons but also to reflect the still on-going development of highly
accurate HTHA inspection methods.
10.7 Inspection Locations

HTHA damage has not only been found in fixed equipment materials in the
hydrocarbon process industry, but also in high pressure boiler tubes, hydrogen
producing units, synthetic gas units, ammonia plants and other equipment where
hydrocarbons may not be present but high temperatures are involved. HTHA affects
carbon and low alloy steels, but is most commonly found in carbon steel and carbon-
1/2 Mo steel operating above or below its corresponding Nelson Curve limits. Base
metal areas and weldments that are hotter, often near the outlet nozzle of catalytic
Page 21 of 28
reformer equipment or the inlet nozzle of an exchanger that is cooling the process,
are areas of concern for HTHA.
Typical HTHA inspection locations and coverage are given in Figures 15 – 17. Due
consideration shall also be given to the inspection technique and coverage
recommended in the RBI study.
Table 2. Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness – HTHA

Inspection
Inspection
Effectiveness Inspection
Category
Category
Highly Inspection techniques for HTHA are not available to qualify
A
Effective for this inspection category
Inspection of susceptible areas with the following techniques:
 AUBT for the base metal and/or in-situ metallography
 For Equipment: Minimum one location of (24”x24”) AUBT
Usually
B scanning for each component (Shell and Heads).
Effective
 For Piping: Two locations of (12”x12”) per 50 ft of piping.
 ABSA, High Frequency UTSW or TOFD techniques for the
welds and heat affected zone.
 AUBT for the base metal and/or in-situ metallography
 For Equipment: Minimum one location of (12”x12”) AUBT
Fairly
C scanning for each component (Shell and Heads).
Effective
 For Piping: One location of (12”x12”) per 50ft of piping.
ABSA, High Frequency UTSW or TOFD techniques for the
weld and heat affected zone.
 AUBT for the base metal or in-situ metallography
 For Equipment: One location of (12”x12”) AUBT scanning.
Poorly
D  For Piping: One location of (12”x12”) per 100 ft of piping.
Effective
 ABSA, High Frequency UTSW or TOFD techniques for
the weld and heat affected zone,
 Or Inspect less 75% WFMPT or FPT of susceptible areas.
E Ineffective No inspection or ineffective inspection technique used

Page 22 of 28
Figure 15. HTHA Inspection of a typical clad pressure vessel
Note: Phased Array, Total Focusing Method (TMF) and Hi ToFD Advanced Microscopy Imaging (AMI)
may also be used instead of AUBT.

Page 23 of 28
Figure 16. HTHA Inspection of a typical heat exchanger shell without cladding

Page 24 of 28
Figure 17. HTHA Inspection of a typical heat exchanger channel without cladding

Page 25 of 28
11 Repair/Replace Decisions
If HTHA damage is confirmed in a component, replacement with upgraded metallurgy
must be the first action to take. However, since extended lead times are required to
procure components, a decision regarding how the damage should be monitored and/or
mitigated must be made and documented in the equipment files. Fitness for service
assessments may be undertaken once these have been developed and validated. At this
time, no validated HTHA FFS methods are available.
11.1 Minor damage may be left in operating equipment with the agreement of the field
Corrosion Engineer and the CSD Material/Corrosion Specialist, if appropriate
inspection monitoring is performed. Fitness for service and risk analysis may also
assist in this assessment.
11.2 Repair of HTHA damaged equipment should only be initiated after consultation
with the field Corrosion Engineer and the CSD Material/Corrosion/Welding
Specialists because HTHA damage can present unusual difficulties during repair.
Some repair attempts could actually aggravate existing damage in the equipment or
increase the potential for future HTHA.
11.3 Mitigation may also include more restrictive operating conditions as noted above.
11.4 A risk assessment should be performed to facilitate these decisions.
12 Documentation
The results of all HTHA inspections should always be recorded in the RBI report, SAP-
SAIF and the permanent inspection file per SAEP-1161 and 00-SAIP-78.
13 HTHA Mitigation Checklist
With proper safety considerations and controls, the risk of HTHA failures is greatly
reduced. This checklist provides the practices to consider:
13.1 Select the proper material for the maximum operating conditions.
13.2 Avoid mixed metallurgy construction of equipment, e.g. vertical heat exchangers
or Texas Towers.
13.3 Use actual operating temperatures for HTHA susceptibility and validate that the
actual operating temperatures and pressures are below API RP 941 curve by the
defined safety margin.
13.4 Use experienced Materials and Corrosion Specialists who understand the HTHA
phenomenon as well as the API RP 941 recommended practice.
13.5 Perform regular process hazard assessment of the operating conditions including
changes in pressure, temperatures or composition of hydrogen.
13.6 Verify the actual operating conditions the equipment experiences through reliable
field data.
Page 26 of 28
13.7 Locate pressure and temperature indicators at locations that measure the actual
operating conditions of equipment that could be susceptible to HTHA.
13.8 Install wireless contact thermocouples at locations where metal temperatures are
unknown.
13.9 Determine whether process creep has occurred that may affect the metal.
13.10 Evaluate material or operating changes using a management of change (MOC)
process.
13.11 Evaluate if temperature excursions/regeneration operations affect HTHA
susceptibility.
13.12 Provide definite safe operating limits or Integrity Operating Windows with
necessary process alarms with appropriate actions or response plan when those
limits are exceeded. Assure that these limits are understood by Operations
personnel.
13.13 Eliminate hydrogen migration paths behind linings or cladding.
13.14 Perform daily infra-red inspections or install wireless contact thermocouples,
especially on refractory-lined equipment.
13.15 Assure that proper foundation support for refractory-lined equipment is present to
reduce flexure of the refractory.
13.16 Implement HTHA inspection methods and inspection frequencies to detect initial
stages of HTHA.
13.17 Know the history of the equipment, and if unknown, ensure HTHA inspections
are performed
13.18 Perform PMI regularly, especially during installation, welding, and maintenance
operations.
13.19 Document all findings in an inspection program and follow-up with appropriate
actions.

Page 27 of 28
APPENDIX A – HTHA Susceptibility Calculator

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Best Practice

SABP-A-078 5 June 2018

Previous Issue: New Next Planned Update: TBD

Contact: Kermad, Abdelhak (KERMADAX) on +966-13-8809529 Page 1 of 28

©Saudi Aramco 2018. All rights reserved.

2 Conflicts and Deviations

This Best Practice is based on the below referenced documents:

3.1 Saudi Aramco References

Saudi Aramco Engineering Procedures

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

TA600015927 Carbon Steel Degradation in High Temperature

American Petroleum Institute

HAZ Heat-Affected Zone

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

5.1.4 HTHA is a time-temperature-pressure function, meaning that the longer that a

5.1.6 HTHA is always hazardous due to potential hydrocarbons/hydrogen mixture

5.2 HTHA Damage Type

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Figure 1. Hydrogen voids at grain boundaries of C-½Mo Naphtha Hydrotreater charge

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Figure 3. HTHA Blistering at C-½Mo JRD Platformer feed/effluent exchanger (Y13-E-8B)

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

5.3 Incubation Period

5.3.1 HTHA is preceded by a period of time when no noticeable change in properties is

5.4 The Nelson Curves

5.5 PWHT Benefits

5.6 Inspection Methods

7 General Material Selection

7.3.2 It must be assumed that the hydrogen dissolved in “all-liquid” hydrocarbon

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

 Refractory becomes degraded or there is gas bypassing behind the refractory

7.7.2 Refractory-lined applications with a risk of HTHA, select a material resistant to

8.2 Bypass Piping

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

1¼Cr½Mo Carbon Steel

8.3 Process Equipment – Hydrogen Pressure Changes

 Additional analysis or modelling of operating scenarios to verify hydrogen

8.4 Effect of Thermal Stresses – Mixing Tees

9 Determination of Susceptibility to HTHA

Table 1. HTHA Susceptibility Criteria

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

If an equipment or piping is found to be operating above the appropriate curve, evaluation

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

10.1 Inspection Techniques

10.1.2 Magnetic particle examination, conventional shear wave UT and conventional

10.1.4 Field metallography or replication can be useful for verification of potential

10.2 On-Stream Inspection

10.3 Internal Inspection

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

10.4 External Inspection

10.5 Positive Material Identification

10.6 Inspection Effectiveness

SAEP-343 Risk-Based Inspection provides guidelines for assigning HTHA

10.7 Inspection Locations

Table 2. Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness – HTHA

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use