*** TOPIC: MARRIAGE: Void Marriages, Psychological Incapacity [VII,E.

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[G.R. No. 229272. November 19, 2018.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GINA P. TECAG, respondent.

J. PERLAS-BERNABE, SECOND DIVISION

Nature of the Action: petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:

On August 2, 2006, Gina and Marjune were married in a civil wedding ceremony at La
Trinidad, Benguet. Gina alleged that Marjune hit her because she was unable to conceive. She
then later found employment in Macau. As time passed, their communication became less
frequent, until in 2010, while abroad, a woman called and informed her that she was presently
living with Marjune and that they already have a child.

On October 9, 2012, Gina filed a petition to declare her marriage with Marjune null and
void on the basis of the latter's psychological incapacity.

During trial, Gina presented the findings of Prof. Sanchez, the psychologist who
conducted a psychological examination of the parties. Prof. Sanchez interviewed Gina, her
sister Sofia, and her brother-in-law Christian Tabadero. In the Case Analysis Report, Prof
Sanchez stated that Gina was suffering from "Anxious and Fearful Personality Disorder" where
traces of "Dependent Personality Disorder" were observed, rendering her psychologically
incapacitated as a spouse to Marjune. Specifically, Prof. Sanchez pointed out that Gina has
many apprehensions, a tendency to be depressive, fears of abandonment and rejection, and
passivity.

With respect to Marjune, Prof. Sanchez found that his behavior was suggestive of an
"Avoidant Personality Disorder," even though she was unable to interview him. She also
concluded that Gina and Marjune's personality disorders "affected their behaviors even before
they contracted marriage and, in the presence of situational factors, became more evident
during the time they were together during the marriage."

The RTC granted the petition, finding that their personality disorders existed even
before marriage, and that because these prevented the parties from performing the essential
marital duties, they are considered grave and serious, and likewise incurable, as concluded by
Prof. Sanchez.

On appeal, citing the findings of Prof. Sanchez extensively, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC and held that the root cause of their psychological incapacity had been medically or
clinically identified, and that they were unable to comply with the essential marital obligations
under Article 68 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses may be
heavily relied on to support the ground of psychological incapacity for the annulment of
marriage.
RULING:

The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. In ruling against the respondent, it
held that:

Based on jurisprudence, psychological incapacity has a specific and peculiar denotation.

It ought to pertain to only the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly
demonstrate the party's/parties' utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under
Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.

The requirements for proving psychological incapacity can be traced in a long line of
cases. In Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, citing Republic v. De Gracia and Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court
emphasized "that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved)."

It has been held that courts should weigh and consider the probative value of the
findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available, and the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must still be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature be fully explained.

In this case, there is no other evidence offered apart from Prof. Sanchez's report to
substantiate Gina's allegation of psychological incapacity. The said report does not adequately
demonstrate the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Gina's purported personality
disorder. The same observations are true with respect to Prof. Sanchez's findings anent
Marjune's purported "Avoidant Personality Disorder." To recount, Prof. Sanchez arrived at her
diagnosis without having examined or, at the very least, spoken to the subject, i.e., Marjune,
even once.

This Court has already settled that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
one is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness
are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes him/her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

As has oft been reiterated in jurisprudence, psychological incapacity is more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations. Instead, it is a
serious, deep-rooted, and incurable psychological condition that renders the party incapable of
complying with — as they are basically incognitive of — these marital obligations. Truth be told,
the peculiar nature of this incapability does not equate to mere difficulty, refusal or neglect to
perform.