01.6.
1 Title of Bills they determined were unfair election practices;
Girion v COMELEC
Henry Giron and petitioners-in-intervention assail
the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of
Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of
Republic Act 9006 known as the Fair Election Act.
Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and
14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26 of
Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Political ad ban being lifted is the main subject of
the Fair Election Act and sections 12 and 14 are not
related to it. Section 12 refers to the treatment of
the votes cast for substituted candidates after the
official ballots have been printed, while Section 14
pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates
holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881which concerns the ipso facto (very act)
resignation of elective officials immediately after
they file their respective certificates of candidacy
for an office other than that which they are
currently holding in a permanent capacity.
Issue
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14
in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one
subject-one title” rule.
Constitutional provisions relation to the subject
matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
power of legislation the requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction.
It is enough that the title gives a general object
which a statute seeks to effect. Mere details need to
be set forth.
Congress did not limit the law to the lifting of the
political ad ban. They found other election
practices that they considered inequitable. Some of
these practices included the appreciation of the
votes cast in case of a late substitution of
candidates and the ipso facto resignation of certain
elective officials upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy. Thus, to level the playing field,
Congress fashioned a law that would address what
hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.
Cawaling v COMELEC
Two (2) separate petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which
created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the
plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E.
Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an “Act
Creating the City of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor.”
Petitioner submitted petition seeking annulment of
plebiscite on grounds of:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was
conducted beyond the required 120-day
period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe
the legal requirement of twenty (20) day
extensive information campaign in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
before conducting the plebiscite
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring
enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending,
in essence, that:
A. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging
two municipalities violates Section 450(a)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in
relation to Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution) which requires that only “a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city”
B. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects,
namely, the (a) creation of the City of
Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon,
thereby violating the “one subject-one
bill” rule prescribed by Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the
Code, a component city may be created only by
converting “a municipality or a cluster of
barangays not by merging two municipalities, as
what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issues
(1) WON a component city may be created by
merging two municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a “compelling” reason
for merging the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon in order tocreate the City of
Sorsogon.
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the “one
subject-one bill” rule enunciated in
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Held
1. Yes. Petitioner’s constricted reading of
Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous.
The phrase “Amunicipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a
component city” is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution allows the merger of local
government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in accordance
with the criteriaestablished by the Code.
The creation of an entirely new local
government unit through a division or a
merger of existing local government
units is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall
comply with the requirements prescribed
by the Code
2. Compelling reason for merging is a
question on wisdom which the judiciary
can’t answer.
3. There is only one subject embraced in the
title of the law, that is, the creation of the
City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation
of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due
to their merger is not a subject separate
and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon
City. Such abolition/cessation was but the
logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger.
4. Publication was completed on September
1, 2000 compared to approval on August
16, 2000. The plebiscite is scheduled after
the publication, not upon approval making
December 16, 2000 which is within the
120 days of the plebiscite.
Lidasan v COMELEC
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato.
Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan
however discovered that certain barrios located in
Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur
pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the
Congressman of Cotabato voted in 2avour of RA
4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded
to establish precincts for voter registration in the
said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a
case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not
clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton,
it would be including in its territory several barrios
from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but
which includes barrios located in another province
– Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon
the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful
effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the
law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province
of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill that
even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it
only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of
his own province. These are the pressures which
heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA
4790.
1.7 Steps in the passage of a bill into law
1.7.1 Formalities
 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines
1. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the
organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further
reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections
to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with
the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the
synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to
appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions
and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent
to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional
mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992
and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called
“regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local”
election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987
Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT
violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either
the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is
subject to the EXCEPTION when the President
certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s
certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
“except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art.
VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and
[ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power
to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the
three options open to Congress in order to resolve
the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials
in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization
in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent]
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office
in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold
special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the
[2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their
respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since
it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,
they are covered and bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. Xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is
effectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and
to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
– like the extension of the elective term – is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a
new term and effectively appoint the occupant of
the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President. Hence,
holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis for
it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054)
in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it
explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under
RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in
the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this
Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation, except where
an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is
unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM
elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 –
for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive
nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make
this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional
or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow
ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of
Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself
should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective
ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting
an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years
that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
will happen – a term of less than two years – if a
call for special elections shall prevail. In sum,
while synchronization is achieved, the result is at
the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the
power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is
valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’
chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the
ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the
only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any
attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should
be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the
officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests
on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the
petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials to be “elective and
representative of the constituent political units.”
This requirement indeed is an express limitation
whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves
the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this
alleged constitutional problem is more apparent
than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that
changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does
not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.” This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials
for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption
to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not
amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and
for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153
should be read – in the manner it was written and
based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from
its order for synchronization, it is purely and
simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Tolentino v Secretary of Finance
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the
constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as
the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the
3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as
Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what
Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text
of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House
Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to
note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco
even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is
procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court
rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to
the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances
before where Senate passed its own version rather
than having the HoR version as far as revenue and
other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a
mere matter of form. There is no showing that it
would make a significant difference if Senate were
to adopt his over what has been done.
PHILJA v Prado
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized
the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain
government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of
the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was
determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the
postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence,
the postal service recommended that the franking
privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a
result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the
said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed
the circular and questioned the validity of Section
35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision
is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is
a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it
is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the
high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking
needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in
contending that the removal of the franking
privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster
would intend to cut expenditure by removing the
franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should
have removed the franking privilege all at once
from all the other departments. If the problem is the
loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of the government, including those who
do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those 7avoured, which may or
may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction (it is true that the
postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the
judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This
might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting
mature books to all persons, regardless of age,
would benefit the morals of the youth but violate
the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from
which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category
to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege,
there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.
1.7.2 Approval of Bills
Bolinao Electronics v. Velencia
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner
and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting
System Inc. They operate and own television
(channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines.
They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then
Secretary of Communications, for operating even
after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed
that because of CBN’s continued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to
claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia
failed to show that any right of his has been
violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation.
Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the
appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in
Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation
allotted then there can be no damage; and if there
are expenditures made by Valencia’s department
they are in fact in violation of the law and they
cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is
shown that the then president vetoed this provision
of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he
may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power
does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it
follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
Abakado Guro Party list v. Purisima
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau
of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed
this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that,
by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law “transforms the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the
system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as
to why such a system should not apply to officials
and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets
to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the
President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards
and incentives limitation to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of
power to fix revenue targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers
has been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.
Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that
“the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not
a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines
the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if
the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard
test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which it is
to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the
revenue- generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the
BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for
the national government through the collection of
taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the
special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great
inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and
standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying
out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of
the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized
the following as sufficient standards: “public
interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience
and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and
welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused
with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC
and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said
IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
1.7.3.1 Enrolled Bill Theory
Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was
engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The
main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported
abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco
paid the required margin fee for its imported urea
and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest
as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax
exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and
it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers
were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor
General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez
maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two
separate and distinct components are not tax
exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea
formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by
combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited
the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No.
2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board
pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange
for the importation of the following:
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea
formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should
be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further
contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction “and”
between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt
“urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a
finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof.

The enrolled bill however used the term “urea
formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea
formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical
solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of
urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different
from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of
Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the
Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill
would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled
bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde”
instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive
— on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers
and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment
or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido
certified other persons as qualified for the post.
Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of
1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. – No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any
high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that
a person “who has served the police department of
a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales
however argued that when the said act was being
deliberated upon, the approved version was
actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation
or police department of any city and has held the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years or any high school graduate who has
served the police department of a city or who has
served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Morales v. Subido Morales argued that the above version was the one
which was actually approved by Congress but
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police
when the bill emerged from the conference
department of a city for at least three years but does
committee the only change made in the provision
not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the
was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as
chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police
chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
went on to support his case by producing copies of
colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman
certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
according to him was signed by an employee in the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was
Senate bill division, and can be found attached to
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at
the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated
the same time, given a provisional appointment to
upon.
the same position by the mayor of Manila.
Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service,
approved the designation of Morales as acting chief
but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the
history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the
legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is
in the statute as officially published in slip form by
the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind
the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith
and credit of what the officers of the said branches
attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding
that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters
which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what
extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered
on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in
the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide.
All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on
the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia
that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and
certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. It would
be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department for this Court either to set aside
a legislative action as void because the Court thinks
the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made
in a case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or
the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted
by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.
1.7.3.2 Journal Entry Rule
Astorga v. Villegas
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila)
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs
of offices of the city government as well as to the
owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been
assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by
Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel
Villegas et al and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied
recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila) because the said law was
considered to have never been enacted. When the
this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower
house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the
Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities
headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred
back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During
such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by
the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower
house and was thereafter approved by the latter.
The bill was sent to the President for approval and
it became RA 4065. It was later found out however
that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to
the lower house for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was
in fact the version that had no amendments thereto.
It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and
as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact,
the Senate president and the President of the
Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and
binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga
further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof
of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly
enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each
House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal
can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the President was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, the
SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial
and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As
done by both the President of the Senate and the
Chief Executive, when they withdrew their
signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill
intended to be as it is supposed to be was never
made into law. To perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making
body.
D. Ordinance
Legaspi v. City of Cebu
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic
Code of Cebu City.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban
(Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas
Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the
RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by
Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its
Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City
Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking
the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as
unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and
damages.
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997,
Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying
parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get
certain records and documents from his office and
after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car
being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was
impounded for three days, and was informed at the
office of the CITOM that he had first to pay
P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu
City for the release of his car but such imposition
the fine was without any court hearing and without
due process of law. He was also compelled to
payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the
clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without
any court hearing and final judgment;
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a
very secluded place where there was no sign
prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized
by CITOM operative and that he was compelled to
pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his
car without a court hearing and a final judgment
rendered by a court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi)
likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu,
demanded the delivery of personal property,
declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu
City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he
had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk
and the street outside the gate of his house to make
way for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon
returning outside, his car was towed by the group
even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its
decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and
void
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to
the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC
declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for
reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to the
Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari.
The appeals were consolidated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is
valid and constitutional.
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid
ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127,
April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a valid
ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established.
A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided
into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU,
and whether it was passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive
(i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity
of the ordinance with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy).
Court cogently observed that police power is
lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this
power to the President and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, delegated police power was
exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities
like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to
enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly
done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also
generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.
The police power granted to local government units
must always be exercised with utmost observance
of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be
exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as
its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation
or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. Due process requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of
the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions
of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under
strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by
its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy.
Identification Reference System” was issued by
President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996.
Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the
said order for violating the right to privacy. He
contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of
the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the
citizen’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to
maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a
distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issue of
Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. Ople’s concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The
blurring demarcation line between the power of
legislature to make laws and the power of executive
to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance
and cannot be allowed.
F. Administrative Rules and Regulations

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a

smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in
the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked

vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce
the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise,
the transgressors would evade liability by simply
driving away.

DENIED

Presidential Issuance

Ople vs Ruben Torres

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise

known as “Adoption of a National Computerized