VOL.

478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 187

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

*
G.R. No. 141613. December 16, 2005.

SENEN B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. VIRGILIO B.

AGUILAR and ANGEL B. AGUILAR, respondents.
ALEJANDRO C. SANGALANG, Intervenor-Respondent.

Civil Law; Properties; Redemption; Requisites for the Exercise

of Legal Redemption.—The following are the requisites for the
exercise of legal redemption: (1) There must be a co-ownership; (2)
one of the co-owners sold his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was
made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of
redemption must be exercised by one or more co-owners within a
period of thirty days to be counted from the time that he or they
were notified in writing by the vendee or by the co-owner vendor;
and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of the sale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Si v. Court of Appeals, Court
ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled
to a written notice.—Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. The old
rule is that a written notice of the sale by the vendor to his co-
owners is indispensable for the latter to exercise their retracto
legal de comuneros. More recently, however, we have relaxed the
written notice requirement. Thus, in Si v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled
to a written notice for such would be superfluous. The law does
not demand what is unnecessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; After a property has been
subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community
has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of pre-
emption or redemption.—By the time Senen filed Civil Case No.
95-039 for legal redemption, his right was no longer available to
him. We have held that after a property has been subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated
and there is no reason to sustain any right of pre-emption or
redemption.
Same; Actions; Laches; Laches is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption

188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined

to assert it; Elements of Laches.—Laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which could or should have been done earlier through the exercise
of due diligence. Otherwise stated, laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. Its elements are: (1) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event, relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Siruelo, Muyco & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
     Benito P. Fabie for private respondent.
          Nazario Regino and Jose Manacop for intervenor-
respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Assailed1 in this petition 2 for review on certiorari are the

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
June 11, 1999 and January 11, 2000, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 55750.

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 27-47. The court’s opinion was written by Associate Justice
Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili and Bernardo P. Abesamis (all retired).
2 Rollo, p. 48.

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VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 189

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

The parties in this case are brothers, except Alejandro

Sangalang, herein intervenor-respondent. As will be
subsequently discussed, this is the second time that the
brothers Aguilar seek the intervention of this Court
regarding the same facts and the same subject matter. The
first was in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76351
3
decided on October 29, 1993 against Senen B. Aguilar. It is
time to writ finis to this family wrangling.
On October 28, 1993, Senen and Virgilio purchased a
house and lot located in Parañaque City, Metro Manila for
the benefit of their father, Maximiano Aguilar (now
deceased). The brothers wanted their father to enjoy his
retirement in a quiet neighborhood. On February 23, 1970,
they executed a written agreement stipulating that their
shares in the house and lot would be equal; and that Senen
would live with their father on condition that he would pay
the Social Security System (SSS) the remaining loan
obligation of the former owners.
In 1974, their father died. Virgilio then demanded that
Senen vacate the house and that the property be sold, the
proceeds to be divided between them. Senen refused to
comply with Virgilio’s demand.
On January 12, 1979, Virgilio filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal
at Pasay City for specific performance. Virgilio prayed that
Senen be compelled to sell the property so that the
proceeds could be divided between them.
However, during the pre-trial, neither Senen nor his
counsel appeared. Thus, Senen was declared as in default
by the trial court and Virgilio was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte.
On July 26, 1979, the trial court rendered its Decision,
declaring the brothers co-owners of the house and lot and
are entitled to equal shares; and ordering that the property
be sold, the proceeds to be divided equally between them.
The

_______________

3 Reported in 227 SCRA 472 (1993).

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190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

trial court also ordered Senen to vacate the property and to

pay Virgilio rentals with interests corresponding to the
period from January 1975 until he leaves the premises.
On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 03933, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision.
Virgilio then filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 76351.
 On October 29, 1993, this Court rendered its Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6912-
P dated 26 July 1971 is REINSTATED, with the modification that
respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in
question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, and
to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar, a monthly rental of
P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he received
the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he
effectively leaves the premises.
The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to
implement this decision, conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil
Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is final and executory.
SO ORDERED.”

On March 27, 1995, Senen filed with the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City, an action for legal
redemption against Virgilio and another brother, Angel,
dock-eted as Civil Case No. 95-039. In his complaint, Senen
alleged that while he knows that Virgilio sold his 1/2 share
of the property to Angel in January 1989, however, he
(Senen) was not furnished any written notice of the sale.
Consequently, as a co-owner, he has the right to redeem
the property.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, pursuant to this
Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 76351, the property was sold
at public auction to Alejandro C. Sangalang, intervenor-
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VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 191

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

respondent herein. Virgilio then received his share of the

proceeds as well as the rental payments due from Senen.
By then, Virgilio had moved to California, USA. It was
only on January 25, 1997 that he was served, through the
Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, a copy of Senen’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 95-039.
On February 24, 1997, Virgilio filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of cause of action and forum
shopping. In an Order dated June 27, 1997, the trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 05-039 on the ground of laches,
holding that Senen incurred a delay of seven (7) years
before asserting his right to redeem the property in
question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed
Order of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
 The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that Senen’s complaint for legal
redemption in Civil Case No. 05-039 is barred by laches.
Legal redemption (retracto legal de comuneros) is a
privilege created by law, partly by reason of public policy
and partly for the benefit of the redemptioner to afford him
a way out of a disagreeable4
or inconvenient association into
which he has been thrust.
With respect to redemption by co-owners, in case the
share of a co-owner is sold to a third person, the governing
law is Article 1620 of the Civil Code which provides:

“ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of

redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any
of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable
rate.

_______________

4 Villasor v. Medel, 81 Phil. 546, 550 (1948).

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192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of

redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned in common.”

The purpose behind Article 1620 is to provide a method for

terminating the co-ownership5
and consolidating the
dominion in one sole owner.
Article 1623 of the same Code also provides:

“ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall

not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendee, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendee that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.”

From the above provisions, the following are the requisites

for the exercise of legal redemption: (1) There must be a co-
ownership; (2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a
stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the
co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption must be
exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty
days to be counted from the time that he or they were
notified in writing by the vendee or by the co-owner vendor;
and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of the
sale.
In this case, the sale took place in January 1989.
Petitioner admits that he has actual knowledge of the sale.
However, he only asserted his right to redeem the property
in March 1995 by filing the instant complaint. Both the
trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that this was
seven (7) years late.
Petitioner, however, now contends that there being no
written notice to him of the sale by the vendee or vendor,
the thirty-day redemption period has not prescribed.

_______________

5 Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31, 35 (1915).

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VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 193

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. The old rule is that a

written notice of the sale by the vendor to his co-owners is
indispensable 6for the latter to exercise their retracto legal
de comuneros. More recently, however, we have relaxed
the written
7
notice requirement. Thus, in Si v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the
sale is not entitled to a written notice for such would be
superfluous. The law does not demand what is
unnecessary.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which could or
should have8
been done earlier through the exercise of due
diligence. Otherwise stated, laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
9
it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. Its
elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation for
which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting
the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right in which he bases his
suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event, relief is accorded
10
to the complainant, or the suit is
not held barred.

_______________
 6 Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 15499, February 28, 1962, 4
SCRA 526, 533.
7 G.R. No. 122047, October 12, 2000, 342 SCRA 463.
8 Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 484,
493, citing Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., 381 SCRA 594 (2002).
9 Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 150913, February 20, 2003, 398 SCRA 24, 35,
citing Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 626 (1999).
10 Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, G.R.
No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315, citing Santos v. Santos,
366 SCRA 395 (2001).

194

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Aguilar vs. Aguilar

Petitioner has actual knowledge of the sale of Virgilio’s

share to Angel in 1989. As provided by Article 1623, he has
thirty days from such actual knowledge within which to
exercise his right to redeem the property. Inexplicably,
petitioner did not take any action. He waited for seven (7)
years before filing his complaint. Definitely, such an
unexplained delay is tantamount to laches. To be sure, to
uphold his right would unduly cause injury to respondent-
intervenor, a purchaser in good faith and for value.
Moreover, by the time Senen filed Civil Case No. 95-039
for legal redemption, his right was no longer available to
him. We have held that after a property has been
subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community has terminated and there is no11 reason to
sustain any right of pre-emption or redemption.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
55750 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales

and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—Redemption by a co-owner does not terminate

the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership. (Cruz vs. Leis, 327 SCRA 570
[2000])

——o0o——

_______________

11 Del Rosario v. Bansil, G.R. No. 51665, November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA
662, 666, citing Caro v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 17 (1982), Caram v.
 Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 315 (1957).

195

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