1.
Guidelines in the conduct of bus searches and similar open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must
vehicles – Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018
FACTS: A bus was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint. SCAA Buco, a member of the Task
Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle
while allowing the female vehicles to remain inside. He then boarded
the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any
contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
CAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear
of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too
heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male
passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later
identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the
direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of
the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and
his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then
requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner
obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised
.30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine
with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and
(4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to
produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable
to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his
rights by SCAA Buco.
ISSUE: Whether the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals as to warrant his conviction was proper.
RULING: Yes. The Trial Court and CA is correct in their appreciation
of evidence as to warrant petitioner’s conviction.
When a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution does not apply. In line with this, the Court lays down
the following guidelines for the conduct of bus searches.
Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be
subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security
protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines
can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In
lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to
be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object,
he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or
the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three
instances.
a. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is
aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of
the person and his or her effects.
b. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the
prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or
luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by
government agents or private security personnel as though the
person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike
an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along
the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the
routine search at the bus terminal.
c. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or
police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle
for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or
luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects
prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in
transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid
reasonable search.
a. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least
intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons
being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any
cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
b. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory
motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other
similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of
vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and
other similar groups should be protected.
c. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be contined to
ensuring public safety.
d. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search,
courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in
 place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the
accused.
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force
Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus
No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation
where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further,
SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally
intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and
physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where
passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages.
Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the
necessity for a warrant.
Note: To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned
cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for
private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by
only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer
be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board
alight from the vehicle.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court
takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals,
just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category. Aside
from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts
passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by
these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a
routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit
constitutes a reasonable search.
2. Airport Search – People v. O’Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071,
December 10, 2018
FACTS:
Eanna O’Cochlain was a 53-year-old Irish national married to
a Filipina, and residing in Ilocos Norte. Charged with illegal
possession of marijuana, committed as follows:
While on his breaktime, Security Screening Officer Suguitan of
the DoT Office of Transportation Security (OTS), assogmed at the
initial security screening checkpoint of the Laoag City International
Airport, was told by CAAP Security and Intelligence Flor Tamayo that
the parking space in front of the departure area smelled like
marijuana. He suspected that Eanna was the one who smoked the
illegal drug, recounting that a few minutes ago he saw a certain male
Caucasian at the parking area lighting something unrecognizable as
he was covering it with his palm. Tamayo observed that whenever he
would suck what he seemed to be smoking, no visible vapor would
come out from his mouth.
Suguitan dismissed Tamayo’s story thinking that it would be
impossible for a passenger to smoke marijuana at an airport. He then
returned to his post at the initial check-in area. Tamayo reported what
he saw to Caole, Jr. and Bal-ot who were manning the final screening
area.
Later on, Bal-ot directed Suguitan to proceed to the final
security checkpoint. Suguitan was instructed to conduct a pat down
search on Eanna, who agreed. When something was felt inside the
pocket of his upper garment, he was asked to take it out. He then
brought out a pack of Marlboro red from his left pocket, as well as a
matchbox and another pack of Marlboro red form his right pocket. The
pack of Marlboro red on his lef hand contained cigaretes but the one
on his right hand contained two rolled sticks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves. He took the pack containing the dried
marijuana leaves and showed it to P01 Manadao, Jr and other police
personnel on duty. Suguitan put them on the nearby screening table
in front of Eanna and P01 Manadao, Jr. the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves.
The RTC convicted Eanna of the crime charged. The CA affirmed
the ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
3. Search incidental to a lawful arrest- People vs. Chua Ho San, 307
SCRA 432 (1999)
FACTS:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police
Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain
Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso
Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there
conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a
lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When
the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a
multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the
police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm
to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police
officers; however, Chua did not understand what they’re saying. And by
resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the man
to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was
found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish
crystalline substances, which was later identified to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to
Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to
inform him of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted
by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement.
Ruling:
No.
Guided by these principles, the Court then held that the facts,
such as report received by the police, entry of Chua in the Philippines,
actuation of Chua before his arrest, the bag containing shabu, etc., in
the case did not constitute as probable cause and thus, do not justify
warrantless arrest. The search cannot therefore be denominated as
incidental to an arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
The Court reiterated that the search was not incidental to an arrest.
There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall
under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already
shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition.
4. Search incidental to a lawful arrest- People vs. Tudtud
Facts:
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian
asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining
about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. Relating to the report, the police conducted
surveillance in Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For
5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato
and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At
around 4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await.
Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked
“King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s
description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and
PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the
police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description
denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he
could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then said “it was alright”
and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one
wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. When the
bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.
The police arrested Tudtud and his companion. They were
charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs before the RTC of
Davao City which convicted the accused.
Issue: Whether there was a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest
5. Plain view doctrine- People vs. Doria
Ruling:
No.
There was no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
become "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above-quoted
constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The
proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The following instances are
not deemed "unreasonable" even in the absence of a warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view."
3. Search of a moving vehicle.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest
if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search. In this case, this is absent.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great
degree of consistency, is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113.
The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.”
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
Facts:
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received
information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug
activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust
operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the
marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at
the house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the
police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the
house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by
SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked
over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the
door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table.
One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside it was something
wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the
house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and
saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they
arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be
dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with
violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4
[Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and
Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
Issue:
Whether the RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana
was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Ruling:
No.
Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was
arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills.
This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao
conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that
the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of
facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the
search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the
marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident
to her arrest.
Plain view
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The
requisites are:
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure
that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-
bust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box
was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside
plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself
admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could
be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the
box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that
the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain
view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never
considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was
found in Gaddao’s house does not justify a finding that she herself
is guilty of the crime charged.
6. Stop-and-Frisk Search- Malacat vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand
grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when he was
said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza
Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking
men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they
scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and
petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his
person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866.. Hence, the present petition
wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from
him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in
admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible
because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure conducted by the police was
valid.
Held: No.
Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been
one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable
cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
invalid:
First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record
nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group.
Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than
that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves
us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not
creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was
visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale
bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and
12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
NOTE: In stop-and-frisk incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, there
must only be a protected search of the outer clothing of the person
arrested, so as to ensure that there are no weapons hidden in his
person.
7. Search of a private moving vehicle- People vs. Balingan
Facts:
On August 1988, the Narcotics Division of the Baguio City police
received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant, alleging
that petitioner Balingan is going to Manila with a bag full of marijuana.
Acting on such information, police officer Obrera conducted
surveillance of petitioner in different places, such as her house and at
bus stations around the city. Upon receiving information that petitioner
boarded a Dangwa Bus, Obrera immediately went to the terminal to
confirm the said report. He boarded the bus and saw petitioner carrying
a gray maleta. A prior checkpoint along Kennon Road was set-up by
the police in order to apprehend petitioner. Upon arrival at the
checkpoint, the bus stopped and yielded to the police officers. Obrera
announced a routine check on petitioner, but petitioner did not respond.
The police officers then grabbed the bag in the overhead compartment
of petitioner Balingan and opened it. Just as they suspected, they found
approximately 3 kilos of marijuana.
The police officers then requested Balingan to go with them to
the police station. However, the petitioner resisted and bit one of the
police officers. Eventually, after thirty minutes, they were able to pull
Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police
Station and locked her up in jail.
The marijuana confiscated were then submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for a confirmatory test on the said prohibited drugs.
The test yielded a positive result. Petitioner alleged that she is innocent
and that the gray bag is not hers. Notwithstanding petitioner’s
protestations, the trial court found her guilty of the crime of illegal
transportation of prohibited drugs and was charged with a penalty of life
imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether the search done inside the Dangwa bus and the
consequent seizure of the marijuana flowering tops were done in
violation of the Constitution.
Ruling:
 No.
That a search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized
exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a
search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view.
The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in
question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid
warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his
co-accused.
The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge —
a requirement which boarders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add
that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a
probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division
received an information that appellant was going to transport
marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance operations revealed
that appellant, whose movements had been previously monitored by
the Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila
carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag. When the moving,
public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana.
Under those circumstances, the warrantless search of appellant's bag
was not illegal. Thus, the conviction of appellant was affirmed in toto.
8. Customs search- Papa vs. Mago
Facts:
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information that
a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs
zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. Upon orders of
petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, Petitioner Alagao
conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4,
1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks
and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load
of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks,
were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.
Issue:
Whether the seizure is valid
Ruling:
YES.
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of
Cebu. Should they be found to have been released irregularly from
Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and
forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes
of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on
November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of
Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector
of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents
contend, that the issuance of the said warrant was only an attempt to
divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire
jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting
it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to
issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of
the Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in question
without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa,
having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs,
could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to
make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any
fine imposed under customs and tariff laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or
other containers wherever found when he had reasonable cause to
suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure
of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him
to demand the assistance of any police officer to effect said search
and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said
assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt.
Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the
two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the
Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo.
9. Customs search- Roldan vs. Arca
Facts:
Respondent company filed with the CFI against petitioner for
the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing
boats in question) which had been seized and impounded by
petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
Respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction with respondent court, but said prayer was, however,
denied. The CFI set aside its order and granted respondent
company’s motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took Possession
of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the
abovesaid writ. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however,
remained in the possession of respondent company. The
Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy
to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged
violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder. The two fishing boats
were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught
with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the
two vessels. The Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan
Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew members
of the fishing vessels. There were filed in the court a couple of
informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and
another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI for illegal
fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed
an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and
therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries
Commissioner to detain the vessels. Respondent company filed a
complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction,
against herein petitioners. it was alleged that at the time of the
seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in
legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by
virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by
respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by
the crew members of the vessels were settled. October 18, 1965,
the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued
the preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond
of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Issue:
Whether their apprehension was valid
Ruling:
Yes.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable
to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are
usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude
pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Another
exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for
a valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to
a lawful arrest, a police officer or a private individual may, without
a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually
committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b)
who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which
has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has
escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from
temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at
bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in
flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite
license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the
vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as
an incident to a lawful arrest.
10. Searches at checkpoints- People vs. Usana
Facts:
On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law
enforcers of the MakatiPolice, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3
Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos,and Inspector Ernesto
Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator GilPuyat
Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking
the cars goingto Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious,
and imposing merely a running stopon the others. At about past
midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride. P03 Suba saw a longfirearm on
the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later
identified asVirgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian
D. Escaño, to open the door.P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-
1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, uponorder of the police,
parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were
searchedfor more weapons.Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm
which they seized from Escaño. The three passengers were thereafter
brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3
Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to
the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the
vehicle, he requested Escaño toopen the trunk. Escaño readily
agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. Theynoticed a
blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to open. The bag
contained a parcelwrapped in tape, which, upon examination by
National Bureau of Investigation ForensicChemist Emilia A. Rosaldos,
was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms.Virgilio T.
Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escaño, were
charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
64.Escaño and Usana were alsocharged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition in violation of PresidentialDecree 1866. The
cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30
May1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court
convicted Escaño, Lopez,Usana and Escaño.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal
Ruling:
No.
The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and
are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.
For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent,
on motorists’ right to “free passage without interruption,” but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot beregarded as violative of an individual’s
right against unreasonable search. In fact, theseroutine checks,
when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The
checkpointherein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC.
The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its
deputized agents were limitedto a visual search of pedestrians. It
would also defeat the purpose for which such ban wasinstituted.
Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know
that they onlyneed a car to be able to easily perpetrate their
malicious designs. The facts adduced donot constitute a ground
for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
againstillegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they
were merely stopping cars theydeemed suspicious, such as those
whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers
thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their
flashlightsinside the cars they would stop, without opening the
car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is
nothing discriminatory in this as this is what thesituation demands.
Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm
theconviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as
amended. The followingfacts militate against a finding of
conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car
was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused
were searchedfor firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman
from the place where it was stoppeduntil the police station; (4) the
car’s trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño,without the
presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police
station anduntil the opening of the car’s trunk, the car was in the
possession and control of the policeauthorities. No fact was
adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in thetrunk
of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the latter’s car before
the “finding” of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presenceleft much to be desired
to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or
transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that
Usana and Lopezknew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of
the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.
11. Exigent and emergency circumstances- people vs. de gracia
Facts:
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup d’état on December 1989 against
the Government. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense
Command, together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC. Such surveillance was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was
being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication
command post. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching
the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group of
five men disengaged themselves and walked towards their
surveillance car. Major Soria ordered the driver to start the car and
leave the area. However, as they passed the area, the five men drew
their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the
driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid
that civilians might be caught in the crossfire. Thereafter, the search
team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-
16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and molotov. Obenia, who first entered the establishment,
found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through the
door in the office of a certain Colonel Matillano. No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there
was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that
the courts were consequently closed. Appellant was convicted for
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion but was
acquitted of attempted homicide.
Issue:
Whether there were a valid search and seizure in this case.
Ruling: against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
The warrantless search and seizure made is valid, and the instant
thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
warrantless search, that is, under exigent and emergency
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
circumstances. The military operatives had reasonable ground to
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are)
believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently
of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and
Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot
premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of be less justified.”
men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open 12. Search by private persons- People vs. Marti
the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling Facts:
the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to
obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or be invoked against acts of private individuals.
arsenals which are the usual depositories for explosives and
It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-
against the State to whom the restraint is imposed. Andre Marti and
powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland
colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and
and contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing
Forwarders. When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and
within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the packages
which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the
simply contained books and cigars. However, the proprietor opened
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they
building and houses therein were deserted.
suspected that the contents were illegal drugs. The proprietor
reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected
In the case of Umil v. Ramos, the Court, in analogy applied the
content were marijuana. In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes
ruling to the present case that: “The arrest of persons involved in
were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside. After Marti was
the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
Act. Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
him, which, according to him, is obtained in violation of his
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
privacy of communication.
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution
of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the Issue:
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
Whether the evidence resulted from the search of a private
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
individual valid?
Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment
to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence Ruling:
 The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only
to governmental action.
This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. In this case, the evidence was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore,
there is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him.
Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search
and seizure of the evidence. The Court pointed out that: a) It was the
proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in
compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents
did not convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless
search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search. Marti further argued that since the
Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured
by police authorities or private individuals.
The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the
people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another person’s right to
privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible; however
the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil
Code.
13. In flagrante delicto-requisites for valid arrest- people vs. Molina
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-
appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover,
the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. In the
morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a,
Davao City. He called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the house
of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged
pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a
“trisikad” carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance,
SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers.
The police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop. SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-
appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, “Boss, if possible we
will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-
appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana allegedly seized
from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Issue:
Whether the search made upon the accused inside a trisikad
was valid
Ruling:
No.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that reliable
information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers,
are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and
 (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
In this case, accused manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused could
not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed
a crime. It matters not that accused Molina responded Boss, if
possible we will settle this to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open
the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of
the arresting officers that accused were committing a crime, is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for
SPO1 Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely
pointed accused to the arresting officers), accused could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. While SPO1
Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a
surveillance of accused Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted
that he only learned Mula’s name and address after the arrest. What
is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused
Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see
Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they
were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused Mula,
considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the
arrest. Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the
arresting officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not
have been certain of accused-appellants identity, and were, from all
indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
14. In flagrante delicto- continuing offense- umil vs. ramos
Facts:
Military agents received confidential information that a certain
man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be one of the five NPA sparrows
who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated
in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds. Later on, it was
found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real
name is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. Meanwhile, he was positively
identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols. In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the
validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the
petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New
People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest is valid
Ruling:
Yes.
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes. It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered,
criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process
or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. A writ of habeas corpus is
no longer available after an information is filed against the person
detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued
by the court where said information has been filed in all petitions for
habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody
up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;"
and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due
process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is
exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what
should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In
short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be Ruling:
promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
Yes.
disposition.
The petitioners were validly arrested. In light of the discussion
15. Arrest in hot pursuit- pestilos vs. generoso
on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
Facts: of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold
that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
In February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an
crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to
be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
report the incident. Acting on this report, the Desk Officerdispatched
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause
policemen to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.
objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes
The policemen arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour
of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable
after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
arrests. To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the
beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who
crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling;
mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite"the petitioners
the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one
to go to the Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went
(1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
withthe police officers.At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
found that the petitionersstabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived theattack. The
his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived
petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.The petitioners filed an
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation onthe ground that
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
validwarrantless arrest took place since the police officers had
narrated a different version of what transpired.
no personal knowledge thatthey were the perpetrators of the crime.
They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered
Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the
for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of
to Rule112 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion. The the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that
court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
65petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as
of their motion for preliminaryinvestigation.CA dismissed the petition the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Issue:
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is
Whether the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant
incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have
when the police officers did not witness the crime and arrived only
complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
less than an hour after the alleged altercation?
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement
of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the
crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred,
SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02
Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police
immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed.
NOTE: It is not proper to say that the arresting police officer had
probable cause; there are only two (2) types of probable cause –
executive (by the prosecutor) and judicial (by the judge).
There is no hard and fast rule on the lapse of time before the
warrantless arrest under hot pursuit may be deemed valid. However,
the case of Pestilos v. Generoso is the most recent.
16. Right to privacy- categories- disini vs. the secretary of justice
Facts:
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the
government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21
separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights,
particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
inforamtion.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of
a temporary restraining order against the government to halt
enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.
Issue:
Whether the assailed provisions are unconstitutional
Ruling: Section 4(b)(3) punishing computer-related identity theft is
constitutional.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known
as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator
Gordon" the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within
these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by
law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most
valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis
of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that
the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his
name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his
place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation,
and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Section 12, allowing the collection of real-time data, was struck down
as invalid.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination,
route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not
content, nor identities. All other data to be collected or seized or
disclosed will require a court warrant. Service providers are required
to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection
or recording of the above-stated information.
The Court recognizes certain constitutional guarantees work together
to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not
intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of
privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the
beginning of all freedoms. But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen
v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional
privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important
decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to
informational privacy—that those who oppose government collection
or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance
and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the
right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is
an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in
relation to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners’
challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications
technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population
who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one
another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured
from the general public’s point of view. Without reasonable
expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
Mainly, the Court struck down this provision as vague because of the
word “with due case” it held:
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause,"
to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-
time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no
precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause
or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the
Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the
meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through
statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel
situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due
cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean
"just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the
Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even
bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a
particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general
gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that
the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data
collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the
traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be
used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data
be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too
sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection
should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an
illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies
holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their
sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from
certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those
"associated with specified communications." But this supposed
limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications.
The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities
to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.

17. Concept of informational privacy- Zulueta vs. CA
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Issue:
Whether the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence
Ruling:
The documents and papers gathered by the wife of private
respondent are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her.
18. Anti-wiretapping act- Salcedo-ortanez vs. CA
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after
presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner
and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her
Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of evidence; on
the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s
offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was
denied. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the CA
assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette
tapes. The CA dismissed the said petition. From this adverse
judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
Issue:
Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is
admissible as evidence in court
Ruling:
The tape recordings of telephone conversations of private
respondent’s wife with unidentified persons are inadmissible in
evidence (in the complaint for annulment of marriage).
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, public respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed
to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that
both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.
19. Anti-wiretapping act- Navarro vs. CA
Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in
Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent
show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the
station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and
accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the
headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of
the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of
words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations
made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who
provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man ,
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
Issue:
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in
view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Ruling:
The exchange between Navarro and Lingan secretly recorded by
Jalbuena and submitted to the court is admissible. R.A. No. 4200
provides:
SEC 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not
in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken
word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative
or administrative hearing or investigation.
 Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording processing personal data, the Court records indicated that Google
of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Spain was established in 2003 by Google Inc. to primarily act as
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not its commercial agent in Spain “to promote, facilitate and effect the
prohibited. sale of on-line advertising products and services to third parties
and the marketing of that advertising.” Under Article 4(1)(a), the
20. Data privacy act of 2012- right to be forgotten- google spain vs.
provisions of the Directive are applicable where:
AEPD
“the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an
establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member
Facts:
State; when the same controller is established on the territory of
In 2010 Mario Costeja González, filed a complaint with the
several Member States, he must take the necessary measures to
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEDP), the Spanish
ensure that each of these establishments complies with the
Data Protection Agency, against a local newspaper and Google
obligations laid down by the national law applicable.”
Spain for claims relating to auction notices mentioning González
By taking into account the objectives of the Directive and the
published in 1998. The notices concerned real estate auctions
wording of Article 4(1)(a), the Court held that Google is subject to
held to secure repayment of González's social security debts.
the provisions because its subsidiary Google Spain is an
González contended that these pages were no longer necessary
establishment in Spain “intended to promote and sell, in that
because "the attachment proceedings concerning him had been
[country], advertising space offered by the search engine, which
fully resolved for a number of years and that reference to them
serves to make the service offered by that engine profitable.”
was now entirely irrelevant." He sought to have the local
[para. 55]
newspaper, La Vanguardia, remove the pages or alter them so his
Lastly, the Court addressed the extent of Google’s responsibility
personal information was no longer displayed. He also sought for
as an Internet search engine with respect to personal information
Google Inc. to remove the links to the articles in question so that
published by third party websites and subsequently sought to be
the information no longer appeared in Google Search results.
removed or altered by the data subject. Applicable provisions here
are Article 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive. Under Article 12(b),
Issue: Whether an individual has the right to request that their
every personal data subject has the right to obtain from controller
personal data be removed from search results (i.e. the "right to be
“as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
forgotten").
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate
Ruling:
nature of the data.” Article 14(a) also grants the data subject the
right to “object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds
As to whether Google search engine must be regarded as a
relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating
“controller” of processing personal data, the Court was of the
to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation.
opinion that the concept of “controller” within the Directive must be
Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by
interpreted broadly in order to ensure “effective and complete
the controller may no longer involve those data.”
protection of data subjects.” [para. 34] And that it would be
Google Spain and Google Inc. argued that based on the principle
contrary to the objectives envisioned in the Directive to exclude
of proportionally, the removal of personal information must be
the operators of Internet search engines as “they play a decisive
addressed to the website that published the data and made it
role in the overall dissemination of [personal] data.” [para. 36]
publicly available. And that the publisher is in the best position to
Regarding whether the Directive as implemented by the national
assess the lawfulness of that information.
laws of Spain can be applied to Google as a “controller” of
In addressing this question, the Court first underscored the to the data subject’s name.” [para. 81] The Court, however,
fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. emphasized that the right to initiate such request may cease to
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states that exist when access to personal information “is justified by the
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account
concerning him or her. [And] [s]uch data must be processed fairly of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in
for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the question.”
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by
law. Everyone has the right of access to data, which has been
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.”
As implemented, inter alia, under Articles 6, 7, 12, 14, and 28 of
the Directive 95/46, the Court also stressed the importance of
balancing the right to privacy against the right to information
access.
In light to the above principles, the Court held that Internet search
engines are subject to “affect [] the fundamental rights to privacy Third, the ECJ held that individuals have a right to request search
and to the protection of personal data when the search by means engines to remove links to personal information.321` The Court
of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual’s name.” held Article 12(b) of the Directive gives individuals the right to ask
[para. 80] However, Internet users’ right to access personal search engine operators to erase search results that are
information through search engines must also be respected, incompatible with Article 6. Article 12(b) of the Directive give data
depending “on the nature of the information in question and its subjects the right to "rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of processing of which does not comply with the provisions of [the]
the public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in Directive." Article 6 requires that data is "adequate, relevant and
particular, according to the role played by the data subject in not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
public life.” [para. 81] collected", "accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date", and
In sum, the Court ruled that “the operator of a search engine is "kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a longer
search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages,
published by third parties and containing information relating to
that person, also in a case where that name or information is not
erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and
even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those
pages is lawful.” [para. 88] The Court also held that individuals
whose personal data are publicly available through Internet search
engines may “request that the information in question no longer be
made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in
such a list of results” as their rights to privacy and protection of
personal data override “not only the economic interest of the
operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general
public in having access to that information upon a search relating
 by-case basis and may depend on "the nature of the information in
question and its sensitivity for the data subject's private life" and
the public's interest in the information. The public's interest, in
turn, may vary depending on whether the individual is a public
figure. According to the Court, Google's economic interest and the
public's interest in links to Gonzalez's auction notices did not
Third, the ECJ held that individuals have a right to request search outweigh the serious interference with Gonzalez's fundamental
engines to remove links to personal information.321` The Court rights under the Directive.
held Article 12(b) of the Directive gives individuals the right to ask
search engine operators to erase search results that are
incompatible with Article 6. Article 12(b) of the Directive give data
subjects the right to "rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of [the]
Directive." Article 6 requires that data is "adequate, relevant and
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected", "accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date", and
"kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
longer than necessary." The Court also made clear that it is not
necessary to find that links cause prejudice to the data subject.
The Court held that "a fair balance should be sought in particular
between that interest and the data subject's fundamental rights."
However, "those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic
interest of the operator of a search engine but also the interest of
the general public in finding that information . . . ." This balance
would vary on a case-by-case basis and may depend on "the
nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data
subject's private life" and the public's interest in the information.
The public's interest, in turn, may vary depending on whether the
individual is a public figure. According to the Court, Google's
economic interest and the public's interest in links to Gonzalez's
auction notices did not outweigh the serious interference with
Gonzalez's fundamental rights under the Directive.an necessary."
The Court also made clear that it is not necessary to find that links
cause prejudice to the data subject. The Court held that "a fair
balance should be sought in particular between that interest and
the data subject's fundamental rights." However, "those rights
override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator
of a search engine but also the interest of the general public in
finding that information . . . ." This balance would vary on a case-