ARATUC V. COMELEC G.R. No.

L-49705-09 February 8, 1979 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies."
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the respondent Comelec
resolving their appeal from the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers for Region The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing actuations
XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives of board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by
to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election
Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to
Facts: Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being
it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
undertaken by respondent Board in Cotabato city. A supervening panel headed by
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or
Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints
office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is
of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in the voting
supposed to do or ought to have done.
centers. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended. After hearing the parties, the
Court allowed resumption of the canvass but issued guidelines to be followed but We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that
thereafter modified. undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec
correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged
On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of
constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral
the voting.
processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have done.
The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing
MACEDA V. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991
was held on April 25, 1978, after which, the case was declared submitted for decision.
Nature: Petition for nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated
In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly :
December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second
It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration provisional increase in oil prices did not allow herein petitioner substantial cross-
records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which examination, in effect, allegedly, a denial of due process.
have not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes;
Facts: On August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their
and
respective applications on oil price increases.
To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons
On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of
from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well
P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26,
as those of the military authorities in the areas affected.
1990.
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases,
Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in- chief commenced on November 21,
declaring the final result of the canvass.
1990. ERB subsequently outlined the procedure as follows:
Issue: WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
.. it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act on these applications
part of COMELEC.
on an industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject, modify or whatever, the Board
Held: Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on will do it on an industry wide basis, so, the best way to have the oppositors and the
Elections) shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have all the evidence-
that relatedly, Section
1
in-chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later, the
cross- examination will come later..
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish
his cross- examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine
each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure
resulted in the denial of due process.
Issue: WON the EBR acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Held: Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the
ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-
legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative agency, it is not bound
by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings.
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings
Before the ERB provides that — These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and
procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing,
investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board.
However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter,
except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the
objectives of the Order.
We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to grant
provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172,
under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the
Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final
disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it
further; or (3) to deny the application.
THE UNITED STATES VS. DORR G.R. No. 1051 May 19, 1903
FACTS: The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with
the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as
follows: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
2
Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb
the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of
April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts."
The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following passages of the article as
those upon which he relies to sustain the conviction: Sidney Adamson, in a late letter
in "Leslie's Weekly," has the following to say of the action of the Civil Commission in
appointing rascally natives to important Government positions: "It is a strong thing to
say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil Commission, through its ex-insurgent office
holders, and by its continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the
military rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate
over a set of men who should be in jail or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the
appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work
that the Commission is doing all over the Islands, reinstating insurgents and rogues
and turning down the men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided
the Americans."
“There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a good many
instances rascals. The commission has exalted to the highest positions in the Islands
Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no
personal character.”
ISSUE: whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292,
above cited.
HELD: No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section
8 of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in
general, and not of specific individuals.
N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not
have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292,
other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion.
As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the
existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also
specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific
government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.
In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of its
individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview
of Act No. 292.
In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those
rules…xxx…the government is the aggregation of authorities which rule a society
(administration)”.[1]
On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used in an
abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political system, its
laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this sense that the term is used in
the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration.
Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil. Islands” is
the government as a system, however, the article in questions attacks the
‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials who run it.
The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the governmental
system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands per
se. In this case, it is the character of men who are entrusted with the administration
of the government which the writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives,
public integrity, and private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does
not constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art. 292.
Respondents are acquitted. [1] ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose
hands the reins of government are for the time being.
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al. GR No. 86995 03
September
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28,
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1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the
submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the
bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction
and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents
at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted
his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the
officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their
non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the
December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked
that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to
award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the
restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order,
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition
for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at
the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage
of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the
provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as
follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary
authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the
State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the
nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-
officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by
the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus
and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon
request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies
and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment
to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of
the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition
in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that
justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project
(citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
BEJA SR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. was first employed by the PPA as arrastre
supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port
Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the
PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
4
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative
Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave
dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz
allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the
part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges.
After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X,
Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet was filed against Beja by the PPA General
Manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being
notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of
administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of
P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of
P.D. No. 807.
A decision was rendered by the AAB that respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed
from the service; The Court of Appeals also rendered a decision in dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court
through an "appeal by certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear
administrative cases against PPA Personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner.
HELD: Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative
relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the
other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision. "Attachment"
is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows: (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the Department or its equivalent and the attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination shall
be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the
attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework
for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency;
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of
an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced
by the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is
free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other
personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions"
under the Administrative Code of 1987. 11 Moreover, the Administrative Code
explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply
to chartered institutions attached to a Department.
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of
personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental
interference and control,
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager
to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought
its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the
herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then
could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
EUGENIO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. She was given
a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the
CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
Said resolution states: “Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall
5
now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service
Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment
of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career
Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the
petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby
annulled and set aside NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be
abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be
read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power
to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.
2. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is
to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this
is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects;
and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case
to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April
1994, on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position
Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary
Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other
hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator
reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
6
ISSUE: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities.
HELD: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that
the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators
may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still
both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation
presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as
the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission,11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely
included in the above-quoted provision.
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 12 Thus, the terms
governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either
of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act
or function is performed.13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state,
contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function.14 An individual person, like an administrator or
executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate,15 in the same manner
that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the
court,16 and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of
the state.17
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental
power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls,
therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted
Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor
Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees
Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91,
which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid
down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under
the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in
amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular
No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of
all quasi-judicial entities18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P.
129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the
legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the
Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the
voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876,
also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which
the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional
Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing
business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the
controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to
the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must
grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.19
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of
the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or
decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the
Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA
7
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled
"An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other
Purposes," the same being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to
fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed
and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification for the
attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the
power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of
absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being
unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
ISSUE: W/O Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 should be declared unconstitutional for
colliding with the security of tenure enjoyed by justices and judges.
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in
answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary.
It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create courts ordinarily
includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish
courts is generally co-extensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish
was not intended to be qualified by the permanence of tenure. The right of Judges to
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its
power to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts. Courts can be abolished.
In fact, the entire judicial system can be changed. To hold that tenure of judges is
superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise of
that power. Under Section 7, Article X, Judges are entailed to their count, from which
they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad
behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their judges, because the power
of the legislative to establish inferior court presupposes the power to abolish those
courts. If an inferior court is abolished, the judge presiding that court will necessarily
have to lose his position because the abolished court is not entailed to him.
Section 1, Article X refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of
Government, Section 7 of the same Article refers to the tenure of office of "individual"
Judges (inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of office is a matter
concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported
by the clause that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of
inferior courts.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful
effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water
content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and
test sampling of the leachate 3that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which
is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that
the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely
halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
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ISSUE: whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which,
in its nature and effect was injunctive
HELD:
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM
FACTS: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators
adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the
National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall
be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported
blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%)
of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or
disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province,
and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is
collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by
the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any
technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline
in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting
in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority
HELD: Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue
delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to
the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion
as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited
period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and
control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft
and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the
eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO
FACTS: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868,
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay,
rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale
thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act.
Section 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders
and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not
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more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation
fixing the price at which rice should be sold and penalizing the violation thereof.
On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging
him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found
guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from
which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence. The defendant questions
the validity of the proclamation by the Governor-General pursuant to Act No. 2868, in
so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be
sold.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold
confers an unconstitutional delegation of powers
HELD: Yes. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for
what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may
be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the
discretion of the Governor-General.
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. It does
not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long
such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect.
All these are left to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General. The law
is thus incomplete as a legislation.
It is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General,
a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would
not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the
sale of it at any price would not be a crime.

That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because
the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature
making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it
at any price was not a crime.
The Governor-General cannot, by proclamation, determine what act shall constitute a
crime or not. That is essentially a legislative task.
RATIO: Allocation of governmental powers. - The doctrine declares that governmental
powers are divided among the three (3) departments of government, the legislative,
executive, and judicial, and broadly operates to confine legislative powers to the
legislature, executive powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the
judiciary, precluding one branch of the government from exercising or invading the
powers of another.
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT
FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which
upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review
on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have
been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the
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improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
RULING:
PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS: The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against
the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January
1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph
of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or
by Act of Congress.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the
official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without
actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby,
in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.

Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of
giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over
the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the
exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than
that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

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