Script:
CRUZ VS MINA
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F
GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Petitioner:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a
formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is
the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third
year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of
the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before
the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a
party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002,
the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that
Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the
Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the
case for continuation of trial.
Respondent:
After hearing the prayer for preliminary
injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC
Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved
to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the
subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that
can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim
for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
tenable.
the respondent regional trial court abused its
discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner
despite petitioner having established the necessity
of granting the writ;
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may
appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In
the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
Five J Taxi and/or Juan Armamiento vs.
NLRC
235 SCRA 556
FACTS:
Petitioner:
My client, Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento
filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul
the decision 1 of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering them to pay
private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and
car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to
the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total
amount as and for attorney's fees. In less than 4
months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver
by the petitioners, he already failed to report for
work for unknown reasons. Petitioners learned that
he was working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by
petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and
conditions as when he was first employed, but his
working schedule was made on an alternative basis
where he drove only every other day. However, on
several occasions, he failed to report for work during
his schedule. On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed
to remit his boundary of P700.00 for the previous
day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati
without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he
adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that
he was driving a taxi for Bulaklak Company.
Respondent:
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as
taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days
weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from
the daily boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned
taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they
were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing,
and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for
any deficiency in their boundary, for every actual
working day.
With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 1983, he was held up by his
armed passenger who took all his money and
thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and
after his discharge, he went to this home province to
recuperate.
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners
for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for
2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a
single centavo was left of his deposits as these were
not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly
the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the
expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units.
When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit,
petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his
part, claimed that his termination from employment
was effected when he refused to pay for the washing
of his taxi seat covers. On November 27, 1991,
private respondents filed a complaint with the
manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor
Relations Commission charging petitioners with
illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
Issue:
Whether or not non-lawyers may appear before the
NLRC or any labor arbiter.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that
non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any
labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or
(2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof. While it may be true that
Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-
lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is
not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
a reasonable compensation for his
services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship
cannot exist unless the client's representative is a
lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for
reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's
fees and directing said public respondent to order
and effect the computation and payment by
petitioners of the refund for private respondent
Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest
thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up
to the date of actual payment thereof.
(21.) IN RE CUNANAN (94 Phil 534)
March 18, 1954
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number
972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act
of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the
Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while other
motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions
for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 972 is
constitutional.
HELD:
No. It is not constitutional.
By its declared objective, the law is
contrary to public interest because it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problem evolved by the times become
more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law
that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly.
In the judicial system from which ours
has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial
function and responsibility. Even considering
the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our
judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
the attorneys at law is a legislative function,
properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules
and principles; in effect, a judicial function of
the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.
Laws are unconstitutional on the
following grounds: first, because they are not
within the legislative powers of Congress to
enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers;
second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because
their purposes or effects violate the Constitution
or its basic principles. As has already been seen,
the contested law suffers from these fatal
defects.
SOPHIA ALAWI vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,
Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
NARVASA, C.J.:
“konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,”
connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
Issue:

Facts: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a

Petitioner:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a
real estate and housing company. Through
Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of
her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title
of “attorney,” which only regular members of
the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Respondent:
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District
in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used
to be friends.
bar, can use the title of Attorney.
Held:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who
pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,”
this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to
the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
“counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter

to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the
company. He claimed that his consent was
vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence. He also wrote similar
letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the
Vice President of NHMFC.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,”

by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous”
with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which
Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding
that he prefers the title of “attorney” because
“counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,”
BARRIOS V MARTINEZ convicted by final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude. He is hereby DISBARRED.
PER CURIAM;
November 12, 2004
FACTS:

The respondent was convicted of the crime

involving BP 22. He was also involved in another
estafa case pertaining to his legal services
rendered on the victim of Dona Paz tragedy. The
victim he represented filed a complaint because
of the compensation that the victim had
received from Sulpicio Lines which was later
deducted by Atty. Martinez. On Sept. 27, 2003
the IBP board of governors passed a resolution
approving the report and the recommendation
of its investigating commissioner. On Dec. 3,
2003 respondent filed a reinvestigation.

Issue:
1) Is violation of BP 22 a crime involving moral
turpitude?
2) What is the appropriate penalty?

HELD:
1)YES. Moral turpitude “includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not relate to
the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. The act of a person in issuing a
check knowing at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of
moral turpitude. It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render
her unworthy of public confidence.

2) In Co. vs. Bernardino and Lao vs. Medel,

we upheld the imposition of one year’s
suspension for non-payment of debt and
issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the
obligation. However, in these cases, for various
reasons, none of the issuances resulted in a
conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa
or BP 22. In the instant case, however, herein
respondent has been found guilty and stands