CASE NAME :

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan

CITATION:
458 U.S. 718 (1982)

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 JUDGES

 White

 Burger

 Blackmun

 Rehnquist

 O'Connor

 Brennan

 Marshall

 Powell

 Stevens

ADVOCATES

 Hunter M. Gholson :- Argued the case for the petitioners

 Wilbur O. Colom :- Argued the case for the respondent

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 INTRODUCTION

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, is a foreign legal case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled (5–4), on July 1, 1982, that a publicly funded women’s university, in
denying admission to a male applicant on the basis of his gender, violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the university’s admissions policy
was not substantially related to a compelling governmental objective.

The court also reasoned that exemptions provided to single-sex institutions by Title IX of the
Federal Education Amendments of 1972 did not exempt university officials
from compliance with constitutional obligations. The case is significant because the Supreme
Court relied on it in subsequent gender-related admissions cases, notably including United
States v. Virginia (1996) , in which it found that the Virginia Military Institute’s refusal to
admit women violated the equal protection clause.

In 1884, Established in Columbus, Mississippi, Mississippi University for Women (MUW)

historically limited its enrolment to female students. In 1974 the university instituted a four-
year baccalaureate program in nursing. Five years later the plaintiff, Joe Hogan, applied for
admission. The plaintiff, a registered nurse in Columbus, Mississippi, did not possess a
bachelor’s degree. Although he otherwise met enrolment requirements, the plaintiff was
denied admission to the nursing program on the basis of his gender. Officials at MUW
informed the plaintiff that he could audit courses in which he was interested but could not
enroll for credit.

The plaintiff filed suit in a federal district court, arguing that the nursing school’s single-sex
admission policy violated the equal protection clause (“No state shall…deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). The court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim, deciding that maintaining MUW as a single-sex public institution bore a rational
relationship to Mississippi’s stated objective in providing the greatest practical range of
educational opportunities for females.

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FACTS OF THE CASE

In 1884, Columbus, Mississippi became the home of the first publicly funded college for
women only in the United States. The institution was named the Mississippi University for
Women (MUW), and was a response to the educational institutions already in existence for
men only.At that time, and until the 1960's, admission was restricted to white women. This
changed in 1966 when MUW admitted three young African American women, and the
university became desegregated.Until 1982, MUW continued to function as a women's only
university, according to its original mission to provide college education to female students.

In the late 1970's, a young, male student named Paul Hogan was in pursuit of a nursing
degree and applied to the Mississippi University for Women for admission. Although he met
all of the University's admissions requirements, he was denied base on being male.MUW did
advise Hogan that he could sit in and listen to the classes, but that he would not be able to
earn college credit for doing so.Paul Hogan challenged the admissions policy of the
University, claiming it violated his 14th amendment right to equal protection under the law.
The case went to trial and the federal trial court ruled in favor of the University.

In their ruling they cited that the State of Mississippi had a vested interested in offering
extended higher learning opportunities to female students and that the college had done just
that since its inception.However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed
the trail court ruling in favor of Mr. Hogan. This court found clear discrimination based upon
gender in the admissions practices of MUW, which in turn did violate Mr. Hogan's
constitutional rights under the 14th amendment. The appeals court stated that the standard
used by the trial court to rule on the case was not high enough, considering the issue of
gender discrimination.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the case,
holding that, because MUW’s admissions policy discriminated on the basis of gender, the
trial court had improperly analyzed the case using the rational relationship test rather than the
higher intermediate scrutiny standard. That higher standard of review required the state to
carry the more substantive burden of demonstrating that the gender classification was
substantially related to an important governmental objective.

Upon the rehearing before the district court, the university argued that, through enacting
Section 901(a)(5) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provides some

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exemptions from Title IX’s gender prohibitions for single-sex institutions, Congress had
expressly authorized officials at MUW to continue the single-sex admission policy. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected that argument, pointing out that Congress could not
authorize states to continue practices that otherwise violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

ISSUES:

Does the exclusion of males from a nursing school violate equal protection?

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

In 1982 the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment in an opinion authored
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The majority determined that MUW’s single-sex admission
policy violated the equal protection clause and that Title IX’s exemptions did not nullify the
university’s constitutional obligations.

At the heart of its rationale, the Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the case
should have been analyzed through the frame of intermediate scrutiny, not the lower level of
rational basis scrutiny, because the admissions policy discriminated on the basis of gender.
Citing the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Personnel Administrator of
Mass. v. Feeney (1979) and Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981), the court held that university
officials were required to demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its
discriminatory gender classification.

In keeping with the Supreme Court’s decision in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance
Company (1980), the university needed to show (in the words of Wengler) that the
classification served “important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”

The record reflected that MUW’s primary objective in maintaining the single-sex admission
policy was that it compensated for prior discrimination against women,
thereby constituting educational affirmative action. To the contrary, however, the Supreme
Court found that Mississippi had made no showing that women lacked opportunities to obtain
nursing education and training in the state. Rather, the court interpreted the exclusion of
males from the nursing program as perpetuating the perception of nursing as
the exclusive province of females.

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The Supreme Court also noted that Mississippi had not demonstrated that a gender-based
admission classification was substantially or directly related to the proposed compensatory
intent. Indeed, the court observed that allowing men to audit classes, but not to enroll for
credit, undermined officials’ claim that separating the genders benefited female students. The
court quickly dispensed with MUW’s Title IX argument, finding it unclear that Congress
intended to exempt MUW from any constitutional obligation through Section 901(a)’s
exemptions.

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.

The Court's opinion bows deeply to conformity. Left without honor indeed, held
unconstitutional is an element of diversity that has characterized much of American education
and enriched much of American life. The Court in effect holds today that no State now may
provide even a single institution of higher learning open only to women students. It gives no
heed to the efforts of the State of Mississippi to provide abundant opportunities for young
men and young women to attend coeducational institutions, and none to the preferences of
the more than 40,000 young women who over the years have evidenced their approval of an
all-women's college by choosing Mississippi University for Women (MUW) over seven
coeducational universities within the State. The Court decides today that the Equal Protection
Clause makes it unlawful for the State to provide women with a traditionally popular and
respected choice of educational environment. It does so in a case instituted by one man, who
represents no class, and whose primary concern is personal convenience.

It is undisputed that women enjoy complete equality of opportunity in Mississippi's public

system of higher education. Of the State's 8 universities and 16 junior colleges, all except
MUW are coeducational. At least two other Mississippi universities would have provided
respondent with the nursing curriculum that he wishes to pursue. No other male has joined in
his complaint.

Nor is respondent significantly disadvantaged by MUW's all-female tradition. His

constitutional complaint is based upon a single asserted harm: that he must travel to attend
the state-supported nursing schools that concededly are available to him. The Court
characterizes this injury as one of "inconvenience." . This description is fair and accurate,
though somewhat embarrassed by the fact that there is, of course, no constitutional right to
attend a state-supported university in one's home town. Thus the Court, to redress
respondent's injury of inconvenience, must rest its invalidation of MUW's single-sex program

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on a mode of "sexual stereotype" reasoning that has no application whatever to the
respondent or to the "wrong" of which he complains. At best this is anomalous. And
ultimately the anomaly reveals legal error that of applying a heightened equal protection
standard, developed in cases of genuine sexual stereotyping, to a narrowly utilized state
classification that provides an additional choice for women. Moreover, I believe that
Mississippi's educational system should be upheld in this case even if this inappropriate
method of analysis is applied....

The arguable benefits of single-sex colleges also continue to be recognized by students of

higher education. They provide an element of diversity . . . and [an environment in which
women] generally . . . speak up more in their classes, . . . hold more positions of leadership on
campus, . . . and . . . have more role models and mentors among women teachers and
administrators."

As summarized in A. Astin, Four Critical Years 232 (1977), the data established that "[both]
[male and female] single-sex colleges facilitate student involvement in several areas:
academic, interaction with faculty, and verbal aggressiveness. . . . Men's and women's
colleges also have a positive effect on intellectual self-esteem. Students at single-sex colleges
are more satisfied than students at coeducational colleges with virtually all aspects of college
life . . . . The only area where students are less satisfied is social life."

The issue in this case is whether a State transgresses the Constitution when -- within the
context of a public system that offers a diverse range of campuses, curricula, and educational
alternatives -- it seeks to accommodate the legitimate personal preferences of those desiring
the advantages of an all-women's college. In my view, the Court errs seriously by assuming --
without argument or discussion -- that the equal protection standard generally applicable to
sex discrimination is appropriate here. That standard was designed to free women from
"archaic and overbroad generalizations . . . ." In no previous case have we applied it to
invalidate state efforts to expand women's choices. Nor are there prior sex discrimination
decisions by this Court in which a male plaintiff, as in this case, had the choice of an equal
benefit....

By applying heightened equal protection analysis to this case, the Court frustrates the
liberating spirit of the Equal Protection Clause. It prohibits the States from providing women
with an opportunity to choose the type of university they prefer. And yet it is these women
whom the Court regards as the victims of an illegal, stereotyped perception of the role of

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women in our society. The Court reasons this way in a case in which no woman has
complained, and the only complainant is a man who advances no claims on behalf of anyone
else.

The Court views this case as presenting a serious equal protection claim of sex
discrimination. I do not, and I would sustain Mississippi's right to continue MUW on a
rational-basis analysis. But I need not apply this "lowest tier" of scrutiny. I can accept for
present purposes the standard applied by the Court: that there is a gender-based distinction
that must serve an important governmental objective by means that are substantially related
to its achievement. Generations of our finest minds, both among educators and students, have
believed that single-sex, college-level institutions afford distinctive benefits. There are many
persons, of course, who have different views. But simply because there are these differences
is no reason -- certainly none of constitutional dimension -- to conclude that no substantial
state interest is served when such a choice is made available....

A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for diversity. This has been
characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who have built our country. It is the
essence of our democratic system. At stake in this case as I see it is the preservation of a
small aspect of this diversity. But that aspect is by no means insignificant, given our heritage
of available choice between single-sex and coeducational institutions of higher learning. The
Court answers that there is discrimination -- not just that which may be tolerable, as for
example between those candidates for admission able to contribute most to an educational
institution and those able to contribute less -- but discrimination of constitutional dimension.
But, having found "discrimination," the Court finds it difficult to identify the victims. This
simply is not a sex discrimination case. The Equal Protection Clause was never intended to be
applied to this kind of case.

JUDGEMENT

The exclusion of males from a nursing school violates equal protection.

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Reasoning:

The party seeking to uphold a statute that makes a classification must carry the burden of
showing that the classification serves important gov't objectives and that the means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives and also Care must be taken in
determining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. If
the objective is to exclude or protect members of one gender because they are presumed to
suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective is illegitimate.

MS says the purpose was to compensate for past discrimination against women. A state can
only evoke a compensatory purpose to justify a classification if members of the gender
benefitted by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification. The
state has made no showing that women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of
nursing .but 94% of nurses in MS are female.

Rather than compensating for past discrimination, the policy tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job. Hence the state failed to establish
that the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification.

The classification is also invalid because the classification is not substantially and directly
related to the compensatory objective. MUW allows men to attend classes as auditors and
participate fully. Thus, this reveals that admitting men to nursing classes does not affect
teaching style and would not affect the education that women receive.

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 CRITICAL COMMENT

In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), the US Supreme Court ruled by a
five-to-four vote that the single-sex admissions policy of the Mississippi University for
Women (MUW) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court made clear that individuals may not be excluded from educational institutions based on
gender alone.

MUW, a state-supported institution, was established in Columbus in 1884 as the Mississippi

Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi.
MUW’s School of Nursing was established in 1971. Joe Hogan, a registered nurse, applied
for admission to MUW’s nursing program in 1979. He was otherwise qualified but was
denied enrollment because he was a male. He was permitted to audit nursing courses but
could not enroll for credit.

Hogan filed suit in the US District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, claiming
that the female-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of MUW because it found that “the maintenance of
MUW as a single-sex school bears a rational relationship to the State’s legitimate interest ‘in
providing the greatest practical range of educational opportunities for its female student
population.’”

Hogan appealed to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court’s
decision and held that the admissions policy was unconstitutional because it discriminated on
the basis of gender. It imposed a higher standard than the district court and found that the
state had to show that the gender-based classification was substantially related to an
important governmental objective. The 5th Circuit ruled that the state failed to meet this
burden.

MUW then appealed to the US Supreme Court. Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor began by noting that because the admissions policy expressly discriminated
against applicants to the School of Nursing on the basis of gender, it was subject to scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The party seeking to uphold the gender classification had
to show an exceedingly persuasive justification for it, a burden that could be met “only by
showing at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those

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objectives.” The objective could not be excluding or protecting members of one gender
because they were “presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior.”

The Court pointed out that under limited circumstances, gender-based classifications may be
justified if the classification assists members of the sex facing disproportionate
discrimination. The state argued that this was the goal of its single-sex admissions policy.
The Court disagreed with this argument, pointing out that women earned more than 98
percent of US nursing degrees and thus did not face discrimination in pursuing that type of
education. In the Court’s view, rather than compensating for discrimination against women,
MUW’s admissions policy tended to “perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an
exclusively woman’s job.”

The Court therefore found that the state had failed to prove that the alleged objective of
educational opportunity for women was the actual purpose of the discriminatory
classification. The state had also failed to show that the females-only policy was substantially
and directly related to its proposed compensatory objective because the practice of allowing
men to audit the nursing courses completely undermined the state’s claim that men adversely
affected women in the nursing program.

The Court affirmed the judgment of the 5th Circuit and held that MUW’s School of Nursing
admissions policy limiting enrollment to women violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and
William Rehnquist dissented, primarily on the grounds that the majority required too rigid
requirements of the state and that Hogan’s only injury was one of inconvenience.

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan has become important precedent for cases
involving single-sex educational institutions, establishing that individuals cannot be refused
admission to public educational institutions based solely on their gender. This decision
proved instrumental in United States v. Virginia (1996), in which the Supreme Court required
the Virginia Military Institute, the last state-supported all-male university in the United
States, to admit women.

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