4 Case Digest in LEGRES

3/9/2019 G.R. No.
208566
Today is Saturday, March 09, 2019
Custom Search
Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013
♦ Decision, Perlas-Bernabe [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Sereno [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Carpio [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Brion [J]
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO
S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province
of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork
barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7
Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of
the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated
therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund
release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall
be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the
House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html 1/36
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the
said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof,
may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from
the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year,
the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators.
"For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being
the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local
government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for
projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the
amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority.
The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added
their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works
Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate
between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after
Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was
only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP)
under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under
the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with
each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their
project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said
ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would,
in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has
been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to
cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or
non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others,
education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and
the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480
Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao
and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators
and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of
₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the
President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of
the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to
the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving
₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any
limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to
be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others,
individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-
President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification
and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with
the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of
projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate,
and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50%
was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project
list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that
"no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein
required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer
required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other
forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA
(called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor."
Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples
of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional
Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be
spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs,
namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44
and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of
the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense
category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained
the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special
provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local
government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on
the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the
2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to
the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially
a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006
and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts
allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the
provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61
anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that
"the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and
completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x
x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the
DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB)
issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68
(the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided
that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to
NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article
included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for
"hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator
as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects."
Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may
be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health,
Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural
Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further
conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category
as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million
in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of
the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed
by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the
term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by
Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD
1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in
1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative
Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the
kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to
a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were
public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the
banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a
roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of
certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004
GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,"
the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the
NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money
was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy,
criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder,
and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff
or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99
covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and
the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and
the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-
and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion
in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP
releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s
findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of
which are as follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly

exceeded their respective allocations.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009
GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the
government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement
projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin
Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents
to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003
to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget,
lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23,
2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and
the National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing
(1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the governmentǁ under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October
8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of
even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica,
et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply
dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the
Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present
cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the
Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely
answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral
Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s
resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b)
the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have
legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766,
and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24,
2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers;
(b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119
and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied
in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass
upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for
the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as
a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from
this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget,
and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage
of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during
the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am
not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that
… (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative
Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is
unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of
the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside
of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty
….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate,
and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or
this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to
be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of
paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have
never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous
whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of
the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is
also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of
note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated
audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s
disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded
not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the
Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands
of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In
this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would
eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on
how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before
the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘
claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition
but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversiesǁ carries the assurance that "the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139
applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within
its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right
to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and
its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or
the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is
by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that
a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but,
in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best
interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards
achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed
respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert
that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have
been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these
cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition
to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis
which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the
cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and
LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however,
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held,
in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata
principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article
8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power
given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of
the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing
submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad
as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b)
the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only
those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main
conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify
of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has
been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority
to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should
not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits
from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon
its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of
Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155
(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not
set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare
decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork
Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing
discourse.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches
of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel
System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer
is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how
to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are
intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the
disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised
of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD
910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2)
kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall
delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the
power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret
laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority
to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one
branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of
powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s
performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,"
the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on
the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval
and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft
of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
1âwphi1
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article –
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They
state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and
definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the
CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they
actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAAǁ and that he "retains the final discretion
to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the
power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows
the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be
the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph
of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced
from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project
falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing
agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative
of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of
the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which
explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is
contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment
of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may beǁ ; and, second , paragraph 1,
also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator
be utilized?
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would
doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and
the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can
a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that
sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not
be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded
into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do
exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive
nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget
process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress
has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the
2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a
certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197
or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199
The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v.
Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified
under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the
bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of
the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The
questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must
determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it
is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the
budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized
the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community
against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community
against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may
be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of
the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise
his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which
provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which
state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are
rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into
component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio
correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which
case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power.
Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of
item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose
funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said
funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of moneyǁ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto.
As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as
not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises
non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the
actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that
item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations
bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to
meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress
to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the
said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation
of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater
degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires.
Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable
ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies
public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out
that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that
the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they
add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate
the decisions of senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions
only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are
designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is
the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another
office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF
for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment,
this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.
xxxx
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy
which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political
subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small
republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their
inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national
government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The
decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles
on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and
budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a
worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based
on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator
and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment
authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and
even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is
deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specificǁ
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid
appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and
specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by lawǁ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according
to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals
in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of
time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws,
such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The
word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the
sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular
form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary
and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose,
then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service
contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if
the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund
to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly
sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00"
(also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed,
they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF
Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by
the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article
does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators
to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other
hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related
"to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates
rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines
for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only
to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the
general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has,
in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,"
remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase
is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the
avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already
been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used
"to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he
may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development
projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to
support commerce as well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context
of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM
be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on
Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot
be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it
was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v.
Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare
the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the
Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report.
Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to
furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any
petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the
conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of
significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as
not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer
on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are
already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition,
access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds.
In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for
the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the
issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF
funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the
release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments."
They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF
funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as
‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be
lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as
declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence,
from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether
or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an
obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount
during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be
determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate
the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for
the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects
covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn
by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In
this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and
without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even
though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However,
these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c)
the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any
name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system
so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic
unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that
no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and
no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized
into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time
this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment
Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by
this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to
the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already
available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible
criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Concurring Opinion NO PART

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Associate Justice Associate Justice
I concur and also join the concurring opinion of I join the Opinion of Justice Carpio, subject to
Justice Carpio. my Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

I join the concurring opinion of J. A.T. Carpio of

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO the ponencia
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

See Concurring Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Dropped as a party per Memorandum dated October 17, 2013 filed by counsel for petitioners Atty. Alfredo B.
Molo III, et al. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 388.
**
No part.
1
The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 20.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 3-51; rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 3-11; and rollo (G.R. No. 209251), pp. 2-8.
3
"’Pork barrel spending,‘ a term that traces its origins back to the era of slavery before the U.S. Civil War,
when slave owners occasionally would present a barrel of salt pork as a gift to their slaves. In the modern
usage, the term refers to congressmen scrambling to set aside money for pet projects in their districts."
(Drudge, Michael W. "’Pork Barrel‘ Spending Emerging as Presidential Campaign Issue," August 1, 2008
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2008/08/20080801181504lcnirellep
0.1261713.html#axzz2iQrI8mHM> [visited October 17, 2013].)
4
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003
Edition, p. 786, citing Bernas, "From Pork Barrel to Bronze Caskets," Today, January 30, 1994.
5
Heaser, Jason, "Pulled Pork: The Three Part Attack on Non-Statutory Earmarks," Journal of Legislation, 35
J. Legis. 32 (2009). <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=&handle
=hein.journals/jleg35&div=6&id=&page=> (visited October 17, 2013).
6
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the Philippines, "Understanding
the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" p. 2. <http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/14th/pork_barrel.pdf> (visited October 17,
2013).
7
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork is a Political, Not A Developmental, Tool."
<http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html> [visited October 22, 2013].) See also rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 328-
329.
8
Morton, Jean, "What is a Pork Barrel?" Global Granary, Lifestyle Magazine and Common Place Book
Online: Something for Everyone, August 19, 2013. <http://www.globalgranary.org/2013/08/19/what-is-a-pork-
barrel/#.UnrnhFNavcw > (visited October 17, 2013).
9
Jison, John Raymond, "What does the 'pork barrel' scam suggest about the Philippine government?"
International Association for Political Science Students, September 10, 2013. <http://www.iapss.org/
index.php/articles/item/93-what-does-the-pork-barrel-scam-suggest-about-the-philippine-government> (visited
October 17, 2013). See also Llanes, Jonathan, "Pork barrel – Knowing the issue," Sunstar Baguio, October
23, 2013. <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/ baguio/opinion/2013/09/05/llanes-pork- barrel-knowing-issue-301598>
(visited October 17, 2013).
10
Entitled "AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR PUBLIC WORKS," approved on March 10, 1922.
11
"Act 3044, the first pork barrel appropriation, essentially divided public works projects into two types. The
first type—national and other buildings, roads and bridges in provinces, and lighthouses, buoys and beacons,
and necessary mechanical equipment of lighthouses—fell directly under the jurisdiction of the director of
public works, for which his office received appropriations. The second group—police barracks, normal school
and other public buildings, and certain types of roads and bridges, artesian wells, wharves, piers and other
shore protection works, and cable, telegraph, and telephone lines—is the forerunner of the infamous pork
barrel. Although the projects falling under the second type were to be distributed at the discretion of the
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
secretary of commerce and communications, he needed prior approval from a joint committee elected by the
Senate and House of Representatives. The nod of either the joint committee or a committee member it had
authorized was also required before the commerce and communications secretary could transfer unspent
portions of one item to another item." (Emphases supplied) (Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by
any name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> [visited October 14,
2013]).
12
Sec. 3. The sums appropriated in paragraphs (c), (g), (l), and (s) of this Act shall be available for immediate
expenditure by the Director of Public Works, but those appropriated in the other paragraphs shall be
distributed in the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, subject to the approval of a
joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The committee from each House
may authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, who with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof may,
for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation. (Emphases
supplied)
13
Those Section 1 (c), (g), (l), and (s) of Act 3044 "shall be available for immediate expenditure by the
Director of Public Works."
14
Section 3, Act 3044.
15
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013.
<http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> (visited October 14, 2013).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the Philippines, "Understanding
the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" <http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited October 17, 2013).
20
21
Id.
22
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),
Special Audits Office Report No. 2012-03, August 14, 2013 (CoA Report), p. 2.
23
Ilagan, Karol, "Data A Day; CIA, CDF, PDAF? Pork is pork is pork," Moneypolitics, A Date Journalism
Project for the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, August 1, 2013
<http://moneypolitics.pcij.org/data-a-day/cia-cdf-pdaf-pork-is-pork-is-pork/> (visited October 14, 2013).
24
Republic Act No. (RA) 6831.
25
Special Provision 1, Article XLIV, RA 7078 (1991 CDF Article), and Special Provision 1, Article XLII (1992),
RA 7180 (1992 CDF Article) are similarly worded as follows: Special Provision 1.
Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other
priority projects and activities upon approval by the President of the Philippines and shall be released
directly to the appropriate implementing agency [(x x x for 1991)], subject to the submission of the
required list of projects and activities. (Emphases supplied)
26
27
Id.
28
Special Provision 1, Article XXXVIII, RA 7645 (1993 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Funds.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities
as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, ₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President, ₱20,000,000. The
fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotment and Notice of Cash
Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning
of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials concerned.
(Emphases supplied)
29
See Special Provision 1, 1993 CDF Article; id.
30
Special Provision 1, Article XLI, RA 7663 (1994 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as
proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives,
₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President, ₱20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the
said credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be administered by a government
financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations. Prior years releases to local
government units and national government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the
government financial institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities released from
this fund.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash
Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning
of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials concerned.
(Emphases supplied)
31
Special Provision 1, Article XLII, RA 7845 (1995 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of equipment and other
priority projects and activities as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the
following allocations: Representatives, ₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President,
₱20,000,000.
The fund shall be automatically released semi-annually by way of Advice of Allotment and Notice of
Cash Allocation directly to the designated implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the
beginning of each semester upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials
concerned. (Emphases supplied)
32
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Fund.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of equipment and other
priority projects and activities, including current operating expenditures, except creation of new plantilla
positions, as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, Twelve Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱12,500,000) each; Senators,
Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) each; Vice-President, Twenty Million Pesos (₱20,000,000).
The Fund shall be released semi-annually by way of Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of
Cash Allocation directly to the designated implementing agency not later than thirty (30) days after the
beginning of each semester upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials
concerned. (Emphases supplied)
33
Special Provision 2 of the 1994 CDF Article, Special Provision 2 of the 1995 CDF Article and Special
Provision 2 of the 1996 CDF Article are similarly worded as follows:
2. Submission of [Quarterly (1994)/Semi-Annual (1995 and 1996)] Reports. The Department of Budget
and Management shall submit within thirty (30) days after the end of each [quarter (1994)/semester
(1995 and 1996)] a report to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance on the releases made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of the projects,
locations, implementing agencies [stated (order of committees interchanged in 1994 and 1996)] and
the endorsing officials. (Emphases supplied)
34
Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund Projects. Within thirty (30) days after the signing of
this Act into law, the Members of Congress and the Vice-President shall, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, submit to the Department of Budget and Management the list of fifty
percent (50%) of projects to be funded from the allocation from the Countrywide Development Fund
which shall be duly endorsed by the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance
in the case of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations in the case of the House of Representatives, and the remaining fifty
percent (50%) within six (6) months thereafter. The list shall identify the specific projects, location,
implementing agencies, and target beneficiaries and shall be the basis for the release of funds. The
said list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation by the Department of Budget and
Management. No funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list
herein required. (Emphases supplied)
35
See Special Provision 2, 1997 CDF Article; id.
36
Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund Projects. x x x PROVIDED, That said publication is

not a requirement for the release of funds. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
37
38
Id.
49
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 335-336, citing Parreño, Earl, "Perils of Pork," Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism, June 3-4, 1998. Available at <http://pcij.org/stories/1998/pork.html>
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
RA 8745 entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
43
Special Provision 1, Article XLII, Food Security Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein authorized shall be used to support the Food Security
Program of the government, which shall include farm-to-market roads, post harvest facilities and other
agricultural related infrastructures. Releases from this fund shall be made directly to the implementing
agency subject to prior consultation with the Members of Congress concerned. (Emphases supplied)
44
Special Provision 1, Article XLIX,
Lingap Para sa Mahihirap
Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein appropriated for the Lingap Para sa Mahihirap
Program Fund shall be used exclusively to satisfy the minimum basic needs of poor communities and
disadvantaged sectors: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing
agency upon prior consultation with the Members of Congress concerned. (Emphases supplied)
45
Special Provision 1, Article L, Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein authorized shall be used to fund infrastructure
requirements of the rural/urban areas which shall be released directly to the implementing agency upon
prior consultation with the respective Members of Congress. (Emphases supplied)
46
Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 8760 (2000 PDAF Article) provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects as indicated under Purpose 1: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released
directly to the implementing agency concerned upon prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the herein allocation may be realigned as
necessary to any expense category: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personal benefits. (Emphases supplied)
47
See Special Provision 1, 2000 PDAF Article; id.
48
Section 25 (7), Article VI, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution) provides that
"if, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
49
Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9162 (2002 PDAF Article) provides:
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects or to fund counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects:
PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local
Government Unit concerned. (Emphases supplied)
50
Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9206, 2003 GAA (2003 PDAF Article) provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects:
PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local
Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be
realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That a maximum
of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for the procurement of rice
and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.
51
Special Provision 1, Article XVIII, RA 9206 provides:
Special Provision No. 1 – Restriction on the Delegation of Project Implementation The implementation
of the projects funded herein shall not be delegated to other agencies, except those projects to be
implemented by the Engineering Brigades of the AFP and inter-department projects undertaken by
other offices and agencies including local government units with demonstrated capability to actually
implement the projects by themselves upon consultation with the Members of Congress concerned. In
all cases the DPWH shall exercise technical supervision over projects. (Emphasis supplied)
52
Special Provision 3, Article XLII, RA 9206 provides:
Special Provision No. 3 – Submission of the List of School Buildings Within 30 days after the signing of
this Act into law, (DepEd) after consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned,
shall submit to DBM the list of 50% of school buildings to be constructed every municipality x x x. The
list as submitted shall be the basis for the release of funds. (Emphasis supplied)
53
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 557.
54
Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9336 (2005 PDAF Article) provides:
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
Special Provision(s)
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released
directly to the implementing agencies as indicated hereunder, to wit:
PARTICULARS PROGRAM/PROJECT IMPLEMENTING

AGENCY
A. Education Purchase of IT Equipment DepEd/TESDA/

CHED/SUCs/LGUs
Scholarship TESDA/CHED/
SUCs/LGUs
B. Health Assistance to Indigent Patients Confined at the DOH/Specialty

Hospitals Under DOH Including Specialty Hospitals Hospitals
Assistance to Indigent Patients at the Hospitals LGUs

Devolved to LGUs and RHUs
Insurance Premium Philhealth
C. Livelihood/ Small & Medium Enterprise/Livelihood DTI/TLRC/DA/CDA

CIDSS
Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services DSWD
D. Rural Barangay/Rural Electrification DOE/NEA

Electrification
E. Water Construction of Water System DPWH

Supply
Installation of Pipes/Pumps/Tanks LGUs
F. Financial Specific Programs and Projects to Address the Pro- LGUs

Assistance Poor Programs of Government
G. Public Work Construction/Repair/ Rehabilitation of the following: DPWH

Roads and Bridges/Flood Control/School buildings
Hospitals Health Facilities/Public Markets/Multi-
Purpose Buildings/Multi-Purpose Pavements
H. Irrigation Construction/Repair/ Rehabilitation of Irrigation DA-NIA

Facilities
(Emphasis supplied)
55
Id.
56
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 558.
57
See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9401.
58
See Special Provision 1, Article XLVI, RA 9498.
59
See Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 9524.
60
See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9970.
61
For instance, Special Provisions 2 and 3, Article XLIII, RA 9336 providing for the 2005 DepEd School
Building Program, and Special Provisions 1 and 16, Article XVIII, RA 9401 providing for the 2007 DPWH
Regular Budget respectively state: 2005 DepEd School Building Program Special Provision No. 2 – Allocation
of School Buildings: The amount allotted under Purpose 1 shall be apportioned as follows: (1) fifty percent
(50%) to be allocated pro-rata according to each legislative districts student population x x x; (2) forty percent
(40%) to be allocated only among those legislative districts with classroom shortages x x x; (3) ten percent
(10%) to be allocated in accordance x x x.
Special Provision No. 3 – Submission of the List of School Buildings: Within 30 days after the signing of
this Act into law, the DepEd after consultation with the representative of the legislative districts
concerned, shall submit to DBM the list of fifty percent (50%) of school buildings to be constructed in
every municipality x x x. The list as submitted shall be the basis for the release of funds x x x.
(Emphases supplied)
2007 DPWH Regular Budget
Special Provision No. 1 – Restriction on Delegation of Project Implementation: The implementation of

the project funded herein shall not be delegated to other agencies, except those projects to be
implemented by the AFP Corps of Engineers, and inter-department projects to be undertaken by other
offices and agencies, including local government units (LGUs) with demonstrated capability to actually
implement the project by themselves upon consultation with the representative of the legislative district
concerned x x x.
Special Provision No. 16 – Realignment of Funds: The Secretary of Public Works and Highways is
authorized to realign funds released from appropriations x x x from one project/scope of work to
another: PROVIDED, that x x x (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
62
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) , p. 559, citing Section 2.A of RA 9358, otherwise known as the "Supplemental
Budget for 2006."
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
63
Id. at 559-560.
64
"As a primary aspect of the Philippine Government's public procurement reform agenda, the Government
Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) was established by virtue of Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. 9184) as an
independent inter-agency body that is impartial, transparent and effective, with private sector representation.
As established in Section 63 of R.A. 9184, the GPPB shall have the following duties and responsibilities: 1. To
protect national interest in all matters affecting public procurement, having due regard to the country's
regional and international obligations; 2. To formulate and amend public procurement policies, rules and
regulations, and amend, whenever necessary, the implementing rules and regulations Part A (IRR-A); 3. To
prepare a generic procurement manual and standard bidding forms for procurement; 4. To ensure the proper
implementation by the procuring entities of the Act, its IRR-A and all other relevant rules and regulations
pertaining to public procurement; 5. To establish a sustainable training program to develop the capacity of
Government procurement officers and employees, and to ensure the conduct of regular procurement training
programs by the procuring entities; and 6. To conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of the Act and
recommend any amendments thereto, as may be necessary.
x x x x" <http://www.gppb.gov.ph/about_us/gppb.html> (visited October 23, 2013).

65
Entitled "AMENDMENT OF SECTION 53 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS PART A
OF REPUBLIC ACT 9184 AND PRESCRIBING GUIDELINES ON PARTICIPATION OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT," approved June 29, 2007.
66
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND REGULATION OF
THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
67
Sec. 48. Alternative Methods. - Subject to the prior approval of the Head of the Procuring Entity or his duly
authorized representative, and whenever justified by the conditions provided in this Act, the Procuring Entity
may, in order to promote economy and efficiency, resort to any of the following alternative methods of
Procurement:
xxxx
(e) Negotiated Procurement - a method of Procurement that may be resorted under the extraordinary
circumstances provided for in Section 53 of this Act and other instances that shall be specified in the
IRR, whereby the Procuring Entity directly negotiates a contract with a technically, legally and
financially capable supplier, contractor or consultant.
xxxx
68
As defined in Section 5(o) of RA 9184, the term "Procuring Entity" refers to any branch, department, office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, including state universities and colleges, government-owned
and/or - controlled corporations, government financial institutions, and local government units procuring
Goods, Consulting Services and Infrastructure Projects.
69
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 564, citing GPPB Resolution 12-2007.
70
Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10147 (2011 PDAF Article) provides:
2. Allocation of Funds. The total projects to be identified by legislators and the Vice-President shall not
exceed the following amounts:
a. Total of Seventy Million Pesos (₱70,000,000) broken down into Forty Million Pesos (₱40,000,000) for
Infrastructure Projects and Thirty Million Pesos (₱30,000,000) for soft projects of Congressional
Districts or Party List Representatives;
b. Total of Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000) broken down into One Hundred Million Pesos
(₱100,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000) for soft
projects of Senators and the Vice President.
71
See Special Provision 4, 2011 PDAF Article.
72
Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10155 (2012 PDAF Article) provides: 2. Project Identification.
Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or
design prepared by each implementing agency. Furthermore, preference shall be given to projects located in
the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the National Household Targeting System for
Poverty Reduction by the DSWD.
For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or
design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
73
RA 10352, passed and approved by Congress on December 19, 2012 and signed into law by the President
on December 19, 2012. Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10352 (2013 PDAF Article) provides:
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference
shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the
NHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said
priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
74
The permissive treatment of the priority list requirement in practice was revealed during the Oral Arguments
(TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 143):
Justice Leonen: x x x In Section 2 meaning, Special Provision 2, it mentions priority list of implementing
agencies. Have the implementing agencies indeed presented priority list to the Members of Congress
before disbursement?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: My understanding is, is not really, Your Honor. Justice Leonen: So, in other
words, the PDAF was expended without the priority list requirements of the implementing agencies?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: That is so much in the CoA Report, Your Honor.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
75
See Special Provision 3 of the 2012 PDAF Article and Special Provision 3 of the 2013 PDAF Article.
76
Special Provision 6 of the 2012 PDAF Article provides:
6. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Environment and Natural Resources, Health, Interior and Local
Government, Public Works and Highways, and Social Welfare and Development are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit
and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for
the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment approved within five (5) calendar days from its
approval.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit
and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for
the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment approved within five (5) calendar days from
approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same
classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by
LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have
been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be. (Emphases supplied)
77
Special Provision(s) 1. Use of Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall be used to fund the
following priority programs and projects to be implemented by the corresponding agencies:
xxxx
PROVIDED, That this Fund shall not be used for the payment of Personal Services expenditures:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That all procurement shall comply with the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 and its
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That for infrastructure projects,
LGUs may only be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
implement the same. (Emphasis supplied)
78
2. Project Identification. x x x.
xxxx
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative
district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
79
See Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article; supra note 76.
80
Sec. 8.
Appropriations. The sum of Five Million Pesos out of any available funds from the National Treasury is
hereby appropriated and authorized to be released for the organization of the Board and its initial
operations. Henceforth, funds sufficient to fully carry out the functions and objectives of the Board shall
be appropriated every fiscal year in the General Appropriations Act.
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service
contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations,
fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration,
development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphasis supplied)
81
Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS,
PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
82
See First Whereas Clause of PD 910.
83
See <http://malampaya.com/> (visited October 17, 2013).
84
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise shall be immediately set aside and allocated to fund the following infrastructure and socio-civil
projects within the Metropolitan Manila Area:
(a) Flood Control
(b) Sewerage and Sewage
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
(c) Nutritional Control
(d) Population Control
(e) Tulungan ng Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification
(g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects; provided, that should the aggregate gross
earning be less than ₱150,000,000.00, the amount to be allocated to fund the above-mentioned project
shall be equivalent to sixty (60%) percent of the aggregate gross earning.
In addition to the priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects with the Metropolitan Manila specifically
enumerated above, the share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings derived by the
Corporate from this Franchise may also be appropriated and allocated to fund and finance
infrastructure and/or socio-civic projects throughout the Philippines as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
85
Entitled "CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C,
1399 AND 1632, RELATIVE TO THE FRANCHISE AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)."
86
Entitled "AMENDING SECTION TWELVE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1869-CONSOLIDATING AND
AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, R ELATIVE TO THE
F RANCHISE AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND G AMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR)." While the parties have confined their discussion to Section 12 of PD 1869, the Court takes
judicial notice of its amendment and perforce deems it apt to resolve the constitutionality of the amendatory
provision.
87
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, now reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the
Fifty (50%) percent share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from
this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall immediately
be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
88
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 301.
89
CDF/PDAF ALLOCATION FROM 1990 -2013.
1990…………… ₱2,300,000,000.00
1991…………… P 2,300,000,000.00
1992…………… P 2,480,000,000.00
1993…………… P 2,952,000,000.00
1994…………… P 2,977,000,000.00
1995…………… P 3,002,000,000.00
1996…………… P 3,014,500,000.00
1997…………… P 2,583,450,000.00
1998…………… P 2,324,250,000.00
1999…………… P 1,517,800,000.00 (Food Security Program Fund)
…………… P 2,500,000,000.00 (Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund)
…………… P 5,458,277,000.00 (Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund)
2000…………… P 3,330,000,000.00
2001…………… 2000 GAA re-enacted
2002…………… P 5,677,500,000.00
2003…………… P 8,327,000,000.00
2005…………… P 6,100,000,000.00
2007…………… P 11,445,645,000.00
2008…………… P 7,892,500,000.00
2009…………… P 9,665,027,000.00
2010…………… P 10,861,211,000.00
2011…………… P 24,620,000,000.00
2012…………… P 24,890,000,000.00
2013…………… P 24,790,000,000.00
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
90
"Pork as a tool for political patronage, however, can extend as far as the executive branch. It is no accident,
for instance, that the release of the allocations often coincides with the passage of a Palace-sponsored bill.
That pork funds have grown by leaps and bounds in the last decade can be traced to presidents in
need of Congress support. The rise in pork was particularly notable during the Ramos administration,
when the president and House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. used generous fund releases to convince
congressmen to support Malacañang-initiated legislation. The Ramos era, in fact, became known as
the ‘golden age of pork.‘
Through the years, though, congressmen have also taken care to look after their very own. More often
than not, pork-barrel funds are funneled to projects in towns and cities where the lawmakers' own
relatives have been elected to public office; thus, pork is a tool for building family power as well. COA
has come across many instances where pork-funded projects ended up directly benefiting no less than
the lawmaker or his or her relatives."(CHUA, YVONNE T. and CRUZ, BOOMA, "Pork is a Political, Not
A Developmental, Tool." <http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html> [visited October 22, 2013].)
91
With reports from Inquirer Research and Salaverria, Leila, "Candazo, first whistle-blower on pork barrel
scam, dies; 61," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 20, 2013, <http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/469439/candazo-
first-whistle-blower-on-pork-barrel-scam-dies-61> (visited October 21, 2013.)
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 387.
96
Carvajal, Nancy, " NBI probes ₱10-B scam," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 12, 2013
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/443297/nbi-probes-p10-b-scam> (visited October 21, 2013).
97
Id.
98
See NBI Executive Summary. <http://www.gov.ph/2013/09/16/executive-summary-by-the-nbi-on-the- pdaf-
complaints-filed-against-janet-lim-napoles-et-al/> (visited October 22, 2013).
99
Pursuant to Office Order No. 2010-309 dated May 13, 2010.
100
During the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson referred to the VILP as "the source of the so called
HARD project, hard portion x x x "under the title the Budget of the DPWH." TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 69.
101
These implementing agencies included the Department of Agriculture, DPWH and the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The GOCCs included Technology and Livelihood Resource Center
(TLRC)/Technology Resource Center (TRC), National Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC), National
Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR), and the Zamboanga del Norte Agricultural College (ZNAC) Rubber
Estate Corporation (ZREC). CoA Chairperson‘s Memorandum. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 546. See also
CoA Report, p. 14.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 546-547.
104
Carvajal, Nancy, ―Malampaya fund lost ₱900M in JLN racketǁ, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 16, 2013
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/445585/malampaya-fund-lost-p900m-in-jln-racket> (visited October 21, 2013.)
105
TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 119.
106
Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 9 and 341.
107
The Court observes that petitioners have not presented sufficient averments on the remittances from the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Officeǁ nor have defined the scope of "the Executive‘s Lump Sum
Discretionary Funds" (See rollo [G.R. No. 208566], pp. 47-49) which appears to be too broad and all-
encompassing. Also, while Villegas filed a Supplemental Petition dated October 1, 2013 (Supplemental
Petition, see rollo [G.R. No. 208566], pp. 213-220, and pp. 462-464) particularly presenting their arguments
on the Disbursement Acceleration Program, the same is the main subject of G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136,
209155, 209164, 209260, 209287, 209442, 209517, and 209569 and thus, must be properly resolved therein.
Hence, for these reasons, insofar as the Presidential Pork Barrel is concerned, the Court is constrained not to
delve on any issue related to the above-mentioned funds and consequently confine its discussion only with
respect to the issues pertaining to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
108
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.
109
Id. at 48.
110
To note, Villegas‘ Supplemental Petition was filed on October 2, 2013.
111
Rollo, (G.R. No. 208566), p. 342; and rollo (G.R. No. 209251), pp. 6-7.
112
Re-docketed as G.R. No. 209251 upon Nepomuceno‘s payment of docket fees on October 16, 2013 as
reflected on the Official Receipt No. 0079340. Rollo (G.R. No. 209251) p. 409.
113
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) p. 97.
114
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
115
Supra note 95.
116
Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
117
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568,
575.
118
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148.
119
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra note 117, at 575.
120
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554,
178581, 178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 175.
121
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402,
450.
122
Id. at 450-451.
123
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19, 2010,
633 SCRA 470, 493, citing Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October
14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 405.
124
Id. at 492, citing Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1913).
125
Baldo, Jr. v. Commision on Elections, G.R. No. 176135, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 306, 310.
126
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 79-81.
127
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
128
Sec. 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to
the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted
for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal
services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.
129
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 504, 514, citing Constantino v.
Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 140656 and 154482, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 205, 219-
220.
130
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 292.
131
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013.
132
TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 134.
133
Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every
regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
134
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 294.
135
Id. at 5.
136
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
137
Id. at 665.
138
See Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, supra note 123, at 492.
139
369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962].
140
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 295-296.
141
Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957) unreported case.
142
406 Phil. 1 (2001).
143
Id. at 42-43.
144
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
145
La Bugal- B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 890 (2004).
146
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 349.
147
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q. Roxas, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 457, 470.
148
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA
410, 421.
149
TSN, October 8, 2013, pp. 184-185.
150
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).
151
See Lanuza v. CA, G.R. No. 131394, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 54, 61-62.
152
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
153
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association o f the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, G.R.
No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180, 197-198.
154
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
155
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
156
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 325.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 329.
159
Id. at 339.
160
Id. at 338.
161
See note 107.
162
Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 139.
163
Id. at 157.
164
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
165
Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
166
Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
167
168
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928).
169
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1, 9-10, citing
Carl Baar, Separate But Subservient: Court Budgeting In The American States 149-52 (1975), cited in Jeffrey
Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217
(1993).
170
Id. at 10, citing Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial
Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).
171
See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-446 and 451-452 (1977) and United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), cited in Justice Powell‘s concurring opinion in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
172
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), Springer v. Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928) cited in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
173
273 Phil. 443 (1991).
174
Id. at 461. "3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers
the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation
of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the
regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities
comprise this phase of the budget cycle."
175
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 118, at 158.
176
Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, at 460-461.
177
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 294-296.
178
Id. at 287.
179
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 179.
180
Id. at 29.
181
Id. at 24.
182
Id. at 86.
183
Id. at 308.
184
Id.
185
See CDF Articles for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.
186
See PDAF Article for the year 2000 which was re-enacted in 2001. See also the following 1999 CIAs:
"Food Security Program Fund," the " Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund," and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund." See further the 1997 DepEd School Building Fund.
187
See PDAF Article for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013.
188
Also, in Section 2.1 of DBM Circular No. 547 dated January 18, 2013 (DBM Circular 547-13), or the
"Guidelines on the Release of Funds Chargeable Against the Priority Development Assistance Fund for FY
2013," it is explicitly stated that the "PDAF shall be used to fund priority programs and projects identified by
the Legislators from the Project Menu." (Emphasis supplied)
189
To note, Special Provision 4 cannot – as respondents submit – refer to realignment of projects since the
same provision subjects the realignment to the condition that the "allotment released has not yet been
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
obligated for the original project/scope of work". The foregoing proviso should be read as a textual reference
to the savings requirement stated under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently
provides that "x x x the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations. In addition, Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 of DBM Circular
547-13, the implementing rules of the 2013 PDAF Article, respectively require that: (a) "the allotment is still
valid or has not yet lapsed"; (b) "requests for realignment of unobligated allotment as of December 31, 2012
treated as continuing appropriations in FY 2013 shall be submitted to the DBM not later than June 30, 2013";
and (c) requests for realignment shall be supported with, among others, a "certification of availability of
funds." As the letter of the law and the guidelines related thereto evoke the legal concept of savings, Special
Provision 4 must be construed to be a provision on realignment of PDAF funds, which would necessarily but
only incidentally include the projects for which the funds have been allotted to. To construe it otherwise would
effectively allow PDAF funds to be realigned outside the ambit of the foregoing provision, thereby sanctioning
a constitutional aberration.
190
Aside from the sharing of the executive‘s realignment authority with legislators in violation of the separation
of powers principle, it must be pointed out that Special Provision 4, insofar as it confers fund realignment
authority to department secretaries, is already unconstitutional by itself. As recently held in Nazareth v. Villar
(Nazareth), G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, 403-404, Section 25(5), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, limiting the authority to augment, is "strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive" in favor
of the high officials named therein. As such, the authority to realign funds allocated to the implementing
agencies is exclusively vested in the President, viz.:
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI
of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is
strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.
Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can
curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an
express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of
the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply
to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will
be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction
of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of
the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
The cogence of the Nazareth dictum is not enfeebled by an invocation of the doctrine of qualified
political agency (otherwise known as the "alter ego doctrine") for the bare reason that the same is not
applicable when the Constitution itself requires the President himself to act on a particular matter, such
as that instructed under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. As held in the landmark case of
Villena v. Secretary of Interior (67 Phil. 451 [1987]), constitutional imprimatur is precisely one of the
exceptions to the application of the alter ego doctrine, viz.:
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on
the board proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we
have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
191
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 294-296.
192
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 16, 17, 18, and 23.
193
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 72-73.
194
Aside from its conceptual origins related to the separation of powers principle, Corwin, in his commentary
on Constitution of the United States made the following observations:
At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating
the three powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second is
the concept of due process of law, which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private
persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari," which John
Locke borrowed and formulated as a dogma of political science . . . Chief Justice Taft offered the
following explanation of the origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional law: "The
well-known maxim ‘delegata potestas non potest delefari,‘ applicable to the law of agency in the
general common law, is well understood and has had wider application in the construction of our
Federal and State Constitutions than it has in private law . . . The Federal and State Constitutions than
it has in private law . . . The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions of this country divide the
governmental power into three branches . . . In carrying out that constitutional division . . . it is a breach
of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the
President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either
executive power of judicial power. This is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
one government and that each in the field of its duties may not invoke government and that each in the
field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the action invoked
shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it
may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be
fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination.
(Emphases supplied)
195
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
196
See Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 702 (1919).
197
See Section 23(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
198
See Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
199
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 288.
200
169 Phil. 437, 447-448 (1977).
201
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
202
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912, 916 (1936).
203
204
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 287.
205
Id. at 292.
206
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, supra note 202, at 916-917.
207
"Log-rolling legislation refers to the process in which several provisions supported by an individual
legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation supported by a majority of
legislators on a quid pro quo basis: no one provision may command majority support, but the total package
will.” See Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 420, citing Briffault, Richard, ―The Item Veto in State Courts,ǁ 66
Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1177 (1993).
208
Passarello, Nicholas, "The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations Bundling in Alaska," 30 Alaska Law
Review 128 (2013), citing Black‘s Law Dictionary 1700 (9th ed. 2009).
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol30/iss1/5> (visited October 23, 2013).
209
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
210
299 U.S. 410 (1937).
211
To note, in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990, 191 SCRA 452, 465), citing
Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 S.E., 2d 120, 176 Va. 281), the Court defined an item of appropriation as "an
indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose." In this relation, Justice Carpio astutely explained
that an "item" is indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any purpose other than the specific
purpose stated in the item.
212
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 421.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 316.
215
Id. at 421.
216
Id. at 566.
217
Id. at 567.
218
"It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards
the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle:
‘The end does not justify the means.‘ No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act,
but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters,
then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to
uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. ‘The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must
bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude.‘" (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 118, 177; citations
omitted)
219
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 406.
220
Id. at 407.
221
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003
Edition, p. 1108.
222
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.
223
See Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
224
See Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
225
Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), p. 9.
226
See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 96, 100-101.
227
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."
228
230 Phil. 379, 387-388 (1986).
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
229
Id.
230
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 95-96.
231
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 523.
232
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the Philippines,
"Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" <http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited
October 17, 2013).
233
<http://www.gov.ph/2013/08/23/english-statement-of-president-aquino-on-the-abolition-of-pdaf-august-23-
2013/> (visited October 22, 2013).
234
Section 106 of the LGC provides:
Sec. 106. Local Development Councils. – (a) Each local government unit shall have a comprehensive
multi-sectoral development plan to be initiated by its development council and approved by its
sanggunian. For this purpose, the development council at the provincial, city, municipal, or barangal
level, shall assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
235
See Section 109 of the LGC.
236
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 423.
237
Id. at 427.
238
Id. at 439-440.
239
Id. at 434 and 441.
240
See Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, where the Court upheld the constitutionality of certain
automatic appropriation laws for debt servicing although said laws did not readily indicate the exact amounts
to be paid considering that "the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters
provided in the decrees"; hence, "the Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be
disbursed for debt servicing." To note, such laws vary in great degree with the way the 2013 PDAF Article
works considering that: (a) individual legislators and not the executive make the determinations; (b) the
choice of both the amount and the project are to be subsequently made after the law is passed and upon the
sole discretion of the legislator, unlike in Guingona, Jr. where the amount to be appropriated is dictated by the
contingency external to the discretion of the disbursing authority; and (c) in Guingona, Jr. there is no effective
control of the funds since as long as the contingency arises money shall be automatically appropriated
therefor, hence what is left is merely law execution and not legislative discretion.
241
Id. at 462.
242
23 Nev. 25 (1895).
243
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 438.
244
Id. at 300.
245
The project identifications made by the Executive should always be in the nature of law enforcement and,
hence, for the sole purpose of enforcing an existing appropriation law. In relation thereto, it may exercise its
rule-making authority to greater particularize the guidelines for such identifications which, in all cases, should
not go beyond what the delegating law provides. Also, in all cases, the Executive‘s identification or rule-
making authority, insofar as the field of appropriations is concerned, may only arise if there is a valid
appropriation law under the parameters as above-discussed.
246
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.
247
See Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary,
2009 Edition, pp. 686-687, citing Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, 576-577 (1965).
248
Id. at 277.
249
§ 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same kind"); specific words; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438.
250
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 437, citing § 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same kind"); specific words; 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 438.
251
Based on a July 5, 2011 posting in the government’s website <http://www.gov.ph/2011/07/05/budget-
secretary-abad-clarifies-nature-of-malampaya-fund/>; attached as Annex "A" to the Petitioners‘
Memorandum), the Malampaya Funds were also used for non-energy related projects, to wit:
The rest of the 98.73 percent or ₱19.39 billion was released for non-energy related projects: 1) in 2006,
₱1 billion for the Armed Forces Modernization Fund; 2) in 2008, ₱4 billion for the Department of
Agriculture; 3) in 2009, a total of ₱14.39 billion to various agencies, including: ₱7.07 billion for the
Department of Public Works and Highways; ₱2.14 billion for the Philippine National Police; ₱1.82 billion
for [the Department of Agriculture]; ₱1.4 billion for the National Housing Authority; and ₱900 million for
the Department of Agrarian Reform.
252
For academic purposes, the Court expresses its disagreement with petitioners‘ argument that the previous
version of Section 12 of PD 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since it allows the
President to broadly determine the purpose of the Presidential Social Fund‘s use and perforce must be
declared unconstitutional. Quite the contrary, the 1st paragraph of the said provision clearly indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund shall be used to finance specified types of priority infrastructure and socio-civic
projects, namely, Flood Control, Sewerage and Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population Control, Tulungan ng
Bayan Centers, Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects located within the
Metropolitan Manila area. However, with regard to the stated geographical-operational limitation, the 2nd
paragraph of the same provision nevertheless allows the Presidential Social Fund to finance "priority
infrastructure and socio-civic projects throughout the Philippines as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines." It must, however, be qualified that the 2nd paragraph should not be
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 208566
construed to mean that the Office of the President may direct and authorize the use of the Presidential Social
Fund to any kind of infrastructure and socio-civic project throughout the Philippines. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis , (meaning, that a word or phrase‘s "correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated"; see Chavez v. Judicial
and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579, 598-599) the 2nd paragraph should be
construed only as an expansion of the geographical-operational limitation stated in the 1st paragraph of the
same provision and not a grant of carte blanche authority to the President to veer away from the project types
specified thereunder. In other words, what the 2nd paragraph merely allows is the use of the Presidential
Social Fund for Flood Control, Sewerage and Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population Control, Tulungan ng
Bayan Centers, Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects even though the same
would be located outside the Metropolitan Manila area. To deem it otherwise would be tantamount to unduly
expanding the rule-making authority of the President in violation of the sufficient standard test and, ultimately,
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
253
Black‘s Law Dictionary (7th Ed., 1999), p. 784.
254
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.
255
Id.
256
234 Phil. 521, 533-534 (1987).
257
252 Phil. 264 (1989).
258
Id. at 279
259
Id. at 278.
260
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 463.
261
Id. at 459-462.
262
Id. at 304-305.
263
<http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/BESE/BESE2013/Glossary.pdf> (visited November 4, 2013).
264
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). Cash authority issued by the DBM to central, regional and provincial
offices and operating units through the authorized government servicing banks of the MDS,* to cover the cash
requirements of the agencies.
*
MDS stands for Modified Disbursement Scheme. It is a procedure whereby disbursements by
NG agencies chargeable against the account of the Treasurer of the Philippines are effected
through GSBs.**
**
GSB stands for Government Servicing Banks. (Id.)
265
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 35-36.
266
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013,
citing Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 148 Phil. 443, 447-448 (1971).
267
Id.
268
Id.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
3/9/2019 Tsoi vs CA : 119190 : January 16, 1997 : J. Torres : Second Division
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997]
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the
unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision on November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals[1] in its decision are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, xxx Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
"After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and
his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking
a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband's
private parts nor did he see hers.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997/119190.htm 1/6
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husbands examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science K
"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which
is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated.[2]
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
"SO ORDERED. "
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence
to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.[3]
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36
of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)."[4]
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, - i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, - why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.[5]
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the
part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity."[6]
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his rights
even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides,
if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through
proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed
any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.[7]
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order,
it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is - a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1] Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 20-24.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rollo, p. 34.
[5] Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C.
[6] Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p.
51.
[7] Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved,
the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating
with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/sep1991/gr_100113_1991.html 1/17
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects
a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the
term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to
interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important
to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than
ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as
well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties.
Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task
or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways,
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the
nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing,
and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing
and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal
with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs
to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems —
physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty.
In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities.
And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he
must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp
not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines
in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in
its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing
the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-
31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men
learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person
is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-
3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is
the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice
of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from
my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her
beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging
on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on
the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court
deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue
to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he
must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to
ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,
repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an
employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed.,
p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p.
806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice
to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette
et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if
ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose
between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of
discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in
its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must
know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the
law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and
was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other
positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could
he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law
enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor
the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly
what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker
in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to
his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I
have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead;
an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person
may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession
of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life;
to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated
in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing
State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental
and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on
the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court
deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue
to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he
must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to
ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,
repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an
employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed.,
p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p.
806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice
to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette
et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if
ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose
between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of
discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in
its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must
know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the
law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and
was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other
positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could
he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law
enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor
the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly
what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker
in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to
his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I
have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead;
an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person
may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession
of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life;
to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated
in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing
State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental
and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 100113
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109
3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE
OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
4 14 SCRA 109.
Unchecked Article
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Custom Search
Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014

♦ Decision, Abad [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Sereno [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Carpio [J]
♦ Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, Leonen [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Brion [J]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO
SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP,

BERTENI "TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA,
CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359
SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE,

JR., ROMEL R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA.
KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL
UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist
BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG,
Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R.
GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B. MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R.
LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's Party, ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_203335_2014.html 1/21
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE
LIMA, Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the
Information and Communications Technology Office, NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National Police,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO,
GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center),
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her
capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR
of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of Government), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI),
CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA
QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-
PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS,
ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C.
RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN
P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A.
HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH
S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B. LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG
AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate
President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity
as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C.
CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office;
HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and
P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the
Philippines; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M.
DE LIMA, in her official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official
capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR
R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and DIRECTOR
GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity
as President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF
REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR

MODERN HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S.
Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A.
CASIÑO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M.
RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR., LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA
TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO
FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person
can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study,
amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special
audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade
houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual
accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of
persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or
for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has
a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and
networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories
of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those
computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to
prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to
reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended
the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track
down and penalize violators. These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime
of libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with
the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct,1 useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a
legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act
– accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ
tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information.
Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in
it and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors
who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.5
Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the
search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free card."6
Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from
the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference,
it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these
guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a
form of vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect9 or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is
proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the
state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in
paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no
tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of
circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being
narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take
the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known
billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who
registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it
happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law
should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a
pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in
penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or
deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no
damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its
existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court
explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the
relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the
right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches16 and
seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy,
a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his
contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The
law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific
conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are
specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered
from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be
published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information
made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news
reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain
which is required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.21 They express fear
that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not
regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In
common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or
"a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces
socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married
couples or consenting individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give
a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x
between and among two private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some."23 The
understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary
to constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article 201 of
the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines
prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration.27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other
purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of
individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and
destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right,
has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.30
The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to
persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one
can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such
higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded
in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct,
manufacture or create any form of child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and
abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish.34 Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on
paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one
who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who
replies to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For
now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the
use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic
message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in
any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term
"spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or
comment was said to be making a "spam." The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which
actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or
spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the
efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s
domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of
computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such
unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads.
What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams.
Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the
same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos,
or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of
the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law
carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with
the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice"
from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for
otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin
v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to be public figures.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of
the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge
that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here
requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even
extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false,
is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay
official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code
and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws
imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a
public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs.44
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of
actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who
were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against
complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on
her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in
fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the above
case, cinema and television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of ₱6,000.00.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement.45 For his
defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact
true.46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country’s
obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v.
Republic of the Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34
to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-
encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the
accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court
and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the
imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of
their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply
suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression.48
Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be
necessary and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new
crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4)
above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement
or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were
enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a
world apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated
by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are
disseminated down the line to other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the
internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter
that the Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids
in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting
sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of
the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or
abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is
at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.51 The legislature is not required to define
every single word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets
another in destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of
laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character.
These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The
idea of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of
cyberspace use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a
year, translating to about 31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most
engaged countries for social networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for
example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared
interests use Facebook to get in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who
they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update
their profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone,
depending on the user’s privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can
react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the program’s screen such as "Like,"
"Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online
his feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original
"posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send
and read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the
practice of posting small pieces of digital content—which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or
other media—on the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this
particular user’s posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those whom this particular user is
subscribed to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to
his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given
posting. Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another person’s tweet without the need of copying and pasting
it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service
provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may
have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog;
and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site.60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on
WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun
Broadband (Internet Service Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair
with a movie star. Linda, one of Maria’s friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are
so immoral." Maria’s original post is then multiplied by her friends and the latter’s friends, and down the line to
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds
it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nena’s "Followers"
then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person’s "Retweet" of Nena’s original tweet and posts this on her
Facebook account. Immediately, Pamela’s Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed
posting. A lot of them even press the Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens,
hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or
"Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the
office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger,
seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur,
passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses
agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel
in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends
or Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or
abetting libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or
abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are
essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original
posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or
thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice
as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to
cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and
culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in
violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,61 a case
involving the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing
transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently
offensive" as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech for
being overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. §223, is a matter of special
concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a
regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.
Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA
threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal
sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas,
and images. As a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory
enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns than those implicated by certain
civil regulations.
xxxx
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech
that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger
provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on protected speech
cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements
can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with
cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a
governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a
person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms.62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will
suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal
laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.64 Hence,
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio
T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of
the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only
insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any
constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It
prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.66
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on
grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or
vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or
vague law thus chills him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any
government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the
constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly
complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could
arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens
are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed,
how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another
comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory
story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting
published on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory
publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it
will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social or
economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography
and facilitates the completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make
Google and its users aiders and abettors in the commission of child pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a
feature in the American law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law lacks—the exemption of a provider or
notably a plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child pornography as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly or
unwittingly. Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user
downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user may give consent to Facebook to access his contact details.
In this way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial communication could be
disseminated on the basis of this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution of
this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of possible
criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of
aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners
point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing
the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section
4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise
of the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker
may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system but the security
employed by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to
usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is alerted.72 If Section 5
that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the
username and password could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The
hacker should not be freed from liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent.73 While this may be true
with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts
specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6),
Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the
commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works.
Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed
by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the
Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of
information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the
technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause
greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be
prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two
different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both
offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave
the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is
again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two
offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A.
10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself
claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353.
Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender
under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as
to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact
already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of
this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a
fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the
damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) but not
exceeding One million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished
with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if
committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment
one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand
pesos (Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)
(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting,
and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate
to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have
been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.78
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to
collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of
underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of
the above-stated information.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is
being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that
will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as
tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the
disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational
relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision
itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate
concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to
the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the
government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law
enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest
Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to empower state authorities
to collect or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications."83 And this is precisely what
Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for
fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who
commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting
sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could easily evade
detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In
this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places
that provide free internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones
under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be
located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle
child pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of
operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-
issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards
against crossing legal boundaries and invading the people’s right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed,
the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of
privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of
privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in
making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to informational privacy—that those who oppose government
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely
without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this
Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation
of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or
group, petitioners’ challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users,
meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one
another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general public’s point of view. Without
reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service provider,
must of necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT
user. For example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service
provider with his cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is
this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope
properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal service. Those who post letters have no
expectations that no one will read the information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to
parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is
broken up into packets and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic
data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice
call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the
packet fits together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at times across
the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient,
only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to another where
their contents are pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the
identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service provider’s communication’s
system will put his voice message into packets and send them to the other person’s cellphone where they are
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
refitted together and heard. The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the
service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to the service provider when he puts his call through. He
also reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating electronically follow the
same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone
users in the ‘70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to
complete a call. That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should remain
private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over
cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for
a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making
the expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are
gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create
profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a person’s
close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond
what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has
the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or
jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the
Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the
law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law,
dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General
suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the
Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the
probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data.
It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement
agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against
an identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that
traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly,
nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of
their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked
information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But
this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify
the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in
"fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it
is not possible to get a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But
warrantless search is associated with a police officer’s determination of probable cause that a crime has been
committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is immediately carried out,
the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users and
that the procedure envisioned by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare
assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The
grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations
must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and
the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free
speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such
analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor
individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All
the forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these
technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees.
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months
from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt
of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once
computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere
furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a
notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They
liken the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic
data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and
are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for
at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The
service provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process
of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue
an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or
relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a
valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the
purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that
the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not
exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers.98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually
lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure
for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications
and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly
issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning
of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is
reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data
storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of
approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures.
On its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the
proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court
warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken.
Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the
computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted
upon the lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service
provider’s storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the
user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the
user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in
its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated
the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be in
violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and
right mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts,
images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital
space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal
property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states
that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on
the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within
constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content
alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content
violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines
established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on
one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear
and present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in
violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to
apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to
freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from
law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of
prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for
each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply
constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or
valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20
to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be
a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are
not struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among
concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of
cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
1avvphi1
the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s
assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity
plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such
[cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international
levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly
adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24
and 26(a) are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in
bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information
belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised
Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve
traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the
expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original
author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post
and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel. 1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases,
WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring & Dissenting Opinion

Chief Justice
See Concurring & Dissenting Opinion (no part due to prior case)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
See Separate Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

I join Justice Brion in all his positions

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
No Part
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
See separate dissenting and concurring opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
No part.
1
The US Supreme Court first suggested the standard by implication in footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene
Products (304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts. Winkler, A. UCLA School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 06-14, http://ssrn.com/abstract=897360 (last accessed April 10, 2013).
2
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254, 278.
3
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416, 437.
4
All 50 states of the United States have passed individual state laws criminalizing hacking or unauthorized
access, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx
(last accessed May 16, 2013). The United States Congress has also passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act 18 U.S.C. § 1030 that penalizes, among others, hacking. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime
considers hacking as an offense against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems and 29 countries have already ratified or acceded,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last accessed
May 16, 2013).
5
Ethical Hacking. Palmer, C. IBM Systems Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2001, p. 770,
http://pdf.textfiles.com/security/palmer.pdf (last accessed April 10, 2013).
6
Id. at 774.
7
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554,
178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 185.
8
The intentional destruction of property is popularly referred to as vandalism. It includes behavior such as
breaking windows, slashing tires, spray painting a wall with graffiti, and destroying a computer system through
the use of a computer virus, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Vandalism (last accessed August 12,
2013).
9
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 7, at 186; Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 354 (2001).
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
10
Id.
11
Id., citing the Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.
12
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.
13
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 189, 204-205.
14
130 Phil. 415 (1968)
15
535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).
16
Supra note 12, Article II, Section 2.
17
Supra note 12, Article III, Section 3.
18
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, supra note
15.
19
Section 3(g) of Republic Act 10173 or the Data Privacy Act of 2012 defines personal information as "any
information whether recorded in a material form or not, from which the identity of an individual is apparent or
can be reasonably and directly ascertained by the entity holding the information, or when put together with
other information would directly and certainly identify an individual."
20
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236.
21
Supra note 17 (G.R. No. 203359 [Guingona]; G.R. No. 203518 [PIFA]).
22
Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/favor (last accessed May 30, 2013).
23
Bicameral Conference Committee, pp. 5-6.
24
Id.
25
Office of the Solicitor General, COMMENT, p. 71.
26
REPUBLIC ACT 9208, Section 4(e).
27
Id., Section 3(c).
28
G.R. No. 191080, November 21, 2011, 660 SCRA 475.
29
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 201 (2)(b)(2), as amended by Presidential Decree 969.
30
Pita v. Court of Appeals, 258-A Phil. 134 (1989).
31
REPUBLIC ACT 9775 entitled AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
32
Sto. Tomas v. Salac, G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 245, citing People v. Ventura, 114
Phil. 162, 167 (1962).
33
Supra note 31, Section 4(b).
34
G.R. No. 203407 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), MEMORANDUM, pp. 34-37.
35
White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19152 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22,
2004).
36
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 387, 449 (2007).
37
Supra note 29, Article 362.
38
Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1 (1999); Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238 (1999).
39
573 Phil. 278 (2008).
40
Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38.
41
L. BOADO, COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW 403-404 (2d ed. 2007).
42
Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d
686 (1964).
43
Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1151 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004).
44
Borjal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, citing United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918).
45
Supra note 41, at 403.
46
Supra note 29, Article 354.
47
Communication 1815/2008.
48
General Comment 34, ICCPR, par. 47.
49
ICCPR, Article 19(2) and (3).
50
Sandals Resorts Int’l. Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 86 A.D.3d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011).
51
Office of the Solicitor General, MEMORANDUM, pp. 69-70.
52
REPUBLIC ACT 3701, Section 1.
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
53
REPUBLIC ACT 4712, Section 5.
54
LABOR CODE, Article 264.
55
G.R. No. 203440 (Sta. Maria), PETITION, p. 2.
56
http://www.statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/ (last accessed January 14, 2013).
57
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_networking_service (last accessed January 14, 2013).
58
http://www.statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/ (last accessed January 14, 2013).
59
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (last accessed January 14, 2013).
60
G. R . No. 203378 (Adonis) and G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino), CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM, p. 34.
61
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
62
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63
G.R. No. 203378 (Adonis), First AMENDED PETITION, pp. 35-36.
64
65
576 Phil. 357 (2008).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
A contention found in Bruce Byars, Timothy O’Keefe, and Thomas Clement "Google, Inc.: Procurer,
Possessor, Distributor, Aider and Abettor in Child Pornography,"
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/archivespring08/byars.pdf (last accessed May 25, 2013).

69
Id., citing 47 U.S.C. 230.
70
Bianca Bosker, Facebook To Share Users' Home Addresses, Phone Numbers With External Sites,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/facebook-home-addresses-phone-numbers_n_829459.html (last
accessed July 18, 2013).
71
G.R. No. 203440 (Sta Maria), MEMORANDUM, p. 14, citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Book
1, 118 (17th ed. 2008).
72
Shiresee Bell, Man Pleads Guilty to Attempted USC Website Hacking, Email Accounts, http://columbia-
sc.patch.com/groups/police-and-fire/p/man-pleaded-guilty-to-hacking-usc-website-email-accounts (last
accessed July 18, 2013); Peter Ryan, Hackers target Bureau of Statistics data,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-26/abs-targeted-by-hackers/4652758 (last accessed July 18, 2013).
73
74
Supra note 51, at 49, citing People v. Doriquez, 133 Phil. 295 (1968).
75
Office of the Solicitor General, MEMORANDUM, p. 49.
76
Section 21, Article III, 1987 CONSTITUTION: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
77
Baylosis v. Hon. Chavez, Jr., 279 Phil. 448 (1991).
78
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 100386, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 476, citing People v. Millora, 252
Phil. 105 (1989).
79
Supra note 14, at 436-437.
80
Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 974-975 (1998).
81
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Alejano v. Gen. Cabuay, 505 Phil. 298, 322 (2005);
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385.
82
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the vital role of information and communications
industries such as content production, telecommunications, broadcasting electronic commerce, and data
processing, in the nation’s overall social and economic development. The State also recognizes the
importance of providing an environment conducive to the development, acceleration, and rational application
and exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) to attain free, easy, and intelligible
access to exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protect and safeguard the integrity of
computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and databases, and the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by
making punishable under the law such conduct or conducts. In this light, the State shall adopt sufficient
powers to effectively prevent and combat such offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable
international cooperation.
83
Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 20, opened for signature November 23, 2001, ETS 185.
84
Cybercrime Law, Section 4(a)(1),.
85
Id., Section 4(a)(3)
86
Id., Section 4(c)(1)
87
Id., Section 4(c)(2)
3/9/2019 G.R. No. 203335
88
Supra note 14.
89
Id. at 433-437.
90
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
91
Id. at 599.
92
93
Jonathan Strickland, How IP Convergence Works, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/ip-convergence2.htm
(last accessed May 10, 2013).
94
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
95
96
Supra note 14, at 437, citing Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. Law Rev. 219, 229
(1965).
97
G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa).
98
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78,
143; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE of 1987, Book I, Chapter 9, Section 37, and Book VII, Chapter 1, Section 13.
99
Computer data is defined by R.A. 10175 as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. x x x
xxxx
(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for
processing in a computer system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform
a function and includes electronic documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local
computer systems or online."
100
Pita v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at 151.
101
Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155 (2008).
102
Entitled PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS.
103
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007).
104
REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Section 3(k).
105
Supra note 94.
106
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, supra note 103, at 586, citing Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39
Phil. 660 (1919).
3/9/2019 People vs Genosa : 135981 : January 15, 2004 : J. Panganiban : En Banc : Decision
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory --
the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven
facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression
-- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating
factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on
parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.
The Case
[1]
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y
Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
[2]
Philippine currency as moral damages.
[3]
The Information charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which
the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and
tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of
the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of
the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
[4]
which caused his death.
[5]
With the assistance of her counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on
[6]
March 3, 1997. In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts in this
wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived
with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived
with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had
two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. When they
arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went
inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to
place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas rented
house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That
was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50)
meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant
likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no
money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw
appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking
her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented
house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph
noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house
being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was
locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a
borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to
reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was
coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was
only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the
dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel,
Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares,
SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom
where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape
of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six
(6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red
stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of
the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo
yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the
cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed
fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got
worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her
cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find
him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants
request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly
ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed
with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or
wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for
help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed
clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards
a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got
a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to
drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up
the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted
[7]
the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom. (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had
graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration,
and was working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The
couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were
classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was
persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant
partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel,
Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple
would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married.
He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would
inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had
shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his
father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty
bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in 1986 or
1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became already
very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3)
misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second
incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until the
eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third
incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens
hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we collected our salary, we
went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks
and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait
for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was
rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in
the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one Fredo who
is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard
by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent.
Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that
he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before
when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always take
her back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He
said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She
said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her
and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she
would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the
injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every
time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence
she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995,
he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies,
he saw the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had
[8]
come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos. )
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his
neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which
is located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding
with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that
evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified
to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His
house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living
together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would
pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling.
Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while Ben was alive he used
to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, Teody because that was what
he used to call me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben
would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed
to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had
been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of
November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market
place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic
wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband. When they got
to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was already there and was
drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic
entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to
sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time
when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and
they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the
window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination,
she said that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte.
Marivic was his patient many times and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that
from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon
Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution
admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected
all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as
Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were
directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the
psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2)
months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or
confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning,
but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each other or they might have
forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and
abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their
quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for
Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and
got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was
leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo,
Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know what
happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and
that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he
saw that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor
emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the
incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the
examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took
the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and
when she got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a
blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the head which
she described as a fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did
not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of
PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly
weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12
November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L.
Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus
sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000,
Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto,
as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons
of her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of
undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief
Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records
Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19
February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court
allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed
her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified
forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-
mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to
forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra.
Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical
interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic
and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the
Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de
Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense
College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the
Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is
the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic
Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with
the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research
about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan
Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as
this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10)
years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic
violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse,
and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a
self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan
said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low opinion of himself. But then
emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and
very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices
like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The batterer also usually comes from a
dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often
how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty,
self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will
change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in
another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of them. She said that in a
normal marital relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day
in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and
even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that
Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as
a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the
past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal
separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and testified
before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-
eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre
where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree
from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the
Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the
Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a
medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate
(siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with
the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a
doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit
involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent
family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is physical
abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such
that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the
vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of
violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the
victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x
x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real,
although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is
irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-
world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness, such as the deprivation of
the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him
within the environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the
time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without
thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who
administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot
control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and primarily
with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a
hospital x x x because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached
the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours
and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming
his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband
Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to explain
scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and
probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.
At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally
stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in
accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were
[9]
elevated.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the
back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1)
the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination
of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to
this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if
any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two
[10] [11]
clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan and Alfredo Pajarillo, supposedly experts on
domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to
and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records
[12]
of the case.
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that
she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased
witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in
concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were
indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the existence of
self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
[13]
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-
defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
[14]
that could affect the outcome of the case.
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case.
In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses
and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation,
findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense
theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions,
we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence
presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with
dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at
all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
[15]
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been
[16]
legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,
this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a
spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the
absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial
court if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellants deceased
[17]
spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic. The defense raised no objection
to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
[18]
admission of her marriage to Ben. Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
[19]
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens death -- whether
by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head,
the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts
actually caused the victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not
dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk,
gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not
raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been relevant.
Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the
legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants children.
As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
[20]
evidence are necessary to present. As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila
and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the
life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances
has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or
defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to
[21]
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the
rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
[22]
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While
new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
[23]
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably
fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.
[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
[25]
woman.
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs
about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male;
the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
[26]
improve.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of
[27]
violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
[28]
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right
to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence
[29]
spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident.
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can
be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she
may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past
painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out
[30]
of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this
tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries
to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that
her partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person
whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the
batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though,
is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially
if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way
of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly
tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. In this
phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness,
each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
[31]
independent, capable of functioning without the other.
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses.
She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a
behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel.
In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the
bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he
said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your
husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
[Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after
your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
[32]
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me.
[33]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D.
Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye.
Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you
mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force
is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning
there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
xxxxxxxxx
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it
was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of
November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for
some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her
personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a
record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23)
times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response
when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related
and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of
giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient
all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is
unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?
[34]
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus.
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic
[35]
would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.
[36]
Ecel Arano also testified that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at
the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten oclock at night, because the couple
were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into Ecels
room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben --
but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk.
Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses
[37]
saw or heard the couple quarreling. Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful
night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards
her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the
service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where
was his father, then my second child said, he was not home yet. I was worried because that was
payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived
from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I
had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested
my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will
happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might
be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that
he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation
and he switch off the light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light when the children were
there. At that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was
angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut
the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already
holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then
he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you
might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and
the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when
he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches
long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
[38]
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it
in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the
court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans term describe
to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional
anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to
physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically
the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with
barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and
which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the
husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying
that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time
very depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it
[39]
was happening day in and day out.
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or
unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three
hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were
escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the
case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of
battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering
their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her
husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the
first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-
defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a
disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened
and so she became an abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time and that is why it
happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses
that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
[40]
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to
find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the
[41]
data that Im gathering from her are the truth.
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
[42]
Psychiatric Report, which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The
Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the
atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also
enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his
barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly
to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive
every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that
her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically
more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of
her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
[43]
frequent and more severe. x x x.
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
[44]
syndrome.
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn from that of
an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
[45]
misconceptions about battered women.
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence,
has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
[46]
relationship with no means of escape. In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse
[47]
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then.
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
[W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s]
who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
[48]
sexually abusive to them.
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave
an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
[49]
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in
suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family
disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which
[50]
the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in posttraumatic stress
[51]
disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism. After being repeatedly and severely
abused, battered persons may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an active response to try to
escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
[52]
have a predictable positive effect.
[53]
A study conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania,
found that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be
more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said
that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to
this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less
important than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women
dont attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else
[54]
does will alter their terrible circumstances.
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.
[55]
Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
[56]
relationship. Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
[57]
found and hurt even more.
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence
that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove
the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How
did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
[58]
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house; that Ben
would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she
would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless
and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed,
they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the
factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would
establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of
the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
[59]
defense.
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
[60]
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order
to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
[61]
merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of
[62]
self-defense:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
[63]
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,
[64]
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been
able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based
on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and
inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet.
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault
at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her
[65]
life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment. Still, impending danger (based on
the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force
must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
[66]
danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
[67]
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In
the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part
[68]
of the victim. Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor
circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal
case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.
[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with her
husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and
natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her
husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
[70]
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part.
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of repetitious
pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the
[71]
prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. Expounding thereon, he
said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering.
Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and
the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social
support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury
to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that
precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a
pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual.
In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to
protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a
severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer
than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you
become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The
[a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become
normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic
[72]
stress disorder.
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her
mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
[73]
A Of course obfuscated.
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,
psychological paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
[74] [75]
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
[76]
Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor.
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that
this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
[77]
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1)
there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
[78]
accused might recover her normal equanimity.
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his
being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a
cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
[79]
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate
room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and
used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period
of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos
[80]
testimony that with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality
[or] trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the
trauma that she suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the
control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the
brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion
and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of
time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted
on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:

Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
[81]
offended party might make. In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
[82]
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the gravity of the
[83]
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his
head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to
establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his
death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you
might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and
the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when
he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches
long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the
other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted
in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I
was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time
pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I
was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot
him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
[84]
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of
the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
[85]
anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful
[86]
act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. There is no showing,
though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
[87]
this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua
to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to
have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
[88] [89]
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to
[90]
have attended the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the
maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum;
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
[91]
detention on parole.
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor
simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized
on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in
which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven
facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct
personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely,
the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the
Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her,
the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago in her
dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
[1]
Penned by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.
[2]
Assailed Decision, p. 17; rollo, p. 43.
[3]
Signed by Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta.
[4]
Rollo, p. 9.
[5]
Atty. Joventino Isidro. The accused was also represented later by Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon.
[6]
Records, p. 65.
[7]
Appellees Brief, pp. 5-13; rollo, pp. 435-443. Signed by Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo, Assistant Solicitor
General Karl B. Miranda, and Solicitor Ma. Ana C. Rivera.
[8]
Spelled as Basobas in some parts of the record.
[9]
Appellants Brief, pp. 10-71; rollo, pp. 284-345; signed by Atty. Katrina Legarda. Citations omitted.
[10]
Qualifying her expertise, Dra. Dayan stated that she had been a practising clinical psychologist for over twenty (20)
years. Currently, she is a professor at the De La Salle University. Prior thereto, she was the head of the
Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology of the Ateneo de
Manila University and St. Josephs College; and the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She
obtained her bachelors degree in psychology from the University of the Philippines (UP), her Master of Arts in
Clinical Counseling from Ateneo, and her Ph.D. also from UP. She is the secretary of the International Council of
Psychologists, comprised of members from about 68 countries; and was the past president of the Psychological
Association of the Philippines. She is a member of the Forensic Psychology Association, the American
Psychological Association, and the ASEAN Counseling Association. She authored the book entitled Energy Global
Psychology (together with Drs. Allen Tan and Allan Bernardo). Dra. Dayan also lectures at the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently on the socio-demographic and psychological profiles of families involved in domestic violence
cases. On the subject, she had conducted, for over a period of ten years, research on the profiles of about 500
families involved in domestic violence.
[11]
Dr. Pajarillo obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas and has been in the practice of
psychiatry for thirty-eight years. He honed his practice in psychiatry and neurology during his stint with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre. Thereafter, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and was assigned at the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty-six years. He was a diplomate of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatry; and a fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was
also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan
Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons. He authored The Comparative Analysis of
Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954-1978, which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which
was likewise published internationally and locally. On a Parke-Davis grant, he published a medical textbook on the
use of Prasepam; on an ER Squibb grant, he was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline); and he published the use
of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier
General. (TSN, February 9, 2001, pp. 6-9; Exhibits F-F-9-Appellant (Bio-Data of Dr. Pajarillo).
[12]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 4, 2003, upon receipt by this Court of appellees Brief.
Appellants Brief was filed on December 2, 2002.
[13]
Appellants Brief, rollo, pp. 346-347. Original in upper case.
[14]
Caca v. Court of Appeals and People, 341 Phil. 114, July 7, 1997; People v. Paragua, 326 Phil. 923, May 24, 1996;
People v. Tanoy, 387 Phil. 750, May 12, 2000; People v. Magaro, 353 Phil. 862, July 2, 1998.
[15]
15 of Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within x x x three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
[16]
333 Phil. 20, December 2, 1996, per Puno, J.
[17]
TSN, September 23, 1997, pp. 11-12 & 14; TSN, November 12, 1997, pp. 29 & 33.
[18]
TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 7-8.
[19]
People v. Sarabia, 376 Phil. 32, October 29, 1999.
[20]
Appellees Brief, p. 26, citing People v. De los Reyes, 229 SCRA 439, January 21, 1994. See also 5 of Rule 110 of the
New Rules of Criminal Procedure and People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 560, April 28, 1993.
[21]
People v. Rabanal, 349 SCRA 655, January 19, 2001; People v. Cario, 351 Phil. 644, March 31, 1998; People v.
Baniel, 341 Phil. 471, July 15, 1997.
[22]
People v. Peralta, 350 SCRA 198, January 24, 2001.
[23]
See Ibn-Tamas v. US, 477 A.2d 626, 1979 DC App. LEXIS 457; McLuckie v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193; 2003 US App.
LEXIS 15240; DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057; 2001 US App. LEXIS 1062; State v. Kelley, 478 A.2d 364
(1984); McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (RI 1992); State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282 (NJ Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990);
State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (NM Ct. App. 1986); R. v. Lavallee (1990) 1 SCR; Reilly v. The Queen, (1984) 2
SCR 396.
[24]
Symposium on Domestic Violence. Article: Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, LEXSEE 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (Summer 1993), 1161.
[25]
McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 731, quoting L. Walker, The Battered Woman, at XV (1979).
[26]
People v. Torres, 128 Misc2d, 129, 488 NYS2d 358; McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725.
[27]
Walker, Lenore, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984), pp. 95-96. Dr. Walker, a clinical psychologist, is an
acknowledged expert on BWS in the United States. She is a pioneer researcher in the field. In this book, she
reports the results of her study involving 400 battered women. Her research was designed to test empirically the
theories expounded in her earlier book, The Battered Woman (1979). In 1989, she also wrote Terrifying Love: Why
Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds.
[28]
Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds (Harper Perennial, 1989), p. 42.
[29]
Ibid. See also R. v. Lavallee, supra; Ibn-Tamas v. US, supra.
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
Ibid.
[32]
TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 12-19.
[33]
Exhibits 1 & 1-A; records, p. 44.
[34]
TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 14-23, 27-31.
[35]
TSN, December 16, 1997, pp. 15-17 & 20-21.
[36]
TSN, May 22, 1998, pp. 2-20.
[37]
TSN (Arturo Basobas), July 21, 1997, pp. 13, 15 & 21; TSN (Jose Barrientos), December 15, 1997, pp. 17-20; TSN
(Junnie Barrientos), December 15, 1997, pp. 35-37; TSN (Ecel Arano), May 22, 1998, pp. 10 & 20.
[38]
TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 19-32.
[39]
TSN, January 15, 2001, pp. 37-38.
[40]
Id., pp. 51-53.
[41]
Id., p. 36.
[42]
Exhibits G-G-3 - Appellant.
[43]
Ibid.
[44]
In R. v. Lavallee, supra.
[45]
Ibid.
[46]
Fiona E. Raitt and M. Suzanne Zeedyk, The Implicit Relation of Psychology and Law: Women and Syndrome
Evidence, pp. 66-67 (Exh. D).
[47]
Walker, Terrifying Love, p. 47.
[48]
TSN, January 15, 2001, p. 18.
[49]
Id., p. 20.
[50]
TSN, February 9, 2001, pp. 11-13.
[51]
Id., p. 14.
[52]
Walker, Terrifying Love, p. 48.
[53]
Id., pp. 49-50.
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
Dr. Lenore Walkers testimony before the court in Ibn-Tamas, supra.
[56]
Psychologist Nancy Kaser-Boyd testifying as an expert on the battered woman syndrome in Depetris, supra.
[57]
Dr. Lenore Walkers testimony before the court in Ibn-Tamas, supra.
[58]
Her biological parents lived separately.
[59]
State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202, 1203 (1982).
[60]
The case would rise or fall on whether . . . [appellant] acted in actual fear of imminent harm from her husband when
she shot [or injured] him . . . . Depetris v. Kuykendall, supra. See also People v. Torres, 128 Misc2d 129, 488
NYS.2d 358.
[61]
People v. PO3 Langres, 375 Phil. 240, 258, October 13, 1999.
[62]
See also People v. Plazo, 350 SCRA 433, January 29, 2001; People v. Cario, 351 Phil. 644, March 31, 1998; People
v. Timblor, 348 Phil. 847, January 27, 1998.
[63]
People v. Saul, 372 SCRA 636, December 19, 2001.
[64]
People v. Galapin, 355 Phil. 212, July 31, 1998; People v. Panes, 343 Phil. 878, August 29, 1997.
[65]
State v. Gallegos, 104 NM 247, 719 P.2d 1268, citing Eber, The Battered Wifes Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
Hasting LJ 895, 928 (1981).
[66]
Id., citing State v. Walker, 40 Wash.App. 658, 700 P.2d 1168 (1985).
[67]
People v. Saul, supra.
[68]
People v. Bato, 348 SCRA 253, December 15, 2000.
[69]
People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169, June 21, 1999; People v. Discalsota, GR No. 136892, April 11, 2002.
[70]
Exhibits B et seq. - Appellant, p. 10.
[71]
TSN, February 9, 2001, p. 19.
[72]
Id., pp. 15-17.
[73]
Id., p. 54.
[74]
Art. 13. Mitigating Circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxxxxxxxx
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
[75]
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
[76]
See People v. Javier, 370 Phil. 596, July 28, 1999; People v. Amit, 82 Phil. 820, February 15, 1949; People v.
Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, July 16, 1947; People v. Balneg, 79 Phil. 805, January 9, 1948.
[77]
People v. Lobino, 375 Phil. 1065, October 28, 1999; People v. Valles, 334 Phil. 763, January 28, 1997.
[78]
I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, p. 272 (1998).
[79]
According to Dr. Lenore Walker, batterers commonly escalate their abusiveness when their wives are pregnant.
[80]
Id., pp. 17-18.
[81]
People v. Cabande, 381 Phil. 889, February 8, 2000.
[82]
People v. Llanes, 381 Phil. 733, February 4, 2000.
[83]
People v. Albao, 383 Phil. 873, March 2, 2000; People v. Aguilar, 354 Phil. 360, July 10, 1998.
[84]
TSN, August 6, 1998, pp. 26-32.
[85]
People v. Buluran, 382 Phil. 364, February 15, 2000; People v. Ereo, 383 Phil. 30, February 22, 2000.
[86]
People v. Caete, 44 Phil. 478, February 5, 1923; People v. Narvaez, 206 Phil. 314, April 20, 1983.
[87]
People v. Aguilar, supra.
[88]
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
xxxxxxxxx
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable,
according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
xxxxxxxxx
[89]
People v. Narvaez, 206 Phil. 314, April 20, 1983; Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 484, July 16, 1990.
[90]
Basan v. People, 61 SCRA 275, November 29, 1974.
[91]
5, Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as amended).

4 Case Digest in LEGRES

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

4 Case Digest in LEGRES

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

3/9/2019 G.R. No.

Today is Saturday, March 09, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 209251

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

The Issues Before the Court

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

II. Substantive Issues.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The Court agrees with petitioners.

The Court agrees in part.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

The Court disagrees.

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.