Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON,

RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO,
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

CORTES, J:

Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to
return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the
right to strike.

The antecedents are as follows:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the
officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday
pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits
given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].

The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this
motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo,
pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and
converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike
was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was
also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a
resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the
Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137].
Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988
denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners'
motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the
motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp.
151-152].

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by
petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.

On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS
are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not
have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the
Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the
Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not
allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS'
complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.

Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the strike are as follows:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the
strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?

These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those
in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in
the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service
as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization
shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of
Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged"
[Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of
these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission,
explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not mean
that because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a
different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to
the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision
that the right to form associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done because the
moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union.
And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including
those from the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are
prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It
does not mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to
strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed
in the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this
problem. We know that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in the
government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go
on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of
discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional
Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code
(P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions:

.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in
their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor
organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided,
however, That this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental
functions and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of
employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and
bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law"
[Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms
and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government owned
and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art.
276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike,
for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is
equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to
organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which,
"prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees ...
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At
present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their
right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be
stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].

But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see
also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.

The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for
distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government employees with regard to the right
to strike:

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as
amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms
and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot
use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power,
the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis
supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper submitted
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public
employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the
right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and
civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the
private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service, and that
accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not
 exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17;
also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January
17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].

E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation
where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:

.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except

those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized
employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities.

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor
disputes in the public sector to wit:

.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable,
shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving
government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the
available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the
dispute to the [Public Sector Labor- Management] Council for appropriate action.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self-
Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

II

The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an
injunction may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of
employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16].
Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes
within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the
instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin
the strike is appropriate.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had
proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to
prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished
the parties to refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer- employee relationship
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].

III

In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and
supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the
individual petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory
injunction to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS
to pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission,
dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and
who are reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled
to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit
Systems Promotion Board.

The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy
is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it
has already become final.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition
for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction"
dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28,

1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary
injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the
subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission
as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered
by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by
the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such
as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No.
6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to
strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with
an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance
of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO,
JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 85279

July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation
of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO,
JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 85279

July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation
of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also a
member of the EPWU. Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which
means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the
said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming
that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because
apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation
from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to
his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement
because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor
union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment
could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes
the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to
enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. But the RA
recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

Facts:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
“stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due
notice.

Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.

Issue:

WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO

Held:

All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because
a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the court.

When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power
to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

Social Security System Employees Association v. CA

Facts:
On 9 June 1987, the officers and members of Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA)
staged a strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. The SSSEA went on strike after
the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-
SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with 6 months or more
of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices. The strike was reported by the Social Security System (SSS) to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work. The strikers refused to
return to work. On 11 June 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the SSSEA, Dionisio T. Baylon, Ramon
Modesto, Juanito Madura, Reuben Zamora, Virgilio De Alday, Sergio Araneta, Placido Agustin, and Virgilio
Magpayo, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that SSSEA, et. al. be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
On 11 June 1987, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction. In the meantime, the SSSEA, et. al. filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. On 22 July 1987, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and
converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal.
As the SSSEA's motion for the reconsideration of the order was also denied on 14 August 1988, SSSEA ,et. al.
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court (GR 79577). In
a resolution dated 21 October 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court
of Appeals. SSSEA, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals
on 9 March 1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case. SSSEA, et. al. moved to recall the Court of
Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on 29 June 1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in GR
97577 for being moot and academic. SSSEA, et. al.'s motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was
also denied in view of the Supreme Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. SSSEA filed the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether SSS employees, in furtherance of labor interests, may conduct a strike.

Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights (Art. XIII, Sec. 3), provides
that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." By itself, this
provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public sector,
to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil
Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters," that "the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees."
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "the right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Statutorily, it
will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (CA 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (PD 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental
functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent
as to whether or not government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage. But then the
Civil Service Decree (PD 807), is equally silent on the matter. Thus, on 1 June 1987, to implement the
constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the President issued EO 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it
is provided that "the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government
service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The President was
apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date
12 April 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence
of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular 6 and as
implied in EO 180. The Court is of the considered view that the SSS employees are covered by the prohibition
against strikes. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under RA 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered
by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by
the employees of the SSS was illegal. In fine, government employees may through their unions or associations,
either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government
to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the present dispute
arose, "the terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed
by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."