PARTS OF LAW AND EQUITY
Lim rejected Reyes offer and
DAVID REYES vs. JOSE LIM,et al.
G.R. No. 134241. August 11, 2003
FACTS:
- On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes (Reyes)
filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of
contract and damages against respondents Jose Lim
(Lim), Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber,
Inc. (Harrison Lumber). The complaint alleged the
following:
Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a
contract to sell (Contract to Sell) a parcel of land
(Property) located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay
City.
Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as lessee
with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The Contract to Sell – Terms and Conditions:
1. The total consideration for the purchase of the
aforedescribed parcel of land together with the
perimeter walls found therein is TWENTY
EIGHT MILLION (P28,000,000.00) PESOS
payable as follows:
(a) TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS
upon signing of this Contract to Sell;
(b) The balance of EIGHTEEN MILLION
(P18,000,000.00) PESOS shall be paid
on or before March 8, 1995 at 9:30 A.M.
at a bank to be designated by the Buyer
but upon the complete vacation of all the
tenants or occupants of the property and
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. If
the tenants or occupants have vacated
the premises earlier than March 8, 1995,
the VENDOR shall give the VENDEE at
least one-week advance notice for the
payment of the balance and execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
2. That in the event, the tenants or occupants of
the premises subject of this sale shall not vacate
the premises on March 8, 1995 as stated above,
the VENDEE shall withhold the payment of the
balance of P18,000,000.00 and the VENDOR
agrees to pay a penalty of Four percent (4%) per
month to the herein VENDEE based on the
amount of the downpayment of TEN MILLION
(P10,000,000.00) PESOS until the complete
vacation of the premises by the tenants therein
(P400,000).
Reyes had informed Keng and Harrison Lumber to
vacate the Property before the end of January 1995.
He also informed them that if they failed to vacate by
8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the
penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the
Contract to Sell.
He further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison
Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated
and equaled the unpaid purchase price of
P18,000,000.
- On 31 May 1995, Lim filed his Answer stating the
following:
. That he was ready and willing to pay the balance
of the purchase price on or before 8 March
1995.
a. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes on the
signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
payment of the balance but Reyes kept
postponing their meeting.
b. On 9 March 1995, Reyes offered to return the
P10 million downpayment because he was
having problems in removing the lessee from the
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
Property.
proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to
the Property
He learned that Reyes had already sold the Property
to Line One Foods Corporation (Line One) on 1
March 1995.
Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison
Lumber to defraud Reyes.
He then files a complaint for estafa against Reyes.
- On 6 March 1997, Lim requested that Reyes be
ordered to deposit the P10 million downpayment. The
RTC granted this motion.
- Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order dated 6
March 1997. The RTC denied this motion. Citing
Article 1385 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that
an action for rescission could prosper only if the party
demanding rescission can return whatever he may be
obliged to restore should the court grant the
rescission.
- Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court
denied the motion. In the same order, the trial court
directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the Clerk of Court.
- Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be
set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial
court could issue the questioned Orders requiring
petitioner to deposit the amount of P10,000,000.00
during the pendency of the action, when deposit is
not among the provisional remedies enumerated in
Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial
court could issue the questioned Orders on grounds
of equity when there is an applicable law on the
matter, that is, Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure.
RULING:
- Reyes contentions are without merit.
- The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this
was a case where there is hiatus in the law and in the
Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus
will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the
expense of Lim.
- This is not a case of equity overruling a positive
provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that
governs this particular case. This is a case of silence
or insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court.
- Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction may validly order the deposit of the P10
million downpayment in court.
- The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in
this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in
cases where the prescribed or customary forms of
ordinary law are inadequate.
- Reyes cannot claim ownership of the P10 million
downpayment because Reyes had already sold to
another buyer the Property for which Lim made the
down payment.
- A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless
there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to
the status quo ante.
- In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the
trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million
downpayment.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 1
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007
FACTS:
- November 26, 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in RTC of Manila, Branch 8. He
alleged that he was born in Manila City by Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962.   He’s   registered   as   male   with   a   name   “Rommel   on marriage and family relations, which will allow a
Jacinto  Dantes  Silverio”  in  his  birth  certificate.
- He further alleged that he is a male transsexual-
anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. On
January 27, 2001, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
- From then on, he lived as a female and in fact, was
engaged to Richard Edel. He sought to change his
name   in   his   birth   certificate   to   “Mely”   and   his   sex   to   insufficiency  of  the  law.”
female.
- June 4, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioner by reasons of principles of justice and
equity  where  he’s  misfortune  to  be  trapped  in  a  man’s   enact legislation to determine what guidelines will
body   is   not   his   own   doing   and   shouldn’t   be   taken   govern the recognition of the effects of sex
against him and that no harm, injury or prejudice will
be caused to anybody in granting the petition.
- August 18, 2003, Republic thru OSG filed a petition for
certiorari  in  CA  alleging  that  there’s  no  law  allowing  the  
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, CA ruled in favor
of  the  Republic  for  RTC’s  decision  lacked  legal  basis,   ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ,et al.
that   there’s   NO   LAW   allowing   the   change   of   name   or   G.R. No. 225973. November 8, 2016
sex in birth certificate on ground of sex reassignment
thru surgery. He filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was denied. Hence, this petition.
- He  alleged  that  it’s  allowed  under  Articles  407  and  413   Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
of Civil Code, Rule 103 and 108 of Rules of Court and
RA 9048.
ISSUES:
(1) WON no law allows the change of entry in the BC as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment
(2) WON entries in the birth certificate as to the first
name and sex can be changed on the ground of
equity
HELD:
(1) NO
- Art. 407: Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
registrar. The three produce legal consequences that
touch legal capacity, status and nationality of a person.
However, sex reassignment is not among those acts
or events mentioned above.
- Art. 413: All other matters pertaining to the registration
of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
However, there are no such laws in the country.
- Civil Register Law, a BC is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth. (sex is
determined at birth) When words are not defined in a
statute,  they’re  to  be  given  their  common  and  ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.
Hence, we determine sex thru male and female only
as per our everyday understanding and do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
- No law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil   registrar   thus,   there’s   no   legal   basis   for   his  
petition.
(2) NO
- Changes sought by the petitioner will have serious and
wide- ranging legal and public policy consequences:
Firstly, marriage is one of the most sacred social
institutions and is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman. One of the
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
In this case, such alteration of the petitioner is for his
marriage to his fiancé. However, to grant his petition
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
union between a man and another man who
undergone sex reassignment. Secondly, various laws
which apply particularly to women (Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies in RPC,
presumption of survivorship under Rule 131 of Rules
of Court) could be substantially affected if such petition
will be granted.
- Art.  9  of  the  Civil  Code,  “no  judge  or  court  shall  decline
to render judgment by reason of silence, obscurity or
- However,  it’s  not a duty of the courts to engage in
judicial legislation, its duty is to apply the law.
- ITCAB,   since   there’s   no   law,   the   legislature should
reassignment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO,et al. vs. REAR ADMIRAL
FACTS:
- During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential
announced that he would allow the burial former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016
elections.
- On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of
Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the
interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
- On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C.
Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army
on the Funeral Honors and Service for President
Marcos.
- Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the
Court.
ISSUE:
WON the burial of the late Ferdinand Marcos in the
LNMB is in accordance with law and equity
RULING:
- The Supreme Court denied the petitions.
Substantive Issues:
(a) The President's decision to bury Marcos at the
LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the
law and jurisprudence.
- While the Constitution is a product of our collective
history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 2
 anything remotely related to the Martial Law period
such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
- Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-
executing provision considering that a law should be
passed by the Congress to clearly define and
effectuate the principle embodied therein. Pursuant
thereto, Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-
Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes,
the Executive Branch has issued various orders,
memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of
behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials
and employees; workflow charts/public transactions;
rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing
and reporting; and client feedback program
- The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise
not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief
Executive, the President represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by
the officials and employees of his or her
department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the
President has the power to take "necessary and
proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The
mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature and is intimately related
to the other executive functions. It is best construed as
an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of
power. The provision simply underscores the rule of
law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the
President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey
and execute them.
- There is no violation of RA 289.
- Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and
historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB
and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This
is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct
and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A.
No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President
Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on
revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No.
42, is different from that covered by Marcos'
Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does
not exist at present. To date, the Congress has
deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its
construction or the creation of the Board on National
Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to
pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular
interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents
of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
- Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is
reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero"
would be violative of public policy as it will put into
question the validity of the burial of each and every
mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers since the allocation of
plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to
the President under existing laws and
regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the
OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to
the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in
itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero."
Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the
purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people
buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only
those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."
Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's
burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to
what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to
the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the
specifics of the interment have been finalized by public
respondents.
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
- RA 10639 is not violated
- The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No
10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the
assailed act has no causal connection and legal
relation to the law. The subject memorandum and
directive of public respondents do not and cannot
interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the
Board and the Commission. More importantly, the
HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by
R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not
curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal,
whether express or implied, the provisions of the
Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375.
- There is no violation of International Human Rights
Laws
(b) The President's decision to bury Marcos at the
LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias
- The LNMB was not expressly included in the national
shrines enumerated in PD 105
- AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained
- Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are
eligible for interment at the LNMB:
(a) Medal of Valor Awardees;
(b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP;
xxx
As to the dissenting opinion of CJ Sereno
- The court’s   duty   is   not   only   to   preserve   the  
Constitution, but also itself.
Not everything legally required is written in
black and white; the Judges' role is to
discern within the penumbra.
- CJ’s   justification: Article 9. No judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reaso
n of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the l
aws. Article10. In case of doubt in the interpretatio
n or application of laws, it is presumed that the
law making body intended right and justice to
prevail.
- Indeed, that judges must interpret statutes as well
as declare the existence and protection of individ
ual rights so that "justice and right"
might prevail has been the essence of an indepen
dent Judiciary.
- There is no question that the importance given to
human rights is encoded in the very building bloc
ks of the Philippine Constitution. For
the Constitution to make sense, the Supreme Cou
rt has to recognize that it is programmed to reject
government actions that are contrary to the
respect for humna rights, and uphold those that do.
- The court has the authority to resolve this controv
ersy under the expanded concept of judicial revie
w in the 1987 Constitution: With the advent of the 1987
Constitution.
- It cannot be claimed that the matter is non-justiciable.
- That the order was supposedly founded on an "el
ection campaign promise
does not transform the matter into a political issue
that is beyond our power to review.
- As a consequence of these principles, any act of
the President that contravenes the law, its policies
, or any right or duty inferable therefrom must be
considered grave abuse of discretion. By the same
token, a refusal to execute the laws when necessary
must be invalidated in the absence of any statutory
justification. As will be demonstrated, the directive
of President Duterte to allow the burial of Marcos
at the LNMB contravenes the constitution, laws,
policies, and jurisprudence. Moreover, the basis for
the directive was an invalid regulation issued by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in excess
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 3
 of its statutory authority. Considering that the order - Under Art. 143 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
was made in contravention of law, it cannot be justified Shari’a  District  Courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  
by mere reference to the President's residual that of regular/civil courts over personal and real
powers. Such act is tainted with grave abuse of actions where the parties involved are Muslims, except
discretion. those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Thus, if
- The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed
human memory. We must note here the unforgettable before the regular courts.
and noble. We must note here the unforgettable and - Furthermore, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
noble sacrifices of the countless brave and patriotic define   “parties”   as   the   real   parties   in   interest   and  
men and women who feel as martyrs and victims “Muslim"  as  a  person  who  testifies  to  the  openness  of  
during the long dark years sacrifices of the countless God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and
brave and patriotic men and women who feel as professes Islam. Although it does not explicitly
martyrs and victims during the long dark years of the distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it
deposed regime of the deposed regime. nonetheless  connoted  the  “exercise  of  religion”,  which  
is a fundamental personal right.
- In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the private
SHARIA COURTS respondents and the petitioner are the real parties in
interest. It also cannot be argued that the private
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF respondents are Muslims. However, that the mayor is
LANAO DEL NORTE vs. HON. RASAD B. a Muslim is irrelevant for purposes of complying with
BALINDONG,et al. the jurisdictional requirement since he was merely
G.R. No. 193340. January 11, 2017 acting in a representative capacity, thus, it is the
petitioner, not him, who must be a Muslim, in order for
FACTS: the  Shari’a  District  Court  to  acquire  jurisdiction.
- The private respondents are the heirs of the late
Macalabo Alompo. They filed a complaint for the HENCE, the petition is granted.
recovery of possession of a parcel of land before the
Shari’a  Court  of  Marawi  City  against  the  petitioner.
- The private respondents alleged that the said parcel of SUPREME COURT
land was owned by Macalabo, who in 1962, entered
into an agreement with the petitioner to allow the latter FIRESTONE CERAMICS, et al. vs. COURT OF
to  “borrow”  the  land  for  the  construction  of  a  municipal   APPEALS, et al.
hall and healthcare center. It was agreed upon by G.R. No. 127022. June 28, 2000
Macalabo and the petitioner that the latter should pay
the value of the land within 35 years or in 1997, - This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court
otherwise, the ownership of the land would revert back En Banc these consolidated cases, which the Third
to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed, however, Division decided on September 2, 1999. The motions
that the petitioner neither paid the value nor returned it for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners,
to its owner. including Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.
- The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds - The following are considered en banc cases:
of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It claimed (Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the
that, as a municipality with no religious affiliation nor Resolution of November 18, 1993)
representing a cultural/ethnic tribe, it cannot be
considered   a   “Muslim”   under   the   Code   of   Muslim   1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
Personal Laws. The complaint must have been filed any treaty, international or executive agreement,
before the RTC of Lanao del Norte. law, executive order, or presidential decree,
- On  March  9,  2010,  the  Shari’a  District  Court  of  Marawi   proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
City   denied   the   petitioner’s   motion   to   dismiss.   It   held   regulation is in question;
that: (1)   Since   the   petitioner   Municipality’s   mayor   is   a   2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision
Muslim, the court has an original jurisdiction. And (2) It imposes the death penalty;
was the proper venue because it has territorial 3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and 4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public
del Norte, in addition to Marawi and Iligan cities. ministers and consuls;
- Hence, the petitioner filed the present petition for 5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the same of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
contention   that   the   Shari’a   District   court   has   no   Elections, and Commission on Audit;
jurisdiction since it is a municipality, it has no religious 6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the
affiliation. On the other hand, respondents argue that dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
the   Shari’a   District   Court   has   jurisdiction   since   the   judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
mayor of the petitioner and they, are Muslims. suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one (1) year or a fine exceeding
ISSUE: P10,000.00 or both;
WON   the   Shari’a   District   Court   of   Marawi   City   has   7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by
jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed the court en banc or in division may be modified
by Muslim individuals against a Municipality whose or reversed;
mayor is a Muslim 8. Cases assigned to a division which in the
opinion of at least three (3) members thereof
RULING: merit the attention of the court en banc and are
NO acceptable to a majority of the actual
- The   Shari’a   District   Court   of   Marawi   City   has   no   membership of the court en banc; and
jurisdiction under the law to deicide the private 9. All other cases as the court en banc by a
respondents’   complaint   because   not   all   of   the   parties   majority of its actual membership may deem of
involved in the action are Muslims. sufficient importance to merit its attention.

LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 4

- The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an
area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land
had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court
alleged to be without jurisdiction
- The validity of the said decision and the original
certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto depends on the classification of
subject area at the time it was so adjudicated, thus,
determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is
in order.
- The assailed decision does not indicate the
classification of the land in question, when the herein
private respondents obtained their decree of
registration thereover.
- There was submitted to the Court en consulta,
petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these
consolidated cases for the consideration of the Court.
- A pleading on March 7, 2000, entitled "FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN
CONSULTA," the Court opined that since the Third
Division had not yet acted on subject motions to refer
the cases to the Banc, it was then premature for the
Court to resolve the consulta. However, the Court
succinctly cautioned that the action of the Third Division
on the matter would just be tentative.
- On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny
petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the Banc.
- On March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the
consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases
for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the
cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to
merit its attention.
- The action of the Court under the premises is a
legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER,
under paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of
November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases as
the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit
its attention."
- The prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the
private petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and
resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is
meritorious.
- It bears stressing that where the Court En Banc
entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it
does so without implying that the Division of origin is
incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. It
simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en
banc attention and consideration.
- Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken
undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was
merely guided by the well-studied finding and
sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual
membership — that, indeed, subject cases are of
sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of
the whole Court
- Taking into account the importance of these cases and
the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of the
area in litigation, which is claimed as government
property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that
their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
DAVID LU vs. PATERNO LU YM, SR. and SONS and
LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 153690. February 15, 2011
FACTS:
- August 14, 2000, petitioners David Lu, et al. filed a
complaint   for   “Declaration   of   Nullity   of   Share   Issue,   involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a
Receivership   and   Dissolution”   against   the   dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
respondents, Paterno Lu Ym Sr. and sons before the
RTC of Cebu City.
- RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The respondents
filed an appeal which is still pending with CA.
- Three petitions were filed to the court which arises
from the complaint. (consolidated)
(1) G.R. No. 153690:   Petitioners   assailed   CA’s  
resolutions dismissing their complaint for lack of
signatories in the certificate of non-forum shopping
and consequently annulling the placing of the
subject corporation (Ludo & Luym Dev. Corp.
(LLDC)) under receivership pendent lite.
(2) G.R. No. 157381: Lu Ym Sr. and sons challenged
the   CA’s   resolution   restraining   the   RTC   from  
deciding their motion filed during the pendency of
the first case to lift the receivership.
- Both have been mooted by the amendment of their
respective complaints in conformity to the
requirements of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra- Corporate Controversies and the
RTC’s   decision   on   merits.   Both   parties   admitted   the  
mootness. (August 26, 2008)
(3) G.R. No. 170889: Moved for a motion to
reconsider   CA’s   denial   for   a   writ   of   preliminary  
injunction in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163.
- The Court dismissed the petition for no merit since the
issue for lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of the
correct RTC docket fees were raised during their filing
of motion for reconsideration before the CA. (August
26, 2008)
- However, on August 4, 2009, a resolution by the
Court (In Division) reversed its decision, setting aside
st
the decision in the 1 case, granting the motion for
nd rd
reconsideration in the 2 case and in the 3 case, it
ruled that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case   for   petitioners’   failure   to   pay   the   correct   docket  
fees, hence, all interlocutory matters challenged in
these consolidated cases are denied for being moot
and academic.
- Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration and
motion to refer resolution to the Court En Banc.
However, on September 23, 2009, a minute resolution
denied such motion.
ISSUE:
WON the decision rendered by the Court In Division last
August 4, 2009 can be referred to the Court En Banc.
RULING:
YES
- Matters and Cases which the Court En Banc shall act:
(Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC))
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, executive order, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision
imposes the death penalty or reclusion perpetua;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls;
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
(f) cases where the penalty recommended or
imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the
disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than one year, or a fine
exceeding forty thousand pesos;
(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 5
 the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judges
suspension or a lawyers suspension from the
practice of law;
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the
Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate
Justice of the collegial appellate court;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by
the Court en banc or by a Division my be modified
or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or
more divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be
obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a
huge financial impact on businesses or affects the
welfare of a community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division
cases that, in the opinion of at least three
Members of the Division who are voting and
present, are appropriate for transfer to the
Court en banc;
(n) cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient
importance to merit its attention; and
(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the
administrative supervision of all courts and their
personnel
- 3   members   of   the   Court’s   Second   Division   found that
the cases were appropriate for referral- transfer to the
Court En Banc.
It does not however, imply that the Division of origin is
incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. This
only means that the nature of the cases calls for an en
banc attention and consideration. The members of the
highest Court wishes nothing but to apply the law to
the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and
rule of law be observed.
- Doctrine of Immutability of Decisions applies only
to final and executor decisions
- ITCAB, it could still have modification or reversal of a
Court- ordained doctrine or principle- judgment
rendered by the Special Third Division may be
considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never
become final.
- Firestone case: While it is true that the Court en banc
exercises no appellate jurisdiction over its Division,
“the   only   constraint   is   that   any   doctrine   or   principle   of   Rules of Court, although appeal had already been
law laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or
in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the
Court sitting en  banc”
- The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend
its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it.
- AITC, David Lu points out: (1) the necessity to declare
legal doctrines regarding actions that are incapable of
pecuniary estimation; (2) application of estoppel by
laches in raising an objection of lack of jurisdiction;
and (3) whether bad faith can be deduced from the
erroneous annotation of lis pendens.
HENCE,   the   Court   GRANTS   petitioner’s   motion   for   WON the honorable respondent judge acted
reconsideration; Resolutions of Aug. 4, 2009 and Sept.
23, 2009, were overturned. The Court reinstates the
Aug. 26, 2008 Decision.
DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased)
substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE
M. TIONGCO vs. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE,et al.
G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
FACTS:
- A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
Order dated March 17, 1994[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which
reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of
lis pendens.
- Estreall Tiongco, filed in the RTC, alleging that she
was, on the basis of an affidavit of adjudication
dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole
surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis
de Tiongco.
- Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed
to the original registered owners, subject to
partition among the lawful heirs, and that
respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages
and costs. Lis pendens was granted by the court.
- He filed three motions for reconsideration to cancel the
notices of lis pendens, the respondent judge ruled to
wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena
Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, that "the continuance or removal of a
notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits. This court
further held that upon considerations and upon
further review of the records, hereby reconsiders
its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens, the
continued annotation of subject notices of lis
pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose
B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the
rights of plaintiff as such rights, if any, are now
foreclosed by prescription.
- This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek
reconsideration reversing himself on the ground
that:
(1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the
case due to the expiration of the last
day to appeal of both parties,
(2) the notice of appeal has been approved,
and
(3) the records had been ordered elevated
to the Court of Appeals
- The respondent judge issued the order, subject of
this petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the
perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders
for the protection and preservation of the rights of
the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal and considering that in the
case at bar, lis pendens is not a matter litigated
in the appeal and the records have not as yet
been transmitted to the appellate court so that
this Court still has jurisdiction.
- The Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of
notices of lis pendens. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
capriciously, whimsically and with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens
RULING:
- The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon
reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose
of which is to make known to the whole world
that properties in litigation are still within the power
of the court until the litigation is terminated and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 6
- The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to
the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at
his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over said property.
- Whether as a matter, of procedure substance, or
the rule is that a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely :
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party; or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it
to be recorded
- The petition should be dismissed, there being a
clear violation of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy
- The Court in People v. Cuaresma, xxx A last word.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpusand injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance),
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part
of their respective regions. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with
the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981,
the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary
writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed.
- There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.
- This is established policy. The Court therefore closes
this decision with the declaration, for the
information and guidance of all concerned, that it
will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will
require a more strict observance thereof.
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties
persisted in disregarding the judicial hierarchy.
- Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory
explanation as to her failure to comply with or
nonobservance of the principle of judicial
hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant
petition could not have been brought before the
Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it.
- Had petitioner brought the instant petition before
the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would,
have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby
bringing under the competence of the said court
all matters relative to the action, including the
incidents thereof.
- Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the
disposition of the instant case will be incomplete
without a reference to the improper and unethical
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
language employed by respondent Jose B.
Tiongco, It is his belief that counsel for petitioner,
Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-
type female of 52 who does not wear a dress
which is not red, and who stampedes into the
courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang
English to conceal her faulty grammar,"is impelled
by less than less than noble reasons in serving as
counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "To
please and tenderize and sweeten towards her
own self the readily available Carmelo M.
Tiongco," respondent bonito,"a retired police major
described by Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio an
unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with
plaintiff for being houseless who rents a place on
the subject property sought to be recovered by
petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried
maiden of a certain age, is variously described by
respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female
Apache who is now ready to skin defendant alive
for not being a bastard,"and a "horned spinster
and man-hungry virago and female bull of an
Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest,
harrass and injure defendant - if only to please
and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior -
the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated
affections - who happens not to miss every
chance to laugh at her behind her back." He
claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public
Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of one-
upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she
happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that
what she thought) plot to put one over her office-
mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a
private) by aiming at no lest than an IMDC major
- hoping to catch him by sheer brass and
audacity. In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the
PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own benefit.
Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will
come out of opposing counsel's scheme since,
quoting     Voltaire,     "outside     of   virtue,     there’s     no    
happiness. "Respondent Tiongco has achieved a
remarkable feat of character assassination. His
verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way,
are cast with little regard for truth. However, he
does nothing more than to obscure the issues,
and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip
betrays only a shocking absence of discernment.
- To this end, it will be wise to give him an object
lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by
which we expect members of the bar to comport
themselves. These provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are pertinent: Canon 8-a
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use languages which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED.
SOCIAL JUSTICE OF SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS
vs. ALFREDO S. LIM
G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014
FACTS:
- On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement
was entered into by oil companies (Chevron, Petron
and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation
of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 7
 risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil
terminals without affecting security and reliability of
supply and distribution of petroleum products.
- On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
(SP) enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies
the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining
areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. Owners and
operators of the businesses affected by the
reclassification were given six (6) months from the
date of effectivity to stop the operation of their
businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
- On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was
filed before the Supreme Court (SC) to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. Unknown to the SC, the oil
companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with
application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was
issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the
other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
- On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved
Ordinance   No.   8119   entitled   “An   Ordinance   Adopting   violated
the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto.
This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned
Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
- On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for
mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals.
- The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) on the 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC later
resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and
that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No.
8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between
them. SC later on denied with finality the second MR
of the oil companies.
- On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor
Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance
No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No.
8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance
No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy
Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil
depots are expressly allowed.
- Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor
Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their
contentions are as follows: (1) It is an invalid exercise
of police power because it does not promote the
general welfare of the people (2)It is violative of
Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
as well as health and environment related municipal
laws and international conventions and treaties, such
as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and
Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions on
nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the
Child (3)The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually
intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
- On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al.
and the intervenors oil companies contend that:
(1) The petitioners have no legal standing to sue
whether as citizens, taxpayers or legislators. They
further failed to show that they have suffered any injury
or threat of injury as a result of the act complained of.
(2)The petition should be dismissed outright for failure
to properly apply the related provisions of the
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the
appropriate remedy available.
(3) The principle of the hierarchy of courts is
violated because the SC only exercises appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance under
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
(4) It is the function of the SP to enact zoning
ordinance without prior referral to the Manila Zoning
Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal
all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be modified.
(5) There is a valid exercise of police power.
- On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No.
8283 which essentially amended the assailed
Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum
refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial
Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES:
(1) WON there are violations of environmental laws
(2) WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is
(3) WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue
(4) WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in
relation to the Pandacan Terminals
RULING:
(1) No
- The scope of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases is embodied in Section 2, Part I,
Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the
procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions
before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs, and
the RTCs involving the enforcement or violations of
environmental and other related laws, rules and
regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969,
Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No.
8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141; and
other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of
the environment and natural resources. Notably, the
aforesaid Rules are limited in scope.
- While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of
environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve
as collateral attacks that would support the other
position of the petitioners the protection of the right to
life, security and safety.
(2) No
- The SC held that it is true that the petitions should
have been filed with the RTC, it having concurrent
jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for
prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. However, the petitions at bar are of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v.
PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
(3) Yes
- The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007
which ruled that the petitioners in that case have a
legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a
public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a
direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances
of the city. No different are herein petitioners who seek
to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed ordinance,
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 8
 and who deal with the same subject matter that
concerns a public right. In like manner, the
preservation of the life, security and safety of the
people is indisputably a right of utmost importance to
the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of
Manila, have the required personal interest to seek
relief to protect such right.
(4) Yes
- In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed
Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil
depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning
used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring health,
public safety and general welfare of the residents of
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the
Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial.
- The following facts were found by the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the
City of Manila which recommended the approval of the
ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters
of highly flammable and highly volatile products
which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum
gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and
fuel oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water
and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and
near Malacanang Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the
depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.
- The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to
life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila
and not just of a particular class. The depot is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as there is such a target in their midst,
the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
becomes necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat. The same best interest of the
public guides the present decision.
- The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even
if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of
any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the
life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are
no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots,
the SC holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to
the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional. For, given that the threat sought to be
prevented may strike at one point or another, no
matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some,
the SC cannot allow the right to life be dependent on
the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very
life of not just an individual but of residents of big
neighbourhoods is at stake.
(5) Yes
- Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and
invalid with respect to the continued stay of the
Pandacan Oil Terminals. The incumbent mayor of the
City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the
relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the
Pandacan area. The oil companies shall, within a non-
extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the
RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive
plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
completed not later than six (6) months from the date
the required document is submitted.
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts:
- In accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution, this court has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. The same jurisdiction
is granted to the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Thus, there is
concurrence of jurisdiction among this court, the Court
of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court with regard to
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. However, the
concurrence of jurisdiction does not mean that parties
are free to choose which court to seek redress from.
This court is the court of last resort, and observance of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to
prevent "(1) inordinate demands upon the time and
attention of the court, which is better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the court's docket."
Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy;
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of
justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.
- However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
BANCO DE ORO, et al. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 198756. 13 January 2015
FACTS:
- On March 23, 2001, the Caucus of Development NGO
Networks (CODE-NGO), with the assistance of its
financial advisers, requested an approval from the
Department of Finance for the issuance by the Bureau
of Treasury of 10-year zero-coupon Treasury
Certificates
- On May 31, 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in
reply to CODE-NGO’s   letters   issued   BIR   Ruling   No.  
020-200117 on the tax treatment of the proposed
PEACe Bonds, confirming that the PEACe Bonds
would not be classified as deposit substitutes and
would not be subject to the corresponding withholding
tax
- The BIR rulings pronounced that to be able to
determine whether the financial assets are deposit
substitutes,   the   “20   or   more   individual   or   corporate  
lenders”  rule  must  apply.  
- On October 9, 2001, the Bureau of Treasury
announced that an auction to be held on October 16,
2011 for P30.0B worth of 10-year zero-coupon bonds.
The   announcement   stated   that   the   Bonds   “shall   be  
issued to not more than 19 buyers/lenders, thus, shall
not be subject to the 20% final withholding tax.
- After the auction, RCBC who participated on behalf of
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 9
 CODE-NGO was declared as the winning bidder
having tendered the lowest bids. Then on October 18,
2001, the Bureau of Treasury issued P35 billion worth
of Bonds at yield-to-maturity of 12.75% to RCBC for
approximately P10.17 billion, resulting in a discount of
approximately P24.83 billion.
- RCBC Capital sold the Government Bonds in the
secondary market. Petitioners purchased the PEACe
Bonds on different dates.
- On October 7, 2011, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 370-2011, declaring
that the PEACe Bonds being deposit substitutes are
subject to the 20% final withholding tax and directing
the BIR to withhold said final tax at the maturity
thereof, [allegedly without] consultation with Petitioners
as bondholders, and without conducting any hearing.
- It is now settled that all treasury bonds (including
PEACe Bonds), regardless of the number of
purchasers/lenders at the time of origination/issuance
are considered deposit substitutes.
- On October 17, 2011, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
issued BIR Ruling No. DA 378-201157 clarifying that
the final withholding tax due on the discount or interest
earned on the PEACe Bonds should be imposed and
withheld not only on RCBC/CODE NGO but also on
“’all  subsequent  holders  of  the  Bonds
- On October 17, 2011, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus (with urgent
application for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction) before the Supreme
Court seeking to:
ANNUL   Respondent   BIR’s   Ruling   No.   370-2011
dated 7 October 2011 [and] other related rulings
issued by BIR of similar tenor and import, for being
unconstitutional and for having been issued without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
PROHIBIT Respondents, particularly the BTr, from
withholding or collecting the 20% FWT from the
payment of the face value of the Government Bonds
upon their maturity;
COMMAND Respondents, particularly the BTr, to
pay the full amount of the face value of the
Government Bonds upon maturity; and
SECURE a temporary restraining order (TRO), and
subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining Respondents, particularly the BIR and the
BTr, from withholding or collecting 20% FWT on the
Government Bonds and the respondent BIR from
enforcing the assailed 2011 BIR Ruling, as well as
other related rulings issued by the BIR of similar
tenor and import, pending the resolution by [the
court] of the merits of [the] Petition.
- On October 18, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary   restraining   order   (TRO)   “enjoining   the   of Treasury to withhold the amount corresponding to
implementation of BIR Ruling No. 370-2011 against
the PEACe Bonds, subject to the condition that the
20% final withholding tax on interest income therefrom
shall be withheld by the petitioner banks and placed in
escrow  pending  resolution  of  the  petition.”
- Petitioners   filed   their   “Manifestation   with   Urgent   Ex   Court of Tax Appeals), as amended by Republic Act
Parte Motion to Direct Respondents to comply with the
TRO.”   They   alleged   that   on   the   same   day   that   the   Commissioner of Internal Revenue pertains to the
TRO was issued, the BTr paid to petitioners and other
bondholders the amounts representing the face value
of the Bonds, net however of the amounts
corresponding to the 20% final withholding tax on
interest income, and that the Bureau of Treasury
refused to release the amounts corresponding to the
20% final withholding tax.
- Respondents  argue  that  petitioners’  direct  resort  to  the   direct   recourse   to   it   when   “dictated   by   public   welfare
Supreme Court to challenge the 2011 BIR Ruling
violates the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
remedies and hierarchy of courts, resulting in a lack of
cause of action that justifies the dismissal of the
petition.   According   to   them,   “the   jurisdiction   to   review  
the rulings of the CIR, after the aggrieved party
exhausted the administrative remedies, pertains to the
Court  of  Tax  Appeals.”
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners violated procedural issues such as
doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts by directly resorting to the Supreme
Court to challenge the 2011 BIR Ruling
RULING:
Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies proper
- Under Section 4 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code, interpretative rulings are reviewable by the
Secretary  of  Finance.  Thus,  it  was  held  that  “if  superior  
administrative officers can grant the relief prayed for,
then special civil actions are generally not
entertained.”   The   remedy   within   the   administrative  
machinery must be resorted to first and pursued to its
appropriate   conclusion   before   the   court’s   judicial  
power can be sought.
- Nonetheless, jurisprudence allows certain exceptions
to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The  exceptions   under  (2)  “When  the  issue   involved   is  
purely   a   legal   question”,   and   (11)   “When   there   are  
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention”   are   present   in   this   case.     The   question  
involved is purely legal, namely:
(a) The interpretation of the 20-lender rule in the
definition of the terms public and deposit substitutes
under the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code;
and
(b) Whether the imposition of the 20% final
withholding tax on the PEACe Bonds upon maturity
violates the constitutional provisions on non-
impairment of contracts and due process.
- Judicial intervention is likewise urgent with the
impending maturity of the PEACe Bonds on October
18, 2011. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies also finds no application when the
exhaustion will result in an exercise in futility.
- In this case, an appeal to the Secretary of Finance
from the questioned 2011 BIR Ruling would be a futile
exercise because it was upon the request of the
Secretary of Finance that the 2011 BIR Ruling was
issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It appears
that the Secretary of Finance adopted the
Commissioner   of   Internal   Revenue’s   opinions as his
own. This position was in fact confirmed in the letter
dated October 10, 2011 where he ordered the Bureau
the 20% final withholding tax on the interest or
discounts allegedly due from the bondholders on the
strength of the 2011 BIR Ruling.
Doctrine on hierarchy of courts
- Under Republic Act No. 1125 (An Act Creating the
No. 9282, the jurisdiction to review the rulings of the
Court of Tax Appeals. The questioned BIR Ruling
Nos. 370-2011 and DA 378-2011 were issued in
connection with the implementation of the 1997
National Internal Revenue Code on the taxability of the
interest income from zero-coupon bonds issued by the
government.
- In exceptional cases, however, the court entertained
 
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice, or the orders
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 10
 complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.”
- Here, the nature and importance of the issues raised
to the investment and banking industry with regard to a
definitive declaration of whether government debt
instruments are deposit substitutes under existing
laws, and the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional
and compelling circumstances to justify resort to this
court in the first instance.
- The tax provision on deposit substitutes affects not
only the PEACe Bonds but also any other financial
instrument or product that may be issued and traded in
the market. Due to the changing positions of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue on this issue, there is a
need for a final ruling from this court to stabilize the
expectations in the financial market.
- Finally, non-compliance with the rules on exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts had
been   rendered   moot   by   this   court’s   issuance   of   the   declared that Smartmatic JV complied with the
temporary restraining order enjoining
implementation of the 2011 BIR Ruling.
temporary restraining order effectively recognized the
urgency and necessity of direct resort to this court.
LEO Y. QUERUBIN, MARIA CORAZON M. AKOL, and
AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC,et al.
G.R. No. 218787. December 8, 2015
FACTS:
- On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC en banc,
Resolution No. 14- 0715, released the bidding
documents for the "Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for
the Lease of Election Management System (EMS) and
Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical
Scan (OP-SCAN) System to be used in the 2016
National and Local Elections. The COMELEC Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) set the deadline for the
submission by interested parties of their eligibility
requirements and initial technical proposal on
December 4, 2014.
- The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation
(SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and
Jarltech International Corporation (collectively referred
to as "Smartmatic JV") responded to the call and
submitted bid for the project on the scheduled date.
Indra Sistemas, S.A. (Indra), aside from Smartmatic
JV, submitted its bid.
- During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV, in a
sworn certification, informed the BAC that one of its
partner corporations, SMTC, has a pending application
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to amend its Articles of Incorporation (AOI), attaching
therein all pending documents. The amendments
adopted as early as November 12, 2014 were
approved by the SEC on December 10, 2014. On even
date, Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-
to-end testing of their initial technical proposals for the
procurement project before the BAC.
- Upon evaluation of the submittals, the BAC, through its
Resolution No. 1 dated December 15, 2014, declared
Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible to participate in the
second stage of the bidding process. The BAC then
issued a Notice requiring them to submit their Final
Revised Technical Tenders and Price proposals on
February 25, 2015, to which the eligible participants
complied. Finding that the joint venture satisfied the
requirements in the published Invitation to Bid,
Smartmatic JV, on March 26, 2015, was declared to
have tendered a complete and responsive Overall
Summary of the Financial Proposal. Meanwhile, Indra
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
was disqualified for submitting a non-responsive bid.
Subsequently, for purposes of post-qualification
evaluation, the BAC required Smartmatic JV to submit
additional documents and a prototype sample of its
OMR. The prototype was subjected to testing to gauge
its compliance with the requirements outlined in the
project's Terms of Reference (TOR).
- After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC,
through Resolution No. 9 dated May 5, 2015,
disqualified Smartmatic JV on two grounds, viz.:
1. Failure to submit valid AOI; and
2. The demo unit failed to meet the technical
requirement that the system shall be capable
of writing all data/files, auditlog, statistics and
ballot images simultaneously in at least two
(2) data storages.
- The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for
reconsideration. In denying the motion, the BAC,
through Resolution No. 10 dated May 15, 2015,
the requirements of Sec. 23.1 (b) of the Revised
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184
(GPRA IRR), including the submission of a valid AOI,
but was nevertheless disqualified as it still failed to
comply with the technical requirements of the project.
- Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest to the
COMELEC seeking permission to conduct another
technical demonstration. Accordingly, on June 19,
2015, Smartmatic JV was allowed to prove compliance
with the technical specifications for the second time,
but this time before the electoral tribunal's Technical
Evaluation Committee (TEC). This was followed, on
June 23, 2015, by another technical demonstration
before the Commission en banc at the Advanced
Science and Technology Institute (ASTI) at the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.
- COMELEC en banc then ruled that the instant Protest
is hereby GRANTED and to RETURN to prospective
bidders their respective payments made for the
purchase of Bidding Documents pertaining to the
Second Round of Bidding.
- Petitioners, filing as taxpayers, alleged the following:
a. that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring Smartmatic JV as the
bidder with the lowest calculated responsive bid.
Smartmatic JV cannot be declared eligible, even
more so as the bidder with the lowest calculated
responsive bid, because SMTC, holding 46.5% of
the shares of Smartmatic JV, no longer has a valid
corporate purpose as required under Sec. 14 of
BP 68.
b. the company could not have submitted a valid
AOI, a procurement eligibility requirement under
Sec. 23.1 (b) of the IRR of RA 9184. Eligibility is
determined at the time of the opening of the bids,
which, in this case, was conducted on December
4, 2014.
c. that SMTC misrepresented itself by leading the
BAC to believe that it may cany out the project
despite its limited corporate purpose, and by
claiming that it is a Philippine corporation when it
is, allegedly, 100% foreign-owned.
Misrepresentation is a ground for the procuring
agency to consider a bidder ineligible and
disqualify it from obtaining an award or contract.
- COMELEC thru the OSG argued that the sole issue
raised before the COMELEC en banc was limited to
the technical aspect of the project. The sufficiency of
the documents submitted was already decided by the
BAC on May 15, 2015 when it partially granted
Smartmatic JV's motion for reconsideration through
BAC Resolution No. 10. Also, it bided to have the case
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 11
 dismissed for failure to observe the hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE:
WON under the circumstances, the Rule on Hierarchy of
Courts may be dispensed with
HELD:
YES
- Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution: duty of the
judiciary,   "…to   determine   whether   or   not   there   has   FACTS:
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
- Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts dictates that recourse
must first be made to the lopwer-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
- The Court reserves the direct invocation of its
jurisdiction only when there are special and important
reasons clearly and especially set out in the petition
that would justify the same.
- In the case of The Dioces of Bacolod v. Comelec,
specific instances were enumerated when direct resort
to the Court is allowed:
(a) When there are genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate
time;
(b) When the issues involved are of
transcendental importance;
(c) Cases of first impression;
(d) When the constitutional issues raised are best
decided by this Court;
(e) When the time element presented in this case
cannot be ignored;
(f) When the petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ;
(g) When there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(h) When public welfare and the advancement of
public policy so dictates, or when demanded by
the broader interest of justice;
(i) When the orders complained of are patent
nullities; and Patent Nullities is obviously wrong
(j) When appeal is considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.
- ITCAB, the second, fifth, and sixth grounds are
applicable.
- With regards to the second ground, much has already
been said of the "compelling significance and the
transcending public importance" of the primordial issue
underpinning petitions that assail election automation
contracts: the success and the far-reaching grim
implications of the failure—of the nationwide
automation project.
- As to the fifth ground, it is sufficient to state that with
the 2016 polls visible in the horizon, the post-haste
resolution of this case becomes all the more
imperative. It would be the height of absurdity to
require petitioners to undergo scrutiny through the lens
of the RTC first. Needless to state, this would impede
the preparations for the conduct of the polls and its
unmitigated effects could very well lead to mass
disenfranchisement of voters.
- For the sixth ground, the rulings of the COMELEC, as
a constitutional body, can immediately be reviewed by
the Court on proper petition.
- In sum, there exist ample compelling reasons to justify
the direct resort to the Court as a departure from the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts not in relation to but
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on certiorari and
prohibition, and to brush aside the procedural issues in
this case to focus on the substantive issues
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
surrounding the procurement of the 23,000 additional
OMRs for the 2016 elections.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED.
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON v. LEILA M. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 217508. April18, 2016
- This resolves a Petition for Certiorari praying that
the Resolutions dated January 27, 2015[2] and
February 20, 2015[3] of respondent Secretary of
Justice Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) in
I.S. No. III-10-INV-14J01102[4] be reversed and
set aside.
- A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine
National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and
private respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo
(Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton).
- On October 17, 2014, Pemberton received a
Subpoena issued by the City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City giving him 10 days from receipt
within which to file a counter-affidavit. Which
directed him to (a) "Pemberton, directing him to
present himself for the lifting of his fingerprint and
of buccal swabs during the clarificatory hearing set
on [November 5,] 2014;" and (b) the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, directing the
Chief of Office to assign forensic personnel to
gather fingerprints and buccal swabs from
Pemberton and subject him to "forensic
examination and analysis, including DNA testing."
On the same day, an Information for murder was
filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 865-2014 and was raffled to
Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court. The trial
court issued a warrant of arrest. On December 18,
2014,
- Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice.
- On the same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.
- Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for
Revew and stated that based on the evidence on
record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or
reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City."
- Pemberton's Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied for lack of merit in the Resolution
dated February 20, 2015.
- Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for
Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
- Pemberton argues that in sustaining a finding of
probable cause, Secretary De Lima committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
absence of jurisdiction based on the following
grounds: (a) Secretary De Lima took into account
additional evidence which the City Prosecutor
allegedly had no authority to receive and which
Pemberton had no opportunity to address and
rebut, thereby denying him due process of law; (b)
Secretary De Lima found probable cause to
charge Pemberton with the crime of murder when
"the evidence on record does not support the
existence of probable cause to indict [him] . . .
with either homicide or murder[;]" and (c) Secretary
De Lima found that "the killing was attended with
the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 12
 superior strength[,] and cruelty despite prevailing
jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these
qualifying circumstances . . . be established by
direct evidence." Secretary De Lima, through the
Office of the Solicitor.
- Leila de lima, through the office of the solicitor general
argued that this Petition is procedurally infirm. The
Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and
law by Secretary De Lima, which are "errors of
judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ
of certiorari."
- Further, by filing this Petition before this court and
not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the
principle of hierarchy of courts.
- Moreover, the case is moot and academic,
considering that the Regional Trial Court has
convicted Pemberton for the crime charged.
ISSUE:
WON Pemberton violated the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.
RULING:
- Respondents contend that petitioners' failure to file
the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent
jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
their petition. They add that observation of the
hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. While respondents claim
that while there are exceptions to the general rule
on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present
in this case.
- The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes
in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue
the so-called extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist
therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally
be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals.
- Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
- The doctrine that requires respect for the
hierarchy of courts was created by this court to
ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence
presented before them. They are likewise
competent to determine issues of law which may
include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or
even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions,
they are territorially organized into regions and
then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring
the facts from the evidence as these are
physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case'
that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
of course, would be national in scope.
- We proceeded to name exceptional cases, where
direct resort to this Court may be allowed:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when
there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A
direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies ofcertiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents
prejudice not only petitioners' right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others
in future similar cases.
A second exception is when the issues involved are
of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional
issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly
faced with the need for substantial protection. In the
case before this court, there is a clear threat to the
paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom
of expression which warrants invocation of relief from
this court.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct
resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower
courts on this matter.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better
decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court
held that: . . . it will be prudent for such courts, if
only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of
its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with
the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion. In this case, it is this
court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial
power, that can rule with finality on whether
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or
performed acts contrary to the Constitution through
the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case
cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the
2013 election period. Although the elections have
already been concluded, future cases may be filed
that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in
certain situations would qualify as an exception for
direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the
injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of
their right to freedom of expression. In this case, the
repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic
right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to
justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of
other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone
is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this
court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are
"dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest
of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered
as clearly an inappropriate remedy."
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 13
- It is not clear why any action by the Court of
Appeals, which has concurrent original jurisdiction
in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be
considered as sufficient for review of petitioner's
case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion
of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a
reason that is special and important enough to
successfully invoke this Court's original jurisdiction.
Once there has been a judicial finding of probable
cause, an executive determination of probable
cause is irrelevant.
- Consequently, even assuming that grave abuse of
discretion somehow taints an executive finding of
probable cause, such grave abuse of discretion
has no effect in a trial.
LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO
A. CASINO, and RAFAEL A. MARIANO, vs HON.
EVELYN A. TURLA, FLORO F. FLORENDO, ANTONIO
LAPUS, EDISON V. RAFANAN, EDDIE C.
GUTIERREZ, and RAUL M. GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 187094. February 15, 2017
FACTS:
- This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners seek to nullify and
set aside the orders dated July 18 and December 2,
2008 of RTC Br. 40, Palayan City and the dismissal of
the criminal cases against them.
- Herein petitioners are former members of the House of
Representatives. Liza represented GABRIELA,
Saturnino and Teodoro represented Bayan Muna while
Rafael represented Anakpawis.
- In three letters all dated December 14, 2006 referred
by Police Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo, there are 3
cases of murder against herein petitioners and 15
other persons, who were allegedly involved in the
deaths of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo
Felipe, members of AKBAYAN Party-list, a rival of
Bayan Muna and GABRIELA.
- A Preliminary Investigation was recommended to be
conducted. Subpoenas were also issued by Prosec.
Lapus, one of herein respondents. Petitioners filed a
Special Appearance with Motion to Quash
Complaint/Subpoena but the same was denied. They
filed another petition and motion to dismiss but were
also denied by the panel of investigating prosecutors.
- On April 11, 2008, the panel of prosecutors issued a
Joint Resolution. The same found that there was a
probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito
Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping with
murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe. The panel
recommended that the corresponding Informations be
filed against the suspects. On the same day, 2
Informations were filed before RTC. Branch 40,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (Palayan Case) and an
Information for kidnapping with murder was filed in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case)
- Petitioners filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case
Outright on the Guimba Case. The same was granted
by Judge Sta. Romana in an order dated August 5,
2008.
- Petitioners also filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable cause with Prayer to
Dismiss the Case Outright on the Palayan Case. The
same was heard in the sala of herein respondent
judge Hon. Turla.
- On July 18, 2008, Hon. Turla issued an order:
(a) Setting   aside   the   Panel   of   Prosecutor’s   Joint  
Resolution dated April 11, 2008.
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
(b) Remanding the case and Ordering the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija to
conduct a complete Preliminary Investigation for
their failure to properly conduct a preliminary
investigation in the Palayan Cases.
- Petitioners moved for Partial Reconsideration of the
July 18, 2008 praying for outright dismissal of the
Palayan cases against them for lack of probable
cause, but the same was denied by herein respondent
judge Hon. Turla.
- Hence, this petition.
- Respondents, for their part, argue that this petition
violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. They
contend that petitioners should have filed their petition
before the Court of Appeals, since it also exercises
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and
prohibition. They contend further that petitioners failed
to justify a direct resort to this court.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of
courts in bringing their petition directly before the court.
RULING:
- No. This petition is an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. As held in the case of Diocese of
Bacolod vs COMELEC, the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts was created to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner. It is not an iron-clad rule This
court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance
and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition."
- The doctrine of hierarchy of courts admits the ff.
exceptions:
1) Genuine Issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time;
2) Issues involved are of transcendental
importance;
3) Cases of first impression;
4) Constitutional issues raised are better decided
by the court;
5) Exigency in certain situations;
6) Review  of  a  constitutional  organ’s  acts;;
7) No other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available;
8) Questions involved are those dictated by Public
welfare, advancement of public policy or for
justice.
TN that it is NOT necessary that ALL must be
present at the same time to warrant direct resort to
this court.
- ITCAB, the presence of compelling circumstances
warrant  the  exercise   of  this  Court’s  jurisdiction.  At  the  
time the petition was filed, herein petitioners were
incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility of
their arrest and incarceration should the assailed
Orders be affirmed, would affect their representation of
their constituents in Congress.
- Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer
present, however, the merits of this case necessitate
this  Court’s  exercise  of  jurisdiction.
HENCE, the petition is partly granted. The assailed
orders dated July 18 and December 2, 2008 are set
aside. The case is remanded back to RTC Branch 40.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 14
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY OR STABILITY
OR NON- INTERFERANCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.
G.R. No. 166859. 26 June 2006
- For resolution is the Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which was filed by petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines, during the pendency of its
Petition for Certiorari before this Court challenging the
denial by public respondent, the Sandiganbayan, of its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case
No. 0033-F (the civil case).
- Petitioner pleads that the issue it raised in its Petition
for Certiorari — whether public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment — must first be resolved,
as a continuation of the proceedings in the civil case
by public respondent might be rendered unnecessary
in the event that its Petition before this Court is
resolved in its favor.
- The mere elevation of an interlocutory matter to this
Court through a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a
suspension of the proceedings before a public
respondent, unless a TOR or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public
respondent.
- The burden is on the petitioner in this petition to show
that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of a
TOR or writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of
suspending the proceedings before the public
respondent.
- The Court finds that petitioner has failed to discharge
the burden. The ground on which it bases its urgent
motion is the alleged futility of proceeding with the trial
of the case. This assertion is speculative, anchored on
the mere supposition that the petition would be
decided in its favor.
- There is thus, a marked absence of any urgent
necessity for the issuance of a TOR or writ of
preliminary injunction. EDHTAI
- The general rule that the mere pendency of a special
civil action for Certiorari commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court or court of origin
does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order.
- There are exceptions to which, wherein even if there is
no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be
proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its
proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.
- The rule on "judicial courtesy" applies where "there is
a strong probability that the issues before the higher
court would be rendered moot and moribund as a
result of the continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court or court of origin".
WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE
OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION filed by
petitioner REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES is DENIED.
The SANDIGANBAYAN is, however, ORDERED, in light
of the foregoing discussion, to continue the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 0033-F, as well as in all other cases
where its interlocutory orders are on challenge before
this Court but no Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction has been issued and there is no
strong probability that the issues raised before this Court
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
would be rendered moot and moribund.
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) vs. EIJI
YANAGISAWAA
G.R. No. 175303. April 11, 2012
FACTS:
- July 12, 1989, respondent, Eiji, a Japanese national
married Evelyn F. Castañeda (Evelyn).
- August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 sq. m.
townhouse unit at Parañaque, Metro Manila.
- 1996, Eiji filed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. While
the case was pending before the CA, he filed a motion
for issuance of a restraining order against Evelyn and
an application for a writ of a preliminary injunction,
asking to enjoined Evelyn from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her
name.
- However, his application and motion were held moot
for Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to
dispose of the properties registered in her name during
the pendency of the case. Hence, the Makati RTC
rendered a decision on October 2, 1996 annotated on
the title of the Parañaque townhouse unit.
- August   25,   1998,   due   to   Evelyn’s   loan   of   Php  
500,000.00 from PAFIN, she executed a real estate
mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the
Parañaque townhouse unit.
- Then, Makati RTC dissolved their marriage and
ordered the liquidation of their properties, including the
Parañaque townhouse unit. The Decision of the Makati
RC  didn’t  lift  its  order  on  Evelyn’s  commitment.
- Eiji learned of the REM and filed a complaint against
PAFIN and Evelyn for its annulment as it in violation pf
the RTC Makati order. Parañaque RTC ruled against
Eiji for the reason that he is a foreign national who
cannot possibly own the mortgaged property, hence,
he has no cause of action.
- Eiji appealed   the   RTC’s   decision   emphasizing   that  
Evelyn made a commitment to him and to the Makati
RTC and such commitment incapacitates her from
entering into the REM contract. This was favored by
the CA by annulling the REM executed by Evelyn and
PAFIN.
- They then filed separate motions for reconsideration
but were denied. PAFIN filed this petition for Review.
ISSUE:
WON the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of
ownership, even as the same issue was already ruled
upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the
Court of Appeals
RULING:
NO
- Cojuangco v. Villegas: The various branches of the
[regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they
have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule
would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
- Doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that
the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates
as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption
by the Parañaque RTC.
- The Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati
RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of
conflicting decisions.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 15
- Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a
standing injunction order are voidable as to the party
enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The
party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of
action to seek the annulment of the offending actions.
- The October 2, 1996 Order by the Makati RTC, embodying
Evelyn’s   commitment   not   to   dispose   of   or   encumber   the   appointments were a valid exercise by Evardone
property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition
or encumbrance of the property.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
CONRADO B. NICART, JR., as Provincial Governor
of LGU Eastern Samar vs. MA. JOSEFINA C.
TITONG and JOSELITO M. ABRUGAR, SR
G.R. No. 207682. December 10, 2014
FACTS:
- Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the: (a) issuance of
a temporary restraining order on
implementation of the writ of mandamus dated
April 16, 2013, issued by the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 2 of Borongan City, Eastern Samar
in Civil Case No. 4236, entitled Ma. Josefina M
Titong, et al. v. Hon. Conrado B. Nicart, Jr., et
al.; and (b) the annulment and setting aside of the
RTC's Decision dated April 11, 2013 as well as its
June 20, 2013 Order, in said case.
- A few days prior to the end of his term, then
Governor of Eastern Samar Ben P. Evardone
(Evardone) issued ninety-three (93) appointments
between May 11, 2010 and June 29, 2010,
including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina
Titong (Titong) and Joselito Abrugar, Sr. (Abrugar),
which appointments were later confirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
- Consequently, the appointees immediately assumed
their respective positions. Upon submission,
however, of the appointments to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Regional Office (CSCRO) No.
VIII, all 93 appointments were disapproved for
having been made in violation of Section 2.1 of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007.
- Evardone appealed the disapproval but it was
dismissed for nonpayment of the requisite filing fee
and the appointments having been issued in
violation of said circular. Respondents, for their
part, individually moved for reconsideration of the
disapproval.
- Meanwhile, on August 10, 2010, Titong and
Abrugar requested the assistance of the CSC with
their claim for payment of their first salary which
was denied by the Commission on Audit (COA)
Provincial Office and by petitioner, who at that
time was already the incumbent Governor.
- Acting on the appeal, the CSC rendered Decision
granting    the  petition,    modifying    the    CSCRO’s    ruling,     WON the respondent violated the Doctrine of Judicial
and declaring the appointment of Titong and
Abrugar valid on the ground that the two are
qualified for the positions to which they were
appointed.
- The Provincial Government of Eastern Samar is
directed to pay the salaries and benefits of Titong
and Abrugar from the time that they have
assumed their respective positions.
- Undaunted, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition for review of the above
CSC Decision and Resolution.
- There, petitioner, in the main, argues that the
appointments were in violation of said Section 21
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, s. 2007 and
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
that the exemptions laid down in Nazareno v City
of Dumaguete4 were not met for the following
reasons: (a) there was no need to fill up the
vacancies immediately; and (b) the appointments
were made en masse.
- Respondents, for their part, maintain that their
of his power of appointment.
- In     view     of     petitioner’s     continued     refusal     to     pay    
their salaries, among others, despite the service of
the writ of execution upon him and with CAG.R.
SP No. 119975 still pending resolution,
respondents filed before the RTC a Petition for
Mandamus with Unspecified Damages against
herein petitioner, the Vice Governor, and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
docketed as in Civil Case No. 4236.5 .
- The CA rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
119975 granting the petition and ruling that
respondents’  appointments    are    not    valid    for    having    
been issued in violation of CSC Rules and for
the failure tocomply with the requisites set forth by
jurisprudence. Consequently, the CA held,
respondents can no longer claim entitlement to the
payment of their salaries from the government and
that it is the appointing authority who shall be
personally liable for their salaries, as directed by
Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules
on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions
which states: Sec. 4. The appointing authority shall
be personally liable for the salary of the
appointees whose appointments have been
disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as
the publication requirement pursuant to RA 7041.
- According to the RTC, the non-issuance by the
CA of a restraining order or injunction restraining it
from proceeding with Civil Case No. 4236, coupled
with   respondents’     filing     of     a     Rule     45     petition    
before this Court (G.R. No. 203835) thereby
staying the Decision of the CA which reversed the
ruling     of     the     CSC     and   declared     respondents’    
appointment as invalid, results in the continued
effectivity     of     the     CSC     Decision     in   respondents’    
favor.13 Furthermore, the RTC held that this is
consistent with Section 82 of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in Civil Service (CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999; CSC
Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999),
which states that "[t]he filing and pendency of a
petition for review with the [CA] or certiorari with
the [SC] shall not stop the execution of the final
decision of the Commission, unless the Court
issues a restraining order or an injunction.
- Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from this
Court via a Rule 45 Petition docketed as G.R. No.
203835.10
ISSUE:
Stability
RULING:
- The petition is meritorious.
- Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the CA of an
injunction or restraining order would make the CSC
Resolution executory pending appeal per Section
82 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19.
- Making it a proper subject of a petition for
mandamus.
- However, what the RTC failed to take into account
is the fact that the propriety of the very directives
under the writ of mandamus sought is wholly
reliant    on    the    CA’s  resolution    of    CA-G.R. SP No.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 16
 119975 and that judicial courtesy dictates that it SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. vs. EMILINDA D.
suspend     its     proceedings     and   await     the     CA’s     MACATLANG, et al.
resolution of the petition for review. When the G.R. No. 180147-180150. January 14, 2015
RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well
aware of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. FACTS:
119975 the subject of which is the reversal and - Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 180147,180148,
setting     aside     of   the     CSC’s     affirmation     of     180149,180150, and 180319 are Sara Lee Philippines,
respondents’     appointments,   embodied     in     the     very     Inc. (SLPI), Aris Philippines, Inc. (Aris) , Sara Lee
Resolution which respondents seek to be enforced Corporation (SLC) , Atty. Cesar Cruz (Cruz) , and
in the petition for mandamus. Nevertheless, the Fashion Accessories Philippines, Inc. (FAPI) ,
trial court, implying that the petition for review respectively and shall be collectively referred to as the
pending before the CA will not, in any way, affect "Corporations." The petition docketed as G.R. No.
or be affected by the petition for mandamus. 180685 is filed by Emilinda D. Macatlang and 5,983
- Petitioner] are with respect to CSC Circulars other former employees of Aris. Emilinda D. Macatlang
and/or Memorandum, Resolutions, Laws, Rules, allegedly represents the employees whose
and Regulations relative to the civil service."20 employment was terminated upon the closure of Aris.
Furthermore, the trial court held that it is an - The controversy stemmed when on Sept. 4, 1995, Aris
accepted principle that "quasi-judicial bodies like filed a Notice of Permanent Closure before the DOLE
the Civil Service Commission are better-equipped stating that it will permanently cease its operations
in handling cases involving the employment status effective October 9, 1995. The closure caused the
of employees as those in the Civil Service since it displacement of 5, 984 rank-and-file employees.
is within the field of their expertise"21 and that - On October 26, 1995, FAPI was incorporated. This
"the appointments of [respondents] having been prompted the former Aris employees to file a case for
accepted by them and in fact assumed office[,] illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a
shall remain in force and in effect until continuing business of Aris. As major stockholders and
disapproved by the [CSC], the only office who officer of FAPI, SLC, SLP, and Cesar Cruz,
has the authority to recall such appointments by respectively, were impleaded as defendants therein.
[respondents]." - On October 30, 2004, the LA held that the 5, 984 Aris
- the court a quo incorrectly concluded that it may employees were illegally dismissed, and awarded
take cognizance of the petition without erroneously them monetary benefits amounting to P 3,453,664,
disregarding the principle of judicial courtesy. What 710.86. The judgment award composed of separation
is more, the RTC went beyond the issues of the pay of one month for every year of service,
case    when  it    affirmed    the    validity    of    respondents’     backwages, moral and exemplary damages and
appointments, considering that the only issue attorney’s  fees.
presented before it is the propriety of executing - Upon receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision, the
CSC Resolution No. 1100653 through a writ of Corporations filed their Notice of Appeal with Motion to
mandamus despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP Reduce Appeal Bond and To Admit Reduced Amount
No. 119975.25. with the National Labor Relations Commission
- Nevertheless, enforcement of the disputed CSC (NLRC). They posted a P4.5 Million bond.
Resolution is no longer proper and necessary in - In light of the impossibility for any surety company to
light of Our Resolutions dated February 27, 2013 cover the appeal bond and the huge economic losses
and     February   10,     2014,     affirming     the     CA’s     ruling     which the companies and their employees might suffer
that     respondents’   appointments     were     not     valid,     if   the   ₱3.45   Billion   bond   is   sustained,   the   NLRC  
making the issue on the propriety of enforcing the granted the reduction of the appeal bond. On March
CSC Resolution pending appeal, moot and 31, 2006, the NLRC issued an Order dated directing
academic. A moot and academic case is one that the   Corporations   to   post   an   additional   ₱4.5   Million  
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by bond,  bringing  the  total  posted  bond  to  ₱9  Million.
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration - The former 5, 984 former Aris employees, represented
thereon would be of no practical value. by Emilinda Macatlang filed a petition for review before
- Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our the CA insisting that the appeal was not perfected due
issuance of two minute resolutions––one denying to the failure of the Corporations to post the correct
the petition, and the second denying amount of the bond which is equivalent to the
reconsideration thereof––thereby     affirming     CA’s     judgment award.
finding against the validity of respondents - While the case was still pending before the CA, the
appointments     and     effectively   reversing     the     RTC’s     NLRC, on December 19, 2006, prematurely issued an
affirmation    of    the    CSC’s    findings.     order   setting   aside   the   LA’s   decision   and   remanding  
- The mandamus now has no basis upon which its the case to the "forum of origin for further
issuance can be anchored under the principle of proceedings”.
res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. - On March 26, 2007, the CA proceeded to reverse and
set aside the March 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal
petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated bond of P1 Billion.
April 11, 2013, the Order dated June 20, 2013, and - On   June   4,   2014,   the   SC   modified   the   CA’s   decision,  
the writ of mandamus dated April 16, 2013, all whereby the Corporations are directed to post P725
issued by the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 2 Million in cash or surety bond within 10 days from the
of Borongan City, Eastern Samar in Civil Case No. receipt of the decision, nullified the Resolution of the
4236, entitled Ma. Josefina M. Titong, et al. v. Hon. NLRC dated December 19, 2006 for being premature,
Conrado B. Nicart, Jr., et al. are hereby ANNULLED and directed the NLRC to act with dispatch to resolve
and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. the merits of the case upon perfection of the appeal.
- Hence, this is a Motion for Reconsideration with
Urgent  Petition  for  the  Court’s  Approval of the Pending
“Motion   for   Leave   of   Court   to   File   and   Admit   Herein  
Statement   and   Confession   of   Judgment”   with   the  

LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 17

 following contention, among others, that: There was no
legal impediment for the NLRC to issue its resolution
vacating  the  LA’s  decision  and  remanding the case to
the latter for further proceeding as no TRO or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued by the CA and the
rule on judicial courtesy remains exception rather than
the rule.
ISSUE:
WON   NLRC’s   December   19,   2006   Resolution   vacating   22,796,200.00.
the Labor   Arbiter’s   decision   would   render   moot   the   -
appeal filed before CA
RULING:
YES.
- In the recent case of Trajano v. Uniwide Sales
Warehouse Club, this Court gave a brief discourse on
judicial courtesy, which concept was first introduced in
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, to wit:
“.   .   .   [t]he   principle   of   judicial   courtesy   to   justify   supposedly discovered that the amounts annotated as
the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court
even without an injunctive writ or order from the higher
court. In that case, we pronounced that "[d]ue respect for
the Supreme Court and practical and ethical
considerations should have prompted the appellate court
to wait for the final determination of the petition [for
certiorari] before taking cognizance of the case and
trying to render moot exactly what was before this
[C]ourt." We subsequently reiterated the concept of
judicial courtesy in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court
of  Appeals”.
- We, however, have qualified and limited the
application of judicial courtesy in Go v. Abrogar and
Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we
expressly delimited the application of judicial courtesy
to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and held that the principle of judicial
courtesy applies only "if there is a strong probability
that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower court."
Through these cases, we clarified that the principle of
judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather
than the rule.
- In the case at bar, the December 19, 2006 ruling of the
NLRC would moot the appeal filed before the higher
courts because the issue involves the appeal bond
which is an indispensable requirement to the
perfection of the appeal before the NLRC. Unless this
issue is resolved, the NLRC should be precluded from
ruling on the merits on the case. This is the essence of
judicial courtesy.
- Hence, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Herein
Statement and Confession of Judgment; and the
respondents' Partial Motion for Reconsideration for
their lack of merit are denied. The directive in the
Decision dated June 4, 2014 to the National Labor
Relations Commission to act with dispatch to resolve
the merits of the case upon perfection of the appeal is
hereby REITERATED.
LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE
HEIRS OF FELICIANO TIMBOL vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 207408. 18 April 2016
FACTS:
- Sometime in December 1996, Karrich Holdings Ltd.
[KHL], based in Hong Kong and owned by Felino M.
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
Timbol, Jr. [Timbol] applied with Philippine National
Bank   [“PNB”]’s   wholly-owned Hong Kong-based
subsidiary, PNB International Finance Limited [PNB-
IFL] for credit facilities.
- Karrich Auto Exchange   [“KAE”],   then   named  
Superkinis Auto Sales, a sole proprietorship based in
the Philippines and also owned by Timbol, acted as
co-borrower. The credit facilities were granted in the
total amount of USD 850,000.00, or PhP
As security, Timbol executed real estate mortgages
over nine (9) different parcels of real estate.
- The first Real Estate Mortgage was in consideration of
credit accommodations in the amount of Php
13,053,600.00. The second Real Estate Mortgage
amounted to PhP 7,598,850.00. The third Real Estate
Mortgage secured an obligation amounting to Php
2,143,750.00.
- The real estate mortgages were annotated on the
aforementioned transfer certificates of title. Timbol
mortgaged added up to PhP 101,117,800.00.
- Over time, Timbol signed several Promissory Notes,
attesting to availments under the credit line amounting
to USD 849,595.07.
- On April 1, 1998, the credit facilities were reduced to
USD 848,300.00.
- When Timbol, KAE, and KHL defaulted on the
payment of their loan obligation, PNB sent a demand
letter dated September 2, 1999, advising them that
their total outstanding obligation stood at PhP
38,088,173.59, inclusive of penalties and interests.
- On October 19, 1999, Timbol manifested that he was
well   aware   of   the   “P33   Million”   outstanding   obligation  
and that he was awaiting the outcome of a pending
application for another loan. Timbol thus requested for
additional time to settle the obligation with PNB-IFL
and for the conversion of the same to Philippine
currency.
- On November 15, 1999, PNB caused the foreclosure
of the mortgaged properties, claiming that
Timbol/KAE/KHL had violated the terms of the real
estate mortgage by defaulting on the payment of the
loan obligation despite demands. As of the date of the
foreclosure, the outstanding obligation already
amounted to USD 1,021,743.40 or PhP
42,320,611.62.
- PNB was allegedly the highest bidder at the public
auction sale with a bid price of PhP 35,669,000.00.
- On August 4, 2000, Timbol filed suit against PNB, et
al. for annulment of the real estate mortgage, of the
foreclosure and auction sale, for accounting and
damages, and for a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction.
- They   accused   PNB   of   deliberately   “bloating”   the  
amount of the obligation. They furthermore assailed
the foreclosure proceedings as highly irregular, invalid,
and illegal, because the petition for the extra-judicial
foreclosure had not been filed in accordance with
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3; the Notice
of  Notary   Public’s  Sale   did  not  specify  the   newspaper  
in which the Notice of Sale would be published, and
was neither raffled for this purpose nor properly
posted; and the Notary did not conduct an actual
public bidding.
- Plaintiffs also prayed for preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief to restrain PNB from consolidating its
title to and ownership over the real properties
- On September 8, 2000, the RTC granted the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. The RTC
denied   PNB’s   Motion   for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, while
granting   the   plaintiffs’   Motion   to   Reduce   Bond.   PNB  
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 18
 elevated  the   RTC’s  Order  all  the   way  to  the   Supreme   such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
Court which would ultimately nullify and set aside the of the case before the court. As a general rule, a
same in its February 11, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to
157535. be the law of the case whether that question is right or
- PNB argued that the total amount of wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself
Timbol/KAE/KHL’s   obligation   already   included   interest   aggrieved  being  to  seek  a  rehearing.”
at agreed-upon rates and that the foreclosure - The doctrine applies when (1) a question is passed
proceedings had been proper and valid. upon by an appellate court, and (2) the appellate court
- On 5 January 2005, the RTC declared null and void remands the case to the lower court for further
the foreclosure of mortgage made by the defendant proceedings; the lower court and even the appellate
bank. courts on subsequent appeal of the case are, thus,
- Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC bound by how such question had been previously
decision, PNB elevated the case to the Court of settled.
Appeals. While the case was pending, Timbol died and - The doctrine of the law of the case is necessary to
was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners. enable an appellate court to perform its duties
- On September 26, 2012, the Court of Appeals satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible
reversed  the  RTC’s  decision. if a question, once considered and decided by it, were
- The Court of Appeals held that factual issues raised by to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and
PNB  have  been  “definitively  laid  to  rest”  by  this  Court’s   every subsequent appeal.
decision in PNB v. Timbol, where it was found that - Thus, questions necessarily involved in the decision on
“respondents   never   denied   that   they   defaulted   in   the   a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case
payment  of  the  obligation.” on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not
- In   the   same   decision,   this   Court   upheld   PNB’s   expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the
argument   that   “Supreme   Court   Administrative   Order   presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on
No. 3 does not apply, the extrajudicial foreclosure the point decided have received due consideration
having been conducted by a notary public to which whether all or none of them are mentioned in the
mode of foreclosure respondents agreed in the REMs, opinion.
hence,  proper.”
- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied in the assailed Resolution dated 31 May DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
2013. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY
- Hence, this petition for review. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in applying the FACTS:
Decision of the Court in PNB vs. Timbol (G.R. No. - July 1976, respondent Guariña Corporation applied for
157535) as the issue on that case is on the injunction a loan (P3,387,000.00) from petitioner DBP for the
only. construction of a resort complex in Iloilo.
- Prior to the release of the loan, petitioner required
RULING: respondent to put up a cash equity of P1,470,951.00
- No. The petition is denied for lack of merit. for the construction of the buildings and other
- The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law of the improvements on the resort complex.
case doctrine. In PNB v. Timbol, PNB brought a petition - The loan was released in several installments, which
for certiorari to set aside the order that issued a writ of respondent used to cover the additional
preliminary injunction. The Court struck down this order, improvements. In all, the amount released totaled
holding   that   the   order   “was   attended   with grave abuse P3,003,617.49, from which petitioner withheld
of  discretion.” P148,102.98 as interest.
- The  Court  found  that  the  Spouses  Timbol  “never  denied   - Upon inspection, petitioner found that Guariña had not
that  they  defaulted  in  the  payment  of  the  obligation.”  In   completed the construction works and demanded in a
fact, they even acknowledged that they had an letter dated Feb. 27, 1978 that respondent expedite
outstanding obligation with PNB, and simply requested the completion and warned that it would initiate
for more time to pay. foreclosure proceedings should they not comply.
- The Court also held that the extrajudicial foreclosure of - The non-action and objection of respondent led DBP
the mortgage was proper, since it was done in to initiate extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, which
accordance with the terms of the Real Estate Mortgage, gave its clients and patrons the impression that
which   was   also   the   Court’s   basis   in   finding   that   business operation had slowed down and that the
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 does not resort had closed.
apply in that case. - January 6, 1979, Guariña sued DBP in the RTC to
- The   Court   also   found   that   the   Spouses   Timbol’s   claim   demand specific performance  of  the  latter’s  obligations  
that PNB bloated the amount of their obligation was under loan agreement and to stop the mortgage
“grossly   misleading   and   a   gross   misinterpretation”   by   foreclosure. While DBP moved for its dismissal, stating
the Spouses Timbol. The Court noted the Spouses that the mortgaged properties had already been sold
Timbol’s   letter   to   PNB that acknowledged they had an to satisfy the obligtion of Guariña.
outstanding obligation to PNB, as well as affirmed that - And so on February 6, 1979, respondent amended the
they received the demand letter directing them to pay, complaint, to seek the nullification of the foreclosure
contrary to their claim. proceedings and cancellation of certificate of sale.
- No doubt, this Court is bound by its earlier - In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a
pronouncements in PNB v. Timbol. writ of possession, which was granted upon their
- The term law   of   the   case   means   “whatever   is   once   motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Guariña
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or assailed  RC’s  decision   to   CA  on  certiorari,   which   was  
decision between the same parties in the same case dismissed.
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which

LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 19

- After which, DBP sought the implementation of the
order for the issuance of the writ of possession which
was granted by the RTC on June 16, 1982.
- January 6, 1998, RTC ruled in respondent’s   favor –
rendered the extrajudicial sale as null and void,
ordered petitioner to give back the properties
foreclosed and for respondent to pay back the loan.
- On   appeal,   the   CA   sustained   the   trial   court’s   decision   -
with the modification   deleting   the   award   of   attorney’s   Elmaco issued an Order discharging P/Insp. Dongail
fees.
ISSUE:
WON the CA adhered to the usual course of judicial
proceedings in deciding the case in accordance with the
law of the case of doctrine
RULING:
NO
- The doctrine of law of the case did not apply herein.
- Law of the case is the opinion delivered on a former
appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court.
- Therefore, when an appellate court has once declared
the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the
law of that case even on a subsequent appeal,
notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have
been reversed in other cases.
- ITCAB,   the   ex   parte   proceeding   on   DBP’s   application   of merit. The appellate court held that the Secretary of
for issuance of the writ of possession was entirely
independent from the judicial demand for specific
performance herein. In fact, the former case, being an
interlocutory appeal while the main case was pending,
was not at all intertwined with any legal issue properly
raised  and  litigated  in  the  latter’s  case.   of the Department of Justice is hereby set aside and
- Also, the ruling in the case of possession did not settle
any question of law involved herein because this case
for specific performance was not a continuation of the
main case, and vice versa.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision of the CA.
PCI JIMMY M. FORTALEZA and SPO2 FREDDIE A
NATIVIDAD vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALES in his
capacity as the Secretary of Justice and ELIZABETH
N. OROLA VDA. DESALABAS
G.R. No. 179287. February 1, 2016
FACTS:
- Maximo Lomoljo, Jr., Ricardo Suganob, and Eleuterio
Salabas were allegedly kidnapped in Bacolod City on
August 31, 2003. A few days later, their dead' bodies
were found in different places in Negros Oriental.
- Several criminal complaints were filed in relation to this
incident.
- First filed, against Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Clarence
Dongail alias Dodong and fifteen other John Does
before the Bacolod City Prosecution Office. The
complaint was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
- Second filed, an Amended Criminal Complaint
against P/Insp. Dongail, Manolo Escalante and fifteen
other for Kidnapping with Murder before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. The
MTC issued a Resolution dismissing the Amended
Criminal Complaint for lack of factual and legal merit.
- Third filed, another Amended Affidavit Complaint for
Kidnapping with Murder before the Negros Oriental
Provincial Prosecution Office against P/Insp. Dongail,
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
and fifteen others. The Complaint was docketed as LS.
Case No. 2004-78. On August 9, 2004, Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Joseph A. Elmaco issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against P/Insp.
Dongail and Ramonita Estanislao and "15 other 'John
Does' for the death of victim Eleuterio Salabas."
- P/Insp. Dongail filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On October 1, 2004, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
from the criminal complaint.
- An Information for Kidnapping with Murder was
thereafter filed against Ramonita Estanislao and fifteen
John Does before the Regional Trial Court of
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. The case was assigned
to Branch 64 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 04-094-
G.
- On October 2, 2006, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez
issued the aforementioned Resolution modifying the
August 9, 2004 resolution of the Negros Oriental
Provincial Prosecution Office (which found probable
cause against P/lnsp. Dongail and Estanislao only and
dismissed the case against the other respondents).
- PS/lnsp. Clarence Dongail appealed the same October
2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before
the Office of the President, which was denied on
January 9, 2008 resolution.
- In the mean time, PC/ Jimmy Fortaleza and SP02
Freddie Natividad filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals challenging the
October 2, 2006.
- On August 16, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for lack
Justice has the power of supervision and control over
prosecutors and therefore can motu proprio take
cognizance of a case pending before or resolved by
the Provincial Prosecution Office. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the 02 October 2006 Resolution
order reinvestigation of the case.
- In her Petition for Certiorari, Orola-Salabas assail the
September 19, 2007 Decision and January 9, 2008
Resolution of the Office of the President
ISSUES:
(1) WON public respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion in proceeding with the
appeal after the RTC had acquired jurisdiction
over the case, an act which was clearly and
unmistakably outside their powers as it
constitute an encroachment upon judicial power.
(2) WON respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the decision of the CA
upholding the power and authority of the
secretary of justice in issuing his resolution
indicting private respondents of the crime
charged.
RULING:
(1) NO
- In People v. Espinosa,we stressed that the court does
not lose control of the proceedings by reason of a
reinvestigation or review conducted by either the DOJ
or the Office of the President.
(2) YES
- The determination by the Court of Appeals on the
question of the validity of the Secretary of Justice
Resolution should be considered the law of the case
and should remain established in all other steps of the
prosecution process.
- Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal, and means, more
specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 20
 established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Office of the
President dated September 19, 2007 and its Resolution
dated January 9, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Secretary of Justice for further
proceedings with respect to respondents Clarence
Dongail, Jonathan Lorilla, Allen Winston Hulleza and
Bernardo Cimatu.
DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562. March 31, 2009
FACTS:
- Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent
Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while
they were classmates in medical school. They fell in
love, and they got married on July 26, 1975 in Cebu
City when respondent was already pregnant with their
first child. Out of their marriage, the couple begot six
(6) children.
- -Five years after petitioner passed the medical board
exam, or in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital,
owned by Carmen's family, as member of its active
staff, while Carmen worked as the hospital's
Treasurer.
- On October 21, 1993, after being married for more
than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, respondent filed a
verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that the
petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity even
at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter. She
alleged that her husband was an excessive drinker,
compulsive gambler, violent, immature and
irresponsible for failing to provide financial support to
their family In his answer, petitioner denied being
psychologically incapacitated.
- During the trial, the respondent presented their former
nanny Susan Wasawas and a psychiatrist, Dr. Pureza
Trinidad-Oñate  who  confirmed  the  respondent’s  claims   courts to cases involving same facts. Whereas the
of  her  husband’s  psychological  incapacity.  For  his  part,   latter requires that the high courts must follow its own
petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist
and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in
VSMMC as his expert witness. He did not find the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated.
- On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void under Art. 36. The RTC
gave credence to Dr. Oñate's findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his
deposition.
- Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October
19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the
trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial court's finding,
stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that he was psychologically incapacitated
at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's
conclusion was based only on theories and not on
established fact, contrary to the guidelines set forth in
Santos v. Court of Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals and Molina.
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
- Because of this, respondent filed a Motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina
decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997,
or more than five years after she had filed her petition
with the RTC. She claimed that the Molina ruling could
not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis.
- Initially, the CA denied the Motion for reconsideration
for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
Respondent thereafter filed a Manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same
was likewise denied for lack of merit.
- Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court. In a Resolution dated March 5, 2003,
this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to
resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration.
- On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous
ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an
Amended Decision reversing its first ruling and
sustaining the trial court's decision.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004
Resolution.
- Hence, this petition for review on certiorari seeking to
set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13,
2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903.
ISSUES:
WON the rule on stare decisis was violated by the CA
when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases
RULING:
YES
- The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by
lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court
in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple
reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
- In   Justice   Puno’s   dissent   in   the   case   of   Lambino   vs  
COMELEC, the doctrine of stare decisis was
elucidated. The doctrine of stare decisis has 2 strains:
vertical and horizontal. The former deals with the duty
of the lower courts to apply decisions of the higher
precedents. Horizontal stare decisis also has 2 kinds:
Constitutional stare decisis and Statutory stare decisis.
The former involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while the latter involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy
more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations.
- Further, In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule
for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy;
and, (3) it allows for predictability.
- Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare
decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress;
and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future
courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck
agreeing with them.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 21
- The leading case in deciding whether a court should
follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations
is Planned Parenthood v. Casey . It established a 4-
pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether
the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add
inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a
remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.
- ITCAB, respondent's argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not
be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down in
Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In
these cases, we explained that the interpretation or
construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit".
- It cannot be said however, that the court has already
abandoned the guidelines set forth in Molina. Far from
abandoning Molina, the court simply suggested the
relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth
therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).
- But where, as in this case, the parties had the full
opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity
and incurability of a party's alleged psychological
incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in
deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17,
2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC.
(PGBI) vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010
FACTS:
- The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI)
seeks in this petition for certiorari and in the motion for
reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify
COMELEC Resolutions, wherein the COMELEC
delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.
- For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC
en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations
from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions.
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
- Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI;
it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections.
- PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but
likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission of
its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization
under the Party-List System Act.
- COMELEC denied the motion/opposition for lack of
merit and found the motion to have been filed out of
time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for
accreditation provided in Resolution 8646.
- PGBI came to this Court in its petition for certiorari.
The same was initially dismissed in light of the ruling in
Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also
known as MINERO v. COMELEC.
- In MINERO v. COMELEC, applying Section 6(8) of RA
7941, the Court disqualified MINERO since petitioner
by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in
2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004
elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding
elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to
certify it.
- PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal
of its petition, asserting that Section 6(8) does not
apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to
participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding
elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure
the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two
(2) preceding elections.
- Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion
and reinstated the petition in the courts docket.
ISSUES:
WON the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable in this
case pursuant to MINERO v. COMELEC.
RULING:
- We find the petition partly impressed with merit.
- Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.
- The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in
the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
- To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for
two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds
cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and
(b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list
votes in two preceding elections should now be
understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure
to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we
declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be
understood and applied. We do so under our authority
to state what the law is, and as an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis.
- The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.
It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 22
 further argument. The doctrine is grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions.
- The Court grants the petition and accordingly annuls
COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,
2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and
the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied
PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004
(MP).
- PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group
or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES,
TEODORO L. DAVID and ANGELITO A. PELAYO vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147097. June 5, 2009
FACTS:
- July 22, 1998, the Fact- Finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint-Affidavit against petitioners with Illegal Use
of Public Funds under Art. 220, RPC and violation of
Sec. 3 (a) and (e) of RA No. 3019, as amended.
- The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in
the use by Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996.
With the help of the other petitioners, they were able to
convert his CDF into cash.
- In the preliminary investigation, Evaluation and
preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) recommended
the filing of 14 counts each of Malversation of Public
Funds and violation of Sec 3 (e), RA No. 3019 against
the petitioners. This was approved by the
Ombudsman; hence 28 Informations were filed against
the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
- Petitioners filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which was granted.
- September 18, 2000, OSP recommended to the
Ombudsman the dismissal of the case for lack of
evidence. However, Ombudsman ordered the Office of
the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution.
- October 24, 2000, OLA recommended the disapproval
of  OSP’s  Resolution  and  to  proceed  with  the  trial.  This   diminished.”
was adopted by the Ombudsman and so the cases
were returned to the Sandiganbayan for the
continuation of criminal proceedings.
- Thus, this instant petition.
- Petitioners assert that Ombudsman had no authority to
overturn  the  OSP’s  Resolution  because  under  Sec.  13,   power of control and supervision over the OSP, to
Art IX of the Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed
only with the power to watch, investigate and
recommend the filing of proper cases against erring
officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute.
Such power was vested to the OSP, which was
separate and distinct entity from Ombudsman. Hence,
the latter should have no power and authority over the
former.
ISSUE:
WON Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
or acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in
adopting   OLA’s   recommendation   for   the   prosecution   of   visits foreign countries to conduct market research on
the petitioners
RULING:
- Acop vs. Office of the Ombudsman:
Sec. 13 (8), Art. XI 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides  that  Ombudsman  shall  “exercise  such  other   make test calls using two telephone lines, the dialing
functions   or   duties   as   may   be   provided   by   law”.   phone and the receiving phone (a caller id unit-
Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated that while
the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
Ombudsman was indeed present, the Consti
Commission of 1986 did not hesitate to recommend
that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe
such other powers, functions and duties to the
Ombudsman.
Sec., Art. XI provides that Office of the Special
Prosecutor   (OSP,   used   to   be   Tanodbayan)   “shall  
continue to function and exercise its powers as now
or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under  this  Constitution.”  Such  powers  are  under  PD  
No. 1630. It follows then that Congress may remove
any of the OSP powers under PD 1630 or grant it
other powers, except those powers conferred by the
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman. And
Congress did through the passage of RA No. 6770.
(Also in Camanag v. Guerrero)
- Based on Acop and Camanag ratio decidendi in Office
of the Ombudsman v. Valera: OSP is merely a
component of the OO and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the O.
- Based on Acop in Perez v. Sandiganbayan: Authority
of the O to prosecute based on RA No. 6770 was
authorized by the Constitution.
- Petitioners   assert   to   revisit   the   Court’s   ruling   in   the  
Constitutionality of RA No. 6770 and the principle of
stare decisis set aside.
- Stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established) is embodied in Art. 8, NCC.
- Fermine v. People: The doctrine enjoins adherence to
judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of the SC
thereof.
- Chinese   Young   Men’s   Christian   Ass.   Of   the   Phil.  
Islands v. Remington Steel Corp.: Stare decisis is one
of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions.
- The   Court   has   ruled   that   “Abandonment thereof
must be based only on strong and compelling
reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would
be  immeasurably  affected  and  the  public’s  confidence  
in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
- ITCAB, petitioners   haven’t   shown   any   strong   and  
compelling reasons to not apply the doctrine of stare
decisis. They have not successfully demonstrated how
or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been conferred by law with the
disapprove any resolution issued by the latter.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed.
PLDT COMPANY vs. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ
and VERNON R. RAZON
G.R. No. 179408. March 5, 2014
FACTS:
- To prevent   network   fraud,   PLDT’s Alternative Calling
Patterns (ACP) Detection Division (ACPDD) regularly
prepaid phone cards abroad that allow their users to
make overseas calls to PLDT subscribers in the Phil.
At a cheaper rate.
- ACPDD bought The Number One prepared card-
marketed to Filipinos in UK for calls in the Phil. to
equipped telephone line which receives the call and
reflect  the  incoming  caller’s  telephone  number.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 23
- During the test call, the receiving phone reflected a
local telephone number (Metro Manila). Upon
verification, the subscriber of the number is Abigail
Razon Alvarez, situated in Brgy. Don Bosco,
Parañaque City. It further learned that several lines are
installed at this address with Abigail and Razon.
- November 5, 2003, to validate, ACPDD conducted
same test using the same prepaid card. The receiving
phone reflected the telephone number registered in
the name of Abigail as the calling number from UK.
- Similar test calls were conducted using the prepaid
cards Unity Card and IDT Supercalling Card which
revealed the same results. The reflected telephone
numbers are in the names of Experto Enterprises and
Experto Phils. as subscribers situated in Better Living
Subdivision, Brgy. Don Bosco, PC which turned out
that the actual occupant of these premises is also
Abigail.
- In its validation test, several telephone numbers were
registered in the name of Experto Phils./Experto
Enterprises as calling numbers supposedly from UK.
- November   6   and   19,   2003,   Narcisco   of   the   PLDT’s   proper subject of theft under Art. 308 of RPC.
Quality Control Division with the operatives of the PNP
conducted an ocular inspection to the two
abovementioned places in PC and discovered that
PLDT telephone lines were connected to several
pieces of equipment.
- December 3, 2003, PS Cruz filed a consolidated
application for a search warrant before the RTC for the
crimes of theft and violation of PD No. 401. According
to PLDT, respondents are engaged in a form of
network fraud known as International Simple Resale
(ISR) which amounts to theft under RPC.
- Four search warrants were issued for violations of Art.
308, in relation to Art. 309 of RPC (SW A-1 and SW A-
2) and of PD No. 401, as amended (SW B-1 and SW
B-2).
- January 14, 2004, after searching and making an
inventory of the items seized, PLDT and PNP filed with
the Department of Justice a joint complaint-affidavit for
theft and for violation of PD No. 401 against the
respondents.
- February 18, 2004, respondents filed with RTC to
quash the search warrants which was denied. They
filed for motion for reconsideration, but it was rebuffed.
Hence, they petition for certiorari with the CA.
- CA quashed SW A-1 and SW A-2 (for theft) on the
ground  that  they  were  issued  for  “non-existent  crimes”  
Relying   on   the   Court’s   decision   in   Laurel v. Judge
Abrogar, CA ruled that the respondents could not have
possibly  committed  the  crime  of  theft  because  PLDT’s  
business (telecommunication services) are not
personal properties contemplated under Art. 308 of the
RPC.
- CA   denied   PLDT’s   motion   for   reconsideration,   hence,  
the petition.
- PLDT argued that CA erred in relying on Laurel for the
ff.  reasons:  (1)  Laurel  is  not  yet  final  and  executor;;  it’s  
still subject of a pending motion for reconsideration
filed by PLDT; (2) Assuming it was final, the facts of
the two cases were different. Laurel involves quashal
of an information, while the present case involves
quashal of a SW; (3) That the court only has to be
convinced   that   there’s   a   probable   cause   in   deciding  
the case, that the items seized are connected to a
criminal activity and these items are found in the place
to be searched.
- Respondents argued that while Laurel may not yet be
final, at least it has a persuasive effect as the current
jurisprudence on the matter.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in relying on Laurel case in deciding the
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
case at hand
RULING:
- Laurel case:
Baynet sells prepaid cards that allows their users to
call to the Phil. from Japan. PLDT asserted that
Baynet is engaged in ISR activities.
To establish its case, PLDT obtained a search
warrant. The prosecutor found probable cause for
theft against Laurel and other Baynet officials. An
information was filed against them.
Laurel moved to quash the information asserting that
ISR activities do not constitute a crime under Phil.
Law. He argued that ISR activity cannot entail taking
personal property because international long
distance telephone calls using PLDT telephone lines
belong to the caller himself.
Due to his failure to secure the desired relief in RTC
and CA, he went to the Court raising the issue WON
PLDT’s   business   of   providing telecommunication
services for international long distance calls is a
Court’s   First   Division   granted   Laurel’s   petition   and  
ordered the quashal of the information by stating that
“…Business,   like   services in business, although are
properties, are not proper subjects of theft under
RPC   because   the   same   cannot   be   “taken”   or  
“occupied”.”
PLDT moved for reconsideration and referral to the
Court En Banc.
January 13, 2009, the Court En Banc granted the
reconsideration  and  ruled  that  in  RPC,  “any  personal  
property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object   of   theft.”, which is in relation to the legal
meaning of personal property in the old Civil Code.
PLDT’s  telephone  service  was  appropriable  personal  
property and was, in fact, the subject of
appropriation in an ISR operation, facilitated by
means  of  the  unlawful  use  of  PLDT’s  facilities.  
YES
- Art. 8, NCC states that the decision of the Court form
part of   the   country’s   legal   system.   They   evidence   the  
law’s   meaning,   breadth,   and   scope   and,   therefore,  
have the same binding force as the laws themselves.
- The said article embodies the principle stare decisis et
non quieta movere that enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents embodied in the decision of the SC. This is
grounded on the necessity of securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions.
- In   adjudication,   a   case   is   not   a   “decided”   case   that   is  
“deemed  settled  and  closed  to  further  argument”  if  the  
Court’s   decision   is   still   the   subject   of   a   motion   for  
reconsideration seasonably filed by the party.
- Ting v. Velez-Ting: The principle of stare decisis
enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by the Court in its final decisions.
- ITCAB, CA legally erred in refusing to reconsider its
ruling that largely relied on a non-final ruling of the
Court  upon  the  PLDT’s  motion  for  reconsideration.
- Respondents   justified   CA’s   action   by   arguing   that   CA  
would still rule in the way it did even without Laurel. As
pointed out by PLDT, there is simply nothing in the
CA’s   decision   that   would   support   its   quashal   of   the  
search warrant independently of Laurel.
WHEREFORE, petition is partially granted.
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 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORUTY vs. NOEL B. PILI,
et al.
G.R. No. 202047. June 8, 2016
FACTS:
- LRTA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation. It entered into a ten-year operations and
management agreement (Agreement) with Meralco
Transit Organization, Inc. (MTOI) from 8 June 1984 to
8 June 1994.
- However, on 7 April 1989, the Commission on Audit
declared the Agreement between LRTA and MTOI
void.
- As a result, on 9 June 1989, LRTA purchased all the
shares of stock of MTOI and renamed MTOI to Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro) and formally
declared Metro as its wholly-owned subsidiary.
- The Agreement between LRTA and Metro expired on
8 June 1994, and was thereafter extended on a
month-to-month basis.
- On 25 July 2000, the union of rank-and-file employees
of Metro staged a strike over a bargaining deadlock
which resulted in the paralysis in the operations of
Metro. On 31 July 2000, the Agreement expired when
LRTA decided no longer to renew. On 30 September
2000, Metro ceased its operations.
- Respondent Noel B. Pili (Pili), in addition to his
monetary claims, alleged that he was illegally
dismissed.
He was holding the position of Liaison Assistant when
he was dismissed on 30 September 2000, when Metro
stopped its operations. Pili argues that his dismissal
was illegal and violative of his security of tenure. He
alleges that the mere fact of the expiration of the
Agreement was not sufficient to justify his dismissal.
- LRTA, on the other hand, argues that NLRC cannot
exercise jurisdiction over it as it is a government-
owned and controlled corporation, and that only the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) can take cognizance
of the matter. Further, LRTA maintains that it has a
separate legal personality from Metro, and thus there
can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the
monetary claims of the employees of Metro.
- The ruling of the Labor Arbiter was in favor of Pili and
the other respondents.
- On December 5, 2005, LRTA appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC found that there was no illegal dismissal as
Pili’s  dismissal  was  valid  on  account  of  the  termination   Decision and the May 28, 2010 Resolution of the
of the Agreement between Metro and LRTA.
- LRTA filed a certiorari to the CA, the CA set aside the
resolution of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of
the Labor Arbiter.
- In this petition, the LRTA seeks a reversal of the
decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction
over the case
RULING:
NO
- The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have
jurisdiction over LRTA. Petitioners
themselves admitted in their complaint that LRTA "is a
government agency organized and existing pursuant to
an original charter (Executive Order No. 603)" and
that they are employees of METRO.
- The doctrine of peircing the corporate veil cannot be
applied. Pili cannot claim to be employed by LRTA
merely on the bare allegation that the corporate veil
must be peirced based   on   LRTA’s   ownership   of   the   - There was a time when DOLE visited the company
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
shares of stock of Metro. It maintained and continued to
have its separate juridical personality.
- Worse, if LRTA was his true employer, as he claims, it
is CSC which would have jurisdiction to hear his
complaint against LRTA. LRTA is a government-owned
and controlled corporation - any allegation of illegal
dismissal against it by its employees should have been
brought to the CSC.
- On the other hand, LRTA still cannot avoid liability for
the respondents' claim. It is solidarity [sic] liable as an
indirect employer under the law for the respondents'
separation pay. This liability arises from the O & M
agreement it had with METRO, which created a
principal-job contractor relationship between them.
- Accordingly, we find that the application of the doctrine
of stare decisis is in order. The doctrine of stare decisis
et non quieta movere means "to adhere to precedents,
and not to unsettle things which are established." Under
this doctrine, when this Court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future
cases, where facts are substantially the same;
regardless of whether the parties and property are the
same.
- The basic facts in this petition are the same as those in
the case of LRTA v. Mendoza. Thus, we find that LRTA
is solidarity liable for the monetary claims of
respondents, in light of this Court's findings in said
case. It is the duty of the Court to apply the previous
ruling in LRTA v. Mendoza in accordance with the
doctrine of stare decisis. Once a case has been
decided one way, any other case involving exactly the
same point at issue, as in the present case, should be
decided in the same manner.
- We find no reversible error in the CA ruling, insofar as
the monetary claims are concerned.
EMMANUEL D. QUINTANAR, et al. vs. COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS, PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 210565. June 28, 2016
FACTS:
- This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the July 11, 2013
Decision and the December 5, 2013 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115469,
which reversed and set aside the March 25, 2010
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
af rming the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter (LA), in a case for illegal dismissal, damages
and attorney's fees filed by the petitioners against
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Coca-
Cola)
- Complainants allege that they are former employees
directly hired by respondent Coca-Cola on different
dates from 1984 up to 2000, assigned as regular
Route Helpers under the direct supervision of the
Route Sales Supervisors. Their duties consist of
distributing bottled Coca-Cola products tothe stores
and customers in their assigned areas/routes, and
they were paid salaries and commissions at the
average of P3,000.00 per month. After working for
quite sometime as directly-hired employees of Coca-
Cola, complainants were allegedly transferred
successively as agency workers to the following
manpower agencies, namely, Lipercon Services, Inc.,
People's Services, Inc., ROMAC, and the latest being
respondent Interserve Management and Manpower
Resources, Inc.
and conducted an investigation whether the company
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 was compliant to mandatory labor standards and
relatively, held the complainants regular employees
entitled to additional claims. As soon as the
complainants learned this, they were immediately
dismissed by the company on various dates on Jan.
2004. The company later settled their claims but the
settlement did not include reinstantement and CBA
benefits.
- Thus, on November 26, 2004, the complainants filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled in their
favor, and held that they were employees of Coco-cola
and were just seconded to Interserve and thus,
ordered Coca-Cola to reinstate them and to pay their
full backwages.
- On March 25, 2010, the NLRC rendered its decision
and   upheld   the   LA’s   ruling.     It   also   found   that   the   sound pronouncements above, adopts the rulings made
relationship between the parties in the controversy
bore a striking similarity with the facts in the cases of
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. National
Organization of Workingmen (N.O.W.) and Magsalin v.
National Organization of Workingmen (Magsalin).
Coca-Cola filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was
denied.
- Upon   appeal,   the   CA   reversed   the   LA   and   NLRC’s   "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong
rulings and held that the petitioners were not
employees of Coca-Cola and it was Interserve who
exercised power of control over them, not Coca-Cola.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
was denied.
- Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
WON following the doctrine of stare decisis, the
petitioners, as route helpers, can still be conserved as
respondent’s   employees   although   they   were   already   compelling reason to convince the Court that the
working for Interserve
RULING:
YES
- Contrary to the position taken by Coca-Cola, it cannot
be said that route helpers, such as the petitioners no
longer enjoy the employee-employer relationship they
had with Coca-Cola since they became employees of
Interserve. A cursory review of the jurisprudence
regarding this matter reveals that the controversy
regarding the characterization of the relationship
between route-helpers and Coca-Cola is no longer a
novel one.
- As early as May 2003, the Court in Magsalin v. National
Organization of Workingmen struck down the defense
of Coca- Cola that the complainants therein, who were
route-helpers, were its "temporary" workers.
- Shortly thereafter, the Court in Bantolino v. Coca-Cola,
among others, held that the route-helpers therein were
not simply employees of Lipercon, Peoples Specialist
Services, Inc. or ISI, which, as Coca-Cola claimed were
independent job contractors, but rather, those of Coca-
Cola itself.
- Then in 2008, in Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines,
Inc. (Pacquing), the Court applied the ruling in Magsalin
under the principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled). It was stressed therein that because
the petitioners, as route helpers, were performing the
same functions as the employees in Magsalin, which
were necessary and desirable in the usual business or
trade of Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., they were
considered regular employees of Coca-Cola.
- A year later, the Court in Agito, similarly struck down
Coca-Cola's contention that the salesmen therein were
employees of Interserve, notwithstanding the
submission by Coca-Cola of their personal data files
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
from the records of Interserve; their Contract of
Temporary Employment with Interserve; and the payroll
records of Interserve.
- The Court once more asserted the findings that route-
helpers were indeed employees of Coca-Cola in Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz and,
recently, in Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
Inc. and that the complainants therein were illegally
dismissed for want of just or authorized cause. Similar
dispositions by the CA were also upheld by this Court in
N.O.W. and Ostani, through minute resolutions.
- From the foregoing, a pattern emerges by which Coca-
Cola consistently resorts to various methods in order to
deny its route-helpers the benefits of regular
employment. Despite this, the Court, consistent with
in Pacquing that Interserve was a labor-only contractor
and that Coca- Cola should be held liable pursuant to
the Principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
- The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Verily, the doctrine has assumed such
value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue
of predictability which is expected from this Court would
be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence
in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished."
- Thus, only upon showing that circumstances attendant
in a particular case override the great benefits derived
by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis,
can the courts be justified in setting it aside.
- ITCAB, Coca-Cola has not shown any strong and
doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied. It failed
to successfully demonstrate how or why both the LA
and the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
sustaining the pleas of the petitioners that they were its
regular employees and not of Interserve.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.
RES JUDICATA
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP. vs. CA and CRISANTO
G. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 173590. December 9, 2013
FACTS:
- Regional Postal Inspector Atty. Buensalida charged
De Guzman, then a Postal Inspector at the Postal
Services Office for dishonesty and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of service, thereby
relieving him from his post.
- This was forwarded to Investigation Security and Law
Enforcement Staff (ISLES). In a Memorandum dated
Feb. 26, 1990, Dir. Reyes recommended for his
exoneration due to lack of merit, approved by DOTC
Asec. Jardiniano in May 15, 1990.
- When RA No. 7354 was enacted, PSO under DOTC
was abolished and was transferred and absorbed by
the PPC.
- July 16, 1993, De Guzman, who became Chief Postal
Service Officer, was formally charged by PPC. This
was decided on Aug. 15, 1994, and found him guilty as
charged and was dismissed from service.
- However, the decision was not implemented until 5
years later when Dir. Lalanto issued a Memorandum
for this purpose.
- De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration claiming
that the decision was recalled on Aug. 29, 1994 and
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 26
 that being dormant for 5 years, it may not be revived
without filing another charge. This was denied.
- He then filed a second motion for reconsideration
which was resolved in his favor which recalled his first
motion for reconsideration and conduct a formal
hearing of the case.
- November 23, 2004, thru PG Rama, found De
Guzman guilty of the charges and dismissing him from
the service. It was pointed out that ISLES
Memorandum by Dir. Reyes which exonerated him
was merely recommendatory and as such he was only
formally charged on July 16, 1993 by PPC, which was
an obvious rejection of the said recommendation.
- He then filed another motion for reconsideration. Jan.
5, 2005, the PPC Board considered it as an appeal
and ruled among others that res judicata was
unavailing as the  decision  exonerating  him  was  “only  a   Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Moses Mendoza.
ruling after a fact-finding  investigation.”
- He then elevated the case to the CA via special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus claiming among
others that the case against him was a mere rehash of
the previous complaint already dismissed by the
DOTC, and therefore, a clear violation of the rule on
res judicata.
- April 4, 2006, CA reversed the Resolutions dated Nov.
23, 2004 and Jan. 6, 2005. PPC moved for
reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
WON res judicata is availing in the present case
considering that De Guzman have been charged with
the same set of acts which had been exonerated by the
ISLES of the DOTC
RULING:
NO
- Court agrees with PCC that there was no formal
charge filed by the DOTC against De Guzman and that
his exoneration did not amount to dismissal on the
merits that would bar the filing of another case.
- Sec 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in CSC states that after a finding of a prima facie case,
the disciplining authority shall formally charge the
person complained of.
- Sec 9, Rule III (B) of the Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures of the PPC states that when the
postmaster general finds the existence of a prima facie
case, the respondent shall be formally charged.
- ITCAB, investigation conducted by ISLES, which
performs fact-finding and investigatory functions for
the Department-wide official undertakings was
purposely for determining WON a prima facie case
against De Guzman existed. However, due to
insufficiency of evidence, he was exonerated by Asec.
Jardiniano.
- Requisites in order for res judicata bar the institution of
a subsequent action: (1) former judgment must be
final; (2) it must be rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
it must be judgment on the merits; (d) there must be
st nd
between 1 and 2 actions- identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action.
- A judgment is one rendered on the merits when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment
is rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment upon some
preliminary or formal ore merely technical point.
- ITCAB, there was no judgment on the merits. The
dismissal of De Guzman by Asec. Jardiniano was a
result of a fact-finding investigation to determe whether
a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for
LEGAL REASEARCH CASE DIGESTS
administrative offenses should be filed. Hence, no
rights and liabilities of the parties were determined
therein with finality.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO
GERARD VIRAY vs. SPOUSES JOSE USI and
AMELITA USI
G.R. No. 192486. November 21, 2012
FACTS:
- At the core of the present controversy are several
parcels of land which form part of what was once Lot
No. 733, Cad-305-D, registered in the name of Ellen P.
With an area of 9,137 square meters, Lot 733 is
located in Brgy. Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga.
- The lot was divided into seven parts, one part of which
was sold to the petitioner. On the other hand, there
was also a subject agreement between the petitioners
and the respondents Usi, Respondent wherein the
subject lot was divided into 13 parts, some parts went
to the Respondents.
- As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping
transactions involving the same property or
portions thereof spawned several suits and
counter- suits featuring, in particular, herein
petitioners and respondents
- In lieu, Spouses Usi instituted complaints against
Viray, among others is a Petition for accion
publiciana/reivindicatoria before the RTC. On the other
hand, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the said
petition, on the ground of litis pendencia and res
judicata, two of the three kinds of actions to
recover possession of real property. The RTC
dismissed the petition for failure to establish
preponderant evidence to support their claim of title,
possession and ownership over the subject lots.
Hence, they appealed before the CA. The CA reversed
RTC’s   decision   basing   its   ruling   on   the   2   notarized  
subject agreements. Viray appealed but was denied.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Respondents are the legal and valid owners of the
subject lot
RULING:
YES
- The court held that the petition is barred by res
judicata – defined as one that operates as bar by prior
judgement when there is a final judgement on merits
rendered by a court with jurisdiction and the first and
second action has identical parties, subject matter or
cause of action.
- Res judicata operates as bar by prior judgment if the
following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or
order must be final (2) the judgment or order must be
on merits (3) the decision must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties and (4) there must be identity of parties, of
subject matter, and causes of action.
- The better right to possess and right of ownership
cannot be relitigated because of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted.   CA’s  
decision is reversed and set aside.
AMORO | CENTINO | DONGALLO | PARACUELLES Page 27
 LUZ E. TAGANAS and VALENTIN G. TABBAL vs.
HON. MELITON G. EMUSLAN and STANDARD
INSURANCE CO., INC
G.R. No. 146980. September 2, 2003
FACTS:
- The controversy arose from a road accident which
occurred along the national highway of Brgy. San
Jose, San Joaquin, Agoo, La Union, involving 4
vehicles to wit: (1) Jack and Yolly minibus, (2) An
Isuzu Elf van-owned by spouses Josalde and Zenaida
Junto, (3) A Petron Tanker truck-owned by herein
petitioner Luz Taganas and was driven by herein
petitioner Valentin Tabbal and (4) A Shell tanker
truck-insured by herein respondent Standard
Insurance Co. Inc.
- According to the records, this is what happened: Jack
and Yolly minibus, Isuzu Elf van, and Petron tanker
truck were travelling in that order on the one side of
the road. Going the opposite direction was the Shell
tanker truck; The Isuzu Elf van tried to overtake the
Jack and Yolly minibus, but instead, collided head-on
to the Shell tanker truck. The Isuzu Elf van swerved
back   to   its   lane,   and   hit   the   minibus’   rear;;   The   Shell   Juntos’   Isuzu   Elf   van   and   Taganas’   Petron   tanker
tanker  truck,  unable  to  stop,  rammed  Isuzu  elf  van’s  s   truck. However, in Civil Case No. 6754, the subject
rear.
- Consequently, 2 cases were filed:
(1) Civil Case No. 97-02055-D: Spouses Junto (the
Juntos) filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Taganas and Tabbal.
(2) Civil Case No. 6754: Private respondent Standard
Insurance Co. Inc. filed a complaint for damages
petitioners and the Juntos. Petitioners filed a MTD on
the grounds of prematurity of action and multiplicity of
suits.
- The RTC in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D held that The
Juntos   are   liable   for   damages   sustained   by   Taganas’  
Petron tanker truck. While the RTC in Civil Case No.
6754  denied  the  Petitioners’  Motion  to  Dismiss.
- With the decision of the RTC in the second case,
nd
petitioners filed a 2 Motion to dismiss, but this time,
invoking RES JUDICATA. They also filed a Motion to
Dismiss   the   Juntos’   cross   claim.   RTC   denied   the   FACTS:
nd
former but granted the latter. Why: for the 2 MTD:
Res Judicata does not apply; for the MTD for cross-
claim: Granted bec. all the 3 requisites of Res Judicata
were present, to wit: Identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action.
- Petitioners filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration to
the RTC but the same was dismissed. So, they
elevated the case to the CA, but it too was dismissed.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the doctrine of Res Judicata would apply in this
case   so   as   to   bar   the   private   respondent’s   cause   of   shopping.
action against the petitioners on the basis that the RTC
in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D has already decided with
finality, that the petitioners were not liable for the
vehicular accident.
RULING:
NO
- The doctrine of Res Judicata does not apply in this
case.
- Res Judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits, on all points and matters
determined in the former suit. The elements of Res
Judicata are:
1. The former judgment or order must be final;
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2. The judgment or order must be on the merits;
3. It must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
4. There must be, between the first and the second
action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and
cause of action.
- For Res Judicata to apply, all these essential
requisites must exist.
- ITCAB,  Since  the  RTC’s  decision  in  Civil  Case  No.  97-
02055-D had become final, there existed a final and
executory judgment in favor of the petitioners rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction. But, that was
only in so far as Civil Case No. 07-02055-D is
concerned. Civil Case No. 6754 is an entirely
different story. There was neither identity of parties,
nor identity of subject matter, much less identity of
cause of action.
- Res judicata is inapplicable ITCAB because:
Identity of parties: Neither the owner nor the insurer
private respondent was a party to Civil Case No. 97-
02055-D.
Identity of subject matter: The subject matter of Civil
Case No. 97-02055-D was the collusion between the
 
matter was the collusion between the Shell tanker
truck and the Isuzu Elf van which was rear-ended by
Taganas’  Petron  Tanker  truck.
Cause of action: In Civil Case No. 97-02055-D,
damage   caused   by   Taganas’   Petron   tanker   truck   to  
the  Juntos’  Isuzu  Elf.  In  Civil  Case  No.  6754,  damage  
suffered by the Shell Tanker truck caused by both
petitioners and the Juntos.
HENCE, petition is DENIED.
DELA ROSA LINER, INC. and/or ROSAURO DELA
ROSA, SR. AND NORA DELA ROSA vs. CALIXTO B.
BORELA and ESTELO A. AMARILLE
G.R. No. 207286. July 29, 2015
- On September 23, 2011, respondents Calixto Borela,
bus driver, and Estelo Amarille, conductor, filed
separate complaints against petitioners Dela Rosa
Liner, Inc., a public transport company, Rosauro Dela
Rosa, Sr., and Nora Dela Rosa, for
underpayment/non-payment of salaries, holiday pay,
th
overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, 13 month
pay, sick leave and vacation leave, night shift
differential, illegal deductions, and violation of Wage
Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16.
- In a motion dated October 26, 2011, the petitioners
asked the labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum
- Labor Arbiter (LA) Danna A. Castillon, in an
order dated November 24, 2011, upheld the
petitioners’   position   and   dismissed   the   complaint   on  
grounds of forum shopping.
- Respondents appealed the LA's ruling. On July 31,
2012, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) 1st Division granted the appeal, reversed LA
Castillon's dismissal order, and reinstated the
complaint.
- The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the
NLRC denied their motion, prompting them to file with
the CA a petition for certiorari, for alleged grave abuse
of discretion by the NLRC in: (1) holding that the
respondents did not commit forum shopping when they
filed the second complaint; and (2) disregarding
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 respondents' quitclaim in relation to the compromise
agreement in the first complain
- The CA 15th Division denied the petition; it found no
grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC ruling that the
respondents did not commit forum shopping when they
filed their second complaint. The NLRC likewise held
that neither was the case barred by res judicata arising
from the CA judgment in the first case.
- Thereafter, the parties settled the case (involving the
first complaint) amicably through the compromise
agreement. Based on this agreement, Borela and
Amarille received from respondents P350,000.00 and
P150,000.00, respectively, and executed a quitclaim.
- Consequently, the CA 13th Division rendered
judgment in accordance with the compromise
agreement and ordered an entry of judgment which
was issued on September 28, 2011. In this manner,
the parties resolved the first case.
- To go back to the present case, the petitioners moved
for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
resolution of May 21, 2013.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in upholding the NLRX ruling that there
was no forum shopping nor res judicata that would bar
the complaint.
RULING:
- The CA 15th Division committed no reversible error
when it affirmed the NLRC ruling that the second
complaint is not barred by the rule on forum shopping
nor by the principle of res judicata. In other words, no
grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
NLRC when it reinstated the second complaint.
- Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents'
second complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 128188), a money
claim, is not a "similar case" to the first complaint (CA-
G.R. SP No. 118038). Thus, the filing of the second
complaint did not constitute forum shopping and the
judgment in the first case is not a res judicata ruling
that bars the second complain There is no identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the
judgment rendered in the previous action will not
amount to res judicata in the action now under
consideration.
- There is also no identity of causes of action in the first
complaint and in the second complaint. In Yap v.
Chua, we held that the test to determine whether
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether
the same evidence would support both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would support both actions, then they are
considered the same; a judgment in the first case
would be a bar to the subsequent action.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
review on certiorari is dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI
JAIME PELEJO and BELEN C. ZABALLERO, vs. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, PATERNO C. ZABALLERO
and AURORA GONZALES
G.R. No. L-60800. August 31, 1982
FACTS:
- In this petition for certiorari, spouses Jaime Pelejo and
Belen C. Zaballero pray that the Writ of Possession,
dated March 30, 1982, issued by the lower court be
declared null and void for having been issued without
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or in excess of jurisdiction and with a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that
the private respondents and the Sheriff of Manila be
enjoined from enforcing the said Writ of Possession.
- On July 3, 1979, herein petitioners filed Civil Case No.
124771 for Annulment of Deed, Title, Reconveyance
and Damages.
- According to petitioners, respondents Paterno C.
Zaballero and his wife Aurora Gonzales Zaballero
approached them sometime in 1974 for assistance.
They borrowed the title TCT No. T-49125, covering the
property so that they could have a collateral for a loan
from the Monte de Piedad Bank, the proceeds of
which  would  finance  respondents’  rice  mill  business  in  
San Juan, Batangas.
- To accommodate herein private respondents, a
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed in favor of Mr. and Mrs.
Paterno C. Zaballero.
- The Zaballeros took the Deed of Sale to mean what it
stated and had the title transferred to their names. As
a consequence, TCT No. T-49125 was cancelled and
TCT No. 130117 was issued in the names of the
Zaballeros.
- Respondents denied the allegations of simulated sale
and claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
properly executed in good faith before a notary public
of the Philippine National Bank.
- On August 22, 1980, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the complaint but allowing the petitioners to
file an amended complaint within ten (10) days. The
original complaint was dismissed upon motion of the
private respondents on the ground that it did not state
a cause of action, and assuming there was a cause of
action, it was already barred by statute.
- The petitioners filed their amended complaint after
September 18, 1980, which was beyond the ten-day
period.
- On October 14, 1980, the trial judge denied the
admission of the amended complaint.
- No appeal was taken by petitioners and instead
another complaint but with the same cause of action
was filed (Civil Case No, 140996)
- On the ground of res judicata, the said complaint was
dismissed on September 9, 1981 and such dismissal
was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- Private respondents filed a motion for the issuance of
a Writ of Possession in Civil Case No, 124771.
- On March 30, 1982, Judge Abelardo Dayrit of the
Court of First Instance granted the motion and issued
a Writ of Possession.
- Petitioners posited that the lower court acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the writ of possession because Civil
Case No. 124771 was not decided on the merits and
the rights and obligations of the parties were not
defined. They alleged that there was no decision on
who the owners were in the order dismissing the
complaint.
- The Court of Appeals sustained the lower court when
it issued the writ of possession.
- Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the Writ of Possession, dated March 30, 1982 was
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and with a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction since Civil Case No. 124771 was not decided
on the merits and the rights and obligations of the parties
were not defined.
RULING:
YES.
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- There is merit in the petition of the Pelejos.
- In Robles v. Timario, et. al., 107 Phil. 809, this court
ruled   that:   “Execution   is   the   remedy   provided   by   law  
for the enforcement of a judgment and the only portion
of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is
that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part.
Whatever may be found in the body of the decision
can only be considered as part of the reasons, or
conclusions of the court and while they may serve as
guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio
decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the
dispositive  part  of  the  decision”
- In the case at bar, the trial judge issued the writ of
possession in Civil Case No. 124771, which was
dismissed in an Order, dated August 22, 1980. In other
words, the complaint for "Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Title, Reconveyance and Damages" was not decided
on the merits
- Thus, this Court finds the petition for certiorari
justifiable. The Writ of Possession, dated March 30,
1982, having been issued by the lower court with
grave abuse of discretion, is hereby nullified; and, the
private respondents and the City Sheriff of Manila are
enjoined from enforcing the said Writ of Possession.

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