Lozada vs COMELEC (G.R. No.

L-59068)
FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the
vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution
which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election,
the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect
the Member to serve the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim
Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is
as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt
of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this
Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision
conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge
expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this
power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise
its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the
funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC,
even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative
of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National
Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”, this simply
means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the
performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
in prison.

TRILLANES IV VS. PIMENTEL SR.

G.R. NO. 179817, JUNE 27, 2008
CARPIO-MORALES J.
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the
aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate.
Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside
orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as
senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held
without bail
HELD: No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not
elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. The Constitution provides: All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizances may be provided by law. The Rules also state
that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions
apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class
of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion
of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making
serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued
authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the
President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require
petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes
his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special
Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the
latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from
office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for
speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken
or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision
has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe
that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or
civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted
in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12
Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will
be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera
case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A
fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves
who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in
the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being
confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations
in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side
with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office
being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about
tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and
for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 128055, 2001-04-18

Facts:
Accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration... and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of the stay of the following
aliens... in violation of Executive Order no. 324. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner
posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was... then recuperating from injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident. Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would
warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that... petitioner was able
to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance. Petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before
the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. Court taking cognizance of the
petition issued a temporary restraining order. Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's
arraignment and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court. The Court
rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining order. Media reports announcing
petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country. Petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit her
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. She filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction with the Court. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the... aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby
supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint. The OSP and the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended informations.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations.
once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993
resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice... the Court issued a temporary
restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from
enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32... Amended informationS, and
from proceeding with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved
by the Court. All the 32 informations were consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698... The
prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.
Sandiganbayan resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby suspends the
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the instant
recourse.
Issues:
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy
thereof to... the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
Ruling:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support
"SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon... government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or... gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received
such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty
of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order... of suspension as a
matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result
of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public officials... and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would...
indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a... specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
"x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty... days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution - which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' andsuspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds
of all... its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days - is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not
a penalty but a preliminary, preventive... measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
Principles:
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution - which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds
of all... its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days - is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not
a penalty but a preliminary, preventive... measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
ABAS VS HRET

G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988

GANCAYCO, J.:

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections
by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court
and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano
and Victor S. Ziga.

On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who
had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and
resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the
respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-
Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest,
thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on
the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the
Resolutions now complained of.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and deliberations
of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by
Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a
party in the two cases.

The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively
require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of
the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members
of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption
of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members
shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with
no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.

We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We
opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself
which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal
correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such)
contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The
other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of
decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded
from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court
or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has
the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed
by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of
the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the
way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must
therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for
the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated
that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati
City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year
preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year
and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to
run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the
district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo: I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid: On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes. So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify. Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just
residence. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he
was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same
district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac. Aquino’s
connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new,
residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino’s
assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts
in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of
one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the May
8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the
adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its
own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the
Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to
evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of
Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a
loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a
qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better

VINZONS-CHATO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131 (April 2, 2007) EN BANC

FACTS: Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of
Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
In her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Chato alleged that during the canvassing of the election returns before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) from May 10 to 12, 2004, her counsel raised several objections and pointed
to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts of the municipality of Labo. Prior to
the suspension of proceedings on May 12, 2004, the MBC Labo gave her twenty-four (24) hours, or until 6:00 p.m. of May 13,
2004, to prove her allegations. Allegedly in violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 204 of Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and
For Other Purposes), before the expiration of the period granted and without notice to petitioner Chato or her counsel, the
MBC Labo concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its canvass to the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) of Camarines Norte. At that time, which was around 4:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, petitioner Chato’s counsel
was supposed to deliver to the MBC Labo her letter enumerating the election returns allegedly containing manifest errors and
discrepancies. Petitioner Chato’s counsel was thus constrained to appear before the PBC and moved for the suspension of its
proceedings on the ground that there were still pending incidents before the MBC Labo. The PBC, however, denied the said
motion. Upon instruction of the PBC, petitioner Chato filed therewith a letter-petition for reconsideration of the denial of her
request to remand the matter to the MBC. However, on May 14, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., petitioner Chato’s counsel received
a Resolution, of even date, of the PBC denying with finality her letter-petition for reconsideration. In so ruling, the PBC stated
that pre-proclamation controversy was not allowed for the election of Members of the House of Representatives. It noted that
the matters raised by petitioner Chato, which formed part of the proceedings of the PBC, were proper for an election protest
before the competent tribunal. Further, according to the PBC, it had no authority to direct the MBC Labo to reconvene for the
purpose of receiving petitioner Chato’s written objections and supporting documents and re-canvassing the election returns.
Likewise on May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte.

Petitioner Chato forthwith filed with the COMELEC a Petition alleging manifest errors in that –

1) Total number of ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots is more than the number of voters who actually
voted in Barangays Anamea[m], Bagong Silang III, Bakiad, Malangcao Basud and Submakin;

2) Total number of votes counted is less than the number of voters who actually voted in Barangays Gumamela, Pinya,
Dalas, Anameam, Baay, Bagacay, Bagong Silang I, II & III, Bakiad, Bautista, Bayan-Bayan, Bulhao, Cabusay, Calabasa,
Cabatuhan, Canapwan, Daguit I, Dumagmang, Exciban, Fundado, Gumacutan, Guisican, Iberica, Lugui, Mabilo I & II,
Macogon, Mahan-hawan, Malanggan Masalong, Napaod, Pag-asa, Pangpang, San Antonio, Sta. Cruz, Submakin,
Talobalib and Tulay na Lupa;

3) The entries in some election returns coming from different precincts in Barangays Tulay na Lupa, Baay and Lugui, all
of Labo, Camarines Norte, appear to have been written by one person;1a\^/phi1.net

4) No data on number of voters who actually voted and of ballots found in compartment for valid ballots from Barangays
Bulhao, San Antonio, Tulay na Lupa, Daguit, Pinya, Cabusay, Napaod, Pag-asa and Dalas; and

5) One election return is supposedly an election return from Barangay Del Carmen, Labo, but there is apparently no
Barangay Del Carmen and does not appear to be part of the series of election returns assigned to Labo.5

The proclamation of a candidate as a winner in the congressional elections transfers the jurisdiction over election contest
relating to his/her election, returns, and qualification to the HRET. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his/her
oath, and assumed office as a Member of House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction end. The proper remedy of the
proclaimed candidate would be to file an electoral protest with the said tribunal. The Constitution provides that once a
candidate has been proclaimed the winner, the electoral tribunal will have the sole jurisdiction over election contests relating
to their members. The use of “sole” in section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral tribunals’ 69 jurisdiction over election contests relating to their members. Likewise, the phrase
“election, returns, and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee’s title. Allegations that the protestee’s proclamation is null and void do not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. It helps to avoids
duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate.
WALDEN F. BELLO v. COMELEC, GR No. 191998, 2010-12-07
Facts:
On November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to
participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, on March 23, 2010, AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination
together with the Certificates of
Acceptance of its nominees.[2]... n March 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807[3]which prescribed
the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes of the May 10, 2010
elections.[4]
When the COMELEC published on March 26, 2010 its initial "List of Political Parties/Sectoral Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the May 10, 2010 elections with their respective Nominees," Arroyo was listed as AGPP's first
nominee.
Through a letter dated April 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to
act, consistently with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification of the nominees of AGPP
for their failure to comply with the... requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807.[21] They also wrote the
COMELEC on April 20, 2010, reiterating their letter-request dated April 7, 2010. The COMELEC failed to respond to
both letters.[2... n July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto[39] were filed with the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo's eligibility as AGPP's representative in the House of
Representatives. On September 7,... 2010, the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing
Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.[
In G.R. No. 192832, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the Court: (a) direct the COMELEC en banc
to review all its decisions in cases for disqualification of nominees and cancellation of registration of party-list groups
filed in the May 10, 2010... elections, as well as those which have not been resolved, in line with the eight-point
guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani;[41] and (b) order Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco and Elias R.
Yusoph to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for their open defiance of the Court's Decisions in Ang
Bagong Bayani[42] and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC.[43]
Issues:
The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees
motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to
AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canvassing of AGPP's votes, and proclaiming it a winner;
and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP's nominee after his
proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives.
Ruling:
For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against a party-list nominee