STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Rule1. Apply the Law when it is CLEAR. Do
not Interpret or CONSTRUE.
Rule2. in StatCon is IBC, interpret before
you CONSTRUE. You CONSTRUE only
when the written law is not enough to
give meaning and EFFECT to the INTENT
of the LAW.
literal meaning or plain meaning rule
dura lex sed lex
doctrine of necessary implication
ejusdem generis
limitations of ejusdem generis
expressio unios est exclusio alterius
negative- opposite doctrine
application of expressio unius rule
doctrine of casus omissus
doctrine of last antecedent
reddeddo singula singulis
stare decisis
res judicata
obiter dictum
A legislature is a kind of deliberative
assembly with the power to pass, amend,
and repeallaws.[1] The law created by a
legislature is called legislation or statutory
law. In addition to enacting laws,
legislatures usually have exclusive
authority to raise or lower taxes and adopt
the budget and other money bills.
Legislatures are known by many names,
the most common being parliament and
congress, although these terms also have
more specific meanings.
Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the
legislature in enacting legislation may
sometimes be considered by the judiciary
when interpreting the law (see judicial
interpretation). The judiciary may attempt
to assess legislative intent where
legislation is ambiguous, or does not
appear to directly or adequately address a
particular issue, or when there appears to
have been a legislative drafting error.
Statutory Construction
When a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the courts have said, repeatedly, that the
inquiry into legislative intent ends at that
point. It is only when a statute could be
interpreted in more than one fashion that
legislative intent must be inferred from
sources other than the actual text of the
statute.
Sources of legislative intent:
Courts frequently look to the following
sources in attempting to determine the
goals and purposes that the legislative
body had in mind when it passed the law:
1. The text of the bill as proposed to the
legislative body,
2. Amendments to the bill those were
proposed and accepted or rejected,
3. The record of hearings on the topic,
4. Legislative records or journals,
5. Speeches and floor debate made prior
to the vote on the bill,
6. Legislative subcommittee minutes,
factual findings, and/or reports,
7. other relevant statutes which can be
used to understand the definitions in the
statute on question,
8. other relevant statutes which indicate
the limits of the statute in question,
9. legislative files of the executive branch,
such as the governor or president,
10. case law prior to the statute or
following it which demonstrates the
problems the legislature was attempting
to address with the bill, or
11. constitutional determinations (i.e.
"Would Congress still have passed certain
sections of a statute 'had it known' about
the constitutional invalidity of the other
portions of the statute?").
Legislative intent- the reason for passing
the law
literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If
the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
You get the meaning of the law from the
word per word written law. Literal
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meaning or plain rule means
INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL
WORDS in a statute should if possible, be
given effect.
Where a statute defines a word or phrase
employed therein, the word or phrase
should not, by CONSTRUCTION, be given
a different meaning. When the legislature
defines a word used in a statute, it does
not usurp the courts function to interpret
the laws but it merely LEGISLATES what
should form part of the law itself.
It is settled that in the absence of
legislative intent to define words, words
and phrases used in statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning which is supported by the
maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda or what is generally spoken
shall be generally understood. It is also the
same as GENERALI DICTUM GENERALITIR
EST INTERPRETANDUM a general
statement is understood in a general
sense.
WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE
INTENT and not intent to words.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, do not distinguish.
dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM
PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX
SCRIPTA EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law.
It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is
written.
Doctrine of necessary implication this
doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. Every statute is
understand by implication to contain all
such provision as may be necessary to
effectuate to its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary
Statutory Construction
consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. The
principle is expressed in the maxim EX
NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity
of the law.
ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR
SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the
particular and general words, by treating
the particular words as indicating the class
and the general words as indicating all
that is embraced in said class, although
not specifically named by the particular
words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of
universal application; it should be used to
carry out, not to defeat the intent or
purpose of the law; the rule must give way
in favor of the legislative intent;
limitations of ejusdem generis
requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of
particular and specific words, followed by
a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words
constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and
specific words is not exhaustive or is not
merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative
intent to give general words or phrases a
broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or
consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of
OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied.
EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM,
where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be
extended to other matters.
These also follows that when a statute
specifically lists downs the exceptions,
what is not list down as an exception is
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ACCEPTED express in the maxim
EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS
NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or
savings excludes others.
application of expressio unius rule. This
auxiliary rule is used in CONSTRUCTION of
statutes granting powers, creating rights
and remedies, restricting common rights,
and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as
well as those statutes which are strictly
construed. It is only a tool and not a
mandatory rule used for ascertaining the
legislative intent. The rule must also yield
to legislative intent.
negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS
EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS
IMPLIED is known as negative-opposite
doctrine or argumentum a contrario.
doctrine of casus omissus (case of
omission) pro omisso habendus est. A
person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. This rule is not
absolute if it can be shown that the
legislature did not intend to exclude the
person, thing or object from the
enumeration. If such legislative intent is
clearly indicated, the COURT may supply
the omission if to do so will carry out the
intent of the legislature and will not do
violence to its language.
doctrine of last antecedent or AD
PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAL RELATIO
NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA or relative
words refer to the nearest antecedents,
unless the context otherwise requires.
QUALIFYING WORDS restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated.
The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of
interpretation of a statute, by which
"Referential and qualifying phrases, where
Statutory Construction
no contrary intention appears, refer solely
to the last antecedent." The rule is typically
bound by "common sense" and is flexible
enough to avoid application that "would
involve an absurdity, do violence to the
plain intent of the language, or if the
context for other reason requires a
deviation from the rule." Evidence that a
qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to
all antecedents instead of only to the
immediately preceding one may be found
in the fact that it is separated from the
antecedents by a comma."
reddendo singula singulis when two
descriptions makes it impossible to
reconcile, reconcile it to have a “singular
meaning” to settle the issue.
refers to each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be
taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to effect that each
word is to be applied to the subject to
which it appears by context most
appropriate related and to which it is most
applicable.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS,
construction. By rendering each his own;
for example, when two descriptions of
property are given together in one mass,
both the next of kin and the heir cannot
take, unless in cases where a construction
can be made reddendo singula singulis,
that the next of kin shall take the personal
estate and the heir at law the real estate.
14 Ves. 490. Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac.
Ab. Conditions, L.
Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision
stand.] The policy of courts to abide by or
adhere to principles established by
decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray duh-
see-sis) n. Latin for "to stand by a decision,"
the doctrine that a trial court is bound by
appellate court decisions (precedents) on
a legal question which is raised in the
lower court. Reliance on such precedents
is required of trial courts until such time as
an appellate court changes the rule, for
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the trial court cannot ignore the
precedent (even when the trial judge
believes it is "bad law")
Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A
rule that a final judgment on the merits by
a court having jurisdiction is conclusive
between the parties to a suit as to all
matters that were litigated or that could
have been litigated in that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having
introduced a final judgment on the merits,
must then show that the decision in the
first lawsuit was conclusive as to the
matters in the second suit. For example,
assume that the plaintiff in the first lawsuit
asserted that she was injured in an auto
accident. She sues the driver of the other
auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury
returns a verdict that finds that the
defendant was not negligent. The injured
driver then files a second lawsuit alleging
additional facts that would help her prove
that the other driver was negligent. A
court would dismiss the second lawsuit
under res judicata because the second
lawsuit is based on the same Cause of
Action (negligence) and the same injury
claim.
Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words
of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the
decision of the case. A remark made or
opinion expressed by a judge in a decision
upon a cause, "by the way", that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before the court or
upon a point not necessarily involved in
the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument. Such are not
binding as precedent.
AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT
LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in
contravention of the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the
Law or RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA.
Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of
Statutes must be done to avoid evil and
injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA
INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.
Statutory Construction
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat
quam pereat, the interpretation that will
give the thing the EFFICACY is to be
adopted. Law must receive sensible
interpretation to promote the ends for
which they are enacted. They should be
given practical CONSTRUCTION that will
give LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE
without doing VIOLENCE to reason.
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A
STATUTE must be interpreted to give it
efficient operation and effect as a whole
avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT
is so that a legal provision must not be so
construed as to be a useless SURPLUSAGE.
Accordingly, in case of Doubt or obscurity,
that construction should make the statute
fully operative and effective. IT IS
PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID
NOT DO A VAIN THING IN THE
ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or
thing.
INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES
LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI
MODUS, or every statute must be so
CONSTRUED and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of
Jurisprudence. ALL laws are presumed to
be consistent with each other.
DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS
JURA, distinguish times and you will
harmonize laws.
IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is
presumed to have been aware, and taken
into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject
of legislation. Thus, conflict on same
subject is not intended and if such occur,
Court must construe, through
reconciliation to give effect to the statute.
If it is impossible to reconcile and
harmonize, one statute has to give way to
the other. The latest statute shall prevail
being the latest expression of the
legislative WILL.
A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are
in pare materia. The fact that one is
general and the other special creates a
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presumption that the special act is to be
considered as remaining an exception of
the General Act. One as a General Law of
the Land, the other as a LAW for a
Particular case. This shall apply all the time
regardless of which law was enacted first.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS
or CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS are
made by the EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions
are the interpretations of the Executive on
Statutes, for them to implement it, they
must understand it and interpret it if the
language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The
executive makes RULES or IRRs for this
statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and
PROCEDURES. These IRRs or RULES issued
by the executive to execute the Statute are
CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary
Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS
of the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out
PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS, under
her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of
the Philippine Republic. The issuances on
how laws are to be prosecuted are
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION of the
Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES handling
disputes in a QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER.
These decisions are based on their
UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by
congress, laws that are enforced. These
are CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS
and Constructions.
THESE CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN,
WHEN THERE ARE NO ACTUAL
CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE
VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME
COURT, therefore,NO STARE DECISIS
HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF THERE ARE
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND
CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are
THE ONES followed BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO
Statutory Construction
INTERPRET AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS
THEY MAKE, MAY ALSO DO
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IN
FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY
THEMSELVES ARE BOUND TO FOLLOW.
WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE RIGHT TO
INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS,
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER
POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER
POWER. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser as expressed in the
maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et
minus.THERE SHALL BE NO
CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A
LAW THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS INTENDED
BY THE LAW.
Every statute is understood by
IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions
as maybe necessary to EFFECTUATE its
object and purpose, or to make effective
Rights, powers, privileges or
JURISDICTION which it grants, including
all such COLLATERAL and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and
LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as
expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate
legis or from the NECESSITY of the LAW.
Doctrine of Necessary Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY
CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY.
QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX
DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER
OBLIQUUM.
WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of Autolimitation—It is the
doctrine where the Philippines adheres to
principles of international law as a
limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.
Functus officio an officer or agency
whose mandate has expired either
because of the arrival of an expiry date or
because an agency has accomplished the
purpose for which it was created.
Function is mere FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o
any stated facts in support of the
conclusion.
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RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The solemn decisions of the judges upon a
statute become part of the statute ; and
the security of men's lives and property,
require that they should be adhered to: for
precedents serve to regulate our conduct ;
and there is more danger to be
apprehended from uncertainty, than from
any exposition; because, when the rule is
settled, men know how to conform to it;
but, when all is uncertain, they are left in
the dark, and constantly liable to error; for
the same offence which, at one time, was
thought entitled to clergy, at another, may
be deemed capital ; and thus the life or
death of the citizen will be made to
depend, not upon a fixt rule, but upon the
opinion of the judge, who may happen to
try him, than which a more miserable state
of things cannot be conceived.
1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity
of statutes, courts shall presume the
statute to be valid." Consequently, the
burden to show the constitutional defect
is on the challenger. "Every act of the
legislature is presumed to be
constitutional, and the Constitution is to
be given a liberal construction so as to
sustain the enactment in question, if
practicable." "When the constitutionality
of an act is challenged, a heavy burden of
proof is thrust upon the party making the
challenge. All laws are presumed to be
constitutional and this presumption is one
of the strongest known to the law.
b. "Another rule of statutory construction
requires the presumption that, in enacting
statutes, the CONGRESS has full
knowledge of existing law and
interpretations thereof . Although the
repeal of statutes by implication is not
favored, if two statutes are in pari materia,
then to the extent that their provisions are
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant,
the latter enactment repeals or amends
the earlier enacted statute.
Statutory Construction
c. "The legislature is presumed to know the
law when enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon
after controversies arise "as to the
interpretation of the original act, it is
logical to regard the amendment as a
legislative interpretation of the original act,
a formal change-rebutting the
presumption of substantial change.
e. " We "assume that the legislature chose,
with care, the words it used when it
enacted the relevant statute."
f. when current and prior versions of a
statute are at issue, there is a presumption
that the CONGRESS, in amending a
statute, intended to effect a substantive
change in the law. "Further, we assume
that CONGRESS’ amendments to a statute
are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.
g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has
affirmed that it is a presumption of
statutory construction that, where both
general and specific statutes appear to
address a matter, CONGRESS intends
the specific statute to control the subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase
"notwithstanding any other provision of
law," it is presumed that CONGRESS
intended to override any potential
conflicts with earlier legislation.
i. "The construction of statutes by
agencies charged with administration of
those statutes is entitled to great weight. A
decision of an agency specified to execute
the law made by CONGRESS carries great
weight and is entitled to deference unless
it is proven the agency erred. The grant of
regulatory authority extends only to duties
or powers conferred by law. As such,
"regulations, promulgated pursuant to
definitive statutory authority, have the
force and effect of law. Moreover, those
regulations which "clearly and explicitly
mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to
be sustained. Any regulation of the
Department must be reasonably
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grounded in an identifiable and definitive
statutory foundation. "Generally, the court
accords substantial deference to an
agency's interpretations of its own
regulations. Provided the interpretation
"does not violate the Constitution, it must
be given 'controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.
j. we will overturn COURT’s decision only
if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary
or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of
delegated discretion." On the other hand,
an "agency does not possess specialized
competence over the interpretation of a
statute merely because it addresses topics
within the agency's delegable authority.
Pure statutory construction, a matter
within the "core competency of the
judiciary," . "This axiom stems from basic
principles of separation of powers. It is
emphatically the province and duty of the
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the
law is. It necessarily follows that the a
priori question whether the statute
delegates or withholds discretion is itself a
question of statutory interpretation, one
implicating our duty of de novo review."
k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred
to the Technical Review Board's reasoning,
correctly noting that courts give "great
deference" to an agency's interpretation of
its own regulations. This deference stems
from Code § 2.2-4027, which requires that
reviewing courts "take due account" of the
"experience and specialized competence
of the agency" promulgating the
regulation. Even so, "deference is not
abdication, and it requires us to accept
only those agency interpretations that are
reasonable in light of the principles of
construction courts normally employ. No
matter how one calibrates judicial
deference, the administrative power to
interpret a regulation does not include the
power to rewrite it. When a regulation is
"not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the
agency's position would be to permit the
agency, under the guise of interpreting a
regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation." Though agencies may be
Statutory Construction
tempted to adjudicate their way around
unwanted regulations, such overreaching
undermines the notice and public hearing
procedures of the rulemaking process -
thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced
political accountability of agency policy
decisions adopted through the
rulemaking process" and the democratic
virtue of allowing "all potentially affected
members of the public an opportunity to
participate in the process of determining
the rules that affect them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's
statutory interpretation conflicts with the
language of the statute or when the
interpretation has not been consistently
and regularly applied, the usual deference
accorded to an agency's interpretation
should be withheld.
m. When Congress enacts an imprecise
statute that it commits to the
implementation of an executive agency, it
has no control over that implementation
(except, of course, through further, more
precise, legislation). The legislative and
executive functions are not combined. But
when an agency promulgates an
imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the
implementation of that rule, and thus the
initial determination of the rule's meaning.
And though the adoption of a rule is an
exercise of the executive rather than the
legislative power, a properly adopted rule
has fully the effect of law. It seems
contrary to fundamental principles of
separation of powers to permit the person
who promulgates a law to interpret it as
well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of
a statute does not encourage Congress,
out of a desire to expand its power, to
enact vague statutes; the vagueness
effectively cedes power to the Executive.
By contrast, deferring to an agency's
interpretation of its own rule encourages
the agency to enact vague rules which
give it the power, in future adjudications,
to do what it pleases.
Construed Against the State/ Vagueness
a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that
all such statutes must be construed strictly
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against the state and favorably to the
liberty of the citizen. The maxim is
founded on the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is
vested in the legislature and not in the
judicial department. No man incurs a
penalty unless the act which subjects him
to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of
the statute which imposes such penalty.
There can be no constructive offenses,
and before a man can be punished his
case must be plainly and unmistakably
within the statute. If these principals are
violated, the fate of the accused is
determined by the arbitrary discretion of
the judges and not by the express
authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it
"must be strictly construed against the
STATE and in favor of an accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must
be strictly construed against the STATE in
criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of
the statute' that would subvert the
legislative intent expressed therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative
enactment is unconstitutionally vague,
the Supreme Court has considered
whether the words used have a well-
settled . . . meaning . . . (citing dictionary to
determine "generally understood"
meaning for adjective in ordinance). "A
penal statute is void for vagueness if it
both fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence notice that her contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute and
encourages selective prosecution
Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v.
Affirmative Defense
1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES
which contain qualifications, exceptions or
exemptions to their application, the
limiting language may be viewed as a
negative element of the offense which the
prosecution must disprove. Alternately,
the court may determine that the
exemption is a statutory defense, which
the accused can assert to defeat the prima
facie case of the prosecution. In
Statutory Construction
determining whether specific limiting
language is an element of the offense or a
statutory defense, a court should look
both to the intent of the statute as a
whole and the ability of the respective
parties to assert the existence or absence
of the underlying facts sustaining the
applicability of the limitation. When
determining whether the limiting
language is a negative element or a
statutory defense, this Court has identified
four factors to be considered: 'the wording
of the exception and its role in relation to
the other words in the statute; whether in
light of the situation prompting legislative
action, the exception is essential to
complete the general prohibition
intended; whether the exception makes
an excuse or justification for what would
otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets
forth an affirmative defense; and whether
the matter is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant.' An
application of these factors to the present
case demonstrates that the phrase "except
as provided by law," as used in Code §
29.1-553, establishes a statutory defense
as opposed to a negative element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a
due process violation in this case, we first
must address the threshold issue of
whether the absence of a valid
prescription is an affirmative defense or a
negative element of the offense. If it is the
latter, the burden of proof is on the STATE,
and it cannot be shifted to the
accused...When construing penal statutes
which contain qualifications, exceptions or
exemptions to their application, the
limiting language may be viewed as a
negative element of the offense which the
prosecution must disprove. Alternately,
the court may determine that the
exemption is a statutory defense, which
the accused can assert to defeat the prima
facie case of the prosecution. The
ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF
PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE
NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. In
determining whether specific limiting
language is an element of the offense or a
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statutory defense, a court should look
both to the intent of the statute as a
whole and the ability of the respective
parties to assert the existence or absence
of the underlying facts sustaining the
applicability of the limitation. Accordingly,
we should consider the wording of the
exception and its role in relation to the
other words in the statute; whether in
light of the situation prompting legislative
action, the exception is essential to
complete the general prohibition
intended; whether the exception makes
an excuse or justification for what would
otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets
forth an affirmative defense; and whether
the matter is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant. (It is
undoubtedly the general rule that the
state must prove all the essential facts
entering into the description of the
offense. But it has been held in many
cases that when a negation of a fact lies
peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant it is incumbent on him to
establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid
prescription" exemption of Code § 18.2-
250 relates to a fact that would be solely
within the knowledge of the accused. If
we accept appellant's contention that the
STATE must prove appellant had no valid
prescription, the offense would be virtually
unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to
obtain a conviction under the facts of this
case, the STATE would be required to
prove that no medical professional,
wherever located, in this Commonwealth
or elsewhere, had prescribed the drug to
appellant. This would involve a consideration, and if the construction is
nationwide search of chain drugstores, as
well as independent pharmacies, hospitals,
prison infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral
argument, conceded that such an
undertaking would most likely be
impossible. CONGRESS clearly did not
intend such a result, nor would they enact
such an impotent statute
Constitutional Construction
Statutory Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of
Rights shall not be construed to limit other
rights of the people not therein expressed.
2)“The office and purpose of the
constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity. It thus proclaims,
safeguards and preserves in basic form the
pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and
modes of thought and life of the people as
developed under the common law and as
existing at the time of its adoption to the
extent and therein stated…The purpose
and object sought to be attained by the
framers of the constitution is to be looked
for, and the will and intent of the people
who ratified it is to be made effective. As
we have stated, CONGRESS may enact
any law or take any action “not prohibited
by express terms, or by necessary
implications by the Constitution.
3)“A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY
OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by
the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of
constitutional law that a court will not rule
upon the constitutionality of a statute
unless such a determination is absolutely
necessary to decide the merits of the case.
A statute will be construed to avoid a
constitutional question whenever this is
possible.
5) "The construction of a constitutional
provision by CONGRESS (note it is
congress construing, not the supreme
court, that is why it is CALLED
“CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to
contemporaneous with adoption of the
constitutional provision, it is entitled to
great weight. In addition, Long
acquiescence in such an announced
construction so strengthens it that it
should not be changed unless plainly
wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER
SELF-EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.
Page 9
 A self-executing provision does not
require enabling legislation for its
enforcement.
A mandatory provision declares or
imposes a duty or requirement that must
be followed.
A Directory provision sets forth procedures
or " confers discretion on the legislature"
for its implementation.
7) "We review arguments regarding the
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE
NOVO. When the constitutionality of a
statute is challenged, we are guided by
the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are
presumed to be constitutional. Where a
statute is constitutional as applied to a
litigant, the litigant has no standing to
challenge the statute on the ground that it
may be unconstitutional on its face, that is,
as applied to a third person in a
hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a
party has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only insofar as
it has an adverse impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining
the constitutionality of a statute, departs
from the express limitations of the
Constitution and relies instead on implied
constitutional restrictions, the legislative
usurpation must be very clear and
palpable to justify the court’s holding that
an enactment is unconstitutional.
9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect
to Article IV, Section 12 is well established.
“The fact that many things of a diverse
nature are authorized or required to be
done in the body of the act, though not
expressed in its title is not objectionable, if
what is authorized by the act is germane
to the object expressed in the title, or has a
legitimate and natural association
therewith, or is congruous therewith, the
title is sufficient. “[I]f there is doubt as to
the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must
be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as
courts will not declare an act of the
legislature unconstitutional unless it is
plainly so. The analysis of a particular act
Statutory Construction
must necessarily “stand on its own,” and
we must look to both the body and to the
title of the act under scrutiny to determine
whether the act violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is
constitutional as applied to a litigant, the
litigant has no standing to challenge the
statute on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional on its face, that is, as
applied to a third person in a hypothetical
situation." We have said that classification
ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of
facts can be reasonably conceived that
would support it." But where the statute
creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race,
sex, or religion) or where it affects a
fundamental constitutional right, the
presumption of constitutionality fades,
and the "strict scrutiny" test, rather than
the more relaxed "rational relationship"
test applies.
11) "Statutory interpretation presents a
pure question of law and is accordingly
subject to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning
"from the beginning," "afresh," "anew,"
"beginning again."
Retroactive Enactment of Laws
1) "Accordingly, when a statute is
amended while an action is pending, the
rights of the parties are to be deemed in
accordance with the law in effect when
the action is begun, unless the amended
statute shows a clear intention to vary
such rights. (Our analysis is guided by the
fundamental principles of statutory
construction that retroactive laws are not
favored, and that a statute is always
construed to operate prospectively unless
a contrary legislative intent is manifest.);
New laws will apply only to future cases
unless there is something in the very
nature of the case, or in the language of
the new provision, which shows that the
new law was intended to have a
retrospective effect. Further, every
reasonable doubt is resolved against a
retroactive operation of a statute, and
words of a statute ought not to have a
retrospective operation unless they are so
clear, strong and imperative that no other
meaning can be annexed to them .
Page 10
Retroactive effect will be given to a statute
only when legislative intent that a statute
be so applied is stated in clear, explicit, and
unequivocal terms.
Common Law
1) In construing statutes, the statutory
definition must prevail over the common
law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known
and to have had the common law in mind
in the enactment of a statute. The statute
must therefore be read along with the
provisions of the common law, and the
latter will be read into the statute unless it
clearly appears from express language or
by necessary implication that the purpose
of the statute was to change the common
law.
3) "We also apply the established principle
that a statutory provision will not be held
to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly
manifested. Therefore, a statutory change
in the common law will be recognized
only in that which is expressly stated in the
words of the statute or is necessarily
implied by its language.
4) " A statutory provision will not be held
to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly
manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed
and not to be enlarged in their operation
by construction beyond their express
terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change
in the common law is limited to that which
is expressly stated in the statute or
necessarily implied by its language
because there is a presumption that no
change was intended. "When an
enactment does not encompass the entire
subject covered by the common law, it
abrogates the common-law rule only to
the extent that its terms are directly and
irreconcilably opposed to the rule
Previous Construction of a Statute
Statutory Construction
1) "Where a statute has been construed by
the courts, and is then re-enacted by the
legislature, the construction given to it is
presumed to be sanctioned by the
legislature, and thenceforth becomes
obligatory upon the courts." Hence, when
the court finds the old construction should
be modified, it cannot anymore, since the
court is BOUND by its old construction
because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long
history of definition by" the courts, and
therefore, it "carries its historical
construction" when used by CONGRESS in
a statute.
3) "We have said that “when judicial
interpretations have settled the meaning
of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new
statute indicates, as a general matter, the
intent to incorporate its judicial
interpretations as well.” (STARE DECIS
becomes the interpretation and
construction of a law or STATUTE that is
ambiguous even if it was applied to a
private case)
New Law New Remedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory
interpretation that "a statute prescribing a
new remedy for an existing right should
never be construed to abolish a pre-
existing remedy in the absence of express
words or necessary implication. Further, "
'when a statute gives a new remedy, and
contains no negative, express or implied,
of the old remedy, the new one provided
by it is cumulative, and the party may elect
between the two.'
Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same
Subject
1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating
to the same subject should not be read in
isolation. Such statutes should be
considered in pari materia. Moreover,
statutes dealing with the same subject
matter should be construed together to
achieve a harmonious result, resolving
conflicts to give effect to legislative intent.
An accepted principle of statutory
construction is that, when it is not clear
which of two statutes applies, the more
Page 11
specific statute prevails over the more
general. Also, when statutes provide
different procedures on the same subject
matter, "the general must give way to the
specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of
your questions and in accord with the rule
of statutory construction in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be
considered as isolated fragments of law.
Such provisions are to be considered as a
whole, or as parts of a greater connected,
homogeneous system of laws, or a single
and complete statutory compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as
if they constituted but one act, so that
sections of one act may be considered as
though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation
dealing with a particular subject consists
of a system of related general provisions
indicative of a settled policy, new
enactments of a fragmentary nature on
that subject are to be taken as intended to
fit into the existing system and to be
carried into effect conformably to it, and
they should be so construed as to
harmonize the general tenor or purport of
the system and make the scheme
consistent in all its parts and uniform in its
operation, unless a different purpose is
shown plainly or with irresistible clearness.
It will be assumed or presumed, in the
absence of words specifically indicating
the contrary, that the legislature did not
intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard,
alter or violate a general statute or system
of statutory provisions the entire subject
matter of which is not directly or
necessarily involved in the act (noting that
in absence of words to contrary,
legislature did not intend to alter or repeal
general statute or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as
being consistent with one another. Two
statutes which are closely interrelated
must be read and construed together and
effect given to all of their provisions.
Statutes should be construed, if possible,
so as to harmonize, and force and effect
should be given the provisions of each.
Statutory Construction
4) The primary objective of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect
to legislative intent. 'In interpreting
statutes, "courts should give the fullest
possible effect to the legislative intent
embodied in the entire statutory
enactment. Potentially conflicting statutes
should be harmonized to give force and
effect to each.
5) City and municipal ordinances must be
consistent with the laws of the
Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local
ordinance both can be given effect,
courts must harmonize them and apply
them together.
The Meaning of Words
1) In the absence of a contrary definition,
the words in a statute are presumed to
have their usual and ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory
construction requires that every part of a
statute be presumed to have some effect,
and not be treated as meaningless unless
absolutely necessary. "We must assume
that the legislature did not intend to do a
vain and useless thing. "It is a well
established rule of construction that a
statute ought to be interpreted in such a
manner that it may have effect, and not
found to be vain and elusive. "A word or
clause contained in a statute may only be
rejected as surplusage if it "appears to
have been inserted through inadvertence
or mistake, and which is incapable of any
sensible meaning," or is otherwise
repugnant to the rest of the statute.
4) "We will not construe a statute by
singling out a particular term or phrase,
but will construe the words and terms at
issue in the context of the other language
used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the
constant endeavor of the courts is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention
of the legislature, that intention must be
gathered from the words used, unless a
literal construction would involve a
manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated
Page 12
the related principle that "the plain,
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute
is always to be preferred to any curious,
narrow, or strained construction." Statutes
should not be interpreted in ways that
produce absurd or irrational
consequences.
6) "A statute must be construed with
reference to its subject matter, the object
sought to be attained, and the legislative
purpose in enacting it; the provisions
should receive a construction that will
render it harmonious with that purpose
rather than one which will defeat it.
7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clear and definite, effect must be given to
it. It is unnecessary to resort to any rules of
statutory construction when the language
of a statute is unambiguous. In those
situations, the statute's plain meaning and
intent govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of
being understood in more than one way,
refers to two or more things
simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend,
is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness
and definiteness.”
9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed.
2004) defines "valid" as "Legally sufficient;
binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does
not provide a statutory definition we may
look to the dictionary definition to
determine legislative intent
10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature
separated the two prohibitions with a
comma followed by the disjunctive word
"nor." We have noted that, pursuant to the
rules of grammar, "phrases separated by a
comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are
independent. The disjunctive serves to
connect the two parts of the sentence but
also to keep them separate and
independent.”
12) "The word [willful] often denotes an
act which is intentional, or knowing, or
Statutory Construction
voluntary, as distinguished from
accidental. But when used in a criminal
statute it generally means an act done
with a bad purpose; without justifiable
excuse; stubbornly, obstinately,
perversely[.] The word is also employed to
characterize a thing done without ground
for believing it is lawful. The term "willful
act" imports knowledge and
consciousness that injury will result from
the act done. The act done must be
intended or it must involve a reckless
disregard for the rights of another and will
probably result in an injury. [T]he term
"gross, wanton, and culpable" describes
conduct. The word "gross" means
"aggravated or increased negligence"
while the word "culpable" means
"deserving of blame or censure." 'Gross
negligence' is culpable or criminal when
accompanied by acts of commission or
omission of a wanton or willful nature,
showing a reckless or indifferent disregard
of the rights of others, under
circumstances reasonably calculated to
produce injury, or which make it not
improbable that injury will be occasioned,
and the offender knows, or is charged
with the knowledge of, the probable
result of his acts
13) "But, courts are not permitted to add
language to a statute nor are they
permitted to accomplish the same result
by judicial interpretation." Rather, when
the language of a statute is unambiguous,
courts are bound by the plain meaning of
that language and may not assign a
construction that amounts to holding that
the General Assembly did not mean what
it actually has stated.
14) "It is equally well established,
however, that if the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, a regulatory
interpretation by the Department that is
in conflict with the plain language of the
statute cannot be sustained.
15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis,
when a particular class of persons or
things is enumerated in a statute and
general words follow, the general words
Page 13
are to be restricted in their meaning to a
sense analogous to the less general,
particular words. Likewise, according to
the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated
words) when general and specific words
are grouped, the general words are
limited by the specific and will be
construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those things identified by the
specific words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class
which would otherwise fall within its
terms, the exception negates the idea that
any other class is to be excepted.
17) One such rule, sometimes referred to
as the last antecedent doctrine, is
particularly applicable here and can be
summarized as follows: Referential and
qualifying words and phrases, where no
contrary intention appears, refer solely to
the last antecedent. The last antecedent is
'the last word, phrase, or clause that can
be made an antecedent without
impairing the meaning of the sentence.'
Thus a proviso usually is construed to
apply to the provision or clause
immediately preceding it. (explaining and
applying "the grammatical 'rule of the last
antecedent,' according to which a limiting
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be
read as modifying only the noun or phrase
that it immediately follows . . . ."); (noting
that construction of a statute according to
the last antecedent rule is "quite sensible
as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a
statute by those charged with its
enforcement cannot be permitted to
override [the statute's] clear meaning.
Amendments of statutes can only be
made by the legislature and not by the
courts or administrative officers charged
with their enforcement
20) "But principles of statutory
construction are not so rigid. Although we
presume that the same term has the same
meaning when it occurs here and there in
a single statute, the Court of Appeals
mischaracterized that presumption as
“effectively irrebuttable.” We also
Statutory Construction
understand that “[m]ost words have
different shades of meaning and
consequently may be variously construed,
not only when they occur in different
statutes, but when used more than once
in the same statute or even in the same
section.” Thus, the “natural presumption
that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning … is not rigid and readily
yields whenever there is such variation in
the connection in which the words are
used as reasonably to warrant the
conclusion that they were employed in
different parts of the act with different
intent.” Ibid. A given term in the same
statute may take on distinct characters
from association with distinct statutory
objects calling for different
implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the
same place") is the term used to provide
an endnote or footnote citation
orreference for a source that was cited in
the preceding endnote or footnote. It is
similar in meaning to idem (meaning
something that has been mentioned
previously; the same), abbreviated Id.,
which is commonly used in legal
citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one
must look at the reference preceding it.
21) "Generally, phrases separated by a
comma and the disjunctive "or," are
independent. (finding that, the word "or"
connects two parts of a sentence, "'but
disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting
disjunctive results in alternatives, which
must be treated separately); (finding that
limiting phrase in statute is independent of
and does not modify two earlier phrases
because the limiting phrase is separated
from the first two by a comma and the
disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a
comma and the disjunctive "or" as
implying two separate and independent
phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing
payment of dividends by corporation "out
of net earnings, or out of its net assets in
excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the
phrase, "made by the Defendant to any
law enforcement officer," is independent
of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny
Page 14
written or recorded statement or
confessions."
The Terms May/Shall
1) The term "may," as used in a statute,
should be given its ordinary meaning
intended by the CONGRESS -permission,
importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the
Supreme Court has held that the word
"may," while ordinarily importing
permission, will be construed to be
mandatory when it is necessary to
accomplish the manifest purpose of the
legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute
generally implies that its terms are
intended to be mandatory, rather than
permissive or directive.
4) "[T]he use of ‘shall,’ in a statute
requiring action by a public official, is
directory and not mandatory unless the
statute manifests a contrary intent."14 "A
statute directing the mode of proceeding
by public officers is to be deemed
directory, and a precise compliance is not
to be deemed essential to the validity of
the proceedings, unless so declared by
statute.
The Term Aggrieved “Locus Standi”
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled
meaning when it becomes necessary to
determine who is a proper party to seek
court relief from an adverse decision. In
order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it
must affirmatively appear that such
person had some direct interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding that he
seeks to attack. . . . The petitioner 'must
show that he has an immediate, pecuniary
and substantial interest in the litigation,
and not a remote or indirect interest.' . . .
Thus, it is not sufficient that the sole
interest of the petitioner is to advance
some perceived public right or to redress
some anticipated public injury when the
only wrong he has suffered is in common
with other persons similarly situated. The
word 'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates
a substantial grievance and means a
denial of some personal or property right,
Statutory Construction
legal or equitable, or imposition of a
burden or obligation upon the petitioner
different from that suffered by the public
generally.
Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent
1) "In the final analysis, the issue
whether mens rea or scienter is a
necessary element in the indictment and
proof of a particular crime becomes a
question of legislative intent to be
construed by the court. Thus, to insert a
mens rea element into the offense, and to
require proof thereof, would defeat the
statutory purpose, which is to criminalize
the introduction of firearms into a school
environment. So we will not add, by
implication, language to the statute that
the legislature expressly has chosen not to
include. Consequently, we hold that the
trial court correctly decided, in refusing
the instruction in question, that this
statute is one of strict criminal liability, and
that the Commonwealth was required to
prove only that the defendant had
possessed, on school property, a firearm of
the type described in the statute.
2) "The contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient
notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability
and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil.
A relation between some mental
element and punishment for a harmful act
is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to,"
and has afforded the rational basis for a
tardy and unfinished substitution of
deterrence and reformation in place of
retaliation and vengeance as the
motivation for public prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this
doctrine by English common law in the
Eighteenth Century was indicated by
Blackstone's sweeping statement that to
constitute any crime there must first be a
"vicious will." Common-law commentators
of the Nineteenth Century early
pronounced the same principle, although
Page 15
a few exceptions not relevant to our
present problem came to be recognized.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally
constituted only from concurrence of an
evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing
hand, was congenial to an intense
individualism.
As the states codified the common law of
crimes, even if their enactments were
silent on the subject, their courts assumed
that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely
recognized that intent was so inherent in
the idea of the offense that it required no
statutory affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division,
found an implication of the requirement
as to offenses that were taken over from
the common law. The unanimity with
which they have adhered to the central
thought that wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal is emphasized by
the variety, disparity and confusion of their
definitions of the requisite but elusive
mental element.
However, courts of various jurisdictions,
and for the purposes of different offenses,
have devised working formulae, if not
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries
around such terms as "felonious intent,"
"criminal intent," "malice aforethought,"
"guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent,"
"wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty
knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil
purpose or mental culpability.
By use or combination of these various
tokens, they have sought to protect those
who were not blameworthy in mind from
conviction of infamous common-law
crimes....The Government asks us by a feat
of construction radically to change the
weights and balances in the scales of
justice.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing
away with the requirement of a guilty
intent is to ease the prosecution's path to
conviction, to strip the defendant of such
benefit as he derived at common law from
innocence of evil purpose, and to
circumscribe the freedom heretofore
allowed juries.
Statutory Construction
Such a manifest impairment of the
immunities of the individual should not be
extended to common-law crimes on
judicial initiative.
3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens
rea was long a requirement of criminal
responsibility. But the list of exceptions
grew, especially in the expanding
regulatory area involving activities
affecting public health, safety, and
welfare. Id., at 254. The statutory offense
of embezzlement, borrowed from the
common law where scienter was
historically required, was in a different
category. 13 Id., at 260-261.
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition
and meaning [401 U.S. 601, 608] of
centuries of practice, it presumably knows
and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken
and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."
The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority
The Dillon Rule of strict construction
controls our determination of the powers
of local governing bodies. This rule
provides that municipal corporations have
only those powers that are expressly
granted, those necessarily or fairly implied
from expressly granted powers, and those
that are essential and indispensable.
"In determining legislative intent, the rule
is clear that where a power is conferred
and the mode of its execution is specified,
no other method may be selected; any
other means would be contrary to
legislative intent and, therefore,
unreasonable. A necessary corollary is
that where a grant of power is silent upon
its mode of execution, a method of
exercise clearly contrary to legislative
intent, or inappropriate to the ends sought
to be accomplished by the grant, also
would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold
legislative intent, the doctrine of implied
powers should never be applied to create
a power that does not exist or to expand
an existing power beyond rational limits.
Page 16
Always, the test in application of the
doctrine is reasonableness, in which
concern for what is necessary to promote
the public interest is a key element.
Finally, when a statute creates a specific
grant of authority, the authority exists only
to the extent specifically granted in the
statute. It can never go beyond the
authority given .
6) “When the legislature delegates
authority to an administrative agency to
promulgate regulations, those regulations
must neither exceed the scope of the
authority delegated nor be inconsistent
with it. Furthermore, "delegations of
legislative power are valid only if they
establish specific policies and fix definite
standards to guide the official, agency, or
board in the exercise of the power.
Delegations of legislative power which
lack such policies and standards are
unconstitutional and void." For example,
language in an enabling statute which
provides merely "that the regulations be
designed to protect and promote the
safety and health of employees" is
insufficient.
7) "We consistently have held that when
the primary purpose of an enactment is to
raise revenue, the enactment will be
considered a tax, regardless of the name
attached to the act. The General
Assembly is directly prohibited from
enacting “any local, special, or private law .
. . [f]or the assessment and collection of
taxes. There is, however, an exception to
this specific prohibition. The General
Assembly may by special act like RA
7160(Local Government Code) delegating
the power of taxation to any province,
city, municipality.
Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with
Manassas' statements that regulations of
Executive Departments have the force of
law, and that any Executive Department
concerned with the execution of a
statute’s interpretation of its governing
statutes, as reflected in its regulations, is
Statutory Construction
entitled to great weight. Regulations,
however, may not conflict with the
authorizing statute. Whether a regulation
is inconsistent with its enabling legislation
is properly a subject of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can
stand together and be given effect, it is the
duty of the courts to harmonize them and
not nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be
consistent with STATUTES. Such
ordinances are inconsistent with state law
when they cannot co-exist with a statute.
The fact that a county or municipal
ordinance enlarges on a statute's
provisions does not create a conflict with
the statute unless the statute limits the
requirements (Separability Clause is
inserted)for all cases to its own terms.
Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance
both can be given effect, courts must
harmonize them and apply them
together.
A Single Body of Law
1) "When attempting to define terms in
one part of the Code, courts should read a
statute with "a view toward harmonizing it
with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a
particular word in a statute is not defined
therein, a court must give it its ordinary
meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code
sections, the SUPREME Court often
examines other related statutes that
contain similar or contrasting language to
help determine legislative intent.
The Exclusion Rule
Ambiguity
1) "Language is ambiguous when it may
be understood in more than one way, or
simultaneously refers to two or more
things.
2) "When the language of a statute is
ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a
manner that will give effect to the intent
of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory
construction is to discern and give effect
to legislative intent, with the reading of a
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statute as a whole influencing the proper
construction of ambiguous individual
provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used
in the connection with the construction of
written documents to the effect that an
ambiguous provision is construed most
strongly against the person who selected
the language." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive
covenant, in particular the phrase
"residential purposes," to be ambiguous in
several respects....Indeed, even the circuit
court's interpretation that the term "
'[r]esidence' means more than mere
physical presence and less than domicile"
is ambiguous. It can be argued that a
nightly or weekly rental is more than mere
physical presence. Moreover, if the phrase
"residential purposes" carries with it a
"duration of use" component, it is
ambiguous as to when a rental of the
property moves from short-term to long-
term. Under our case law, a restrictive
covenant of "substantial doubt or
ambiguity" must be interpreted "in favor of
the free use of property and against
restrictions
Criminal Versus Civil Intent of a Statute
The question whether a particular
statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory
construction." First, one must determine
whether the legislature, in establishing the
penalizing mechanism, indicates either
expressly or impliedly a preference for one
label or the other. Second, where the
legislature has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, one must address
"whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution supersedes any
conflicting state law. The preemption of
Local laws by STATUTES may occur by
express statutory language or other clear
indication that Congress intended to
legislate exclusively in the area. Even if
Statutory Construction
Congress does not intend the enactment
of a STATUTORY scheme completely to
preempt Local laws in the area,
congressional enactments in the same
field override Local laws with which they
conflict.
The Supreme Court has identified three
ways in which preemption may occur:
(1) Congress may adopt express language
setting forth the existence and scope of
preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for
regulation that "occupies the field" and
leaves no room for states to adopt
supplemental laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with
the constitution, typically when
compliance with both laws is a "physical
impossibility" or the statute stands "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.
2) "Settled legal principles provide that the
Constitution, not a state court erroneous
interpretation of it, is controlling. (in
context of determining whether to apply
retroactively a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions, adopting
Blackstonian view that judges...find the
law rather than make the law and that
judicial declaration of law is merely a
statement of what the law has always
been.
Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the
lawmakers on matters of economics,
sociology and public policy. . . . Those
considerations belong exclusively in the
legislative domain. Regardless of whether
it "may or may not be better public policy".
Meaning COURTS do not interpret
provisions for ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY
and PUBLIC POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the
"propriety, wisdom, necessity and
expediency" of legislation. We ask only
whether the statutory classification erects
an irrational, arbitrary distinction - one that
no conceivable state of facts could
reasonably sustain.
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