CASE1567

ARTICLE III, SECTION 17: Right against Self-incrimination

Chavez v. CA (L-29169)

FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During his trial, he
was presented as a witness for the prosecution. His counsel objected by later submitted
after being assured by the court that petitioner will not be cancelled to answer any
question that would incriminate him.

ISSUE: Whether this accused may refuse to take the witness stand.

RULING: Yes. an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and
claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and
all questions. For in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the
people would be to incriminate him. The rule positivity intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction. Petitioner is ordered to be released unless he is also held
or detained for any cause other than the subject criminal case.

MAIN POINT: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," fully

echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, ROC where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant
shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself."
 CASE 1568
ARTICLE III, SECTION 17: Right against Self-incrimination
Cabal v. Kapunan (L-19052)

FACTS: Jose Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint
charging Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices,
unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President created a
committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered
petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be
sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of
unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order, invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand
and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a
witness to take the witness stand. The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of
Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the CFI of
Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the
witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan.
Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination

RULING: Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge
against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the
forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture
has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for
forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, hence, the exemption of defendants
in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable
thereto. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness
against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a
proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an
offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in
nature. The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely
asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an
option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely
because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his
constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for
refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is
improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However,
where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear
that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all
questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to
answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

MAIN POINT: The right against self-incrimination of an accused is available in

administrative hearings because of the nature of the penalty that may be imposed by
administrative body.
 CASE 1569
ARTICLE III, SECTION 17: Right against Self-incrimination
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners

FACTS: This case stemmed from an administrative case filed against petitioner Pascual
for alleged immorality being heard by Board of Medical Examiners (BEM). In this
administrative case against petitioner, he was asked to be the first witness for the
complainants – thus compelling him to be a witness against himself. Petitioner objected
to the said act of the complainants, hence the BEM required Pascual to secure a
restraining order from a competent authority so as he cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts
stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right
against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against
self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was
sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants; he being the party proceeded against in an administrative
charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

ISSUE: Whether the right against self-incrimination may be invoked in administrative

proceedings.

RULING: YES. The SC ruled in favor of herein petitioner citing the case of Cabal v.
KapunaN, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been
filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the complainant requested the
investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which
request was granted. Upon petitioner’s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge
for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to
quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in
accordance with the well-settled principle that “the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.”
It was noted in the opinion penned by the then Chief Justice that while the matter
referred to an administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act
authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire,
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the
imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character
thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar;
petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property
but the revocations of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even greater
deprivation.

MAIN POINT: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to

administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.