Critical Discourse Analysis in Historiography - The Case of Hong Kong's Evolving Political Identity-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2012)

Critical Discourse Analysis
in Historiography
The Case of Hong Kong’s Evolving
Political Identity
John Flowerdew
Critical Discourse Analysis in Historiography
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Critical Discourse Analysis
in Historiography
The Case of Hong Kong’s Evolving
Political Identity
John Flowerdew
Professor of English, City University of Hong Kong
© John Flowerdew 2012
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Contents
List of Figures viii

List of Tables ix
Preface x
Acknowledgements xiv
Introduction 1
1 Background on Hong Kong and Theoretical Framework 3
Part I The Discourse of the Outgoing Administration 39
2 The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal 41
3 Rhetorical Strategies and Identity Politics in the
Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal 64
4 Discourse and Social Change in a Public Meeting 88
Part II Intercultural Discourses in Hong Kong 115
5 Face in Intercultural Political Discourse 117
6 Competing Public Discourses in Transitional Hong Kong 133
7 Metaphors in the Discursive Construction of Patriotism:
the Case of Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform Debate 153
Part III The Discursive Construction of a New Hong Kong
Identity 173
8 Identity Politics and Hong Kong’s Return to Chinese Sovereignty 175
9 Discourse as History: History as Discourse. ‘The Rise of
Modern China’ – a History Exhibition in Post-Colonial
Hong Kong 199
10 Discriminatory Discourse Directed towards Mainlanders 218
11 Globalisation Discourse: Continuity with the Old 245
12 The Discursive Construction of a World Class City 262
Conclusion 289
13 Conclusion 291
Notes 302
References 313
Index 329
vii
List of Figures
3.1 A diagrammatic representation of parallelism in extract 2 76

5.1 Options available when performing a face-threatening act 123
12.1 Dynamics of decision-making 269
12.2 Targets for Bringing the Vision to Life 271
viii
List of Tables
2.1 Positive environments of noun phrases containing the word

economy or economic 54
2.2 Phrases containing the word wealth 56
2.3 Complex noun phrases in which the word individual occurs 56
2.4 Examples of the rule of law in context 57
2.5 Examples of accountability in context 58
4.1 Time taken up by different phases of the meeting
(not including translation) 108
7.1 Themes of metaphors used by Ta Kung Pao and Apple Daily 159
8.1 Positive environments of text extracts containing the
lemma economy 186
8.2 Negative environments of text extracts based on the
lemma economy 187
8.3 Text extracts related to the ‘knowledge-based’ economy 188
8.4 Text extracts associated with China’s economy 190
8.5 Text extracts containing the word individual(s) 191
8.6 Text extracts containing the term rule of law 192
8.7 Examples of the lemma democracy in context 193
8.8 Examples of democracy collocating with the Basic Law
in context 194
8.9 Text extracts containing the item Chinese culture 196
8.10 Text extracts containing the word values 197
10.1 Composite taxonomy of discriminatory discourse strategies
as found in the CDA literature 227
ix
Preface
In late 1989, when the informal research began for the project which is
described in this book, Hong Kong still had many of the characteristics of
a colonial backwater, although it was already beginning to take on many
of the features of the globalised city that is has since become. At that time,
only a few months after the tragic events of Tiananmen Square in Beijing,
there was much nervousness among the Hong Kong people about their
future under mainland Chinese rule following the change of sovereignty
(popularly referred to as ‘the handover’) scheduled to take place on 1 July
1997. In many ways, the period leading up to 1997 had the feeling of a ‘last
chance saloon’. People were determined to make as much money as they
could before the reversion, and the stock and property markets, although
extremely volatile, were shooting up in a speculative bubble. Meanwhile,
those who could do so had obtained foreign passports or residency and
many of those who had not done so were emigrating to countries such as
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and other smaller coun-
tries (Britain only allowed 50,000 full British passports to be distributed
among Hong Kong nationals).
On the political front, in accordance with a policy referred to as the
‘through train’ (a metaphor based on the train that travels directly from
Hong Kong to Guangzhou, in mainland China and vice versa), negotiations
were going on between Britain and China over the make-up of the govern-
ment which was supposed to straddle the change of sovereignty and over
some other issues where China felt that it had an interest (for example, the
new airport that the British had decided to build prior to the reversion in
order to restore confidence in the territory after the extreme nervousness
created post-Tiananmen). Chinese policy at this time was ultimately deter-
mined by Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the ‘one coun-
try, two systems’ policy under which Hong Kong was to revert to Chinese
sovereignty, but with a high degree of autonomy in all issues except defence
and foreign affairs. On the British side, this policy had been entered into by
Margaret Thatcher, but she was removed by a political coup on the part of
the Conservative Party in late 1990 and replaced as prime minister by John
Major.
Soon after his appointment as prime minister, in 1992, Major held an
election to confirm his position. Under Thatcher, British Hong Kong policy
had been determined by Foreign Office officials under the leadership of
Sir Percy Cradock, a sinologist of many years’ experience and Thatcher’s sen-
ior foreign affairs adviser. In some quarters, however, there was discontent
with Cradock and the Foreign Office sinologists, on the grounds that they had
x
Preface xi
a history of giving in too easily to Chinese demands. Accordingly, after the

general election in 1992, Major decided to replace David Wilson, the Foreign
Office official who was then the governor, with Chris Patten, the former
Conservative Party chairman who had masterminded the Conservative
electoral victory, but in doing so had lost his own seat in Parliament. Major
stated that he appointed Patten ‘to deal with a very important element of
British history’. Patten’s brief was to take a harder line in negotiations with
China and see British Hong Kong through to the change of sovereignty.
When Patten arrived in Hong Kong, there was a sea change in the atmos-
phere. Dispensing with the cocked hat adorned with ostrich feathers and
other colonial regalia favoured by previous Hong Kong governors, Patten
arrived in a plain lounge suit. Dispensing with other formalities, he declared
that he wanted to make his governorship as open and accessible as possi-
ble (Flowerdew, 1998). Following his arrival, Patten gave expression to this
promise of openness and accessibility through regular press conferences,
question time sessions in the Legislative Council and walkabouts in various
Hong Kong districts. He promised to open up the electoral system and take a
tougher stance with China, soon engaging in a ‘war of words’ with Chinese
officials. He cultivated the pro-democracy parties, who had been somewhat
cold-shouldered under the previous governor (and by China). Patten went
down very well with the Hong Kong people in general and his approval rat-
ings were very high. All of this was backed up by a very powerful rhetoric
and discursive style.
As a result of this change of atmosphere, I decided that somebody needed
to analyse this phenomenon from a discourse perspective. I had been read-
ing a lot of the literature in critical discourse analysis (CDA) and felt that
Patten’s discourse, in particular, but also the whole discourse surrounding
the change of sovereignty, was calling out for a study which I conceived of
as combining discourse analysis and historiography (the writing of history).
My plan soon developed into an open-ended one, to study the political
discourse accompanying and at the same time constituting (discursively
constructing) the whole transitional period, from the time of Patten (five
years prior to the handover) and for an equivalent period (or longer) fol-
lowing it.
Throughout this period, I have acted as a participant observer of the
political scene in Hong Kong and have analysed in detail various discursive
phenomena which in their various ways index Hong Kong’s transition. The
result has been a series of papers developed diachronically across a period of
more than 10 years, an earlier book (Flowerdew, 1998) and now the present
volume. This present volume brings together (in edited form) many of the
papers I have written over this period, with an extensive introduction and
(shorter) conclusion which pull them together and contextualise them as
the historiographical document that I always intended them to be. My aim
is, at one and the same time, to show how critical discourse analysis can be
xii Preface
applied with a view to develop our understanding of real-world phenomena

in their (diachronic) historical context, on the one hand, and to provide
insights for (critical) discourse theory, on the other.
With this aim in view, after the extensive introduction already referred
to, where I set out the theoretical underpinnings and justification for the
study – my case for a historiographical approach to critical discourse – the
three chapters in Part I are devoted to the discourse of Chris Patten: in
Chapter 2, an analysis of the myth he promoted to the people of Hong Kong
and the world of the British legacy to Hong Kong, in Chapter 3, an analysis
of the rhetorical strategies used by Patten to enunciate his discourse of colo-
nial withdrawal and, in Chapter 4, an analysis of a public meeting to show
how he used language power over the people of Hong Kong to persuade
them to his political point of view.
Part II is concerned with intercultural political discourse. International
politics, of course, takes place in intercultural contexts and the Hong
Kong transition represents an excellent case study of how this happens. In
Chapter 5, an understanding is attempted of the negotiations between Britain
and China from the perspective of a Chinese model of face. In Chapter 6, the
pulse of Hong Kong at the time of the lead-up to the reversion is taken in
discourse terms, by means of an analysis of competing Utilitarian (Western
influenced) and Confucian public discourses. In Chapter 7, the focus is
switched to post-reversion discourse and a consideration of how pro-Beijing
news discourse promoted patriotic feelings among Hong Kong readers.
Part III covers in more detail post-transfer discourse, how the pro-Beijing
administration attempted to carve out a new Hong Kong Chinese identity,
while at the same time preserving its capitalist roots. In Chapter 8, a similar
approach is adopted to analysing the discourse of the first chief executive
of the new Special Administrative Region of China (SAR), Tung Chee-hwa,
as that applied in Chapter 2 to Chris Patten; Tung’s discourse is interpreted
in terms of a myth with major similarities and differences from that of
Patten. In Chapter 9, a history museum exhibition is analysed with a view
to considering to what extent the museum curator’s attempt to present a
‘balanced’ view (neither too pro-Beijing, nor too pro-democracy) of the
history of Hong Kong was successful or not. In Chapter 10, analysis turns
to the question of discriminatory discourse, showing how post-1997 many
Hong Kong people still harbour negative feelings for their brethren over the
border in mainland China. Chapter 11 shows how Tung Chee-hwa, the first
Hong Kong SAR chief executive, promoted a globalised view of Hong Kong’s
identity to international business. Chapter 12 shows how the Hong Kong
government discursively constructed Hong Kong as a ‘world class city’.
The concluding chapter (Chapter 13) summarises the main findings of the
study. The conclusion is that the study shows how public discourses have
changed in some respects during the period of transition, but in other areas
have been maintained. On the one hand, Hong Kong’s essential capitalistic
Preface xiii
identity has been preserved, while, on the other, in political terms, the goal
has been to develop a more ‘patriotic’ Hong Kong Chinese identity.
In terms of the overall goal of the study, the volume demonstrates the
role that CDA can play in historiography, the writing of history, in this case
Hong Kong’s return to China, and with it ‘the success of applying Deng
Xiaoping’s concept of “one country, two systems” to resolve the Hong Kong
issue, … an important step forward in the cause of China’s reunification
[and] a contribution to world peace and stability’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2000).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following for permission to use previously pub-
lished material:
John Benjamins Publishing Company, for ‘Rhetorical strategies and identity

politics in the discourse of colonial withdrawal’ in Journal of Language and
Politics, 1(1): 149–80, 2002 (Chapter 4), and ‘Discourse as history: history
as discourse. “The rise of modern China” – A history exhibition in post-
colonial Hong Kong’ in J. R. Martin and R. Wodak (eds) Re/reading the past:
Critical and functional perspectives on time and value. Amsterdam. Benjamins,
pp. 193–216, 2003 (Chapter 9).
Cambridge University Press, for ‘Discourse and social change in contempo-

rary Hong Kong’ in Language in Society 25(4): 557–86, 1996 (Chapter 3).
Elsevier, for ‘Identity politics and Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sover-
eignty: Analyzing the discourse of Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive’ in
Journal of Pragmatics. 36(9): 1551–78, 2004 (Chapter 7) and ‘Competing
public discourses in transitional Hong Kong’ in Journal of Pragmatics 28:
533–53, 1997 (Chapter 6).
De Gruyter Mouton, for ‘Face in cross-cultural political discourse’ in TEXT

19(1): 3–23, 1999 (Chapter 5).
Sage Publications Inc., for ‘The discourse of colonial withdrawal: A case study
in the creation of mythic discourse’ in Discourse and Society 8 (4): 493–517,
1997 (Chapter 2), ‘Metaphors in the discursive construction of patriotism:
The case of Hong Kong’s constitutional reform debate’ (with S. Leong) in
Discourse & Society 18(3): 273–94, 2007 (Chapter 7), ‘Discriminatory news
discourse: some Hong Kong data’ (with D. C. S. Li and S. Tran) in Discourse
and Society 13(3): 319–45, 2002 (Chapter 10), ‘Globalization discourse: A view
from the East’ in Discourse and Society 13(2): 209–25, 2002 (Chapter 11),
and ‘The discursive construction of a world-class city’ in Discourse and Society
15(5): 579–605, 2004 (Chapter 12).
I would particularly like to thank David C.S. Li and Sarah Tran for permis-
sion to use the article I co-wrote with them and which is reproduced in a
revised version as Chapter 10 and Solomon Leong for permission to use the
article I co-wrote with him and which is reproduced in a revised version
xiv
Acknowledgements xv
as Chapter 7. I would also like to thank very much Ruth Wodak, who
commented on an earlier version of Chapter 1.
Research for this book received financial support in the form of the follow-
ing grants: City University of Hong Kong Strategic Grants 7000336, 7000593
and 7001022; and City University Small-Scale Grant 9030782.
A number of people have helped me in various capacities over the years with
this work. They include: Antonio Domingo, Rodney Jones, Eddie Leung,
Barry Low, Clara Mak, Connie Ng, Ron Scollon, Joey Wong and Jacqueline
Young. I thank them all.
Finally, I would like to thank Chris Patten, former governor of Hong, Kerry
McGlynn, governor’s spokesperson, Edward Llewelyn, governor’s personal
adviser, and Dr Ting Sun-pao, former director of the Hong Kong History
Museum, for kindly granting me interviews.
Introduction
1
Background on Hong Kong and
Theoretical Framework
1.1 Introduction
This chapter will first provide some very brief background about Hong Kong,
because Hong Kong is the focus of the discourses analysed in this book. The
chapter will then review the literature on the three key theoretical terms in
the title of this book: critical discourse analysis, historiography and identity.
After this, something will be said about other theories and the methods used
in this study. This will be followed by a summary of each chapter. Finally, a
checklist will be given of the main discourse theories and methods of textual
analysis used in each chapter.
1.2 Hong Kong1
Hong Kong is a former British colony and now a Special Administrative

Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Hong Kong is located
in the southern part of China and has a population of approximately
7 million. Its total land area of 1076 km2 is made up of three distinct parts:
Hong Kong Island, ceded to the British in perpetuity in 1842; the Kowloon
peninsula, ceded to the British in 1860; and the New Territories, com-
ing under British control according to the terms of a 99-year lease agreed
with China, in 1898. Each of the three parts of Hong Kong was taken over
by the British following minor Sino-British wars and, consequently, the
legitimacy of Britain’s sovereignty has always been contested by China,
although that country never took any concrete steps to retrieve control,
stating that ‘[t]he Hong Kong issue should be resolved through negotiation
when conditions permit’ and that ‘the existing status of Hong Kong should
be maintained pending a solution’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). In
the early 1980s, with the approach of the expiry of the lease on the New
Territories in 1997 and British concern about what would happen to Hong
Kong, negotiations were entered into. These negotiations resulted in 1984
in agreement that, under the terms of a ‘Joint Declaration’, on 1 July 1997,
3
4 Critical Discourse Analysis in Historiography
sovereignty over the whole territory would return to China and that Hong
Kong would become a Special Administrative Region of that country. Based
upon the Joint Declaration, which went into considerable detail in specify-
ing the terms of the return, China published its own ‘Basic Law’, a mini-
constitution for post-1997 Hong Kong. Both the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law state that Hong Kong would retain a high degree of autonomy
under Chinese sovereignty and that its way of life, including its capitalist
economic system, its common-law legal system, its free press, its freedom of
worship, its right of assembly, its academic freedom and its two official lan-
guages (Chinese and English) would remain the same for 50 years following
the change of sovereignty.
Not long after the signing of the Joint Declaration, demonstrations for
greater openness on the part of the mainland government, in Tiananmen
Square, in the centre of Beijing, led to many deaths, following the interven-
tion of the People’s Liberation Army. This created great concern in Hong
Kong and led to mass emigration on the part of Hong Kong people to
countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States (although many
subsequently returned). The British refused to give right of abode in Britain
to all Hong Kong people, but, in 1990, passed the British nationality act,
allowing 50,000 families to obtain British citizenship, the idea being that
this would encourage those key members of society offered right of abode
in Britain to remain in Hong Kong. In order to further reinforce confi-
dence, the British Hong Kong government, under Governor David Wilson,
embarked on a public spending campaign, the most important element of
which was a new airport. The Chinese government was suspicious that the
British were trying to use up Hong Kong’s financial reserves in paying British
contractors working on the airport and tried to block this project, although
it eventually went through.
By this time, Governor Wilson and his Foreign Office colleagues had come
to be judged by the Conservative government of the time, under Prime
Minister John Major, to be too accommodating to the Chinese government,
especially with regard to the negotiations over electoral arrangements in
the lead-up to and following the handover. Accordingly, in July 1992, Major
appointed a ‘political’ governor, Chris Patten, as its representative, to take
a harder line in dealings with the mainland government. Patten introduced
proposals for political reform designed to give Hong Kong greater democ-
racy. The Chinese viewed this as interference in its internal affairs (because
the reforms would run beyond the handover) and ostracised Patten, mount-
ing a vitriolic verbal campaign against him, referring to him as a ‘whore
of the East’, a ‘serpent’ and a ‘criminal who would be condemned for a
thousand generations.’ In spite of this Chinese opposition, however, Patten
pushed through his reforms.
On 30 June 1997, at a ceremony in Hong Kong presided over by the
Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, and Prince Charles, the colony was formally
Background on Hong Kong and Theoretical Framework 5
transferred from Britain to China. In their speeches, both Charles and Jiang
commented on the great achievement of international cooperation that was
represented by Hong Kong’s reversion.
The first chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR (equivalent to governor),
Tung Chee-hwa, had been selected prior to the handover by a small circle
of Hong Kong Beijing supporters and mainland legal experts and members
of the PRC hierarchy. The first thing that Tung did after his appointment
was to oversee the dismantling of the Patten reforms and the organisation
of elections for its replacement under the old system legislature (something
that the Chinese had warned would happen). Faced with a range of other
difficulties, including an avian flu epidemic, a right of abode issue concern-
ing the rights of children born in Hong Kong to mainland citizens to remain
in the SAR, problems with education concerning a switch from English to
mother-tongue instruction, and, above all, the fallout from the Asian finan-
cial crisis, which led to a crash in the property and employment market,
Tung proved to be very unpopular with the people of Hong Kong. In spite
of this he was selected by Beijing in 2002 for a second five-year term.
Early in his second term, Tung tried to implement an article in the Basic
Law which required the Hong Kong government to draw up anti-subversion
legislation. This proved hugely unpopular, due to concerns about restric-
tions on Hong Kong citizens’ freedom, freedom which they had been
promised in the Joint Declaration. Early in his second term, Tung was also
criticised for his government’s mishandling of an epidemic of SARS. These
issues and others led, in 2003, to a mass demonstration of some 500,000
people calling for Tung to resign. Following further criticism, including a
public dressing down from the PRC president himself, Hu Jintao, in 2005,
Tung resigned, officially for health reasons.
During the post-handover period, debate continued in Hong Kong over
democratic development. According to the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law, Hong Kong is to work gradually towards universal suffrage for the chief
executive and the legislature. There was much argument in Hong Kong
over the pace of this reform, with the Hong Kong government (and Beijing)
favouring a slower pace of development and a legislative framework that
gave it more control, and the pro-democracy parties favouring a faster pace
of development and a more broadly based Western-style electoral system. In
2004, following the failure on the part of the Hong Kong government, under
Tung, to win the necessary two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council for
its proposals for limited democratic development, the Chinese government
unilaterally decided that it would impose the Beijing/Hong Kong govern-
ment model. Universal suffrage for the chief executive and the Legislative
Council would not occur before 2017, it declared. Following that decision,
debate continued in Hong Kong over the exact form of the elections and a
demand on the part of the pro-democracy camp for a ‘road map’ showing
how the 2017 model will be arrived at.
Following Tung’s departure, his successor, Donald Tsang, was first

appointed acting chief executive until a selection procedure could be organ-
ised to formally appoint him. This having been done, Tsang was confirmed
in his position, to serve out Tung’s shortened term, until 2007. He was then
reselected (unopposed) for a further five years until 2012. In 2007, an elec-
toral reform proposal put forward by Tsang was voted down, failing to get
the required two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council, due to the pro-
democracy parties refusing to support it. In 2010, however, a further revised
package received the reluctant support of most of the pro-democracy legisla-
tors and it was passed. It looks as if, by 2017, Hong Kong will have universal
suffrage, but that there will be built-in features that will ensure that Beijing
has ultimate control, a model more akin to that of Singapore than to that
of Western democracies.
Hong Kong is often described as a meeting of East and West, based on the
traditional Chinese heritage of its inhabitants and the influence of British
colonialism and international capitalism. It is an important centre for trade
and finance and, since the handover, has become increasingly important
as a funnel for mainland trade and investment. Hong Kong people are well
educated and sophisticated, many of them having lived or studied overseas.
In elections, pro-democracy parties consistently win majorities, although
the make-up of the Legislative Council, with its functional constituencies
(small constituencies based on designated individuals and organisations rep-
resenting special interests), together with pro-Beijing parties, ensures that
the government can usually get its way. On the few occasions when it has
failed to do so, the Hong Kong government has called upon the mainland
government to impose its policies. Most Hong Kong people resist political
control from Beijing, however, while at the same time embracing China as
the motherland for culture and heritage.
The chapters in this book cover the period from the appointment as gov-
ernor of Chris Patten up to and including the time of Tung Chee-hwa. They
thus cover both the pre- and post-handover period, although they do not go
right up to the tenure of Donald Tsang.
1.3 Critical discourse analysis
The model of critical discourse analysis (CDA) employed in this volume is

influenced primarily by Norman Fairclough (e.g. 1989, 1995a, b, 2003), Ruth
Wodak (e.g. 2001, 2002) [see also Fairclough and Wodak, 1997]), and Teun
van Dijk (e.g. 1987, 1988a, b, 2008a), although insights are also drawn from
other (critical) discourse analysts and other social and discourse theories.
In this book, the term discourses is used in the plural to differentiate it
from the singular term discourse. The latter refers to language use in gen-
eral, while the former refers to specific sets of meanings expressed through
particular forms and uses which give expression to particular institutions
or social groups (Kress, 1989; Foucault, 1984). Discourses vary from person
to person, because people’s views of the world and relations with it vary,
depending upon their individual circumstances. Discourses are not the same
as texts (written or spoken). Texts are manifestations of discourses and dis-
courses are manifested through text (and other semiotic systems), but they
are not the same thing.
Discourse is related to ideology in so far as discursive practices reflect
subjective understandings of the world. Discourse is thus infused with the
ideological assumptions of its creators. Discourses may present subjective
versions of reality with a view to imposing particular ideologies onto sub-
jects. They may thus reflect power struggles within society.
CDA is concerned with the relation between language and society from a
critical perspective (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). For CDA, discourses
are conceptions of the world, connected to the relations people share
with the world, depending on their social positions (Fairclough, 2003).
Discourses can thus be conceived of as ‘ways of representing aspects of
the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the
“mental world” of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social
world’ (Fairclough, 2003: 124).
Fairclough’s conception of discourses as expressive of systems of knowledge
and belief, social relations and social identities is derived from the linguistic
theory of Halliday (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), referred to as systemic-
functional linguistics (SFL). SFL emphasises how language simultaneously
performs three major functions: (i) representing the world (ideational func-
tion), (ii) enacting social relations and identities (interpersonal function)
and (iii) (an enabling function) realising the other functions as text (textual
function). In relating SFL’s theory of the characteristics of language to CDA,
Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) see discourse not only as representing
social situations and relations, but at the same time as being constitutive of
them: ‘it [discourse] constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the
social identities of and relationships between people and groups of peo-
ple’. What distinguishes CDA, indeed, from the approach of, for example,
Foucault and other post-structuralists to discourse is its emphasis on linguis-
tic form. CDA posits a dialectical relation between macro social structures of
discourse and micro linguistic features (Fairclough, 1995a). Social structure
determines linguistic form, but, at the same time, linguistic form determines
social structure (Fairclough, 1995a: 28).
Fairclough (1995a: 28) relates this dialectic between the macro and the
micro to the term ‘critical’ in CDA: ‘[t]he critical approach has its theoretical
underpinnings in views of the relationship between “micro”… and “macro”
structures which see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of
the former and which therefore reject rigid barriers between the study of the
“micro”… and the study of the “macro’’.’ CDA emphasises both the power
of discourse in producing and reproducing unequal power relations, on the
one hand, and the role of discursive structures in activating ideologies, on

the other (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). The term ‘critical’, as Wodak has
explained in an interview (Kendall, 2007), is derived from the Frankfurt
School and other sources and does not necessarily imply negativity, but
refers to ‘not taking anything for granted, opening up alternative readings
(justifiable through cues in the texts); self-reflection of the research process;
making ideological positions manifested in the respective text transparent,
etc.’ (in Kendall, 2007). At the same time, there is no denying that an impor-
tant function of CDA is the unmasking of hidden assumptions in discourse,
assumptions which may not be obvious even to its users, as they have become
naturalised, or part of common-sense understanding (Barthes, 1972).
In relating the micro and macro, Fairclough (2002) relates CDA to
Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony. For Fairclough (1992: 92), hegemony
is ‘leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cul-
tural and ideological domains of a society’. Hegemonic struggle can be
related to discourse in so far as social structures and discursive structures
are in a mutually defining relationship. Social structure is manifested in its
discursive practices and discursive practices are constitutive of social struc-
ture, in society’s norms, conventions, relations, identities and institutions
(Fairclough, 1992: 64). This means that changes in society are reflected in
changes in discursive practice and vice versa.
In bringing hegemony and discourse together, one can talk of discursive
hegemony. By this is meant, as Fairclough (2003: 218) defines the term, ‘the
dominance and naturalisation of particular representations’, how certain dis-
courses come to prevail in given sociopolitical contexts, as a result of a strug-
gle between the relevant political actors. This conceptualisation of discursive
hegemony is an extension of Gramsci’s broader notion of hegemony, which
conceives of power as being based on acquiescence and consent, not just
force, that is to say hegemony consists of both ideology and physical force.
The emphasis put on the discursive dimension of hegemony here, how the
struggle for political dominance is at least partly constituted through discur-
sive means, is derived from Laclau and Mouffe (2001), who see discourse as
central to their influential rearticulation of the notion of hegemony.
The creation of a hegemonic discourse concerned with national and
sociopolitical identity implies the projection of a common identity onto
subjects as belonging to an autonomous community and expressing a sin-
gle national and political culture (Smith, 2002). This struggle for discursive
hegemony underlies most, if not all, of the discourses analysed in this book.
Thus in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we see how Chris Patten, the last British Hong
Kong governor, tried to project a particular image of Hong Kong’s identity
onto its people, while in Chapter 8 we see how Tung Chee-hwa, the first
Chinese chief executive of the newly formed Special Administrative Region
of China, partly tried to perpetuate this view, but also attempted to make
changes to it, to fit in with the post-handover status quo. In Chapter 7, on
the other hand, we see how a pro-Beijing newspaper, in its depiction of the
Hong Kong ‘patriot’, strove to impose a pro-mainland view of the prevailing
political scenario. In Chapter 6, we see two contrasting discourses compet-
ing in the public domain of Hong Kong: the Utilitarian discourse, which is
characteristic of those who support greater democracy and autonomy for
Hong Kong versus the Confucianist discourse, which is employed by repre-
sentatives of China and the pro-China camp in Hong Kong. Each of these
different discourses can be seen to be striving for discursive hegemony.
CDA enables us to look into the discourse dimensions of injustice, ine-
quality and the abuse of power in general. The social, political and cultural
organisation of dominance in the language structures of a discourse is con-
stitutive of a hierarchy of power. As one of the essential functions of text and
talk is to persuade others to one’s point of view, it is possible to analyse the
linguistic structures and the discursive strategies of a discourse in order to
uncover the power struggle, social inequality and other forms of social and
political problems (van Dijk, 1993a).
In order to uncover the linguistic structures and the discursive strat-
egies of a discourse referred to in the previous paragraph, it is necessary to
consider the context in which they are made. CDA, in line with Hallidayan
systemic functional linguistics, views context as constraining the properties
of texts (spoken and written); at the same time, however, properties of texts
contribute towards the creation of social structures and contexts. Indeed,
analysis in CDA involves what Halliday (1961) a long time ago referred
to as ‘shunting’ between textual properties, on the one hand (the micro),
and social context (the macro) (referred to as the context of situation in
Hallidayan linguistics (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004)), on the other.
Van Dijk (2001b: 108) distinguishes two levels of context: global and local.
The global level concerns the overall social, political, cultural and historical
structures in which the discourse takes place while the local level concerns
the immediate interactional situation.
The approach to context in Wodak’s (2001) ‘discourse-historical’ approach
to CDA fits with van Dijk’s global level and puts particular emphasis on the
historical background (for more on this, see the next section on history):
‘In investigating historical, organizational and political topics and texts,
the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate a large quantity of
available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the
social and political fields in which discursive “events” are embedded.’ This
approach is very close, in fact, to that adopted in this volume, where the
sociohistorical background is very important to the textual analysis in all of
the individual case studies.
In contrast to Wodak, van Dijk’s own approach to context puts more
emphasis on the local dimension. Van Dijk is particularly concerned with
how context is mediated through cognition, how individuals relate text and
context through ‘subjective mental models on-goingly constructed by the
participants of the current communicative events …’ (van Dijk, 2005: 95).

Van Dijk (1991) is concerned with what is implicit in discourse and how
ideology is transmitted between individuals through the implicit transfer-
ence of mental models, of which what is spoken or written, the text, is only
the tip of an iceberg of sets of attitudes. Van Dijk is particularly interested
in racial discrimination in discourse: ‘… we want to know how political
discourse is involved in the enactment, confirmation or challenge of atti-
tudes and ideologies about ethnic groups, ethnic relations, or issues such as
immigration and integration’ (van Dijk, 1991: 87–8). Racial discrimination
is the theme of Chapter 10 in this book.
There has been a growing trend in CDA towards the integration of cogni-
tive linguistics into the enterprise. This can be seen as an extension of van
Dijk’s ‘socio-cognitive’ approach, just referred to. An early example of this
is the work of O’Halloran (2003), who combines four cognitive frameworks:
connectionism, cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistic evidence on inference
generation, and relevance theory. Another development in this direction
is that of Charteris-Black (2004, 2005), who has focused on metaphor and
examined how metaphors convey intentions, motivations and ideologies
that underlie language use. In the present volume, there is a focus on the
use of metaphor in the discourse of Chris Patten (Chapter 3) and in a pro-
Beijing Hong Kong newspaper (Chapter 7). Charteris-Black uses a technique
for identifying metaphors used in CDA by the present author (Flowerdew,
1997a) and which is employed in the present volume (Chapters 2, 3 and 8),
that of corpus linguistics, although the present author uses this technique
not just to identify metaphor, but also other rhetorical tropes (see also Baker,
2006; Baker et al., 2008). A further application of cognitive theory in CDA is
that of Hart (2010), this approach also drawing upon evolutionary psychol-
ogy. The present volume does not delve into this territory, however.
CDA is not without its critics, an early one being Widdowson (see
Widdowson, 2004 for the latest version). Basically, Widdowson accuses CDA
of bias and for ignoring context. This argument has been well documented
and there is not space enough to go into it here (but see e.g. Fairclough, 1996),
although Meyer (2001) provides some answers to these criticisms, arguing
that all human beings are socially positioned and that CDA is at least open
about its commitment. Meyer also provides a set of criteria for evaluating CDA,
including representativeness, reliability, validity, completeness, accessibility
and triangulation (see also Flowerdew, 1999). Blommaert (2005) is critical of
CDA for being too focused on text at the expense of context and for focus-
ing too much on first world issues at the expense of less developed countries.
There is some truth in Blommaert’s critique and, in its emphasis on history (see
below), this volume, hopefully, goes some way to answering this critique.
A further critic of CDA and one who must be referred to here is Shi-xu
(2004). This is because, not only does this writer critique CDA (and Western
discourse analysis in general), but because, in his book, A cultural approach
to discourse, he has also written specifically about Hong Kong. Shi-xu (2004)
critiques Western discourse analysts, who, he argues, claim to be objective
and universal, but are, in fact, no such thing, but rather the tools of Western
imperialism (see Unger, 2005 for a critique of this view). What is needed
instead, to counter this alleged cultural imperialism of Western discourse an-
alysts, according to Shi-xu, is a deconstructive approach to this discourse, on
the one hand, and an approach focused on developing cultural harmony, by
finding positive aspects in non-Western traditions, on the other.
It is in Chapter 5 of A cultural approach to discourse that Shi-xu deals specifi-
cally with Hong Kong. He begins by arguing that the West needs to understand
‘cultural Others’. He then demonstrates how this might be done, by examin-
ing contrasting Western and Chinese (including mainland and Hong Kong)
media discourses about Hong Kong’s change of sovereignty. The Western
discourses marginalise and leave out positive aspects of the change of sover-
eignty, Shi-xu finds, which are emphasised more in the Chinese discourses.
For example, the British refer to the change of sovereignty negatively, accord-
ing to Shi-xu as a ‘handover’, while the Chinese refer to it more positively as
a ‘return’. The Western discourse sees Hong Kong as an independent entity,
while the Chinese discourse sees Hong Kong as linked to China in a ‘mother
and child’ relationship (see Chapter 8 of this volume on this metaphor). The
Western discourse sees Hong Kong’s success as resulting from the influence
of the British, while the Chinese discourse sees it as due to the efforts of the
Hong Kong people. This analysis is in many ways admirable and it is good
that a Chinese scholar has taken on the task, for an international readership,
of demonstrating the contrasting cultural views on Hong Kong’s return, to
use the preferred Chinese term. In deconstructing the British discourse on
Hong Kong, Shi-xu, in fact, is doing a similar job of deconstruction as that
undertaken in the present volume.
However, while critique of Western discourse is to be encouraged, according
to Shi-xu, critique of non-Western discourse is frowned upon. In another pub-
lication, Shi-xu (2009) critiques CDA work on non-Western discourses (includ-
ing that of Achugar [see below] and that of Flowerdew and Leong [2007] [in
large part reproduced as Chapter 8 of the present volume]), referring to such
work as examples of ‘Westcentric definitions and judgements of non-Western
situations’ (p. 33). Instead of critique with regard to non-Western discourses,
a perspective from ‘in-between’ cultures should be adopted, drawing inspi-
ration from indigenous methodological approaches, Shi-xu argues. Shi-xu
(2009: 38) draws on traditional Chinese philosophy for his ‘in-between’ pos-
ition, claiming that ‘[w]e can evaluate communicative practices in terms of
whether they are conducive to unity and harmony, or detrimental to them’.
With regard to traditional Chinese cultural approaches, it is unfortunate that
Shi-xu argues for the application of this Confucian notion of ‘harmony’,
however. Harmony is a term which has been appropriated as a slogan by the
PRC government (also, more recently, by the Hong Kong government) and it
has become the focus of a powerful counter-discourse among Chinese people.

In this respect, Zhang et al.’s (2011) claim, based on cognitive and evolution-
ary psychology and Habermasian discourse ethics, that the critical faculty is
universal, is pertinent. Why should critique be encouraged of manipulative
Western discourses, but not of those emanating from non-Western sources,
one might well argue against Shi-xu.
Shi-xu thus takes a different cultural view from that of the present book.
The position taken here is that CDA should seek to uncover naturalised and
manipulative discourses wherever they may be found and, in the context of
Hong Kong, this applies to both pre- and post-handover discourses. Shi-xu,
on the other hand, prefers to limit critique to Western discourses and to seek
‘harmony’, with an emphasis on the positive in non-Western discourses.
There is thus an issue of conflicting subjectivities between the present book
and that of Shi-xu.
Shi-xu’s approach has affinities with what Martin and Rose (2003) have
proposed as ‘positive discourse analysis’ (PDA), an approach which they
present as an antidote to CDA and which highlights positive, affirmative
aspects in discourse, although Martin and Rose’s agenda is for discourse in
general, while Shi-xu puts a special emphasis on non-Western approaches.
As has been written elsewhere (Flowerdew, 2008), however, with regard to
PDA, with both Martin and Rose and Shi-xu’s approaches, there may be a
danger of propaganda taking the place of dispassionate critical analysis.
1.4 History and historiography
Historiography is concerned with how the past is written about. It is a meta-

level of analysis concerned with historical writing. Meaning and purpose
are not inherent in historical data, some historiographers have empha-
sised strongly; historians impose interpretations on past events, people
and situations (Ankersmit, 1994, 2001; White, 1973, 1978, 1987; Jenkins,
1991, 2003). It is historians who create history, according to this view, not
what happened in the past. Although ‘professional’ historians strive for
objectivity and impartiality, they are, to an extent, prisoners of language
and discourse. The past is not organised systematically into sequences of
events. Historians select which events to include in their accounts and
sequence them chronologically. They stress the importance of some events,
people and situations and downplay or remain silent about others. They
impose causality, by arguing that certain events, people and situations are
responsible for others. They also chop history up into convenient ‘periods’
and apply labels, such as Renaissance and Enlightenment, labels which are
added to historical processes post ipso facto and of which the participants
living at the time are unaware. Roland Barthes (1997) argued eloquently in
his essay, ‘The discourse of history’, that the transparency effect of historical
accounts is created through the absence of the author in the text. This use
of an impersonal style misleadingly encourages a reading whereby the text

appears to be directly related to the historical event, process or situation,
unmediated by authorial intervention.
Michel Foucault has been influential in the social sciences for his concep-
tion of discourse, although his approach is much more abstract than the
more linguistically focused CDA (Fairclough, 2002). Foucault is important to
this volume for bringing together the two concepts of discourse and history.
Foucault’s ‘genealogical’ approach to discourse emphasises the historical
construction of modern-day concepts such as madness (1988), discipline
(1991) and sexuality (1978), demonstrating, through an ‘archeological’
analysis (1970), how these concepts have developed historically. However,
in line with the view expounded in the previous paragraph, Foucault’s con-
ception of history is not that of a rational, linear construct, but rather of
something that may be plural and inconsistent. Historical truth does not
follow an inevitable progression for Foucault, but may develop by chance
and be influenced by power and interest.
Historians are not only responsible for the content of their writings, but also
the form. Writing about the past, like any writing, indeed, as discourse ana-
lysts are very much aware, is also reliant on rhetorical tropes. Hayden White
is perhaps the best known historiographer to emphasise this point. White has
written that, in addition to its referential function, historiography
… cannot not operate the other functions which modern linguistics

identifies as the different functions of the speech act: expressive (of
the authors’ values and interests), cognitive (of audiences’ emotions,
interests, prejudices), metalinguistics (seeking to clarify and justify its
own terminology and explanatory procedures), phatic (establishing com-
munication channels) and poetic (by which structure is transformed in
sequence). (Cited in Jenkins 2003: 45)
For White, the historical representation of the past is essentially a linguistic

enterprise. White made the following programmatic statement about his
approach: ‘I will consider the historical work as what it most manifestly
is – that is to say, a verbal structure in the form of narrative prose’ (White,
1973: 2). For White, historical texts can be classified according to the four
deep poetic structures of metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy and irony. The
reading of a historical text is thus not like that of a mathematical equation,
but more like that of a poem. Because of this ubiquity of the figurative, for
Jenkins (2003:46), a follower of White,
[t]he connections between the people, events or situations presented in

historical discourse are therefore not logical connections but are meta-
phorical/allegorical. Further, since none of the discrete events which it is
thought took place can be described as having in themselves an inherent
arrangement or storyline (let alone some intrinsic value that is objectively

there and which cannot be ignored), then the processes by which such
inert phenomena are turned (troped) and emplotted into a narrative form
they were never in has to be … fictive. Hence, what ‘realism’ the narrative
has must be that of the rhetorical figure. What else could it be?
Following on from this line of reasoning, another historiographer,

Ankersmit (2001), has argued that histories are nothing but ‘proposals’.
Histories are not to be judged on the basis of their faithfulness to some
objective truth, but with regard to each other, as aesthetic objects. What
leads us to prefer one historical writer over another is not how close they may
come to some putative objective historical reality, but one’s own individual
disposition, one’s personal life experience, according to Ankersmit (2002).
It must be emphasised that the view just presented of historiography, the
linguistic turn in historiography, if you like, is not well accepted by most
practising historians and a strong version of this perspective is not argued
for here. The following is a series of quotations from Arthur Marwick (2001:
2–3), a more conservative historian, who represents the more traditional,
mainstream view and who has vigorously countered ‘postmodern’ concep-
tions of history:
… what happened in the past influences what happens in the present,

and, indeed, what will happen in the future, so that knowledge of the
past – history – is essential to society.
… human beings are not born with knowledge of how to build bridges
or make television sets: they have to learn it. Similarly, human beings
are not born with knowledge of the past (though it often seems to be
assumed that they are): they have to learn it, and that learning, at what-
ever a remove, and however filtered (through school lessons, magazines,
television, or whatever) comes ultimately from the researches and writ-
ings of historians.
To my mind, it is an enormous tribute to historians that we already
do know so much about the past: about ancient China, about the
Renaissance, about poverty and ordinary life in an incredible range of
different cultures, about the denial and gaining of civil rights by, for
example, women, blacks, gays; about the origins of the First World War;
about Russia under Stalin and Germany under Hitler; about the recent
machinations of the CIA and MI5. How has all this knowledge come
about? It has come about … through large numbers of historians doing
history in strict accordance with the long established, though constantly
developing, canons of the historical profession.
There are three main points here: first, knowledge about the past can
inform present and future society; second, there is a need to learn about
the past and such knowledge comes from historians; and third, history has
already informed us about a whole range of past phenomena, knowledge
which, again, has come down to us via the established methods of histor-
ians. These are all valid points. History does play an important role in soci-
ety, historians are the originators of historical knowledge, such as it is, and
historians and their accepted methods, in large part, are responsible for this
knowledge, however filtered that knowledge may be.
Are these points incommensurable, however, with the linguistic perspec-
tive put forward above? Perhaps not. While one might not accept, contra
Baudrillard (1994), for example, that history could be written in the form
of anagrams, in rhyme, or as acrostics (which might be a logical conclu-
sion of the linguistic view), one might agree with Ankersmit (2001) to the
extent that, in considering and comparing historical accounts, one is, to
a considerable degree, making decisions about which set of ‘truths’ might
be preferred, based on one’s individual predilections, in addition to their
actual degree of ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’. To an extent, individuals are ruled by
their particular socialisations and subjectivities. Interpretations of histor-
ical accounts are dependent on one’s own social values just as the accounts
themselves are dependent on the values of the historians who created them.
This is to be borne in mind, it might be pointed out here, in passing, by
readers when evaluating the contents of this volume, because this applies
to interpretation in CDA as well as more broadly in history. Nevertheless, it
might be argued that there is an element of sophistry in the strong linguistic
view, denying as it does any role for representation.
1.5 Historiography and the population at large
This book will examine how the past has been created, not by ‘professional’
historians, but by politicians, journalists, public relations professionals,
museum curators and members of the general public. If, in spite of their best
efforts to ensure ‘objectivity’, even professional historians are somewhat
prisoners of their own rhetoric and that of those who originally created the
documents they work upon, what then of these other purveyors of the past?
Museum curators may, like historians, strive for objectivity, but, as will be
shown in Chapter 9, they may be swayed by political considerations; jour-
nalists may lay claim to being objective, but they may also be swayed by the
editorial policy of their editors, as will be seen in Chapter 7, and as for politi-
cians, here one is dealing with a totally different animal; as will be seen, in
particular in Chapters 2 and 8, they are likely to put their own ideological
and political spin on any interpretation of history.
In an analysis of the Waldheim affair in Austria,2 Mitten (1992) uses the
metaphor of the many-layered Austrian Mozartkugel, or Mozart cake, to dem-
onstrate the relationship between historical material and public consciousness.
The Mozartkugel has four concentric layers which can each stand for a different
level of historical consciousness, according to Mitten’s metaphor. At the centre

are the historical materials to which the historians have access. In the second
layer are the specialised historians, who have a variety of interests, ideologi-
cal viewpoints, personal histories, degrees of intellectual honesty and scholarly
competence which are likely to give rise to a range of interpretations of the
given historical materials. In the third layer are the non-specialist intellectuals,
consisting of teachers, journalists, writers and other non-historians (and one
might add, too, that, importantly, politicians also operate at this level). This
layer is likely to give rise to a further range of interpretations, because these
people are subject to a similar disparity of viewpoints and prejudices as the
historians. In the fourth, outer, layer is the majority of the population not
included in the previous layers. These people, again, are dependent on the
previous layer of the intelligentsia for their knowledge and opinions about
history. Their ideas will be filtered down to them through school lessons,
newspapers, oral accounts from family and friends, and through history books,
if they read them. (Although Mitten does not say so, there should really be one
further layer right at the centre of the cake. This is the actual historical events,
because many historical documents are just that, documents. They are reports
of what has happened, not actual events and are thus subject to the various
biases of those who created them. This, therefore, makes the ‘person in the
street’ even further removed from the actual ‘truth’.)
What this metaphorical account of Mitten’s means for the average per-
son is that what counts as ‘history’, as the past, can only have meaning
in relation to the values current in contemporary society, because received
knowledge about the past is filtered down through the predilections and
prejudices of other people, whether they be the original chroniclers, spe-
cialist historians, teachers, journalists or family and friends. And, as Mitten
points out, there is a tendency for conceptualisations of the past to reinforce
the assumptions of the dominant political culture, for them to become natu-
ralised, to use a term familiar in discourse analysis.
As Mitten points out, the story is nevertheless not quite as severe as all
this, because, in theory at least, individuals are free to engage their critical
intelligence on the material available to them and in many societies there
are enough materials to be had for individuals to develop alternative views
to the prevailing ones. The amount of access and amount of control exer-
cised over the flow of information by the dominant class, however, varies
very much from society to society.
1.6 A historiographical approach to (critical)

discourse analysis
What is meant by a historiographical approach to discourse? By this is meant,

following the above discussion, an approach which conceives of the dis-
course analyst as a historiographer, as someone who considers texts (and
their contexts) which deal with ‘historical’ events, people and situations in
a critical way and recognises their essentially figurative nature. There is a
role for the (critical) discourse analyst as mediating between Mitten’s various
layers, in deconstructing the language used to purvey historical knowledge.
This can be either between the second and third layers – the specialist histor-
ians and the non-specialist intelligentsia – or, especially, between the third
and fourth layers – the non-specialist intelligentsia (in particular in the case
of this book, politicians and journalists) and the population at large. A his-
toriographical approach to (critical) discourse analysis will seek to reveal the
hidden assumptions in received and naturalised historical accounts, with a
particular emphasis on the language used in their elaboration.
In addition to the dimension of a historiographical approach just described,
the methodology adopted in this book is also inherently historiographical in
so far as the project that will be reported upon is a longitudinal one and deals
with an important real world ‘historical’ event. There is a role for discourse
analysis in the writing of history, in considering discourse as it is created syn-
chronically, and creating critical first readings of (discursive) events (includ-
ing written texts) as they take place over time. This book may be exceptional
in this respect, in studying a historical process as it unfolds over a period of
more than a decade (although see below especially on Wodak).
In studying discourse from a synchronic perspective, an extra dimen-
sion is added to the analysis. Traditionally, discourse analysts focus on
individual texts or groups of texts; they may consider intertextuality, how
the text under consideration relates to other texts, and in this sense their
analysis is historical. Fairclough emphasises this point, for example, in his
book on discourse and social change (Fairclough, 1992, see below), but there
is a tendency to provide a static snapshot rather than a dynamic analysis
which gives due emphasis to the longitudinal dimension of discourse as
it develops over time. A diachronic analysis allows for an understanding
of what changes over time and what stays the same. An understanding of
discourses of the more distant and of the more immediate past allows for a
better understanding for discourses of the present. This is considered to be
an important contribution of the present volume.
1.7 Other discourse analysts and history
This book is not unique in considering discourse in a historical context.

In fact, a number of critical discourse analysts have taken a historical turn
in recent years.
Norman Fairclough (1992), referred to earlier in this context, is the best
known critical discourse analyst to argue for a historical approach, in his pro-
gramme for the study of discourse in social change. Fairclough argues for four
minimal conditions for such an undertaking (Fairclough, 1992: 8–9). First,
an approach to discourse and social change should be multidimensional,
capable of showing relations between discursive change, social change, and

properties of texts. Second, it should be multifunctional, showing how chang-
ing discourse practices contribute to changes in knowledge, in social relations
and in social identities; the method of analysis should allow for the interplay
of these three. Third, it should be a ‘method for historical analysis’ (emphasis
added). It should focus upon ‘articulatory’ processes in the structuring of
texts and in the longer-term structuring of the ‘orders of discourse’; this can
be analysed at the textual level in terms of intertextuality and show how
changes in textual structure correspond with changes in social circumstances.
Fourth, the approach should be critical. Critical means showing how mean-
ings may be hidden and at the same time demonstrating how there may be
resistance to discursive and social change and how this may also be indexed
in discourse and text. In his earlier work, in the 1980s and 1990s, Fairclough
applied his method to analysing what he saw as tendencies towards ‘democra-
tisation’, ‘commodification’ and ‘technologisation’ of discursive practices (e.g.
Fairclough, 1992), while, in his later work, he has considered discourse and
social change in relation to ‘globalisation’, ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘new capitalism’
and the ‘knowledge economy’ (e.g. Fairclough, 2003, 2006).
As already mentioned, perhaps the best known discourse analyst taking
a historical approach is Ruth Wodak, who, as previously noted, has even
named her approach the ‘discourse-historical method’ (referred to elsewhere
by Wodak also as an ‘approach’). In a number of projects (summarised in
Wodak [2001]), Wodak and colleagues have analysed various discrimina-
tory, racist, anti-Semitic and chauvinist aspects of discourse from a critical
and historical perspective. The historical dimension of the analysis in the
discourse-historical method is a part of the overall contextual analysis. Thus
in a study of the 1986 election campaign of Kurt Waldheim, Waldheim’s
own account of his alleged non-involvement in Wehrmacht atrocities in the
Balkans and the deportations of Jews from Greece was analysed in the con-
text of the ‘historical facts’ (Wodak, 1991: 70). In this way, Wodak argues,
she and her colleagues were able to show ‘the disfiguring of facts and reali-
ties’ in Waldheim’s version of the story. In another study, this time of the
commemoration of 50 years since Hitler’s occupation of Austria, a number
of documents were brought into comparative analysis: the publication and
media treatment of the report by a commission of seven international histo-
rians on former president Waldheim’s Nazi past in 1988; the official political
commemoration of the Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in March 1938; the unveiling
of a ‘memorial against war and fascism’ by a sculptor and the controversial
discussions that preceded it; a play on Austrian anti-Semitisim ‘then and
now’; and the fiftieth anniversary of the November pogrom. This compara-
tive analysis allowed Wodak and her colleagues to develop
a differentiated examination of the official political and media recol-

lection, and a critical consideration of the Austrian National Socialist
past, of the often conflicting narratives on Austrian history and of some

related convenient myths, such as Austria as the first victim of the Nazi
politics of dictatorship and territorial expansionism.
In all of four studies reviewed in her overview article, Wodak (2001: 72)
argues that ‘it was possible to follow the genesis and transformation of
arguments, the recontextualisation throughout different and important
public spaces resulting from the social interests of the participants and their
power relations’. In sum, the historical dimension of the discourse-historical
approach allows Wodak and her colleagues, in a way similar to that of the
present volume, to create a diachronic analysis, going beyond the time-
bound snapshot nature of most contemporary discourse analysis.
In an edited volume bringing together CDA and SFL approaches (which are
seen by the editors as complementary), Martin and Wodak (2003) present a
range of papers studying various aspects of discourses on and/or about his-
tory in various parts of the world. Genres covered include political speech and
interview, TV talk show, newspaper, history textbook and the bureaucratic
planning process. As Martin and Wodak (2003) argue in their introduction,
the collection ‘deals with the construction of time and value in a post-colonial
(and post-WWII) world where discourses of or about history and the past are
central to on-going processes of reconciliation, debates on war crimes and
restitution’ (p. 2). Martin and Wodak argue further that ‘every society which
has to deal with traumatic events creates myths and taboos around these
events. Pasts are rearranged, transformed, recontextualised, substituted, mys-
tified or totally changed’ (ibid.). This treatment of the past resonates strongly
with the view of history presented above and with that to be found in many
of the chapters of the present volume. Furthermore, Martin and Wodak link
historical writing with the theme of identity. ‘Such strategies also relate to the
construction of national and also individual identities. Identities need found-
ing myths and certain pasts, which they can integrate easily and positively’
(p. 11). This theme is also to be found in the present volume.
Wodak has also written, with Michal Krzyzanowski (Krzyzanowski
and Wodak, 2009), the introduction to another volume dealing with the
past (Galasinska and Krzyzanowski, 2009), in this case, the sociopolitical
changes undergone by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In this
introduction, Krzyzanowski and Wodak apply Fairclough’s model of social
change supplemented by insights from the discourse-historical method. In
particular, they emphasise the historical dimension:
… discourse must be seen from the perspective of its historicity: it is in

synchronic discourses that earlier discourses are frequently ‘recontex-
tualised’ (Wodak, 2001). The distinctive contribution of the Discourse-
Historical Approach thus lies in ‘the analysis of historical and political
topics and texts … and their continuity’ (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 7).
Accordingly, the systematic analysis should illustrate how on-going

transformation is linked to and draws on previous (historical) stages and
discourses in complex ways.
One important way in which transformation comes about in discourse is

through ‘intertextuality’, how different discourses or fragments of discourses
are linked and can be taken from their original contexts to reappear in
different historical conditions (Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2009). In the con-
text of Central and Eastern Europe, this is demonstrated in the diachronic
analysis of Galasinska and Krzyzanowski (2009), which shows how elements
of discourses of the Communist period before 1989 are still present after
1989. In the present volume, this phenomenon can be noted in Chapters 2
and 8, where the outgoing British governor Patten’s discourse is taken
up and adapted by his successor, Tung.
This phenomenon of continuity and discontinuity is also focused upon
in a monograph by Mariana Achugar (2008), which studies the discursive
construction of memory in military discourse in Uruguay. Achugar writes of
the diachronic aspect of her study as follows:
A historical focus is important because it allows us to notice the dynamic

aspect of discourse and the importance of time in the construction of
our knowledge of the past: memory. By focusing on how discourse is
constructed and reconstructed over time it is possible to see continuities
and discontinuities – what changes and what remains, how the inter-
psychological is internalised as intra-psychological. (p. 25)
Echoing another point about the value of a diachronic approach made

earlier, Achugar continues this quotation as follows:
By analyzing a series of texts related by belonging to the same discursive

formation3 (Foucault 1982) the goal is to understand the interrelation-
ships between different texts and how certain discourses are reproduced
or reappropriated by others. In this way, the historical focus serves as a
window that allows not merely the observation of the instances as fin-
ished products, but rather the observation of the construction processes
of language and memory.
In focusing on memory, Achugar’s work resonates with other volumes

which deal with memory and reconciliation. A monograph by Annelies
Verdoolaege (2008), for example, focuses on the discourse of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (see also Norval [2009]
on the theme of South Africa’s apartheid past). Verdoolaege (2008) begins
from the simple premise that ‘[c]learly, for a full understanding of a dis-
cursive event one always has to take into account the historical position
from which a person speaks’ (p. 99). In her analysis, Verdoolaege notes how
different participants speak from different historical positions and orient to
various time frames, most notably the pre- and post-apartheid periods. She
notes that, for many of the TRC testifiers, there remained a level of con-
tinuity between the apartheid past and the present and that many of the
apartheid conflicts remained the same. This phenomenon applies to the
discourses in the present volume, where there are overlaps in pre- and post-
reversion Hong Kong discourses.
Verdoolaege also makes the point that, in her analysis, ‘[t]he past was
brought to the present TRC moment and at the same time, the present expe-
rience of testifying before the HRV Committee was extended to the future’
(p. 99). This point about the past projecting into the present and into the
future is one that is often made in the historiographical literature. A justi-
fication for reflection on the past is to be found in its value for the present
and the future. In the context of the present volume, this is particularly
notable in the discourse of Patten and Tung; the values that they identify
as traditional to Hong Kong carry over to the present and can be carried
forward into the future. Verdoolaege, echoing insights by Blommaert (2005,
see below), refers to this application of the discursive moment ‘with an eye
to the future’ (p. 102) as historical layering.
In relation to collective memory, Achugar (2008: 12) also talks about this
telescoping of time in terms of ‘collective memory as a process that is situ-
ated in the present and that uses fragments of the past to create a narrative
that will be used in the future’. This telescoping of past, present and future
explains why Chris Patten and the outgoing British administration were so
keen in their speeches to demonstrate a continuity between these three
points in time, as will be shown in Chapter 2.
A number of volumes have appeared which deal with the theme of
commemoration. Commemoration is a form of historical layering, in
Verdoolaege’s terms, in so far as it involves a reflection on the past with a
view to the present and the future. Reference has already been made to the
study by Wodak and colleagues (Wodak, 2001) of the exhibition commemo-
rating 50 years since Hitler’s occupation of Austria. A more recent edited
volume is that of Titus Ensink and Christoph Saur (2003) entitled The art
of commemoration: Fifty years after the Warsaw uprising. The chapters in this
volume consider various aspects of this topic from a discursive perspective.
In their introduction, Ensink and Saur make a number of observations of
relevance to the present volume. Drawing on Nietzsche, they note two
approaches to history: ‘historicism’, where the past is used to legitimise the
present, where the present is constructed as a prolongation of the past, and
where the past and the future are in an equivalent relationship; and ‘oblivi-
onism’, which is a reaction to historicism, which is seen as putting too much
emphasis on the past at the expense of the present, and which involves the
systematic forgetting of the past. Ensink and Saur see commemorations as
doing the work of both approaches (p. 7); commemorations encourage the
remembrance of things which the organisers want their audience to remem-
ber but they also ignore aspects of the past which their organisers prefer their
audience to forget. This feature of discourse is not limited to commemora-
tions, it may be added, but is present in most, if not all, political discourse,
and as such is a recurrent theme throughout the present volume.
An important contribution has been made to historiography and dis-
course by Jan Blommaert (2005). Blommaert is critical of CDA for not taking
account of history (but see Wodak [in Kendall 2007] for a refutation of this
point). Blommaert’s particular insight for discourse and historiography is his
notion of ‘layered simultaneity’, how, although it takes place in real time,
discourse nevertheless carries with it different layers of historicity, layers of
which participants may or may not be aware. For Blommaert, this can only
be got at through ethnographic analysis. This is where Blommaert takes issue
with CDA, arguing that it needs to deal more critically with what he refers
to as ‘forgotten contexts’. Although this criticism of CDA may not apply to
all of its proponents (Wodak being the most notable exception, as reviewed
above), there is some truth in this claim. The examples used by Blommaert
in presenting his model highlight how discourse does not travel well across
time (and space). What may be valued in one historical context may not be
valued or may even be stigmatised in another time period. This is very obvi-
ous in the present volume in the adaptation of the discourse of the outgoing
administration by the incoming one (Chapter 8) and in the care taken by
the museum curator interviewed in Chapter 9 to create a historical exhibi-
tion that would be accepted by both the ‘the left’ and ‘the right’.
Finally, in this review of discourse analytic perspectives on history, men-
tion should be made of the work of Coffin (2006). Working within an SFL
framework, Coffin presents a linguistically oriented study of historical texts
written for and by secondary school students. Coffin’s linguistic approach
convincingly demonstrates how history discourse has its own specific genres
and lexico-grammar. Although the present volume tries to limit or explain
the technical terminology as much as possible and is eclectic in its approach
to textual analysis, the approach to lexico-grammar is broadly functional in
the SFL tradition.
1.8 Discourse and space
As well as time, discourse analysis needs to consider space, the other dimen-
sion of context. It is significant that in classical rhetoric the two types of
‘actualisation’, or scene creation – chronographia (actualisation of time)
and topographia (actualisation of space) (together with prosographia [actu-
alisation of people] – are grouped together (Cockroft and Cockroft, 1992:
154–5) (see Chapter 3 for more on this) (see also Bakhtin’s [1981] notion of
chronotope, the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships
in discourse). In more recent years, attention has begun to be given to the

relation between discourse and space by a range of discourse analysts. Lou
(2010: 625–6) has written on this topic as follows:
Research on narrative and place has shown that not only can place evoke
and enrich stories (e.g. Basso, 1988; Johnstone, 1990; Myers, 2006),
stories can in turn create place (e.g. Finnegan, 1998; Johnstone, 1990;
Schiffrin, 2009). From the latter social constructionist viewpoint, nar-
rative about place presents us with rich material for analyzing how the
politics of place-making comes into play through language and discourse
(Modan, 2002, 2007).
And, in a similar vein, Johnstone (2004: 68) elaborates that:
A space becomes a place through humans’ interaction with it, both

through physical manipulation, via such activities as agriculture, archi-
tecture, and landscape, and symbolically, via such activities as remember-
ing, ‘formulating’ (Schegloff 1972), depicting, and narrating.
Other texts talking about history and discursive change referred to above
are located in distinct spaces (nation states): Achugar (Uruguay); Verdoolaege
(South Africa); Galasinska and Krzyzanowski (Central and Eastern European
states); Wodak (Austria). The reason for this is simple: historical events take
place in geographical spaces and historical events are very much bound up
with nation states. Hong Kong, of course, is not a nation state. Now, it is
a ‘Special Administrative Region’ of China and before that it was a British
colony, or ‘dependent territory’, as it was officially titled. However, its iden-
tity is very much tied in with the identity of those two nation states. Each
of the chapters in this book is very much about Hong Kong and Hong Kong
is evoked one way or another in just about all of the texts analysed. Hong
Kong’s identity as a place is subject to what Blommaert (2005: 157) refers to
as ‘inequality in mobility of semiotic resources’, although the term is used
here slightly differently from Blommaert. By this is meant the way Hong
Kong and its identity are conceived of differently, according to the semiotic
resources which are drawn upon by the interpreters. For both Britain and
China, Hong Kong is a metonym. It represents something much bigger than
its tiny geographical area would merit. For the British, Hong Kong was the
last of its significant colonies and, in many ways, its return to China in 1997
represents the end of empire. Hong Kong is also represented as a great success
story for the British of British rule (thanks to British free market principles
and rule of law, according to this British view). What was referred to as ‘a bar-
ren rock’ by Lord Palmerston when Hong Kong was first seized in 1848 was
transformed into a centre of great wealth and enterprise. Because Hong Kong
was seen as a symbol of British rule, this may explain why, at the last moment,
many would say, (limited) democracy was introduced to the colony, to put
the icing on the cake of British values, so to speak. For China, on the other
hand, a different set of semiotic resources is drawn upon when the notion of
Hong Kong is evoked. Hong Kong was seized from China after wars (referred
to as ‘opium wars’, because the British wanted to be able to trade unhindered
in that drug). Hong Kong’s return to China is interpreted as the conclusion of
a century and a half of national shame and the source of patriotic joy. For the
British, Hong Kong’s return is a ‘handover’; for China, it is a joyous ‘return to
the Motherland’ (Shi-xu, 2004: 154). These differing spatial conceptions are
most salient in the present volume in the chapters devoted to the discourses
of Chris Patten (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and to Tung Chee-hwa (Chapter 8), but,
as already stated, they also underlie all of the texts analysed in this volume.
The coming together of space and time is particularly salient in the analysis
of extracts from Patten’s speeches in Chapter 3.
An important binary opposition and contextual parameter for all of the
discourses in this volume is Hong Kong’s relationship with, on the one
hand, mainland China, and on the other, Britain and the rest of the world.
According to the terms of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, and in
accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s formula of ‘one country, two systems’,
Hong Kong is promised a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sover-
eignty. For Chris Patten and the pro-democracy supporters in Hong Kong,
the two systems and high degree of autonomy are emphasised – Hong
Kong as distinct from China. For China and the first chief executive, Tung,
and his Hong Kong supporters, following the change of sovereignty, more
emphasis is added to the ‘one country’ part of the formula. This tension is
very evident in the history museum chapter (Chapter 9), because the cura-
tor of the exhibition is keen to represent both sides. Whether or not they
are for greater closeness with China (‘the Motherland’ in Tung’s and the
pro-China discourse) or for greater autonomy (the ‘two systems’ in the one
‘country, two systems’ dichotomy), both the outgoing administration and
the incoming one nevertheless supported Hong Kong’s integration in the
world economy, as part of globalisation. This is most clear in Chapter 11,
which is about Hong Kong and globalisation and in Chapter 12, which is
about Hong Kong as a ‘world class city’.
1.9 National identity
Time and space together collaborate in the creation of identity. One’s

identity is to be found in where one comes from, both in terms of space and
through time. The notion of cultural or national identity has been the focus
of much study in recent years. Wodak et al. (1999: 290) state that:
[t]he national identity of individuals who perceive themselves as belong-

ing to a national collectivity is manifested, inter alia, in their social
practices, one of which is discursive practice. ... The discursive practice as

a special form of social practice plays a central part both in the formation
and in the expression of national identity.
Given this important discursive dimension of identity, identity can be

projected onto subjects (Kress, 1989). Kress (1989: 15) gives the example
of the political leader whose role is to give definition to an entirely new
group. It is the leader’s role in such a situation to produce texts which bring
together hitherto disparate discourses in a unified, coherent manner. Where
changes in ideology are rapid (as in the case of Hong Kong), this may be
accompanied by a rapid change in the discursive construction of identity. Of
course, there is no guarantee that the projected identities will be taken up
by individuals. To quote Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 195), ‘a new dis-
course may come into an institution or organisation without being enacted
or inculcated’. As Stuart Hall (1996a: 6) has noted, given the possibility of
such change, however, identities are ‘points of temporary attachment to
the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us’; they are
constantly in the process of change and transformation. Nevertheless, the
elaboration of cultural and national identity is ‘a gradual process in which
histories, traditions and social memories are invented, revised and repro-
duced’ (Ma and Fung, 1999: 498).
Identity is usually defined in relation to the Other (Martin, 1995: 2): ‘The
life of a human being as a person requires the presence of the Other, that is,
the perception of someone different and the establishment of a relationship
with him/her/them.’ As Stuart Hall (1996a: 4) puts it: ‘. . . it is only through
the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what
it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’
meaning of any term – and thus its ‘identity’ – can be constructed.’ If identity
is viewed as positive, then the Other must be viewed as negative; the Other
is the marked form which is excluded, while the self is unmarked and essen-
tial (Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990, cited in S. Hall, 1996a: 5). This ‘Othering’
dimension of identity is most obvious in the present volume in Chapter 10,
where people from mainland China are the object of discrimination on the
part of Hong Kong people. It is also evident in Chapter 7, where the notion
of the Hong Kong ‘patriot’ is set against that of the pro-democracy parties.
Identity politics is inextricably concerned with relations of power, of
agents, or agencies, imposing their will. Political leaders have much power
in projecting cultural identity. They have ready access to the mass media
and use press secretaries, or ‘spin doctors’, to put over their message. On
the other hand, the exertion of power will always also encounter resistance
(Foucault, 1980; Flowerdew, 1997b, 2008). In Foucault’s words, the exist-
ence of power relationships ‘depends on a multiplicity of points of resist-
ance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power
relations. These points of resistance are everywhere in the power network’
(Foucault, 1980: 95). This is most clearly represented in Chapter 4 of the

present volume, where members of the Hong Kong public tried to resist
the language power of British Hong Kong governor Chris Patten in a public
meeting (see also Flowerdew, 1997b). It is also very evident in Chapter 7,
where one Hong Kong newspaper resisted the attempt at discursive hegem-
ony on the part of another.
Identity has also been analysed in terms of narrative (Martin, 1995; Ricoeur,
1992; Wodak et al., 1999). Individuals may consider their identity in terms
of the stories they experience or imagine. Being both real and fictitious, nar-
rative identity is open-ended and amenable to revision. Because individuals
are always parts of groups, a group identity can be construed in terms of a
narrative, just like an individual’s identity can (Martin, 1995: 3). A collective
narrative must define a group in terms of sets of criteria, such as language,
ethnicity, social class, attitudes, beliefs, and so forth. In terms of political
narrative, Martin (1995: 5) stresses the role of individual leaders and how
a few individuals play essential roles in constructing the identity narrative
of the group. This is highlighted most clearly in Chapters 2 and 8 of this
book, where the language power of the last British Hong Kong governor,
Chris Patten, and the first chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR, Tung
Chee-hwa, attempt to project an identity on to Hong Kong and its people.
Collective narratives are also present in Chapter 11, on Hong Kong as a glo-
balised city and in Chapter 12, on Hong Kong as a world class city.
Strath and Wodak (2009) have noted how, in historical accounts, certain
events are foregrounded and acquire what they refer to as ‘iconic status’, as
a foundation for a historical ‘turning point’ or new national identity narra-
tive. They mention 1914, 1945, May 1968 and November 1989 as turning
points in twentieth-century European history. China, too, has such events:
4 May 1919, when there were student demonstrations in Beijing which
prepared the ground for the founding of the Communist Party, is a date
recognised by most educated people in China; 1949 and the founding of
the PRC is another iconic date; as is 4 June 1989, the so-called Tiananmen
‘incident’ (referred to by Chris Patten as ‘the killings of Tiananmen’ and by
others as a ‘massacre’, or ‘crackdown’). This latter event is not recognised
by the authorities in mainland China, but is commemorated every year in
Hong Kong with a candlelight vigil attended by thousands of people – in
2009 there were estimated to be over 150,000 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/8083569.stm).
Such events are closely connected to what Strath and Wodak (2009: 16)
refer to as ‘the crisis concept’ and ‘contentious value mobilisations (right/
wrong, good/bad society, friend/enemy, etc.)’. Hong Kong and 1997, the
year of the change of sovereignty, clearly fits into this category of historical
turning points: 1997 has its element of crisis, with hundreds of thousands
of Hong Kong people emigrating in the lead-up to the reversion for fear
of the ‘communist takeover’ and seemingly endless negotiations between
Britain and China over the terms of the change of sovereignty being just two
manifestations of this crisis mentality. And 1997, of course, is also clearly a
turning point in history. Furthermore, it is iconic in the sense that the term
‘1997’ acts as a metonym for a whole range of sociopolitical changes. One
difference between 1997 and the other transformational events referred to
above, of course, is that 1997 was foreseeable, while the other events may
only be considered retrospectively.
Strath and Wodak (2009) also talk about ‘collective memory’ and how
such memories are discursively constructed in line with national myths
(p. 18) and contribute towards national identity building (p. 20). In Chapter 2
of this volume, we will see how Chris Patten elaborated such a myth about
the British legacy to Hong Kong and in Chapter 8 how Tung Chee-hwa per-
petuated this myth, with notable changes of emphasis. Strath and Wodak
(2009: 18) further talk about how ‘[t]he media constructs, through a plural-
ity of voices, images [of Europe in their case] with a positive or negative
load’. This phenomenon is well illustrated in Chapter 7 of the present vol-
ume where different voices are drawn upon by a pro-mainland newspaper
to create a myth of the so-called Hong Kong ‘patriot’. Similarly, myths are
projected in Chapter 11 (Hong Kong as a globalised centre for business) and
Chapter 12 (Hong Kong as a ‘world class city’).
1.10 Hong Kong and the question of identity
With such a sudden political change as that represented by Hong Kong’s

change of sovereignty, the society needs to radically adapt its conception of
cultural and national identity. The need for a change of cultural and political
identity was noted by the outgoing Hong Kong colonial government in the
lead-up to the reversion and is expressed in the following extract from a
government document issued in 1996, hence just before the reversion, on
civic education in the schools:
… the civic learner needs to know the cultural and political identity of
Hong Kong as a Chinese community, as a British colony for a certain
period, and as the HKSAR of China from July 1997. At a time of political
transition, we need our citizens to actively adopt a new national identity,
and to be participative and contributive to bring about smooth transitions,
to sustain prosperity and stability and to further improve the Hong Kong
society. (Education Department, 1996, p. 21, cited in Bray, 1997: 16)
The call for a ‘transition’ in cultural and national identity suggests that
Hong Kong people had a clear sense of cultural and national identity in the
first place, but the question of identity in Hong Kong has always been prob-
lematic. Ma and Fung (1999: 199) describe the development of Hong Kong
identity as having followed an ‘erratic path’: it is, in fact, a good example
of what Martin (1995: 3) refers to as an identity having ‘nothing to do with

homogeneity and permanence’. Although the population of Hong Kong is
95 per cent ethnic Chinese, Hong Kong people mostly either came to Hong
Kong from the mainland to escape Communist rule or are the children or
grandchildren of such people. Colonial policy, by minimising contact with
mainland China, created a space for the creation of a local Hong Kong
identity, which thus can be said to be determined in terms of the cultural
differences between Hong Kong and the mainland (Ma and Fung, 1999:
500). Hong Kong people have traditionally seen themselves as sophisti-
cated and Westernised, in contrast to the ‘less civilised’ mainlanders (Ma
and Fung, 1999). Even now, although the former British colony is a Special
Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong people are reluctant to label
themselves as ‘Chinese’ when asked to do so in opinion surveys. They prefer
to refer to themselves as ‘Hong Kong people’ or (to a lesser degree) as ‘Hong
Kong Chinese’.4 Of course, identity is multifaceted and, in the case of the
people of Hong Kong, three dimensions of identity seem to be particularly
salient: ethnic identity, cultural identity and political identity. However,
these dimensions do not necessarily coincide. One can say ‘I am Chinese’,
but such a statement can have different meanings according to these three
different dimensions. As to the first, no Hong Kong Chinese would be likely
to deny that they are ethnically ‘Chinese’. However, politically, because
they do not want to identify with the PRC government, they might say
that they are not ‘Chinese’ in this political sense. Then again, as suggested
by Ma and Fung (1999), they might not want to be considered ‘Chinese’ in
the sense of sharing cultural values with mainland Chinese.
The cultural identity discussed by Ma and Fung (1999) can be contrasted
with the identity as projected on to the Hong Kong people (in the sense
that Kress (1989), as cited above, describes the term ‘projection’) by its
political and business leaders (both before and after the change of sover-
eignty). This identity, which stresses the free market economy, the rule of
law, individual freedom and democratic institutions, is designed for the
international business community — to encourage international business
to view Hong Kong as a centre for international trade and investment. This
is the Hong Kong identity which is projected most notably in some of the
chapters in this book (Chapters 2, 8 and 11), although another chapter
(Chapter 8) projects a very different identity onto the Hong Kong person,
that of the Hong Kong ‘patriot’.
1.11 Modes of analysis of this book
In line with Fairclough’s conception of the relation between discourse

and society as dialectical and mutually constitutive, of discourse practice
reflecting social structure and social structure reflecting discourse practice,
the analysis in this book recognises two interactive levels: a macro-level
and a micro-level, with analysis taking the form of what Halliday (1961),
using his train metaphor mentioned earlier, refers to as ‘shunting’, moving
back and forth between each of the two levels. The analysis is conducted
via a consideration of the sociohistorical context as it relates to the texts,
on the one hand, and of the texts as they relate to the sociohistorical
context, on the other. In an earlier book (Flowerdew, 1998), the focus was
more on the sociohistorical than the textual context. In this volume, there
is more emphasis on textual analysis, and the reader is referred to the earlier
volume for a fuller sociohistorical account (going right back to the ini-
tial seizure of Hong Kong by the British). Nevertheless, it is important to
emphasise the diachronic nature of the analysis. As mentioned earlier in this
chapter, diachronic analysis allows for an understanding of what changes
over time and what stays the same. An understanding of discourses of the
more distant and of the more immediate past allows for a better understand-
ing of discourses of the present.
More immediate contextual analysis is presented here, based on a range of
methods, including the following: participant observation as a member
of the Hong Kong public exposed to the media on a daily basis during the
whole period of the analysis; a study of various documents, such as gov-
ernment reports and archives and Hong Kong newspaper archives; large
electronic corpora of public pronouncements by Chris Patten and Tung
Chee-hwa, during their periods of office for corpus-based analysis; inter-
views (with Chris Patten and his advisers, and with Dr Ting, director of the
Hong Kong Museum of History (Chapter 9); interviews with members of the
public attending the history museum exhibition (Chapter 9); participant
observation of Legislative Council meetings, including those attended by
Patten and Tung; and interviews with public relations insiders for ideas on
branding for the chapter on Hong Kong as a world class city (Chapter 12).
The various approaches used in the study allow for triangulation, a powerful
tool in validating the results of analysis, the theory being that more confi-
dence can be had if different methods arrive at the same conclusion.
The analysis is informed by various social, discursive, pragmatic and
linguistic theories. Thus, in Chapter 2, for example, a theory of political
genres, pragmatic theories of presupposition and involvement, as well
as theories of lexical structuring and reiteration are used to show how
Chris Patten promoted a myth about the British legacy to Hong Kong. In
Chapter 3, a classical theory of tropes is applied to understand how Patten
used language as a persuasive device to exert language power over the Hong
Kong people and persuade them to support his political reform proposal. In
Chapter 7, a theory of metaphor is used to understand how a pro-Beijing
Hong Kong newspaper developed a model of the Hong Kong ‘patriot’, with
a view to establishing discursive hegemony for its political position. In
Chapter 12, theories of branding, genre chaining and intertextuality are
employed to show how the Hong Kong government promoted to the people
of Hong Kong and the world at large its conception of Hong Kong as a world
class city. In two chapters (Chapters 2 and 8), corpus linguistics techniques
are used to analyse the lexical and collocational patterning of Patten’s and
Tung’s discourse, with a view to establishing their discursive formations (see
note 3) and analysing their political rhetoric.
1.12 Summary of the rest of the book
The following is a chapter by chapter summary of the rest of this book.
Part 1: The Discourse of the Outgoing Administration

During the greater part of the colonial period, public discourse in Hong
Kong was relatively closed, with only token representation of the voices
of the majority of the population in government decision-making. It was
only with the Joint Declaration, signed by Britain and China in 1984,
that real advances began to be made in democratisation, with the drafting
of the Basic Law, which contained proposals for the gradual development of
limited democracy. Following the introduction of direct elections in 1991
and an impending second round in 1995, the British government sent a
‘political’ governor, Chris Patten, who tried to open up the polity and public
discourse. This first part of the book analyses this discourse, as created by
Patten and his allies.
Chapter 2: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal

Based on a large corpus of speeches, interviews, public meetings, writings
and other pronouncements, this chapter critically examines the discourse
of the last British Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, in the five years lead-
ing up to the change of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China
in 1997. The thesis of the chapter is that in its focus on four issues – the
free market economy, the freedom of the individual, the rule of law, and
democracy – each of which was designed to highlight an aspect of what
Patten promoted as Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong, Patten’s discourse can be
characterised in terms of a myth concerned with ensuring that Britain could
withdraw from its last major colony with honour.
Chapter 3: Rhetorical Strategies and Identity Politics in the Discourse

of Colonial Withdrawal
Skilful use of the rhetorical tropes which typify the language of serious polit-
ical occasions – described here as ‘rhetorical weight’ – is closely associated
with charismatic political leaders. This chapter studies the political rhetoric
of Chris Patten, a skilled exponent of this verbal art, showing how he used
rhetorical weight to promote his political agenda. Detailed analysis of four
segments of Patten’s political oratory, spread over the period of his five-year
term of office, highlights his heavy use of the tropes of metaphor, antithesis,
parallelism, actualisation, and the unities of time, place and action. The
chapter demonstrates how the use of these tropes related to Patten’s overall
political goals and their manipulative nature within the context of his dis-
cursive construction of Britain’s imperial/national history and identity.
Chapter 4: Discourse and Social Change in a Public Meeting

This chapter documents discursive and social change taking place in Hong
Kong during the transitional period leading up to the change of sovereignty
from Britain to China. It does so by means of a detailed analysis of a politi-
cal meeting involving the British Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, and
members of the Hong Kong public. The meeting took place in October 1992,
a day after Patten introduced proposals to widen the democratic franchise.
Patten used the meeting, the first time a Hong Kong governor had made
himself openly accountable to the public at large, to demonstrate the sort
of democratic discourse for which the reform proposals were designed to
create a framework. The analysis focuses on two main ways Patten high-
lighted the democratic nature of the discourse: the use of mise en abyme, or
a ‘play within a play’ structure, and the downplaying of overt markers of
hierarchy and power asymmetry. Although Patten’s aim was to demonstrate
openness and accountability, his ultimate control of the discourse belied the
democratic agenda he ostensibly promoted. The analysis consequently also
focuses on the manipulative dimension of Patten’s discourse. The conclu-
sion considers to what extent the meeting might mark a real shift to a more
democratic order of public discourse in Hong Kong.
Part 2: Intercultural Discourses in Transitional Hong Kong

During the transitional period, the competing discourses of the pro-
democracy group in Hong Kong, supported by Britain, and of the pro-Beijing
forces, supported by mainland China, as the two main political groupings
are typically characterised in Hong Kong, came into conflict. This part of the
book examines these intercultural aspects of the political transition.
In dealing with intercultural issues, there is always a danger of essential-
ism, or stereotyping. As Scollon and Scollon (2001: 174) note, the perennial
problem of intercultural communication analysis is having to constantly
look for differences between people while at the same time guarding against
positive or negative stereotyping. Stereotyping arises when individual
members of a group are focused upon and these individuals are claimed to
have the characteristics attributed to the whole group. The problem with
stereotyping is that, while it may be possible to identify typical features of
a particular cultural group, no individual member of that group will repre-
sent all of these features. As Scollon and Scollon (2001:171) note, it is not
possible to classify all Asians and all Westerners together, for example; it is
difficult to find clear differences where one culture can be unambiguous-
ly differentiated from another (Scollon and Scollon, 2001: 174).
Scollon and Scollon’s solution to this problem is to restrict comparison

to what they refer to as ‘discourse systems’. A discourse system, according to
Scollon and Scollon (2001: 5), involves ‘everything that can be said or talked
about or symbolized within a particular, recognizable domain’. This is very
similar to the definition of ‘discourses’ (as used in the plural) in this book:
‘specific sets of meanings expressed through particular forms and uses
which give expression to particular institutions or social groups’. Discourse
systems, according to Scollon and Scollon (2001: 176), are ‘sub-cultural sys-
tems where contrasts between one system and another are somewhat more
strongly made’. These subcultures, or discourse systems, or discourses, are
the units of analysis employed for the intercultural case studies presented in
Part 2 of this volume.
Chapter 5: Face in Intercultural Political Discourse

This chapter examines issues of intercultural discourse during Hong Kong’s
political transition, focusing on different conceptions of face. Application
of a model of Chinese face proposed by Bond and Hwang (1986) provides a
means for explaining certain aspects of the breakdown in communication
that occurred between the Chinese and British Hong Kong governments
during the transitional period. The chapter contributes to an understanding
of intercultural political negotiations, while demonstrating the explanatory
power of Bond and Hwang’s model. At the same time, the chapter highlights
problems with ‘universal’ models of face because of their lack of emphasis
on cultural relativity.
Chapter 6: Competing Public Discourses in Transitional Hong Kong

This chapter describes two competing discourses at work in the public
domain in Hong Kong during the period leading up to the change of sov-
ereignty in 1997. The two discourses are loosely labelled Utilitarian and
Confucianist. The Utilitarian discourse is characteristic of those who support
greater democracy and autonomy for Hong Kong, while the Confucianist
discourse is employed by representatives of China and the pro-China camp
in Hong Kong. The Utilitarian discourse promotes egalitarian values and
may be confrontational. The Confucianist discourse is more hierarchical
and consensus-oriented in nature. The two discourses are illustrated by
means of brief descriptions of a set of discursive events reported in the press
and by four texts: a television news item, a television interview and two
newspaper articles.
Chapter 7: Metaphors in the Discursive Construction of Patriotism:

the Case of Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform Debate
This chapter considers the notion of patriotism, as promoted by the pro-
Beijing camp in the transitional period, with a specific focus on the role of
metaphor. The chapter examines reports and opinion pieces from two local
newspapers published in the early post-colonial period concerning this issue

of patriotism. The following questions are posed:
1. What are the different metaphors that are used in the discursive construc-
tion of patriotism?
2. How do these metaphors vary according to the contrasting ideologies of
the two newspapers?
3. What role does the use of these metaphors have in the hegemonic strug-
gle between the two newspapers over what is an appropriate conception
of patriotism?
The findings and possible answers to these questions not only assist in
gaining a better understanding of the role of language in constructing the
identity of a patriotic Chinese, but they also contribute to an understanding
of the politics and tensions between the local and the national under the
unprecedented ‘one country, two systems’ of post-colonial Hong Kong.
Part 3: The Discursive Construction of a New Hong Kong Identity

With the change of sovereignty in 1997, the incoming pro-Beijing adminis-
tration needed to establish a discursive identity for the new SAR of China.
This discourse constructed Hong Kong citizens as also citizens of the
People’s Republic of China. At the same time, however, it tried to maintain
a continuity with the previous regime (referred to as a through-train), in order
to ensure local and international confidence. This part of the book considers
these issues.
Chapter 8: Identity Politics and Hong Kong’s Return to Chinese Sovereignty

This chapter critically examines the discourse of the first chief executive of the
Hong Kong SAR of China, Tung Chee-hwa, during his first five-year period of
office, following the return of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty
in 1997. Based on a large corpus of primarily speeches, but also interviews,
press conferences and other pronouncements, and a parallel corpus of media
reports and commentary, the analysis demonstrates that, in the interests
of a smooth handover and the policy of ‘one country, two systems’, Tung’s
discourse, in its basic configuration, mirrors that of the last British colonial
governor, Chris Patten, as set out in Chapter 2. However, there are certain
notable variations; in particular, there is a new emphasis on the need for a
knowledge-based economy, the importance of Chinese values and identifica-
tion with China, and a downplaying of democratic development.
Chapter 9: Discourse as History: History as Discourse. ‘The Rise of Modern

China’ – a History Exhibition in Post-Colonial Hong Kong
Following Hong Kong’s retrocession to China as a SAR with a high degree of
autonomy, there was great interest in the extent to which the formula
of ‘one country, two systems’ was working. In September 1999, the Hong
Kong History Museum held a special exhibition called ‘The Rise of Modern
China’, which proved a fruitful site for investigating the balance achieved
between the ‘one country’, on the one hand, and the ‘two systems’ dimen-
sions of the formula, on the other. Investigation was carried out by means of
a lengthy interview with the director of the museum, a close reading of the
texts and artefacts, and interviews with visitors to the exhibition. In spite of
the great care taken by the museum director to create a ‘preferred reading’
which would satisfy majority public opinion, an analysis based on the texts
and visitor interviews considered the exhibition to be biased in favour of
‘one country’ over ‘two systems’.
Chapter 10: Discriminatory Discourse Directed towards Mainlanders

This chapter analyses the discriminatory discursive practices of one leading
liberal Hong Kong newspaper, The South China Morning Post, highlighting
the continuing discrimination against people from mainland China, in spite
of the reversion of sovereignty. The data for the study consists of a total
of 80 articles concerning one news event, Chinese mainlanders claiming
the right of abode in Hong Kong during the period 30 January 1999 to 19
August 2000. A review of the rather diffuse literature leads to the develop-
ment of a composite taxonomy of discriminatory discursive practices. The
Hong Kong data is then tested against this taxonomy. Examples of all of the
strategies in the taxonomy are found to be present in the Hong Kong data,
with certain local variations due to the particular situation of Hong Kong.
The findings are all the more striking because the people who are the focus
of the discrimination are from the same ethnic and linguistic background.
In contrast to the news stories, a comparison with the editorials on the right
of abode issue in The South China Morning Post reveals a much more liberal
tone in the latter. This raises the question as to whether it is the news sto-
ries or the editorials which represent the true institutional ideology of this
influential Hong Kong newspaper.
Chapter 11: Globalisation Discourse: Continuity with the Old

This chapter presents an analysis of the discourse of globalisation from
the perspective of Hong Kong. It shows the continuity in the pre- and
post-colonial discourse in the area of the economy in strongly supporting
globalisation and the free market economy. The chapter takes the form of
a detailed analysis of a speech delivered by the Hong Kong chief executive,
Tung Chee-hwa, in London in October 2000, highlighting the SAR govern-
ment’s measures to address the challenges posed by globalisation and its
ability in capitalising on the assumed benefits of the global phenomenon.
The textual analysis shows that globalisation is discursively constructed as
immutable and that it is the role of the government to manage the conse-
quences of globalisation.
Chapter 12: The Discursive Construction of a World-Class City

With the coming of globalisation, which, as shown in Chapter 11, is strongly
supported by the post-colonial government, there has been increased
competition among cities internationally to become so-called ‘world cities’,
i.e. centres of high technology, industry, trade, banking, finance, profes-
sional activity, higher education and the arts. This chapter describes and
analyses how post-colonial Hong Kong attempted to discursively construct
itself as such a city. Applying ideas from CDA, genre theory and branding,
the chapter considers the governmental consultation process designed to
promote Hong Kong as a world city and shows how this is influenced not
only by the government’s control of the various genres which make up the
consultation, but also by its use of language. Textual analysis, as demon-
strated in a focus on three documents, grounded in the political situation,
highlights the manipulative nature of the consultation process.
Conclusion
Chapter 13: Conclusion
This chapter summarises the main findings of the study, particularly with regard
to the three theoretical constructs in the title of the volume and as discussed
in this chapter: CDA, history and identity. The study has shown how official
discourses have changed in some respects during the period of transition, but
in other areas have been maintained. Specifically, with regard to political issues,
official discourse has come more in line with the ideology of mainland China.
On the other hand, concerning economic issues, the official position has
remained relatively constant, in line with Hong Kong’s continuing position as
an international centre for trade and finance. In terms of discourse theory and
method, the study has demonstrated the value of a longitudinal historiographi-
cal approach both in terms of the contribution that it can make to discourse
theory and in terms of the role that discourse can play in developing an under-
standing of real world issues and in historiography. It has also demonstrated
the possibility of a multi-method approach in a long-term study, involving
ethnography, textual pragmatics, rhetorical analysis, cognitive linguistics, genre
analysis, systemic-functional linguistics (SFL) and corpus linguistics.
1.13 The main discourse theories and methods of textual

analysis used in each chapter
In this volume, as already indicated, the reader will find that many social,
discursive, pragmatic and linguistic theories are employed. Those employed
in each chapter are listed as follows.
Chapter 2: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal

• myth in discourse
• four discursive strategies used by Patten in the promotion of his myth:
− the transformation of old political genres and the introduction of new

ones,
− presupposition,
− involvement (the use of indexicals),
− lexical structuring and reiteration.
Chapter 3: Rhetorical Strategies and Identity Politics in

the Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal
• language and power
• indexicals
• involvement (Tannen, 1989)
• manipulative discourse
• mise en abyme
• order of discourse (Foucault, 1982)
• turn-taking
Chapter 4: Discourse and Social Change in a Public Meeting

• identity
• identity politics and national identity
• political rhetoric
• rhetorical tropes:
− metaphor
− antithesis
− parallelism
− actualisation
− the classical unities
Chapter 5: Face in Intercultural Political Discourse

• intercultural political negotiations
• Chinese face systems (Bond and Hwang, 1986)
• (problems with) ‘universal’ models of face (Matsumuto, 1988)
• cultural relativity
Chapter 6: Competing Public Discourses in Transitional Hong Kong

• discourse systems (Scollon and Scollon, 2001)
• the cooperative principle (Grice, 1975)
• indirectness
• high- and low-context cultures (Ting-Toomey, 1988)
• individualism and collectivism
• face in discourse (Goffman, 1967, 1971)
Chapter 7: Metaphors in the Discursive Construction of Patriotism

• metaphor
• discursive construction of patriotism
• discursive hegemony
• intercultural discourse
Chapter 8: Identity Politics and Hong Kong’s Return

to Chinese Sovereignty
• myth in discourse
• intertextuality/recontextualisation
• four discursive strategies used by Tung in the promotion of his myth:
− the transformation of old political genres and the introduction of new
ones
− presupposition
− involvement (the use of indexicals)
− lexical structuring and reiteration
Chapter 9: Discourse as History: History as Discourse. ‘The Rise of

Modern China’ – a History Exhibition in Post-Colonial Hong Kong
• (national) identity in discourse
• discourse as history
• Van Dijk’s (1997) transformational model of text selection
• conditions of production and reception
• discourse and ideology
• presupposition
• abstraction in discourse
• heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981)
Chapter 10: Discriminatory Discourse Directed towards Immigrants

from the Mainland
• media discourse
• ideology in discourse
• discriminatory discursive strategies
Chapter 11: Globalisation Discourse: Continuity with the Old

• discursive agency
• discursive construction
• listing
• metaphor
• nominalisation
Chapter 12: The Discursive Construction of a World Class City

• branding
• genre
• genre chaining
• genre colonies
• intertextuality
• voice in discourse (Bakhtin, 1981)
Part I
The Discourse of the Outgoing
Administration
2
The Discourse of Colonial
Withdrawal
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on how Chris Patten, the last Hong Kong governor,
and the chief animator of Britain’s policy over Hong Kong, used language
to achieve his goals in guiding the transition of sovereignty from Britain to
China and Britain’s withdrawal from its last major colony. The period cov-
ered is April 1992, when Patten was invited by the British prime minister,
John Major, to be governor, up to 30 June 1997, when sovereignty was to
revert to China and Patten would leave Hong Kong. Data collected over the
full period of Patten’s governorship, as follows, forms the corpus on which
the analysis of this chapter is based:
• Patten’s annual addresses to the Legislative Council

• other formal speeches, in Hong Kong and on overseas visits
• recordings of press conferences given by Patten
• television interviews with Patten
• monthly question-and-answer sessions in the Legislative Council
• statements made by Patten to the press (‘sound bites’)
• video recordings of ‘Question Time with the Governor’, public meet-
ings held following the governor’s annual addresses to the Legislative
Council
• personal interviews with Patten, his personal adviser and his chief
spokesperson
The particular focus of this chapter is to demonstrate, through a critical

analysis of Patten’s discourse, that (whether or not it served the best interests
of the people of Hong Kong) one of his main concerns, if not the main con-
cern, was that Britain’s withdrawal from its last major colony – effectively
the ending of its empire – should go down in history as an honourable one
and that, in order to achieve this goal, Patten attempted to create a myth
about the legacy which would remain after the British withdrawal. As the
41
following analysis shows, Patten claimed that Britain’s and Hong Kong’s
values and interests coincided. His myth – which was constantly reiterated
both overtly and covertly – was based on a conception of Hong Kong as
embodying a set of essentially Western liberal values. In this way Patten
promoted his goal of withdrawal with honour, while at the same time claim-
ing to be acting with the best interests of the Hong Kong people at heart.
In analysing the creation of his myth, the chapter identifies a number of
discursive strategies used by Patten and, as such, is a case study of the way
mythic discourse is created in the political domain.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The overall theoretical framework for the analysis of this chapter is that
of critical discourse analysis (CDA), as outlined in Chapter 1. In addition,
theoretical perspectives are drawn upon from the field of interactional
sociolinguistics. A range of researchers have demonstrated how fields of
professional activity are characterised by special languages, access to which
is usually restricted to members of the given profession (e.g. Lakoff, 1990;
Tannen, 1990). In the field of professional politics, political leaders are able
to use the special language of politics to exert power over the general public
and develop support for their policies (Kress, 1985).
A number of sources in interactional sociolinguistics provide models for
analysing the special languages which characterise the discourse of different
professional groups such as politicians and how power relations are instanti-
ated in discourse (e.g. Brown and Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1981; Lakoff,
1990; Tannen, 1990). Models are also available for the specific analysis of
political language (e.g. Atkinson, 1984; Chilton, 1985a; Fairclough, 1989,
1992, 1995a; Gastil, 1992; Wilson, 1990). Of particular value for the present
chapter is Fairclough’s analysis of the discourse of Margaret Thatcher
(Fairclough, 1989). The changes Patten tried to bring about in the politi-
cal perceptions of the people of Hong Kong are of a similar magnitude
and in other ways parallel the changes which Margaret Thatcher brought
about in the political perceptions of British society in the 1970s and
1980s. Fairclough demonstrates in his analysis of the discourse of Margaret
Thatcher how she was able to bring about a shift in the set of assumptions
and presuppositions which had characterised political discourse in Britain
preceding her coming to power (in the creation of her own myth, in fact,
although Fairclough does not use the term).
2.3 Mythic discourse
Myth is construed, in this chapter, as a set of beliefs and values deriving

from a shared past which, to varying degrees, may or may not be true.
The notion of myth carries with it a number of salient features, as follows
The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal 43
(Barthes, 1972; Edelman, 1971, 1977, 1988; Fiske, 1982; Gastil, 1992; Geis,
1987; Lewis, 1987):
1. By appealing to common features of a culture or group, myth provides

a sense of individual and communal identity.
2. A myth may take the form of a narrative or it may be associative (that
is to say made up of related, but non-sequential themes) in structure
(in the present context it is the latter).
3. Whether narrative or associative, the elements of a myth fit together to
form a coherent whole.
4. Because myth appeals to communal beliefs and values, it is not
necessarily supported by rational argument, but may be considered to
be axiomatic.
5. As such, myth may operate at the level of the non-conscious mind.
6. At the same time, myth exists in a state of ‘naturalness’, that is to say
its meaning is accepted as inevitable, timeless and universal, even if
determined socially, historically, economically and culturally.
7. Communities may continue to believe in a myth and reject information
contesting it if it justifies their roles and past actions and assuages their
future hopes and fears.
When the notion of myth is applied to the political context, two further
important considerations come into play:
8. Political leaders may invoke, project or create a myth as a means of

motivation and direction of the masses for political support or action
and as a way of deflecting criticism of their policies.
9. In order to invoke, project or create a myth, political leaders must
bring it to a state of ‘naturalness’ (acceptance as true); they may seek to
achieve this through discourse by means of a range of discourse strate-
gies, including constant reiteration.
In accordance with these salient features, the notion of myth may be seen
to be closely related to a number of other concepts in discourse studies:
10. Insofar as its elements together create a coherent whole which expresses
the underlying values and beliefs of a group or community, myth can be
construed as a manifestation, or instantiation, of ideology.
11. When articulated, a myth constitutes a discourse, in the sense of that
term as a domain of language use which is unified by a set of common
assumptions (Foucault, 1971).
12. In its relationship to communal identity, the notion of myth may be
associated with hegemony; and the promotion of a myth by, for exam-
ple, political leaders, can be related to the process of hegemonic struggle
(Gramsci, 1971).
There are many well-known examples of myths which have been

promoted by political leaders. Adolf Hitler, for example, promoted a myth
about the superiority of the Aryan race. Winston Churchill, on the other
hand, encouraged a myth of the British as an ‘island’ people capable of
withstanding any aggression. In citing these two examples, it is to be noted
that myth-making may be motivated by more or less respectable political
goals. As another example of political myth-making, in more recent times,
Ronald Reagan has been shown to have consistently appealed to a mythol-
ogy concerned with the origins of America and the rise of freedom and
economic progress in that country (Lewis, 1987). According to Lewis (1987:
282), Reagan’s use of myth provided ‘a sense of importance and direction’
and ‘a communal focus for individual identity’, and, for Gastil (1992: 490),
Reagan’s use of myth ‘unified his listeners and led them to accept the
empirical assumptions and values embedded within them’. In addition, for
Gastil again, Reagan’s use of myth not only won over his listeners, but also
reduced or deflected criticism of his policies. In all of the three examples of
myth-making cited, it should be emphasised that the exploitation of myth
for political goals carries with it a significant element of manipulation.
The situation of Chris Patten, an outsider charged with ensuring that
Britain’s exit from Hong Kong should be perceived to be an honourable one,
presents an interesting case study in political myth-making. It is the con-
tention of this chapter that Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong, like
those political leaders cited, created a myth in order to build support for
his policies and to ensure that the history of British rule in Hong Kong and,
indeed, the history of the British Empire (given that Hong Kong was the
last of Britain’s significant colonies) was recorded in a favourable light.1 The
following sections analyse how he went about creating his myth.
2.4 Chris Patten
Chris Patten was sent to Hong Kong in 1992 to be the last British governor
during the five years leading up to the reversion of sovereignty over Hong
Kong from Britain to China. In Britain, he had been a successful Conservative
politician, holding a number of cabinet posts and tipped by many as a pos-
sible future prime minister. In 1992, however, as leader of the party, while
organising a Conservative general election victory, he lost his own seat in
Parliament. Although his friend, Prime Minister John Major, offered him a
peerage and a place in his cabinet (Dimbleby, 1997a: 8), Patten chose the
alternative option of the governorship of Hong Kong, ‘to deal with a very
important element of British history’, as Major was later to put it (South
China Morning Post, 7 March 1996).
Patten is widely recognised as a powerful speaker (Flowerdew, 1998).
When interviewed for this research, both his personal adviser and his offi-
cial spokesperson were full of praise for his skill as a public communicator
(Flowerdew, undated). These aides also emphasised how, unusually for a

prominent politician, Patten did most of the speech-writing himself. As head
of the Conservative Party research office, he had regularly written speeches
for Margaret Thatcher when she was prime minister. When interviewed
for this research (Flowerdew, 1997c), Patten expressed his enthusiasm for
speech-writing, stating that although he had no formal training, he used
figurative language to make his speeches more memorable. When shown the
passages of his speeches which are the focus of analysis in this chapter, he
asserted that he himself had written them, referring to them as good exam-
ples of what he called ‘Pattenese’. He also took pride in his ability to make
speeches, as he had used to in the House of Commons and at Conservative
Party conferences, without a prepared text. Patten’s own admiration for Iain
Macleod, one of his Tory predecessors, noted for his powers of oratory, also
bears judgement to the importance Patten attaches to speech-making.
Patten can be considered to be a charismatic figure. On his arrival in
Hong Kong, he created a tremendous impact on the local population and
enjoyed high popularity ratings. He was the focus of great interest in Britain
during his governorship, where, previously, the British public had been
fairly uninterested in Hong Kong affairs. In his confrontations with China,
he became an international figure reported widely in the world’s press and
received by world leaders, up to and including the president of the United
States, Bill Clinton. On his departure from Hong Kong, he was the subject of
great controversy for his outspoken views – conveyed through a book and a
BBC documentary television programme by his friend Jonathan Dimbleby
(1997a, b) – on British policy on Hong Kong prior to his arrival. It was even
claimed that the Labour government excited interest in Patten as a means
of deflecting attention away from various scandals affecting its own popu-
larity with the public. In the documentary series, Patten comes out as an
honourable man, standing up for Hong Kong against the evil intentions of
the incoming Chinese sovereign.
2.5 Patten’s discursive formation
As a professional party politician, Patten’s discourse directed at the people

of Hong Kong was radically different from that of his predecessors, who had
been diplomatic service officials, and it was directed at the international
media, as well as (perhaps more so than) the people of Hong Kong. In exam-
ining the corpus, a number of themes continually recur throughout Patten’s
speeches, interviews, broadcasts, public meetings, Legislative Council
‘Question Time’ sessions and writings. The major themes are woven together
into a coherent discursive formation, made up essentially of Western liberal
values, emphasising laissez-faire economics, the freedom of the individual
(although not at the expense of the welfare of the less privileged), the rule
of law, and democracy.
Although these values are essentially those of Western liberalism, they

were not presented as being imposed on the people of Hong Kong (whose
values have their basis in Confucianism as much as, if not more than, in
any Western ideology [Bond, 1986, 1991, 1996; Lau and Kuan, 1988]),
but as universals which have always been a part of Hong Kong’s way of
life. Patten was in fact creating an identity for the Hong Kong people in
terms of the values he himself subscribed to. He did not make the con-
nection that these values are essentially the same as those promoted by
the more left-of-centre tendency within the British Conservative Party to
which he belonged. Kress (1989: 7) refers to how discourses can ‘colonise
the social world imperialistically’. This is what Patten sought to do in
Hong Kong, by creating a myth about the British legacy. It is ironic, how-
ever, that he should have undertaken the discursive colonisation of Hong
Kong, while at the same time ostensibly managing the process of political
decolonisation.
The main planks of Patten’s platform and the four components of his myth
were stated in his first annual policy speech, in October 1992, as follows:
The policies of the Government I lead will be based on four key

principles:
– first, we must continue to generate the economic success that has made
Hong Kong one of the wonders of the world: our approach to business
will remain one of minimum interference and maximum support.
– second, we must leave individuals and families free to run their own
lives, while providing proper help for those who – often through no
fault of their own – are in genuine need;
– third, we must guarantee the rule of law, with an independent judiciary
enforcing laws democratically enacted, and with crime and corruption
under unremitting attack.
– fourth, we must make possible the widest democratic participation
by the people of Hong Kong in the running of their affairs, while
reinforcing certainty about Hong Kong’s future. (1992 policy speech)
These four areas – the market economy, the freedom of the individual,
the rule of law, and democratic participation – were the major themes
of Patten’s governorship. Together they constituted the myth Patten was
concerned to develop about Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong. In line with
the theory of naturalisation as regards myth, these four concepts were con-
stantly reiterated throughout the five years of Patten’s period of office and
appeared in one form or another in just about every public pronouncement
Patten made.2
2.6 Patten’s discursive strategies
This section will demonstrate how Patten used a range of discursive

strategies in the projection of his myth. These strategies operate at both a
macro- and micro-level. At the macro-level, the principal discourse strategies
used by Patten concerned the transformation of old political genres and the
introduction of new ones. At the micro-level, this generic manipulation was
supported most notably by the use of presupposition, involvement (Tannen,
1989) (here, the use of indexicals), and lexical structuring and reiteration.
2.6.1 The transformation of old political genres and the

introduction of new ones
During a century and a half of colonial rule, Britain never introduced democ-
racy to Hong Kong. Following the 1984 signing of the Joint Declaration,
which stated that the executive government of post-handover Hong Kong
should be accountable to the legislature, Britain and China agreed to a
gradual introduction of a limited number of elected seats to the Legislative
Council. The first direct elections were held in 1991 and the second in 1995.
The main focus of Patten’s governorship was his (failed) attempts to per-
suade China to agree to electoral arrangements in 1995 which would allow
for a somewhat broader franchise than the previously limited franchise
agreed between the two governments.3
Prior to Patten’s appointment, the British approach to dealing with China
had been one of conciliation and compromise, with an emphasis on the part
of the British Hong Kong government and its governor, David Wilson, on
the need for a ‘smooth transition’ of sovereignty, even if this meant giving
in to Chinese demands. Negotiations were conducted secretly with China,
and the Hong Kong public were presented with a fait accompli when agree-
ments were reached. When Patten took over, there was a complete change
of attitude. Patten’s aim was to introduce as much democracy into Hong
Kong before the handover as the previous agreements with China allowed.
In order to promote this democratic agenda, Patten projected himself as
a man of the people. His style was totally different from that of his pred-
ecessor. Whereas Wilson was somewhat aloof, Patten adopted a very high
public profile, taking every opportunity to be photographed by the press
and be seen meeting ordinary Hong Kong people on so-called ‘walkabouts’.
Symbolic of this ‘democratisation’ of public discourse (Fairclough, 1992), at
his inauguration, Patten shunned the traditional white tropical suit, plumed
hat and ceremonial sword of previous governors in favour of a low-key
lounge suit. In addition, where Wilson had engaged in quiet negotiations
with the Chinese government, Patten, in preferring virulent ‘megaphone
diplomacy’ with China, positioned himself as a champion of democracy in
the face of the intransigent Chinese Communist government. Most Hong
Kong people are either refugees or the children or grandchildren of refugees
from China. They had been shocked by the events of Tiananmen Square and
were wary of their rights being limited after the handover. The most popular
political party by far was the Democratic Party whose agenda was against
the PRC government and in favour of more democracy in Hong Kong. In
positioning himself against China, Patten won the support of those people
who wanted greater democracy in Hong Kong.
As part of this discursive positioning as a champion of democracy, Patten
sought to create new opportunities for demonstrating ‘open’ government.
In order to do this, on the one hand, he transformed already existing genres
to make them more ‘democratic’ and, on the other hand, introduced new
ones which were, again, ‘democratic’ in nature. While the inauguration and
the meet-the-people ‘walkabouts’ had occurred under the previous governor,
Patten transformed the purpose and nature of these genres. The inauguration
became an opportunity for drawing closer to the people of Hong Kong, with
Patten dressed in a lounge suit, rather than the traditional colonial outfit,
mixing and shaking hands with the crowd, giving the thumbs-up sign and
introducing his family; this in contrast to the previous inaugurations, which
had been more of a demonstration of colonial authority. By making the
‘walkabouts’ with much greater frequency, with greater informality and show
of care for the ordinary man and woman than had been the case with the
previous governor, this genre again became much more of a means of dem-
onstrating ‘democratic’ government and an affinity with the people than a
tour of inspection. Similarly, while the Chinese government and its press
had always attacked the British Hong Kong government, often virulently,
Patten transformed this genre by answering back, where previous governors
had maintained a diplomatic silence. In this way, Patten demonstrated how
Britain was ‘doing its best’ for Hong Kong on behalf of the people of Hong
Kong, in standing up to the Chinese Communist government.
In line with his emphasis on democracy and informality, Patten also intro-
duced new genres. In the past, in a show of benign paternalism, the governor
had presided over proceedings of the Legislative Council from a raised throne-
like chair. Patten changed this and withdrew himself from these proceedings,
allowing the legislators to debate unhindered. In addition, he established
monthly question time sessions where he appeared before the legislature to
make himself accountable. Other new genres he introduced were public meet-
ings where he answered questions from the floor, a monthly radio broadcast,
the opening up of Government House for public entertainment, and even
the hosting of a radio record show. All of these new genres contributed to the
democratic picture Patten wanted to paint of his governorship. He described
them as part of Hong Kong’s way of life, even though they had only been
introduced at this very late stage in British rule, when Britain was handing
Hong Kong over to China. These new, more democratic genres played a part
in allowing Patten to claim that Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong was an hon-
ourable and democratic one, while in actual fact, until his arrival, this had
demonstrably not been the case. In this, his transformation of old genres and
introduction of new ones can be seen as the discursive equivalent of what the
historians Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) refer to as the ‘invention’ of tradi-
tions, that is to say, the introduction of ‘a set of practices, normally governed
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which
automatically implies continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). In this
way, Patten was able to create an impression of the British legacy to Hong
Kong as democratic, while in fact these ‘invented’ traditions were ‘responses
to novel situations which ... establish their own past by quasi-obligatory rep-
etition’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 2). One striking example of how Patten attempted
to claim historical continuity for the ‘democracy’ that he was ‘inventing’
occurred during his first public meeting, the first time a governor had ever
made himself accountable to the Hong Kong public. In this meeting, Patten
described the greatest objective of his governorship as being ‘to secure your
way of life for the future’, a way of life which, he preposterously claimed, was
that ‘we have free and open meetings like this’.4
2.6.2 Presupposition
Within the political genres which Patten either transformed or introduced,
he used a range of discursive strategies in promoting his myth about the
British legacy to Hong Kong. The first of these was in the systematic use of
presupposition. Fairclough (1989: 152) states that ‘having power may mean
being able to determine the presuppositions’. In creating new opportunities
and genres for putting over his message, Patten can be seen to have been
exerting and increasing his power as governor as a means of applying this
control of the presuppositions that Fairclough refers to.
Presupposition was an important strategy used by Patten to insinuate his
myth into the consciousness of the people of Hong Kong and the interna-
tional press. The four dimensions of Patten’s myth concerning the British
legacy to Hong Kong – a free market economy, the freedom of the indi-
vidual, the rule of law, and democracy – were presented as axiomatic. Patten
frequently referred to them as ‘bedrock principles’ and as ‘self-evident and
universal truths’ – that is to say there was no requirement to justify them,
provide evidence in their support, or question them in any way. This, in
spite of the fact that they had long and complex philosophical histories,
on the one hand, and that their applicability within the context of British
colonial rule in Hong Kong could be doubted, on the other.
Under the heading ‘The Bedrock Principles’, two aspects of Patten’s myth,
as cited earlier from his 1992 policy speech, were returned to in 1995:
1. The programme I launched in 1992 was built on two bedrock principles.

2. These principles are so ingrained in Hong Kong’s systems, so much a
3. part of our consensus, that they are usually taken as self-evident and
4. universal truths.
5. The first concerns the economy. Hong Kong knows better than most
6. communities that we must first create the wealth before spending a
7. share of it on improving our public services. We must never lose sight of this
8. fundamental economic reality, and we must accept its implications. There are
9. no shortcuts, no soft options. Social progress is linked directly to economic
10. progress. If we want better services, we must fund them by creating new
11. wealth.
12. The second bedrock principle concerns our rights and freedoms under the law.
13. There is a consensus that our civil institutions must develop in step with the
14. development of our economy.
15. In short, Hong Kong recognises that economic and social development must
16. take place within the framework of what is perhaps this community’s most
17. prized possession, the Rule of Law. This is not some abstract concept far
18. removed from the daily lives of the people of Hong Kong. It is the Rule of Law
19. which provides a safe and secure environment for the individual, for families
20. and for businesses to flourish. This is the best safeguard against arbitrary and
21. overbearing government. It is the very essence of our way of life. (1995 policy speech)
In this extract, the presupposition and assertion of the axiomatic nature

and certitude of the components of the myth are reinforced by a number of
features, as follows:5
• The use of the term ‘bedrock principles’ (to refer to the economy and
rule of law) (lines 1 and 12), with the accompanying presupposition
that because they were so securely in place they did not require any
justification and were not open to doubt or dispute.
• Similarly, the description of the ‘bedrock principles’ as ‘... the very
essence of our way of life ...’, with its presupposition again that there is
no need to question them.
• The use of the overt statement of the presupposition that the principles
in question need not be justified or questioned: ‘These principles are so
ingrained in Hong Kong’s systems, so much a part of our consensus, that
they are usually taken as self-evident and universal truths’ (lines 2–4).
• The use of ‘Hong Kong knows better than most ...’, ‘There is a consensus ...’,
and ‘Hong Kong recognises ...’ to insinuate the presupposition that the
people of Hong Kong are united in their agreement with the beliefs and
values that Patten is asserting.
• The use of the so-called present simple tense in its function of expressing
‘universal truths’: are (lines 2, 8) is (lines 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21), concerns
(lines 5, 12) provides (line 19).
• The use of the modal must (lines 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15), expressing high obli-
gation and therefore certitude.
• The use of emphasisers and superlatives to express certitude: so ingrained
(line 2), so much a part (lines 2–3), better than most (line 5), most prized
(lines 16–17), the best (line 20), the very essence (line 21).
• The use of emphatic negation to create the presupposition of an alterna-

tive view that must be emphatically contradicted: never (line 7), no short-
cuts, no soft options (line 9), not some abstract concept (line 17).
• The use of the axiomatic structure if we want ... we must (line 10).
• The use of the metaphors, possession (line 17) and safeguard (line 20), with
their accompanying presupposition that what is possessed or safeguarded
must already exist.
Manipulative presupposition such as Patten used here has been described

by Fairclough as a type of intertextuality. ‘Manipulative presuppositions’,
Fairclough says, ‘... postulate interpreting subjects with particular prior tex-
tual experiences and assumptions, and in so doing they contribute to the
ideological constitution of subjects’ (1992: 121). Interpreted in these terms,
Patten’s use of presupposition was a way of projecting his myth concern-
ing the British legacy onto the people of Hong Kong. He was interpreting
his subjects, the Hong Kong people, as having prior experience of the four
elements of his myth, when, in fact, it can easily be argued, this was to a
considerable degree demonstrably not the case.6
2.6.3 Involvement strategies: the use of indexicals

For a myth to be accepted, it must be seen to be imbued with shared values
and beliefs. Both the person or group promoting a myth and the person or
group onto which the myth is being projected must be perceived as sharing
these beliefs and values which constitute the myth. As a British colonial
governor, Patten had a difficult task in this respect: he was British and a
colonialist, but the community he was seeking to influence was composed
of Asian colonial subjects. One important way he sought to overcome this
problem was to position himself discursively on the side of the majority
pro-democracy camp and against China, as already noted. Another way was
to use a whole range of discursive involvement strategies (Tannen, 1989) to
ingratiate himself with Hong Kong society.
A fairly detailed study will be presented in Chapter 4 of Patten’s involve-
ment strategies. Here, just one strategy, the use of the indexical, we/us/our,
is highlighted, to show how it contributed to the projection of Patten’s
myth.7
As indexicals, the items we/us/our only take on meaning in relation to con-
text, either within the text or outside it. As such, they can be ambiguous and
open to multiple interpretations, on the one hand, and manipulation, on
the other. In Patten’s discourse, these items are often used with considerable
ambivalence. In the extract from the 1992 policy speech cited earlier, we in
the four-part reiteration, we must, according to one possible reading, refers
back to ‘the government I lead’, which had come earlier in the text. At the
same time, however, these uses of we could also be interpreted more widely,
outside the text, or exophorically, as Patten and his audience, the people of
Hong Kong. In this way, Patten uses the indexicals to integrate himself into
Hong Kong society. Patten’s reference to ‘our way of life’ and the claim that
‘we have meetings like this’, in his first public meeting referred to earlier, is
another example of his use of the indexical we/us/our as a way of integrating
himself into Hong Kong society.
This use of we/us/our, in fact, runs right through Patten’s discourse and
is used when referring to the various dimensions of his myth concerning
the purported British legacy. In this way he projected his values onto the
people of Hong Kong. In the following extract, for example, from a speech
given in Singapore, the use of we/us/our suggests that Patten is a part of the
‘community’ whom he is referring to, even though logic indicates that he is
not a part of that community, and would certainly not be after 1997, when
he would leave:
If the Joint Declaration is as faithfully followed after 1997 as we are fol-

lowing it today, then all will be well. The Joint Declaration describes how
we live. We are a community not a Lego set. We can’t be dismantled and
then assembled again by an act of political will, an act which may also
take away some of the bits and put them back in the box. We are a living,
thriving organism, with the sap and vitality coursing through our whole
system. (Speech to Fortune Global Forum, Singapore, 9 March 1995;
emphasis added)
The same strategy of ascribing the values and beliefs Patten is promoting
to those of the community as a whole by the use of the indexical we is appar-
ent in the following extract on liberty and the law:
The liberty that the law constrains, it also protects, and in Hong Kong
we believe that liberty should be as broadly drawn as possible. A soci-
ety where men and women are more free is one where we believe they
will also be more responsible, more successful and more happy. The
old American adage that the average man and woman are better than
the average strikes a chord with us. We trust them to make most of the
decisions about their own lives and lifestyles. We also think that the
strength of government is enhanced not weakened by the freedoms
of the people it serves. (Speech to Fortune Global Forum, Singapore, 9
March 1995)
And the strategy is present again in the following extract on rights:
There’s a view, expressed frequently in the last few years, that this is a
very western view, that these rights are not as important as we in Hong
Kong believe, that they are certainly not universal. My only contribution
to that debate is to say that it’s certainly not an argument between West
and East. The argument is addressed by Asians within Asia. (Speech to
Fortune Global Forum, Singapore, 9 March 1995)
In this extract, a careful reading of the text suggests even that, in claiming
the debate on rights to be an argument by Asians within Asia and at the
same time entering into the debate himself, Patten seems to be including
himself as an ‘Asian’, something which he demonstrably was not.
In all of the preceding three extracts, whether the issue is the Hong Kong
social system, liberty and the law, or rights, in each case Patten’s use of we/
us/our integrates him into the Hong Kong community and ascribes to the
Hong Kong people shared experience and beliefs which, logic would dictate,
are not in fact shared by them with the colonial governor at all, but which
nevertheless conveniently fit within the framework of the myth he was
building about Britain’s legacy.
Finally, concerning the remaining dimension of Patten’s myth not men-
tioned in the preceding examples, the economy, a similar strategy is found
again in the next extract, although here it is rather different:
Whatever indicators we look at, Hong Kong’s performance in the past

decade has been impressive. By the standards of most of the developed
world, it has been spectacular. Let us start with the economy. Since 1984:
living standards for the whole community have improved dramatically.
Total GDP has grown by 79 percent in real terms, and in terms of GDP
per person, we now rank 17th in the world instead of 28th, as we were in
1984; the value of our foreign trade has increased by about 350 percent
in real terms. In 1984, Hong Kong was the 13th largest trading economy
in the world; we are now eighth and rising; we have made the transition
from a manufacturing base to an international business centre, with
labour productivity rising 54 percent in the process. (1994 policy speech;
emphasis added)
In this extract, by his use of we/us/our, Patten claims the success of the
Hong Kong people to be part of his success also, in spite of the fact that
the aspects of this success to which he refers had all been accomplished
long before his arrival in 1992. The use of we/us/our in this extract is
thus somewhat different from earlier examples insofar as whereas in the
previous extracts, in ascribing his values and beliefs to those of the com-
munity, Patten was imposing something of his onto the people of Hong
Kong, here he can be interpreted as taking something away from Hong
Kong, a share in their economic success, that is not in fact his. In all of the
examples, however, we/us/our contributes to the projection of the myth of
the British legacy, built on purported or insinuated, common beliefs, values
and experiences.
2.6.4 Lexical reiteration

Perhaps the most systematic way in which Patten sought to naturalise
his myth about the British legacy to Hong Kong was in his use of lexical
reiteration and patterning. Lexical choice is the most obvious way in which
the particular field, or ideational meanings, of a discourse or register are
signalled (Halliday and Hasan, 1976, 1985/89; Halliday and Matthiessen,
2004). In accordance with this theory, we find that the four principal
themes of Patten’s discourse, as elaborated earlier, are instantiated by the
frequent and consistent reiteration throughout the corpus of lexis belong-
ing to the four semantic fields of the market economy, the freedom of
the individual, the rule of law, and democratic participation. Computer-
generated word frequency lists indicate the wide range and regularity with
which words belonging to these semantic fields occur in the corpus and
indicate their use to be a consistent discursive strategy in Patten’s promo-
tion of his myth.8
To take an example of one of these themes, high-frequency items belong-
ing to the semantic field of the economy, in addition to the term economy
itself, are market, business, trade, commerce, competition, industry, enterprise,
initiative, investment, wealth, reward and talent. If we look at the contexts in
which these keywords are used, by using a concordancer, we see that they
are overwhelmingly positive. Table 2.1 shows some examples of the positive
environments of the words relating to the economy, as represented in a
range of noun phrases containing the word economy or economic. As the table
shows, economy is related to choice, freedom, fairness, cheerfulness, growth, good
health, virtues, benefits, positive change, success, talent and initiative.
If we look at how words relating to the economy function within the
clause, as opposed to the noun phrase, we further see the positive and
dynamic attributes of these items. The keywords listed in Table 2.1 as
belonging to the semantic field of the economy were all nouns. To see how
Table 2.1 Positive environments of noun phrases containing the word economy
or economic
• economic choice, freedom under the law

• fair economic choice
• the background of some still pretty cheerful predictions for economic growth
• the eighth largest trading economy in the world
• our flourishing economy
• all the virtues and benefits of a free economy
• a dramatic contribution to China’s economic revolution
• the enduring economic success of Hong Kong
• a market economy that liberates talent and rewards initiative
• the great mass of men and women who make our economy the outstanding
success that it is
these nouns function within the clause we need to consider the verbs with
which they collocate. Typical verbs collocating with nouns relating to the
economy include create, generate, sustain and support. These verbs are of the
material process, or ‘processes of doing’ type (Halliday and Matthiessen,
2004), that is, they conceptualise actions being performed and thereby con-
tribute further to the positive impression of the economy by introducing the
semantic component of dynamic action.
The nouns collocating with these material process verbs may fulfil the
role within the clause of ‘recipient’ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), either
as object, in active, transitive clauses – ‘to protect free trade’, ‘to increase
economic growth’ – or as subject, in passive clauses – ‘wealth is generated’,
‘trade is facilitated’. They may also be conceptualised as entities which are
capable of acting on their own behalf, that is, as an integral part of the
dynamic process itself, if the verb is used ergatively (Halliday and Matthiessen,
2004; Lock, 1996; Sinclair, 1990) – ‘trade has boomed’, ‘economic growth
has increased’. In some cases nouns relating to activity may perform the role
of actor, as the doer of the material process – ‘a market economy liberates
talent and rewards initiative’ (market economy = actor, liberates = material
process); ‘the free and open competition of goods, of services and ideas
promotes the advance of knowledge, of technology, of efficiency’ (the free
and open competition of goods, of services and ideas = actor, promotes =
material process); ‘it (free and open competition) encourages initiative
and stimulates the creation of wealth’ (free and open competition = actor,
encourages = material process). In these examples, the economy becomes
personalised, insofar as the actors associated with material process verbs are
more usually human.9
Further emphasising this positive, dynamic nature of economic activity,
if we turn now to adjectival forms, taking the adjective economic as an
example, we find a preponderance of collocations of this item with deverbal
nouns, that is, nouns derived from verbs, which therefore have a ‘process’
component in their semantic structure. These deverbal nouns are either
derived from ergative verbs, which are capable of spontaneous action by
themselves (e.g. economic revolution, economic growth), or process verbs,
where a human agent, or actor, would typically be involved (e.g. economic
choice, economic success).10
To further highlight the positive environment in which words relating to
the economy are incorporated, we find that pre- and post-modifications of
nouns belonging to this semantic field are again overwhelmingly positive
and dynamic: ‘our flourishing economy’, ‘the eighth largest trading economy
in the world’, ‘the men and women who make our economy the outstanding
success that it is’ (positive attributes in italics).
To illustrate still further the positive, dynamic behaviour attaching to
the meaning of words relating to the economy, Table 2.2 provides a list of
phrases containing the word wealth. Notice here the material process verbs,
Table 2.2 Phrases containing the word wealth
• creating new wealth

• those who create our wealth
• the need to generate wealth
• we must first create the wealth
• a dynamo for further wealth creation
• rising wealth enables more to be spent by government, encourages initiative and
stimulates the creation of wealth
• generating the wealth required to provide the standards of public services
• to use a proper share of the wealth we generate
• the wealth we generate as a community
Table 2.3 Complex noun phrases in which the word individual occurs
• the individual against the state

• the individual against the collective
• the rights of the individual
• decency and fairness, individuality and enterprise
• respect for individual rights
• the individual’s right to privacy
• individuals and their right to seek the protection of the courts
• the freedom of individuals to manage their affairs without fear of arbitrary inter-
ference
• individuals and families free to run their own lives
• opportunities for ... individuals to shape their own lives
• the privacy of individuals
create and generate, the ergative verb, rise, and the deverbal noun, creation,
all collocating with wealth in these phrases. As with the examples with
the word economy, these collocates are thus overwhelmingly positive and
dynamic.
When we look at keywords attaching to the economy, as analysed in
Table 2.2, in context, we notice a phenomenon which Fowler et al. (1979)
call over-lexicalisation, that is, how a large concentration of interrelated
terms occurs together as an expression of a fundamental preoccupation of
the given discourse. This applies not only to the theme, or semantic field,
of the economy, but also to the other three principal themes, or semantic
fields, of Patten’s discursive formation. To illustrate further how this phe-
nomenon functions in these other fields, let us this time take the example
of the semantic field relating to the freedom of the individual. Table 2.3
lists a range of complex noun phrases in which the word individual occurs.
Examining this table, we find that the term individual collocates positively –
as with the economy, these items are again overwhelmingly positive – with a
wide range of nouns – rights, decency, fairness, enterprise, respect, right, privacy,
protection, families, freedom, opportunities – while it is contrasted negatively
with the terms state, collective and interference.11
Table 2.4 Examples of the rule of law in context
1. this way of life, Hong Kong’s capitalist system, its freedoms, its values, its rule
of law
2. the rule of law, on which our success depends
3. Hong Kong’s rule of law essential to preserving Hong Kong’s prosperity and its
way of life
4. the rule of law that guarantees stability and fundamental freedoms
5. the rule of law, the guardian angel of Hong Kong’s decency and the engine of
Hong Kong’s success
6. the innate strength of the values that make Hong Kong special and the rule of
law
7. the importance of the rule of law and its role in creating Hong Kong’s prosperity
8. the rule of law that has for many years provided the framework for Hong Kong’s
achievements
9. the rule of law ... the glue by which millions of people of different ambitions
abilities and temperaments can be joined together
10. the rule of law that champions the rights of the individual against the collective,
the rights of the weak against the mighty
11. the rule of law: a safe and secure environment for the individual, for families
and for businesses to flourish
12. the rule of law which protects the vulnerable against the powerful, the
individual against the state
13. the vitality and the industry of its people, living, working and prospering
within a framework of sound administration and the rule of law
14. Freedom under the rule of law ... not just a slogan in Hong Kong ... a policy ...
a strategy ... our history, our life
15. the rule of law, with an independent judiciary enforcing laws democratically
enacted, and with crime and corruption under unremitting attack
16. the bedrock of your way of life ... the rule of law that guarantees fair and equi-
table treatment for everyone
17. a free, prosperous, decent society, living with the rule of law – under a Chinese
flag
18. the rule of law ... hand in hand with clean and competent government
19. a government both dedicated to, and subject to the rule of law
20. a decent, open, plural society living in freedom under the rule of law
21. this community’s most prized possession, the rule of law
Turning now to the semantic field relating to the rule of law, Table 2.4
shows examples of this key term in context.
The rule of law collocates in the examples in Table 2.4 with the follow-
ing lexical items: nouns: life, vitality, freedom(s), success, prosperity, stability,
decency, strength, importance, achievement(s), ambitions, abilities, values, rights,
individual, success, glue (metaphor), guardian angel (metaphor), engine (meta-
phor); verbs: preserve, guarantee, create, provide, champion, flourish, protect,
live, work, prosper, enforce; and adjectives: fundamental, open, independent, fair,
equitable, decent, essential, clean, competent, dedicated, plural, prized, prosperous,
secure, special, bedrock (metaphor).
This wide range of collocates indicates again the phenomenon referred

to by Fowler et al. (1979) as over-lexicalisation, while at the same time
showing how the term rule of law occurs in linguistic environments which
are overwhelmingly positive. Especially worthy of note here, also, is the
phenomenon (noted earlier for the word economy) of the item rule of law
fulfilling the syntactic function of actor. As noted in the discussion of the
item economy, this function of actor is typically fulfilled by humans (e.g.
‘The students studied the text’, ‘Susan hit the ball’, ‘They ate their lunch’).
In fulfilling a role which is more typically reserved for humans, rule of law
is personified, taking on a human dimension and becoming capable of
dynamic action. In Table 2.4, this occurs in examples 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10,
12 and 16.12
Considering, finally, the semantic field relating to democratic participation,
because he was constrained in how much he could do in terms of introducing
democracy in the form of universal suffrage, Patten chose to emphasise other
features of democracy relating to government openness and accountability.
(These ideas were based on the British Conservative Party’s reforms in Britain
concerning open government and the so-called ‘Citizen’s Charter’.) Table 2.5
shows examples of the keyword accountability in context. Accountability
collocates in the examples in Table 2.5 with the following related concepts:
service, performance, commitment, openness, decency, competency, determination,
Table 2.5 Examples of accountability in context
• a relationship based on service, accountability and performance

• This will also be a speech about accountability and commitment
• greater openness and accountability
• decent, competent, accountable government in Hong Kong
• our determination to make the government more accountable to the people of
Hong Kong
• What accountability means in practice is creative dialogue between the
Administration and you
• the need to provide a more professional, more accountable, more responsive
government
• the process by which the government is accountable to the community
• to strengthen the representation and accountability of the municipal councils and
district boards
• the government becoming more open and more accountable
• an evolving system of accountability to an increasingly democratic assembly in
Hong Kong
• The discharge of its responsibility for which it is accountable to this legislative
council
• accountability must begin with the government’s own performance
• this Hong Kong system, with an executive-led administration accountable to an
increasingly elected legislature
• our arrangements for ensuring that the government is held accountable to the
community for its decisions and actions
creative dialogue, professionalism, responsiveness, representation, openness,

democratic assembly, responsibility, performance, elections, legislature, community,
decisions, actions.
The examples in Table 2.5 demonstrate again the phenomenon of over-
lexicalisation, together with the positive associations which, as we have now
seen, go with all four of the key components of Patten’s discursive forma-
tion and therefore contribute to Patten’s myth of colonial withdrawal with
honour.
2.6.5 Integration of the four dimensions of Patten’s discursive

formation
The previous section looked separately at examples of lexis relating to one
of the four principal themes of Patten’s myth. Part of Patten’s political
stance, however, was to show how these four areas of a market economy,
rule of law, freedom of the individual, and democratic participation are
interrelated, how it is not possible to have one without the other. This is an
important aspect of Patten’s discursive formation, because other East Asian
politicians had argued that it is possible to have strong economic growth
without some of the other attributes of the developed Western democra-
cies, such as party politics and high levels of social welfare provision, some
arguing that this ‘Asian’ model is more appropriate for Hong Kong and thus
undermining Patten’s political and social reform programme.
At times, Patten overtly stated this purported relationship. In the follow-
ing extract, for example, three of the four dimensions of the myth are
integrated, starting with the rule of law, moving on to the freedom of the
individual, and concluding with the free market economy:
The rule of law is essential for Hong Kong’s future. It begins with individ-
uals and their right to seek the protection of the Courts, in which justice
is administered by impartial judges. It protects the freedom of individu-
als to manage their affairs without fear of arbitrary interference by the
Government or the improper influence of the rich and powerful. Its start-
ing point is the individual but it encompasses the whole of society. For
the business community in particular, the rule of law is crucial. Without
it, there is no protection against corruption, nepotism or expropriation.
(1994 policy speech)
In the next example we have democracy (not mentioned in the

previous extract) integrated with the market economy and the rule of law,
respectively:
Democracy is more than just a philosophical ideal. It is, for instance, an

essential element in the pursuit of economic progress. Let me give an
example of what I mean. Without the rule of law buttressed by democratic
institutions, investors are left unprotected. Without an independent

Judiciary enforcing laws democratically enacted, businesses will be vul-
nerable to arbitrary political decisions taken on a whim – a sure recipe
for a collapse in confidence and a powerful deterrent to investors from
overseas. So democracy brings benefits as well as representing values. It
helps to create the sort of society, as well as the business opportunities
that first attract talent and capital. (1992 policy speech)13
As well as being overtly stated, the interrelationship of these key concepts

is reinforced in a less explicit way, through the application of particular lexi-
cal items to more than one field. A particularly good example of this is the
lexical item freedom and its related forms, which collocate with items from
all four of the semantic fields. Examples are as follows:
• the free market economy

free trade
free markets
free enterprise
free and fair commerce
• freedom of the individual
a free and plural society a society where men and women are more free
individuals and families free to run their own lives
• freedom under the rule of law
freedom under the rule of law
freedom of expression is a universal right
• freedom and democratic participation
political freedom
freedom to say what you want
freedom of expression
Similarly, to take another example, the word rights also cuts across the
four fields:
• economic rights
rights of property
economic rights
the rights of the consumer
• individual rights
the rights of the individual
the rights of the child
human rights
• legal rights
legal rights
rights and freedoms under the law legislative framework for defending
rights
• democratic rights
civil and political rights
electoral rights
• freedom and the free market economy and political freedom
economic and political freedom
This phenomenon of words collocating in different semantic contexts or

fields has also been noted by Fairclough (1995a: 113), who calls the strategy
‘ambivalence potential’. It is perhaps significant that Fairclough notes this
strategy in the discourse of another British Conservative politician, Lord
Young of Graffham.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has tried to demonstrate how, as Britain’s imperial adventure

to all intents and purposes drew to an end with the relinquishment of Hong
Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the main architect and animator of British pol-
icy, the Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, by means primarily of a powerful
rhetoric, created a myth which was presented to the people of Hong Kong
and, more importantly for the British, to the world at large and the history
books, as Britain’s lasting legacy. The myth which was promoted as this
legacy was constructed upon four key concepts – a free market economy, the
freedom of the individual, the rule of law, and democracy.
According to Barthes (1972: 129), a function of myth is to ‘[transform] his-
tory into nature’. Citing an example from French imperialism/colonialism,
Barthes demonstrates, in perhaps his best-known analysis of contemporary
myth, how a photograph of a black soldier saluting the French flag might be
interpreted as either a symbol of imperialism, on the one hand, or as what
he refers to as an ‘alibi of coloniality’, on the other. In both cases, if one of
these interpretations occurs, however, there would be no myth. It is when
the viewer feels that the picture seems quite ‘natural’ and no particular
symbolic interpretation is suggested that the myth comes into being, and,
as Barthes puts it, that ‘French imperiality achieves its natural state’ (1972:
130), or as other writers such as Fairclough (1989, 1992) have conceptual-
ised this process, the discourse (if we accept visual information as part of
discourse) becomes ‘naturalised’: the ideological element in the relation
between the French flag and the black soldier is no longer apparent. This
chapter has shown how Chris Patten, the last colonial governor of Hong
Kong, set out to naturalise his myth of Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong in
the way Barthes described, by focusing on his transformation of old politi-
cal genres and introduction of new ones, and his use of presupposition,
involvement (indexicals), and lexical structuring and reiteration.
Gastil (1992) makes some telling points about the function of myth in
discourse. Mythic discourse, he states, can forge consensus and bring the
members of a community together, making them aware of their shared

values, views and histories. This was clearly Patten’s purpose, to establish
a unified constituency of support among the people of Hong Kong, based
upon his so-called ‘bedrock principles’. At the same time, however, for
Gastil, such rhetorical strategies can ‘intoxicate’ or ‘mystify’ the commu-
nity, oversimplifying political situations and obscuring important differ-
ences. This would also seem to be the case with Patten. Because Patten was
creating a myth, which is by definition simplistic, there was a lot left out
of the picture he depicted of the British legacy to Hong Kong. Although
space precludes any sort of detailed analysis, suffice it to say that Hong
Kong is not the model of free market economics that Patten made it out
to be. The internal market, in fact, is riddled with monopolistic practices,
some of them controlled by British-backed conglomerates. The record of
the British on individual freedom is patchy, to say the least. During the
colonial period, Hong Kong was subject to draconian laws restricting the
freedom of the individual. One of the most glaring iniquities, in fact, was
the racial discrimination which was built into the system. Regarding the
rule of law, although Hong Kong does have an independent judiciary, as
already mentioned, there are a range of draconian laws on the statute
books which restrict personal freedom. In addition, although corrup-
tion has been reduced in recent years, certainly during the 1970s, official
corruption reached such a level that when the then governor made an
attempt to control it, he was forced to offer an amnesty to those in the
police force who were involved. Finally, concerning democracy, it is only
since the signing of the Joint Declaration that Britain made any attempt at
introducing representative democracy. There must be more than a suspi-
cion that Britain only decided to act at all at this late stage because it knew
that it was washing its hands of the colony.14
To what extent Patten was successful in naturalising his myth there is no
direct way of knowing. The relative popularity of Patten in opinion polls
would perhaps suggest he was at least partly successful with the people of
Hong Kong (Chung, 1993, 1994), and positive accounts in the international
press and media of his governorship would also provide support for such
an interpretation. The following assessment, made in 1995, would suggest
such a view:
By the time the Union Flag is lowered, Mr Patten will probably say,
with pride, that 155 years of British rule has turned Hong Kong from a
barren rock into a world-class financial centre, with a governmental sys-
tem that is as democratic as can be, an efficient infrastructure marked
by a modern airport and port facilities and an affluent population that
enjoys free education and heavily subsidised medical and housing
benefits. ‘The Brits go with pride’, the Western press will probably say.
(Lau, 1995)
In his 1996 policy speech, his last, Patten presented what was gener-
ally interpreted to be an evaluation of a century and a half of British rule.
Extracts from the speech were broadcast internationally, including on
the American CNN and NBC networks. According to the (invented) colo-
nial ‘tradition’, the policy speech was followed each year by a motion of
thanks by the Legislative Council. In 1996, however, an amendment was
introduced by a member of the Democratic Party which sought to put on
‘historical record’ that Britain’s failing had been that it had not introduced
democracy into Hong Kong and, that as a result, the fruit of the economic
success of the territory was shared by only the wealthy few. ‘It is fair to tell
the world that we are disappointed’, the proposer of the amendment later
stated.15 The amendment, however, was rejected by one vote.
3
Rhetorical Strategies and Identity
Politics in the Discourse of Colonial
Withdrawal
3.1 Introduction
In their article on the discursive construction of national identities, de Cillia

et al. (1999) state that ‘[t]he idea of a specific national community becomes
reality in the realm of convictions and beliefs through reifying figurative dis-
course continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people …’
Chapter 2 of this book showed how the last British governor of Hong
Kong, Chris Patten, through his powerful oratory, tried to guide the inter-
pretation the world and the history books would put on the British legacy to
its former colony and indeed its whole imperial history. This discourse was
referred to as ‘the discourse of colonial withdrawal’. Chapter 2 also focused
on Patten’s adaptation of existing political genres and creation of new ones,
and his use of presupposition, indexicals and lexis, all of which contributed to
what was referred to as a myth concerning the purported British imperial leg-
acy of a free market economy, rule of law, individual freedom and democratic
participation. The present chapter will take the analysis further, examining
and interpreting Patten’s heavy use of traditional rhetorical tropes in his
major set-piece speeches. At the same time the chapter will show how the use
of these tropes related to Patten’s overall political goals and their manipula-
tive nature within the context of his discourse of colonial withdrawal and
the discursive construction of Britain’s imperial/national history and identity.
It is assumed here that although ‘history’ cannot be equated with the past
(Jenkins, 1991), our understanding of the past is appropriated by history. It is
history which gives the past the meanings which we attach to it. As such, his-
tory is important in the creation of national identity (de Cillia et al., 1999).
In an essay on the nature of critical discourse analysis, Fairclough and
Wodak (1997: 276) argue that utterances (and also, it may be understood,
specific texts and speech events) are meaningful only if:
1. We consider their use in a specific situation;

2. We understand the underlying conventions and rules;
64
Rhetorical Strategies and Identity Politics 65
3. We recognise their embedding in a certain culture and ideology;

4. We know what the discourse relates to in the past.
This chapter will first analyse extracts from a number of Patten’s major
set piece speeches in a fairly traditional way, with emphasis on the use of
rhetorical tropes, or figures of speech. The purpose here will be to dem-
onstrate how Patten effectively applied the tenets of classical rhetoric to
create a poetic effect. It is emphasised, however, that the purpose is not to
praise Patten as a skilled orator (which he undoubtedly was), but to prepare
the way for a more critical reading. Following this analysis, therefore, in the
discussion, after some general observations about Patten’s discourse and
the politics of identity, Fairclough and Wodak’s four points will be returned
to in a consideration of Patten’s speeches from a critical perspective within
these contextual parameters.
The major arguments will be as follows. First, Patten’s set-piece speeches
identified him as an important statesman fulfilling a historical political role
in shaping history’s interpretation of Britain’s colonial experience. Second,
they discursively constructed the people of Hong Kong as involved with
Patten in a heroic historic undertaking and ideological struggle against
China; Hong Kong people were thereby put into a subject position which
identified them as the carriers of essentially British values. Third, through
their skilful use of the classical figures of speech, the speeches threatened the
face of the Communist Party-led Chinese government, thereby contributing
to Patten’s demonisation of China in the fulfilment of his overall political
agenda. As noted in Chapter 1, the discursive construction of national iden-
tity is always associated with the construction of difference and uniqueness.
And fourth, in going above the heads of the majority of the Hong Kong peo-
ple (the speeches were in English and had to be translated into Cantonese
for the local population),1 Patten’s set-piece speeches demonstrated his
preoccupation with Britain’s place in history and, therefore, its national
identity. In short, the rhetoric of the set-piece speeches was manipulative in
nature and played an important part in Patten’s goal of British withdrawal
from Hong Kong being portrayed as an honourable one.
3.2 Classical rhetoric
From the Greeks and the Romans, the discipline of rhetoric, the study of
persuasive language, remained popular through the Renaissance and right
up until the Enlightenment (Bender and Wellbery, 1990: 4). With the com-
ing of the Enlightenment, however, and its emphasis on objectivity and
transparency in language as an expression of scientific truth, rhetoric fell
out of favour, dismissed at best as mere ornamentation and at worst as wilful
deception, ‘deceiving by a beautiful show’, as Kant put it (cited in Bender
and Wellbery, 1990: 18). The rhetorical tropes, which since antiquity had
characterised intellectual discourse, were banished from the new ‘scientific’

writing. It was the scientific ‘facts’ which should persuade the reader, not
the skilful manipulation by the writer of ‘terms of art’.
While rhetoric was supposedly expunged from the discourse of science
and lost its place as a field of study in its own right, it nevertheless
persisted in other domains of language use, most notably in the present
context, political oratory, from which it had originally developed. The
important classical writers on rhetoric – Isocrates, Aristotle and Plato in
Greece; Cicero and Quintilian in Rome – had propounded their models of
effective speaking, their ‘rhetorics’, for the use of political actors. While
the lessons of these writers were disregarded by Enlightenment thinkers
(and later) positivistic science, they were never abandoned by politicians
right up to the present day. The history of the twentieth century and
early twenty first century, indeed, is marked by powerful orators – Lenin,
the two Roosevelts, Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Kennedy, King, Reagan,
Thatcher, Blair and Obama are just some of these centuries’ most persua-
sive political speakers that spring immediately to mind. The purpose of
rhetoric is to persuade not only by argument, but also through the emo-
tions, sense of history and pragmatic motivations of the audience (Eco,
1976: 277). Objectivity and transparency are not, therefore, foregrounded
in much political discourse. Indeed, the figures of speech of rhetoric are a
necessary facet of such language as a means of attracting the attention of
the listener and making the arguments presented by speakers more memo-
rable than those of their competitors. For this reason, it is not surprising
that use of the rhetorical tropes is also found in the language of advertising
(Cook, 1992).
One ability powerful political orators have is to change how their audi-
ences view the world. Charismatic political leaders tend to be preoccupied
with destiny and their place in history as much as with the here and now.
They attempt, accordingly, to affect the way their political pronouncements
and actions will be recorded by history. As American political speech writer
Peggy Noonan (1990) has stated, political speeches are both ‘the way we
judge great men [sic] and how we understand our national identity’. As
an indication of the importance attached by politicians to their speeches,
Noonan reports that about 50 people will go over an important US presi-
dential speech (pp. 77–8).
Great orators are not appreciated by everyone. Indeed, the words ‘rhetoric’
and ‘rhetorical’ carry a negative connotation in everyday contexts. While
Hitler was able to mesmerise the majority of the German people, Charlie
Chaplin was able to ridicule his speech-making in his famous film The Great
Dictator. To a degree, rhetorical language is, like poetry, a matter of taste.
Fairclough (2000a: 115), for example, states that he ‘is not convinced’ by
the poetic style of Tony Blair and that ‘it comes across to [him] as rather
indifferent amateur dramatics’.
3.2.1 Rhetorical weight

A feature of Patten’s use of discourse is the ability he has to create emotive
force in those passages of his speeches which deal with matters which he
considers to be of great moral or historical importance. It is such passages
which have been selected for analysis in this chapter. The extracts – which
all exhibit a heavy usage of the rhetorical tropes – reflect the theme of
withdrawal with honour. This theme is projected by means of what Patten
promoted as Britain’s lasting contribution to Hong Kong – the liberal values
which underlie the market economy, the freedom of the individual, the rule
of law and democratic institutions. At the same time, therefore, the use of
the rhetorical tropes draws attention to the positive aspects of what Patten
considered to be British identity.
The overall effect of the use of the various figures of speech on the part
of Patten in the selected passages gives rise to what will be referred to as
‘rhetorical weight’. Rhetorical weight is created when there is a concentrated
usage of figures of speech in a given text or passage of a text, a density which
indexes the seriousness and momentousness of the occasion, is more memo-
rable than ordinary language, and has the potential for creating emotive
feelings among the audience.
In Patten’s oratory, the most striking passages are those which carry the
heaviest weight in terms of rhetorical figures. The extra linguistic load
puts extra emphasis on the medium, making it more prominent, indeed,
than the basic informational message. When interviewed for this research
(Flowerdew, 1997c), Patten said that he used figures of speech (which he
referred to as ‘terms of art’) because he considered that they made his pro-
nouncements more memorable. In this, he was in line with the Russian
formalists and their notion of defamiliarisation (Fowler, 1996). Ordinary
language, for the formalists, is conventional and familiar and thus lit-
tle attention is paid to it. Artistic language use, on the other hand, gives
expression to ideas in new and unfamiliar ways and thereby captures our
attention, by defamiliarisation.
Patten’s use of heavily rhetorical language can also be interpreted in
terms of Jakobson’s well-known theory concerning the poetic function of
language. According to Jakobson, poetry is characterised by a focus on the
message for its own sake – the reverse of ordinary communication, where
attention is directed to the information carried by the message. However,
it should be emphasised that the choice of a rhetorical style by a politician
itself carries with it its own meaning(s), what Fowler (1996: 96) calls ‘a pat-
tern for independent notice’. Such a style used by a politician is often a
signal that the speech deals with serious matters of high national or moral
importance, whatever one might think of the artistic merits of the perora-
tion. As Bender and Wellbery (1990: 7) put it, heavy rhetoric indexes ‘the
seriousness of a topic, an occasion, or a cause’.
One concrete effect of the use of figurative language on the part of

politicians is to provide ‘sound bites’ for the press to ensure that they
receive maximum media exposure. Newspaper articles and television news
clips invariably choose figurative use of language on the part of politicians
for direct quotation (Atkinson, 1984: Chapter 5). The use by politicians of
attention-catching language in this way is thus a tool of agenda setting, how
politicians attempt to structure public awareness and opinion by ensuring
that the issues that concern them and their point of view on these issues are
reported in the media (Cohen and Young, 1981).
3.2.2 The rhetorical tropes

3.2.2.1 Introduction
This section will briefly introduce the main rhetorical tropes used by Patten
which will be the focus of the textual analysis which will follow. The tropes
are metaphor, antithesis, parallelism, actualisation, and the unities of time,
place and action.2
3.2.2.2 Metaphor
Metaphor is probably the most memorable of the figures of speech of politi-
cal language (see Hudson, 1978; Wilson, 1990: Chapter 5). Whether it is ‘the
iron curtain’ of Churchill, ‘the tryst with destiny’ of Nehru, ‘the winds of
change’ of Macmillan, ‘the rivers of blood’ of Powell or ‘the mother of all
battles’ of Saddam Hussein, metaphor has the power to remain in the public
consciousness long after its original utterance. In an interview with his advis-
ers (Flowerdew, undated), Patten’s use of metaphor was singled out as one of
the striking features of his discourse. Indeed, it provided a constant stream
of ‘sound bites’ for the press, a clear indication that such language is more
striking and worthy of recall than ordinary usage, and ensuring that Patten
maintained a prominent position in the consciousness of the public.
3.2.2.3 Antithesis
A recurrent feature of Patten’s oratory is the use of antithesis, the contrast of
ideas in what Levin (1982: 114, cited in Tannen, 1989: 22) calls a ‘stylistic
frame’. American presidential speech writer Peggy Noonan (1990) claims
this to be the most striking aspect of presidential inaugural addresses, citing
Kennedy’s ‘Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do
for your country’ as a well-known example and rather irreverently referring
to such linguistic balance as the ‘Let us always bop bop bee dop but let us
never boop boop be doop’, describing it also as the ‘modern stately tone’ (p.
193). The situation of Hong Kong’s transition of sovereignty is particularly
suited to antithetical expression, with its dualisms of Britain/China, Hong
Kong/China, East and West, ‘one country, two systems’, before the change
of sovereignty and after, etc.
3.2.2.4 Parallelism
Parallelism, which is closely associated with antithesis, is a feature much
favoured by Patten to heighten the rhetorical weight and emotive force of
his oratory. Parallelism is noted by Cockroft and Cockroft (1992: 131) as the
closest of the rhetorical devices to the conveyance of emotion, providing
evidence of the poet Coleridge’s insight about rhythm ‘striving to hold in
check the workings of passion’. Tannen (1989) analyses parallelism as an
important feature of the speeches of the black orators Martin Luther King
and Jesse Jackson. Atkinson (1984) testifies to the emotional effect parallel-
ism can have by showing how its use correlates closely with spontaneous
applause on the part of audiences attending political meetings. Parallelism
can be at the level of syntax, semantics and/or phonology, although usu-
ally all three work together. Parallelism is one of the fundamental processes
which for Jakobson (1960) distinguish poetic from ordinary language.
However, as Fowler (1996: 95–6) points out, it is not only literary genres
which make consistent use of parallelism; rules and regulations, advertising,
and, significantly here, political oratory are also mentioned by Fowler.
3.2.2.5 Actualisation
In her analysis of the oratory of the black orators, Martin Luther King and
Jesse Jackson, Tannen (1989) shows how these speakers use details to create
vivid scenes within their speeches. Citing various sources in psychology,
Tannen (1989: 29ff.) maintains that words only have meaning for indi-
viduals in relation to specific scenes that they conjure up in the imagina-
tion. In classical rhetoric this process of scene creation or ‘actualisation’
may be of people (prosographia in classical rhetoric), of time (chronographia)
or of place (topographia) (Cockroft and Cockroft, 1992: 154–5; see also
Bakhtin, 1986 on the interaction of space and time and his notion of the
chronotope). Perhaps the best-known example of such creation of a scene
in modern oratory is Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech, which
is constructed around the vision King has of modern America and which
culminates in a listing of the high places throughout America from which
freedom can ring out. In a similar, but lower key, way, Patten made use
of this device of actualisation – of people (Hong Kong people), of a place
(Hong Kong), or of an era (Hong Kong’s historic transitional period) – to
generate emotion among his audiences. In its use of salient features to
evoke a greater whole, actualisation makes use of metonymy, the use of a
particular feature or features closely related to a given referent to represent
it (Malmkjaer, 1991: 446).
3.2.2.6 The classical unities

In her book on political speech-writing, Peggy Noonan (1990: 227) refers
to speeches as a form of theatre. As such, powerful political speeches, for
Noonan, should comply with the classical dramatic unities of time, action
and place.3 Noonan was mentioned by Patten in one of his speeches and
it is perhaps not just coincidence that a notable feature of his speeches is a
compliance with the unities.
The theme of time is an important constant running through Patten’s dis-
course. This is, of course, quite understandable, given the fixed time period
for his governorship and the cut-off date of 30 June 1997, when Britain
would cease to have responsibility over Hong Kong and sovereignty would
pass to China. One of Patten’s preoccupations was to ensure that Hong
Kong’s way of life and the values which he saw as underpinning this way
of life continued beyond 1997 and the change of sovereignty. In line with
this goal, a feature of Patten’s discourse was an emphasis on demonstrating
continuity between past, present and future.
According to Aristotle, a play, if it was to comply with the unity of time,
should have a beginning, a middle and an end. Patten’s term as governor of
Hong Kong was neatly structured from the outset in these terms. It began
with his arrival, leading up to his first major policy speech in October 1992;
the middle was his actual governorship; while the end was his departure and
Hong Kong’s return to China.4 This temporal unity provided a dramatic ten-
sion to Patten’s governorship which was reflected in his speeches.
For Aristotle, a plot should also be limited to a single interest, in order
to observe the unity of action. Patten ensured this unity of action by mak-
ing his political reform programme (his attempt to give Hong Kong greater
democracy) and his war of words directed at China the overriding preoc-
cupation of his governorship. The unity provided by this dramatic structure
was also reflected in Patten’s speeches.
The third of Aristotle’s dramatic unities is that of place; the action of a
play should be centred around one location. In making Hong Kong the
focus of just about all of his public pronouncements, Patten also observed
this final unity in his speeches.
In addition to the unities in drama, Aristotle talks about the tragic
hero.5 In various ways Patten also projected himself in this role. The tragic
hero is involved in a life or death struggle (in Patten’s case, the war of words
with China), which, in spite of noble sentiments (Patten’s attempt to pro-
mote democracy and other Western values in Hong Kong) is controlled by
an immutable, tragic destiny (the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997).
Viewed from this perspective, one may understand how, on his way to
take up his posting, Patten described his task as ‘an adventure’ (Dimbleby,
1997a).
The dramatic dimension added to Patten’s governorship and exploited
in his speeches performed a number of possible functions. First, it helped
Patten project himself as a great statesman with a historic mission, thereby
possibly furthering his personal political ambition (Patten was generally
regarded as a political heavyweight with potential for even becoming prime

minister). Second, in projecting himself as a hero standing up for Hong Kong
on behalf of the Hong Kong people, Patten at the same time discursively
constructed the Hong Kong people as his allies and thereby positioned them
on his side against China, even though many of them did not support his
confrontational approach. Third, in positioning the Hong Kong people with
him against China, he reinforced his overall face-threatening approach to
that country, which considered the Hong Kong people to be compatriots
and allies, not enemies. This reading is supported by statements made by
representatives of the Chinese government claiming Patten was ‘posing’ as
a ‘saviour’ of Hong Kong. This positioning thus further contributed towards
Patten’s overall demonisation of China.
3.3 Extract 1 – Inaugural speech
The following is the complete text of Patten’s inaugural speech, delivered on

his arrival in Hong Kong in July 1992.
1. I am greatly honoured today, to assume the responsibility of the Governorship of

2. Hong Kong – one of the world’s greatest cities.
3. Hong Kong has been made great not by the accidents of geography but by its most
4. formidable assets, the enterprise, the energy, the vitality and the industry of its
5. people, living, working and prospering within a framework of sound administration
6. and the rule of law.
7. You, the people of Hong Kong, have created here at the heart of Asia, a wonder of the
8. world, one of the most spectacular examples of the virtues of a free economy known
9. to Man.
10. Now the people of Hong Kong face a further task. I am privileged to share it with you
11. for the next five years. Our task for the future is as momentous as your
12. achievements in the past. It is a task that will require all the qualities you have already
13. shown – resilience, determination , drive – only in still greater measure. It is a task
14. which, when we accomplish it successfully – as we are going to do – will provide a
15. shining example to the world of partnership and cooperation between peoples and
16. nations for the good of all.
17. What we have to do in the closing years of this tumultuous century is to turn from
18. earnest hope to firm reality, that historic and far-sighted concept – ‘one country,
19. two systems’.
20. When we have achieved that, we will have fulfilled the promise enshrined
21. in the Joint Declaration: a stable and prosperous Hong Kong, whose future
22. – founded in that Declaration – is secure; a Hong Kong that cherishes and
23. maintains its present lifestyle; a capitalist heart beating at the centre
24. of Asia, pumping prosperity ever more widely.
25. That achievement will be good for the people of today’s Hong Kong; good
26. for the people of the Hong Kong of tomorrow; good for China; good for
27. Britain; good for the close relationship between our two ancient
28. civilisations; and it will – as a new century unfolds – be good for the
29. world.
The impact of this speech was reported in the leading English language news-
paper, the South China Morning Post, the next day, as follows (Anon., 1992):
The smack of firm government resounded around Hongkong yesterday as

Chris Patten delivered his speech as Governor. All the sceptics who had
doubted whether or not he could make a difference saw the living proof.
His address at the City Hall was direct and decisive … The contrast in
style with his predecessor was obvious to all and Mr Patten backed that
message with some powerful words. Yesterday’s speech proved how well
Mr Patten performs on set-piece occasions.
Three years later, this speech was still recalled in another English language
daily, the Hong Kong Standard (Fong, 1995):
When the last British governor spoke at the inaugural ceremony in City
Hall, July 1992 … the audience was transfixed because for the first time
someone in his office could finally exude passion.
When interviewed by this author in 1997, the governor’s official spokes-

person, Kerry McGlynn, described the speech as ‘wonderful, and very
moving, beautifully put together’ (Flowerdew, undated).
3.3.1 Metaphor
The speech is interwoven with a series of positive metaphors for Hong Kong,
its people, their way of life, and Britain’s role in their development. Early in
the speech (lines 4–6) Hong Kong is described as having four major ‘assets’
in the various qualities of its people. The British administration and the rule
of law create a ‘framework’ within which these qualities can thrive (lines 5–6)
(the administration, in another concrete metaphor, is described as ‘sound’).
Hong Kong is described as a ‘wonder of the world’ (lines 7–8), ‘one of the
most spectacular examples of a free economy known to man’ (lines 8–9), and
‘a shining example to the world of partnership and cooperation between peo-
ples and nations for the good of all’ (lines 14–16) (emphasis added). Hong
Kong’s promise for the future is ‘enshrined’ in the Joint Declaration (line
20) and is ‘secure’ (line 22). Hong Kong is ‘stable’ and ‘prosperous’ (line 21).
Finally, in the most striking metaphor in this passage and as a final emphatic
reminder by Patten of what he claims to be Britain’s capitalist legacy, Hong
Kong is portrayed as ‘a capitalist heart beating at the centre of Asia, and pump-
ing prosperity ever more widely’ (lines 23–24) (emphasis added).
Less conspicuous (although more prominent in other speeches, as we shall
see, is the metaphor of Hong Kong as a story which is coming to an end.
Patten refers to the ‘closing’ years of the present century (line 17) and the
‘unfolding’ of a new one (line 28).
3.3.2 Antithesis
In this speech there is antithesis (often working in conjunction with par-
allelism) in the paired contrastive prepositional phrases, ‘not by the acci-
dents of geography but by its most formidable assets …’ (lines 3–5), and in
the contrasting phrases ‘our task for the future … your achievements in the
past’ (lines 11–12) and ‘all the qualities you have already shown … only
in greater measure’ (lines 12–13); there is the aphoristic ‘turn from earnest
hope to firm reality’; this is followed by ‘one country, two systems’ (line 20),
which is normally attributed to the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping – how-
ever, Patten reworks it by describing it antithetically as both ‘historic’ and
‘far-sighted’; finally, in a climactic last paragraph, there is the juxtaposition
of the people of Hong Kong (present and future), the peoples of China and
Britain, the ancient civilisations of Britain and China and, finally, the world
at large.
3.3.3 Parallelism
There is considerable use of parallelism in this speech. In the second para-
graph Patten makes use of repeated definite noun phrases – ‘the enterprise,
the energy, the vitality and the industry ...’ – and present participles – ‘living,
working and prospering’. This technique of series of nouns or verbs, which
is referred to as synathrismos in classical rhetoric, is described by Cockroft
and Cockroft (1992: 130) as being ‘highly persuasive’ and replicating a sense
of emotional, intellectual or sensory pressure in the audience’. Synathrismos
is used again with the piling up of the nouns, ‘resilience, determination,
drive’ (line 13). In the fourth paragraph the word ‘task’ is repeated in four of
the five sentences (fronted for emphasis in the parallel cleft third and fourth
sentences beginning with ‘It is a task which/that will …’). In paragraph
6, parallelism is present in the three clauses in apposition to the opening
sentence – ‘a stable and prosperous Hong Kong …; a Hong Kong that …; a
capitalist heart beating …’ (lines 21–23). But it is in the seventh paragraph
that parallelism (in conjunction with antithesis, as already noted) is used
to most emotive effect, with the six iterations of ‘good for’ (each with their
complements presented in antithetical pairs – people of today’s Hong Kong/
people of the Hong Kong of tomorrow, China/Britain, two ancient civilisa-
tions/the world – and with each pair indexing larger entities, climaxing with
‘the world’) creating a powerful climax to the speech. Notice also how at the
end the ‘will be’ of the opening is repeated, but is interrupted by the addi-
tional phrase, ‘as the century unfolds’, to provide an element of suspense
before the climax finally arrives:
That achievement will be

good for the people of today’s Hong Kong;
good for the people of the Hong Kong of tomorrow;
good for China;

good for Britain;
good for the close relationship between our two ancient civilisations;
and it will – as a new century unfolds – be
good for the world.
3.3.4 Actualisation
A number of scenes are created by Patten in this speech. In the second
paragraph he evokes an idyllic picture of the hard-working, prosperous (i.e.
capitalist) people of Hong Kong going about their business protected by the
sound (British) administration and rule of law. In the third paragraph, his
reference to Hong Kong as a ‘wonder of the world’ is likely to have conjured
up an image of the spectacular, gleaming skyscrapers which make up Hong
Kong’s well-known skyline. Finally, Hong Kong society and lifestyle are
evoked again in the sixth paragraph, with further emphasis on the colony’s
prosperity and dynamic capitalism.
3.3.5 The classical unities

As was to be the usual case in his speeches, Patten’s inaugural address
respected the three classical unities. The focus is Hong Kong. Britain, China
and the rest of the world are briefly mentioned, but this only serves to
increase the intensity of the spotlight on Hong Kong. As far as action is
concerned, the main protagonists are the people of Hong Kong. Patten refers
to what (under British rule) they have achieved so far, what (together with
Patten) they must achieve in the next five years of his governorship, and,
briefly, what lies before them, if they are successful. The unity of time is in
line with the unity of action. The first part of the speech (paragraphs 2–3)
refers to the past and what has been achieved to date (the tense is present
perfect). The middle section (paragraphs 4–5), introduced by the emphatic
temporal adjunct ‘Now’, refers to the present (this is the focal point for the
whole speech) and the task for the next five years (the tense is either present
simple or future). The final section (paragraphs 6–7), introduced by the tem-
poral adjunct ‘When’, refers to the future, after Hong Kong reverts to China
(the tense is future).
3.4 Extract 2 – 1992 policy speech
The following is the opening section of Patten’s 1992 policy speech, ‘The
Agenda for Hong Kong’, his first major speech, given in October, following
his arrival in July.
1. In a little under five years, British administration in Hong Kong will come to an end. One
2. chapter will close; a new one will begin. Now is the time to set out what we want to
3. achieve over the next five years. Now is the time to be clear about the kind of Hong Kong
4. we want to see. Now is the time to show how we mean to prepare for Hong Kong’s
5. future under that far-sighted concept, ‘one country, two systems’.
6. My goal is simply this – to safeguard Hong Kong’s way of life. This way of life not only
7. produces impressive material and cultural benefits; it also incorporates values that we all
8. cherish. Our prosperity and stability underpin our way of life. But, equally, Hong Kong’s
9. way of life is the foundation on which we must build our future stability and prosperity.
10. Thanks to this combination, Hong Kong has achieved more than anyone could ever have
11. predicted. Pride in our past and present should help make us confident about our future.
A number of rhetorical devices contribute to the rhetorical weight of this

passage. The various rhetorical devices will be taken in turn.
3.4.1 Metaphor
The metaphor of one chapter ending and another beginning in lines 1–2 of
this segment, alludes to the historical import of Britain’s final years in Hong
Kong. These final years will become a chapter in a history book, a chapter
which Patten wants to be sure is written in a way that ensures Britain’s place
as the source of the essential values which he claims to underpin Hong Kong’s
way of life. These values and their essential role in supporting Hong Kong
society are alluded to by means of a series of building metaphors in the sec-
ond paragraph – ‘underpin’, ‘foundation’, ‘build’, ‘stability’.
3.4.2 Antithesis
This segment is replete with antithesis. There is antithesis in the idea of
one chapter closing and another beginning (lines 1–2); there is the anti-
thetical phrase, ‘one country, two systems’ (line 5), there is the pairing of
the clauses, ‘this way of life not only produces ... it also incorporates’ (lines
6–8), there is the special type of antithesis known as chiasmus, where the
two clause segments, ‘prosperity and stability’, on the one hand, and ‘way
of life’, on the other, are reversed in two adjoining clauses (lines 8–9); and,
in the final sentence, there is the contrast between ‘pride in our past and
present’ and ‘confidence about our future’. In addition, the statement,
‘My goal is simply this – to safeguard Hong Kong’s way of life’ (lines 6–7),
while not strictly speaking antithetical, does involve the pairing of two
equally balanced concepts; the cataphoric reference of the first clause,
which is set up by the pronoun ‘this’, creates an expectation which is real-
ised in the (delayed6) second of the two clauses, ‘to safeguard Hong Kong’s
way of life’.
3.4.3 Parallelism
In this segment, the use of parallelism, with its powerful rhythmic effect,
and working in conjunction with antithesis, as just seen, emphasises
Patten’s determination in promoting his vision of his governorship. The
Sentence 1
In a little under five years, British administration in Hong Kong will come to an end.
Sentence 2 Sentence 3
One chapter A new one
will will
close begin
Sentence 4 Sentence 5 Sentence 6

Now Now Now
is is is
the time the time the time
to to to
set out be clear about show
what the kind of (Hong Kong) how
we we we
want want mean
to to to
achieve see prepare
over the next five years for Hong Kong’s future
under that far-sighted
concept, ‘one country two
systems’
Figure 3.1 A diagrammatic representation of parallelism in extract 2
parallelism of the first paragraph can be diagrammed as in Figure 3.1. We

can see here examples of exact parallelism on all three levels of syntax,
semantics and phonology. The repeated ‘Now is the time to ...’, at the
beginning of sentences 4, 5 and 6, with their sense of urgency and purpose,
is an example of this type of exact parallelism. But we also have the use
of another type of parallelism, where a word or phrase is substituted for
another, in a paradigm which is syntactically and phonologically similar,
but semantically different, or even opposite. Sentences 2 and 3, with the
contrast between ‘one chapter’ and ‘a new one’ and between ‘close’ and
‘begin’, are an example of this use of parallelism, as is the contrastive ‘set
out’, ‘be clear about’ and ‘show’, which follow on ‘Now is the time to ...’ in
sentences 4, 5 and 6.

This short extract observes the unities of place (Hong Kong) and action
(preparing for the future), but it is the unity of time which is most interest-
ing. The segment begins with a time adjunct, ‘In a little under five years’
and concludes with the coming together of past, present and future in the
sentence, ‘Pride in our past and present should help make us confident
about our future (line 11)’. In between, further time references are promi-
nent. In addition to the reference to the future of the opening adjunct
(which is in a marked position, at the beginning of the clause, it is to be
noted), other references to the future are the use of ‘will’ in the first sen-
tence (line 1), the repetition of ‘will’, twice, in the second sentence (line
2), a reference to ‘future stability and prosperity’ (line 9), and a reference
to confidence ‘about our future’ in the final sentence (line 11). This large
number of references to the future – to post-1997 – is juxtaposed with
references to the present and to the period leading up to the present.
References to the present, with the triple sequence beginning with ‘now
is the time to’ (lines 3–4), express the urgency of the task of preparing
for the future. The use of the present perfect – ‘Hong Kong has achieved
more than anyone could ever have predicted’ (line 10) – relates past
achievements to the present situation and to the future in prospect, thus
preparing the way for the integration of all three periods, ‘past’, ‘present’
and ‘future’, of the last sentence.
3.5 Extract 3 – 1993 policy speech
This extract came one year later than extract 2, at the end of the 1993 policy
speech:
1. The democratic ideal clearly enshrined in the joint declaration means that
2. the community , through its elected legislature, makes the laws that govern
3. it. You are both the rulers and the ruled. That is why democracy is both a
4. high privilege and a heavy responsibility.
5. I say all this because I believe it to be true. And I say it as well because I am
6. growing to love Hong Kong as you who have created it from rock and scrub love
7. Hong Kong. And I want, as you want, to see Hong Kong as it confidently enters
8. the next millennium under Chinese sovereignty, a blazing beacon of good
9. fortune, a dazzling example of what free men and women, putting adversity and
10. hardship behind them – can together achieve. That is what we want. And that is
11. what we can achieve. All we require is to keep our confidence in the values that
12. bind us into a thriving community. With the courage that has brought success in
13. the past, and the confidence that success has earned, everything is possible. And I
14. believe that you believe it, too.
This speech was described by Patten’s official spokesperson and by his

personal adviser when interviewed for this research as his ‘best’. The spokes-
person provided the following account as illustrative of the emotional
impact of the speech:7
… and I remember coming up in GIS [Government Information Services],

and Teresa Poole, who’s the Independent correspondent in Beijing, was
rushing excitedly to his [Patten’s] press conference from Legco [The
Legislative Council, where Patten had just given the speech] and she
said to me, ‘On a day like today’, she said, ‘I feel proud to be English’
and I understood exactly what she meant it was a very moving oration
or peroration.
3.5.1 Metaphor
Metaphor is again prominent in this extract, the following being the most
interesting examples:
• the democratic ideal is ‘enshrined’ in the Joint Declaration.

This is an allusion to the importance Patten attached to observing the con-
tents of this Sino-British agreement (and possibly a warning to China that it
should be careful to observe it).
• Hong Kong was ‘created’ from ‘rock and scrub’

This metaphor emphasises the tremendous achievement that is modern-day
Hong Kong. There is an element of intertextuality (Bakhtin, 1981; Kristeva,
1980; Fairclough, 1995b) here, which provides added force to the metaphor,
as the British foreign minister, Palmerston, in an often quoted statement,
referred to Hong Kong as a ‘barren rock’ when it was first seized for Britain,
as an expression of his anger that such an unlikely place should have been
chosen as a British enclave.
• Hong Kong will be ‘a blazing beacon of good fortune’ and ‘a dazzling

example of what free men and women ... can achieve’
The light metaphor is a common one in political language, often used to
represent good (in contrast to dark for evil). Patten chooses it here as a way
of emphasising Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong as a free market and place of
political liberty. In this, he may well have been intentionally threatening
the face of China, which espoused a socio-economic and political system
which did not have these notions as part of its political vocabulary. The
implicature might be that if Hong Kong is represented by light (goodness),
China would be shrouded in darkness (evil).
3.5.2 Antithesis
Antithesis is again an important rhetorical device of this speech. In this
extract, contrasts are made between ‘the rulers’ and ‘the ruled’, between
the ‘privilege’ of democracy and the ‘responsibility’ that goes with it,
between Patten’s love for Hong Kong and the people’s love for Hong
Kong, between what ‘we want’ and what ‘we can achieve’, between ‘the
courage that has brought success in the past’ and ‘the confidence that suc-
cess has earned’, and, finally, between ‘I believe’ and ‘you believe’.
3.5.3 Parallelism
Parallelism, often working in conjunction with antithesis, is again an impor-
tant feature here. Examples of parallelism in this extract are as follows:
• I say all this ...

I say it as well
• I ... love Hong Kong
you ... love Hong Kong
• I want ...
you want
• a blazing beacon of good fortune
a dazzling example of what free men and women ... can together
achieve
• That is what we want ...
that is what we can achieve
• the courage that has brought success in the past ...
the confidence that success has earned
• I believe that
you believe
3.5.4 Actualisation
The reference to Hong Kong having been created from rock and scrub is
likely to have evoked images of the immigrants to Hong Kong working
hard in difficult conditions to achieve the prosperity that they enjoy today.
The reference to ‘what free men and women, putting adversity behind
them – can together achieve’ (lines 9–10) is again likely to have created
visual images of the successive waves of immigrants to Hong Kong fleeing
from China and the hard life suffered there under Communist rule, with the
turbulent 1949 revolution, the famine of the so-called great leap forward,
and the upheaval of the cultural revolution.8

Unity of place (Hong Kong) is again achieved here. The action consists
of Hong Kong’s success story. Time is again an important theme running
through this segment. Here, past achievement is conceived of as the force
that will make Hong Kong a success in the future.
3.6 Extract 4 – Governor’s speech at farewell ceremony
The last extract is the beginning of Patten’s speech at the British farewell
ceremony. It took place on the parade ground of the British garrison head-
quarters. In the presence of Prince Charles, as the representative of Queen
Elizabeth, and the British prime minister, the speech was delivered at dusk,
in pouring rain, during a ceremony full of pomp and imperial ceremony,
featuring the marching bands of the Royal Marines, Scots Guards and
Gurkhas and culminating in fireworks. The incoming first Chief Executive
of the Special Administrative Region, Tung Chee-hwa, declined an invita-

tion to attend, as did representatives of the Chinese government.
1. For Hong Kong as a whole, today is cause for celebration not sorrow. But here
2. and there, perhaps there will be a touch of personal sadness as is true of any
3. departure, a point to which I shall return.
4. History is not just a matter of dates. What makes history is what comes before and
5. what comes after the dates that we all remember. The story of this great city is
6. about the years before this night, and the years of success that will surely follow it.
7. Of course, Hong Kong’s story is not solely that of the century and a half of British
8. responsibility, though it is the conclusion of that chapter that we mark tonight.
9. This chapter began with events that, from today’s vantage point, at the end of the
10. following century, none of us here would wish or seek to condone. But we might
11. note that most of those who live in Hong Kong now do so because of events in our
12. own century which would today have few defenders. All that is a reminder that
13. sometimes we should remember the past the better to forget it.
14. What we celebrate this evening is the restless energy, the hard work, the audacity
15. of the men and women who have written Hong Kong’s success story. Mostly
16. Chinese men and Chinese women. They were only ordinary in the sense that
17. most of them came here with nothing. They are extraordinary in what they have
18. achieved against the odds.
19. As British administration ends, we are, I believe, entitled to say that our own
20. nation’s contribution here was to provide the scaffolding that enabled the people
21. of Hong Kong to ascend. The rule of law. Clean and light-handed government.
22. The values of a free society. The beginnings of representative government and
23. democratic accountability. This is a Chinese city, a very Chinese city, with
24. British characteristics. No dependent territory has been left more prosperous,
25. none with such a rich texture and fabric of civil society, professions, churches,
26. newspapers, charities, civil servants of the highest probity and the most steadfast
27. commitment to the public good.
28. I have no doubt that, with people here holding on to these values which they
29. cherish, Hong Kong’s star will continue to climb. Hong Kong’s values are decent
30. values. They are universal values. They are the values of the future in Asia as
31. elsewhere, a future in which the happiest and the richest communities, and the
32. most confident and the most stable too, will be those that best combine political
33. liberty and economic freedom as we do here today.
3.6.1 Metaphor
In this final speech, Patten uses a ‘story’ metaphor, with its connotations
of the historical importance of Patten’s mission. The word ‘story’ is used in
lines 5, 7 and 15 and ‘the conclusion’ of the British ‘chapter’ of the story is
referred to in lines 8 and 9. There are also building metaphors for Britain’s
contribution to Hong Kong’s success, paragraph 6 referring to the people of
Hong Kong ‘ascending’ the ‘scaffolding’ provided by Britain and paragraph
7 alluding to the need for Hong Kong people to ‘hold on’ to the values they
have inherited from Britain. Mixing his metaphors, as he sometimes did,
in paragraph 7 (line 28), Patten depicts Hong Kong in the metaphor of a
rising star.
3.6.3 Antithesis
This extract is again replete with antithesis. In line 1 there is the ‘celebra-
tion, not sorrow’ of the departure, with its possible intertextual echoes
of Shakespeare’s ‘parting is such sweet sorrow’; in line 2 there is the
more formulaic ‘here and there’, followed in lines 4–5 with ‘what comes
before and what comes after’, and in line 6, ‘the years before this night,
and the years of success that will surely follow’; in lines 7–8 there is
‘not solely [the story] of the century and a half of British responsibility,
though … the conclusion of that chapter’. In line 13 there is the apho-
ristic, yet rather enigmatic ‘we should remember the past the better to
forget it’ (a manipulative use of antithesis that exonerates the negative
dimension of Britain’s role in Hong Kong); in lines 16–17 there is ‘They
were only ordinary in … They are extraordinary in ... ’. Finally in lines
23–24, there is an intertextual play on Deng Xiaoping’s famous expression
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, in Patten’s ‘a very Chinese city,
with British characteristics’.
3.6.4 Parallelism
As if reserved for the final climax, parallelism only enters into this speech
in the fifth paragraph, with the repeated syntactic structure of the definite
noun phrases – ‘the restless energy, the hard work, the audacity …’ (lines
14–15) – somehow replicating the activity and effort portrayed. This pat-
tern is immediately followed by the two pairs of antithetical nominals,
‘men and women’ (line 15) and ‘Chinese men and Chinese women’ (lines
15–16), and then the paired antithetical clauses, ‘They were only ordinary
in … They are extraordinary in …’ (lines 16–17).
In paragraph 6 there is the emphatic ‘… a Chinese city, a very Chinese
city’ (line 23), the ‘No … none …’ (lines 24–25) and the synathrismos of
‘civil society, professions, churches, newspapers, charities, civil servants …’
(lines 25–26), with its repeated pattern of nouns elaborating the metaphor
Patten chooses for Hong Kong society of a ‘rich texture and fabric’. Note
also the further synathrismos here of ‘civil servants of the highest probity
and the most steadfast commitment …’, with its repeated superlatives pre-
ceded by the definite article (line 26).
Parallelism continues in paragraph 7 with the three-part list, ‘Hong Kong’s
values are decent values. They are universal values. They are the values of
the future in Asia (lines 29–30)’. The combination of syntactic, lexical and
phonological parallelism here adds emphasis to what is one of the major
features of the ideology promoted by Patten during his governorship, the
assertion of universal values and denial of so-called ‘Asian’ values, which
had been put forward by prominent Asian leaders (notice how in refer-
ring to universal values as the values of ‘the future in Asia’ Patten creates
a possible implicature that the present paradigm of ‘Asian’ values will be
replaced). Finally, this extract ends with further examples of synathrismos,

with the reiteration of ‘the future … a future …’ (lines 30–31), and, more
powerfully, the four superlatives, ‘the happiest … the richest … the most
confident … the most stable’ and the three conjuncts ‘and … and … and …’
(lines 31–32), by means of which the grammatical structure (superlative)
reflects the superlative nature of Hong Kong society (as it has been created
by Britain).
3.6.5 Actualisation
A number of scenes are created by Patten in this speech. They evoke Hong
Kong (topographia), its history (chronographia) and its people (prosographia).
Because this was a speech marking the final withdrawal of Britain from
Hong Kong, Patten would have been expected to review the overall British
experience. This put him in a difficult position, however, as Hong Kong
was seized by force by Britain following a one-sided minor war with China
over the right of British merchants to import opium into what was then
known as the Middle Kingdom and the British subjugated China as part
of its ‘unofficial’ empire during much of the nineteenth and the early part
of the twentieth century. There is only a fleeting indirect reference to this
early historical period, therefore – ‘This chapter began with events that,
from today’s vantage point, at the end of the following century, none of us
here would wish or seek to condone ‘(lines 9–10) – although it was quite
likely that even this would have conjured up negative images on the part
of certain members of the audience (a Chinese-made film, The Opium War,
was released in Hong Kong at the time of the farewell speech and many of
the audience were likely to have seen it). This negative image of Britain is
quickly replaced by another one which reflects badly on China, however,
in the statement, ‘… we might note that most of those who live in Hong
Kong now do so because of events in our own century which would today
have few defenders’ (lines 10–11) – a probable reference to the communist
takeover of China in 1949, the famine provoked by the ‘great leap forward’,
and the cultural revolution of the 1960s, upheavals that caused mass immi-
gration to Hong Kong from the mainland. Further trying to downplay any
negative evaluation of Britain, Patten concludes this paragraph with his call
to forget history.
In paragraph 5, a more positive scene from the British point of view is
created, with images conjured up of the hundreds of thousands of impov-
erished refugees who came to Hong Kong and who were taken in by the
colonial administration and subsequently contributed to Hong Kong’s
success. This is followed in paragraph 6 with a reference to the political
reforms Patten instituted – ‘The beginnings of representative government
and democratic accountability’ – a reference which is likely to have created
images of the elections and Legislative Council debates which had received
so much media attention during Patten’s governorship. Finally, in paragraph
5, developing the cloth metaphor, Patten lists the democratic institutions

that Britain has bequeathed to Hong Kong – the civil society, professions,
churches, newspapers, charities, civil servants – a list calculated to create
images of the various institutions mentioned.

Regarding the unity of time, this speech looks back (‘the years before this
night’ [line 6]) and forward (‘the years of success that will surely follow it’
[line 6]), from the present (‘today’s vantage point’ [line 9]), which is the point
of equilibrium. The unity of place is observed, with the focus of the speech
on Hong Kong, as was invariably the case in Patten’s speeches. As regards the
unity of action, Aristotle claims that a plot should be a ‘representation of an
action which is complete and whole and of a certain amplitude’. In making
the subject of the speech the total British experience in Hong Kong, Patten,
in his final speech, certainly observed this last of the three unities.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Introduction
This discussion will first present some general observations about Patten’s
discourse and the politics of identity. It will then return to the four contextual
parameters set out by Fairclough and Wodak referred to in the introduction
to this chapter and consider some questions concerning the historical and
intertextual nature of Patten’s use of rhetorical weight from a critical dis-
course perspective. These parameters are also closely tied in with the politics
of identity, especially its historical dimension.
3.7.2 Patten’s discourse and the politics of identity

How, then, in general terms, did Patten discursively construct the
identity of Hong Kong and its people? The image created is overwhelm-
ingly positive. In extract 1, for example, Hong Kong is described as
stable, prosperous, and with a secure future. Hong Kong’s principal asset,
according to Patten, is the qualities of its people. These qualities are listed
as ‘enterprise’, ‘energy’, ‘vitality’, ‘industry’, ‘resilience’, ‘determina-
tion’ and ‘drive’. However, these qualities have only been able to flourish,
according to Patten, within a framework provided by Britain. Hong Kong
people have only been able to prosper because of ‘a framework of sound
administration and the rule of law’ and because of its capitalist system – ‘a
capitalist heart beating at the centre of Asia’ – a system again provided
by Britain.
In extract 4, Patten emphasised that Hong Kong’s success had been mainly
due to the efforts of ‘Chinese men and Chinese women’. But these are not
ordinary Chinese men and women, according to Patten, because they have
benefited from the ‘scaffolding’ provided by Britain: ‘The rule of law. Clean
and light-handed government. The values of a free society. The begin-
nings of representative government and democratic accountability’. And
because of the safeguards provided by the Joint Declaration (negotiated on
behalf of Hong Kong by Britain), according to this view, Hong Kong’s values
will continue to prosper. Political and economic freedom will continue after
Britain’s departure.
One essential component of identity, according to many scholars (Baumeister,
1986; Guibernau, 1996; S. Hall 1996a), and as mentioned in Chapter 1, is
differentiation from the Other. If one considers Patten’s discursive construction
of Hong Kong and its people, it is clear that this is determined in relation to
the Other, the Other in this case being Communist China. There is a strong
contrastive implicature running through Patten’s discourse between British
values – which have allowed Hong Kong and its people to flourish – and the
values of China and its Communist system. Thus, when Patten refers to the
importance of the rule of law, clean government, the values of a free society,
and the beginnings of representative government and democratic account-
ability, there is an implied contrast with mainland China, which has a society
where such attributes do not pertain. The identity constructed for Hong Kong
and its people by Patten puts them in a subject position which enables Patten
to contrast British values with those of China. It is thus not an exaggeration
to claim that Patten’s discursive construction of Hong Kong and its people is
not an attempt to define their true identity, but rather to highlight what he
considers to be key positive aspects of British identity, which, he claims, have
been grafted onto Hong Kong society.
3.7.3 Rhetorical weight and the four contextual parameters

3.7.3.1 Rhetorical weight in relation to the specific situation
In understanding the purpose and effect of Patten’s discourse, it is important
to understand that he was sent to Hong Kong by the British government
with a specific purpose in mind. In the larger scheme of things there had
for a long time been a school of thought in the British government that
during the final years of the transitional period a ‘political’ person should
replace the administrators who had traditionally filled the position of Hong
Kong governor (Flowerdew, 1998). The idea was that someone with inter-
national standing in their own right would be better able to carry off what
would be a high-profile, historic mission. This helps to explain the very
different discourse projected by Patten compared to that of his administra-
tor predecessors. Administrators are not ideologues and they are not suited
to highly rhetorical speeches. A heavyweight politician, such as Patten, on
the other hand, is expected to engage in oratory and is thus better suited to
presenting an honourable and dignified picture to the world and history of
the British withdrawal.
At a more specific level, Patten was appointed in response to a perception

in the British government that their previous policy, largely in the hands
of Foreign Office diplomats, had led to diplomatic setbacks in dealings
with China and what was referred to as ‘kowtowing’ in the aftermath of
the June 1989 Tiananmen Square suppression. Patten was therefore seen
as someone who would ‘stand up’ to China and take a more assertive line.
Finally, in the final years of British rule, it had been agreed that there would
be the gradual introduction of limited democracy in Hong Kong. This
meant that the governor had to be able to develop support among the Hong
Kong people to an extent not needed by previous governors (Dimbleby,
1997a: 9–10).
These aspects of the situation help to explain the highly rhetorical nature
of Patten’s discourse, as analysed in this chapter, on the one hand, and his
negative attitude towards China and positive attitude to the people of Hong
Kong, on the other. The rhetorical weight signified the historic nature of
the last five years of British colonial rule and imbued the period with the
sense of national dignity that the British government wanted to project.
The negative image of China evinced through the rhetoric was a reaction to
the earlier conciliatory line of previous governors and, as suggested above,
an assertion of British values and political identity. The positive image of
the Hong Kong people was directed towards enlisting their solidarity and
support.
One important question which arises in talking about the Hong Kong
people concerns the question of audience design (Bell, 1991). When inter-
viewed, Patten stated that the Hong Kong people were always his primary
audience (Flowerdew, 1997c). However, given that the majority of the people
of Hong Kong are Chinese and not native speakers of English, for the most
part, they would have listened to or read his speeches in translation and the
optimum rhetorical effect would likely have been lost. One might wonder,
therefore, if the primary audience was not elsewhere, with the international
(including the British) press, and that Patten’s rhetoric was perhaps more
concerned with Britain’s place in history than the welfare of the Hong Kong
people. In this respect it is significant that in separate interviews with Patten
and his advisers (Flowerdew, 1997c, undated) the same expression was used
to express Britain’s concern with history. In both interviews it was stated
that the history of the British Empire would be viewed ‘through the prism
of Hong Kong’.
3.7.3.2 Rhetorical weight and the underlying conventions and

rules of the discourse
The key aspect to the underlying conventions and rules in Patten’s discourse,
as analysed in this chapter, is that Patten was in a privileged position,
that he was in command of the audience, and that he had at his disposal
an efficient press and public relations team which was able to ensure that
his message was disseminated through the mass media in ways which
suited him. It was this power which allowed Patten to project himself as an
important statesman, to promote his myth about the British legacy to Hong
Kong, and to discursively position the Hong Kong people alongside him in
opposition to China. In the application of rhetorical weight, it is notable
that Patten’s most heavily rhetorical language was reserved for those very
formal occasions which Patten was able to stage-manage as set pieces for the
promotion of his most ideologically weighted statements (of which those
speeches cited in this chapter are notable examples) – his inauguration,
his annual policy speeches and his farewell speech. The fact that rhetorical
weight was most evident in these most ideologically oriented set-piece
speeches is further evidence of the important ideological load which rhetori-
cal weight carries with it.
Aware of the importance of being able to control the conventions and
rules of these set pieces, it is significant that the British and Chinese gov-
ernments spent a long time wrangling over the actual format of the final
handover ceremony, in which both Britain and China would participate
(Flowerdew, 1998). While the Chinese wanted to make sure that Patten
should be sidelined in such a high-profile event, which would be televised
throughout the world, the British were determined that he should not be
silenced. A compromise was finally arrived at, with the British arranging
their own farewell ceremony at dusk on June 30, 1997, at which Patten
made his farewell speech (extract 4) (and at which there was no Chinese
representation), and the actual handover at midnight, with Prince Charles
making the speech on Britain’s behalf (and with Patten silenced).
3.7.3.3 Rhetorical weight as it is embedded in a certain culture and ideology

As indicated earlier, classical rhetoric is a pervasive feature of the Western
cultural tradition. Use of the tropes of classical rhetoric (‘rhetorical weight’
in this chapter) is closely identified with the Greco-Roman cultural tradition
and the development of oratory in the early democratic fora of Athens and
Rome (Chilton, 1985b). It is also closely identified with the British demo-
cratic parliamentary tradition of argumentative debating. These associations
attaching to rhetoric are not likely to have gone unnoticed by repre-
sentatives of the Chinese government and its supporters. To this extent,
rhetorical weight would have constituted what Fowler (1996: 96), cited
earlier, refers to as ‘a pattern for independent notice’. This pattern, with its
close association with the Western democratic tradition, would have con-
stituted a level of intertextuality (Bakhtin, 1981; Kristeva, 1980; Fairclough,
1995b), an indexing of Patten’s ideological stance of the promotion of
liberal Western democratic values (implicitly contrasted with the very dif-
ferent Marxist ideology of China [Flowerdew, 1998]).9 Rhetorical weight
was thus itself a face-threatening action as far as China was concerned,
designed to contribute further to the image of the superiority of Western
values that Patten wanted to create, as contrasted with Chinese Marxist

values (Flowerdew, 1998).
3.7.3.4 Rhetorical weight and what the discourse relates

to in the past
When Patten finally left his official residence in Hong Kong on 30 June 1997,
there was a formal ceremony at which the British flag was taken down for the
last time and presented to him. The ceremony was televised internationally
and Patten was shown to be close to tears, as, head bowed, he accepted
the flag. Patten’s demeanour was reported with a certain triumphalism
in the Chinese press, as a testament of British ignominy, while the British
press interpreted it very differently, as a sign of Patten’s true affection for
Hong Kong and his sadness at having to abandon Britain’s last significant
colony and leave its people in the uncertain hands of China. These contrast-
ing interpretations highlight the role that perceptions of history may play
in the interpretation of discourse (if we accept the scene described above as
discourse [Barthes, 1972; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996]).
Official Chinese accounts of the British historical role in Hong Kong view
the colonial power in a negative light. They tend to dwell on the early history
of the colony, when it was seized by force by Britain as a base from which
to pursue the opium trade and generally exploit the Chinese mainland. The
reversion of sovereignty is viewed as just retribution for a century and a half
of colonial subjugation and exploitation. Official British accounts, however,
including those given by Patten (as in his farewell speech, extract 4), while
acknowledging earlier misconduct, tend to dwell more on what they con-
sider to be Britain’s more recent, honourable role – a case of what Guibernau
(1996: 133) has referred to as ‘common amnesia’ – in allowing the free
market economy to flourish, establishing the rule of law and creating a rela-
tively high degree of personal freedom.
As with the flag ceremony, these two readings of history affect the inter-
pretation that one may put on Patten’s use of rhetorical weight. For Patten
and the British, along with Bender and Wellbery (1990: 7, cited above),
rhetoric would have served to mark ‘the seriousness of a topic, an occasion,
or a cause’, in this particular case the bringing to an end of an honourable
imperial experience. For China, on the other hand, as already indicated,
it was a face-threatening act, with its overtones of the Western classical
tradition and implied cultural imperialism. As for the Hong Kong Chinese
people, those most affected by the change of sovereignty, they were caught
in the middle, positioned as subjects and pawns in the game of identity
politics played out by Patten and China.
4
Discourse and Social Change in a
Public Meeting
4.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to document, by means of a case study of a

political meeting, an important aspect of what Fairclough (1992: 96) calls
‘discursive change in relation to social and cultural change’, as was cur-
rently taking place in Hong Kong at the time of the study (1992). The
approach of this chapter is based on Fairclough’s ideas (1992) on the
reflexive relation between discourse and social change (see Chapter 1).
For Fairclough, changes taking place in society may be reflected in
changes in the structure and function of discoursal events. At the same
time, changes in the structure and function of such events may be
reflected in changes taking place in society in general. The methodology
here employs a range of discourse analysis techniques developed over
recent years in the overlapping fields of political discourse analysis (e.g.
Atkinson, 1984; Wilson, 1990; Gastil, 1992), critical discourse analy-
sis (e.g. Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1979; Fairclough, 1989,
1992; van Dijk, 1993a), and interactional sociolinguistics (e.g. Brown
and Levinson, 1987; Lakoff, 1990; Tannen, 1984, 1989, 1990; Schiffrin,
1987). The detailed text analysis is especially influenced by the work of
Tannen.
As the long period of colonial rule drew to an end, particularly since the
appointment of Patten as governor in 1992, Britain tried to implement
greater (although still limited) democracy in Hong Kong. The reforms which
the colonial government had been trying to introduce were most notably,
and controversially, in the constitutional and political arenas. But reforms
of a broader nature, affecting the overall order of public discourse (Foucault,
1984; Fairclough, 1989, 1992) – designed to ‘democratise’ public discourse,
to use the term of Fairclough 1992 – were also attempted. This case study
focuses on both dimensions: political reform and democratic discourse, but
with emphasis on the latter.
88
Discourse and Social Change in a Public Meeting 89
4.2 Political background
As outlined in the previous two chapters, in 1992, reacting to what was seen
by the Conservative British government as too soft an approach to the PRC
on the part of the Foreign Office, Britain sent Chris Patten as governor of
Hong Kong, with a brief to take a tougher line in negotiations regarding the
change of sovereignty with China, especially with regard to political reform.
The main plank of the new British policy, under Patten’s guidance, was to
quicken the pace of democratic reform, even if this meant angering China.
During the period of British rule, Hong Kong had been administered by
colonial bureaucrats; there had been only token democratic representation
of the approximately 6.5 million ethnic Chinese population, mainly through
selected appointees. Elections and public political debate had not been a
part of the Hong Kong way of life. It is ironic that Britain should have shown
so much interest in developing democracy at this late stage in its rule, given
that it had done very little to develop democracy in Hong Kong before the
signing of the Joint Declaration (see Miners, 1991 for reasons for this lack of
democratic development in Hong Kong). Be that as it may, in October 1992,
Patten presented proposals for reform designed to promote democratically
elected representation and accountability during the transitional period and
beyond. The proposals were controversial because the Chinese government
judged them to be too radical and in contravention of the Joint Declaration
and Basic Law; China preferred a slower pace of reform.1
This chapter focuses on a public meeting held in Hong Kong on 8 October
1992, chaired by Patten. The meeting, ‘Question time with the Governor’,
took place on the day following the governor’s annual policy speech, in
which he set out his proposals for democratic reform. The official primary
purpose of the meeting was to discuss the proposals for reform, but also
other topics raised in Patten’s speech. The meeting is particularly worthy of
study because Patten’s aim in holding the meeting – the first of its kind in
Hong Kong, as he makes clear at several points during the meeting – was
to exemplify political participation and accountability of politicians to the
public of the sort for which the reforms set out in his policy speech were
designed to provide a framework.
As a professional politician, Patten’s background was one of account-
ability to the public, on whose votes he had depended throughout his
career in order to stay in office. The political instinct which guided Patten’s
behaviour thus directed him toward gaining popular support. Although he
did not owe his position to the votes of the people of Hong Kong, he was
trying to institute democratic reforms, and thus needed to promote himself
as accountable. This approach to what Goffman (1959) calls ‘impression
management’ contrasts strongly with the image projected by the previous
governor, Sir David Wilson – who, like his predecessors, was a government
servant. As such, he preferred to keep a fairly low profile, and did not
particularly concern himself with public opinion or accountability. One

commentator described Wilson as ‘a functionary, not a leader’ (Roberti
1994: 186). Thus Wilson held no public meetings such as the one which is
the focus of this study.
In terms of impression management (an important dimension of which is
the use of language), certainly in the context of ‘Question time’, Patten must
be judged as highly effective.2 Although his approval ratings subsequently
declined considerably, a number of indicators of Patten’s successful impres-
sion management during his first year of office are as follows.
Patten’s popularity with the people of Hong Kong was high. At the point
of the ‘Question time’, it was at 81 per cent, according to one poll, conducted
on behalf of the Hong Kong Standard (Free, 1993).3 He was considered by the
majority to be close to the people of Hong Kong. After one year of office, 84
per cent of those polled responded ‘Yes’ to the question ‘Is he [Patten] close
to the Hong Kong people?’, in a poll conducted on behalf of the South China
Morning Post (Anon., 1993). He created a positive image through his use of
the media. Thus the local legislator, Emily Lau, commented in an interview
(Thomas, 1995):
When Chris Patten came out here the British reputation was very bad
for selling Hong Kong people down the river ... Nothing has changed
fundamentally – the British are still abandoning us and handing us back
to communist rule in 1997 – but just by proposing what I call a ‘drop’ of
democracy, he has turned the image around and mesmerised the media.
I think he’s a skilful operator.
On many occasions, Patten had been touted as a possible future British

prime minister (cf. Blyth, 1995; Braude, 1995; Wallen, 1995). On visits
overseas, he was received by important leaders, including the US president,
Bill Clinton, and Emperor Akihito of Japan – people to whom the previous
governor did not have access. He was also interviewed on the well-known
Larry King Live show on CNN international television.
4.3 Discourse, social change and democratisation
The analysis of the discourse of ‘Question time’ highlights what Fairclough

(1992) has indicated as the reflexive relation which changes in discoursal
practice have to social and cultural changes. An understanding of changes
in discoursal practice must be grounded, for Fairclough, in an understanding
of changes in society. At the same time, changes in society, if they are to be
fully understood, require the study of how these changes are instantiated in
discursive events.
In terms of social change, Patten’s main goal in the years until the hand-
over was to promote limited democratic reform in Hong Kong. Promotion
of democracy for Patten did not only mean electoral reform (although this
was important, as shown by the subject matter of ‘Question time’), but also
‘democratisation’ in the sense that Fairclough (1992) uses the term, in rela-
tion to processes which had taken place over recent years in Britain and
elsewhere. Democratisation, according to this formulation, refers to ‘the
removal of inequalities and asymmetries in the discursive and linguistic
rights, obligations and prestige of groups of people’ (p. 201). In attempting
to bring about such a change in the discourse practice of Hong Kong, Patten
was trying to bring about a shift in what Foucault (1984) and Fairclough
(1989, 1992) refer to as order of discourse.
Gastil (1992: 472) has outlined the discursive characteristics of an ideal
democratic order of discourse:
(a) Collective choices must be made in a deliberative way.

(b) The members of the ‘demos’ must have equal opportunities to
participate in the deliberative process.
(c) The ideal ‘demos’ aims to arrive at a rationally motivated
consensus.
(d) Members of the ‘demos’ should discursively acknowledge one
another’s autonomy and mutuality.
In this connection, Patten consistently stressed that government needed

to be fair, open and accountable, and that the rule of law needed to be
strengthened.4
Various social changes following Patten’s arrival in Hong Kong illustrate
democratisation in Fairclough’s sense. Early in his tenure as governor,
Patten appointed a number of much more critical and radical Legislative
Councillors; these were vocal in their attacks on the government, and
promoted many anti-discrimination causes relating to gender, age, race,
and press freedom, as well as other social issues such as the environment.
Following Patten’s arrival, two radical newspapers which regularly attacked
the Hong Kong government, China and Britain, were launched: Apple Daily
(Chinese) and Eastern Express (English). Government departments became
much more accountable than they were in the past, with officials having
to undergo critical, public cross-examination in the Legislative Council.
Government departments which deal with the public adopted ‘perform-
ance pledges’; they were required to commit themselves to provide service
within minimum time limits, and they had to provide information when it
was requested by the press and public. The ‘Code on access to information’
(cited in MacPherson, 1995) ‘authorises and requires civil servants, routinely
or on request, to provide information unless there are specific reasons for
not doing so ...’. Patten strongly promoted proposals for an old-age pension,
something which Hong Kong had not previously had. Most importantly, the
proposals for electoral reform which were the focus of the ‘Question time’
meeting were put in place (although subsequently revoked following the

change of sovereignty), and the first fully elected Legislative Council was
created. On 17 September 1995, following an active public campaign,5 six
elections returned pro-democracy legislators with a large majority. These
legislators were outspoken in their criticism of China, Britain and Patten.
The overall trend toward more open government and public participa-
tion was noted in the press, as shown by the following quotation from an
editorial in the Eastern Express, which regularly criticised Patten and his
government:
One of the battle cries of the tenure of the Governor, Chris Patten, has
been his drive towards a more open society. An administration in which
there is ready public access to information and where administrators
are held fully accountable for their actions is self-evidently desirable,
and slowly Hong Kong has been progressing towards that goal. (Anon.,
1995f)
Reporting on the aftermath of the elections, an editorial headed ‘The cli-

mate changes,’ in the South China Morning Post, the highest-circulation
English language Hong Kong newspaper, stated:
Something unusual is happening in Hong Kong politics. It is as if the

LEGCO [Legislative Council] elections of a week ago freed the imagina-
tion of politicians ... Now even the most immovable elements in the
territory’s future are being questioned ... the changes in the territory’s
political system have encouraged at least some people to question what
had been laid down for them to accept without demur. That is what hap-
pens with democracy: elected representatives think they have – or should
have – the power to change things. (Anon., 1995c)
Of course, Patten did not bring about these changes single-handedly.

Some of them may have been motivated by outside forces. The worldwide
information explosion – through satellite television and the Internet, both
of which were already readily available in Hong Kong – may be partly
responsible for promoting a demand for greater accessibility to information.
The large numbers of Western expatriate professionals in Hong Kong, the
large numbers of Hong Kong people returning from education overseas in
Western countries, and the very large numbers of Hong Kong people who
have relatives who have emigrated to Western countries such as Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and the US are also likely to have contributed to an
acceptance of these ideas. Nevertheless, Patten certainly acted as a catalyst
in bringing about these changes.
These changes in the social order and the order of discourse were reflected
in Patten’s style. On his arrival in Hong Kong, he was the first governor to
shun the traditional colonial dress of cocked hat and sword, in favour of a
lounge suit. In going out into the territory and meeting the people, he had
a much higher profile (perhaps because of his very active publicity machine)
than the previous governor. As a sign of his democratic style, he gave up
chairmanship of the Legislative Council (which was an important duty of
previous governors) in favour of appearing once a month to answer ques-
tions, thus leaving councillors to conduct their legislative business without
interference from him. When he did appear in the Legislative Council, he
shunned the throne-like governor’s chair positioned on a raised dais, in
favour of a simple desk on the same level as the councillors. These are just
some of the non-linguistic semiotic systems used by Patten to reflect his
more democratic and informal style. His style was summarised by one com-
mentator as follows:
The new Governor brought with him to Hong Kong a populism which
was a world away from Wilson’s fastidious discretion. Patten declined
the customary knighthood, discarded the white ceremonial uniform, and
drew crowds so large and enthusiastic on his early ‘walkabouts’ that the
police could barely secure his route. (Cottrell 1993: 192)
Of course, the creation of this image is to a large extent cosmetic (Fairclough,

1992), and the cosmetic dimension of Patten’s democratisation of discourse
is one of the foci of this chapter. Although Patten instituted limited electoral
reform, in accordance with Hong Kong’s so-called executive-led system,
power still remained largely in the hands of the governor. The primary role
of the elected Legislative Council is to examine proposed legislation, not to
introduce new laws of its own. Legislation is initiated by an executive coun-
cil, which is appointed and led by the governor. Patten’s electoral reforms,
therefore, had only limited real impact on the way Hong Kong was governed.
In addition, for many people, other aspects of Patten’s reform programme,
such as it is, were too slow. Many demanded that some of Hong Kong’s out-
dated colonialist press laws be repealed and that a human rights commission
be set up – calls which Patten resisted. Although Patten continued to defy the
Chinese government in insisting that his political reforms should continue
beyond 1997, he did this in the knowledge that the British government had
avoided a confrontation with China over its repeated statements that his
reforms would be scrapped following the transfer of sovereignty and an alter-
native system of appointing the legislature adopted (Anon., 1995e; Yeung,
1995a). Finally, some claimed that Patten became less open and more reclu-
sive since his early days. However, this may have resulted more from force of
circumstance than choice. As the transition drew near, the focus inevitably
began to turn more toward China, the incoming sovereign, and away from
Patten, the representative of the outgoing ruler, Britain. In addition, having
set his reforms in place, Patten may have preferred that Hong Kong should
develop under its own steam (Anon., 1995b) and that Hong Kong’s elected
representatives should do more of the running (Yeung, 1995b).6
Mention was made earlier of Fairclough’s claim that social change can
only be studied by investigating how it is instantiated in discursive events,
and vice versa. In selecting events on which to focus, Fairclough suggests
that ‘moments of crisis’ – by which he means moments where things are
going wrong – provide particularly suitable targets for study. The contention
here, however, is that critical moments might also be times when things
are going particularly as they should. Such is the rationale for selecting
‘Question time’ as a reflection of the changes being undergone in public
discourse in Hong Kong. The ‘Question time’ meeting, as the analysis shows,
is particularly suitable for selection as a ‘key’ event, in that it highlights how
Patten was able to model the discourse to represent the sort of democratising
social change that he wanted to bring about.
4.4 Organisation of the meeting as a discoursal event
The context of ‘Question time’ is that it followed a day after a policy speech
in which Patten set out his legislative agenda for the coming year. The most
controversial aspect of his speech dealt with the arrangements for political
reform; but he addressed a range of other issues concerning, for example,
the economy, education and social welfare. Questions in the meeting
focused on these issues.
The meeting took place in the ‘City Hall’, which is located in Central,
the main business district of Hong Kong. Tickets to the meeting were issued
at various locations throughout the territory, on a first-come, first-served
basis, and were free of charge. The meeting was thus open to the complete
cross-section of Hong Kong society, although its venue, in the main business
district, might have meant that an above-average number of more educated
and better-off members of the public attended. To judge by their dress, a fair
cross-section of social classes were represented at the meeting. The fact that
the meeting was televised ‘live’ in Hong Kong created further broad access
to the meeting for the public, at least as observers.
As mentioned earlier, the meeting was the first language event of its kind
in Hong Kong. Its basic form of questions from the floor, calling a politi-
cian to account, invites parallels with the House of Commons and public
election meetings in Britain. The title of the meeting, ‘Question time with
the Governor’, suggests parallels with ‘Prime Minister’s question time’ in
the House of Commons; and, given that the meeting was televised, Patten
and his advisers may also have been thinking of the British television pro-
gramme, Question Time, when they planned their programme.
An important complicating factor in the turn-taking of ‘Question time’
is created by the dual code of English and Cantonese used in the meeting.
Although English was still the official language of government and the law
in Hong Kong, and was (and still is) used widely in business, the mother
tongue of the vast majority of Hong Kong residents is Cantonese. Following
the signing of the Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong government gradu-
ally introduced measures to allow for the increasing use of Cantonese
in government and the law. The proceedings of the Legislative Council,
for example, were at the time of the meeting conducted in a mixture of
English and Cantonese; legislators chose whichever language they pre-
ferred, and simultaneous translation was provided.7 Ng and Bradac (1993)
note that in colonialist systems the language of the dominant minority
group, the colonialists, is imposed on the majority, the colonised. While
there are also other reasons for the use of English in Hong Kong – deriving
from its growing importance as an international centre for trade, banking,
communications and information – it is the case that the vast majority of
Hong Kong people are more at ease in Cantonese than English.
Given Patten’s espousal of democratic ideals, it was important that those
attending ‘Question time’ should have the opportunity to participate in their
language of choice, Cantonese. Because Patten did not speak Cantonese, his
remarks had to be translated; and the questions asked in Cantonese had
to be translated into English. (Some questions were asked in English, but
these also had to be translated, for the benefit of the non-English-speaking
members of the audience.) In the Legislative Council, simultaneous inter-
pretation is used; but ‘Question time’ used consecutive interpretation, pre-
sumably because of the unavailability of simultaneous translation sets for
the over 2000 people attending the meeting.
The use of consecutive translation had a number of possible effects on the
proceedings. First, it may have drawn attention to the colonialist dimension
of the meeting, given that the reason for translation was the governor’s
inability to speak Cantonese.8 Second, consecutive translation certainly had
the effect of making things rather slow, thereby possibly detracting from
the positive image of democratic discourse in action that Patten wanted to
project. A third effect of the need for translation was that, because Patten
was able to control the pauses for translation during his delivery, he had the
chance to pace himself, and give himself time to think. When a question
was asked in English, Patten also benefited from thinking time during the
Cantonese translation which preceded his reply. However, when questions
in Cantonese were very long, it was difficult for Patten to cut people off at
an appropriate point, as he would not have been able to follow what they
were saying. In 1995, for the first time, a similar ‘Question time’ meeting
made use of simultaneous translation, although the hall only had a capac-
ity of about 450 people. On this basis, perhaps Patten and his advisers
decided that the disadvantages of consecutive translation outweighed the
advantages.
4.5 The function of the meeting as an index of

democratisation
Perhaps the most striking instantiation of the reflexive relation between

discourse and social change is Patten’s own overt references to how he saw
the meeting as an exemplar of the sort of democratic discourse which the
political reform programme he was proposing was designed to produce. In
the structure and function of ‘Question time’ itself, Patten waned to dem-
onstrate to the people of Hong Kong (and the world at large) his conception
of democratic discourse in action, and the ability of Hong Kong people to
participate in such a form of discourse. Patten conceived of the meeting as
a ‘play within a play’, or an example of what French literary theorists, fol-
lowing André Gide in his novel The Counterfeiters, refer to as mise en abyme
(‘in the form of an abyss’; Wales, 1989). Gide (erroneously) saw a parallel
between the structure of his novel and heraldry, where the outer design of
a coat of arms was repeated or reflected, en abyme, in the inner design. Just
as in Gide’s novel, the author casts himself as the main protagonist who is
writing a novel very similar to The Counterfeiters, so did Patten, the author of
‘Question time,’ cast himself as the main protagonist in a meeting the dis-
course of which was very similar to the sort of discourse which the political
reforms outlined in his speech a day earlier were designed to promote.
Patten’s most overt reference to this structure is in his closing remarks,
when he made the point that the meeting could be viewed as an indication
of the political maturity of the people of Hong Kong. In this, he revealed,
by means of his use of the play within a play, that the whole purpose of the
meeting had been to promote his goal of democratic reform:
… but what it [the meeting] does show is that anyone who’s interested
whether here or elsewhere is that the people of Hong Kong whatever their
views can be trusted to talk about their future, the future of their families
and their community in a responsible and intelligent and mature and
restrained way and that is how we’re going to show to the whole world
what a sophisticated and democratic political community this can be.
In terms of speech acts, from Patten’s point of view, the whole meeting can
thus be seen as one macro-speech act (van Dijk, 1977) designed to express
the political maturity of Hong Kong people.
Patten made overt reference to mise en abyme not only in his closing
remarks, but also at the beginning (thus creating a neat framing structure
which emphasised the importance of the device) and at various points dur-
ing the question-and-answer part of the meeting. Patten’s opening remarks
invoke it as follows:
Part of that way of life [of Hong Kong] is that we have free and open
meetings like this and I believe that one result of meetings like this is that
the decisions that I have to take and others in government have to take
are better if we have to go and explain our decision to you. That’s what
accountability and what greater democracy means. I have to know when
I make a decision that at some stage I may have to stand in front of the
Legislative Council or stand in front of you and explain myself and that
I can tell you that has a great effect on political leaders.
As an example of the invocation of the play-within-a-play structure during

the question-and-answer time, at one point a questioner challenged Patten
on his reform proposals; it was suggested that they were in contravention
of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration, that they would weaken the govern-
ment, and that they would jeopardise a smooth change of sovereignty. In
rebutting this question, Patten turned around the questioner’s claim, using
it as an opportunity to invoke mise en abyme, by stating that the proposed
reforms would not weaken the government. On the contrary, governments
that are willing to answer questions in meetings such as ‘Question time’ are
not weaker for being more democratic, but stronger:
I don’t believe that the proposals that I’ve made would in any way
weaken the government. Is it a weaker government that comes before a
meeting like this this evening to try to explain what it is doing. I happen
to believe that where government is accountable it is stronger precisely
because it has a stronger relationship with the community that it serves.
APPLAUSE
I don’t believe that you are more likely for example to encourage politi-
cal stability by preventing people expressing their views. I think you’re
more likely to have political stability if people are able to express their
views even if they’re critical of the government.
In general discourse terms, the function of the play-within-a-play struc-

ture is to heighten awareness of the overall structure and/or function of
the text within which it is embedded. Mise en abyme has been studied
more frequently in works of literature (Hutcheon, 1980; Rimmon-Kenan,
1989) than in public discourse. The plays of Shakespeare, many of which
contain a play within a play, are notable examples in literature. The
contemporary novel, with its emphasis on reflexivity, frequently makes
use of the device. Novels such as Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman
(1969), or many of the works of the so-called French new novelists, are
good examples.9
In terms of political discourse, Patten’s use of this textual structure in a
public meeting is unusual. Mise en abyme in the context of ‘Question time’
would seem to represent an instance of what Bhatia (1995: 15) calls ‘genre
mixing’, that is, ‘a deliberate mixing of communicative purpose, embedding
one generic form within another’. Patten took a discourse strategy more
familiarly used in one genre, and introduced it into another, where it is not
usually employed. Thus Patten’s use of the play-within-a-play structure is
an example of his individual skill as a communicator, rather than a con-
ventional feature of the genre of political meetings. As Bhatia (p. 16) would
have it, Patten exploited the ‘tactical freedom [available] to expert members
of the discourse community in question to manipulate generic resources
and conventions to express private intentions within the framework of
socially recognised communicative purposes’.
4.6 The removal of overt markers of hierarchy and

power asymmetry
An important feature of the democratisation of discourse for Fairclough

(1992: 203) is ‘the elimination of overt markers of hierarchy and power
asymmetry in types of institutional discourse where power relations are
unequal’. Traditionally, when the Hong Kong governor came into contact
with the people, it was in formal situations, where the discourse acted as a
clear index of the power relation between governor and governed. These
encounters would include inaugurations of public works, opening cer-
emonies of shows and exhibitions, official visits to factories and places of
business, occasional press conferences, meetings of the Legislative Council
and New Year addresses on TV and radio.
One feature of Patten’s governorship was his attempt, on the one hand,
to reduce the markers of hierarchy in these encounters, and on the other,
to create opportunities for new sorts of encounters in which inequalities
are intrinsically less evident. The ‘Question time’ meetings, of which Patten
each year held a series, are an example of this new sort of less overtly
unequal discourse event. The very act of organising a meeting in which
members of the public have the opportunity to question the governor rep-
resents a reduction in inequality.
A number of features in the ‘Question time’ meeting illustrate this attempt
to remove overt markers of hierarchy and power asymmetry.
4.6.1 Informality
Patten’s general demeanour and delivery could be described as relaxed and
informal. Fairclough (1992) points out how informality is one of the strat-
egies for democratising discourse. In linguistic terms, this informality is
reflected in Patten’s use of first names to refer to colleagues and members of
the audience. He peppered his discourse with reference to ‘Michael’, ‘Elsie’,
‘Chris’ and others. Informality is also reflected in Patten’s use of humour.
He consistently prefaced his answers to questions with some sort of humor-
ous remark, even if the questions were serious. Thus he used humour to
introduce his very first answer – indicating, jokingly, how he signalled when
he wanted to pause for translation:
the first thing that I said yesterday in my speech to the Legislative Council
is that it’s very important – what you’ll notice is that whenever I move my
hand RAISES HAND – LAUGHTER – CANTONESE TRANSLATION – watch
this – RAISES HAND –CANTONESE TRANSLATION – LAUGHTER
As part of his informality, Patten played down his status as governor. One
questioner pointed out that Patten had never been to a temporary housing
area; to this he replied, reversing the normal hierarchical relation between
governor and ordinary citizen, that if THE QUESTIONER had time, he would
go to a temporary housing area with him:
I’ll do a bargain with you. If em you’ve em got a day off SIGHS or can
spare an afternoon I’ll go to a temporary housing area with you
4.6.2 Accountability and consensus

Patten’s emphasis on accountability has already been referred to earlier. He
promoted consensus, as well as the role of the community and the executive
and Legislative Council, in referring to his duties with regard to developing
political reform:
those are problems which I have to address on the community’s behalf

and with the help of the executive and legislative councils.
On this question of political reform, Patten again stressed the importance of

consultation and consensus:
the proposals that I set out yesterday they are proposals but they’re pro-
posals to discuss er with China they’re proposals that I’ll discuss as well
with the Legislative Council and the community.
Patten emphasised the role of the community as a whole in making

decisions that affected the community and the importance of demo-
cratic procedures in general. In answering an aggressive questioner who
complained about the eviction of residents from an area scheduled for rede-
velopment, note how Patten responds (in a lexical chain) by emphasising
various democratic phenomena:
In every community including this one the community as a whole decides

from time to time that a particular area for one reason or another should
be redeveloped ... it is only right in the first place residents and businesses
should be consulted. In the second place there should be compensation

if the plan goes ahead. That is what has happened in the case of the
walled city [the area where the redevelopment had taken place] with for
example a right of appeal to the board ... that you describe in less than
flattering terms er appeal to a board ... but it will always be the case in
any community particularly in one that’s growing and expanding and
thriving that one has to redevelop parts of it from time to time and make
I hope adequate and generous compensation payments as a result.
In answering a question about pornographic material, Patten responded

in terms not of his own reactions, but that of the community:
You mentioned em some of the material which I know causes people great
offense when they see it on public display in shops and so on where their
children and families and wives and loved ones can go in and see it.
In presenting his solution to the problem of pornography, his recommen-

dation was presented as a mere hope and appeal to the community spirit of
those who deal in such material:
I do hope that retailers will be very careful about what they have on dis-
play I don’t think that any of us are prudes but all of us think that there
is some material which is offensive and should be kept out of the way of
children and families.
Notice here too how Patten tried to integrate himself into the community
as a whole, with his rather presumptuous ‘I don’t think that any of us are
prudes but all of us think ... ’. It is as if Patten and the community at large
are of one flesh and blood, at one in attitude and thought.
4.6.3 Involvement
In integrating himself into the community as a whole, Patten was using a
strategy which Tannen (1989: 12) refers to as ‘involvement’, described by
her as the creation of ‘an internal, even emotional connection individu-
als feel which binds them to other people ... as well as to places, things,
activities, ideas, memories, and words’ (cited also in Johnson, 1994: 210;
Maynard, 1994: 236). Patten used a whole range of devices to create involve-
ment, as described in the following sections.
4.6.3.1 Turn-taking
Reference has already been made to the structure of the meeting, with its
alternation of turns between questioners and the governor.10 This of course
creates an immediate impression of involvement. But Patten increased the
feeling of involvement and equal participation on the part of the audience

in the way he allocated the turns. First, there were eight microphones spread
around the hall, and Patten made great play of ensuring that questions were
distributed equally among these different microphones:
What we have to do now is to follow a policy of being fair to micro-

phones otherwise I’ll get into trouble. But judging by the number of
hands that are going up and the limited time available we can have more
of these meetings em four five two and then eight.
Number eight number eight is asking a question. There are three people
who want to ask a question at number two and they’d better sort out
between themselves who it’s going to be. I suggest you draw lots.
Notice how, in these turn allocations, Patten emphasised at every oppor-

tunity the democratic nature of the exercise – with his reference to getting
into trouble if he is not fair, to questioners drawing lots, and to members of
the audience working out among themselves who will ask a question.
Second, Patten made many references to his desire that as many people as
possible have a chance to ask questions:
The lady there, number three. Can I suggest if people can conceivably
restrict their questions to one em it will enable if they ask three questions
three times as many people to get in?
Can I just say em in order that we can get questions from the three micro-
phones which haven’t had questions yet that is number eight number
seven and number two that any further questions really must be brief
otherwise it won’t be fair on people who haven’t had a chance to get to
a microphone.
4.6.3.2 Attending to personal details

In selecting questioners, Patten made individual members of the audience
feel involved, with his many references to personal details. As Tannen
(1989) notes, reference to insignificant details may be valued for the rapport
and sense of caring it creates. These details may refer to dress:
there’s a gentleman in a yellow shirt
the gentleman who’s wearing the interesting headgear
there’s a gentleman with a striped shirt at number four then there’s some-
body right at the back putting their hand up
if we start with number three then there’s a gentleman with a striped

shirt at number four
Or they may refer to actions:
there’s somebody right at the back putting their hand up near number six
all right if we start with number three and six number three
oh right well number five since you’ve been so vigorous em you can have
a go after the chap at number four but number three
In one case, a potential questioner said that his name was Chris, and
Patten made great play in drawing attention to this person and anyone else
in the audience who shared the name of Chris:
Perhaps next we can have em the em gentle questioner near microphone

six and then can we have the gentleman down here? Your name’s what?
If your name’s Chris you can certainly have a question LAUGHTER First
of all number six, first of all number six and then everyone in the audi-
ence called Chris
4.6.3.3 Building a sense of community

Apart from turn-taking and the allocation of turns, another device Patten
used to create involvement was to create a sense of community. This empha-
sis was touched on in the section on accountability and consensus. A general
sense of community was developed throughout the meeting through lexical
choice. During the meeting there were 44 references to Hong Kong, 28 to
the people, 15 to the community and 12 to the family or family members.
At every opportunity, Patten created a positive picture of Hong Kong, and
praised the people of Hong Kong for their part in making the territory suc-
cessful. To give just some examples of this positive image of Hong Kong and
praise for the Hong Kong people, Patten praises Hong Kong people for the
economic success of the territory:
Because of our economic success
For Hong Kong’s growth and dynamism:
A community that is growing and expanding and thriving
For their treatment of the Vietnamese boat people:
A problem which the people of Hong Kong have handled with consider-
able generosity of spirit and great competence
For the improving quality of life in general, and cultural life in particular:
As Hong Kong’s way of life and quality of life improve so it is true to say
that Hong Kong’s cultural life has improved as well.
And, as we have already seen, for their mature political outlook:
a sophisticated demo and democratic political community
Patten even praised Hong Kong businessmen for building up the economy
of Vietnam so the boat people could go back:
The Vietnamese economy is beginning to improve and many Hong Kong

businessmen are playing a significant part in that.
In creating this sense of a successful community, Patten makes himself

a part of it by the consistent use of the indexicals we and our. We is used
by Patten 70 times in the meeting, and our is used 16 times. The following
extract illustrates this usage:
We all know that one of the biggest reasons for high property prices in
Hong Kong is that we are short of land and we have an awful lot of housing
to provide and that as economists would tell you er produces the pressures
that lead to higher prices. Er, one reason why I’m keen that we should get
ahead with building the new airport is that it would produce a great deal
more land which would help us with some of our social needs.
This use of the indexicals we and our will be reviewed later in the section
on manipulation. Here it may just be noted that it is an important feature
of involvement.
4.6.3.4 Demonstrating trust in the community

As well as building a sense of community, Patten expressed his trust in the
community. This expression of trust can be seen in the first three examples
in this chapter. The next example repeats part of an earlier one, highlighting
the section where Patten expresses his trust in the community:
The people of Hong Kong whatever their views can be trusted to talk
about their future, the future of their families and their community, in a
responsible and intelligent and mature and restrained way.
4.6.3.5 Confiding in the audience

Another way in which Patten created involvement with his audience was
by taking them into his confidence. In the following extract, he explained
in some detail the negotiations which had gone on between the foreign
ministers of Britain and China:
When the British foreign secretary saw his Chinese colleague opposite
number in New York, er two weeks ago tomorrow er he em he raised
with him the question of the number of directly elected seats in the
Legislative Council in nineteen ninety-five. He pressed him to accept er
an increase in the number of directly elected seats, arguing that if China
was to accept that it would be good for Hong Kong and redound greatly
to China’s credit throughout the world. The Chinese foreign minister
replied in I think terms with which the community is familiar here that
China did not believe that that would be sensible and that it would con-
travene the Basic Law and was therefore not accepted.
This involvement strategy is particularly significant in the context of Sino-

British negotiations, because negotiations between Britain and China con-
cerning Hong Kong had before the time of Patten always been conducted
in great secrecy, with Hong Kong not even being officially represented
(Cottrell, 1993; Cradock, 1994; Flowerdew, 1998; Roberti, 1994).
4.6.3.6 Presenting a caring attitude

One way in which Patten tried to make himself sympathetic to his audi-
ence, and thereby encourage their involvement, is in showing a caring
attitude toward the Hong Kong community’s less privileged members. In
various answers, Patten referred to his government’s plans to increase social
welfare spending. In the following extract he mentions an overall spending
increase, with specific plans for increased provision for the mentally ill, the
disabled, the elderly and single-parent families:
We’ve announced in my speech that over the next five years we’ll
increase expenditure on social welfare provision by about twelve and a
half percent ... We will be able to do a great deal more for the mentally
ill, for the mentally handicapped, er for the handicapped generally,
for the disabled and so on that will result next year for example in the
employment of I think between three and four hundred additional
social workers.
At other moments in the meeting, Patten referred to increased public

assistance for the unemployed, to an increase in the number of government
social workers and schoolteachers, and to an increase in the construction of
public housing (with emphasis on provision of housing for the disabled, the
mentally handicapped and the elderly). Further social improvements that
Patten mentioned, which can have been expected to evoke the audience’s
sympathy and involvement, were plans to strengthen the judiciary, with
an emphasis on localisation (i.e. the replacement of expatriate lawyers by

locals), and plans to increase the size of the police force.
4.6.3.7 Highlighting a personal contribution to the community

In building the sense of community, Patten demonstrated his own personal
contribution, as in the following reference to promotion of the arts:
I think we have to support further cultural enrichment in our commu-

nity both by private subsidy and by public subsidy and I hope that I’ll be
playing my own part in the next few months by the support we give for
a series of concerts given by the excellent academy of performing arts.
4.6.3.8 Referring to activity in the community at large

As well as this personal contribution to the life of the community, Patten
referred to his activities out and about in Hong Kong:
I’ve visited most of many other parts of Hong Kong and have visited
squatters’ areas and other difficult housing areas.
Tannen (1989: 135) refers to the capacity of details and images to cre-
ate involvement: ‘Through images created in part by details’, she states,
‘a hearer or reader imagines a scene.’ In extracts like the one cited, Patten
probably stimulated the imagination of his audience to recall the televi-
sion and press coverage of the numerous public ‘walkabouts’ he conducted
during his first months in Hong Kong. This coverage showed Patten consist-
ently being mobbed by very enthusiastic crowds of local people who wanted
to greet him. Such references to Patten’s activity among the Hong Kong
community thus had the capacity to make a powerful contribution to the
sense of involvement on the part of the audience.
4.6.3.9 Standing up for Hong Kong

In the years leading up to the appointment of Patten as Hong Kong governor,
British policy with regard to China and Hong Kong had been essentially one
of accommodation. An important part of Patten’s strategy of winning over
the Hong Kong public during his governorship was to emphasise his willing-
ness to stand up for the interests of Hong Kong, even in the face of Chinese
criticism. In the following extract, Patten refers to criticisms of his proposals
for political reform. The source of the criticisms to which he was referring,
as everyone at the meeting was aware, was the Chinese government. The
extract is notable for the strong rhetoric and emotive force directed at the
Chinese government and its officials (referred to as others and people):
It is for others if they disagree with me to point out where my proposals are
inconsistent and to put forward their own proposals. It’s not enough for
people to criticise. People have, if they disagree, to put forward their own
proposals for the nineteen ninety-five elections. I didn’t invent the fact that
we have to produce an election committee in nineteen ninety-five. I didn’t
invent the fact that we have to put together new functional constituencies.
Those things are all consequences of the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law. And those are problems which I have to address on the community’s
behalf and with the help of the executive and legislative councils
CANTONESE TRANSLATION (INTERRUPTED BY APPLAUSE AT ONE

POINT) APPLAUSE
4.6.3.10 Demonstrating commitment and creating emotion

In her discussion of political rhetoric, Tannen (1989) discusses the way
emotive language can evoke involvement on the part of audiences. One
powerful rhetorical figure that she discusses is that of repetition and paral-
lelism, which are both notable in the previous extract, repeated here:
I didn’t invent the fact that we have to produce an election committee in

nineteen ninety-five. I didn’t invent the fact that we have to put together
new functional constituencies.
Further repetition is employed in the language leading up to the next two

examples. Notice how, in the second of these, not only the parallel struc-
ture of the phrase were entirely consistent with, but also the complements of
this repeated phrase – district boards, functional constituencies, election com-
mittee, the voting age – create a lexical chain of hyponyms relating to the
(unmentioned) superordinate, ‘democracy’. Notice too how this chain is
held between the twin superordinates in every particular, which precedes it,
and in every part, which follows it:
The proposals that I made yesterday
proposals for discussion with China
were entirely consistent with the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration
they were consistent with the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration in every particular
they were consistent with the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration in what that said about district boards
they were consistent in what they said about functional constituencies
they were consistent in what they said about the election committee
they were consistent in what they said about lowering the voting age
they were consistent in every part
Patten used repetition in this way when he wanted to demonstrate

commitment and emotional involvement.
4.7 Manipulation
In the preceding discussion of features which index efforts to democratise

the discourse of ‘Question time with the Governor’ and to downplay
overt markers of hierarchy and power asymmetry, Patten’s strategy has

been taken more or less at face value. However, as Fairclough notes
(1992: 203), ‘[i]t is ... arguable that as overt markers become less evident,
covert markers of power asymmetry become more potent, with the result
that power asymmetry becomes more subtle rather than disappearing’.
Patten’s democratisation of the discourse of ‘Question time’ may to a
greater or lesser degree be cosmetic. This section focuses on this cosmetic
dimension – on the extent to which Patten manipulated the discourse to
achieve his own ends.
The supreme irony of ‘Question time’ is that Patten, a non-elected colo-
nial governor, used the meeting to promote democracy (with a big D) and
democratic (with a small d) discourse. There must be suspicions on the part
of Hong Kong people of a representative of a colonial power which, on the
verge of sovereignty reverting to China, suddenly decides to increase the
pace of democratic reform, when for some 150 years there was little attempt
to promote democracy at all (see Flowerdew, 1998; Miners, 1991 for back-
ground).
The need to overcome these severe difficulties makes necessary, it can
be argued, the heavy emphasis on downplaying markers of hierarchy and
power asymmetry, and on maximising strategies of involvement in the dis-
course of the meeting. To what extent, then, are these discourse strategies
manipulative?
4.7.1 Structuring of the discourse event

The most obvious cosmetic device is the overall structuring of the discourse
event. The title ‘Question time with the Governor’ places emphasis on the
role of the audience, of the questioners. The meeting was an opportunity
for the people of Hong Kong to put questions to the governor, one would
think. However, in actual fact, the meeting was structured in such a way that
control of the floor (with a few exceptions, when questioners took tempo-
rary control) was always with the governor. From the governor’s point of
view, the main function of the questioners is, arguably, to provide him with
a platform from which to put over his message, and to further manipulate
the audience with his superior language power.
During the meeting, which lasted 90 minutes, only 11 questions were
asked. Questions, with their canonical form of single interrogative clause,
tend by their nature to be shorter than answers. Wilson (1990) reviews a
number of quantitative studies of political interviews and parliamentary
questions and answers, all of which show answers to be considerably longer
than questions. In ‘Question time’, a measurement of the time taken by
questions and answers (Table 4.1) shows that Patten’s answers took up
approximately 50 per cent more time than did the questions; 22 minutes
and 35 seconds of the turn-taking phase were taken up by Patten’s answers,
as compared to 15 minutes exactly for the questions.11 In addition, Patten
Table 4.1 Time taken up by different phases of the meeting

(not including translation)
Questions 15’
Answers 22’ 35”
Opening statement 4’ 16”
Closing statement 1’ 23”
Total Patten 28’ 14”
demonstrated his dominance by prefacing and concluding the question and

answer part of the meeting with lengthy statements, which took up a further
4 minutes and 16 seconds and one minute and 23 seconds, respectively.12
In addition to this quantitative dominance, Patten controlled the turn-
taking in terms of quality. By not allowing the right of reply, he ensured that
he always had the last say on any issue. One questioner was so frustrated by
this situation that he walked out of the meeting, in order to demonstrate his
dissatisfaction with Patten’s answer to his question.
Perhaps the most striking power asymmetry in the meeting concerns the
need for translation. English would not have been used in the meeting, and
translation would not have been necessary, if the meeting had been chaired
by a Hong Kong person who spoke Cantonese. The use of English draws
attention to the fact that Patten, in spite of his role as a promoter of democ-
racy, was essentially a colonialist, requiring the people he is addressing to
use an alien language in their own country.
4.7.2 Mise en abyme

Another manipulative feature of the meeting is Patten’s use of the play-
within-a-play structure or mise en abyme, as outlined above. Whatever
the audience may have thought of Patten’s plans for political reform, or
his more global ideas on the democratisation of discourse in Hong Kong,
Patten forced them to be protagonists in his play within a play of demo-
cratic discourse. Van Dijk (1993a) talks of the ‘resistance, reproduction,
and joint-production’ of individuals in relation to the exertion of language
power by elites (Flowerdew, 2008; Foucault, 1980). Whichever of these
roles the audience of ‘Question time’ might prefer to take in relation to
Patten’s discourse, they are forced in ‘Question time’ to participate in its
joint production.
It might be argued that members of the audience, through their opportunity
to ask challenging questions, at least had one opportunity to resist Patten’s
elitist discourse. This may be true to a certain extent. Some questioners did
demonstrate considerable language power of their own and asked quite
challenging questions. However, even here they were, in a way, playing
into Patten’s hands. It was the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan
(one of Patten’s Tory forebears) who realised that, when interviewed
on television, he would present a better image if he engaged in debate with
a strong opponent rather than a neutral television commentator (reported

in Atkinson, 1984). Macmillan astutely realised that strong opponents,
themselves exerting considerable language power, may, ironically, help poli-
ticians rather than hinder them. A politician who can better a strong ques-
tioner surely creates a superior image to a politician who merely counters
weak opposition.
It seems that Patten had also learned this lesson. A close study of the
meeting reveals that Patten’s most eloquent and emotive responses are
to those questions which are themselves most eloquent and emotive.
Evidence from this is in the heavier use of rhetorical devices, most notably
repetition. Examples of the increased language power applied by Patten in
response to powerful questions have already been cited. Notice also how
these responses, marked by a heavy use of repetition, evoke applause from
the audience. Patten seemed to be aware of another lesson of political ora-
tory (reported by Atkinson, 1984), namely the potential of repetition and
listing to elicit applause.
4.7.3 Involvement and sense of community

Another feature of Patten’s use of discourse the sincerity of which might be
called into question is his concern to develop involvement and a sense of
community. Again, his status as a colonial governor provides the rationale
for calling him to account here. Many aspects of Patten’s position and back-
ground marked him as an outsider and not a member of the community. He
was not ethnic Chinese; he did not speak Chinese; and by his own admis-
sion, he had little knowledge of Chinese history and culture. At the time
of the meeting he had only been in Hong Kong for a few months and his
commitment to Hong Kong had to end with the reversion of sovereignty to
China in mid-1997. This background makes Patten’s use of certain involve-
ment strategies particularly suspect.
4.7.4 Use of indexicals

One cosmetic strategy which stands out is the use of indexicals. When
Patten used we or our, there are a number of possible interpretations as to
whom these items refer.13 We could have meant Patten and the audience
present at the meeting; or it could have meant Patten and the people
of Hong Kong in general; or it could have meant Patten and the Hong
Kong government. In previous extracts, Patten was referring to the audi-
ence present in the hall or to the people of Hong Kong in general. In the
following extract, Patten seems to have been referring to himself and his
government:
The decisions that I have to take and others in government have to take
are better if we have to go and explain our decision to you. That’s what
accountability and what greater democracy means.
None of these uses is a case of untruth, but neither do they present the
whole truth. More blatantly, on occasions, Patten referred to past events or
states of affairs resulting from past events or policies before he came to Hong
Kong. Here Patten did seem to be claiming credit for things with which he
had nothing to do:
I think low taxes is one of our successes
[referring to progress in repatriating Vietnamese boat people]. .. a number

[of Vietnamese] are going under the orderly repatriation scheme which of
course we played a very significant part to negotiate
The transformation of housing in Hong Kong has been a very important

reason for Hong Kong’s stability and social harmony. ... in our manage-
ment of public housing
None of these policies was instituted by Patten; they were all in place
before he came to Hong Kong. Patten also refers to the future beyond 1997
and the handover of sovereignty. The following extract takes us up to 1997 –
when, it is true, Patten would still be in Hong Kong (at least until the end of
June) – but the implicature (Grice, 1975) must be that the people of Hong
Kong, if not Patten, would have been living in Hong Kong and making up
its community beyond the handover:
I do think that by 1997 that we should be able to be living in a com-

munity in which about sixty percent of people are owning their own
homes
To what extent Patten can be said to be ‘living in the community’ when

he shared his time between his official residence and his country lodge
and made frequent official and unofficial trips overseas while the major-
ity of Hong Kong people lived in extremely crowded conditions, is also
debatable.
4.7.5 Manipulation of topics and facts

Finally, as an example of Patten’s manipulation and insincerity, we can
see how he manipulated the topics and facts which were referred to in the
meeting. An earlier section of this chapter, ‘Presenting a caring attitude’,
highlighted the range of positive topics that Patten chose to mention in the
meeting: provision for the elderly, disabled and otherwise disadvantaged
members of the community and the measures being taken to improve their
lot. For every topic on which he chose to focus, there are of course other
topics which he chose not to mention. In one sense, therefore, the selec-
tion of topics which showed Patten and his government in a good light is
manipulative. Why did he choose topics which show him in a good light,
but not more contentious issues?
In theory, in a democratic discourse, this is where the role of the ques-
tioners should come in. They have an opportunity to raise topics which
might challenge the image that Patten wanted to project of himself and
of his government. But even here, Patten exerted control. One questioner
asked him two questions, one concerning his political reforms, the other
the government’s treatment of illegal immigrants from China. Patten
chose to answer the first question, which suited him well, given that his
major purpose in the meeting was to promote his reforms. The second
question, which might have been more difficult to answer convincingly,
he ignored.
Even where Patten was unable to avoid a challenging topic, he was able
to manipulate the facts to present a positive image. Such is the case with
regard to the Vietnamese migrants in Hong Kong. Hong Kong had tens of
thousands of Vietnamese migrants housed in detention camps while the
Hong Kong government negotiated with Vietnam over their repatriation.
It is probably true to say that the majority of Hong Kong people resented
the presence of these migrants, who were accepted in Hong Kong by the
British government, but who were paid for by Hong Kong taxpayers. Patten
answered a question on this issue as follows:
Er, first of all I, didn’t mention Vietnamese boat people er in my speech

because in my judgment that is in the last few years we now have a situ-
ation in which largely because of voluntary returns home the er number
of Vietnamese in our camps has fallen to below fifty thousand and each
month about another thousand return voluntarily. In addition, a number
are going under the orderly repatriation scheme which of course we
played a very significant part to negotiate. So the problem is becoming,
I am pleased to say, less acute. We are going to be able for instance to close
a camp shortly which will allow us to put another two hundred police-
men and policewomen on our streets, which is an important step forward
and we will continue to press for a successful conclusion to the policy.
What will make the greatest difference in my judgment is as it becomes
clear to those in the camps er that the Vietnamese economy is beginning
to improve. And many Hong Kong businessmen are playing a significant
part in that. I hope that it’s possible to see further improvements.
Patten’s manipulation on this issue is suggested in a number of ways.

First, the reason he gave for not referring to the Vietnamese question in his
policy speech was perhaps disingenuous. The Vietnamese migrant issue was
of considerable interest to Hong Kong people; regular coverage was given
to it in newspaper articles and on TV news and current affairs programmes.
The issue would therefore have merited a place in his policy speech. More
likely, it was omitted because of its controversial nature and the unpopu-
larity of the Hong Kong government’s policy on the Vietnamese migrants
issue – a policy dictated by Britain and Britain’s place within the United
Nations. Certainly, inclusion of this topic, with its overtones of infringe-
ment of human rights, would have put the proposals for greater democracy,
which were the main focus of the speech, in a poor light.
Second, Patten’s portrayal of a regular and orderly return of Vietnamese is
misleading. The images that would have sprung to the mind of most Hong
Kong people with regard to Vietnamese migrants would probably be, on
the one hand, of violent riots put down by armed riot police, using tear gas
and wielding clubs and shields, and, on the other hand, of migrants being
forced onto aircraft returning them to Vietnam against their will. These are
the images which had been most consistently appearing in newspapers and
on television in the time leading up to the ‘Question time’ meeting. Patten’s
claim that each month another thousand go, with its suggestion of a regular
flow, is also misleading; the repatriation programme was fraught with prob-
lems, and did not run anywhere near as smoothly as this expression suggests.
The Hong Kong government consistently had difficulty in persuading volun-
teers to return to Vietnam; and even for those who did agree to go, there were
difficulties in getting the Vietnamese government to accept them.
Third, the reference to voluntary repatriation is misleading. Those migrants
returning ‘voluntarily’ only did so because they would otherwise have been
forced to go under the terms of the so-called orderly repatriation scheme.
Fourth, Patten is manipulative in his suggestion that the closure of a camp
would lead directly to the addition of 200–300 police officers on the streets
of Hong Kong. Obviously there is no such clear causal relation.
Fifth, the term ‘orderly repatriation scheme’ is itself manipulative. The
adjective orderly is a euphemism for forced. Repatriation under this scheme
was carried out under duress, and was usually accompanied by violence
between police and migrants. The term ‘repatriation’ suggests returning
to one’s homeland; but the migrants’ goal was to escape from their own
country and to find asylum under a more hospitable regime.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed a key public discourse event in Hong Kong during
its transitional period from British to Chinese sovereignty. It has shown
how the organiser and principal protagonist in the event, Chris Patten,
the Hong Kong governor, used ‘Question time’ to promote ‘democratic’
development in Hong Kong – not only in terms of political reforms, but
also, and more significantly for this study, in terms of order of discourse.
The meeting is symptomatic and catalytic in Patten’s agenda of shifting the
order of public discourse in Hong Kong in preparation for the change of
sovereignty and the greater autonomy promised for Hong Kong post-1997.
Two principal strategies have been identified in Patten’s use of discourse:

the use of mise en abyme, i.e. making the meeting a ‘play within a play’,
to reflect the sort of democratic discourse that Patten wanted to promote
in Hong Kong; and the removal of overt markers of hierarchy and power
asymmetries within this discourse, by means of rhetorical devices such as
informality and involvement.
In promoting his democratic ideals, the analysis has shown how Patten’s
use of discourse was at the same time manipulative; his removal of overt
markers of hierarchy and power asymmetries, by means of devices such
as informality and involvement, may have been cosmetic. While promot-
ing democracy and democratic discourse, Patten ironically undermined
it, thereby highlighting the impossibility of arriving at a true democratic
discourse, in terms of Gastil’s four criteria for an ideal democratic order of
discourse (1992). In particular, Gastil’s criterion that members of the ‘demos’
must have equal opportunities to participate in the deliberative process in
an ideal democratic order of discourse is manipulated by Patten. On the
surface, there was participation by the members of the public, but in reality
this participation was rigidly controlled by the governor.
To conclude this chapter, consideration should be given to the ques-
tion of the extent to which Patten was successful in acting as a catalyst of
social and discursive change in pre-handover Hong Kong. Some indication
of social and discursive change which occurred since ‘Question time’ was
given earlier in the chapter. But the true test was to come after the change
of sovereignty in 1997.
As noted in Chapter 1, China repeatedly stated that it would dismantle
Patten’s political reforms when it took over, on the grounds that they were
in contravention of the terms of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law,
and this is what indeed happened. A provisional legislature was appointed
in place of Patten’s legislature until fresh elections were held according
to the old arrangements. However, there is disagreement about just how
‘democratic’ this new legislature is, with the perpetuation of functional
constituencies (half of the seats) and the limitation of the power of the
legislature to only being able to institute new legislature if it does not have
any budgetary implications, in accordance with Hong Kong’s ‘executive-led’
system of government.
The discourse change which accompanied the political reforms may
perhaps be more enduring. It is China’s intention that Hong Kong will
remain an international centre for trade, banking, communications and
information. Hong Kong people will continue to travel for business,
education and contact with their relatives living overseas. This will encour-
age the free flow of ideas. In addition, China wants to use Hong Kong as a
model, applying the ‘one country, two systems’ format to reunification with
Taiwan. Any repression of free speech in Hong Kong would not encourage
Taiwan to go down this road. However, one pro-democracy legislator, Emily
Lau, expressed her pessimism regarding the future. In a BBC Any Questions
radio programme, broadcast from the governor’s residence in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong Government, 1995), a panel of local personalities, including
Governor Patten, was asked: ‘Could you hold Any Questions in this build-
ing in such a free and frank manner after 1997?’ Lau’s answer specifically
alluded to ‘Question time’ meetings, as follows:
The answer is no. I don’t think there will be freedom of expression after
1997 and I don’t know whether the future chief executive will choose to
live here. But whoever it is, I don’t think they will allow to have such a
lively discussion session here and neither will, I think, the future chief
executive do what the governor does right now and that is every year,
after delivering the policy address, he will go to the Town Hall to answer
questions from the public ... I think we are going to have quite a closed
society ... So definitely they will not tolerate free speech.
At the time of writing, Ms Lau has not been proved right, however. There
is still free speech in Hong Kong and, while reducing the number of Town
Hall sessions, Tung did continue with them. His successor Donald Tsang,
indeed, held a public debate with another pro-democracy legislator, Audrey
Eu, regarding his administration’s proposals for electoral arrangements for
the lead-up to universal suffrage in 2017. At the same time, those arrange-
ments have been criticised for not being clear about what exactly is meant
by the term ‘universal suffrage’ and whether functional constituencies, for
example, will be continued.
Part II
Intercultural Discourses in
Hong Kong
5
Face in Intercultural Political
Discourse
5.1 Introduction
Studies of intercultural discourse provide opportunities for investigating

real-world issues and communication problems, on one hand, while adding
to our knowledge about important theoretical constructs in discourse the-
ory, on the other (Tannen, 1985). This chapter, which presents a case study
of Sino-British relations over Hong Kong, has as its twin goals the develop-
ment of our understanding of a difficult historical period in the relationship
between two countries, while at the same time testing the applicability of
a theory of intercultural communication – that of face – to a field – that of
international relations – where it is not normally applied. Acknowledging
the universality of the notion of face, the chapter argues for the need for
such models to allow for cultural relativism in their application.
The field of international relations is in many ways the foremost context
within which to study intercultural communication. When representatives
of countries with different languages, cultures and modes of communicat-
ing come together to reconcile their differences, the stakes can be very high
and miscommunication can have tragic results (Tannen, 1985). From a dis-
course analysis point of view, the study of international relations is made
difficult by the fact that most diplomatic negotiations take place behind
closed doors and remain confidential. At best, discourse analysts can piece
together diplomatic encounters, based on second-hand accounts. However,
diplomacy takes place on many levels besides that of direct negotiation
between governments, and one important level is that of the mass media.
Governments may seek to influence the governments of other countries and
public opinion, both at home and abroad, with such devices as public state-
ments and ‘off-the-record’ briefings for journalists which are then reported
in the media. The situation during the final years of British administration
of Hong Kong is a fruitful research site in this respect, because as a result of
Patten’s unilateral introduction of constitutional reforms at the beginning
of his governorship in 1992, direct relations between the British Hong Kong
117
government under its leader, Chris Patten, and representatives of the

Chinese government – with the exception of one meeting – were never
established. At the same time, however, a virulent campaign of ‘megaphone
diplomacy’ was conducted through the media, a form of dialogue which can
be productively analysed from an intercultural discourse perspective.
5.2 Chris Patten and Sino-British Hong Kong relations1
As mentioned in earlier chapters, from the beginning of the negotiations

leading to the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 and agreement on
the transfer of sovereignty, British policy on Hong Kong was managed by a
group of Foreign Office officials under the leadership of Sir Percy Cradock.
As sinologists, these men took a conciliatory line in their dealings with the
Chinese government. They believed Britain to be in a very weak negotiating
position as far as the future of Hong Kong was concerned, because the lease
which granted Britain sovereignty over the major part of the territory was
due to run out in 1997 and at that point China would be free to do what
it wanted, whatever the British government might have felt. British policy
was to obtain the best deal possible for Hong Kong, but in the belief that
ultimately, in the words of Cradock (1994: 211), ‘the Chinese held virtually
all the cards’.
During the transitional period between the signing of the Joint Declaration
and the handover in 1997, Sino-British negotiations focused on the pace of
the constitutional development which had been offered to Hong Kong
as a future Special Administrative Region of China with a high degree of
autonomy. The history of this period, under the governorship of Sir David
Wilson, was of British acquiescence to a gradual erosion of the democratic
development which Britain would have liked to have seen introduced.
In 1992, however, as reported in earlier chapters, following a general
election, the British prime minister, John Major, replaced the Hong Kong
governor, Sir David Wilson, with someone who was neither a diplomat nor
a sinologist, Chris Patten, a former cabinet minister.
The contrast between Patten and his predecessor, Wilson, could not have
been greater. Wilson had devoted his life to the study of China, its language
and culture.2 Patten, on the other hand, on his own admission, knew noth-
ing of China and never made any effort to learn the language (Flowerdew,
1997c). There was a feeling in the British government that the accommo-
dating stance of the Foreign Office mandarins and their stranglehold on
Britain’s policy on China had led to humiliating setbacks for Britain. As
Cradock (1994: 250) himself notes, the Foreign Office sinologists:
came to occupy a leading role in the demonology of the time. They

were alleged to be so besotted with things Chinese, or alternatively, so
overawed by China, that they surrendered automatically to Peking’s
Face in Intercultural Political Discourse 119
demands, or even, by anticipation, before the demands were formulated.

‘Pre-emptive cringe’ was a phrase much employed.
A decision was therefore taken by Britain to switch away from the policy of
accommodation and become more assertive, even at the risk of confronta-
tion with China.
In selecting Chris Patten, former speech-writer for Margaret Thatcher,
cabinet minister and chairman of the Conservative Party, the British govern-
ment had chosen someone with very good credentials for the job. Patten
was a heavyweight politician used to the cut and thrust of parliamentary
politics. As environment minister under Thatcher, he had to introduce a
hugely unpopular poll tax and had to confront angry opposition, both
inside and outside Parliament – including street riots – to the plans he was
introducing.
In stark contrast to previous governors, Patten presented himself in Hong
Kong as open and accountable and willing to speak out. On arrival in Hong
Kong, in his swearing-in speech, he stated that he had ‘no hidden agendas’,
and that ‘if you want to know what I believe, if you want to know what I
think, and if you want to know what I intend to do, read what I say and
listen to what I say’. He also said that he ‘had no secret agenda’ and that his
only agenda was ‘the one I have laid before you today. It is clear. It is public.
And so it will remain’ (Patten, 1992a). In his speeches, he consistently said
that he would seek to ‘stand up for Hong Kong against China’.3 Although
in his swearing-in speech he said that he sought cooperation with China,
he also stated that this was on condition that ‘trust is a two-way street’, and
in both his swearing-in speech and his first major policy speech he listed
cooperation with China as the last of his priorities, where his predecessor,
Wilson, had always put it first (Patten, 1992a, b).
During the three-month period from his arrival in Hong Kong in July
1992 to his first policy speech in October, Patten refused invitations to
visit Beijing, saying that his first responsibility was to the people of Hong
Kong and that he would visit Beijing after his speech. The Chinese gov-
ernment was concerned about the political reform plan he was preparing
concerning arrangements which needed to be made for elections in 1994
and 1995. China and Britain had engaged in close consultation on all
previous electoral arrangements and China was concerned that Patten had
abandoned this policy of prior consultation. When Patten announced his
plans in the October speech, he said that they were ‘for discussion’ (Patten,
1992a). However, having been excluded from consultation beforehand,
China refused to cooperate. Shortly after the announcement of his propos-
als, Patten made his one and only visit to Beijing, but a six-hour meeting
with the head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Lu Ping (Patten’s
opposite number in the Chinese government), resulted in no agreement
and was followed by a press conference held by the Chinese side in which
Lu launched the first of what were to prove to be many personal attacks

on Patten, stating that the Hong Kong governor’s approach left China with
no option but to participate in the confrontation which he had started
(Dimbleby, 1997a: 153–4, 1997b).
In subsequent months, Patten was to be subjected to a continuous tirade
of such attacks from Chinese officials, the official Chinese media and the
China-backed press in Hong Kong. Epithets used to refer to the Hong Kong
governor included ‘a man to be cursed by history for a thousand years’,
‘a whore’, ‘a shyster’, ‘a snake’, ‘a robber’, ‘a thief’, ‘a prostitute’ and ‘a tango
dancer’.4 Patten’s understanding in putting forward his reform proposals ‘for
discussion’ was that some sort of compromise between what he was sug-
gesting and what China wanted would be the outcome (Dimbleby, 1997a).
When, after many months of megaphone diplomacy via the media, talks
did begin about his proposals, 17 rounds of negotiations were conducted
with no agreement being arrived at. China insisted that Patten withdraw
the essential provisions of his proposed arrangements, while Britain and
Patten insisted they had a ‘bottom line’ beyond which it would not go in
any compromise (Flowerdew, 1998).
As a result of this impasse, Patten went ahead with his original reforms,
while China set up its own shadow government (referred to as a second
kitchen in Chinese) which in 1997 would replace the legislature elected
under Patten’s arrangements. During this interim period of an appointed
legislature, revised electoral arrangements would be made.
5.3 Accusations concerning Patten’s insensitivity to

Chinese face
During the period preceding and following the transfer of Hong Kong from
British to Chinese rule in June 1997, there was considerable controversy
over the confrontational policy pursued by the British under the governor-
ship of Patten. According to Patten’s own reading and that of his supporters,
by standing up to China, two objectives were achieved. First, Britain was
able to withdraw from Hong Kong honourably, having done its best, if belat-
edly, to introduce more democracy in the face of Chinese intransigence.
Second, a more accommodating stance towards China would have given
China all it wanted anyway; at least, in pushing through his reforms, Patten
had given Hong Kong people a taste of democracy which would encourage
them to stand up for more in the longer term.
According to Patten’s critics and the pro-Beijing camp, who wanted a
smooth transition of sovereignty above all else, Patten’s period of office as
governor was a disaster, creating five years of confrontation when Hong
Kong should have been learning how to cooperate with China in preparation
for the reversion of sovereignty. Patten made two vital errors of judgement,
according to these critics, first, in expecting China to come to some sort of
compromise on his reform proposals, and second, in imagining that China

would not dare dismantle his reforms once they had been presented as a fait
accompli and it had been demonstrated that they were operating smoothly
(Dimbleby, 1997a, b).
Many of those commentators who were critical of Patten’s performance
attributed what they saw as his failure to his lack of knowledge of China
and how to deal with the Chinese. These commentators invariably referred
to Patten’s inability or unwillingness to consider China’s sense of face, ‘To
him [Patten], taking a confrontational approach may not necessarily hurt
the face or feelings of Chinese officials’, as one writer put it (Cheng, 1993).
Another writer described the reactions to Patten’s performance of those used
to dealing with China in the following terms:
The cognoscenti attuned to reading between the Beijing lines suggest that
the governor’s fundamental mistake was his failure to give the Chinese
leadership face. He did not inform them of his election proposals before
his first Legco address last year, and they have responded as expected
when humiliated, especially by a colonial devil. (McGee, 1993a)
A third commentator analysed Patten’s actions as follows:
He started off by ignoring China. Then he defied China. China suffered

a tremendous loss of face with the Hong Kong and Chinese people and
began to retaliate psychologically, even instinctively. From then on, it
was a rough ride for Hong Kong. (Chang, 1994)
When, on the other hand, the British – against Patten’s better judgement5 –
did finally agree to start negotiations with the Chinese over his reform
proposals, this was described by one journalist as having ‘largely restored
Beijing’s standing and injured sense of face’ (McGee, 1993a).
Journalists were not the only ones to criticise Patten’s position in terms of
face. Former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew insisted that ‘face
matters because face affects [the Chinese leadership’s] standing with their
own people’ (Lee, 1993). An unnamed ‘colleague’ of the former Singapore
leader was reported as saying that ‘China won’t reach an agreement because
it can’t. National pride or face is at stake. They can’t concede to Britain, or to
Mr Patten, whom they ignore’ (McGee, 1993b). Even the senior member of
Patten’s Executive Council (cabinet), Baroness Lydia Dunn, advised restraint
in dealing with the Chinese government. ‘Making them lose face is not the
way to be successful’, she said (Ellison, 1993). Finally, the Chinese govern-
ment itself mentioned face. One anonymous Chinese official, for example,
described Patten’s introduction of his reform proposals to the Legislative
Council as ‘[the British Hong Kong governor having] spat in the face of
Beijing’ (Yeung and Fan, 1993).
Patten, on the other hand, declared himself to be unconcerned about

issues of face: ‘I don’t care about face. How can a Western politician of
my background be obsessed about face?’ he said in one interview (Patten,
1993: 11), explaining in another that he was less sensitive to face than
Chinese officials because before coming to Hong Kong he had been demo-
cratically elected and was used to criticism and being heckled (Binks, 1993).
When interviewed by the present writer for this research, Patten was asked
if he took advice on cultural issues. His answer was as follows:
I could get advice on these issues. How useful it would be and how much
that would certainly affect what I say is another matter. (Flowerdew,
1997c: 41)
When asked if he could think of any situations in which cultural issues

had led to misunderstandings with the Chinese government, he mentioned
that he had been told that irony can sound like sarcasm and that humour
is open to misunderstanding. However, in a reinforcement of his ethno-
centric attitude, he added that ‘when you’ve been called a whore and a
serpent you start to scratch your head about what precisely the subtleties
are that you haven’t quite managed to learn about’ (Flowerdew, 1997c: 41).
5.4 Face and intercultural communication
Although commonly used as a folk term (as indicated in the previous sec-
tion), since Goffman (1967, 1971), face – the positive impression that human
beings are presumed to want to show in any social encounter – has been the
object of considerable academic inquiry as a fundamental of human behav-
iour. For Goffman, in every social encounter, an individual will tend to take
a line, ‘a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his
view of the situations and through this his evaluation of the participants,
especially himself’ (1967: 5). Whether or not individuals intend to take a
line, they will be perceived as having done so by the other participants. In
dealing with the response of other participants, individuals must therefore
take into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of them.
The term face is defined by Goffman as ‘the positive social value a person
effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during
a particular contact’ (1967: 5). Each person, subculture and society has its
own repertoire of face-saving practices, but this set of practices is drawn
from a universal framework. Individuals may have, or maintain face, when
they maintain their line, but they may also be in wrong face, when informa-
tion comes out which is incompatible with their line. They may be out of
face, when they do not have a line that they might be expected to have in
a certain encounter and they may save face, when they seek to preserve the
impression that they have not lost face. Finally, individuals may give face,
when they arrange for others to take a better line than might have been
available to them.
For Goffman, the operation of face-work, or mutual face enhancement,
is dependent on the willingness of interactants to engage in it. In some
situations, one or more interactants may decide not to participate, prefer-
ring instead to hurt the feelings of others, forcing them to feel guilt and
remorse and creating a situation of sustained ritual disequilibrium, a period
of interaction in which face-work breaks down. In this state, the purpose in
interaction is to preserve one’s own line while scoring points against one’s
adversary. Winners are those who introduce the most information which is
favourable to themselves and unfavourable to others, thereby demonstrat-
ing that they are more capable than their adversaries. In such interchanges,
Goffman notes, an audience is normally required.
Following Goffman, for Brown and Levinson, face is ‘the public self image
that every member wants to claim for himself’ (1987: 61). Face consists of
two desires which interactants attribute to one another in communication:
the desire to be unimpeded (negative face) and the desire to be approved
of (positive face) (1987: 62). An important feature of Brown and Levinson’s
model is that, in addition to acting according to their face wants, interact-
ants are also be assumed to be guided by rationality, i.e. they will assume
means which satisfy their ends. Face wants and the application of rationality
together result in particular types of linguistic behaviour which Brown and
Levinson refer to as negative and positive politeness: negative politeness to
show independence; and positive politeness to show solidarity.6 In Brown
and Levinson’s model positive and negative politeness only come into play
in the performance of speech acts which are intrinsically face threatening
(FTAs). In performing a face-threatening act speakers have a number of
options, as shown in Figure 5.1.
The speaker may perform the FTA off record (i.e. indirectly) or on record
(directly). If the latter, then this may be with or without redressive action. It
is important to note that in Brown and Levinson’s model, it is only where
redressive action is concerned that positive and negative politeness come
into play. Brown and Levinson provide an extremely detailed taxonomy
1. Without redressive action, baldly

On record 2. Positive politeness
Do the FTA With redressive action
4. Off record 3. Negative politeness
5. Don’t do the FTA
Figure 5.1 Options available when performing a face-threatening act (Brown and
Levinson, 1987: 69)
of strategies which speakers use when expressing negative and positive

politeness.7 Choice of strategy is determined by the estimated risk of loss of
face in the performance of a given speech act, and by the relative power and
social distance of interlocutors.
Face is a universal phenomenon, according to Goffman and Brown and
Levinson. One indication of this being the case is the existence of a folk ter-
minology for the notion in many different languages and cultures. Indeed,
with respect to Chinese, Goffman’s original adoption of the term was influ-
enced by his reading of the Chinese scholar, Hu (1944), on the Chinese
notion of face (Goffman 1967: 5–6, note 1). In spite of its universality,
however, face is nevertheless subject to cultural variation in its application.
What constitutes a desirable face may vary across cultures. For this reason,
face is central to an understanding of intercultural communication (Scollon
and Scollon, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987). In addition to such broad
variation, face may also vary between what might be called subcultures,
such as gender, generations, organisations, regions and class (Cupach and
Imahori, 1993).8 Furthermore, face may vary between individuals within
any given subculture – a cognitive variable – according to the degree to
which they may seek autonomy or acceptance, on the one hand, and be
able or willing to address the face concerns of interlocutors, on the other
(Cupach and Imahori, 1993). Acknowledging the potential for such varia-
tion, it is to be noted that in their reissue of their original theory, Brown
and Levinson (1987) accept a greater role for cultural variation within their
overall broad framework, writing as follows:
Such cultural differences doubtless exist and work down into the linguis-
tic details of the particular face-redressive strategies preferred in a given
society or group. Nevertheless, for the purposes of intercultural compari-
son developed here, we consider that our framework provides a primary
descriptive format within which, or in contrast to which, such differences
can be described. (1987: 15)
Taking the relativistic position further, while acknowledging face as

a universal, some researchers have questioned the whole basis of ‘universal’
models such as that of Brown and Levinson (Du-Babcock and Babcock,
1997; Matsumoto, 1988). Brown and Levinson’s model of face and polite-
ness, as already mentioned, takes as its starting point the rational, free
individual. Face wants are determined from the perspective of the rational
actions of an individual interacting with others. This may be appropriate
for individualistic Western societies, these researchers have argued, but in
oriental societies, which tend to be collectivistic (Hu, 1944; Ho, 1976, 1996;
Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Ting-Toomey, 1985, 1989), an individual’s face wants
are determined by the group as much as, if not more than, the individual. It
is the reputation and face wants of the social network or in-group as a whole
which motivates the individual, not just the reputation and face wants of
the person directly concerned. At the same time, an individual’s face can be
affected not just by the actions of that individual, but also by members of
that individual’s in-group.
The collectivistic nature of oriental societies is rooted in the Confucian
notion of filial piety and the so-called cardinal relations of ruler–subject,
father–son, husband–wife, elder–younger and friend–friend (King, 1994;
Scollon and Scollon, 1994; Wu, 1996). An individual’s identity is deter-
mined in terms of these relationships (or their fictive equivalents, such as
teacher–student), each of which requires the subordinate partner in the
relationship to submit to the authority of the senior. Absolute authority of
parents over their children and, by extension, of governments over their
subjects, requires that individuals strive to bring honour to their in-group
and at the same time avoid disgrace (Ho, 1996). Failure to live up to one’s
filial duty results in the worst type of shame and loss of face.
In line with these other researchers just cited who emphasise the cultural
dimension of face, Bond and Hwang (1986) claim that the collectivist and
hierarchical structure of Chinese society has an important determining
effect on communicative behaviour. This contrasts with American soci-
ety, for Bond and Hwang, where patterns of communication are typically
determined by the values of individualism and egalitarianism. In American
culture, according to Bond and Hwang, interactants have a freer choice
in the use of language and action according to their individual wishes. In
Chinese culture, on the other hand, the hierarchical structure of a situ-
ation is a more important determinant in what is said or done. In other
words, Americans are less inhibited by face concerns in performing their
actions than are Chinese, for whom face is likely to be a consideration
of the foremost importance. As Gao et al. (1996: 289) put it, ‘the notion of
face permeates every aspect of interpersonal relationships in Chinese culture
because of the culture’s overarching relational orientation’.9
Bond and Hwang (1986) describe how face typically operates in Chinese
culture according to six categories: enhancing one’s own face; enhancing
other’s face; losing one’s own face; hurting other’s face; saving one’s own
face; and saving other’s face. This model will be illustrated in greater detail
in the analysis which follows in the next section.
5.5 Patten’s behaviour from a Chinese perspective of face
The folk accounts of the failure of Hong Kong Governor Patten and China
to communicate effectively cited earlier in this chapter clearly interpret
the breakdown in terms of face. From the Chinese point of view, Patten
refused to respect the face of the Chinese government and people, while,
as far as Patten was concerned, face was not a real issue. From the perspec-
tive of Goffman, the war of words between the two parties can be clearly
interpreted as a case of sustained ritual disequilibrium, with both sides sticking

to their line and attempting to score points off each other and with the
Hong Kong public and international press acting as the obligatory audi-
ence. Using the terminology of Brown and Levinson (1987), Patten refused
to address the positive face wants of the Chinese by failing to make use of
positive politeness strategies. These analyses do not lead very far, however.
In particular, they do not take into account the contrasting cultural nature
of face which is considered to be such a factor in the folk accounts. In pur-
suit of an explanation in more culturally relativistic terms, using Bond and
Hwang’s (1986) model, this section of the chapter investigates the possibil-
ity of interpreting the breakdown in Patten’s relations with China in terms
of primarily a Chinese model of face.
5.5.1 Bond and Hwang’s six categories of Chinese face applied to

Governor Patten
Although the six categories of Chinese face of Bond and Hwang (1986)
referred to earlier apply to individuals and their relations with their in-group
members, they may also be extended to relations between nations and
their governments. The metalanguage used by the Chinese government in
discussing international relations is indicative of this perspective. Officials
of the People’s Republic frequently refer to China as the ‘Motherland’,
especially in the context of Hong Kong, which has recently ‘returned to
the Motherland’.10 Similarly, officials refer to the ‘feelings of the Chinese
people’ being affected when relations with other countries are concerned
and the need for Hong Kong people to ‘love the Motherland’. International
relations, in terms of face, may thus be viewed as a fictive extension of in-
group or family relations. The six categories of Bond and Hwang thus pro-
vide a framework within which to analyse Governor Patten’s conduct from
a Chinese perspective.
In what follows, each of Bond and Hwang’s face categories will be briefly
described and then applied to the conduct of Governor Patten. In this way
a possible interpretation of Patten’s behaviour is provided from a perspective
of Chinese face.
5.5.1.1 Category 1: Enhancing one’s own face

This type of face is concerned with managing the impression one gives to
others. It depends on finding out what others value and demonstrating
to them that one possesses these attributes. This should be done subtly,
the aim being to present a superior impression of oneself while preserving
modesty.
Applying this category to the behaviour of the British Hong Kong governor,
Patten clearly made no effort to enhance his face in the eyes of the Chinese
government. As such, he was perceived as lacking in dignity. Previous Foreign
Office dealings with the Chinese had been characterised by efforts to create
social harmony and personal familiarity before negotiations took place. In

stark contrast to this approach, as noted earlier, invitations to Beijing at the
beginning of Patten’s governorship were rejected. In presenting his consti-
tutional proposals as a fait accompli and refusing to consult with China on
them beforehand, the Hong Kong governor again shocked the Chinese side,
who had become accustomed to the careful diplomacy of Cradock’s people
and in particular, Governor Wilson, Patten’s immediate predecessor.
Patten did not demonstrate due modesty either, as enhancement of one’s
own face would require. He claimed that he spoke with the full authority
of John Major, the British prime minister, his personal friend. From the
Chinese point of view, as a mere governor, with a relatively low position
in the political hierarchy, this was unacceptable, especially as the territory
and people Patten claimed to speak for were considered by China to fall
under their sovereignty. In this respect, Patten’s high-profile personal meet-
ings with important world leaders, including those of the United States,
Germany and Japan, would have been received by the Chinese as a further
indication of the Hong Kong governor behaving above his station.
5.5.1.2 Category 2: Enhancing other’s face

In addition to enhancing their own face, individuals should apply tactics of
ingratiation, such as flattery and agreement, to enhance the face of others
who are in a superior position. This permits superiors to reciprocate in ways
beneficial to the ingratiators, who thereby enhance their own face. This is
the dimension of face from a Chinese cultural perspective which is prob-
ably most striking in comparison with the Anglo-Saxon model. In Chinese
culture, emphasis may be put on the performance of specific speech acts
the primary purpose of which is giving face to others; hence the common
use of the expression to give face in the Chinese language.11 It is significant
that Goffman (1967: 9) had to borrow the term give face from Chinese in
order to incorporate it into his model, suggesting perhaps that this concept
was not so salient in Anglo-Saxon culture, which has the expressions to
lose face and to save face, but not to give face. The notion of giving face is
similarly downplayed in Brown and Levinson’s model. As already shown in
Figure 5.l, in Brown and Levinson’s model, face is only of concern when a
face-threatening speech act is performed and politeness strategies only occur
in those face-threatening acts where redressive action is called for. While
Brown and Levinson do acknowledge that positive politeness may be used
in its own right (to compliment or flatter, etc.), as what they call a ‘social
accelerator’, or way for speakers to draw closer to hearers (1987: 103), this
is not actually a part of their model. In presenting their model of face and
politeness in terms of the redressing of speech acts which would otherwise
be face threatening, face-work is viewed as subsidiary to the main force of
any message; there is no place for speech acts the primary force of which is
to give face to others.
Turning to Governor Patten again, as far as enhancing other’s face is

concerned, the Hong Kong governor refused to take part in mutual face
enhancement when offered the opportunity by China. In his single meet-
ing with the Chinese official responsible for Hong Kong affairs, Lu Ping, Lu
offered the olive branch (to use a Western metaphor) of mutual face enhance-
ment when he said that he had dealt with many Hong Kong governors, that
they had all become ‘old friends of China’, and that he hoped Patten would
also be an ‘old friend of China’ when he left Hong Kong. Patten rejected
this invitation, however, saying that he would rather be judged according
to how well he had helped to implement the Joint Declaration to ensure the
stability, the prosperity and the way of life of Hong Kong (Crothall, 1992).
Patten refused to enhance the face of China in many other ways. He
continually affirmed what he claimed to be the British legacy to Hong
Kong – the rule of law, a free market economy, individual freedom, and
democratic values – features which were not part of the Chinese political
system. He said that he wanted cooperation with China, but only on his
terms. He used his acerbic wit to denigrate Chinese officials. And, along
with anti-China activist and legislative councillor, Emily Lau, he was one of
the few people in Hong Kong to insist on referring to the capital of China
as Peking, in preference to Beijing, the official Romanised form preferred by
the Chinese government.
This failure of Patten to enhance the face of China contrasts strikingly
with his predecessors as governor and other Foreign Office officials who
were very happy to flatter their counterparts, a good example of which are
the ritual preliminaries to meetings during which opportunities were taken
by both sides to praise the other.
5.5.1.3 Category 3: Losing one’s own face

Face is lost by not following social custom and moral behaviour. If individu-
als are prepared to forfeit moral standards in pursuit of personal gain, then
they are judged by others as ‘not wanting face’. Because of the Chinese
group orientation to social behaviour, loss of face affects not just indi-
viduals, but also their in-group, their family, or, in the case of politics, their
government or country.
On a personal level, Patten was perceived by the Chinese as being moti-
vated by personal ambition12 (he was thought to have ambitions of becoming
British prime minister), of being willing to sacrifice Sino-British agreement
for his own benefit. This perception by the Chinese of forfeiture of moral
principles by Patten explains their use of epithets such as ‘tango dancer’
(i.e. arrogant), ‘sinner of a thousand years’ and ‘prostitute’ (lacking in moral
principles) and ‘snake’ (devious), to describe the Hong Kong governor. On
another occasion, Patten was described by a Chinese official as masquerad-
ing as a ‘saviour’, i.e. attempting to redeem 150 years of British misrule by
introducing democratic reform.
5.5.1.4 Category 4: Hurting other’s face

The hierarchical nature of Chinese society requires individuals to be sensitive
to their position on the social ladder and to the status of those who are
above and below them. Before making a request one should consider care-
fully the position on the social hierarchy of the requestee and the likelihood
of the request being acceptable. If a request is not sensitive to the social hier-
archy and what is possible, it may damage the requestee’s face, in which case
retaliation may follow, in line with the principle of bao (reciprocity). Here
the question of Patten’s status as a mere governor is again at issue. As far
as China was concerned, agreement over the constitutional arrangements
which were to straddle the handover had been arrived at between the British
and Chinese governments at foreign minister level. Patten, a mere governor,
did not have the right to unilaterally break this agreement. The Hong Kong
governor also showed insensitivity to the diplomatic hierarchy and thereby
hurt China’s face in enlisting the high-profile support of world leaders such
as Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl and Brian Mulroney, among others, whom, as
already mentioned, he met with personally.
5.5.1.5 Category 5: Saving one’s own face

Loss of face results in shame and guilt, requiring face-saving measures.
When responsibility for loss of face is attributed to the other, face may be
saved by retaliation, especially if the other is not a member of the in-group.
This is the behaviour applied by China in reacting to Governor Patten.
Given that Patten had hurt the face of the Chinese government in this way,
the Chinese exercised their prerogative of retaliation – in their vilification
campaign, in threats to take over Hong Kong before 1997, in threats against
Sino-British trade, and in their decision to rescind Patten’s reforms and set
up a provisional legislature to replace the one created by the Hong Kong
governor in 1995 (Dimbleby, 1997a; Flowerdew, 1998).13
Where direct action is not an acceptable face-saving strategy, an alterna-
tive strategy is to ignore completely the face-losing event or issue in order
to de-emphasise its seriousness. After its initial retaliatory action of vilifying
Patten and emphasising that his action would ruin the plans made by China
and Britain for the change of sovereignty, China switched to this alterna-
tive self-defensive strategy, first ostracising Patten completely14 and then
downplaying the seriousness of Patten’s actions, while setting up its own
provisional legislature to resolve the issue.
5.5.1.6 Category 6: Saving other’s face

In a hierarchical society, one must pay attention to maintaining the face of
others – especially one’s superiors – as well as one’s own. This is necessary
because of the reciprocal nature of the face negotiation process. A threat to
another’s face now is likely to result in retaliation from the other later. This
explains the emphasis on harmony in Chinese interpersonal relations, the

reluctance of Chinese to criticise each other, and the use of indirect or vague
language if criticism is really necessary.15
In his emphasis on speaking out against China, Patten clearly violated
this convention of avoidance of direct criticism. Prior to his arrival on the
scene, British Foreign Office sinologists had always tried to put a positive
spin on Sino-British relations with China, even when China did things
which, from the British point of view, appeared to be against Hong Kong’s
interests (Flowerdew, 1998). This is where the term pre-emptive cringe comes
in, another term, Percy Kowtow, also being used by one newspaper to refer to
Sir Percy Cradock (Anon., 1995). Patten, on the other hand, went out of his
way to criticise China, insisting that a double standard had been applied in
Sino-British communication previously – China could criticise Britain, but
Britain was not allowed to criticise China (Flowerdew, 1997c).
5.6 Evaluation of Governor Patten as an intercultural

communicator
The preceding analysis has systematically accounted for the reactions of the
Chinese government to the actions (verbal and non-verbal) of the British
Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, from the perspective of a Chinese
conception of face. According to this analysis, Patten took various actions
(verbal and non-verbal) which led to a breakdown in Sino-British Hong
Kong relations. Patten’s failure to comply with Chinese notions of face does
not necessarily mean that he was totally misguided as an intercultural com-
municator, however. It needs to be said that the analysis of Patten from the
Chinese perspective assumes that it was the British governor who should
accommodate to the Chinese, but not vice versa. As Patten himself fre-
quently stated, those who criticised him for failing to accommodate to the
Chinese applied a double standard, in putting the onus on him to adapt his
behaviour while not expecting the same from the other side. In this respect
it is important to emphasise that this chapter has not considered the ques-
tion of face from the British, or Patten’s, perspective. When Patten, as cited
earlier, said that he was not concerned with face, this was with reference to
what he took to be the Chinese concept of this notion. Elsewhere, in fact,
he stated that although he was not interested in face, he was concerned
about British ‘honour’.16 Like the Chinese, Patten was also motivated by
national prestige and dignity, therefore, in spite of the fact that he chose
not to accept the label face.
Patten’s ego and personal political ambition, which set him apart from
earlier diplomats, making him more independent and less sensitive or
accommodating to the face of his interlocutors, but highly sensitive to the
face of his other audiences, the Hong Kong public and the international
press, would also need to be taken into account in an assessment of face on
the British side. Earlier chapters in this book have demonstrated the great
skill with which Patten ingratiated himself with the Hong Kong public, skill
which resulted in very high approval ratings, according to a range of opin-
ion polls. In this respect the various models of face reviewed in this chapter
are all deficient in so far as they do not consider the possibility of multiple
audiences. A certain linguistic act may be perceived in one way by one
audience and another by others. When interviewed for this research, Patten
identified the problem of multiple audiences as one of his greatest problems
as a public communicator (Flowerdew, 1997c).
Evaluated in his own terms, Patten’s approach may find some justifica-
tion. It seems likely, it is true, that he misjudged the Chinese in so far as
he thought that they would be willing to compromise on his constitutional
proposals and that they would not be willing to go so far as to dismantle
his reforms and set up their own provisional legislature once his reforms
had been put in place (Tsang, 2004). It is this misjudgement which critics
of Patten, cited earlier, attribute to his underestimation of the importance
of face for the Chinese. Within the overall context of his communicative
strategy vis-à-vis the Chinese, however, these misjudgements were less
important for Patten when set against his overall goal of winning the sup-
port of the Hong Kong people, giving the soon-to-be-relinquished colony a
taste of democracy and securing British withdrawal with honour. His main
audience was not China, therefore, but the Hong Kong people and the
international media.
A final factor that needs to be taken into account in an evaluation of
Patten as an intercultural communicator is the possible exploitation of face
theory by China for its own strategic purposes. According to this inter-
pretation, in accordance with the principle of bao (reciprocity), Patten’s
face-threatening behaviour would have provided China with a pretext for
retaliation, for being equally, or even more, unaccommodating. In this case,
it provided them with a reason to set up a constitutional system without the
need to take into account the wishes of the British Hong Kong government
and majority Hong Kong public opinion. Without this pretext of Patten’s
face-threatening behaviour, China would likely have needed to compromise
its own wishes with at least some accommodation towards the preferences
of the British Hong Kong government, if only to satisfy international and
Hong Kong public opinion. It is here that the position of the sinologists who
had been in charge of British Hong Kong policy prior to the arrival on the
scene of Patten is relevant. By accommodating to Chinese face, these diplo-
mats argue, more would have been achieved, from the British perspective, in
the long run. Patten, on the other hand, as previously noted, did not accept
this view, arguing in one interview that:
I dare say, there are some who, if China were saying our price is the slaugh-
ter of the first-born, would say: ‘Well, maybe that’s not unreasonable in
the circumstances ... you have to allow for different cultural traditions,
you know.’ (Tacey, 1997; Dimbleby, 1997a)
In terms of realpolitik an overall evaluation of the relationship between

the British and Chinese governments during the Patten era might be that
while both parties protested that they wanted cooperation, independence
was what suited them best; independence for Britain to go its own way
in administering Hong Kong, to criticise China, and to thereby secure an
honourable withdrawal; and independence for China to set up its own
arrangements for the constitutional system in post-1997 Hong Kong, to
criticise Britain and its representative, Patten, and to gain face in the eyes of
its people and the world at large in making up for a century and a half of
colonial subjugation and national shame.
5.7 Conclusion
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, investigation of specific problems

in intercultural discourse/communication can contribute to an understand-
ing of real-world problems (and history, it might be added, given the larger
thesis of this volume of the role of critical discourse analysis in historiogra-
phy), on the one hand, and provide insights for ongoing theory building in
discourse analysis, on the other. As far as contributing to an understanding
of real-world problems is concerned, this chapter has demonstrated how
face may have been an important variable in relations between Britain
and China over Hong Kong during the period leading up to the change
of sovereignty in 1997. The chapter has shown how China’s actions (both
verbal and otherwise) may have been motivated by face concerns (bearing
in mind, at the same time, the possibility of a strategic use of face by China
to achieve its political ends), while the British Hong Kong governor, Chris
Patten, demonstrated great insensitivity to China’s sense of face. In terms of
discourse/communication theory, the chapter has stressed the importance
of cultural relativity in face theory. Specifically, as regards Chinese culture,
it has been argued, an application of a model such as that of Brown and
Levinson is enhanced if the collectivistic nature of the Chinese perspective –
in particular the greater role assigned to positive face enhancement, or,
in Goffman’s terms (borrowed from the Chinese) giving face – is taken
into account. At the same time, the chapter has tested Bond and Hwang’s
cultural model of Chinese face in the context of international relations
involving China and Britain and demonstrated it to possess a considerable
degree of explanatory power.
6
Competing Public Discourses
in Transitional Hong Kong
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is a rather ambitious and polemical attempt to analyse the

tension within Hong Kong society over the handover of sovereignty from
Britain to China, as it is realised and instantiated in two very different
competing styles of public discourse, the Utilitarian discourse promoted
by Patten and his supporters, and the Confucianist discourse promoted by
China and the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong.
As mentioned in previous chapters, the arrival of the new governor, Chris
Patten, saw a change in British policy over Hong Kong. Since the signing of
the Joint Declaration, Britain’s policy had been to engage in quiet diplomacy
with China, with a view to adapting policies to fall in line with how China
saw post-1997 Hong Kong. This policy, known as ‘convergence’, from the
point of view of some in the British government, led to a number of humili-
ating compromises on Britain’s Hong Kong policy, with China insisting that
it should be consulted and its approval be given for a range of issues which
had not been specified at the time of the signing of the Joint Declaration.
As a result, when the prime minister, John Major, was confirmed in his posi-
tion, as again noted in previous chapters, following a general election, the
Hong Kong governor, Wilson, was replaced by the ‘heavyweight’ politician,
Chris Patten.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the change of governor
represented a distinct shift in policy. Where, in the past, the emphasis had
been on cooperation with China and compromise, perhaps with an eye to
longer-term Sino-British relations and trade considerations (Cradock, 1994),
the policy became much more proactive, with quite radical (for Hong Kong)
political and social reforms being introduced and an affirmation of the
importance of the legacy of British values which would remain in Hong
Kong following the change of sovereignty. As seen in earlier chapters, the
policy was promoted aggressively by Governor Patten, by means of a very
powerful rhetoric.
133
As a result of Britain’s new policy and the arrival of Patten, China reacted
by totally ostracising the new governor, claiming that the reforms he intro-
duced were in contravention of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law and
other agreements between the British and Chinese governments. Given the
de facto replacement of the earlier policy of convergence, China made its
own plans for the change of sovereignty, its ‘second kitchen’, affirming that
Patten’s reforms would be repealed and that, in particular, the Legislative
Council elected in 1995 which, according to the earlier policy, was to strad-
dle the change of sovereignty, would be replaced immediately after the
handover, by an appointed, provisional legislature until new elections under
the system envisaged before Patten, could be arranged.
Patten’s reforms and China’s alternative plans led to a rhetorical strug-
gle within Hong Kong between the two opposing camps, as seen in earlier
chapters. The struggle was about what sort of a polity there would be in
Hong Kong beyond 1997. What was essentially at stake, in discourse terms,
were questions of who can say what to whom, how, when and where, in
the public domain. Patten and the sizeable pro-democracy camp argued for
a polity based upon what this chapter will refer to (after Scollon and Scollon,
2001) as a Utilitarian style of public discourse, a discourse which promotes
egalitarian values and which may be confrontational.1 The public discourse
style promoted by China and the pro-China camp in Hong Kong, on the
other hand, which will be referred to in this chapter as Confucianist, is more
hierarchical and consensus-oriented in nature.
What this chapter tries to get to grips with is what are referred to by others
as ‘discourses’ (e.g. Kress, 1989), or ‘orders of discourse’ (Fairclough, 1989,
1992). A key feature of discourses, or orders of discourse, as discussed by
these authors, is that they are in a constant state of change. The application
of labels to characterise particular discourses might seem to run counter to
the notion of discourses, therefore, by reifying what are essentially evolving
systems. Nevertheless, especially if it is possible to trace the development of
particular discourses back through history and show how they have evolved,
but at the same time maintained certain core characteristics, it is useful to
have labels in order to distil these essential features. This is especially true
when considering two discourses which are in contrast, or conflict, as is
the case with the Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses in Hong Kong. In
drawing out key features of the discourses, as manifested in the data of this
chapter, therefore, while there is a danger of overgeneralising, it is hoped to
highlight the fundamental conflict in Hong Kong.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, the salient features of the two
discourses are outlined, based upon a reading of the literature. Next, a range
of what will be referred to as discursive events, or situations, which featured
in the media and which highlight these contrasting styles, are described.
Finally, the two styles are illustrated as they are instantiated in four texts:
a television news report, a television interview and two newspaper articles.
Competing Public Discourses in Transitional Hong Kong 135
6.2 Utilitarian discourse
The term ‘Utilitarian’ is used by Scollon and Scollon (2001) to describe a dis-
course, or discourse system, as they prefer to call it, which has come to pre-
vail most notably in the United States and Great Britain, but which extends
to other countries. The Utilitarian discourse has its roots for Scollon and
Scollon (2001) in the European Enlightenment, although it can be traced
back further, to the democratic ideals originating in ancient Greece.
Just as there is no universal definition of democracy, so is there no uni-
versal definition of democratic discourse (but see Gastil, 1992). However, a
number of characteristics which would contribute to an ideal democratic
discourse can be enumerated. These would include equality of opportu-
nity to speak, truthfulness, rationality, openness, clarity and cooperation.
Western rhetoric, with its basis in the public debate of the agora of ancient
Greece, is imbued with such democratic values (Steiner, 1985; Chilton,
1985b).2 As Chilton (1985b: xiii) has stated, ‘The rise of rhetoric in classi-
cal Greece was integral with the emergence of democratic forms of social
organisation, whatever its later restrictions and ossifications.’ As noted in
Chapter 3 of this book, although the study of rhetoric was neglected in
Europe during the Middle Ages, with the return during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to the study of the Ancients, these values were resur-
rected and developed within the movement that came to be known as the
Enlightenment.
It is the ideas embodied in the Enlightenment, which, as noted by Scollon
and Scollon (2001), were carried across the Atlantic, notably in the writ-
ings of the philosophers Montesquieu, Locke, Bentham, Kant and Mill and
the capitalist economist, Adam Smith, with their emphasis on freedom of
the individual, reason and the rule of law, which provide the ideological
foundation for what Scollon and Scollon refer to as the Utilitarian discourse
system. The freedoms attaching to Utilitarian discourse are enshrined in
the first amendment of the American Constitution, which establishes
the freedom of the press. The ideas put forward by Grice (1975) in ‘The
Logic of Conversation’, with its cooperative principle and four maxims
(reproduced below) which, Grice claims, guide all cooperative communica-
tive behaviour, seem to be related to some sort of democratic ideal and to
the democratic values of the Utilitarian discourse listed above (see Lakoff,
1990, on this).
• Cooperative principle
Make your contributions such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged.
• Maxim of quality
Do not say what you believe to be false or do not have evidence for.
• Maxim of quantity
Be as informative as required.
• Maxim of relation
Be relevant.
• Maxim of manner
Avoid ambiguity and obscurity; be brief and orderly.
Carbaugh (1989, cited in Scollon, 1993) traces the Utilitarian discourse

just outlined right through to the talk shows on contemporary American
television.
In talking of Utilitarian (or indeed Confucianist) discourse it is important
to bear in mind that a label is being put on a discourse style which appeals
to certain values. Such appeals may well be, and often are, cosmetic or
manipulative (Fairclough, 1992). Many so-called Western democracies fall
well short of fulfilling the democratic values they claim to uphold. The
plight of the poor, racial minorities, women and those with minority sexual
orientations in many/most of the Western democracies are examples of how
the democratic values of the Utilitarian discourse do not extend to all social
groups within so-called democratic societies. In the context of colonialism,
it should be noted that the democratic, egalitarian values cherished by the
colonialists were not usually extended to the colonised. As the Utilitarian
political philosopher J. S. Mill3 put it (cited in Scollon and Scollon, 2001:
128-9) in his book, On Liberty:
This doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of

their faculties ... we may leave out of consideration those backward states
of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbar-
ians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by
actually effecting that end.
Although this attitude is now outdated and would be considered racist,

vestiges of it still prevailed right up to the retrocession and beyond in Hong
Kong, where fully representative democracy has never been introduced.
Utilitarian discourse is manifested in a style which appeals to democratic
ideals (just as, as will be shown later, Confucianist discourse appeals to
Confucianist ideals), but it is an idealisation which does not occur in
actuality and which may be distorted and manipulated, as well as evolving
over time.
6.3 Confucianist discourse
In describing Western Utilitarian values at work in shaping discourse in pre-

handover Hong Kong a historical perspective was taken and the way the
Utilitarian discourse has developed over time in the West since the Greeks
was described. A parallel historical analysis can be adduced to explain the

Confucianist discourse of China, with its associated authoritarianism.
Kirkpatrick (1995) (see also Oliver, 1971) explicitly contrasts the historical
development of Chinese rhetoric with that of classical Greece: the law courts
where the citizens4 enjoyed equal status and where proof and facts were of
importance. This contrasts tellingly with the political origins of Chinese
rhetoric which have roots in a more authoritarian social structure, and the
primary function of rhetoric was the persuasion of superiors by their inferi-
ors as to their future conduct.
Just as it is possible to trace the Utilitarian discourse from the time of
Aristotle and the Greeks up to the present day in the West, so is it possible
to trace a similar process from the time of Confucius up to the present day
in contemporary China. Kirkpatrick notes that, in spite of periodic upheavals
such as the Communist revolution of 1949, for millennia, China has been
a hierarchical society. The traditional hierarchical and autocratic nature of
Chinese society, Kirkpatrick argues, may help to explain the indirectness of
Chinese discourse. Because Chinese society has traditionally been a hierarchi-
cal one, Kirkpatrick claims, argument and persuasion, when they occur at all,
are from an inferior to a superior. This in turn requires an indirect method of
reasoning. Indirectness in Chinese discourse is a characteristic which has been
noted by Western scholars for centuries. Kirkpatrick cites Smith, who as long
ago as 1894 (well before Grice we might note) contrasted the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
habit of going directly to the point with the Chinese habit of indirection:
Next to a competent knowledge of the Chinese language, large powers

of inference are essential to anyone who is to deal successfully with the
Chinese. (Smith, 1894: 66, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1995)
A discourse style is concerned as much with what is not said as with what
is said. One way of being indirect is to say nothing at all. An important
feature of Confucian discourse is that less value is placed on the Utilitarian
discourse values of openness, clarity and equality of opportunity to speak,
and more value put on silence, which may be an obligation for those in
subordinate positions and a prerogative of those in authority. In the words
of the Confucian classics, ‘Those who know do not speak. Those who speak
do not know.’
Other scholars have conceptualised the indirectness of Chinese discourse
within the paradigm of high- and low-context cultures (E. Hall, 1976, 1983;
Ting-Toomey, 1988). High-context cultures such as those of China, Japan,
Korea and Vietnam prefer to use high-context messages in which very lit-
tle of the meaning is transmitted in the coded, explicit, transmitted part
of the message. Low-context cultures such as those of the US and Western
Europe, on the other hand, prefer to use low-context messages in which
more of the information is presented in the explicit code.
Confucianist/high-context and Utilitarian/low-context cultures have also

been differentiated on the basis of collectivism and individualism (e.g. Bond
and Forgas, 1984; Chua and Gudykunst, 1987; Hofstede and Bond, 1984).
High-context cultures are collectivist; intentions and meanings are situated
within the larger shared knowledge of the cultural context. Low-context
cultures are individualistic; intentions are clearly displayed and have direct
correspondence with verbal patterns (Ting-Toomey, 1988). (This, of course,
makes it easier to find features of Utilitarian discourse in actual texts than it
is to identify features of Confucianist discourse.)
Tracing this notion of individualism vs collectivism back historically,
Oliver (1971) contrasts the democratic egalitarianism of the English philoso-
pher Locke with the collectivist authoritarianism of the early Confucianist,
Hsun-tze. Both noted that men are born equal but because of different
social and educational conditions grow up to be unequal. From this Locke
concluded that states should equalise opportunities so that all men might
be equal. Hsun-tze, on the other hand, emphasised the needs of the com-
munity in general, and the necessity of having men at all ranks to fulfil
society’s essential services.
The authoritarian attitude to society and communication within society
is noted by Oliver (1971: 97) in Confucius himself:
Confucius agreed with the view that social needs must take priority over
individual preferences. This was the basis for the Confucian political
philosophy of subordination and respect for established authority. It also
led the great sage to advise the people of his time: ‘Do not talk of policies
when you are not in a position to make them.’
The inherent authoritarianism of Chinese attitudes is reflected in more

recent research in social psychology. Yang (1986) reviewed 20 contempo-
rary empirical intercultural studies that demonstrate that authoritarianism
remains a prevalent social-psychological trait of the Chinese people up to
the present day, although some might argue that, with globalisation, clear
ethnic and cultural distinctions are becoming more difficult to identify.
Confucianist/high-context and Utilitarian low-context cultures can be
further differentiated in terms of ‘face’, ‘the public self-image that every
member of a society wants to claim for himself/herself’ (Brown and
Levinson, 1978: 66; Scollon and Scollon, 1983), as shown in Chapter 5.
In high-context cultures such as that of China, the self is projected as a
‘social’ identity and is defined with reference to a network of social and
personal relationships. Face is constantly being negotiated with others.
In low-context cultures, on the other hand, face is the projection of one’s
individual identity and corresponds more closely to a person’s internal state
(Ting-Toomey, 1988). Oliver (1971: 99), again, emphasises the social nature
of face in Chinese society:
No people have learned better than did the ancient Chinese how to
deliver unpalatable truth in palatable form. The preservation of face was
among their highest social goals. However widely opinions might differ,
propriety and decorum were to be preserved. For in the long run the
maintenance of general harmony was of greater value than the achieve-
ment of any particular result in an individual dispute.
Before leaving this outline of Confucianist discourse and moving on

to the analysis of specific discourse events and texts, something needs to
be said about the place of the Communist revolution and its aftermath
in the order of Chinese discourse. Kirkpatrick mentions the Communist
revolution as one of the upheavals which periodically shake Chinese
society, but, paradoxically, it might well be claimed that the arrival of
the Communists did little to undermine the concept of a hierarchical
society; rather, it replaced one hierarchy and absolute authority (that of
the Chinese emperors and warlords) with another (that of the Communist
Party of the PRC).5
Analysed in terms of the individualist/collectivist dichotomy, it is perhaps
significant that Marxism–Leninism, with its emphasis on collectivism, fits
better into the Chinese public discourse than the individualistic, Utilitarian,
public discourse of the West. It is important to note also, that under China’s
‘open door’ policy and the promotion of ‘socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics’ under Deng Xiaoping, as King (1991: 126) points out, many of
the traditional behavioural norms which were previously censured are now
tolerated in the privatised economic sector and in interpersonal relations
(although not in the public domain).
Finally, it should be emphasised that just as Utilitarian discourse is capable
of exploitation, so is Confucianist discourse. As an illustration of this, China’s
turbulent history provides plenty of evidence of the failure on the part of the
powerful to fulfil their responsibilities over those they rule over and of a con-
cern for the welfare of the individual overriding that of the collective.
6.4 Some discursive events which highlight the competing

discourses
Earlier, the struggle going on in Hong Kong was characterised as essentially

being concerned with what sort of a polity there would be in Hong Kong
beyond 1997 and that what was essentially at stake were questions of who is
entitled to say what to whom, how, when and where in the public domain.
In order to create conditions which would determine the sort of polity each
side wanted to see, certain social structures and procedures needed to be put
in place. This is why in the early part of his governorship, Patten undertook
a range of reforms aimed at creating the conditions for a more democratic
polity than had previously been the case under colonial rule, a polity that
would embody a more ‘democratic’ style of discourse (see Chapter 4).

Notable among these reforms were a greater number of directly elected seats
in the Legislative Council, greater accountability on the part of the govern-
ment and civil service, with better access to information and performance
pledges on the part of government departments, and the repeal of a range
of laws restricting civil liberties and freedom of speech. In this section of the
chapter, a range of discoursal events which themselves instantiate the strug-
gle over what is an appropriate public discourse are presented, as they were
reported in the media at the time the research was originally conducted. The
purpose is to demonstrate the extent to which the struggle itself, in the lead-
up to the change of sovereignty, was the focus of much public discourse. The
examples are as follows:6
1. Three mainland officials visit Hong Kong to explain why China wants
to repeal the Bill of Rights, a set of legislation introduced after the 1989
pro-democracy clampdown in China to reassure Hong Kong people of
their personal freedoms. The officials refuse to answer questions from
the public or media, preferring to restate Beijing’s position. One com-
mentator states that their mission seemed to be to deliver the message:
‘Thou shalt not speak; thou shalt only listen’ (South China Morning Post,
1 November 1995).
2. A plan for collective responsibility on members of the Preparatory
Committee [a committee set up by the mainland to create a shadow
government, or ‘second kitchen’ for Hong Kong, following the break-
down of cooperation between Britain and China over the arrangements
for post-handover Hong Kong] is criticised.7 Under the plan, put for-
ward by mainland officials, members will not be allowed to disclose
issues to be discussed by the committee. They will not be allowed to
publicly voice their own views after an issue is discussed and, once a
decision has been reached, all members will be expected to support it
(South China Morning Post, 10 December 1995).
3. Three days before his appointment as one of two religious leaders
represented on the Preparatory Committee, the head of the Anglican
Church in Hong Kong, Bishop Peter Kwong-kit, delivers a public
Christmas Eve message to his followers, based on the theme of the tra-
ditional Chinese proverb ‘saying too much is not the way to politics’.
‘Many people pay too much attention to popularity, publicity and
packaging’, the bishop says. ‘They promote idol worshipping and are
commended as great heroes. On the other hand, those who work in
silence are despised. They are considered deficient in rendering lofty
speeches and performing earth-shaking acts. They are thus deemed
unworthy of being leaders.’ The message is widely interpreted as an
attack on the elected politicians and other pro-democracy supporters
in Hong Kong, who have been ostracised by China, and in support of
the appointed members of the Preparatory Committee (South China

Morning Post, 29 December 1995).
4. The Preparatory Committee votes to set up a provisional legislature,
to straddle the handover, a body not foreseen in the Joint Declaration
or the Basic Law. Only one member, Frederick Fung Kin-kee, votes
against the plan. Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office, Lu Ping, declares that Fung will not be eligible to sit on the
provisional legislature or on the selection committee for the chief
executive. Fung declares that China is not yet ready to accept dissent-
ing views. Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen says it is ‘inadequate’
for people to judge democracy simply by looking at the form and
procedure of elections. ‘To mechanically ape the Western democratic
model does not accord with Hong Kong’s actual conditions or accom-
modate the interests of all social strata’, he says (South China Morning
Post, 25 March 1996).
5. Reacting to a statement to educationists made by Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office deputy director, Wang Fengchao, that Hong Kong
schools need to take further steps to promote patriotism in children,
various commentators warn that patriotism may mean two different
things in Hong Kong and the mainland. ‘Hong Kong Chinese are
already proud to be Chinese but they care more about individualism
and are more internationally orientated’, says Cheung Honchung, the
Legislative Council’s Education Panel deputy chairman (South China
Morning Post, 7 April 1996).
6. Demonstrators shout ‘You turtle with your head in your shell’ at dep-
uty director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Chen Ziying,
in protest at China’s unwillingness to listen to opposing opinions dur-
ing consultations held to gauge local views on how a selection com-
mittee should be set up to return a provisional legislature and choose
a first chief executive for post-handover Hong Kong (South China
Morning Post, 15 April 1996). [Representatives of various groups had
been excluded on the grounds that they opposed the setting up of the
provisional legislature.]
7. The Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, reacting to demonstrations
against the Beijing-appointed Preparatory Committee and its plans to
set up a provisional legislature, comments: ‘You can’t govern any com-
munity successfully on the basis that you will only talk to anybody
who will guarantee in advance to agree with whatever conclusion
you reach.’ ‘We tolerate expressions of all sorts of opinion and it’s a
sign of strength and a sign of confidence if you try to embrace all
shades of opinion in the debate’, he says (South China Morning Post, 17
April 1996).
8. A prominent Catholic organisation contests a memo issued by
the Church hierarchy that says Church members should not voice
objections to the Beijing-appointed Selection Committee. ‘It [the

Selection Committee] is undemocratic and against the will of the
Hong Kong people’, a spokeswoman, Mary Yuen, says. Another promi-
nent member, Father John Hurley, says ‘We’re not afraid of disputes.
They can be a good thing if handled properly and resolved amicably.’
Support for the memo is voiced by the Beijing-appointed adviser,
Father John Tsang, who calls the memo ‘prudent’ and ‘very reasonable’
(Eastern Express, 3 May 1996).
9. Chinese officials say that they wish to be involved in ‘joint appraisal’
of journalists coming to Hong Kong to cover the handover. Speaking
at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, and reacting to the Chinese state-
ment, Freedom Foundation director, John Schidlovsky, says that it is
in China’s interests to retain the environment that made Hong Kong
an economic success, including the ‘free and unfettered exchange of
ideas, access to information and tolerance of different opinions’ (South
China Morning Post, 4 May 1996). Preparatory Committee member, Dr
Raymond Wu Wai-yung, says he thinks the request is a good move. ‘Just
like the Chinese style of wedding, the bride and groom get together to
invite the guests’, he says (Sunday Morning Post, 5 May 1996).
10. The New China News Agency accuses the Hong Kong government of lack-
ing in sincerity in ‘leaking’ to the press a list of ten requests for cooperation
submitted by the Chinese side (Eastern Express, 6 May 1996).8
Each of the above discursive events highlights the Utilitarian and Confucianist
discourses in conflict. Confucianist underpinnings which are discernible in
these discursive events include the following:
• importance is attached to collective responsibility

• those in authority, once appointed, are not required to be openly
accountable to the public
• leadership should be by example rather than rhetoric
• emphasis is put on the national (group) interest above that of the
individual
• importance is attached to decorum and public order
• those at the top of the social/political hierarchy have a responsibility
towards those below
These Confucianist underpinnings may be contrasted with the Utilitarian

values which are also discernible in the example discursive events. Utilitarian
values which are explicitly stated or are implicit in these examples, include
the following:
• the importance of freedom to express one’s views

• the need to speak out
• the need for accountability to the general public of those in positions of

power
6.5 Analysis of four texts
This section of the chapter will analyse four texts: a television news report,
a television interview, and two newspaper articles, and attempt to highlight
the two conflicting discourses which underlie them.
6.5.1 Text 1
TVB Pearl: Main News 8:00 p.m. 25 April 1996

NEWSREADER: One major item on the agenda for the Chief Secretary
and Chinese officials in Beijing is the Preparatory Committee’s demand
for RTHK air time. Today Legco members here in Hong Kong got confir-
mation that RTHK has the final say on what goes into its programmes,
but, as Mark Tung reports, some legislators also want to know about the
other demands put forward by the Preparatory Committee.
CUT TO PICTURE OF GOVERNMENT HOUSE AND THREE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL MEMBERS BEHIND MICROPHONES FACING THE PRESS
MARK TUNG: Several legislators took their concerns to the governor this
morning. They voiced their opposition to the Preparatory Committee
demand for RTHK air time.
ANDREW CHENG: LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLOR: Mr Patten said that em
Anson Chan would probably pass the message to Director Lu Ping on the
independence and the freedom of editing of RTHK.
CUT TO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (LEGCO) PANEL MEETING
MARK TUNG: Meanwhile, at a Legco panel meeting, Recreation and
Culture Branch officials were fending off questions on RTHK and its
fiercely guarded editorial autonomy.
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL RITA LAU (DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR
RECREATION AND CULTURE) (IN CANTONESE, WITH ENGLISH SUB-
TITLES): If a government department suggests to RTHK about a new
service, something to be promoted, I believe RTHK has the final say as to
whether to accept it.
CHEUNG MAN-KWONG (LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLOR) (IN CANTONESE
WITH ENGLISH SUB-TITLES):
There is an important difference between editorial independence and
information sharing. If that line of demarcation is blurred it will lead to
problems in the future.
MARK TUNG: (VOICE-OVER – PICTURES OF SECRETARY FOR RECRE-

ATION AND CULTURE): But the Secretary for Recreation and Culture
refused to speculate on how the Government would deal with the demands
for air time, citing the vagueness of the Preparatory Committee’s request.
CUT TO PRESS ROOM OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Five legislators called
a press conference in the afternoon to announce their disapproval of
what they believed would be a move that would turn RTHK into a gov-
ernment mouth-piece. They also attacked the secrecy of the demands put
forward to the government by the Preparatory Committee.
EMILY LAU (LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLOR): I think we should put this
into the public domain. Let the people have a debate. Let them find out
what’s going on, what kind of demands have been made.
6.5.1.1 Analysis of Text 1

The first text is taken from a news broadcast on one of Hong Kong’s two
English language television channels. In the extract, the presenter introduces
a news item about China’s requests for what were reported to be ten areas
of cooperation from the British Hong Kong government. One of China’s
ten reported requests, in particular, was to be allowed air time on RTHK,
the government-funded, but editorially independent, radio and television
organisation. The extract indicates how this demand was contested by a
group of legislative councillors, who took their concerns to the governor.
The governor, it seems, supported their stance, by telling them that their
view on RTHK’s editorial independence would be passed on to Lu Ping, the
head of China’s Hong Kong Affairs Office. The news item then switches to
the Legislative Council, where RTHK’s editorial freedom was debated. Here,
the extract again shows the concern on the part of legislators that RTHK’s
editorial freedom might be compromised, but also their anxiety about the
secrecy of the demands put forward by the Preparatory Committee. The
position of one legislator, in particular, Emily Lau, is focused upon, and her
demand that the whole issue should be brought into the public domain.
This extract is interesting for two features, in particular, which highlight
the tension between China and Britain/Hong Kong and which can be iden-
tified as features of the two competing discourses. These features are, first,
the desire of the Chinese side for confidentiality and the fact that their
demands were not made public (the Chinese later criticised the Hong Kong
government for releasing details of the requests to the press [Eastern Express,
6 May 1996]), an issue which elected legislator Emily Lau takes issue with,
and second, the question of the editorial freedom of the government-funded
broadcasting organisation, RTHK. Although funded by the government,
RTHK has editorial freedom and reserves the right to broadcast programmes
which may contain criticism of the government and the establishment.
This is an issue over which there is dispute. A leading Chinese official had
claimed that it was common knowledge that RTHK was spending taxpayers’
money and that it must therefore come under the control of the govern-
ment (South China Morning Post, 23 April 1996).
Stated in terms of the two competing discourses, the underlying values
in competition here are the Utilitarian values put on freedom of expres-
sion (RTHK should be independent of the government) and the need for
openness (China’s requests should be part of the public domain), versus
the Confucianist emphasis on the trust which should be placed in those in
authority (there is no need for the requests to be made public; the govern-
ment should have control over RTHK).
6.5.2 Text 2
Newsline, ATV World Television, 8:00 p.m., 28 April 1996

OPENING CREDITS
SALLY BLYTH (PRESENTER): Frank Ching and I are joined in the studio
by a leading member of the Preparatory Committee, F.Y. Kan. Over the
last week we’ve had the ministerial summit between the British Foreign
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen as
well as the Chief Secretary Anson Chan’s visit to Beijing. During both
these sets of talks the legitimacy of the Provisional Legislative Council
has featured high on the agenda, as well as concerns over the future of
the civil service ...
FRANK CHING: ... welcome to the studio Mr. Kan. The visit to Beijing by
Anson Chan, I think, has improved the atmosphere quite a bit, at least
judging by the newspaper reports, but in spite of that I think there is still
a widespread feeling within Hong Kong that the Preparatory Committee
itself is not representative enough ah in that it doesn’t have any directly
elected Legco members for instance. Do you agree with that feeling?
F.Y. KAN: I don’t think I agree with that feeling. The Preparatory
Committee has got more than ninety Hong Kong people and each of
them have got their own sphere of operation and throughout their work
in the past years they are quite well known to Hong Kong people.
FRANK CHING: So you think it is representative enough?
F.Y. KAY: Well, I think, you know it’s a matter of degree, you know, when
you ask for the utmost it is something that each one will have to form
his own opinion.
FRANK CHING: Oh, but I don’t think people are asking for the utmost
LAUGHTER I think that they’re just asking that it includes the most
popular political party in Hong Kong.
F.Y. KAN: Well, taking the view, you know, taking the people from
the commerce industries are concerned, I mean, I have read Chinese,
Chinese newspapers giving some of the members as being in control, of
being in control, of almost one third of the quoted stocks in Hong Kong,
the value of them, I mean if you take that as a measure to see whether
these people are representative enough of the people in the commerce
and industry it’s a very good example that they are.
SALLY BLYTH: Well, I think you may feel that it is representative and I
hear your argument, but you can’t get away from the fact that the percep-
tion is that it’s not and that it’s very much people who are going to voice
the views which Beijing wants to hear who have been appointed to that
committee and the example in point was in fact the votes in the last four
meetings of the Preparatory Committee in Beijing when every member
except one voted in favour of the setting up the Provisional Legislature
and that one person who didn’t vote was subsequently threatened.
F.Y. KAN: So?
SALLY BLYTH: Well, clearly that is not representative of the views of
Hong Kong that what I am trying to say that is the exact example of how
the Preparatory Committee is voting in favour of what Beijing wants it
to vote in favour of.
F.Y. KAN: I think I would I wouldn’t like to go into debate on this issue,
you know the Preparatory Committee is formed and you know who they
are and you can judge the past records of these people as to how repre-
sentative or not representative they are.

The second text is from a current affairs television programme, Newsline,
broadcast by Hong Kong’s second English language channel, ATV World.
It is the first part of an interview of a local Hong Kong member of China’s
Preparatory Committee, F.Y. Kan, by the programme’s two presenters, Sally
Blyth and Frank Ching.
After an introduction by Sally Blyth, Frank Ching challenges Kan on
the representativeness of the Preparatory Committee, in that it does not
have any directly elected members of the Legco (Legislative Council).
Representativeness, he thereby suggests, means inclusion of those who
have been elected by popular franchise. Kan’s response, however, indi-
cates that he has a different conception of representativeness. For him,
representativeness means that members should be from different spheres
of society and that they should be well known to the Hong Kong people
from ‘their work in the past years’.9 After another exchange, Ching again
suggests that representativeness should mean inclusion of popularly
elected political figures. Again, however, Kan disagrees, this time con-
sidering representativeness in terms of control of capital. (‘I have read
Chinese newspapers giving some of the members being in control ... of
almost one third of the quoted stocks in Hong Kong’). At this point Sally
Blyth intervenes, accusing the mainland government of appointing to
the Preparatory Committee only people who will express the views that
they want to hear and of ‘threatening’ the only member who refused to
join the consensus.10 Kan finds no problem with this accusation, however,
merely asking ‘So?’ In response, Blyth can only reiterate her point that the
Preparatory Committee is not representative of the views of Hong Kong
people and that it is voting in favour of what Beijing wants it to do. Kan
concludes this segment by stating that he does not wish to debate the
issue and reiterating that committee members should be judged by their
past records.
In this extract can be seen, on the one hand, the two presenters promot-
ing the Utilitarian values of representativeness as measured by popular fran-
chise, the need to speak out, and the right to disagree. On the other hand,
we have the interviewee promoting the Confucianist values of representa-
tiveness as measured by public reputation, power (in terms of control of
capital) and respect for work of past years (and hence seniority and loyalty),
and the need for unanimity and consensus.
6.5.2 Text 3
South China Morning Post, 17 May 1996, p. 21

Selection worries
Margaret Ng
After two days of discussions, the sub-committee of the Preparatory
Committee has come up with broad principles but no concrete method
for the formation of the Selection Committee – the all important group
which will select the chief executive in the name of the people of Hong
Kong. Some of these broad principles bear re-thinking.
Effectively replacing the governor, the chief executive will have great
powers under the Basic Law. As someone standing between Hong Kong
and China, his integrity, ability and credibility are clearly of crucial
importance.
... The credibility of the chief executive depends most fundamentally on
the way he is selected. This is well recognised by China, or the Basic Law
would not have been littered with so many assurances of the representa-
tiveness of the method of his selection.
It is plain that election by universal suffrage is the best means, and the
only means of guaranteeing credibility. However, even when China
is not prepared to allow such an election, credibility and a process of

maximum representativeness with the least intervention from Beijing
must ever be the criteria.
It is in this context that the principles adopted earlier this week for the
formation of the Selection Committee are questionable. As reported, one
requirement for serving on the Selection Committee is that one has to
‘recognise the duty’ of the committee in setting up the provisional legis-
lature ... An honest person will ... have to ask: ‘if I am opposed to the
setting up of the provisional legislature as decided by the Preparatory
Committee on March 24, do I fail to meet the requirement?’
... Whether the criteria enjoined upon the Preparatory Committee by the
1990 decision that the Selection Committee be ‘broadly representative’
has been met will be open to challenge, with the result that the selection
of the chief executive will be open to challenge.
A chief executive so selected will be operating under a severe disadvan-
tage because his credibility will be in question.
The only proper approach, in my opinion, is to impose no requirement as
to political views .... This is what should happen in a democratic election,
or any election in which representativeness is the aim and criterion.
The process the PC is heading for is going to be one which will be chal-
lenged as having a built-in mechanism of pre-selection.

Text 3 is extracted from an article by Margaret Ng, a barrister and legisla-
tive councillor representing the legal profession, a grouping which had
rejected the idea put forward by China and its Hong Kong supporters for a
provisional legislature, on the grounds that such a body was not foreseen in
either the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law.11 The article is a clear example
of the Utilitarian discourse.
In the article Ng criticises the basis on which a subcommittee of the
Preparatory Committee has chosen to select the committee that will select
the future chief executive. As in the previous interview data (text 2), the key
issue here is that of representativeness. For Ng, representativeness should
only mean one thing, appointment based on universal suffrage – ‘universal
suffrage is the best means, and the only means of guaranteeing credibility’.
However, given that China will not allow such a process for the selection
of the chief executive, ‘credibility and a process of maximum representa-
tiveness with the least intervention from Beijing must ever be the criteria’.
These criteria are not met, however, according to Ng, because a prerequisite
of involvement in the selection process for the chief executive is to at the
same time recognise the need for the committee to set up a provisional
legislature.12 Effectively, therefore, the selection committee will not be

representative, in so far as it will not allow participation by those who do
not approve of the setting up of the provisional legislature. This leads Ng
to argue that there should be no restriction on the political views of those
involved in the selection process for the chief executive, as would happen
‘in a democratic election, or any election in which representativeness is the
aim and criterion’. Ng concludes by claiming that the whole procedure will
have ‘a built-in mechanism for pre-selection’.
As already mentioned, in this text we have a very clear example of
the Utilitarian discourse. Positive value is put on representativeness and
democracy, both of which should be based upon universal suffrage. Without
these, those who govern have no credibility. The idea of consensus (a
Confucianist value), as put forward by the Preparatory Committee in mak-
ing support for the provisional legislature a prerequisite for participation in
the selection process for the chief executive, is criticised on the grounds that
it compromises the need for universal suffrage.
6.5.4 Text 4
South China Morning Post, 16 May 1996, p. 16

Folly to tamper with a good thing
David Chu
The Legislative Council last Wednesday approved by 38 votes to one the
motion for a review of the present statutory and advisory bodies to make
them supposedly more accountable, representative and transparent.
I alone voted not so much against the motion but for the retention of
executive appointments, for continuity, for stability.
Some councillors suggested that Legco vet and approve these appointees
and that more elected political figures be selected. I could imagine there
and then what it might be like with these entities consumed by parti-
sanship and confused about their real purpose and function which are
comparable to those of consultants, not politicians. I feared that such
members might be keener to offer advice perceived to be popular rather
than practical.
Those proposals served up in Legco last week also sounded like an attempt
to usurp the role and authority of the executive. The Government has
always enjoyed the prerogative of appointing people to those commit-
tees, authorities, boards and commissions based on their track record,
personal integrity, intelligence, special knowledge and other less tan-
gible, but invaluable, qualities.
The administration also weighs its appointments on whether those cho-
sen can reach crucial, often difficult, decisions requiring tact, compromise
and consensus. There is no question that the system boils down to

arbitrariness. These days ideology and ideals often eclipse common sense
in our political dialogue. We in Hong Kong are often prompted to act
according to a prescription laid down by the most eloquent activists
whose admiration for Western concepts corresponds with their aversion
to local conventions ...
Democracy may be the by-word of these times. We have been told that
all our institutions and our conduct must be seen through the prism of
democracy. To me, democracy is in the offing as spelt out in evolutionary
terms in the Basic Law and we should not worry too much about it to the
distraction of everything else.

Text 4 is an article written by a pro-China legislative councillor and
member of the Preparatory Committee. He is well known for his interest in
Confucianism and has written articles in the local press on this topic. He
is sometimes referred to in the press as ‘the Confucianist, David Chu’. In
this article Chu argues against the idea of LEGCO vetting appointments to
government statutory and advisory bodies, on the grounds that this would
politicise their work. In this text Chu seeks to undermine the values this
chapter depicts as being associated with a Utilitarian discourse and to pro-
mote those associated with a more Confucianist, as the term is defined in
this chapter, approach.
In the first paragraph, Chu argues that the proposal to review the statu-
tory and advisory bodies was based on the claim that they should be made
‘more accountable, representative and transparent’. The three adjectives
‘accountable, representative and transparent’ gained great currency in Hong
Kong following the arrival of Governor Chris Patten and they were closely
identified with Patten and the pro-democracy camp (Flowerdew, 1998),
referring as they do to aspects of the democratic, equitable, open values
promoted by the Utilitarian discourse. This explains the use of the hedge,
‘supposedly’, by Chu, who thereby expresses his scepticism with regard to
the promotion of such values. Chu argues that his opposition to the motion
was motivated by a desire ‘for continuity, for stability’, thereby setting up an
opposition and a suggestion of mutual exclusivity between accountability,
representativeness and transparency, on the one hand, and continuity and
stability, on the other.
In the second paragraph, Chu warns of the dangers of those who do accept
such values, arguing that the ‘political figures’ who would likely be selected
on the proposed basis would be ‘consumed by partisanship and confused
about their real purpose and function’ and that they would provide advice
which would be ‘perceived to be popular rather than practical’. Here Chu is

arguing against the Utilitarian values of representativeness based on popular
franchise, a view put forward also by F.Y. Kan in text 2.
Reminiscent of Kan, also, in paragraphs 3 and 4, Chu argues that appoint-
ments should be made by those in authority and that they should be based
on ‘track record, personal integrity, intelligence, special knowledge and
other less tangible, but invaluable, qualities’. Other necessary abilities
needed by appointees are ‘tact, compromise and consensus’ (attributes
valued within the Confucian discourse). Interestingly, in direct contrast
to text 3, where Margaret Ng argues that it is inevitable that the selection
system for the chief executive proposed by the China and pro-China side
will be biased, Chu states that under the system of executive appointees for
the statutory bodies, ‘[t]here is no question that the system boils down to
arbitrariness’.
In paragraph 5, Chu overtly directs his attack at the pro-democracy
camp and their supporters, accusing them of uncritical adoption of
Western values and suggesting that their eloquence is somehow mislead-
ing the people of Hong Kong. In setting up the opposition between the
‘Western concepts’ of the ‘eloquent activists’ (i.e. pro-democracy politi-
cians and their supporters), on the one hand, and ‘local conventions’, on
the other, Chu creates the possible implicature that those who support
greater democracy are somehow disloyal and do not share the values of
local people.
In paragraphs 6 and 7 Chu criticises the emphasis in Hong Kong placed
on democracy – ‘We have been told that all our institutions and our conduct
must be seen through the prism of democracy’ – arguing that evolution
towards democracy is provided for in the Basic Law.
This text presents a number of arguments which seek to undermine the
values identified in this chapter as being associated with the Utilitarian dis-
course. First, aspersion is cast on the notions of accountability, representa-
tiveness and transparency, on the grounds that they represent a threat to
continuity and stability. Second, the notion of popular franchise is attacked,
on the grounds that elected politicians are likely to play to the gallery of
popular opinion rather than take decisions on an impartial basis. Third,
the idea of making the statutory bodies more accountable, representative
and transparent, is criticised because the role and authority of the execu-
tive would be undermined. In place of the Utilitarian values which this text
seeks to undermine, a range of alternatives which this chapter has identified
as characteristic of the Confucianist discourse is offered. These are, first, the
power of the executive in decision making is asserted. Second, a notion of
representativeness based on a number of criteria which are determined by
those in power (but which do not include popular franchise) is put forward.
Third, value is attributed to tact, compromise and consensus in public
discourse.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has considered public discourse in transitional Hong Kong in

terms of the conflicting forces of the Utilitarian discourse normally associ-
ated with the West and the Confucianist style, normally associated with
China and the Chinese people. In characterising the two discourses in such
dichotomous terms, there is a danger of overgeneralising. However, it is
hoped that the chapter has demonstrated through the example discursive
events and texts, how discourses are inherently unstable constructs and
that an element of idealisation is necessary if the concept of discourse is
to have any value. In addition to the problem of idealisation, two other
shortcomings in the analysis should be mentioned. The first of these is
that the analysis inevitably suffers from the problem that the analyst is not
bicultural, but is a product of one of these discourses, having been brought
up in Great Britain; the possibility of bias is therefore great. Second, the
analysis is likely to be more successful with regard to Utilitarian discourse,
because by its very nature this discourse strives for transparency, valuing as
it does openness, directness and the expression of opinion;13 this in contrast
to Confucianist discourse which is more opaque and values confidentiality,
indirectness and silence, thus making analysis more difficult. In this respect,
texts 2 and 4 are unusual in openly promoting what is referred to here as
the Confucianist discourse.
One way of conceptualising the clash between the two competing dis-
courses is in terms of the notion of hegemonic struggle. As noted in Chapter 1,
Fairclough (1992: 92) defines hegemony as ‘leadership as much as domina-
tion across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a
society’. Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses, according to this concep-
tualisation, were thus competing for hegemony in transitioned Hong Kong.
As Fairclough notes, total hegemony is never achieved more than partially
and temporarily. Even if equilibrium were reached in Hong Kong and either
a Utilitarian or a Confucianist discourse came to dominate the other, the
equilibrium that was reached would still remain unstable, because the
Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses are themselves in a state of flux. In
the meantime, following the handover, at the time of writing, there remains
a tension between these discourses: the Utilitarian discourse promoted most
notably within the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ democracies or the Confucianist discourse
associated with China and the Chinese people.
7
Metaphors in the Discursive
Construction of Patriotism: the
Case of Hong Kong’s Constitutional
Reform Debate
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we now switch to focusing on intercultural discourse taking

place after the retrocession. This will prepare the way for Part III, where the
focus moves firmly onto this period.
7.1.1 Global phenomenon

In spite of claims concerning the demise of the nation state (Jenkins and
Sofos, 1996; Smith, 1999; Spencer and Wollman, 2002), patriotism, and its
associated concept of nationalism, is still a powerful force in many countries
(Billig, 1995). Indeed, patriotism appears to be an equally, if not increas-
ingly, influential concept across the world in recent years. This is especially
the case after the 9/11 incident in the US, where patriotism surfaced as a
prevalent force and became central to much of the country’s political rheto-
ric and policies. The focus of this chapter, however, involves the notion
of patriotism not in the context of the US, but in that of Hong Kong, in
the post-colonial period, as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China.
Patriotism usually refers to positive attitudes by individuals to their own
nation, culture and interests. The word is derived from the Latin term
‘patria’, which means ‘fatherland’. Nationalism, as distinct from patriotism,
generally refers to the ideology which holds that the nation’s ethnicity is a
‘fundamental unit’ of human social life and which makes certain political
claims based upon such a belief. In simple terms, nationalism is an ideology
advocating the formation of a separate nation state for each distinct ethnic
group. Benedict Anderson (1984) emphasises that nations are essentially
a socially constructed phenomenon. He describes nations as ‘imagined
communities’ and a necessary consequence of modernisation. Similarly,
Ernest Gellner (1983: 2) claims that: ‘[n]ationalism is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’.
Nonetheless, patriotism as a concept is often intertwined with that of
153
nationalism. George Orwell differentiated the two concepts in an article

titled ‘Notes on Nationalism’:
By ‘nationalism’ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human

beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions
or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled ‘good’ or ‘bad’.
But secondly – and this is much more important – I mean the habit of
identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond
good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its
interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words
are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be
challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two
different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean
devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one
believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other
people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally.
Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power.
The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and
more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which
he has chosen to sink his own individuality. (Orwell, 1945: 1)
Where distinctions between nationalism and patriotism are often made,

as raised in Orwell’s quote above, it is along the lines of the former being
extreme and aggressive and the latter being largely a defensive and personal
expression. In practice, there are no clear and steadfast differences between
the two and usage of these terms is often ambiguous, context-specific and
highly malleable. The USA Patriot Act might be taken as an example of where
nationalism blurs with patriotism. This Act was signed into law on 26 October
2001. It was initially drafted to counter terrorism after the 9/11 attack, yet it is
possible that such an Act created a strong patriotic/nationalistic surge which
favoured the George W. Bush administration in the run-up to wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. However, while many US citizens viewed supporting the
Act as patriotic, many others viewed it as nationalistic and a harmful assault
on civil liberties. As casualties mounted and opposition to the war increased,
those who were pro-war considered those opposed to it to be unpatriotic, or
even traitors. Some even felt that news reports that reflected the USA in a
negative light would support and provide solace to the enemy.
From this, it can be seen that while patriotism is widely used as a syno-
nym for nationalism and vice versa, their meanings remain ‘fundamentally
ambiguous’ (Spencer and Wollman, 2002: 2). Unfortunately, both terms
are often used as euphemisms for chauvinism, jingoism and racism (Essed,
1991). Although nationalism is prevalent in most nation states, its presence
is often overlooked, as the very concept of the nation state is taken for
granted. Michael Billig (1995) describes this as ‘banal nationalism’, referring
Metaphors in the Discursive Construction of Patriotism 155
to various forms of nationalism which discursively shape the minds of a

nation’s inhabitants on an everyday basis.
7.1.2 Metaphors as a conduit for patriotism

Public discourse is frequently utilised to promote patriotism and maintain
national hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). As a result, the media often become
a platform for the ideological articulation (Miles, 1989) of patriotism. But
the concern of this chapter is more specific in its linguistic focus. It consid-
ers the use of metaphors as a discursive device, not only to construct, but
also to relate national identities under different sociocultural contexts and
ideological preferences.
In their seminal work on metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) point to
the fact that the use of metaphor is not only a matter of language usage or
poetic licence, but a functional mechanism which affects the way we think,
act and experience reality. To demonstrate this claim, they take the meta-
phor of ‘war’ in daily discourse to analyse arguments. Although arguments
are mostly verbal and local, the concept of ‘war’ is frequently used to con-
ceive of these situations. To ‘win’ or to ‘lose’ the argument, to ‘attack’ each
other’s ‘position’, for instance, are metaphorical expressions that directly
affect the way people experience situations of argument and confrontation.
Metaphor can thus be considered a necessary cognitive mechanism through
which discourses and, by extension, social reality are formulated.
Metaphors are widely used in political discourse as pragmatic devices to
perform ideological articulation and sensationalisation, as well as emotional
arousal (Kitis and Milapides, 1997; Lee, 2005; Wei, 2000; Wilson, 1990).
Where different ideologies are at stake, it is likely that there will be variation
in the use and interpretation of metaphors. As a number of scholars have
noted (Charteris-Black, 2003; Deignan, 2003; Littlemore, 2003; Trompenaars,
2003), to achieve its purposes, metaphor has to be interpreted through
shared cultural knowledge, and there is variation in the extent to which
people from different cultural backgrounds share cultural knowledge and
ideologies. With specific reference to Hong Kong, Lee’s (2005) study of meta-
phors used in Hong Kong and mainland Chinese discourses over the change
of sovereignty has demonstrated that differences in ideological dispositions
are often mirrored by the different usage of metaphors.
7.1.3 Research focus

Based on the above considerations, this chapter considers the role that
language, and especially the language of metaphors in the media, plays in
the politics of post-handover Hong Kong. It examines reports and articles
from two Hong Kong newspapers (a popular tabloid called Apple Daily and
a Chinese government-endorsed broadsheet Ta Kung Pao) concerning the
issue of patriotism in Hong Kong published between 1 October 2003 and
1 October 2004. Two primarily different and competing discourses presented
by the two newspapers – which are generally recognised in society at large –

can be observed. Apple Daily is generally regarded as taking a pro-democracy,
liberal stance (what, after Scollon and Scollon, 2001 has been referred to as
a Utilitarian discourse in previous chapters), while Ta Kung Pao is taken as
reflecting the Beijing government’s views and promoting the latter’s hybrid
Communist/Confucianist discourse (see also Chapter 6 on these competing
discourses). This chapter examines the role of metaphor in instantiating these
two discourses in relation to their different conceptions of patriotism.
With regard to the metaphors in the two newspapers, the following ques-
tions are asked:
1. What are the different metaphors that are used in the discursive con-
struction of patriotism?
2. How do these metaphors help to express the contrasting ideologies of
the two newspapers?
3. What role does the use of these metaphors have in the hegemonic strug-
of patriotism?
The findings and possible answers to these questions help gain a better
understanding of not only the role of language in constructing the identity
of a patriotic Hong Kong Chinese, but also the politics and tensions between
the local and the national under the unprecedented ‘one country, two
systems’ framework of post-colonial Hong Kong.
7.2 Historical background of the case: debate on patriotism

in Hong Kong
It is useful to provide some background information for readers of this chapter.

A history of public protest underpins the background to the debate on patriot-
ism examined here. The first public protest occurred on 1 July 2003, the sixth
anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China from British colonial rule, when
over 500,000 people took to the streets protesting against the Hong Kong gov-
ernment’s intended application of Article 23 of Hong Kong’s mini-constitution,
an article which called for the introduction of an anti-subversion law. Largely
middle-class professionals and their families voiced their opposition to the pro-
posed new national security legislation for the city. The mainland Chinese gov-
ernment wanted to see the legislation enacted, in accordance with its view of
Hong Kong and China as ‘one country’, within the ‘one country, two systems’
framework. But as the protest showed, many Hong Kong people remained
wary. This protest was the second biggest public protest ever in Hong Kong,
after the demonstration following the events of Tiananmen Square on 4 June
1989, when almost 1 million citizens took to the streets of the city.
This first post-handover demonstration was followed by further dem-
onstrations such as the march on 1 January 2004, when 100,000 people
demonstrated in support of universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The Basic Law
recognises the goal of gradual democratisation, yet it does not specify an

exact method or timetable. Nevertheless, the document left the way open
for direct elections starting as early as 2007 (although as it turned out this
did not come to pass), a date which opinion polls at the time showed a vast
majority of citizens to be in favour of.1 A few days after the 1 January 2004
demonstration, the then chief executive of the Hong Kong government,
Tung Chee-hwa, delivered his annual policy address. He announced the for-
mation of the Constitutional Development Task Force. The main function
of this task force was to oversee development of the city’s constitution and
the possibilities of reform. However, Tung’s concerns were less about setting
up a timetable for democratisation than the city’s relationships with Beijing.
Tung emphasised the need to consult Beijing concerning certain ‘matters of
principle’ before any constitutional review could begin.
Despite public demands, the mainland government was reluctant to allow
Hong Kong to democratise further. It appeared that the Beijing government
had an agenda of an extremely gradual pace of development and was keen
to get its message across to the Hong Kong people directly by leading the
debate on political reform. It argued that political development in the city
is not just a local issue, but also a national one. On 10 February 2004, the
official Chinese news agency Xin Hua stated that the constitutional reforms
and governance of Hong Kong must be led by ‘patriots’. This comment
sparked successive waves of heated debate in the Hong Kong media and
political circles about what it meant to be a ‘patriot’. To fuel the debate,
further coverage by pro-Beijing sources painted a visit to the US Senate to
lobby for democratisation in Hong Kong on the part of Martin Lee, a lead-
ing Hong Kong pro-democracy figure, as being treasonous and ‘unpatriotic’.
It was generally agreed among political commentators that the purpose
of Beijing calling for ‘patriots’ to lead Hong Kong, on the one hand, and
denigrating pro-democracy campaigners such as Martin Lee as ‘unpatriotic’,
on the other, was designed to persuade the public not to vote for pro-
democracy candidates in the upcoming elections. Indeed the debate over
patriotism continued right up to the elections (‘Beijing Can Reinterpret the
Basic Law Anytime’, Apple Daily, 31 March 2004; ‘Ho Chun Yan Criticised
for Lying to Hong Kong People through Constitutional Developments’, Ta
Kung Pao, 27 February 2004, Domestic News, A03; ‘Tung Chee-hwa: We Will
Not Let Foreigners Intervene, Let Alone Going Abroad Seeking out their
Intervention’, Ta Kung Pao, 5 March 2004, Feature News, A01 Headline).
7.3 Methodology
For the analysis of this chapter, two corpora of texts were collected from
two Hong Kong Chinese language newspapers, namely Apple Daily (蘋果日
報) and Ta Kung Pao (大公報). The references to patriotism in the corpora
are primarily the mediated comments of news actors and politicians, not
the comments of the journalists themselves. The choice of which person’s
opinions to cite and what to cite also serves to indicate the ideological posi-
tions of the newspapers. In addition, a considerable number of references
occur in opinion articles and editorials. Hong Kong newspapers are habitu-
ally classified in terms of their political stance towards China. For instance,
one well-established social practice among Hong Kong people involves call-
ing an article ‘pro-Beijing’ or ‘leftist’, on the one hand, and ‘pro-democracy’
or ‘right-leaning’, on the other.
Research procedures were as follows:
1. Dates: from 1 October 2003 to 1 October 2004, 1 October being the

national day of China and February 2004 (i.e. the middle of this period)
being the height of the debate on patriotism.
2. Data collected through the search engine of Wisenews, with keywords
(in Chinese characters) being ‘Hong Kong’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘constitu-
tional reform’.
3. In total, 250 articles were found from Ta Kung Pao and 85 from Apple
Daily.
4. Each article was examined in search of common themes, discursive
strategies and, in particular, metaphors.
5. Implications were then derived from the findings of the research.
7.4 Themes of the metaphors
By examining the reports and articles published by Apple Daily and Ta Kung
Pao, numerous metaphors related to patriotism in the discourses of both news-
papers were observed. These metaphors are often utilised to construct identi-
ties and relationships between mainland China and Hong Kong. They can be
categorised into the following dominant themes: family, war, the body and
traitors (see Table 7.1 for the distribution of these themes within the corpora).
Under each of the themes, the similarities and differences in the usage
of the same metaphor by the discourses of the two newspapers will be
examined. The discourses of both newspapers largely share similar themes
of metaphors. This reflects not only the cultural common ground between
Hong Kong and the mainland as Chinese-speaking communities, but also,
and perhaps more importantly, the power struggle between the two dis-
courses in setting the agenda and framing (Goffman, 1974) issues that were
to be addressed in the debate.
Following the successive public protests and demonstrations by Hong
Kong citizens in 2003 and 2004, the Beijing government was determined
to get its message across to the Hong Kong public directly. This can clearly
be seen in its unusually active participation in commenting on the subject
of constitutional reforms in Hong Kong via mouthpieces such as Ta Kung
Pao. As a consequence, the discourse promoted by the Beijing government
took the lead in setting the agenda and framed the entire debate. In doing
Table 7.1 Themes of metaphors used by Ta Kung Pao and Apple Daily
Themes Ta Kung Pao Apple Daily

250 articles 85 articles
Total 338,121 words Total 91,854 words
Family 29 times in total 6 times in total

12% of 250 articles 7% of 85 articles
Once in every 11,659 words Once in every 15,309 words
War 12 times in total 12 times in total
Once in every 28,176 words Once in every 7654 words
The body 7 times in total 2 times in total
Traitors 14 times in total 7 times in total
so, Beijing’s discourse successfully established the parameters and priority of

the debate over patriotism, actively promoting the notion of patriotism and
marginalising other issues that were not aligned with Beijing’s political and
ideological preferences.
This strategy of framing is closely reflected by the themes of the meta-
phors chosen by the discourse of Ta Kung Pao, which initiated and framed a
particular ‘grammar of context’ (Scollon and Scollon, 2001) over patriotism,
and which was subsequently expanded or resisted by Apple Daily, which by
then was required to respond with the discourse established by the former.
Moreover, by taking the lead in framing the debate, the Beijing govern-
ment also established itself as the ‘primary definer’ of the entire discourse.
By the term ‘primary definer’, reference is made to a source of informa-
tion that is usually official, that generates control and establishes initial
definitions of particular events, situations and issues (Chibnall, 1977). This
enabled the pro-Beijing discourse to manipulate social information to its
advantage, leaving less room for competing alternative discourse, as any
other source of information would be deemed as secondary to the primary
definers and therefore less credible. Ta Kung Pao, as a pro-Beijing newspaper,
was at the forefront of this framing through its presentation of Beijing’s
position. Examples of primary definers in the form of experts for the Beijing
government’s discourse frequently include opinions from mainland legal
scholars, for example, Xiao Wei Yun (蕭蔚雲), who were accredited with
special status and authority regarding the Basic Law and issues relating to
Hong Kong and China. Ta Kung Pao, as a pro-Beijing mouthpiece, took the
lead in presenting these people as primary definers.
In contrast, the pro-democracy Apple Daily, as pro-democracy and
anti-Beijing, featured expert comments from pro-democracy lawyers and
other professionals as definers in resisting the agenda being set by the

pro-Beijing discourse. Nonetheless, under the political framing of the pro-
Beijing discourse, these expert comments appear to be passive responses
or defences against the criticisms launched by the primary definers.
Consequently, at least in terms of discursive strategies, one might consider
the hegemony of the pro-Beijing discourse to be largely successful in mar-
ginalising alternative political voices.2
The strategic use of expert advice and comments as primary definers intro-
duces the complex issue relating to ‘voices’, where the roles and voices of the
media (newspaper editors for the current case), primary definers (politicians
and commentators) and the ideological stance of the Beijing government or
the democratic camp are often intertwined and at times overlapping.
Goffman’s idea of participation statuses addresses this issue well. According
to Goffman (1981), a speaker (or writer) can have three participation sta-
tuses in relation to any utterance. A speaker may be the ‘animator’ (the one
who is physically making the utterances), the ‘author’ (‘someone who has
selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which
they are encoded’, p. 144), and the ‘principal’ (‘someone whose position is
established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been
told, someone who is committed to what the words say’, p. 144).
In the case of this study, as previously mentioned, the majority of the
texts from the corpora that feature metaphors are news reports. In this
context, one might consider the newspaper as the animator, which is
mechanically reporting and quoting what the authors have said, while
the authors are the politicians and commentators who have actually
made the statements. The principals are the ideological motivations
behind these authors. However, in reality, the newspaper’s role cannot
be strictly classified as the animator, because it is frequently involved in
selecting and editing news items to be published, or paraphrasing and
quoting certain statements as headlines and the body of news reports.
In that sense, the journalists’ and editors’ voices of the newspaper are
also actively participating in the role of the author and even that of the
principal in the articulation of certain political voices, albeit under the
guise of the passive animator. In fact, it is rare to find the editors of either
Ta Kung Pao or Apple Daily risking forfeiting their social role of impartial
news gatekeeper by explicitly committing themselves to align with more
extreme political stances. As a result, the voices of the newspaper editors
often surface through the layout of the newspaper content, prioritisation
and treatments of headlines, rather than through the use of more radical
metaphors.
7.4.1 The family

Let us begin with the category of the family. This is one of the most
dominant and salient themes of the metaphors used in the debate over
patriotism. In the data, metaphorical variations on this theme are found

in both pro-democracy and pro-Beijing discourses, as represented by Ta
Kung Pao and Apple Daily. These thematic variations include notions of
family business, ancestral country,3 and parent and child. In general, these
metaphors are used to symbolise relationships between Hong Kong and
China, where Hong Kong is the son and China is the parent. However, this
comparison automatically implies not only a difference in status and power
between a son and his parent, but also the duties and expectations arising
between them. Consequently, although the database is not large in terms
of numbers of metaphors for each category, it is not surprising that this
research reveals that the majority of thematic variations on the metaphor of
family were found in the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao (almost five times as many
as in Apple Daily), and that their political messages were very much tied to
the Confucian value of filial piety. Apple Daily at times also used the same
metaphoric variations, but frequently its goal in doing so was to undermine
the unequal power hierarchy as framed by the Beijing discourse.
7.4.1.1 Family business

The metaphor of ‘family’ will be looked at in more detail by starting
with the thematic variation of family business. Use of this metaphor
focuses on the belief that Hong Kong’s affairs should be considered ‘inter-
nal’ because Hong Kong is now a part of China. Tung Chee-hwa, the then
chief executive, for instance, was quoted by Ta Kung Pao as commenting
on the issue of constitutional reform as a matter of ‘family business’ in
which foreigners should not intervene (Extract 1). In this extract, Tung
used foregrounding as a discursive strategy which gradually built up extra
dimensions and substance to his politically charged metaphor, first address-
ing the issue by claiming that it was a ‘family business’, then extending
it to become a ‘national business’, and finally referring to it as ‘our busi-
ness’. Here one can note that Tung was playing the roles of both author
and primary definer. On the one hand, he was the author in so far as he
articulated the principal voice of the Confucian Beijing ideology. On the
other hand, he was primary definer, as the chief executive of Hong Kong,
the ultimate insider in Beijing–Hong Kong affairs. As a result, Tung’s use of
the family business metaphor and its connotations, aided by Ta Kung Pao’s
editorial discretion in co-constructing and instantiating his role as a pri-
mary definer (by choosing to cite him and which of his comments to cite),
had the potential to exert much influence in articulating Beijing’s political
messages and framing the public’s perception.
Extract 1
All extracts are first presented in Chinese followed by English
translations4.
在「一國兩制」下面,, 香港的政制發展, 是家事

在「一國兩制」下面是家事,, 是國事是國事,, 是我們自己的事。
外國人不應該干預, 我們亦絕對不會接受外國人干預, 更不應該自己跑出去, 要
外國人來干預我們, 這涉及到什麼呢？是愛國家愛香港, 或是不愛國家不愛香
港的問題。
‘董建華：絕不接受外國人干預更不應自己跑出去要外國人來干預’, 大公報,
2004-03-05, 要聞, p.A01頭條
Under the notion of ‘one country, two systems’, Hong Kong’s constitu-
tional development is a matter of family business. It is a matter of national
business. It is our business. Foreigners should not intervene, and we will not
let them intervene, let alone going abroad seeking for their intervention.
What does this whole thing involve? It involves the question of whether
or not we love our country and Hong Kong. (Tung Chee-hwa: ‘We Will
Not Let Foreigners Intervene, Let Alone Going Abroad Seeking out their
Intervention’, Ta Kung Pao, 5 March 2004, Feature News, A01 Headline)
7.4.1.2 Ancestral country

Another variation on the theme of the family metaphor is the ancestral
country ‘祖國’. Unlike the variation of the family business, which concerns
immediate familial relationships, the ancestral country metaphor takes on a
more historical and traditional angle in relation to the notion of the family.
In Chinese culture, the notion of ancestral country is closely tied in with
the concept of family. It is a Chinese tradition that key dates are set in the
calendar for sweeping graves of the ancestors, and shrines are installed at
home for worshipping one’s ancestors. In other literature, the term ‘祖國’
is often translated as the ‘Motherland’ or in some cases the ‘Fatherland’.
However, as indicated in note 2, it may be more appropriate, for the purpose
of this chapter, to translate the term more directly. Generally, the character
‘祖’ refers to ancestor and ‘國’ refers to the concept of a country. This trans-
lation highlights the relationship between this term and the metaphorical
theme of the family.
Given this, from Beijing’s point of view, the use of this metaphor auto-
matically implies a naturalised state of power difference between Hong
Kong and the mainland. An example can be seen in the opinion of Xiao
Weiyun (蕭蔚雲), one of the drafters of the Basic Law (see Extract 2), in
which he claims that the return of Hong Kong to the ancestral country is
already a form of power to the people. Similar to Tung as a primary definer
because of his status as chief executive in Extract 1, Xiao’s status as a drafter
of the Basic Law, and through the pro-Beijing editorial of Ta Kung Pao,
has credited him with the status of the primary definer of the situation of
constitutional reform in Hong Kong. Moreover, like Tung, Xiao made use of
foregrounding, in the form of a series of questions, as a discursive strategy
to give depth and practical relevance to the more abstract metaphor of the
ancestral country.
Extract 2
對於香港有團體提出「還政於民」的要求, 蕭蔚雲認為, 香港回歸祖國祖國已是「
還政於民」。他說：「現在的民主比以前還要高千百萬倍, 過去港英政府時期
二十八個港督, 誰選的？英國人。為什麼那時候你不喊還政於民？不喊沒有民
主？不上街遊行？」他認為現在有極少數在這個問題上的看法是有偏頗的。
‘何謂如有需要？何謂最終達至普選？蕭蔚雲：要由人大釋法’ , 大公報,
2004-03-28, 港聞, p.A07
Concerning the fact that some Hong Kong social groups have called
for the ‘return of power to the people’, Xiao Weiyun says that the return
of Hong Kong to its ancestral country has already expressed the return of
power to the people (Chinese people). He says ‘the level of democracy
now (in Hong Kong) is a million times higher than before. Who elected
the past 28 governors for the previous Hong Kong British government?
The British did. Why did you not cry for returning power to the people
then? Why did you not complain about the lack of democracy? And
why did you not take to the streets?’ He considers that this view held by
very few people in the Hong Kong society is rather biased. (‘What Does
“Where Necessary” Mean? What Does “Eventually Achieving Universal
Suffrage” Mean?’ Xiao Weiyun: We Need NPC to Reinterpret the Law’, Ta
Kung Pao, 28 March 2004, Domestic News, A07)
While the metaphor of the ancestral country serves Beijing’s purposes

and is consequently found relatively frequently in Ta Kung Pao, from pro-
democracy Apple Daily’s perspective, the metaphor implies unequal power
relationships, and so is best avoided. Indeed, no examples of its use were
found in Apple Daily.
7.4.1.3 Parent and child

The third variation on the theme of the family metaphor is that of par-
ent and child. Framed by the pro-Beijing discourse, this metaphor is again
charged with hierarchical power differences. In the Ta Kung Pao corpus,
mainland China was often compared with the tolerant parent, whereas
Hong Kong was compared with that of the lost son who identifies a bandit
as his father (Extract 3). The bandit in this extract refers to Great Britain, the
colonial ruler of Hong Kong for 150 years.
Extract 3
我們覺得對於愛國者的標準，要嚴格按照鄧小平先生的指示，不宜訂得過高過
認賊為父、挾洋自重、出賣港人利益，要求外國政
嚴，除了對個別背叛祖國、認賊為父、
府干預香港的分子以外，盡可能團結最大多數的香港市民，結成最廣泛的愛國
愛港陣營，防止出現日前台灣選舉中反映的對立與分裂現象。
顧國華, ‘團結最大多數防止對立分裂’, 大公報, 2004-03-26, 大公論壇/華南
工業城, p.A14
We feel that we should follow Mr Deng’s [Deng Xiaoping, former

Chinese leader and the architect of the ‘one country, two systems’ con-
cept] instructions strictly, and not set the standards for being patriots
too high or too strictly. Other than those individuals who betray their
ancestral country, or those who identify the bandit as their father, those
who seek self interests by supporting foreigners, those who betray Hong
Kong people’s interests, and those who seek foreign intervention, we
should include as many Hong Kong citizens as possible to form a most
extensive patriots’ camp, so as to avoid confrontational and divisive
scenarios as seen recently in the Taiwan election. (Koo Kwok wah, ‘To
Include the Majority So as to Prevent Confrontational and Divisive
Scenarios’, Ta Kung Pao, 26 March 2004, Ta Kung Forum/South China
Industrial City, A14)
The author of this opinion article, Mr Koo, is a well-known Hong Kong

shipping tycoon who is also the uncle of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa.
Not surprisingly, his political stance was much aligned with the policies of
Beijing. Given this intertextual reference, it would only be consistent to
observe that his role in the whole debate over patriotism is another primary
definer of the Hong Kong constitutional situation, co-constructed along
with other mass media by Ta Kung Pao.
The metaphor of parent and child was generally resisted by the pro-
democracy discourse of the Apple Daily, although it was at times used in a
sarcastic manner. This is noticeable in the way in which the metaphor was
quoted, manipulated and ridiculed (see Extract 4). Instead of the respectable
and tolerant parent, the parental figure portrayed by Apple Daily (Beijing) is
replaced in a sarcastic fashion by an old-fashioned and stubborn grandfather
(阿爺).
Extract 4
今次報告避而不談卻又最關鍵的議題，是政改啟動權誰屬。有港區政協私下和
中方官員討論時，北京最關心只是主導權誰屬，「畀你○七年可以普選特首又
點？只要阿爺（北京）
阿爺（北京）鍊住啟動權，即係鍊住政改要害，改唔改由佢話事。」
‘北京可隨時再提釋法’, 蘋果日報, 2004-03-31, 港聞, p.A02
This report [referring to the first report by the Constitutional
Development Task Force] has avoided talking about the most important
issue, which is who has the power to initiate constitutional reforms in
Hong Kong. Some national commissars of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference from Hong Kong have discussed the issue with
some Beijing officials privately. They found that Beijing is most con-
cerned about who holds the right of initiation. They said: ‘So what if
you can have universal suffrage for electing the chief executive of Hong
Kong in 2007? As long as granddad (Beijing) is holding onto his power to

initiate, which is the core of constitutional reforms, he can still decide
otherwise. (‘Beijing Can Reinterpret the Basic Law Any Time’, Apple Daily,
31 March 2004, Domestic News, A02)
Resistance is also found in this extract from Apple Daily on the level of
the discursive style, where part of the quotation was written in colloquial
Cantonese rather than standard written Chinese. This use of the colloquial
Cantonese language can be seen as an attempt not only to resist Beijing’s
homogenisation of Hong Kong and the mainland under the metaphor of
the parent and son, but also to build a distinct local identity with its own
voice. However, it should be noted that the role of the newspaper is not only
the animator in this extract. It is also playing the role of the author who
articulates the pro-democracy political agenda. One example illustrating
this overlapping of roles is the title of the article ‘Beijing Can Reinterpret
the Basic Law Any Time’. Although being sensational is a common strategy
employed by commercially driven newspapers such as Apple Daily in order
to push sales and profits, it appears that the editors of the newspaper created
the article’s title with the aim of inducing worry: that Beijing might interfere
in Hong Kong’s affairs. Moreover, by positioning the report by an anony-
mous reporter as A02 (immediately following the headline), the ‘voice’ and
resistance of the editors of Apple Daily quietly surfaced through the form of
a news report.
The pro-democracy discourse in Apple Daily was also quick to extend the
parent and son metaphor, a key element in traditional Confucian discourse,
by associating it with ‘free lunch’, a concept drawn from Western Utilitarian
discourse, implying that Hong Kong people’s right for universal suffrage has
been sacrificed for economic benefits (Extract 5). Such appropriation of the
parent and child metaphor not only reflects the differences in the ideologi-
cal underpinnings of Ta Kung Pao and Apple Daily, but also the effort on the
part of the latter to resist the connotations of the metaphor as framed by
the pro-Beijing discourse.
Extract 5
奈何董建華政府把特區矮化為只懂向母親母親招手討飯的「二世祖」「二世祖」，似乎港人命
中注定只有免費午餐免費午餐，卻無普選權利。
何喜華, ‘政制檢討未開始已結束’, 蘋果日報, 2004-03-30, 蘋果論壇, p.E17
Tung Chee-hwa’s government has belittled the SAR to become the
frivolous son who only knows how to get meals from his mother. It seems
that Hong Kong is destined to be only entitled to free lunches, but not
universal suffrage. (Ho Hei wah, ‘Constitutional Reforms Have Finished
before They Start’, Apple Daily, 30 March 2004, Apple Forum, E17)
7.4.2 War
Similar to the theme of the family, the theme of war is also prevalent in
both the discourses of Ta Kung Pao and Apple Daily. Complex issues sur-
rounding voices remain, as this metaphor directly involves the emotions of
aggression and violence, which go against the common social expectation
of the news media being level-headed, rational and an impartial gatekeeper.
Consequently, it is not uncommon in the corpora to observe that ‘Othering’
as a strategy was frequently used alongside the metaphor of war, where
‘self ’ and ‘Other’ is often presupposed and authors would justify their own
principal viewpoints as necessary and exclusive, while marginalising and
criticising alternative views.
The pro-democracy discourse of Apple Daily, for example, highlighted the
metaphor of war through editing and paraphrasing comments made by pri-
mary definers such as the controversial pro-democracy bishop, Joseph Zen,
known for being a tenacious defender of religious freedoms and democracy
(see Extract 6), in order to portray the Beijing government as an oppressive
and irrational Other which Hong Kong needs to fight against in order to
maintain its survival. In fact, with the statistics given in Table 7.1, it can be
seen that the projection of self as the victim is repeated throughout the Apple
Daily corpus. This perhaps can partly explain the higher percentage in the
use of this metaphor by Apple Daily compared with its use by Ta Kung Pao.
Extract 6 is a lead-in for a news report published by Apple Daily on 16
March 2004 (A2).
Extract 6
今年7.1，風雲再起
今年7.1 ，風雲再起。北京官員與左派政客近數周以來打壓香港民主發展的言
論，激起天主教領袖的反擊反擊。天主教香港教區主教陳日君呼籲信徒今年七月一
日上街，參加民主大遊行，因為「我們需要讓人們知道，我們對更多民主的強
烈願望。」
蔡元貴, ‘陳日君籲信徒7.1上街「讓人知道我們對民主強烈願望」’, 蘋果日
報, 2004-03-16,港聞, p.A02
The cloud of war is looming for 1 July this year. The suppressive opin-
ions against Hong Kong’s democratic development by Beijing officials
and leftist politicians have incited a counter-attack by the leader of the
Catholics. Bishop for the Hong Kong region Joseph Zen appeals for
Catholics to take to the streets on 1 July and participate in the pro-
democracy march, because ‘we [referring to Hong Kong’s Catholics as
Hong Kong citizens] need to let people know about our strong desire for
democracy’. (‘Joseph Zen Calls for Catholics to Take to the Streets on 1
July “to Let People Know About Our Strong Desire for Democracy”’, Choi
Yuen Kwai, Apple Daily, 16 March 2004, Domestic News, A2)
It is interesting to note that although using the emotion-laden metaphor

of war, the editor of this news report justified its use as a form of self-defence
through actively Othering leftist and Beijing officials’ comments as suppres-

sive. Moreover, through recontextualising and redefining the situation as
one that was provoked by the pro-Beijing discourse, along with the high
priority of the news item (A2), the use of the metaphorical term ‘counter-
attack’ not only emphasises Bishop Zen’s role as a primary definer for the
pro-democracy discourse, but also helps to reinforce the newspaper’s own
ideological principle, which is to promote and gain support for universal
suffrage as well as undermine and resist the hegemony framed by the pro-
Beijing discourse.
Similar to Apple Daily, the use of war as a metaphor in Ta Kung Pao is
often accompanied by the discursive strategy of Othering and presupposi-
tion, where personal deictics like ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘us’ are often presupposed,
represented and utilised by these conflicting discourses to serve their own
ideological purposes. These presuppositions limit the readers of the text to
fixed subject positions offered by the discourse, where alternative readings
are heavily marginalised. In Extract 6, from Apple Daily, the ‘us’ referred to
is the pro-democracy public. It presumes the reader to be one of ‘us’, and
by doing so it effectively marginalises any possible alternative subject posi-
tions. One would risk being the threatening ‘Other’ if one does not agree
with the definition provided by the discourse of the text. By way of contrast,
Extract 7 shows clearly that under the framing of Ta Kung Pao’s anonymous
report, the ‘us’ is more the patriot who values China and Hong Kong’s col-
lective interests than one who fights for individual rights.
Extract 7
剛才何先生說到二十三條，保不保持一黨專政，愛不愛國，流露了他與大家
的理念不一樣，但大家應該要考慮現在香港的政治現實，是要去傾好？還是是要去傾好？還是
去『砌』好？……我們五十萬人上街，西藏新疆也不難找到一百萬人上街，
去『砌』好
是否每一個地方都可以決定地方本身的事？大家由一個整體的利益，還是個
人的利益去找個平衡點，找出對大家大家都最有利的。
‘發言者炮轟何俊仁斥企圖借政制發展政制發展欺騙港人’, 大公報, 2004-02-27, 港
聞, p.A03.
Earlier on Mr Ho commented on Article 23, and his opinions on
whether or not China should remain a one-party country and what
should be counted as patriotism have shown that his views are different
from ours. However, we must consider the political reality of Hong Kong
at the moment. Should we talk, or should we ‘fight’? ... Hong Kong has
50,000 people participating in a march, but it is not that difficult to have
a million people protesting on the streets of Tibet either. Can every city
decide its own business? It should be the best for all of us if we could find
a balance point between collective and individual interests. (‘Ho Chun
Yan Criticised for Lying to Hong Kong People through Constitutional
Developments’, Ta Kung Pao, 27 February 2004, Domestic News, A03)
Whereas the pro-democracy discourse of Apple Daily stresses the right of the
individual to be autonomous, the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao clearly positions
its argument at the other end of the spectrum. Focusing on the collectivis-
tic value of the Confucian tradition, the discourse of Ta Kung Pao stresses
that the welfare of the country (China) as a whole should come before that
of Hong Kong, which is only a part of China. Such discrepancies between
the emphases of the two discourses tend to reflect their respective political
motivations in attempting to sustain or subvert the discursive hegemony, as
established and framed by the pro-Beijing discourse.
7.4.3 The body

The theme of the body as metaphor is not as prevalent in either Ta Kung
Pao or Apple Daily as the themes of war and family. However, the ways that
the body is used as a metaphor to represent sociopolitical ties between Hong
Kong and the mainland are similar to both the metaphors of family and war.
In the case of the pro-democracy Apple Daily, only a handful of articles were
found to make use of the body metaphor to describe the Hong Kong/Beijing
relationship. This is perhaps not too surprising as the body metaphor, like
the ancestral country metaphor, implies inseparable yet hierarchical rela-
tionships between Hong Kong and Beijing.
In the case of Ta Kung Pao, however, the metaphor of the body is often uti-
lised as a strategy to manipulate public perception regarding the current eco-
nomic and political well-being of Hong Kong. For instance, the democrats are
compared with poison that is affecting the ‘body’ of Hong Kong, and unless
this poison is leached in time, this ‘body’ will not recover fully (Extract 8).
Extract 8
大律師公會主席陳景生「不認為現階段需要釋法」。現階段「釋法」，正是需
要、非常及時，早了「亂象」還沒充分呈現，晚了流毒必釀禍害晚了流毒必釀禍害，不早不晚，
來一個當頭棒喝。
金察柯, ‘釋疑止爭人大說了算’, 大公報 2004-03-30, 大公論壇/工商零訊,
p.A12
The chairman of the Barristers’ Association ‘does not agree that this
is an appropriate time for the NPC to reinterpret the Basic Law (the law
regarding the method of electing the chief executive for Hong Kong in
2007 and legislative council in 2008)’. It is very necessary to reinterpret
the Basic Law now, as ‘chaos’ has still not set in. There will be grave con-
sequences if we leave it too long before we leach the poison. This is the right
time to set the record straight. (Jin Cha Ke, ‘Let NPC Interpret the Law
and Clear the Confusion’, Ta Kung Pao, 30 March 2004, Ta Kung Forum/
Business News, A12)
The body metaphor was also used to compare Hong Kong’s economic situ-
ation with a recovering body that could not risk falling ill again (Extract 9).
Such a comparison again mirrors the ideological dispositions of the pro-

Beijing discourse, which places great emphasis on the collectiveness of Hong
Kong and China as one single entity.
Extract 9
香港經濟的復甦從去年底今年初剛有喜色剛有喜色。目下正最需要是社會和諧，人們和
衷共濟，求同存異，把握內地提供的多種機遇，搞好經濟，固本培元固本培元，改善民
生，才是真正符合港人的利益。
王國興, ‘爭拗已偏離基本法軌道釋法來得正是時候’, 大公報, 2004-03-29,
大公論壇/工商零訊, p.A11
Hong Kong’s economy has shown signs of recovery starting from the
end of last year and the beginning of this year. What the society needs
most at the moment is harmony. People should live in harmony with and
be tolerant of each other. They should make good use of all the benefi-
cial opportunities provided by the mainland and improve Hong Kong’s
economy, thereby strengthening the original body and develop further from
it. (Wong Kwok Hing, ‘Arguments on Constitution Reforms Have Strayed
from the Basic Law, Reinterpretation Is a Timely Move’, Ta Kung Pao, 29
March 2004, Ta Kung Forum/Business News, A11)
7.4.4 Traitor
The difference in emphasis between the collective and the individual as
articulated by the Confucian and Utilitarian discourse systems as repre-
sented by Ta Kung Pao and Apple Daily is further magnified in the theme of
the traitor as metaphor. As with the themes of metaphor discussed previ-
ously, the traitor metaphor is again framed by the pro-Beijing discourse and
articulated by primary definers and authors to criticise the democrats for
their ‘unpatriotic’ behaviours, namely the demand for universal suffrage in
2007 for the election of the chief executive and 2008 for the election of the
Legislative Council.
An example of this can be seen in Extract 10, where the author, a former
high court judge of Hong Kong, plays the role of the expert in defining the
situation. Alongside the discursive strategy of the traitor metaphor, it can
be observed that other strategies such as foregrounding, presupposition and
Othering are also used in defining the China/Hong Kong collectivity as ‘self ’
against the ‘intervening foreigners’. It is also worth noting that the author bor-
rows the voice of another author/primary definer by paraphrasing comments
made by a judge from Guangdong province to express the more extreme accu-
sations against the democrats’ ‘slave mentality’ and ‘traitor’s mentality’.
Extract 10
所謂民主人士不是持續長期地發表歪論嗎？不是日以繼夜地在電台、電視、報
章、討論會、文章上大聲疾呼、煽動群眾嗎？不是馬不停蹄地威脅策動街頭運
動嗎？這不是「反中亂港」又是怎麼？ … 以往一位廣東省大法官形容一、兩
「奴隸思想」、「漢奸心態」。多年觀察這數位人士的
位所謂民主人士為太重「奴隸思想」、「漢奸心態」
言行，同是香港土生土長的中國人，我真的很希望可以名正言順的為他們找出
一點辯解理由，可惜實在找不到。
廖子明, ‘人大釋法不僅有權而且必要’, 大公報 2004-03-29, 港聞, p.A08
Aren’t the so-called democrats persistently expressing their twisted
views? Are they not constantly crying out subversive opinions on radio,
television, forums, and in writings? Aren’t they keeping on instigating
campaigns on the streets? What would you call these if they are not
‘anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong’ behaviours? ... A judge from
the Guangdong province once described a few so-called democrats as too
rooted in ‘slave mentality’ and ‘traitor’s mentality’. After observing these
people for a few years, I, as a Hong Kong born Chinese would really
like to find some reasons to defend their behaviours but unfortunately
I cannot find any. (Liao Zi Ming, ‘NPC Does Not Only Have the Right to
Interpret the Basic Law, But it is Also Necessary to Do So’, Ta Kung Pao,
29 March 2004, Domestic news, A08)
In response to the criticisms framed by the pro-Beijing discourse, the pro-

democracy discourse of Apple Daily made deliberate attempts to detach the
emotional link of the traitor metaphor by subjecting it to counter-arguments
found in ‘Western’ utilitarian thought, such as the concept of falsification
(Extract 11), thereby undermining the validity of the pro-Beijing discourse
argument. Moreover, if the author of this article, who is a member of the
Hong Kong democratic development network, is considered, it is to be noted
that the presuppositions on what constitutes ‘us’ and ‘them’ again reflect
the underlying principal ideological position of the Apple Daily discourse.
Extract 11
許崇德怒斥別人「打叉」，李柱銘卻要被冠以「吳三桂」、「賣國賊」、「「吳三桂」、「賣國賊」、「
忤逆仔」
忤逆仔」的稱號，有如「只許州官放火，不准百姓點燈」，令人哭笑不得。
著名哲學家卡爾．波柏（Karl Popper）以證偽原則（Falsification）見稱，
他在《開放社會及其敵人》一書中指出，民主制度不是一種選出明君的制
度，而是一種防止獨裁累積權力的制度。
‘可以打叉才是真民主’, 盧偉明, 蘋果日報, 2004-03-25, 蘋果論壇, p.E15
Hsu Cheng De scolds people for putting crosses on his pictures, yet
Martin Lee is labelled as ‘Wu Sangui’,5 ‘treasonous thief ’ and ‘the ungrateful
son’. This simply is ‘allowing the officials to commit arson while forbid-
ding civilians to light their lamps’. This is contradictory. The famous
philosopher Karl Popper, whose theory of falsification is well known,
once pointed out in his work Open Society and its Enemies, that the func-
tion of democracy is not to elect an enlightened leader, but to prevent
the accumulation of power on the part of a single despot. (‘To be Able to
Put Crosses on Portraits is True Democracy’, Lo Wai Ming, Apple Daily,

25 March 2004, Apple Forum, E15)
7.5 Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter, it was stated that the intention was to
address, through an analysis of two corpora of newspaper articles, the role of
metaphors in discursively formulating the patriot in post-1997 Hong Kong.
Three questions were asked:
1. What were the different metaphors that were being used to address the
issue of patriotism?
2. How did these metaphors vary according to the contrasting ideologies
of the two newspapers?
3. What role did the use of these metaphors have in the hegemonic strug-
of patriotism?
With respect to the first research question, it has been found that a variety
of metaphors are used in both Apple Daily and Ta Kung Pao, and that these
can be grouped and categorised under several common themes relating to
various social domains in traditional Chinese culture and in a way that
is common to both mainland China and Hong Kong. For instance, the
theme of the family and the body are linked to the Chinese traditions of
filial piety and familial duties, while the themes of war and the traitor are
intertextualised with historical references and collective memories. The
appeal of common social experience that these themes of metaphors con-
notes also partly accounts for the fact that both Ta Kung Pao and Apple Daily
often share the same metaphoric themes when trying to articulate their
messages to the public. However, while both newspapers tend to share the
same themes of metaphors, Ta Kung Pao is proactive in creating the meta-
phoric framework, while Apple Daily is reactive (although at the same time
taking what Ta Kung Pao initiated in different directions). The ways that
these metaphors are used and defined thus tend to be context-specific and
subject to appropriation and manipulation in different circumstances.
This brings us to the second question: ‘How did these metaphors vary
according to the contrasting ideologies of the two newspapers?’ Differences
in the use of the same metaphors also reflect the ideological principals behind
a particular piece of text. For instance, in Extract 5, the pro-democracy Apple
Daily author has appropriated ‘the frivolous son’ metaphor by injecting the
‘free lunch’ concept, thereby challenging the hegemonic framing of the pro-
Beijing discourse. Nonetheless, it is rare in the corpora to find metaphors
being used alone as a discursive strategy when articulating messages. A more
common scenario is that metaphors are combined with and used alongside
other discursive strategies such as foregrounding, presupposition, framing,
Othering and subject positioning.
This leads on to the discussion of the third question for this chapter,
which is to look at the way metaphors help to sustain or undermine hege-
monies. It has been found in the corpora that hegemonic dominance can
be successfully maintained, or even reinforced, by metaphors, especially
when they are authored and articulated by primary definers. Many of the
themes of the metaphors in the corpora have either been authored by pri-
mary definers such as experts or politicians directly or paraphrased by the
newspapers indirectly. Metaphors, when articulated by primary definers,
who are themselves partly created by the newspapers’ political leanings
and editorial discretion, can aid in setting and framing situations and social
information to the advantage of certain ideological positions, by marginalis-
ing alternative views and limiting subject positions. For instance, the role of
the retired high court judge, Liao Zi Ming (Extract 10), as a legal expert adds
considerable weight to the framing of the situation of patriotism in terms of
the traitor metaphor. Nonetheless, although primary definers can be consid-
ered as authors of the ideological principals behind them, their influence in
framing depends much on the newspapers’ editorial boards, which decide
who and what to cite and at what time. In fact, through strategies of editing,
prioritisation and layout, the impartiality of the newspaper as animator can
also be easily manipulated by various hidden principals, highlighting the
complex issue of ‘voice’ that underlines contentious subjects such as patri-
otism. Finally, resistance to dominant hegemonic metaphorical framings is
possible through negotiations and appropriations. In the corpora, many of
the Apple Daily articles and reports (as seen, for example, in Extracts 4 and 6)
have, to a certain extent, managed to resist the hegemonic discourse, albeit
in a defensive position, by actively engaging in appropriating or challenging
the validity of the metaphors used by the pro-Beijing discourse.
Part III
The Discursive Construction of
a New Hong Kong Identity
8
Identity Politics and Hong Kong’s
Return to Chinese Sovereignty
8.1 Context of the present chapter
Based on a large corpus of speeches and other public pronouncements,

Chapter 2 analysed the discourse of the last British governor of Hong Kong,
Chris Patten, over the five years of his period of office, leading up to the
transfer of sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The chapter
argued that, in his focus on four issues – the free market economy, the free-
dom of the individual (although not at the expense of the disadvantaged),
the rule of law and democracy – Patten created a myth, defined as ‘a set of
beliefs and values deriving from a shared past which, to varying degrees,
may or may not be true’. This myth was promoted as Britain’s legacy to
Hong Kong, thus ensuring that Britain could withdraw from its last major
colony with honour. The chapter’s analysis focused on four discursive strat-
egies employed by Patten in the promotion of his myth: the transformation
of old political genres and the introduction of new ones, presupposition,
involvement (the use of indexicals), and lexical structuring and reiteration.
The present chapter will take a similar approach to the discourse of the
first chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)
of the PRC, Tung Chee-hwa, over the five-year period of his first term
of office. The corpus used in this study consists primarily of 140 major
speeches delivered by Tung. Other sources include television and radio
broadcasts, press conferences, government press releases, Legislative Council
question and answer sessions, and newspaper articles (from a corpus of 1369
articles collected from 19 December 1996 until 3 June 2002).
The chapter will argue that Tung sought to reassert some elements of
Patten’s myth, to distance himself from others (most notably that of democ-
racy), while at the same time introducing elements of his own. The analysis
documents Tung’s unsuccessful attempt to bring about a shift in communal
identity for Hong Kong in the post-colonial era.
With regard to the discourse of Tung Chee-hwa, it is important to be
aware that it is not the discourse of one man that is being referred to. Tung
175
may be the ‘animator’ of his discourse in Goffman’s terms – the person

who takes on the role of speaking the words (Goffman, 1981: 144) – but
the ‘author’ – the person who has selected the ideas that are expressed and
encoded (ibid.) – is to likely also include Tung’s advisers and officials, as well
as the Beijing government. That said, the fact remains that Tung is also the
‘principal’ – the person whose position is established by the words that are
pronounced, who believes in what he is saying, and who is committed to
what the words say (ibid.).1
8.2 Language choice
The Hong Kong government has set as its goal to make Hong Kong a
bilingual society. Because most Hong Kong people are more comfortable
in Cantonese (the mother tongue and generally considered to be the lan-
guage of solidarity), the majority of Tung’s public pronouncements were in
Cantonese. Nevertheless, in line with his promotion of Hong Kong as an
international city, a great deal of his speeches were also given in English2
and press conferences and radio phone-in programmes were bilingual.
(Some speeches, where the audience included important mainland officials,
were also given in Putonghua, the spoken standard used on the mainland.)
In whatever language a speech or official statement was given, it was made
available immediately on the government website in both Chinese and
English. This raises the important question of audience design. While the
immediate audience for a speech or statement may be predominantly either
English- or Cantonese-speaking, the wider audience of the press and other
interested parties must be able to read it on the Internet in either language.
According to the official Government Information Service (personal com-
munication), speeches are usually drafted in the language in which they
will be presented and then translated. Tung used speech-writers and did
not write his own speeches. For the purposes of this chapter, the English
versions of all citations have been used, but it is indicated if the speech
was actually presented in English, Cantonese or Putonghua.3 This mode of
analysis has its problems, but it is indicated in notes interpolated into the
analysis where there might be variation in pragmatic uptake across the two
languages.
8.3 Political background
On 1 July 1997, sovereignty over Hong Kong reverted from Britain to China.
Hong Kong became an SAR of China, but was guaranteed a high degree of
autonomy in running its affairs, with the mainland taking responsibility
only for defence and foreign relations. The agreement for this unprec-
edented form of decolonisation – decolonisation without independence,
or, in the words of the Chinese leader at that time, Deng Xiaoping, ‘one
Identity Politics and Hong Kong’s Return 177
country, two systems’– as has been seen in earlier chapters, had been jointly
negotiated by Britain and China during protracted negotiations which took
place during the early 1980s. Following the signing, in 1984, of the Joint
Declaration, China, with input from Britain and Hong Kong, drafted the
Basic Law, which was to become the future ex-colony’s mini-constitution.
Together, the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration specified the terms and
conditions under which Hong Kong’s autonomy was to operate. Included in
both documents were provisions for the gradual development of democratic
government, with the Basic Law allowing for the possibility of universal suf-
frage for the election of the SAR’s leader, or chief executive, from 2007.4
In the meantime, the chief executive would be elected for five-year terms
by a small electoral college of local people selected by China. Following
provisions in the Basic Law, in 1997, the selection committee was made
up of 400 members, while in 2002 it was expanded to 800. On both occa-
sions Tung Chee-hwa, a former Hong Kong shipping magnate, was selected
to govern the SAR. Tung had no previous political experience (apart from
serving for a short time on the former British governor’s executive council),
but was well trusted by the authorities in Beijing.5 Tung had a reputation as
a conservative and the local and international media viewed his policies as
directed first and foremost towards pleasing Beijing (see e.g. Cheng, 1997;
Vines, 2001). For example, in spite of suffering from very low popularity
among the public, as measured by opinion polls,6 his main achievement
during his first term of office was generally interpreted as maintaining good
relations with the central government (Yeung, 2001).
In terms of political philosophy, one of Tung’s early proclamations was that
he wanted ‘less politics’ in Hong Kong (Yeung, 1997). This meant emphasis
on livelihood rather than political issues. On the question of constitutional
development, Tung backpedalled, saying that everything would follow the
provisions laid out in the Basic Law, in spite of the fact that decisions needed
to be made on issues left open in that document, such as the manner and
degree to which democratic development was to proceed after 2007.
8.4 Tung’s discursive formation
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Chris Patten, during the full five years of his
governorship, constantly reiterated a number of themes which were woven
together into a coherent discursive formation, his ‘myth’, as it was referred
to. These themes were essentially expressions of Western values, emphasis-
ing laissez-faire economics, the freedom of the individual (although not
at the expense of the welfare of the disadvantaged), the rule of law, and
democracy. In constantly reiterating these themes, Patten presented them
as part of the Hong Kong way of life, and, by placing the Hong Kong people
in a subject position, he created an identity for them in terms of the values
he himself subscribed to.
When consideration is given to Tung’s discursive formation,7 it is found to

be broader than that of Patten’s narrowly targeted one. While Patten’s four
themes are encountered also in Tung’s discourse, there is a new emphasis on
the development of a ‘knowledge-based’ economy (not just the free market
in general), which was not found in Patten’s speeches.8 In addition, there
is much less emphasis on democratic development. All four basic elements
were evident, however, in a speech that Tung made in Shanghai in 2001,
for example:
There are other dimensions of good governance on which we are work-

ing hard to improve ... A government that delivers better service at lower
cost and a smaller government that does not stand in the way of the market
and the individual. A government that promotes citizen participation and
democracy, in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law ...
And, a government that stresses rule of law, safeguarding of the freedoms
that its citizens enjoy, and public security especially in times that demand
heightened vigilance. (APEC CEO Summit in Shanghai on October 18,
2001– given in English) (emphasis added)
In addition to these themes of Patten’s myth, we find two other related

topics: Asian, or Confucian values,9 and the Hong Kong people’s identity as
an essential ‘Chineseness’ (Hong Kong as part of the motherland).
On Confucian values, for example, Tung made the following statement in
his manifesto for his selection as chief executive in 1996:
As we move forward there is a need for us to renew our commitment

to the values we hold dear. These values have been with us for thou-
sands of years and are as relevant today as they ever have been: Trust,
love and respect for our family and our elders; integrity, honesty and
loyalty towards all; commitment to education and a strong desire to
strive to improve and advance oneself; a belief in order and stability;
an emphasis on obligations to the community rather than rights of the
individual; a preference for consultation rather than open confronta-
tion. These are some of the shared values which make our society more
cohesive. Together with a strong identity, they will provide us with clar-
ity of direction and unity of purpose. (‘Building a 21st Century Hong
Kong Together’, 22 October 1996 – both Chinese and English versions
available)
In a speech given to a group of local youths, he asserted the Chineseness

of Hong Kong people as follows: ‘I believe that every Chinese takes pride
in the development of our nation and is proud of being Chinese (‘Coming
of Age’ ceremony, 4 May 2000 – given in Cantonese). Speaking to an
audience in New York, he also stressed the Chinese identity of Hong Kong
people:
. . . in Hong Kong . . . over 95% of us are Chinese. We ourselves were on

the receiving end of colonialism. We share the sense of dignity and pride
on the return of Hong Kong to China, and at long last our new found
responsibilities of managing our own affairs. China is our sovereign, and
naturally, like Americans, we have an affinity for our own fellow country-
men. And like Americans, our patriotic feeling is something very natural
to us. (Speech at a luncheon hosted by the Asia Society, New York on
12 September 1997 – given in English)
On many occasions, Tung stressed that ‘what is good for Hong Kong is
good for China’ and ‘what is good for China is good for Hong Kong’. The
following quotation from a BBC interview shortly before the handover is
just one of many occasions when Tung used this expression:
Our economic future is interlinked with China. Our culture is linked with
China. What is good for Hong Kong is actually good for China, because we
do contribute to China’s modernisation. And what is good for China is very
good for Hong Kong. The long-term interests of China and Hong Kong are
the same. (BBC interview, 10 June 1997, emphasis added)
8.5 Discursive strategies
This section will demonstrate how Tung used the same range of discursive
strategies as Patten did in the projection of his own myth (see Chapter 2 on
Patten). These strategies operate at both a macro- and a micro-level. At the
macro-level, the principal strategy used by Patten was the transformation of
old political genres and the creation of new ones. At the micro-level, Patten
used presupposition, involvement strategies (primarily the use of indexi-
cals), and lexical structuring and reiteration.
8.5.1 The transformation of old political genres and the creation of

new ones
Tung needed to maintain confidence on the part of the Hong Kong people
that there would be little change from the old system. For this reason, his
discursive formation maintained most of the elements of that of Patten,
with a few additions of his own. Tung’s style contrasts strongly with
Patten’s. Patten wanted to promote democracy, so he acted as if he were
an elected politician, which was indeed his previous background. Tung was
selected by Beijing primarily to maintain stability.10 He had no political
background and was constantly accused of running the SAR like a family
company (Lau, 2002). One commentator referred to ‘[H]is shy reluctance to

face the public and displays of intolerance to dissenting views . . . ‘ (Yeung,
2002), while another contrasted Tung’s personality with that of Patten:
Mr Tung himself does not consider persuasion and negotiation important.

The chief executive’s paternalistic and conservative image does not
appeal to a crowd who still remember former governor Chris Patten’s
friendliness and casual manner. (Hung, 2002)
It is certainly true, as agreed by many commentators, that Tung was a

much less effective speaker than Patten (e.g. Ho, 1997; Schwartz, 2001;
Shamdasani, 2001).
Tung’s vision of his role and his personality affected the way he
approached the various political genres. He was very reluctant to face the
public. Whereas Patten had made great play about attending question
and answer sessions at the Legislative Council on a monthly basis, Tung
appeared only three times a year, in spite of repeated requests for more
visits (Ku, 1998; Li, 1999). Tung gave far fewer interviews and made fewer
public ‘walkabouts’, which had been one of the hallmarks of Patten as
governor. Patten had also instituted a series of public meetings following
his annual policy addresses. Tung abandoned these. Tung was described as
a Confucianist (e.g. N.K. Lau, 2001). According to this reading, the reason
he accepted the office of chief executive was to do with his sense of social
responsibility. He took a paternalistic view in his dealings with his subjects.
He had a vision: he knew what is best for Hong Kong and was not concerned
about critics. As a Confucianist, he was ultimately accountable only to his
conscience (N.K. Lau, 2001).
In terms of political discourse, Tung’s style reduced the emphasis placed
on those already existing genres,11 while he did not take any initiative to
introduce new ones. Accordingly, his need to face the public was reduced,
which may be one of the reasons for his very low popularity ratings, as com-
pared to Patten.12 On the other hand, this style fits in with Tung’s avowed
desire for ‘less politics’ in Hong Kong.
There are other public genres over which Tung had control, but in which
he did not actively participate. One of the first decisions taken by Tung
and his Beijing advisers, even before the handover, was the replacement
of the Legislative Council by a provisional legislative council, the role of
which was to reverse legislation which had been introduced by Patten, but
which was not acceptable to the mainland government. Another impor-
tant decision was to disband the two municipal councils (Yeung, 1999),
on the grounds that they were inefficient. Even so, since the members of
these councils were elected by popular suffrage, their abolishment meant
the disappearance of a tier of elected government and of a forum for public
debate and participation. On the other hand, Tung was tolerant of public
demonstrations – government officials even proclaimed such activities as

a sign of Hong Kong’s continuing freedom of expression. Similarly, the
Falun Gong movement, in spite of being banned on the mainland, was
allowed to hold meetings in Hong Kong (although, in a show of solidar-
ity with the mainland government, Tung labelled it as ‘an evil cult’ (Ho,
2001)). Tung’s desire for a less confrontational style of politics is summed
up in a rare public attack on Hong Kong’s leading pro-democracy politi-
cian, Martin Lee. ‘Our culture is changing, Mr Lee’, Tung stated, ‘you only
criticise without offering solutions . . . It’s no solution if there are only
criticisms. It’s not in anyone’s interest to keep bad-mouthing Hong Kong’
(Lee, 2002). As an indication of his disdain for democratic processes, Tung
refused to produce a manifesto for his reselection for his second term as
chief executive.13
8.5.2 Presupposition
By presupposition is meant the background assumptions that speakers
make about their hearers when they make an utterance. Such assumptions
have to be made in the interests of economy, as communication would not
be possible if everything had to be defined and explained every time we
spoke (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1986). However,
the degree of explicitness required will vary depending upon the presumed
shared knowledge on the part of the interlocutors. In particular, a number of
linguistic structures and lexemes, referred to as ‘presuppositional triggers’ by
Levinson (1983: 179), have certain properties which give rise to inferences
(see Levinson, 1983: 181–5 for a list of examples).
If speakers wilfully make assumptions about their hearers which they
know not to be the case, presupposition may turn into manipulation. In
Patten’s discourse, there is evidence that he made such assumptions con-
cerning the degree to which his hearers shared his conception of the myth
he was promoting about Britain’s heritage to Hong Kong. For example, he
described the view he promoted about free market economics and the rule
of law as ‘bedrock principles’ and ‘the very essence of our [the Hong Kong
people’s] way of life’ (see Chapter 2), in spite of the fact that both ideas,
from an alternative perspective, were open to question (Flowerdew, 1998).
As for Tung, it seems that he was happy, in the interests of a smooth political
transition, to perpetuate the essential components of Patten’s myth and its
underlying presuppositions, with changes of emphasis and additions of his
own, as indicated above, concerning Hong Kong’s Chinese identity.
Let us take as an example an extract of a speech made on 1 July 1997, the
first day under Chinese sovereignty:
Hong Kong is at present the freest and the most vibrant economy in
the world. Free enterprise and free trade; prudent financial management
and low taxation; the rule of law, an executive-led government and an
efficient civil service have been a part of our tradition. All these factors
which underlie our success have been guaranteed in the Basic Law.
Leaders in China have said time and again that the prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong will contribute to the modernisation of our coun-
try. Furthermore, the successful implementation of ‘One Country, Two
Systems’, ‘a high degree of autonomy’ and ‘Hong Kong people admin-
istering Hong Kong’ is the first step towards the ultimate reunification
of China. (Ceremony to Celebrate the Establishment of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China on 1 July
1997 – given in Putonghua)
In terms of subject matter, Tung refers in this extract to various aspects

of the myth: the free market economy, the rule of law and Hong Kong’s
Chinese identity. In terms of presentation, these aspects are all statements
of fact: they express a high degree of certainty and presuppose that the audi-
ence will have the necessary background assumptions for accepting these
assertions as facts. The tenses used are either the simple present (used for
the expression of universal or axiomatic truths) or the present perfect (used
to anchor present truths in the past).14 The emphatic nature of Tung’s asser-
tions is reinforced by the use of the verb ‘guaranteed’ and of the adverbial
‘time and again’, while the sentences are combined in an additive paratactic
relationship (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), where one sentence builds
on its predecessor, adding new information in the development of a logi-
cal series of meanings. The same happens at the level of the noun phrase,
with the long list in the second sentence of the first paragraph. The use of
‘[f]urthermore’, which begins the last sentence, provides a sense of finality
to this cumulative build-up of meaning. The high degree of certainty is fur-
ther reinforced by the use of the strong modal ‘will’, in ‘will contribute to
the modernisation of our country’.15 Note, moreover, how the use of ‘our’
in ‘our country’ here is also a highly marked presuppositional trigger.16 This
phrase had only become possible because the change of sovereignty had
just taken place; a few hours earlier, Hong Kong was not yet a part of China.
Given their ambivalence towards, and concern for, a future under Chinese
rule, many in the audience would have been made uneasy by this allusion
to Hong Kong as part of China, so soon after the handover. The expression
‘the first step towards the ultimate reunification of China’ provides a final
sense of certainty and inevitability to this extract.17
Let us take now an extract from a speech made in 1999, this time on the
theme of the ‘knowledge-based’ economy and the need to invest in educa-
tion to prepare for it:
A new era with remarkable and dynamic technological development

is unfolding. Technological advances will change fundamentally the
manner in which the world competes. For any country, region or

individual, the only way to maintain a competitive edge in the long run
is to acquire knowledge. To maintain Hong Kong’s position as a leading
cosmopolitan city in the new millennium, the SAR Government will
continue to make substantial investments in education, innovation and
technology, as well as infrastructural developments, so as to make Hong
Kong more competitive and to achieve our vision. (Millennium Address,
31 December 1999 – given in English)
As in the previous extract, the sentences are presented as statements of

fact. They all express a high degree of certainty and presuppose that the
audience will have the necessary background assumptions for accepting the
statements. Again, the sentences are held together in a relationship of addi-
tive parataxis; each sentence develops from the previous one, adding to the
development of the logical argument and creating a sense of inevitability.
The certainty is increased by the strong modality of the future tense (‘will
change’, ‘will continue’). Certain of the verbs also act as strong presupposi-
tional triggers: ‘change’, ‘maintain’ and ‘continue’ all presuppose a certain
state of affairs which must already exist if the conditions in questions are to
be modified or persist. The construction ‘the only way . . . is to . . .’ presup-
poses that there is no possible alternative. Finally, the use of ‘our’ in ‘our
vision’ insinuates the presupposition that Tung and the people of Hong
Kong share the same view of the future.
8.5.3 Involvement strategies: the use of indexicals

In order for a myth to be accepted, it must provide a sense of communal
identity. In the political context, this means that leaders need to discursively
construct a set of values which they can share with their constituents; they
need to integrate themselves into the society that they want the common
myth to be accepted by. One way to do this is through the use of first person
plural indexicals (‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’). The meaning of these indexicals is
unspecific outside of their context of use, and even then they can be impre-
cise. Seidel (1975) refers to indexicals as ‘shifters’, where potential ambigu-
ity can be exploited by politicians. As to Patten, he used first person plural
indexicals to refer to the Hong Kong government (of which he was the
leader), the United Kingdom government (which he represented in Hong
Kong), the people in his audience (with whom he shared a presupposed
common view) and, more widely, the population of Hong Kong (of which
he was not a member, but into which he nevertheless insinuated himself).
At times, as shown in Chapter 2, it was difficult to work out which of these
groups was being referred to.
In the speeches made by Tung, who, unlike Patten, could genuinely claim
to be a Hong Kong person,18 the first person plural indexical is nevertheless
used as a ‘shifter’. The four opening paragraphs of his 1 July 1997 speech
show this variation.19 The themes of this speech evoke the elements of the
myth: the rule of law, freedom, democracy, integration with the Motherland
and Chinese values.
1. Reunification with China opens up new opportunities for Hong Kong.

2. Successful implementation of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ requires us to
3. develop a better understanding of our country, cultivate a congenial
4. relationship with the mainland, embrace a distinctive set of values; safeguard
5. the rule of law; protect our freedoms; promote democracy; and establish a
6. common long-term purpose.
7. The interests of Hong Kong and the Motherland are intricately linked and
8. intertwined. Due to our long separation, there is a general lack of
9. understanding about China among the people of Hong Kong. The reunification
10. has created a new environment and better conditions for us to understand our
11. country and our people, and to love our country and our people. Only then can
12. we firmly establish our roots and make ‘One Country, Two Systems’ a
13. success. We must strengthen the understanding and relationship between Hong
14. Kong and the mainland, through mutual trust, mutual economic benefits,
15. cultural interaction, and mutual respect for each other’s way of life. We know
16. Hong Kong and the mainland will move forward together, hand in hand.
17. Every society has to have its own values to provide a common purpose and a
18. sense of unity. Most of the people of Hong Kong are Chinese, some are not.
19. For a long time, Hong Kong has embraced the eastern and western cultures.
20. We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must also
21. reaffirm and respect the fine traditional Chinese values, including filial piety,
22. love for the family, modesty and integrity, and the desire for continuous
23. improvement. We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we
24. strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect minority
25. views but also shoulder collective responsibilities. I hope these values will
26. provide the foundation for unity in our society.
27. Maintaining and developing the legal system and the rule of law in Hong
28. Kong is immensely important. We will continue to ensure that the executive,
29. legislative and judicial branches of the government will operate
30. independently. We will keep up our efforts against corruption and maintain a
31. clean society. We will ensure equality before the law and provide an attractive
32. environment for investors and the people of Hong Kong.
(Ceremony to Celebrate the Establishment of the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China on 1 July 1997 –
given in Putonghua)
In the first paragraph of this extract, ‘us’ in line 2 seems to refer to the
people of Hong Kong (the preceding referent in line 1 is ‘Hong Kong’). In
line 3, however, ‘our country’ integrates the people of Hong Kong with
those of the mainland.20
The second paragraph continues with this alternation between the peo-
ple of Hong Kong and those of China in general. There is not, however, a
simple correspondence between ‘we’ = the people of Hong Kong and ‘our’ =
the Chinese people in general, including those in Hong Kong. In lines
10–11, where we have the expression ‘better conditions for us to understand

our country’,21 there does seem to be such a correspondence. However, if
we look at the expression in lines 11–12, ‘only then can we establish our
roots’,22 both indexicals seem to refer to the people of Hong Kong.
In the third paragraph, which is an interesting overt statement of Tung’s
desire to develop a community identity (through the affirmation of the pre-
supposed identity that he maps out), there is again ambiguity. In line 20, for
example, ‘We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must
also respect the fine traditional Chinese values . . .’,23 is Tung referring to
his government or to the Hong Kong people? Perhaps a better way to put it
would be to say that he is speaking on behalf of the Hong Kong people. This
certainly seems to be the case with the series of parallel antithetical structures,
beginning with ‘We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation’ and
continuing with ‘we strive . . .’ and ‘we respect . . .’ The final sentence of this
paragraph gives credence to this interpretation, with its reference to ‘these val-
ues provid[ing] the foundation for unity in our society’.24 The use of indexicals
in this paragraph is a case of manipulative presupposition, with Tung project-
ing values onto the Hong Kong people which they may or may not share.
In contrast to the preceding paragraphs, the fourth paragraph is relatively
unproblematic. Here, the series of sentences beginning with ‘we’ seems to
refer fairly unambiguously to the Hong Kong government.25
8.5.4 Lexical reiteration

Lexical reiteration and patterning is the most obvious way of establish-
ing the major themes of a corpus. This is also the most systematic way
in which politicians may signal the preoccupations which make up their
discursive formation (see Chapter 2). Through constant reiteration of the
same themes, politicians attempt to naturalise the myths they create; they
do this by developing what Fowler et al. (1979) refer to as patterns of over-
lexicalisation, that is to say, concentrations of interrelated terms which
occur together as markers of a fundamental preoccupation of the given
discourse. The following analysis of lexical reiteration and patterning will
confirm the dimensions of Tung’s discursive formation and indicate the
similarities and differences with that of Patten, as earlier identified in this
chapter. The analysis is based on 140 major speeches delivered by Tung since
he took office. Out of these, 26 were made in 1997, 30 in 1998, 26 in 1999,
30 in 2000, 23 in 2001 and 5 in 2002 (cut-off point: May 2002). The total
number of words is 255,225. The data was analysed using a word frequency
and concordancing package (Scott, 1999).
8.5.4.1 The free market economy

Results from the concordancer show that members of the word family, or
lemma, economy/economies/economic/economically (經濟) occur 1784 times
in the speeches, and that the semantic environment, or prosody,26 is mostly
positive. As shown in Table 8.1, the lemma economy (經濟) in Tung’s speeches
is frequently collocated with the words growth (增長), (135), development
(發展) (87), free (自由) (48), open (開放) (40), vitality (活力) (38), largest (最大)
(35), strong (最強) (31), success (成功/發展) (31), growing (增長) (29), opportunities
(機會/機遇) (27), competitive (競爭/強大) (26), grow (增長) (24), sustain (持續/維持)
(24), stimulate (刺激) (22), remarkable (重要) (21), stability (穩定/安定) (18),
progress (進展/成效) (17), enhance (增強/強化/加強) (15), strength (力量/優勢)
(15), opening (開放) (14), successful (成功) (14), vibrant (活力/生氣勃勃) (13),
advantage (優勢) (12), competitiveness (競爭力) (12) and grown (發展) (12).
However, in contrast to Patten, who invariably used these words in
positive contexts, Tung also associates the ‘economy’ lemma with negative
Table 8.1 Positive environments of text extracts containing the lemma economy
Date
1 we are, after all, the world’s 7th largest trading economy 31-07-97
2 we have been rated consistently as the freest economy in the 31-07-97
world
3 the world economy is becoming increasingly open, increas- 09-10-97
ingly competitive, and ever more integrated through infor-
mation technology
4 Hong Kong’s economic vitality and sustain economic growth 17-10-97
5 our huge foreign reserve and our sound economic and finan- 22-10-97
cial fundamentals
6 the main objective of our country is its economic develop- `19-11-97
ment and its direction is very clear
7 The depth of economic opportunities in the coming decade 11-03-98
8 our long-term focus of building a Hong Kong which is fair, `07-05-98
free, prosperous and economically competitive
9 ours is a free market and an economy which adjusts upward 10-06-98
and downward very quickly
10 a new string to our economic bow, and stimulate growth in 08-10-98
the value added areas of our economy, as well as improving
our competitiveness
11 our continued economic success and competitiveness 30-11-99
12 our free and market-oriented economy with fair competition 30-11-99
13 our economy is also rebounding strongly and we are 17-04-00
optimistic that the recovery is here to stay now
14 we are in the centre of the fastest growing economy 17-05-01
anywhere in the world – the Pearl River Delta
15 economic restructuring is necessary if we are to preserve our 10-05-02
economic vitality, create greater prosperity and maintain a
higher living standard for Hong Kong people
collocates, such as bubble (泡沫) (24), challenges (挑戰) (21), downturn

(逆轉) (19), turmoil (混亂) (16), difficult (棘手) (14), crisis (危機) (11), recession
(衰退狀態) (11), difficulties (艱難/困難) (10) and challenge (挑戰) (8). The use
of such negative collocates reflects the fact that, while Patten was fortunate
to be governing during an economic boom, Tung had a severe economic
downturn to deal with. The negative prosody of economy mainly appeared
in the speeches made after 1997, thus corresponding to the onset of the
Asian economic crisis. Out of the 134 collocations of economy which con-
tain the above negative collocates, only one comes from a speech made in
1997. Similarly, only two out of the 38 entries containing the word recovery
occurred in a speech made in 1997 (see Table 8.2 for examples). This aspect
of the free market economy was not developed by Patten.
Tung’s determination to develop Hong Kong as a ‘knowledge-based’ society
and reap the claimed benefits of globalisation27 is demonstrated by another
range of collocates, including the following: knowledge (知識型/知識) (150),
new (新) (60), restructuring (轉型) (60), market (市場) (54), recovery (經濟復蘇)
(40), technology (技術/科技) (37), rapid (急速) (36), education (教育) (19), changes
(改進/轉變) (18), information (資訊) (17), reform (改善/調整) (17), globalisation
Table 8.2 Negative environments of text extracts based on the lemma economy
Date
1 high property values have had a strong negative bearing and on 17-10-97
social stability and our economic vitality
2 the slow-down of our economic growth 07-05-98
3 almost all Asian economies, including Hong Kong, recorded 14-06-98
negative or slower economic growth in the first quarter
4 the euphoria has been dented by the severe economic downturn as a 14-06-98
result of the Asian financial crisis
5 the financial turmoil has not only exerted short-term financial 23-11-98
pressure on the press at large, but also highlighted the great
challenges that came along with economic globalisation and rapid
advancement of technology
6 the economic downturn in Hong Kong 09-03-99
7 with the approach of the 21st century and a rapidly changing 03-06-99
external environment, we are undergoing a difficult process of eco-
nomic recovery
8 the Asian Financial Turmoil, the worst economic downturn which 31-10-00
Hong Kong has faced in recent memory
9 the bursting of the economic bubble had brought us one of the 22-02-01
worst recessions Hong Kong has experienced in recent years
10 globalisation and rapid advances in IT have together presented 22-03-01
new challenges to economies around the world
(經濟全球化) (15), innovation (創新) (14), adjustment (調整) (12) and change
(改進/轉變) (11). Notice, in particular, the very high frequency of the collo-
cate knowledge (知識型/知識) (150). See Table 8.3 for examples in context.
Table 8.3 Text extracts related to the ‘knowledge-based’ economy
Date
1 for the free, information-based market economy of tomorrow, 09-10-97

investment in high-quality education is the single most important
initiative that we can take to ensure sustained success
2 we can be a key processor in the worldwide networked economy of 09-10-97
the information age
3 In a knowledge-based global economy, innovation and technology 04-11-98
are important drivers for economic growth
4 we know that the 21st century economy will be a knowledge-based 17-05-99
economy
5 having a knowledge-based and information economy will benefit 23-07-99
the entire society
6 there is a pressing need for us to revamp our education system 26-10-99
and encourage innovation in order to maintain the competitive
edge and leading position of Hong Kong as a knowledge-based
economy in the long run
7 globalisation of the world’s economy and advances in information 30-03-00
technology are rapidly reshaping the world we live in and
intensifying competition
8 the world’s economy is becoming more globalised as a result of free 06-04-00
trade and advances in information technology
9 Hong Kong remains at the forefront of the global knowledge 22-02-01
economy
10 we have recognised the importance of IT to our future in the 22-03-01
knowledge-based economy
11 we must invest in human capital in a sustained manner and on a 12-10-01
vast scale, sufficiently to form a deep, strong base of brainpower
to support a knowledge economy with high value-added economic
activities
12 the world is rapidly transforming from an industrial economy to a 06-11-01
knowledge-based economy
13 The globalised new knowledge economy provides an infrastructure 28-11-01
for us to cooperate with each other, to promote the free flow of
people, knowledge and wealth, and to create a world of peace and
shared prosperity
14 The most important success factor in the knowledge economy is 13-04-02
education
When Tung speaks about the economy on a positive note, very often he
is referring to the state of the Chinese economy (119 entries). His tone on
the Chinese economy is overwhelmingly positive, both praising the rapid
development and growth of the PRC economy in the past 20 years and
describing its positive future projections. Tung also frequently talks about
the unique economic relationship that exists between mainland China and
Hong Kong. While the continuing growth of the Chinese economy and
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) might bring about
new challenges to Hong Kong’s economy, the long-term impact should be
positive and the benefits are mutual, according to Tung. In many instances
Tung also emphasises that, as a Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong,
with its geopolitical proximity to China, also has much to contribute to the
mainland’s economic prospects. This association between economic devel-
opment in Hong Kong and the mainland thus brings together two elements
of Tung’s discursive formation: the benefits of the free market economy
and Hong Kong’s identity as essentially Chinese (Hong Kong as part of the
motherland). See Table 8.4 for examples in context.
8.5.4.2 The individual

Results obtained from the concordancer show that the keyword individual(s)
(個人/個體) occurs 69 times out of Tung’s 140 speeches, suggesting that
this concept is not so central to Tung’s discursive formation as it was to
Patten’s (see Chapter 3). As the examples in Table 8.5 demonstrate, Tung
does present safeguarding individual rights as an element essential to
good governance and to the upholding of the Basic Law under the ‘one
country, two systems’ principle. He also stresses the need for individual
self-development, which he sees as crucial to Hong Kong’s economic
growth in the new global economy. However, positive collocations only
occur sporadically; the most frequent of these – rights (權利) – occurring
just five times.
8.5.4.3 The rule of law

Turning now to the semantic field relating to the rule of law, Table 8.6 shows
examples of this term in context. The term appears in Tung’s speeches 146
times and collocates with words such as free (自由) (14), upholding (秉持)
(9), strong (密切/緊密) (6), uphold (支持) (6), freedom (自由) (5), freedoms (自
由) (5), protect (保護/保障/捍衛) (5), service (服務) (5), underpins (支持) (5) and
upheld (支持) (5). These collocates are overwhelmingly positive. Tung there-
fore accepts Patten’s presupposition that the rule of law is essential to Hong
Kong’s well-being. In example 5 of Table 8.6, he even accepts it as part of
‘the fine legacy that Britain has given us’. One difference between Patten
and Tung on the rule of law is that the latter frequently relates it to the Basic
Law (a document drawn up by China; e.g. examples 12 and 13 of Table 8.6),
Table 8.4 Text extracts associated with China’s economy
Date
1 our economic interests have long been intertwined, and I firmly 04-09-97
believe that if Hong Kong succeeds, China will benefit. And if
China is prosperous, Hong Kong will benefit even more
2 By early next century, China will become an economic giant and 13-10-97
will take her rightful place as one of the leaders in the
community of nations
3 China’s economy will continue to do well as we move into the 10-11-97
21st century and Hong Kong is uniquely positioned to benefit
from this development
4 the past 20 years of rapid and successful economic development 11-03-98
on the mainland of China ... has given our economy boundless
opportunities to move forward
5 China’s political stability and sustained economic growth further 08-10-98
strengthen our hand
6 Hong Kong is uniquely positioned to take full advantage as 17-05-99
China’s economy opens up further
7 the Chinese economy is already the seventh largest in the world 08-10-99
and that the World Bank says that by 2020, it could become the
third largest in the world or certainly one of the largest
8 As China’s economy grows, Hong Kong stands to benefit greatly if 05-04-00
we can play an active part in that process
9 At the dawn of the 21st century, I see China’s economy 05-04-00
continuing to grow strongly
10 China’s economy continues to expand steadily and rapidly 12-05-00
11 Since 1978, China’s economy has undergone changes at a 13-12-00
breathtaking pace
12 we should continue to benefit from the growth in the European 17-04-01
Union, and the sustained vigorous growth of mainland China’s
economy
13 we see opportunities for Hong Kong to continue to contribute 18-10-01
to the mainland economic development by providing services in
the areas which we excel in – especially after China’s accession
to WTO
14 We are ideally located as a gateway to the mainland of China 28-11-01
to take advantage in the rapidly developing China’s economy
whereas references to the Basic Law are far less frequent in the case of Patten.
This is a further signal of Patten’s desire to distance himself from China, in
contrast with Tung’s wish to emphasise the positive influence of the central
government whenever he can.
Table 8.5 Text extracts containing the word individual(s)
Date
1 We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we strive 02-07-97

for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect
minority views, but are mindful of all of our wider interests; we
will protect individual rights, but also must shoulder collective
responsibilities
2 we must retain and further enhance those distinctive features 21-02-00
which have been critical to Hong Kong’s vitality and success,
including, for example, a society underpinned by the rule of law;
the independence of the judiciary, protection of freedom of the
press and rights of individuals, all of which, is institutionalised in
the Basic Law
3 The SAR government welcomes contributions of ideas, com- 10-08-00
ments and criticisms from individuals and organisations on all
matters and aspects of government
4 This emphasis on the initiative on the part of the individual as 16-10-00
the prime motivating force for a person to improve his own
fortunes is no different from that underlying our economic
philosophy, which all of you already know so well
5 Governance in a modern society involves three main 31-10-00
elements ... second, to respect the rights and dignity, and to
safeguard the freedoms of each individual
6 If individuals, companies and the government all join together 12-10-01
to invest in human capital in a serious and sustained manner,
then HK will definitely be able to become what we want to
be – a economic powerhouse where high-value-added economic
activities are the norm
7 There are other dimensions of good governance on which we 29-10-01
are working hard to improve, a government that delivers better
service at lower cost and a smaller government that does not
stand in the way of the market and the individual ...
8 I believe that a society should allow individuals, be they women 10-05-02
or men, to make free and informed choices for their own lives
and realise their potential to the full
8.5.4.4 Democracy
Among the 80 entries for the lemma democracy (民主), words which collo-
cate frequently with this keyword seem to be positive. The most frequent
examples are evolution (進展/進程) (20), process (程序) (14), more (更加/更多)
(13), development (發展) (11), further (其他) (10) and develop (發展) (7).
Examples in context are shown in Table 8.7. In spite of these positive com-
ments, commentators are generally agreed that Tung was not keen on the
development of democracy. Results from the concordancer show that in
192
Table 8.6 Text extracts containing the term rule of law
Date
1 Mark my words, the rule of law must be preserved by all means 31-07-97
and it will be preserved by all means
2 Part of Hong Kong’s success is also as a result of our promotion of 23-09-97
free competitive environment, the strict adherence to the rule of
law, minimum bureaucracy and a level playing field and a strong
commitment against corruption – all provided and supported by
an efficient civil service
3 Those with free markets, strong regulations, rule of law and strin- 11-03-98
gent fiscal discipline, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have
passed the test of fire
4 We know strict adherence to the rule of law, the need for 14-06-98
corruption-free society, predictable government policies as well as
free flow of information and capital and people are some of the
other very important factors which will put investors, local and
international alike, at ease
5 We are determined to uphold the rule of law, which together with 09-10-98
good public administration have been the fine legacy that Britain
has given us
6 Most important of all is that there must be a rule of law as well as 23-11-98
a legal system that create an environment to ensure and protect
freedom of press and freedom of information.
7 The fact also is that the rule of law is very much intact and is 22-07-99
going from strength to strength
8 We will continue to provide a pro-business environment, under- 14-10-99
pinned by the rule of law, the clean and effective administration,
and a level playing field
9 But it is crystal clear that international investors are fully con- 04-11-99
fident about the rule of law, freedom of speech, the openness of
our economy and level playing field in Hong Kong
10 Our ability to meet these challenges and to sustain economic 30-03-00
success is built upon the rule of law, a clean, transparent and
accountable government, the free flow of information, a free and
tolerant society, adherence to the prevailing international stan-
dards and a level playing field for all
11 And the pillars of our success – the rule of law, an independent 12-05-00
judiciary, a level playing field for business, free and open markets,
the free and unfettered flow of information, and the freedoms of
individuals that are so essential in today’s society – are thriving
12 The Basic Law has also underpinned the rule of law in Hong 02-06-00
Kong, enhanced the stability of the entire community and safe-
guarded the rights of the Hong Kong people
13 there is also the resolute preservation of the rule of law as guaran- 10-08-00
teed under the Basic Law
(continued)
193
Table 8.6 Continued
Date
14 we have been focusing on ensuring that those quintessential quali- 22-03-01

ties that have made Hong Kong such a unique and successful city
are rigorously protected. These qualities include the rule of law ...
15 a government that stresses rule of law, safeguarding of the free- 18-11-01
doms that its citizens enjoy, and public security especially in
times that demand heightened vigilance
Table 8.7 Examples of the lemma democracy in context
Date
1 The Special Administrative Region government is fully committed 01-07-97

to preserving the Hong Kong way of life, maintaining Hong Kong’s
free and open economic system, upholding the rule of law, and
building a more democratic society
2 In seven years’ time, we will have more democracy in the legislature 09-09-97
than we ever have in 156 years of colonial rule
3 The Basic Law provides that further democratic evolution will depend 12-09-97
on the wish of Hong Kong people and the overall environment at
that time with universal suffrage being the ultimate objective
4 In fact, the progress we will achieve in 10 years from 1997 in terms 12-09-97
of democratic process will be far more comprehensive and far-
reaching than what we had achieved under 156 years of colonialism
5 Given the fact that the democratic process for the Legislature only 21-09-97
began in the early nineties, and for the post of Chief Executive only
in 1996, I believe we need a suitable period for transition
6 Our constitution, the Basic Law, requires us to develop democratic 17-10-97
institutions: our commitment as a society is to do the same
7 In 10 years’ time, that is after 2007, according to the Basic Law, 20-10-97
Hong Kong people will decide how to take forward the democratic
process with the ultimate aim of universal suffrage to elect both the
Chief Executive and the Legislature
8 In fact, the process of democratic evolution in the next decade will 11-03-98
be far more comprehensive and far-reaching than what we had
under 156 years of colonialism
9 We are also carrying on with the development of democracy in Hong 11-03-98
Kong
10 The government will move forward to a more democratic form of 26-05-98
government in accordance with the provisions in the Basic Law
11 Aside from electoral politics, there are other forms of participatory 10-08-00
democracy that we are promoting
12 A government that promotes citizen participation and democracy, in 18-10-01
full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law
many of his speeches, Tung emphasises that the provision for democracy
is enshrined in the Basic Law (Table 8.8), thereby exonerating himself from
further consideration of the matter, when in fact that document allows for
a lot of leeway in the extent to which the suffrage will be extended and, as
many have argued, the matter should have already begun to be considered
at the time of Tung’s speeches (Wan and Leung, 2000; Ng, 2001). In his
earlier speeches, in particular, when referring to democracy and the Basic
Law, Tung repeated standard formulae, even often ‘cutting and pasting’ the
exact same words into different speeches. It is also significant that Tung
failed to discuss constitutional development in any of his five annual policy
addresses (Yeung and Cheung, 2002) – this is in total contrast to Patten, who
made democratic development one of the main themes of each of his five
policy speeches.
Table 8.8 Examples of democracy collocating with the Basic Law in context
Date
1 The Basic Law provides that further democratic evolution will 09-09-97
depend on the wish(es) of Hong Kong people and the overall 12-09-97
environment at that time with universal suffrage being the ulti- 17-09-97
mate objective 17-10-97
22-10-97
11-03-98
2 The Basic Law has also established the framework for the 12-09-97
democratic evolution of our political structure 21-09-97
23-09-97
13-10-97
22-10-97
23-11-97
3 the Basic Law, requires us to develop our democratic institutions: 13-10-97
our commitment as a society is to do the same 17-10-97
22-10-97
11-03-98
4 The Basic Law also requires us to develop our democratic institu- 20-10-97
tions: we as a society are fully committed to doing that. The
blueprint for the democratic evolution of our political structure
over the first 10 years has been laid down in the Basic Law
5 In 10 years’ time, that is after 2007, according to the Basic Law, 20-10-97
Hong Kong people will decide how to take forward the demo-
cratic process with the ultimate aim of universal suffrage to elect
both the Chief Executive and the Legislature
6 The government will move forward to a more democratic form of 26-05-98
government in accordance with the provisions in the Basic Law
7 A government that promotes citizen participation and democracy, 18-10-01
in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law
Another feature worthy of note with regard to Tung’s attitude to democratic

development is that out of the 80 entries for the lemma democracy (民主),
60 come from speeches made in 1997, 13 from 1998, while only one is
from 2000, 6 are from 2001, and none from 2002. In spite of the fact that
the time for the possibility of extending the franchise was getting closer,
Tung’s interest in it seemed to be declining. Another often used formula
for de-emphasising the development of democracy is that little democracy
was developed during the 156 years of colonial rule, a fact that Patten did
his best to play down. For example, when Tung was asked by a reporter
of the Oriental Daily News in 1997 why he did not accept the democratic
formula proposed by Patten in 1995, he answered: ‘Well the fact is, A: we
are going by the Basic Law and secondly is that, don’t forget, for 156 years,
until the 1990s, there were no elections’ (Hong Kong Bank headquarters in
London, 21 October 1997).
8.5.4.5 Chinese cultural values

The lexical item culture (文化) occurs 77 times in Tung’s major speeches.
Some of the common words that collocate with this keyword include: our
(我們的) (25), different (不同) (11), history (歷史) (11), best (最佳/最好) (10),
Chinese (中國/中華/中文) (9), blending (交融/融合) (7), ideas (構想) (7), technol-
ogy (科技) (6) and education (教育) (5). Using the computer-assisted analysis,
we see that Tung regards the Chinese culture as an element which plays an
important role in projecting Chinese values as part of the Hong Kong cul-
tural identity. (See the examples shown in Table 8.9.) A search on the lemma
‘value’ also reveals a preoccupation with traditional Chinese values. There
are 37 entries for the keyword values (價值). When Tung refers to values in
terms of standards and principles, he mostly points to the set of Chinese
traditional values which he claims are part of the cultural identity of Hong
Kong. In a few cases, he refers to Hong Kong as a place where Eastern and
Western values meet. This, according to Tung, has been beneficial to Hong
Kong. Examples associated with values are shown in Table 8.10.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how Tung Chee-hwa, the first chief execu-
tive of the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC, developed the mythical identity
established for Hong Kong by Chris Patten, the last colonial governor. The
chapter has shown how the core elements of the myth were maintained,
with additional emphasis on the knowledge-based economy with regard
to the free market, but how the role of democratic development has been
played down. In addition, the notions of the Hong Kong people as believers
in Confucian values and their essential Chineseness were emphasised or
grafted onto the myth, in an attempt to establish a new identity for the
people of Hong Kong.
Table 8.9 Text extracts containing the item Chinese culture
Date
1 As Hong Kong becomes a Special Administrative Region of the 04-07-97

People’s Republic of China, we must step up civic education so
that our youngsters will have a better understanding of China,
the Chinese culture and history, the concept of ‘one country, two
systems’ and the Basic Law
2 In the assimilation of the essence of the fine Western culture in 20-12-97
a cosmopolitan and pluralistic place like Hong Kong, they will
hand down and further enhance the Chinese culture and build a
better Hong Kong and China
3 We must work hard to familiarise ourselves with the Chinese 20-12-97
culture and get to know the Chinese values. I stress this point
because in one’s lifetime, adolescence is the period when one
is most imaginative, energetic, creative and innovative. It is in
this way that the glorious cultural history of a civilisation has
been written down from generation to generation
4 Because of the long separation from our motherland, promot- 20-12-97
ing the knowledge of Chinese culture has become an important
task of the SAR government. From the practical viewpoint, this
is the basis for the successful implementation of the ‘one coun-
try, two systems’ concept
5 While we preserve the virtues of Chinese culture, we will con- 17-06-98
tinue to assimilate the knowledge and experiences of the West.
Combining the best of the East and the West make each and
every one of us a better person and in turn make our society
that much stronger
6 Some overseas Chinese newspapers have to struggle hard in 23-11-98
order to survive. Apart from the coverage of news of their
hometown, they help to promote the Chinese culture and
enhance intercommunal communication
7 With thousands of years of Chinese culture and history behind 01-05-00
us, we are doing more to highlight the tourism potential of our
heritage by preserving historical sites and trails, and making
them more accessible so people can get a better understanding
of our culture and heritage
The question arises, of course, as to how effective Tung was in projecting

this myth onto the people of Hong Kong; to what extent was he able to ‘nat-
uralise’ it (Barthes, 1972)? As is the case of Patten, there is no direct way of
knowing the answer to this question. However, a number of factors suggest
that Tung was not particularly effective. First, his weak oratorical skills are
likely to have detracted from the power of his discourse. Second, his popu-
larity ratings suggest that people did not agree with him (although this may
to a great extent be attributed to the negative economic conditions). Most
Table 8.10 Text extracts containing the word values
Date
1 We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but 02-07-97

we must also reaffirm and respect the fine traditional Chinese
values, including filial piety, love for the family, modesty and
integrity, and the desire for continuous improvement. We
value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we strive
for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect
minority views, but are mindful of all of our wider interests; we
will protect individual rights, but also must shoulder collective
responsibilities. I hope these values will provide the foundation
for unity in our society for a long time to come
2 In social terms, my vision is for Hong Kong to be a place in 09-10-97
which the majority of families have the security of owning their
own home, where our traditional values are upheld, where the
elderly can enjoy a dignified retirement and where care and
compassion are encouraged
3 We must work hard to familiarise ourselves with the Chinese 20-12-97
culture and get to know the Chinese values. I stress this point
because in one’s lifetime, adolescence is the period when one is
most imaginative, energetic, creative and innovative
4 ... our goal must be to maintain a socially cohesive and stable 21-02-00
society, increasingly affluent and well educated, proud of our
Chinese heritage, and at the same time assimilate the best cul-
tures and values of the East and West. We recognise diversity
brings us many advantages and that it strengthens our cosmo-
politan outlook
5 Chinese New Year is the most important festival in our tradi- 30-01-01
tion. It is an occasion for family reunion and for reminding our-
selves of the need to care for one another; I am sure that Hong
Kong people will be able to build on our values, treasure the
family and contribute to the development of our community
6 While safeguarding the openness and diversity of our society, 13-12-01
should we not have a set of community values which foster
mutual help and support? The answer is definitely affirmative.
I believe the next administration not only needs to lead Hong
Kong to economic recovery, but also to foster a community dis-
cussion on these issues. Our aim should not only be economic
fulfilment. It is only with such shared values that we can take
pride in our identity
importantly, however, Hong Kong people did not see themselves as Chinese
in the political sense of identity any more during Tung’s period of office
than they did during the colonial era.
This relatively weak sense of Chinese political identity was evident in the
results of anniversary surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Programme
of Hong Kong University. This poll, entitled ‘People’s Ethnic Identity before
and after the Handover’, was carried out every June since 1997. People of
age 18 or above were interviewed and asked whether they were proud of
formally becoming a national citizen of China after the 1997 handover. The
1997 results show that advocates for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ were close to equal, with
46.6 and 45.7 per cent, respectively. However, after 1998 there was a signifi-
cant change in the results, and they remained fairly steady following that.
In June 1998, 31.6 per cent of the 555 respondents said ‘Yes’, 65.7 per cent
answered ‘No’, and the remainder said ‘Don’t know/Hard to say’. In a poll
conducted in June 2001, 35.4 per cent of the 1074 respondents said ‘Yes’,
59.9 per cent said ‘No’, and the rest ‘Don’t know/Hard to say’.
Some people may criticise the wording of this question and suggest that
other measures of association with being Chinese, such as people’s responses
to significant symbols and events, such as the national flag, China’s
becoming a member of the World Trade Organization, or the news that
the Olympic games would be held in Beijing, might be more appropriate.
Nevertheless, these results add to the general picture that Hong Kong people
did not want to be directly labelled as Chinese in the political sense and
that Tung’s patriotic discourse had little impact. While it is true that more
people may have identified themselves as Hong Kong Chinese, the majority
of Hong Kong people wanted to retain their identity as either ‘Hong Kong
people’ or ‘Hong Kong Chinese’.28 They did not want to accept Tung’s line,
which would seem to want people to identify themselves as simply ‘Chinese’
(Fung, personal communication, April 2003). According to a poll conducted
by the Chinese University’s Hong Kong’s Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies on
13–16 March 2002, 75.9 per cent of the 1002 respondents wanted to elect
the chief executive through universal suffrage. When asked how long they
thought it would take for universal suffrage to be realised in Hong Kong,
38 per cent said not until 10 years or more, 21 per cent said 5–10 years and
8 per cent said never (Abraham, 2002; Hong Kong Economic Journal, 2002).
In the terms of Chiapello and Fairclough (2002: 195), cited above, Tung’s
discourse was not ‘enacted’ or ‘inculcated’; in a Foucauldian sense, there was
resistance to his discourse. The Hong Kong people, at least during the first
five years of Chinese sovereignty, maintained their identity as distinct from
that of the mainland.
9
Discourse as History: History as
Discourse. ‘The Rise of Modern
China’ – a History Exhibition in
Post-Colonial Hong Kong
9.1 Introduction
The relative calm and cordial relations between the parties involved in the
Joint Declaration following the signing of that document were shattered in
June 1989, with the brutal crushing of the Tiananmen demonstrators by
the People’s Liberation Army. This created great nervousness in Hong Kong
about how serious China was in the promises made in the Joint Declaration
and Basic Law.
Because of the distrust created by the events of Tiananmen and the
unique concept of a capitalist enclave imbued with democratic institutions
(although not an elected government), existing within the context of a
country governed by an authoritarian Communist Party, political commen-
tators and the public at large have watched with great care every move in
the Hong Kong–mainland relationship which might indicate any suggestion
that the People’s Republic might be reneging on its promises and interfering
in Hong Kong’s internal affairs.
For the most part, the general feeling is that China has been scrupulous
in adopting a hands-off policy and has complied with everything that was
promised. If there have been any misgivings, these have been directed
towards the Hong Kong government under the leadership of Tung Chee-hwa
and his successor, Donald Tsang, and a feeling that they have been too eager
to make decisions which they feel will satisfy the ultimate rulers in Beijing
rather than stand up for Hong Kong’s own interests. In other words, Tung
and Tsang have put more emphasis on one country, rather than two systems.
The single decision which has contributed most to this feeling was the refer-
ral of a decision by Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal on the status of the
right of abode in Hong Kong of the offspring of Hong Kong residents born in
the mainland. The court found in favour of the immigrants, a decision which
would have led to what the government considered an intolerable number
of new residents entering the territory. In order to overturn the decision of
the Court of Final Appeal, the Hong Kong government had the case referred
199
to a mainland constitutional body, the National People’s Congress, which

reversed the court’s decision. According to many, this was an interference in
Hong Kong’s internal affairs and an infringement of the autonomy promised
to Hong Kong, albeit that it was instituted by the Hong Kong government. It
was certainly a humiliation for one of the cornerstones of the ‘one country,
two systems’ policy, Hong Kong’s independent judicial system.
Given this sensitivity, commentators are permanently on the lookout for
further cracks in the ‘one country, two systems’ policy. In late 1999, a his-
tory exhibition was held in Hong Kong entitled ‘The Rise of Modern China:
A Century of Self Determination’. A review of this exhibition appeared in
Hong Kong’s leading English language newspaper, The South China Morning
Post. The review is quoted in full as follows:
History Compromised
It claims to include the main events in China this century. But the new-
est show at the new Museum of History does not mention the one-child
policy, reduces the occupation of Tibet to an inkpot and empty promises
and gives a famine which killed six million people just two lines – a sad
post-script – on a history panel.
The Rise of Modern China has been curated by the Hong Kong Museum
of History and the Museum of Chinese History in Beijing.
In order to obtain the Beijing museum’s objects – some of which are
fascinating, including an old Boxer pennant, man-sized, proclaiming
‘Support the Qing, Eliminate the Foreigners’, or the microscope used
by Dr Sun Yat-sen, or fascinating 1920s film footage of the Northern
Expedition – compromises have been made.
No doubt many of the items visitors will take for granted – like
the panel admitting that the Cultural Revolution caused tremendous
suffering – involved numerous faxes and considerable bravery.
But a show which can exhibit the public notice issued in Tibet in the
1950s by the People’s Liberation Army – guaranteeing freedom of religion
and respect for the people’s customs – without a hint of irony, or indeed
any comment at all about how those promises have since been broken, is
a show which has severe credibility problems.
I recommend readers visit the Tsim Sha Tsui exhibition. Not so much to
learn about the history of modern China – although there are panels and
artefacts aplenty and many of them are informative – but to learn more
about the future of modern Hong Kong.
What this chapter demonstrates, among other things, is the author’s sen-
sitivity to aspects of the exhibition which might be seen as justification for
policies of the People’s Republic of China, that is to say a possible attempt
Discourse as History: History as Discourse 201
at establishing ideological hegemony over Hong Kong and therefore an

erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy. This comes out most strikingly in the
final sentence, in which the writer suggests that the exhibition is a pointer
to the future of Hong Kong.
This researcher’s reading of this review prompted a visit to the exhibi-
tion itself and to indeed delve further and try to decide to what extent the
reviewer’s claims were valid or not. A first visit to the exhibition revealed
that the reviewer’s reading of the exhibition, from this researcher’s perspec-
tive, was unbalanced. As well as the negative factors pointed out by the
reviewer suggesting a possible erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy, there were
also other surprising things in asserting an individual Hong Kong perspec-
tive. For example, there was a display board devoted to Taiwan and report-
ing on its democratic development in a rather positive way. The exhibition,
for this researcher, represented a complex semiotic combination of signs, a
combination which itself reflected the hybrid nature of Hong Kong’s cultural
identity. In order to investigate this cultural artefact further, a methodology
was employed which included the following: several visits to the exhibi-
tion and a close reading of the artefacts and accompanying texts, which
were all photographed; an interview with the museum’s curator; interviews
conducted by a research assistant with people visiting the exhibition; and
telephone interviews with a number of local historians.1
9.2 History and national identity
Ma and Fung (1999: 498) have the following to say about cultural identity:
… the elaboration of cultural identity is a gradual process in which

histories, traditions and social memories are invented, revised and
reproduced. Secondly, the concept of ‘other’ as opposed to ‘us’ has been
widely accepted to delineate identity boundary. Thirdly, the construction
of identity often involves agencies’ domination and resistance which are
multifaceted, combining discursive, cognitive and emotive dimensions.
Fourthly, multiple and hybridized identities are simultaneously present
in a shifting metamorphosis.
Ma and Fung (p. 499) then go on to describe what cultural identity might
mean in the context of Hong Kong:
The term ‘Hong Kong people’ signifies the distinctive identity of the
community which resides in the southern apex of China and has been
under British colonial rule. It is this collective identity which the com-
munity is proud of and at the same time is so difficult to be envisioned,
accepted and acknowledged by the Chinese authorities, who tend to
perceive the Hong Kong identity but as a token of colonial power and as
a historical insult. Like other communities, whether perceived to be of

concrete existence or of an imagined kind (Anderson, 2004), the concep-
tion of Hong Kong identity is historically and culturally real and relevant
at least to the indigenous populace. It constitutes a cognitive boundary
which has been continually crafted and moulded by historical, political,
social and cultural contingencies. The development of the Hong Kong
identity has taken an erratic path and, while colonial rule subtly created a
space in which the Hong Kong identity could exist (which was distanced
from the Chinese at large), the sovereignty transfer of Hong Kong back
to China has, however, attempted to eclipse it.
Fung and Ma trace the development of a distinctive Hong Kong identity

to the late 1960s and early 1970s, following a series of influxes of immi-
grants fleeing the various upheavals which periodically affected the main-
land. This identity was primarily constructed, they claim, by emphasising
the differences between Hong Kong people and those from the PRC. In
accordance with, or as part of, this process, people from the mainland were
discursively constructed in the media in a negative light, conceived of as
‘uncivilised’ outsiders, in contrast to the relatively modern, cosmopolitan
Hong Kongers. This development from a Chinese to a specifically Hong
Kong identity is referred to by Ma and Fung as ‘de-sinicisation’, which
they describe as:
… an ambivalent and, sometimes, contradictory Sino-Hong Kong iden-

tity: Hong Kong people identify with traditional Chinese culture in an
abstract and detached sense, but, on the other hand, they discriminate
against the particular cultural practices which are affiliated with the
Communist regime in the mainland. Hong Kong’s identity has therefore
mainly emerged as a distinctive identity vis-à-vis mainland citizens.
Hong Kong is unusual in coming so late to decolonisation, but also

because decolonisation has not meant independence, but reintegration as
a part of mainland China. Given its high degree of autonomy, as set out in
the Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of 1990, some might go so
far as to say that Hong Kong has passed from one colonial master, Great
Britain, to another, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). With ideological
control now ultimately in the hands of the PRC, one might expect what Ma
and Fung refer to as ‘resinicisation’, that is to say ‘the recollection, reinven-
tion and rediscovery of historical and cultural ties between Hong Kong and
China’ (pp. 500–1). An exhibition representing the last 100 years of Chinese
history might be expected to be a critical site for the process of resinicisa-
tion, as outlined by Ma and Fung.
Indeed, at the opening of the exhibition, such an aim was indicated by the
chairman of the Provisional Urban Council. ‘This exhibition has been timed
to tie in with the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic
of China’, he stated. ‘Past events are our teachers in the future. Given the
close kinship that binds Hong Kong to the mainland, an understanding of
China’s history will serve as a guide in the search for our future direction’, he
continued. Referring to a number of events in China over the last 100 years
in which Hong Kong played a part, ‘these demonstrate that Hong Kong is an
inalienable part of China’s historical development’, he further added (Hong
Kong Standard, 15 September 1999). At the same time, given the sensitivity
of the population at large to their specific Hong Kong identity as separate
from mainland identity, one might expect such an exhibition to display a
certain amount of subtlety in its format. This issue will become apparent
when we consider the conditions of production of the exhibition.
9.3 Preferred readings
According to Stuart Hall (1980), the different areas of social life are mapped
out into discursive domains which are hierarchically organised into ‘pre-
ferred meanings’, that is to say domains (or here, texts and artefacts) which
‘have the institutional/political–ideological order imprinted in them and
have themselves become institutionalised’ (p. 134). Consumers of texts have
been socialised into accepting certain manifestations of the linguistic (and
other semiotic) codes as given, or ‘naturalised’ (p. 134). However, this does
not mean that there is a necessary correspondence between the encoding
and decoding of texts, merely that this appears to be the case, as a result of
constant uncontested exposure. It follows from this that, because there is no
necessary correspondence between encoding and decoding, text producers
can only attempt to ‘pre-fer’, ‘but cannot prescribe or guarantee’ that their
preferred readings will be taken up by readers (p. 135). This notion of pre-
ferred readings will be important in the analysis which follows.
9.4 Analysis
In order to come up with what Hall calls a ‘preferred reading’, it is necessary

to examine three factors: the conditions of production of the exhibition,
the actual texts (including the artefacts) in the exhibition, and the various
readings of the target audience.
9.4.1 Conditions of production

Insights into how the exhibition was put together were elicited through an
interview with the director of the museum, Dr Ting Sun-pao. According to
Dr Ting, the exhibition was jointly presented by the Hong Kong History
Museum and the National Museum of Modern Chinese History (formerly
the National Museum of Revolutionary History) (in Beijing). Initially a
request came from the head of the Hong Kong Urban Service Department
for an exhibition to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the

People’s Republic of China. Because this period is controversial, a decision
was made to expand the period to cover 100 years, not just 50. There follows
a quote from Dr Ting:
Because this year is the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC,
that’s why we’re asked to do this exhibition – to sort of celebrate the 50th
anniversary. After we had discussions with our counterparts in China, we
decided to expand it to a hundred years instead of just covering the past
50 years because it’s very, very difficult. Even in China, even the Museum
of Revolutionary History, they’ve never managed to put up an exhibition
on the last 50 years. If you go to Beijing, you can only see exhibitions
which start from 1841 up to 1949. It stops there, because even they con-
sider the last 50 years is – I mean they have their own difficulties. So,
we decided to extend it to a hundred years. So, we are very concerned
about – if this exhibition is to be held in Hong Kong, it has to be accepted
by the local public, and in doing so, we need to do this. We need to be
careful and tactful.
Later in the interview, Dr Ting further elaborated on the reasons for

extending the period covered from 50 to 100 years:
Originally it was 50 years. Because in the last fifty years we have at least
20 years where China was in chaos – we have the Cultural Revolution,
and all kinds of political movements, so this is a very difficult part. So,
we decided to expand it to a hundred years because 1999 – we’re in the
last year of this century, so it’s timely to look back … rather than just fifty
years because if you are doing the last 50 years, it’ll just be on the PRC
and nothing more.
So, by extending the period covered, it seems that the museum avoided
an exhibition that might be considered as Communist propaganda by the
majority popular opinion and anti-China politicians in Hong Kong, if pre-
sented from a pro-PRC perspective, and ‘unpatriotic’ by the pro-PRC faction
and political figures, if presented more critically.
Dr Ting … on the last hundred years, we can talk more about the histori-
cal background of the 19th century and then we can go to the
20th century – why we are striving for self-strengthening – it’s
because of the Opium War, the western aggression in the 19th
century, so we can talk something about that as the histori-
cal background. Then, we go to talk about the revolution, the
reforms and things like that.
Researcher So you try to balance the negative with the positive.
Dr Ting Yes.
According to Dr Ting, although the exhibition was jointly presented by

the two museums, the Hong Kong museum exerted much more influence
on its format. Dr Ting again:
We gave them the framework and they provided the artefacts in accord-
ance with the framework that we have laid out, and we also have
prepared all the texts.2
For Dr Ting the role of the texts was crucial. He explained how for the
museum’s permanent exhibition, which was at that time being revised and
expanded, he had been requested to put more emphasis on the Opium War,
the handover and Dr Sun Yat Sen. He explained that the people making the
request, whom he declined to name, wanted to be ‘more or less more patri-
otic’. He then stated that: ‘[f]ortunately they only asked for expansion of a
certain area, they did not ask to see the texts. That’s the crucial part … We
are very, very careful about the texts.’
Although the written texts were crucial for Dr Ting, he also attached
importance to the interplay between the text, the pictures and the arte-
facts. For example, when it was suggested that the section on the Cultural
Revolution was quite critical of what happened, but did not actually
attribute this tragedy to Mao Zedong, Dr Ting’s response was as follows: ‘But
if you combine the texts, the photographs, the artefacts, then you’ll have a
different view.’
In addition to the artefacts obtained from Beijing, other artefacts, pho-
tographs, audio recordings and films came from the Hong Kong museum’s
own collection or were borrowed locally or from overseas. In this way, the
museum was further able to adjust the ideological balance of the exhibition,
it seems. An appropriate ideological balance was crucial for Dr Ting. As he
put it, the exhibition had to be ‘accepted by the public’ and ‘by the left and
by the right’. While he stated that there had been criticism from both the
left and the right, this had been less than he had expected. In general he
thought the exhibition’s reception had been ‘satisfactory’ because ‘we had
expected much more adverse comments’.
When asked if his aim as an historian was objectivity, Dr Ting replied that
he ‘would try his best to make the thing as objective as possible’, but that he
did not think that ‘there’s anything like absolute objectivity’.
9.4.2 Textual analysis

Textual analysis in the context of an exhibition must include consideration
of the artefacts and their disposition, as well as the texts describing them.
The leitmotiv running through the design of the exhibition is a bright red
background – red is the national colour of China, including its flag. Overlaid
on this red background is a copy of a frieze from a statue from Tiananmen
Square in Beijing which is a heroic depiction of members of the proletariat:

soldiers, workers and students. There is no doubt about the nationalistic
nature of this format which runs right through the exhibition.
In addition to the visual, there is also the dimension of sound. Throughout
the exhibition heroic Chinese martial music is played.
The exhibition is divided into nine sections entitled as follows:
1. A nation on the verge of subjugation

2. The revolution of 1911: creation of a republic
3. The May 4th movement: the Chinese awake
4. Cooperation between Nationalists and Communists: the beginning of
the Northern Expedition
5. Internal strife and external humiliation: the Nanjing regime
6. The eight-year war of resistance: the nation unified against Japan
7. Inauguration of the People’s Republic of China: a historical epoch
begins
8. The tortuous road: going astray
9. Reform programme and open policy: socialism with Chinese
characteristics
9.4.2.1 Selection of texts

Using a focus group methodology, in their study of the discursive construc-
tion of national identity, De Cillia et al. (1999: 159) provide a list of main
topics which relate to the construction of a collective political history, one of
the important components, their focus group research showed, of national
identity. The list includes the following elements: myths of genesis and ori-
gin, mythical figures, political triumphs, times of flourishing and prosperity,
decline, defeat and crisis. All of these elements can be found in the Hong
Kong exhibition.
In the early parts of the exhibition, the emphasis is on decline, defeat and
crisis; the late nineteenth century is characterised as one of imperial aggres-
sion against China, the Opium Wars, and the corruption of the late Qing
dynasty.
Two major myths of genesis and origin stand out from others. First, the
events leading up to the revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of the Qing
dynasty. And second, the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party and
its struggle, which ultimately resulted in its winning control of the country.
Mythical figures would include Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and
Deng Xiaoping. Interestingly, regarding this category of mythical figure,
at the end of the exhibition, from a set of 20 famous figures, visitors were
invited to vote for the person they believed to have been most influential
in Chinese history.3
Political triumphs would include the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, the
rise to power of Mao Zedong, the creation of the policy of ‘socialism with
Chinese characteristics’ of Deng Xiaoping, and the negotiations leading to

the retrocession of Hong Kong to China in accordance with the slogan of
‘one country, two systems’.
Times of flourishing and prosperity are limited to the present era, starting
with the opening of China to the outside world in the early 1970s and the
economic reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping.
Given the above analysis the exhibition can clearly be interpreted in
terms of national identity.
9.4.2.2 A transformational model of text selection

In analysing a set of texts (by texts here are included the actual written texts,
and also the pictures and artefacts which made up the exhibition; by set of
texts reference is made to the complete exhibition) it is possible to apply a
transformational model. Various combinations, real or possible, can affect
the ideological impact of the way the texts are presented and interpreted.
(This model is developed by van Dijk, 1997: 35, although it is used in a
rather different way.)
First, there may be additions, which represent more information than
might be expected according to an ‘objective’ reading and therefore elabo-
rate on preferred meanings. On the other hand, there may be deletions,
where information might be expected in a given context but is absent, again
to maintain preferred readings. Then, there may be substitutions, the presen-
tation of a given text or topic in an unexpected place or manner. There may
also be repetitions, ‘to draw attention to preferred meanings and to enhance
construction of such meanings in mental models and their memorisation
in ongoing persuasion attempts or later recall’ (van Dijk, 1997: 35). Finally,
there may be what will be referred to as double voicing (not in van Dijk),
where different readings may be juxtaposed or embedded one within the
other (what Fairclough, 1992 refers to as interdiscursivity and intertextuality
respectively) (cf. Bakhtin’s, 1981, heteroglossia, where different axiological or
ideological positions are present in one text at the same time), making the
preferred reading ambiguous.
The decision to expand the exhibition from 50 to 100 years is clearly an
example of addition. As indicated by the curator, Dr Ting, the extension of
the period covered was intentionally ideological; 50 years would have been
seen as a celebration of the Chinese Communist Party, while 100 years can
incorporate the last 50 into an ongoing process. The overall effect of this
was to totally transform the preferred meaning of the exhibition. In actual
fact, the period of the exhibition was a lot longer than 100 years. Quite
extensive space was devoted to the mid to late nineteenth century, a period
of humiliation and decline.
Deletions would include those elements identified by the newspaper
reviewer cited at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. the one-child policy,
a serious treatment of the Tibet question, and the famine created by the
so-called ‘Great Leap Forward’, among many others. Clearly if these issues
had been included, then the ideological thrust of the exhibition would have
been affected. Another significant deletion would be a thorough treatment
of the so-called Tiananmen incident, or massacre. The only references to this
event (which is highly emotive and commemorated in Hong Kong every
year by thousands of people) are a single photograph with the caption: ‘The
curfew team clearing Tiananmen Square in the small hours of 5 June follow-
ing the Tiananmen incident which took place in Beijing on 4 June 1989’ and
a reference at the end of a text about Deng Xiaoping which stated that ‘After
the Tiananmen Incident of 4 June 1989 there were changes in the leadership
structure’. Knowledge of ‘the Tiananmen incident’ is presupposed in order
for both this statement and the photograph to be comprehended.
A significant substitution would be the inclusion of a positive panel
devoted to the development of Taiwan, something one would not have
expected if the exhibition had been organised by the mainland. In addition,
there is space devoted to Chiang Kai-shek as a revolutionary (although he
was also to become the leader of the breakaway Taiwan), again something
one would not expect in a mainland exhibition.
As regards repetitions, one might include here the material devoted to
the Cultural Revolution. Not only were several panels devoted to this issue,
but there was also a film of some 20–30 minutes devoted to this episode.
It is notable here that Dr Ting, the curator, had the following to say, in his
interview, on the Cultural Revolution:
When I talked to them in Beijing, I emphasised that there should be –

I consider the Cultural Revolution as a very important part because that
has a strong impact not only on Chinese history but – I mean that kind
of thing never happened in other parts of the world. But I think we need
to sort of highlight that so that the Chinese people can learn from it.
Visitors who not only viewed the exhibition, but also watched the film
were likely to come away with a different reading, or mental model, than
those who just viewed the exhibition.
9.4.2.3 The language of the texts4

What can the language of the actual texts tell us about the ideological posi-
tioning of the exhibition? Let us begin with the preface and the epilogue.
Preface
1 Welcome to the new Hong Kong Museum of History. … The major exhibition of
2 the year ‘Rise of Modern China: A Century of Self-determination’ jointly presented with
3 the National Museum of Modern Chinese History of Beijing, is now being held at the
4 Special Exhibition Gallery. It is in fact most appropriate to review China’s pursuit for
5 self determination in the past 100 years at the turn of the century and the 50th anniversary
6 of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. …

7 Actually, the substantial and amazing changes that China has gone through in the
8 past 100 years cannot be fully explained by a single exhibition. Owing to differences in
9 our upbringing, background, experience and political standpoint, we will have different
10 views and interpretations on the history of China in these 100 years. Therefore, you are
11 cordially invited to provide your comment on the exhibition in the questionnaire which
12 can be found at the entrance of the exhibition gallery. …
13 Visitors may be aware that we have brought from the mainland 2 large-
14 scale exhibitions on the history and culture of China since our occupation of the new
15 museum premises. Some may doubt whether the Hong Kong Museum of History places
16 no weight on the history of Hong Kong and whether the museum will only present
17 exhibitions promoting Chinese history and culture. Our reply is definitely in the
18 negative. Ever since the 19th century, Hong Kong has been playing the role of a window
19 on the western world. As Hong Kong is one of the largest cities of the world, apart from
20 knowing Hong Kong and the Chinese history and cultural heritage, we should also have a
21 good understanding of the history and culture of other parts of the world. In fact, we are
22 presenting the exhibition ‘Johann Strauss: Thunder and Lighting’: jointly with the
23 Museum of History of the Museum of Vienna in mid December. …
The preface was signed by Dr Ting himself. If we examine this text, we can
see that it begins with a justification for holding the exhibition now: ‘It is
in fact most appropriate to review China’s pursuit for self determination in
the past 100 years at the turn of the century and the 50th anniversary of the
founding of the People’s Republic of China.’ The function of this statement,
however, seems to be to mask the 50th anniversary of Communist Party
rule. The focus of the exhibition is the 100-year period; the 50th anniversary
is only a secondary reason for making it a convenient time to do this, the
main one being the turn of the century. In actual fact the exhibition goes
back to the 1840s, so the 100 years is not totally accurate (although one
might justify the inclusion of this earlier material as important background).
Given Dr Ting’s interview comments about the sensitivity of the 50th anni-
versary, this interpretation seems highly feasible.
Moving down the text, in lines 8–10, it seems that we have the voice
of the historian speaking, explaining that one single historical interpreta-
tion is not possible and that everyone will have their own view. ‘Owing
to differences in our upbringing, background, experience and political
standpoint, we will have different views and interpretations on the history
of China in these 100 years.’ To forestall any dissent, patrons are invited to
express their views on the provided questionnaires. The writer of this text,
it seems, is going out of their way to avert any undesirable ideologically
based criticism.
The defensive tone continues in the third paragraph, where the writer
feels the need to justify holding another exhibition from the mainland.
‘Visitors may be aware that we have brought from the mainland 2 large-
scale exhibitions on the history and culture of China since our occupation
of the new museum premises.’ The implicature here is perhaps to forestall
any criticism of cultural imperialism from the mainland, which might

undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy under ‘one country, two systems’. This
is reinforced in the next sentence, where the writer this time refutes any
possible neglect of Hong Kong: ‘Some may doubt whether the Hong Kong
Museum of History places no weight on the history of Hong Kong and
whether the museum will only present exhibitions promoting Chinese his-
tory and culture. Our reply is definitely in the negative.’ In setting up the
opposition Hong Kong–China here, there is an implicit assertion of Hong
Kong’s individual identity.
As justification for this claim, an argument is presented that, as ‘[since the
nineteenth century] a window on the world’ and as ‘one of the largest cities
in the world’, Hong Kong should know about history and culture from other
parts of the world. Note again in these statements, the assertion of Hong
Kong’s individual identity. A forthcoming exhibition devoted to Johann
Strauss is provided as an example of this international outlook. However, no
example is given for an exhibition devoted to Hong Kong.
In this prologue, then, there is a definite attempt to forestall any criticism
of the exhibition on ideological grounds. There are three main elements to
this line of argument. First, the link with the 50th anniversary of the PRC is
played down. Second, the claim is made that there is no one single reading
of history (and so any opposing views are valid). And third, the museum
will present exhibitions devoted to other topics besides China. Overall, the
tone is cautious and defensive. The ‘preferred reading’ of this text, therefore,
seems to be aiming to pre-empt any criticism that the exhibition might be
undermining the ‘one-country, two systems’ policy and Hong Kong’s indi-
vidual identity.
When we turn to the epilogue, however, we find a very different kind
of text. Whereas the preface was defensive and sensitive to Hong Kong’s
individual identity, the epilogue is just the opposite. Although it was not
possible to find out whether the epilogue had been written by Hong Kong or
Beijing, its tone is very much that of Beijing. It is hortatory, subsumes Hong
Kong and its people as part of China, and makes direct appeals to patriotism
and national identity.
Epilogue
1 China experienced earth shattering changes in the last hundred years. At the
2 beginning of the century the country was weak and demoralised, and the Chinese,
3 ashamed of being called ‘the sick men of East Asia’ and ‘the enslaved people of a
4 conquered country’, strove to find a way to save China from subjugation. Amidst the
5 celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China at a
6 time when the country is beginning to grow strong and prosperous, we should not forget
7 the period in the past when we suffered humiliation and untold hardship. Nor should we
8 forget all those who gave up their lives to the cause of China’s revitalisation. The ability
10 to develop our inner strength in adverse circumstances is a characteristic of the Chinese

11 people, their will to survive as a people seemingly to intensify in times of great hardship.
12 As the new century will surely bring even greater challenges to the Chinese people, we
13 should keep alive the spirit of self-strengthening that sustained us in the last hundred
14 years in our effort to make China flourish and soar in the years to come.
The hortatory tone of the text is expressed most overtly in the strong
modality to be found in line 6, ‘we should not forget’, in lines 7–8, ‘nor
should we forget’, and in lines 12–13, ‘we should keep alive’. This is hardly
the stuff of ‘objective’ history.
National identity is evoked through allusions to past humiliations, with
the heavy use of negative epithets (line 2 ‘weak’, ‘demoralised’; line 3
‘ashamed’, ‘sick’; line 4 ‘enslaved’; line 4 ‘conquered’; line 7 ‘untold’
(hardship); line 10 ‘adverse’; line 12 ‘great’ (hardship)), and nouns (line 7
‘humiliation’, ‘hardship’; line 11 ‘hardship’). These are contrasted with
positive images of the present and future. Note the positive epithets (line 6
‘strong’, ‘prosperous’; line 11 ‘great’ (challenges)), nouns (line 8 ‘revitalisa-
tion’; line 10 (inner) ‘strength’; line 11 ‘will’; line 12 ‘challenges’; line 13
‘self-strengthening’; line 14 ‘effort’), and verbs (line 11 ‘survive’, line 11
‘intensify’; line 13 ‘sustained’; line 14 ‘flourish’, ‘soar’). Note also the meta-
phors for creation and growth ( line 5 ‘founding’; line 6 ‘Beginning to grow’;
line 13 ‘self-strengthening’, sustained’, line 14 ‘flourish’) relating to the
concept of national regeneration.
Note too how the negative past and the positive present come together
in lines 7–8 (‘Nor should we forget all those who gave up their lives to the
cause of China’s revitalisation.’) and lines 12–14 (‘As the new century will
surely bring even greater challenges to the Chinese people, we should keep
alive the spirit of self-strengthening that sustained us in the last hundred
years in our effort to make China flourish and soar in the years to come.’).
The antithesis contained in this statement, like much of the language of this
text, is closer to the rhetoric of political speech-making than that of ‘objec-
tive’, ‘factual’ history.
National identity is referred to directly (and positively) in lines 9–10: ‘The
ability to develop our inner strength in adverse circumstances is a charac-
teristic of the Chinese people, their will to survive as a people seemingly to
intensify in times of great hardship.’
Another feature of this text is the presupposition which makes Hong Kong
an integral part of China during the era when it was a colony of Britain.
This is conveyed in the use of the indexicals ‘we’ and ‘our’ (we, line 6; line 7
(twice); line 12, our; line 13 we; line 12 we; line 14 our).5 Certainly during
the vicissitudes of the Communist era to which many of these indexicals
refer, Hong Kong people were sheltered by colonial Britain. Indeed, the
majority of Hong Kong’s population, their parents, or grandparents came to

live in Hong Kong because of these difficulties on the mainland.
A further important feature of this text is its level of abstraction. Qualities,
events and things are referred to in very general terms. This is done by the use
of what Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) refer to as grammatical metaphor,
by using nouns instead of verbs. Thus we have ‘earth shattering changes’ in
line 1, but these changes are not specified; we have ‘subjugation’ in line 4,
but by whom and in what way we are not told; we also have ‘celebrations’
in line 5, but again we are not told what they consist of (indeed, in the
context of Hong Kong, for most of the population, the 50th anniversary of
the PRC was not a cause for celebration); in line 8 we have ‘humiliation’ and
‘hardship’, again without explanation. Other grammatical metaphors in the
text are ‘revitalisation’ (line 8), ‘ability’ (line 8) and ‘circumstances’ (line 10),
‘characteristic’ (line 10) and ‘will’ (line 11), ‘hardship’ (line 11), ‘challenges’
(line 12), ‘self strengthening’ (line 13) and ‘effort’ (line 14).
This text, then, in contrast to the prologue, is overtly patriotic, with a strong
appeal to national identity. It assumes shared values, even though most Hong
Kong people would not identify with the Communist government.
The preface and the epilogue can be seen as special types of texts, or meta-
texts, in so far as they do not form part of the actual exhibition itself, but
provide an overall commentary. We will now look at two texts which form
part of the main exhibition. Two other texts have already been referred to
above which refer to the ‘June 4 incident’ and it has been noted how these
can be seen as representative of deletions within the exhibition as a whole
because they cannot be understood without prior knowledge of what this
major incident was. The two further texts which will now be presented refer
to the period under Mao Zedong. The point to be made in examining these
texts is the ambiguous role attached to Mao. This is what was referred to
above as double voicing, where different readings may be juxtaposed or, as
is the case here, embedded one within the other.
Rectification and anti-rightist campaigns
1 In March 1957 Mao Zedong coined the slogan ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom and
2 a hundred schools of thought contend’ to encourage the people to criticise ‘bureaucracy,
3 sectarianism, and subjectivism’. The motive was to use criticism from outside to rectify
4 undesirable styles in the Party. Intellectuals responded enthusiastically to the call, some
5 going so far as to propose ending the one-party rule. Taken aback by the response and
6 worried that public sentiments could not be contained, Mao launched a large-scale anti-
7 rightist campaign. Targets of the anti-rightist campaign included democrats, capitalists,
8 intellectuals, even some Communist cadres – a group which numbered more than
9 550,000.
In the first of these texts Mao is referred to as the agent in both line 1 and
line 6. He is clearly identified as the agent responsible for both the ‘hundred
flowers’ campaign and the anti-rightist campaign. However, when mention

is made of the form the anti-rightist campaign took, Mao is no longer identi-
fied as the agent. The reader is told of ‘[t]argets of the anti-rightist campaign’
(line 7), but Mao is not mentioned as the agent of these ‘targets’. Moreover,
the use of the word ‘targets’ enables the writer to avoid mentioning in what
way these people were ‘targeted’. What actually happened to them? Were
they sent a letter? Were they criticised publicly? In actual fact, a much more
serious fate awaited many of them, including death, but this is not men-
tioned in the text and Mao is thereby absolved of responsibility. Applying
the transformational model introduced earlier, what we have here is a case of
deletion. The preferred reading seeks to avoid overt criticism of an inhumane
act. This process of deletion is brought about by the use of double voicing, of
making Mao the agent, on the one hand, in immediately neutral contexts,
and excluding agency, on the other, when the context is more negative.
Three Red Banners
1 The three Red Banners referred to were the General Direction of Building
2 Socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and People’s Communes. In all three, the thrust and
3 pace were to be ‘more, faster, better, cheaper’ according to directives issued in May
4 1958. The Great Leap Forward and the merging of cooperatives into people’s communes
5 were characterised by such rash methods as unrealistically high targets, arbitrary orders
6 and exaggerated claims. In industry, the boosting of steel production was identified as
7 the key to development, and the whole nation was plunged into a feverish mania for
8 making steel. The aim of this misguided movement was to ‘overtake Britain and be level
9 with the United States in 15 years’. In agriculture, the collective ownership in communes
10 extended to plots of land which had previously been in private hands for raising animals.
11 These measures, far from boosting agricultural production, drastically reduced it, and the
12 famine that resulted caused widespread starvation and untold suffering.
In the three banners text we find the opposite approach to Mao to that of
the ‘hundred flowers’ text. In the former, Mao is mentioned as the agent, but
the result of the policy is inexplicit. Here, the negative impact of the policy
is much more explicit (we are referred to ‘widespread starvation and untold
suffering’ [line 14]), but the agent of this policy, Mao, is not mentioned at
all. The agent is either an impersonal grammatical metaphor – ‘directives’
(line 3), ‘movement’ (line 8), ‘measures’ (line 11) or is excluded through
the use of the passive voice or ergative verbs – the boosting of steel produc-
tion ‘was identified’ (line 6), but by whom we are not told; the nation ‘was
plunged into a feverish mania for making steel’ (lines 7–8), but again we
are not told by whom; ‘the collective ownership in communes extended
to plots of land which had previously been in private hands for raising
animals’ (lines 9–10), but again, the agent of this policy is not mentioned.
Perhaps, because no personal responsibility for these policies is attributed,
the critical tone can be heightened. This is done primarily through the use
of negative epithets and adjuncts – ‘rash’ [methods] (line 5), ‘unrealistically

high’ [targets] (line 5), ‘arbitrary’ [orders] (line 5), ‘exaggerated’ [claims]
(line 6), ‘feverish’ [mania] (line 7), ‘misguided’ [movement] (line 8), ‘drasti-
cally reduced’ [agricultural production] (line 11), ‘widespread’ [starvation]
(line 12) and ‘untold’ [suffering] (line 12). The main point to make, though,
is that we have another example of double voicing. However, whereas in
the previous text Mao was made the agent in immediately neutral contexts
and excluded when the immediate context is more negative, in this case, we
have the opposite; the negative impact of the policy is much more explicit,
on the one hand, but Mao is not made the agent, on the other.
9.5 Conditions of reception
This section will consider briefly how the exhibition was received by mem-
bers of the general public. What is of interest is the extent to which the
public perception accorded with the preferred reading of Dr Ting, as set out
in his interview, and which can be summed up as the most objective as pos-
sible account which is acceptable to both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’. According
to what is an admittedly brief analysis of certain text segments, there is a
tension between neutrality and overt patriotism in the preface and prologue
and also a tension between criticism and approbation within the two texts
devoted to aspects of the period under Mao Zedong. To what extent was the
preferred reading of Dr Ting, on the one hand, and this researcher’s own
textual analysis, on the other, shared by members of the public?
In order to consider this question, 20 individuals or groups were inter-
viewed by a research assistant as they were leaving the exhibition. The
interviews were reflexive (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983), that is to say
the interviewer started with a framework of questions eliciting people’s
views on the exhibition, but encouraged participants to focus on those
aspects of the exhibition which they themselves felt to be important. In the
brief space of a section of a book chapter only very limited information can
be provided on these interviews. However, a number of salient views are
particularly worthy of comment. First, a majority of participants (11 out of
12 referring to this issue) felt that Hong Kong people did not know enough
about history. As the following quotation suggests, this can be attributed to
their colonial past:
I.5: I don’t think we have enough knowledge of modern Chinese

History. It’s only after the handover that people have more interest
and more in-depth understanding modern Chinese history.
The colonial government emphasised material advancement and dis-

couraged interest in cultural heritage and identity, as this next quotation
demonstrates:
I.10: Hong Kong people have never paid much attention to history.
To the Hong Kong people, history is a very insignificant part of
life – making money is more important to them.
A second point is that there was a general feeling that things had been left
out of the exhibition. In particular, many interviewees (16 out of 19 refer-
ring to this issue) felt that there was not enough on the Cultural Revolution
and the June 4th ‘incident’. The following quotations are indicative of this
feeling:
I.18: The exhibits only outline the stages of the revolution. They have
something on the sufferings of the people and they did say that the
Chinese Cultural Revolution brought about serious consequences.
But they did not explain in detail what kind of consequences, such
as the young people’s loss of 10 years of schooling, which can
never be replaced. Twenty years of progress had been lost because
of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and those 20 years of possible
progress is crucial.
I.2: Something has been left out – for example, the Tiananmen Square
Incident has been left out in this exhibition. It is a very significant
historical event which is being avoided in the exhibition.
I.5: It only gave a very brief account on the Chinese Cultural Revolution
with no critique. The relationship between Mao Zedong and the
Chinese Cultural Revolution is not clearly explained.
I believe the organisers of the exhibition are trying to avoid giving

any detail about this [June 4th] incident because of their concern of
the Beijing government. There’s pitifully little information on this
incident.
In addition, a majority of participants (12 out of 17 referring to this issue)

felt the exhibition to be biased:
I.4: There is not enough information on the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

They want to protect the Chinese government’s image.
I.9: We think that it’s quite pro-communist. We feel that it’s trying to
protect the image of the Communist Party.
I.7: The information on the Chinese Cultural Revolution does not seem
to be comprehensive enough, probably because it could affect nega-
tively the image of the Chinese government.
I.16: They did kill many people in those years [during the Mao Zedong
era] and they didn’t disclose it. So, I think the exhibition has not
really maintained a neutral position – it’s hiding something. It
should let the public know what really happened.
When asked if the exhibition reflected ‘one country’ more than ‘two sys-
tems’ the majority (11 out of 14 referring to this issue) felt it was the former.
In spite of these views, many interviewees seemed quite accepting that the
exhibition should be pro-China. When asked about the lack of information
on the June 4th incident, one response was as follows:
I.9: Well, it’s best to stay out of trouble. The June 4th incident will make
the Chinese government look bad.
While another took a similar line:
I.18: It is understandable that little information is given on these two

topics (the Cultural Revolution and the June 4th incident) because
of political concern. Nobody dares to write about the Tiananmen
Square incident. If he or she does, they will be in trouble. There is
some political consideration.
A third quotation on the June 4th issue provides a somewhat more

detailed reason for its omission:
I.19: Hong Kong is supposed to be a neutral zone, and therefore talking

about this incident in this exhibition should not be a problem. But
the reality is that they have avoided saying too much about it
because the Beijing government’s position on this incident is
a concern for them. It’s expected that they have some political
consideration.
9.7 Conclusion
Dr Ting clearly wanted to create a preferred reading which would create as

little controversy as possible. To some extent he was successful. He managed
to mask the 50th anniversary issue, as none of the visitors interviewed raised
it as an issue. In terms of Goffman’s (1981) theory of ‘footing’ and ‘par-
ticipant framework’ the exhibition was a hybrid text. The ‘animator’ – the
sounding box or entity articulating the text – was clearly the Hong Kong
museum. This is where the exhibition took place. The ‘author’ – the entity
which selected the words (and, in this case, the artefacts) and sentiments
that are expressed – also for the most part was Hong Kong. The artefacts
were requested by Hong Kong and most of the texts were written by Hong
Kong. However, some of the texts accompanying the artefacts from Beijing
and some of the actual artefacts were authored by Beijing. So the author,
while mainly Hong Kong, was nevertheless partly Beijing. When it comes
to the ‘principal’, however, – the person or entity whose position is estab-
lished by the words that are spoken and whose beliefs are expressed – this
dimension of the participant framework is most problematic. Officially the
principal was the two museums – one in Hong Kong and one in Beijing. On
the other hand, the initiator of the exhibition was the head of the Hong
Kong Urban Council, whose initial idea was to celebrate 50 years of the
PRC. However, this purpose was considerably undermined by Dr Ting, in
extending the exhibition to take in over 100 years in order to forestall any
controversy.
Dr Ting’s warning at the beginning of the exhibition concerning the dif-
ferent backgrounds people bring to their reading of history justified to an
extent any perceived biases. Nevertheless, based on the analysis of the exhi-
bition and the interviews with the visitors, there was a majority preferred
reading which saw the exhibition as biased in favour of Beijing. In particu-
lar, many visitors felt there not to be enough on the Cultural Revolution (in
spite of Dr Ting’s claim that he had insisted that it had to be included) and
the role of Mao Zedong.
In terms of national identity theory, the exhibition, in spite of its attempt
to apply the tenets of ‘one country, two systems’, nevertheless, on balance,
can be seen as an attempt to impose cultural hegemony on Hong Kong. As
such, it is representative of the tension regarding cultural identity, as Hong
Kong reverts to being part of China, albeit with a guarantee of a high degree
of autonomy.
10
Discriminatory Discourse Directed
towards Mainlanders
10.1 Introduction
Research in critical discourse analysis (CDA) has shown considerable interest

in the study of racial discrimination. In most of the reported cases, the vic-
tims of discrimination tend to be minority groups residing in a host country
(e.g. Turks in Germany, Africans in France), and so discrimination tends to
cut across both ethnic and language boundaries. Although few people who
dislike members of other social groups would openly admit to harbour-
ing discrimination, CDA research has demonstrated that a discriminatory
stance may be shown to be embedded in discursive practices in the form of
subtle linguistic strategies (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1989; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997;
Graumann and Wintermantel, 1989; Gruber, 1997; Horvat et al., 1997; Teo,
2000; van Dijk, 1993a, b, 1995; van Dijk and Smitherman-Donaldson, 1988;
Wodak et al., 1999).
This chapter draws upon the reporting of one major news event – immi-
grants from mainland China claiming the right of abode in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of China – in one Hong Kong
English language newspaper, the South China Morning Post (hereafter SCMP),
with a view to examining one major research question: to what extent are
linguistic strategies of discrimination as reported in the literature also found
in the Hong Kong data? The findings of this chapter show that, with certain
local variations, all the major strategies identified in the literature are also
to be found in the data used in this study. Of further interest is the fact that
these findings apply to people from the same ethnic and linguistic back-
ground as the readership of the newspaper in question.
The corpus used in this study consists of articles with a major focus on
the right-of-abode question collected during the period 30 January 1999
to 19 August 2000. This search yielded a total of 80 articles. The SCMP was
selected as it is the leading English language newspaper in Hong Kong, has
traditionally been viewed as one of the ‘newspapers of record’, and appeals
to an elite, mostly liberal readership.
218
Discriminatory Discourse 219
Compared with other sites in which discursive practices of discrimination

are held up to scrutiny, Hong Kong presents an interesting case. British
colonial rule ended on 30 June 1997, when the sovereignty of Hong Kong
reverted to the People’s Republic of China amidst a great deal of fanfare
broadcast live and witnessed by millions of television viewers worldwide. In
terms of ethnic composition, Hong Kong has always been a predominantly
Chinese city. No fewer than 98 per cent of the inhabitants, estimated
at about 6.8 million when the study was conducted, are ethnic Chinese
with Cantonese as their mother tongue. The majority of Hongkongers
are descendants of successive waves of immigrants from mainland China
who fled sociopolitical turmoil and/or natural disasters and came to seek
refuge and shelter under the British flag (Flowerdew, 1998; Li, 2002). For
about three decades, from the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949
to the late 1970s, travel and other forms of communication between Hong
Kong and China were difficult and extremely limited. Meanwhile, a sym-
biosis of Western business organisation, entrepreneurial spirit and capital
of businessmen from Shanghai, coupled with traditional Chinese virtues,
industry and thrift, turned Hong Kong into a vibrant manufacturing
and financial centre. Sustained economic growth significantly improved
the livelihood of many, who began to consider Hong Kong their home
(Li, 2002). Since the mid-1980s, however, manufacturing as the dominant
type of economic activity gradually gave way to service industries. Today,
there is widespread consensus that as one of the most important trad-
ing and financial centres in the world, Hong Kong has developed into a
knowledge-based economy.
The economic boom since the 1960s and the widely publicised Sino-
British negotiations over the political future of Hong Kong from the early
1980s led many Hongkongers to rethink who they were. Back in 1978, when
China, under Deng Xiaoping, declared to the whole world its intention to
end decades of political isolation and to adopt an open-door policy, Hong
Kong Chinese, especially those who were born and bred locally, gradually
developed a Hong Kong (Chinese) identity. Several factors contributed to
the formation of such an identity: the Hong Kong way of life, characterised
among other things by a laissez-faire economy, freedom of speech and the
rule of law; the colonial government’s campaigns since the 1970s in promot-
ing a stronger sense of belonging (e.g. ‘Hong Kong Festival’ and the ‘Keep
Hong Kong clean campaign’); and above all, the emergence of a distinctive
‘Hong Kong culture’ transmitted principally via television, films and pop
songs (‘Canto-pop’) – all expressed in the increasingly prestigious regional
vernacular, Cantonese.
One of the most influential framers of Hong Kong identity is popular
media such as sitcoms and soap operas, which are primary sites at which
sophisticated local social practices mixed with Western cultural values are
juxtaposed or contrasted with crude, laughable mainland Chinese practices,
including the immigrants’ accented Cantonese. As Ma and Fung (1999) have

pointed out:
The [Hong Kong] media absorbed Western values, transformed Chinese

cultural particulars, articulated local experiences, and crystallised images
of a distinct Hong Kong way of life. This newly found [Hong Kong] iden-
tity was largely constructed by foregrounding the cultural differences
between Hong Kongers and the mainland Chinese. Accordingly, in the
mass media, mainlanders were stigmatised as ‘uncivilised’ outsiders and a
ready-made cultural contrast against which modern, cosmopolitan Hong
Kongers could define themselves. Since most Hong Kongers are ethnic
Chinese, the Sino-Hong Kong cultural differentiation, or the ‘othering’ of
mainland Chinese, was a significant process from which the distinctive
local Hong Kong identity emerged. (Ma and Fung, 1999: 500)
One consequence of the ‘Othering’ of mainland Chinese, as propagated

in popular media, is therefore the reinforcement of a ‘them versus us’ mind-
set. It is in this way that mainland Chinese are stigmatised in the collective
subconscious of the home-grown generations. This helps explain the Hong
Kong Chinese people’s covert hostility and general indifference to the plight
of Chinese immigrants from the mainland.
At the political level, after the handover, in accordance with Beijing’s
pledge of ‘one country, two systems’, Hong Kong, being a special adminis-
trative region of China, was allowed to retain the capitalistic economy and
legal system inherited from the colonial era. The transition was relatively
smooth, although not without political and social controversies under
the leadership of the chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa (see Chapter 8). It
must be pointed out, however, that ‘one country, two systems’ is a grand,
unprecedented sociopolitical arrangement or model of decolonisation.
In his handling of various social and political crises, accentuated by an
economic downturn afflicting the Asia-Pacific region, Hong Kong’s first
chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was accused of being too eager to accom-
modate the interests of Beijing, thus laying stronger emphasis on ‘one
country’, at the expense of the interests of Hong Kong and its people,
thereby overshadowing ‘two systems’. The ‘right-of-abode’ controversy,
which was a major news story during the early post-handover period, is a
case in point.
According to Article 24(3) of the Basic Law – the mini-constitution of
the HKSAR – all children born to Hong Kong permanent residents out-
side the HKSAR would automatically be entitled to the right of abode. More
specifically, a child will be entitled to this right provided that at least one of
the parents is already an HKSAR permanent resident (which usually means
having resided in the territory for at least seven years uninterruptedly) when
the child is born. To exercise this right, however, these children are expected
to file an application to the mainland Chinese immigration authorities

requesting a permit to enter the HKSAR. The provisions in the Basic Law,
however, do not specify whether those children who came to the HKSAR
through illegal means should be allowed to exercise that right. What eluded
the drafters of the Basic Law and the HKSAR government is that thousands
of mainlanders born to Hong Kong people either rushed to Hong Kong on
a two-way entry permit or entered Hong Kong illegally shortly before the
handover in July 1997, in the hope of claiming their ‘Hong Kong resident’
status immediately after the political transition. Consequently, there was
a sudden rise in the number of mainlanders entering Hong Kong in the
months immediately prior to the handover. This development, generally
described in the newspapers as an ‘influx’, created a social perception
among Hongkongers that these immigrants ‘jumped the queue’. In addi-
tion, there was widespread concern about potential family problems after it
was revealed that a significant number of such immigrants were illegitimate
children born to male, married Hongkongers doing business in the main-
land. Indeed, this practice has been so common among Hong Kong Chinese
businessmen residing in the mainland that it is popularly referred to as baau
yih laai (‘keeping a concubine’). If the illegitimate children were allowed to
automatically become Hong Kong residents, it was feared, a great deal of
family problems would arise in the local households affected.
Alarmed by the large number of abode-seekers, the HKSAR government
decided to repatriate the ‘overstayers’ and ‘IIs’ (illegal immigrants), a move
that sparked off a long, bitter legal dispute between the right-of-abode
claimants and the government. In retrospect, it was as if a bomb had been
planted in the drafting process of the Basic Law. The legal disputes lasted for
a considerable period with many twists and turns.
One of the most dramatic developments was the ruling of the Court
of Final Appeal (CFA) in January 1999, which ruled in favour of granting
the right of abode to the ‘overstayers’ and ‘IIs’ (illegal immigrants) on the
grounds that the abode-seekers were merely exercising their right accorded
to them by the Basic Law, regardless of how they entered Hong Kong. A few
days after this ruling, the SAR government gave a press conference at which
some figures were publicised, the most eye-catching of which was that an
estimated 1.67 million immigrants would have the right to enter Hong
Kong in the next three years. These figures suggested that if the CFA’s rul-
ing was left to prevail, Hong Kong would have to receive a huge number
of immigrants, further stretching the already strained demand for social
services and resources. Shortly after this move, the SAR government made
known its intention to request the National People’s Congress (NPC), a cen-
tral government body – amidst strong opposition and protest in public – to
overrule the CFA. This request was accepted and the Standing Committee of
the NPC subsequently declared the CFA’s ruling to be void and introduced
a new ruling whereby all children born to Hong Kong permanent residents
must first obtain a Certificate of Entitlement from the Chinese immigration

authorities before being admitted into the HKSAR. As a result of this new
ruling, all ‘overstayers’ and ‘IIs’ faced imminent repatriation. This gave rise
to a public controversy, with pro-human rights groups, on the one hand,
and pro-HKSAR/Beijing forces and pressure groups, on the other, being the
main contestants. The legal sector itself was also divided on this issue. The
biggest losers are no doubt those immigrants who saw their fate tossed and
turned by the authorities within a matter of months.
10.2 CDA and discriminatory media discourse
CDA has a history of investigating unequal power relations in society (see

Chapter 1). The goal in such work is to analyse the linguistic structures and
discursive strategies of a given discourse or discourses in order to reveal
exploitative and discriminatory (discursive) social practices. The study
reported in this chapter is based upon a corpus of news discourse. Bell and
Garrett (1998: 18) recommend Fowler’s (1991) approach as ‘the most acces-
sible’ framework for analysing media language. In particular, they appreciate
his approach for its analysis of language structures such as transitivity, pas-
sives, modality, nominalisation, and especially lexical choice in functional
terms.
Fowler’s analytical tools were drawn from Halliday’s systemic functional
approach to language. Fowler considers Halliday’s framework the best model
for examining the connections between linguistic structure and social
values and ideologies (1991). Hence, he also sees language as performing
simultaneously the ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’ functions. His
studies of news discourse have illustrated how it is constructed according
to the stylistic and ideological conventions of the newspaper, not of the
writer. That means, news discourse activates an institutional voice rather
than a personal voice. The writer is constituted by the discourse, which
is embedded in the social and institutional ideologies. This major finding
helps reveal a potential discursive practice of discrimination in news dis-
course, which is achieved by means of a variety of discursive strategies and
linguistic tools.
A survey of the work in CDA of discriminatory discourse to date reveals
a number of common, and partly overlapping, discriminatory discourse
strategies. What is to be found is that, depending on the scholar, different
terms are used to label what are essentially the same strategies, making com-
parison across cultures and sites of discrimination research rather difficult.
A summary is presented below of the discriminatory discourse strategies as
they are labelled by leading scholars in the field, followed by what is consid-
ered to be a more unified and coherent taxonomy (see Table 10.1).
Van Dijk (1995: 17) theorises that ideologies in discourse and communi-
cation are ‘enacted’ in different forms of action and interaction (verbally
or non-verbally), and that the reproduction of ideologies is embedded

in organisational and institutional contexts. He regards the ideologies
of the press as primarily to sustain, legitimate or manage group conflicts
and relationships of power and dominance. The enactment, production
and reproduction of dominance relations in the discourse structures are
achieved by means of various strategies which are discursive, cognitive and
social in nature. These discursive strategies are regarded as sociocognitive,
realised in linguistic forms and patterns, and contributing to the social func-
tions of the ideologies of the institution or groups of people involved. In
other words, in the context of the present study, the sociocognitive strate-
gies are embedded in the discourse structures which serve to transmit the
ideologies and attitudes of the newspaper to the readers through various
linguistic forms and patterns.
In his wide-ranging research on racism and discrimination, van Dijk
(1987, 1988a, b, 1991, 1993a, b) discussed a number of sociocognitive
strategies for empowering the majority group and discrediting the minority
group, as follows:
1. Scare tactics: the use of exaggerated figures and extensive attention to the
alleged threat to the interests and privileges of the dominant group as a
way to create panic and discredit the powerless group;
2. Categorical generalisation: generalised ascription to the minority group
which is stereotyping or cognitively prejudiced;
3. Positive self-presentation, as opposed to negative Other-presentation;
4. Positive discrimination/self-justification: accusing the minority group of
creating a burden of social resources as a way of justifying the majority
group’s discriminatory attitude;
5. Problematisation: to problematise issues concerning the minority group
such as immigration, residence, cultural conflicts, etc.;
6. Blaming the victim: that the minority in question are to blame for causing
conflicts or problems;
7. Disclaimers: verbal denial of discrimination; and
8. Mitigation: downtoning, minimising or using euphemisms when describ-
ing the negative actions of the dominant group.
Wodak (described in Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) has devised the

‘discourse-historical method’ (see Chapter 1) to ‘integrate systematically
all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of
the many layers of a written or spoken text’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997:
266). With a similar interest in social inequality and racism, Wodak has
elaborated and refined van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach. She employs a
multidisciplinary approach in which discourses are analysed according to
three interwoven dimensions: contents, strategies, and means and forms of
realisation. Her definition of strategies as applied in discourse analysis differs
slightly from that of van Dijk but accords with the concept of Heinemann
and Viehweger (1991) in the following way:
. . . strategies mediate between communicative functions and objectives

deduced from the interaction and the social conditions of interacting
partners and, on the other hand, the realisation of linguistic means and
their structuration. (Heinemann and Viehweger, 1991, cited in Wodak,
1997: 32)
In their study of the discursive formation of national identity, Wodak and

her colleagues have developed a set of macro-strategies with subcategories
of highly refined micro-strategies, some of which involve discrimination
against foreigners, as follows (Wodak, 1997: 36–42):
i. strategies of justification and relativisation:

shift of blame and responsibility, downplaying/trivialisation,
legitimation/delegitimation.
ii. strategies of transformation:
positive self-presentation, heteronomisation or warning against
heteronomy, autonomisation, discontinuating/dissimilation,
devaluation/negative connotation, vitalisation.
iii. strategies of dismantling or destruction:
discrediting opponents, negative presentation of self/Others,
heteronomisation, assimilation, dissimilation/exclusion,
discontinuation, strategy of pronouncing somebody/something
‘dead’, ‘Cassandra’ strategy.
Adopting the approach of Wodak and her colleagues, Gruber (1997) has
studied the coverage of right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism in Austria’s
most widely read tabloid. In his investigation, he identified two major types
of argumentation strategies: strategies of group definition and strategies of
justification. His strategies of justification are similar to those discussed by van
Dijk and Wodak. These strategies of justification are (Gruber, 1997: 143-6):
i. Trivialisation
– Rationalisation
– Scapegoating/Blaming the victim
– Ridiculing/Devaluating
ii. Disavowal of guilt/responsibility
– Blaming the victim
– Construction of conspiracy theories against the in-group (through
exaggerated discursive presentation of hostile/negative character-
istics of the out-group)
iii. Denial of responsibility (refusal to face a reproach).
Apart from critical discourse analysts who have conducted extensive

research on the issues of racism or social inequality, there are other writers
who have used different approaches to investigate similar issues. Graumann
and Wintermantel (1989) look into the social, mental and linguistic features
of discourses on social discrimination and conceptualise a set of discrimi-
natory speech acts within a social psychological framework. They regard
social discrimination as a form of social action and examine how it takes
effect and how it is realised linguistically. They have derived a number of
‘cognitive–emotional processes’ which are based upon the traditional
studies in social psychology of stereotypes and prejudice, and the linguistic
manifestations of these processes. This set of cognitive–emotional processes
serves the social function of discrimination in different forms as follows:
Social function Cognitive–emotional processes

1. Separating: Differentiating, Categorising
2. Distancing: Dichotomising, Focus on differences
3. Accentuating: Exaggerating differences, Polarising
4. Debasing/degrading: Categorical negative evaluation, Affective
responses to social category
5. Fixating: Stereotyping
6. Assigning traits: Categorical attribution of negative
characteristics
7. Typing Categorisation as type or as typical
(Graumann and Wintermantel, 1989: 184–97)
Bar-Tal (1989: 172–3) has scrutinised the process of delegitimation and

developed a list of micro-strategies for delegitimising the minority group:
i. Dehumanisation: categorisation of a group as inhuman or inferior

race or animals;
ii. Outcasting: categorisation of a delegitimised group as violators of
pivotal social norms;
iii. Trait characterisation: attribution of extremely negative and
unacceptable personality traits to the minority group;
iv. Use of political labels: categorisation of the minority group into
totally unacceptable political groups; and
v. Group comparison: labelling the minority group as a symbol of
malice, evil or wickedness.
Horvat et al. (1997) have studied the process of delegitimation of the

refugee problem in Slovenia, focusing on the use of exaggeration and scare
tactics. The manipulation of the number of refugees is realised in the form
of metaphor, whereas the exaggeration of threats to the public order is
accomplished by means of a process of ‘abnormalisation’ and ‘criminalisa-

tion’ (Horvat et al., 1997: 190–5).
Analysing the ideological construction of racism in newspaper reports in
Australia, Teo (2000) adopted an eclectic CDA approach by integrating the
theories of Fowler, van Dijk, Fairclough and Wodak. He studied news reports
relating to a Vietnamese gang in Australia and discovers evidence of a sys-
tematic ‘Othering’ and ‘stereotyping’ of the ethnic community by the white
majority. More significantly for the present study, Teo’s work unmasks the
racist ideology of the press, which is manifested in an ‘asymmetrical power
discourse’ (Teo, 2000: 7). He differentiates various cognitive strategies which
help shape the discourse and serve to protect the interests of the in-group.
The following are the strategies he describes (Teo, 2000: 16–23):
i. Positive Us-presentation and Negative Them-presentation in the news

headlines and leads;
ii. Generalisation: to ascribe certain key qualities to the main partici-
pants of the news discourse without presenting details;
iii. Stereotyping: to perpetuate an Us-versus-Them mentality between
the dominant majority and the ethnic minority;
iv. Denial of minority voice: to enhance the status and visibility of the
powerful, and to silence and disempower the powerless through quo-
tation patterns; and
v. Othering: by means of over-lexicalisation (i.e. the use of a range
of words of similar meaning) of the minority group, to establish a
pejorative effect which signals deviation from the social convention
and expectations, and reflects perceptions and judgements from the
biased standpoint of such cultural norms/social expectations.
10.3 Composite taxonomy for this study
The different taxonomies cited above seem to be scattered around a cen-

tral theme of power dominance and discrimination. In order to paint a full
picture of the situation in Hong Kong, an attempt will be made to integrate
the different terminologies to form a composite taxonomy of discourse
strategies which will help to examine and illustrate the manifestation of
discourse strategies and structures in the data drawn upon in this study con-
cerning the right-of-abode crisis. The composite taxonomy, which consists
of four categories, is summarised in Table 10.1.
10.3.1 Negative Other presentation

Van Dijk describes the strategy of drawing readers’ attention to the ‘negative
social or cultural differences, deviance or threats attributed to “them”’ as
negative Other presentation. This term is preferred, as the strategy consists
227
Table 10.1 Composite taxonomy of discriminatory discourse strategies as found in

the CDA literature
Discourse Sources Description of category
strategies
(A) van Dijk: negative other Focuses attention on the
Negative Other presentation negative social or cultural
presentation differences, deviance or threats
attributed to ‘them’; effective in
sustaining existing attitudes or
forming new negative attitudes
Teo: negative-them Accentuates positive
presentation/Othering us-presentation vs negative
them-presentation in the news
headlines and leads
Uses over-lexicalisation to
stigmatise the minority group
Graumann and Wintermantel: Assigns negative traits by labelling
fixating (labelling and others with adjectives, and assigns
stereotyping) types by stereotyping others with
nouns
Bar-Tal: trait characterisation Attributes extremely negative and
unacceptable personality traits to
the minority group
Wodak: negative presentation Disparages the ‘locus amoenus’,
of self/Others even employs ‘negative
singularisation’, that is, to
emphasise the negative national
uniqueness to help construct
singularity in connection with
negative attributions
(B) van Dijk: scare tactics Uses exaggerated figures and
Scare tactics extensive attention to alleged
threat to the interests and
privileges of the dominant group
as a way to create panic and
discredit the powerless group
Horvat et al.: abnormalisation Uses exaggeration and scare
and criminalisation of the tactics by means of manipulation
Other of the number of refugees … the
exaggeration of threats to the
public order … .
(C) van Dijk: Blaming the victim, Accuses the minority group of
Blaming the positive discrimination/ creating a burden of social
victim self-justification resources as an attempt to justify
the majority group’s discrimina-
tory attitude
(continued )
Table 10.1 Continued

Discourse Sources Description of category
strategies
Gruber: blaming the victim The most extreme form of
‘scapegoating’: the victim, instead
of the offender, is to blame for
the course of events
Wodak: justification Justifies a ‘societal status quo
ante’ by emphasising the
legitimacy of past acts and
attitudes of the majority group
(the ‘own’ national ‘we’-group)
(D) Wodak: delegitimation Discrediting and disempowering

Delegitimation the minority group
Bar-Tal: outcasting Categorises a delegitimised group
as violators of pivotal social
norms
van Dijk: problematisation Problematises issues
concerning the minority group
such as immigration, residence,
cultural conflicts, etc.
of focusing on the negative, repugnant characteristics of the ‘Other’ group,

typically a minority group. The spread of negative attributes will gradu-
ally result in the formation of stereotypes in the readers’ attitudes towards
the ‘Other’ group. This, in turn, may lead to social isolation of the ‘Other’
group.
10.3.2 Scare tactics

Scare tactics are achieved by means of the use of exaggerated figures and
survey statistics in order to create threat and panic to the society of the
majority group. The massive use of scare tactics in the media discourse can
stir up panicky emotions among the general public and thus foment a col-
lective hostile attitude against the minority group.
10.3.3 Blaming the victim

This strategy of putting all the blame on the victim instead of the offender
is regarded as the most extreme form of ‘scapegoating’ (Gruber, 1997).
Adopting this strategy allows the majority group to focus attention on the
burden caused by the victim or minority group and thus to deny and even
shift the responsibility involved to the latter. Ultimately, the use of this
strategy will help the majority group to justify their discriminatory attitude
towards the minority group.
10.3.4 Delegitimation
Some writers have used different terminologies to describe the use of
delegitimation as a way to outcast a minority group as outsiders by the
majority group. This macro-strategy is typically realised by such micro-
strategies as outcasting (Bar-Tal) and discrediting and disempowering the
minority group (Wodak). Delegitimation plays an essential role in outlawing
the status of, and disempowering the rights claimed by, the minority group.
In what follows, it will be shown that, to a very large extent, the strategies
in this composite taxonomy can be found in the data used in this study. The
analysis of the use of discourse strategies and their linguistic manifestations
forms the major description in this study. By describing the discourse strate-
gies used in the data, the aim is to uncover the ideologies that are embedded
in the discourse structures and reveal the less transparent institutional values,
beliefs and attitudes of the SCMP in regard to the socially contentious issue of
granting or denying right of abode to immigrants from mainland China.
10.4 Findings
In the analysis of the data, it is found that the four categories of discourse
strategies in the composite taxonomy comprise subcategories of micro-
strategies which are manifested in the linguistic form and structure of the
corpus. How these micro-strategies are used in the SCMP news discourse data
will be illustrated below.
10.4.1 Negative Other presentation

10.4.1.1 Negatively connotated metaphors
Van Dijk (1993b) discusses the use of positive representation of the own
group and the negative representation of the ‘Others’ as complementary
strategies for the justification of inequality. These strategies can be achieved
by focusing attention on the ‘negative social or cultural differences, devi-
ance or threats attributed to “them”’ (1993b: 263). He stresses that these
strategies are effective in sustaining existing attitudes or forming new
negative attitudes. In the corpus used in this study, the use of negative rep-
resentation of the ‘Others’ is prevalent, whereas the other complementary
strategy – positive representation of the own group – is relatively rare. The
use of negatively connotated metaphors is the dominant tactic used for
negatively presenting the ‘Other’ group. The SCMP makes use of a number
of metaphors that convey negative implications to describe the immigrants
from China claiming the right of abode in Hong Kong. The dominant
metaphors used in the corpus are flood, influx and burden. These metaphors
contain clear connotations that a large number of immigrants would have
a tremendous, and above all negative and unwanted, social impact on the
Hong Kong community. These negatively connotated metaphors are used
frequently in the headlines, leads and body of news reports, and have
become naturalised over the three- year period when the mainland migrants
tried hard to obtain the right of abode in Hong Kong. Some writers even
describe the immigrants as a ‘mass influx’ or ‘exodus’ in the news articles
(990203).1 Below are some typical examples of negatively connotated meta-
phors found in the headlines and leads of the data:
(a) Influx fears after victory on abode (990130sc) [Headline]

(b) Anson warns of abode ruling burden (990131) [Headline]
(c) Taskforce on migrants; Calculations begin amid fears of huge influx
after abode ruling (990203) [Headline]
(d) 1000 migrants a day could move to SAR, creating a ‘heavy burden’
warn officials (990429sc) [Lead]
(e) Stemming a flood (990429sd) [Headline]
(f ) A potential mass influx of mainland migrants (990506) [Lead]
(g) Influx may send jobless rate spiralling to 25% (990507sc) [Headline]
(h) Orchestrating an unjust exodus (000819) [Headline]
Van Dijk and Smitherman-Donaldson (1988: 226–7) regard the headline

as the ‘top’ and the ‘identification tag’ of a news report in three important
aspects: semantic, schematic and organisational aspects. Headlines provide
the semantic framework for readers’ interpretation of the news story, and
search and retrieval of old information. Thus, headlines can take up a cen-
tral and revealing role in the production and reproduction of discriminatory
ideologies in the press. The headlines and leads cited above all point to a
central motif that migrants are considered unwelcome and unwanted by the
Hong Kong people. The semantic choice of negatively connotated words in
the news headlines and leads helps to build up a biased stance on the abode
issue.
Bell (1991) differentiates between the headline, the lead and the body of
a news report and suggests that the headline and the lead are the most sali-
ent parts. Simply by scanning through the headline and the lead, readers
can easily and immediately catch the main points of the news. More sig-
nificantly, he describes the lead as a ‘micro story’, which gives a ‘directional
summary’ of the news to help focus attention on the gist of the news and
magnify its news value. He explains that the writing of headlines is usually
the work of subeditors, not journalists, who only produce the lead and the
body (1991: 186). In the media context, the accumulative use of negatively
connotated metaphors in the headlines and the leads of news reports con-
veys a discriminatory tone which is indicative of its institutional voice and
value.
The Hong Kong data concerning negatively connotated metaphors is in
line with research findings reported elsewhere, suggesting that these meta-
phors are probably universal in discriminatory discourse.
10.4.1.2 Negative attributions

The SCMP also reports on Hong Kong people’s negative impression of
mainland immigrants by quoting survey results and highlighting the key
adjectives that ascribe negative attributes to the immigrants. This kind
of report draws attention to the purported negative characteristics of the
mainland migrants, which may not be representative of the major findings
of survey results. The negative characteristics attributed to the mainland
migrants obtain direct and immediate coverage in the news reports. For
example:
(a) . . . The Movement Against Discrimination said migrants were being

negatively stereotyped by the Government as poor and unemploy-
able. (9905018) [Lead]
(b) Migrants dirty and uneducated: poll. (990907sc) [Headline] People are
becoming less tolerant towards mainland migrants and regard them
as uneducated and unhygienic, according to a survey. . . . The survey
found new arrivals were generally seen as uneducated, dirty and with
little understanding of the rule of law. . . (990907sc) [Body]
(c) Mainlanders describe daily humiliation: Immigrant Leung Liu Yuet-
fan . . . claims she was rejected from jobs because employers believed
she was uneducated and ignorant. . . . ‘often, people at the market-
place shout, complaining new immigrants are picky and stingy’,
she [43-year-old Lui So Shuk-hing who arrived three years ago] said.
(990907sd) [Body]
(d) Mainlanders ‘regularly insulted as bumpkins’. (000728) [Headline]
(e) ‘. . . They claim these people are uneducated, uncivilised and lazy’,
he [Human Rights Monitor spokesman Ho Hei-wah] said, . . .’People
think that if mainlanders come here they’ll lose their jobs. They say
“you’re making Hong Kong society worse, you’re destroying stabil-
ity”’, he said. (000728) [Body]
By directing readers’ attention to the supposed negative characteristics of

the migrants, the SCMP manages to form and fixate the uncritical reader’s
views on this minority group, creating a degrading and unpopular image
against them. In terms of the epithets used in making negative attributions,
those which are found in the Hong Kong data (e.g. poor, uneducated, igno-
rant, dirty, uncivilised, lazy) are very similar to those reported elsewhere,
with the exception of perhaps one attribute: ‘with little understanding of
the rule of law’. If this is indeed unusual as a negative attribute in interna-
tional research on discriminatory discourse, it is because the rule of law is
prized by the HKSAR government as one of the most important pillars of
a liberal society – a legacy it has inherited from the British colonial regime
(Flowerdew, 1998).
10.4.1.3 Labelling: collocation and repetitive use of labels for the

right-of-abode seekers
By collocating and repeating a group of labels ascribed to the immigrants
from China, the SCMP reinforces the following negative values on the main-
land migrants:
• ‘Mainlanders’: they are not from Hong Kong and therefore belong to
an ‘out’ group (although they are of the same race and the majority of
Hong Kong residents or their parents originated from the mainland)
• ‘overstayers’: they abuse their right to remain in Hong Kong
• ‘illegitimate mainland children’: by virtue of their illegitimacy their right
to live in Hong Kong is compromised (although this had yet to be estab-
lished by the courts)
• ‘illegal immigrants’: by law, they do not have the legal right to live in
Hong Kong (although, again, this had yet to be established through the
courts)
• ‘claimants’: they were supplicants and therefore belong to an ‘out’
group
The above-mentioned labels are frequently used in the SCMP to refer to

people who have come to Hong Kong from China in an attempt to seek
their right of abode in Hong Kong as stated in the Basic Law. Even before
the mainland migrants’ legal status has been decided by the courts, they are
already labelled as an ‘illegal’ or ‘illegitimate’ group of people. By assigning
and repeatedly using these stereotypical labels to refer to them in the news
reports, especially in the headlines and leads, therefore, the SCMP wittingly
or otherwise stigmatises the abode-seekers from China as an ‘out-group’.
Labelling is one of the tactics of ‘negative Other presentation’. The tactic
becomes naturalised as the labels for the powerless group (the abode-seekers)
become stereotypes.
Probably because of circumstances specific to the Hong Kong context,
most of the labels found in the data (e.g. mainlanders, overstayers, illegiti-
mate mainland children, claimants) appear to be unique to the discrimina-
tory discourse surrounding the right-of-abode issue in Hong Kong.
10.4.2 Scare tactics

In its reports of government announcements concerning the right of
abode, the SCMP, wittingly or unwittingly, served as the mouthpiece for the
government. The government constantly used a negative agenda-setting
technique in its official announcements on the right-of-abode issue. As all
the press widely covered these threatening official announcements, the
government’s discourse strategy of scare tactics, as mediated by the press,
became naturalised and succeeded in inciting fears and resentment among
the public vis-à-vis the migrants.
Writing in the Hong Kong Standard, the other major English language
newspaper in Hong Kong at that time, Professor Yash Ghai of the University
of Hong Kong claimed that the government had set up a ‘task force’ to cre-
ate fears of an impending ‘influx’ by presenting ‘doomsday’ estimates of the
number of potential migrants and unbearable financial and social conse-
quences. By ‘task force’, he meant the joint effort of government leaders and
officials in painting a threatening picture of a socially deprived community
as a consequence of the potential influx of mainland migrants. He criticised
the government’s reactions to the issue as a way to stimulate and encourage
resentment against mainlanders as if they were ‘invaders, unconnected with
the community here’ (Hong Kong Standard, 26 May 1999), whereas in fact the
Chinese in Hong Kong are of the same race as their counterparts in China
and, since 1 July 1997, Hong Kong had been a part of China. Allen Lee, a
deputy of the National People’s Congress, also blamed the government for
stoking public fears of the immigrants (Hong Kong Standard, 14 May 1999).
10.4.2.1 Predicting a threat to interests and privileges of the dominant group

Scare tactics can be achieved by stirring up worries and fears among the
dominant group. In the case of the right-of-abode issue, the dominant
group is the residents of Hong Kong. The government and its allies made
announcements to incite fears and resentment against the mainland immi-
grants by predicting possible threats to the public’s interests and privileges
in various aspects. The following are examples of such tactics, as found in
the corpus:
(a) ‘The arrival of thousands of migrant children could have a “serious

and adverse impact” on education for Hong Kong students’, the
Government admitted yesterday. . . (990130sd)
(b) ‘The Court of Final Appeal ruling on residency rights for mainland-
born children will be a burden on resources . . .’, Anson Chan Fang
On-sang [Government Chief Secretary] says . . . . Executive Councillor
Antony Leung Kam-chung believed the arrival of migrant children
would put extra pressure on the education system. . . (990131)
(c) Right of abode migrants could stir social unrest and bear the brunt of
anger over jobs and welfare, it was claimed yesterday. . . . The Hong
Kong Council of Social Service called on the Government to channel
more resources into relieving potential grievances and reducing the
gap with the migrants. . . . ‘Many people are unhappy because they
fear the mainlanders will flood Hong Kong, crowd schools and com-
pete with us for jobs and housing. . . and there will be social unrest.’
[Council Director Hui Yin-fat said] . . . (990205)
(d) ‘Tens of thousands of mainland residents settling in Hong Kong will
cause a rapid increase in population and the unemployment rate, and
a more crowded living environment’, Mrs Ip, Secretary for Security,

said . . . (990429)
(e) Mr Suen [Acting Chief Secretary for Administration] said the biggest
problem was the need to find a total of 6,000 hectares of land, almost
five times the size of Chek Lap Kok airport . . . (990507sh)
(f) Secretary for Housing Dominic Wong Shing-wah said: ‘It means a new
town of the size of Junk Bay will have to be developed every two years
to cope with the influx . . . ‘(990507sf)
The government and its allies tried to scare and mislead the public into
believing that the acceptance of mainland immigrants would lead to an
uncontrollable situation and that, most importantly, the interests and
privileges of the local people would be adversely affected. In this way, the
government, through its statements mediated by the mass media such as
the SCMP, hoped to win public support in its campaign to expel the right-
of-abode seekers.
Regarding the types of threat to the interests of the dominant group,
those that are found in the data are, in general, not unlike those reported in
research on discriminatory discourse elsewhere – for example, unwanted
burden on resources and social welfare, adverse impact on education and
housing, and the accentuation of unemployment and social problems,
including the prediction of social unrest. What is perhaps unique about the
Hong Kong data is the alleged pressure on land, as shown by the officials’
claims in excerpts (e) and (f). This is understandably a public concern given
the small size and very high population density of Hong Kong and high
property prices.
10.4.2.2 Predicting threat to public order and political stability

Built upon a capitalist and commercial base, Hong Kong has always empha-
sised its political stability and observance of the rule of law. A threat to
either of these pillars of society would represent an alarm signal to the pub-
lic. The government was quick to manipulate these threats to incite public
emotion and provoke a sense of crisis towards the ‘influx’ issue. The follow-
ing are examples of the SCMP’s reporting of the government’s predictions on
the projected impact on the society’s order and stability:
(a) Warning of II [illegal immigrant] influx if SAR loses test case; Talks
held with mainland officials: Officials have warned of a possible
influx of illegal immigrants if the Government loses a test case this
month. . . . [Secretary for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee said] ‘. . .
there will be a message sent that it is difficult for the Government to
conduct repatriation or it is very easy to obtain legal aid to challenge
the Government. This will attract more people to come …’ (990310)
[Double headline + body]
(b) ‘ . . . it would also encourage the activities of snakeheads [smugglers

of illegal immigrants] and adversely affect those waiting to comply
with procedures’, the judge said . . . (990404)
(c) Organised smuggling of IIs [illegal immigrants] ‘on the rise’ . . . snake-
heads use the abode ruling as an excuse to create an illegal immigra-
tion wave . . . (990720)
In these reports, vivid predictions are made regarding various threats to

the well-being of the people in Hong Kong. They all aim at inciting panic
and anxiety among the general public. In reporting the pronouncements
of the government and its allies in such a way, the SCMP at the same time
reproduces the government’s position.
Predictions bearing on adverse consequences such as a projected increase
in illegal immigrants are certainly not unique to Hong Kong. What seems
unusual in the Hong Kong data is the indication that the governments
and jurisdictions on both sides of the border show a strong willingness to
cooperate in their efforts to stop the movement of migrants – a character-
istic which arguably owes its origin to the unparalleled ‘one country, two
systems’ sociopolitical model of decolonisation.
10.4.2.3 Use of quasi-objective figures

The use of ‘quasi-objective figures’ is one of ‘the most compelling scare
tactics in the formation of public opinion’ (van Dijk, 1993b: 107). To sup-
plement its scare tactics, the Hong Kong government exploited this strategy
in order to manipulate public reaction to the right-of-abode issue. The gov-
ernment cited estimates and survey statistics to make the public believe that
the immigrants were going to financially drain the SAR government, that is,
the taxpayers’ money. These estimates, it was subsequently agreed by many
experts, were wildly exaggerated. Further serving to dramatise the situation,
the figures were widely used in headlines by the SCMP, with the maximum
estimate usually cited:
(a) Court gives 1.67m right of abode. (990429)

(b) Extra $300m may be needed for migrants. (990502)
(c) $710b (needed) for migrants in 10 years. (990507sh)
(d) Taxpayers face $28b bill to provide new schools. (990507sd)
(e) $270b bill for new networks. (990507se)
(f) 170,000 flats needed in three years. (990507sf )
(g) Influx may send jobless rate spiralling to 25%. (990507sc)
It did not take long for the impact of the scare tactics employed by the
government and surveys to make themselves felt in the immediate response
of the public. Two surveys were conducted shortly after the release of
government estimates to poll public opinion about the purported influx:
. . . more than 60% of people object to the expected influx of mainland

migrants, according to a new survey [the Hong Kong University’s Social
Science Research Centre polled 519 people] . . . 44% saying their main
concern was unemployment, followed by 12% citing fears for public
order and 11% concerns about housing and education. . . . (990510)
Survey shows most opposed to influx of mainland children . . . 60% of

1003 respondents polled opposed allowing those with right of abode
to come to the SAR. . . . 76% believed Hong Kong should not shoulder
the financial burden caused by their arrival. . . . [a poll conducted by the
Better Hong Kong Foundation]. (990513)
These survey results indicate that some of the people in Hong Kong had
already developed a strong sense of crisis within a short period after the
government had presented its alarmist figures and statistics. The reporting
of these survey results by the SCMP is likely to have further reinforced nega-
tive feelings towards the migrants and further naturalised such attitudes.
The scaremongering propagated by the use of quasi-objective figures in the
data is very much in line with findings in discriminatory discourse reported
elsewhere.
10.4.3 Blaming the victim

10.4.3.1 Scapegoating
In search of a defence for its handling of the right-of-abode issue, the gov-
ernment found an easy and immediate scapegoat in the target group – the
mainland migrants. This is the strategy of ‘blaming the victim’, which Gru-
ber (1997) describes as the extreme form of scapegoating and which Wodak
(1997) calls the ‘victim–perpetrator inversion’. From the standpoint of the
government, the mainland immigrants are to blame for causing all kinds
of problems to the Hong Kong community and thus should be kept out or
expelled. Accusations against this minority group made by the government,
as reported in the SCMP, are rather direct and far-reaching, as illustrated in
the following examples:
. . . Kwan Wai-wah of the Progressive Alliance of Hong Kong [a pro-

government party] . . . was worried the SAR might not cope with a sud-
den influx of ‘hundreds of thousands of immigrants’. He pointed to the
influx of mainlanders in the 1980s, which led to the bloom of squatter
areas. . . . (990131)
Right-of-abode ruling puts housing target in jeopardy: Tung Chee-hwa’s

pledge to cut needy families’ wait for public housing to three years
could fall flat, housing officials admit. . . . Acting Business Director Fung
Ho-tong said yesterday the ruling [the Court of Final Appeal’s right-of-
abode ruling] could lengthen the waiting list. . . . (990207)
‘Tens of thousands of mainland residents settling in Hong Kong will

cause a rapid increase in population and the unemployment rate, and a
more crowded living environment, . . . the problem of hillside squatters
may also reappear and education and medical facilities may not be able
to meet the demands of a substantially larger population . . . there is a
possibility that our environment, and the present ecological balance may
be badly affected too’, Secretary for Security Regina Ip said. . . . (990429)
He [Government economist Tang Kwong-yiu] predicted a surge in

the already record jobless rate – 6.2 percent – starting next year with the
arrival of the first migrants. The second generation of mainland people
would push the rate up again by 12 percentage points seven years later,
he said. . . . (990507sc)
An influx of mainland migrants could prompt a new brain drain, a sur-

vey revealed . . . . Nearly 80% of respondents said more people would
emigrate if social and economic conditions deteriorated after the arrival
of migrants. . . . (990508)
These are actually not facts but projections based on the possible outcome of
the ‘influx’ of mainland immigrants. The government’s purpose is to divert
attention from the humanitarian issues involved and to put the blame on
the mainland migrants so that it will not be held responsible. Apart from
blaming the victim, the government goes further, projecting the Hong Kong
community as the victim if it accepted the ‘influx’. By reporting on the gov-
ernment’s predictions and projections, wittingly or unwittingly, the SCMP
becomes an ally of the government in helping to naturalise these ideas.
Most of the accusations made against the mainland immigrants are not
unlike those reported in the literature. For example, mainland immigrants
are to blame for ‘the bloom of squatter areas’, ‘a rapid increase in popula-
tion and the unemployment rate’, ‘a more crowded living environment’,
a ‘record jobless rate’ and the alleged ‘lengthening of the list of needy
people waiting their turn for government housing’. There is, however, one
projected consequence which is fairly specific to the Hong Kong context
and which is not therefore found in the literature, namely, the possibility
of ‘a new brain drain’. That this could be the case may be explained by the
fact that many educated Hong Kong Chinese are upwardly and outwardly
mobile professionals, as shown in the successive waves of emigration – pri-
marily to Anglophone countries – in the decade leading to the handover

(Flowerdew, 1998; Li, 2002).
10.4.3.2 Positive discrimination/self-justification

Positive discrimination/self-justification develops when a dominant group
accuses a minority group of being a burden on the social resources as an
attempt to justify their discriminatory behaviour or attitude (van Dijk,
1993b: 264). In the right-of-abode crisis, some government officials and
public figures – their voices again reproduced by the SCMP – blamed the
mainland immigrants for putting a heavy burden on the various resources
of Hong Kong and also for causing social problems:
She [Secretary for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee] said the ruling would,
in the long term, affect community life and put pressure on resources
such as education, health and housing. . . . (990130sc)
‘The Court of Final Appeal ruling on residency rights for mainland-born

children will be a burden on resources’, Acting Chief Executive Anson
Chan Fang On-sang says. . . . (990131)
‘[A] large influx of new immigrants to Hong Kong will be an unbear-

able burden in terms of education, medical facilities, housing and
general social welfare arrangements’, Mr Justice Wally Yeung warns. . . .
(990404)
An extra $300 million may have to be spent on the handling of applica-

tions by mainlanders who have the immediate right to migrate to Hong
Kong, according to the immigration chief. . . . (990502)
Government economist Tang Kwong-yiu said mass immigration would

‘pull down the standard of living, wage levels, push up unemployment
and thin out resources for economic development and improvement of
living conditions … ‘ (990507sh)
Thirteen residential estates with more than 4,000 flats each would have
to be built each year for the expected 1.67 million arrivals, according to
government estimates. The result would be that needy families would
have to wait at least 10 years for a public low-rental flat and taxpayers
would have to pay an extra $288 billion for housing over the next 10
years. . . . (990507sf )
The government officials’ predictions on the possible burden to be

brought about by the mainland immigrants’ influx gradually reinforce the
belief that the Hong Kong community as a whole will suffer, and that the
mainland immigrants should be held responsible. This strategy plays an
important role in shifting the responsibility and, at the same time, serves to
justify the discriminatory attitude of the Hong Kong government and the
Hong Kong people (the majority group).
10.4.3.3 Distortion
To inflate the issue of immigration into a problematic one that threatens
the well-being of the local residents, some public figures presented a dis-
torted picture, which was again reproduced by the SCMP, of the impact of
the influx on the local community. Although this strategy is not common
in the Hong Kong data, reports of public figures indirectly making use of
distortion in their presentation of survey data and opinions do occur. The
following citations, for example, present highly unlikely scenarios:
(a) Nearly 85% of women are worried the court ruling will have a
negative effect on men’s fidelity, a survey by a women’s group
[the Women’s Rights Concern Alliance] has found. . . . 88.2% said
the judgment would lead to an increase in marital disputes . . . .
84.2% were also worried the judgment. . .would have an impact
on monogamy. . . . ‘The judgement indirectly acknowledges Hong
Kong people taking second wives in the mainland’, the alliance
said. (990303sd)
(b) ‘Allowing them [mainland immigrants] to stay would lead to
chaos . . . [and] would result in many thousands of visitors on two-
way permits refusing to go back and may prompt the mainland to
prevent “innocent” people making trips to Hong Kong, damaging the
tourist industry. . .’ Mr Justice Yeung warns. (990331)
What is problematised in the distorted picture of the Hong Kong data

is, to say the least, untypical of studies on discriminatory discourse strate-
gies elsewhere. For example, Hong Kong Chinese men’s infidelity to their
spouses is blown up beyond reasonable proportions. The alleged ‘impact
on monogamy’ is based on an opinion survey the methodology of which is
suspect and the reliability questionable, and yet, reported uncritically in a
newspaper of the stature of SCMP, the figures give the appearance of being
objective and real. As for the other problematised issue – that the Hong
Kong tourist industry will suffer as a result of the mainland government’s
tightening of visa control because visitors from the mainland on two-way
permits would refuse to go back – is a wild guess at best. And yet, quoted
verbatim from Mr Justice Yeung in an SCMP news story, these projections
take on a higher rate of credibility than what one person’s private opin-
ion deserves. By reporting uncritically and citing directly the distorted
predictions and inflated figures, therefore, the SCMP reproduces and

perpetuates a discriminatory stance and, at the same time, indirectly
reinforces the allegation that there is no legitimate basis for mainland
immigrants to claim right of abode in Hong Kong.
10.4.4 Delegitimation
Delegitimation is employed to outcast a minority group, resulting in the
minority group being outlawed as illegitimate. Van Dijk’s description of
problematisation is similar to the strategy of delegitimation. He regards the
strategy as a tactic to discredit any voices or policies in favour of the minor-
ity group by means of problematising issues related to them, such as the
immigration problem, right of abode and cultural conflicts. Delegitimation
is realised through two major, related strategies, as exemplified in the fol-
lowing excerpts.
10.4.4.1 Pointing to illegitimate status and illegal activities associated with the
target group
(a) Abode migrants told to leave. (990331) [Headline]

(b) ‘They have no right of abode in Hong Kong under the Basic Law.
They have no right to enter Hong Kong illegally or to remain in
Hong Kong in breach of the conditions of stay’, he [Mr. Justice Yeung]
added. (990331)
(c) ‘It [Allowing illegal immigrants to stay] would . . . encourage the
activities of snakeheads [smugglers of illegal immigrants] and
adversely affect those waiting to comply with procedures’, he [Mr.
Justice Yeung] said. (990331)
(d) Organised smuggling of IIs ‘on the rise’. (990720) [Headline]
(e) ‘We have discovered more organised illegal activities’. . . Returning
from a one-day conference in Zhuhai, Mr Lee [Deputy Commissioner
of the Police Department] said: ‘Snakeheads use the abode ruling as
an excuse to create an illegal immigration wave.’ (990720)
(f) Illegitimate children will have to provide proof of their relationships
through DNA samples. (990731)
In the Hong Kong data, various claims are found to outlaw the minority
group as an illegitimate group having no right of abode in Hong Kong. One
set of claims points to the fact that the abode-seekers entered Hong Kong
illegally, either through organised smuggling of humans or overstaying upon
expiry of their two-way permits, as shown in the words of Mr Justice Yeung
in excerpt (b) above. Another set of claims alleges that granting mainland
immigrants the right of abode would unleash illegal activities associated
with the minority group, notably an increase in organised smuggling of

humans and ‘IIs’ (illegal immigrants) by snakeheads. Still other claims
draw attention to the status of the children who were born to ‘concubines’
in the mainland. Thus in many news stories, negative attributes such as
‘illegitimate children’, ‘born out of wedlock’ and ‘DNA testing required’
reinforce public scepticism of the legitimacy of the mainland immigrants’
claim to right of abode – the last mentioned being the result of the Hong
Kong government’s decree that DNA test results were required of all child
immigrants seeking right of abode in Hong Kong as a means to ascertain the
parent–child blood relations.
10.4.4.2 Mediating and magnifying voices opposed to the minority group

Another discursive strategy through which the legitimacy of the abode-
seekers’ right to stay is undermined is found in the voices – mediated and
to some extent magnified by the SCMP in its news stories – of those who
were opposed to the abode-seekers’ claims. Among the voices mediated were
those of the Beijing authorities, Hong Kong government officials and some
unidentified Hong Kong Chinese as shown in local opinion polls.
(a) Beijing says abode ruling was wrong and should be changed. (990209)
[Lead]
(b) The landmark Court of Final Appeal ruling on right of abode was a
mistake and should be changed, a mainland official said yesterday.
(990209)
(c) Court wrong on abode, NPC told Judges should have consulted
Beijing before issuing ruling, meeting hears. (990623) [Headline]
(d) Local Standing Committee member Tsang Hin-chi dispelled fears the
reinterpretation would undermine the power of, and public confi-
dence in, the final court. ‘[It’s all right] if the court doesn’t make a
mistake next time’, he said. (990623)
(e) During the meeting, Miss [Elsie] Leung said that she considered
‘clarification’ to be a kind of rectification. Her remark came after
Democratic Party chairman Martin Lee Chu-ming asked her about
Beijing’s call for rectification which preceded the Government’s
request to the Court of Final Appeal for it to clarify part of its January
29 judgment on right of abode for mainland children. (990306)
(f) Most people support blocking the mass influx either through an NPC
interpretation or amendment of the Basic Law, a survey published
yesterday showed. Only 16.2 percent of respondents said the Court
of Final Appeal ruling should be upheld. The remaining 83.8 percent
said either an interpretation or an amendment of the Basic Law by
Beijing best met the interests of Hong Kong, according to the poll of
980 people conducted by the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute.
(990501)
(g) Survey shows most opposed to influx of mainland children. (990513)
[Headline]
As shown in these excerpts, some legal experts from Beijing openly called
the Court of Final Appeal’s (CFA) ruling a ‘mistake’, while Elsie Leung, head
of the Hong Kong judiciary, was quoted as echoing Beijing’s view that the
CFA ruling needed to be ‘rectified’. Such official voices of the mainland and
Hong Kong authorities were mingled with a third type of voice – the voice
of a ‘faceless majority’ projected and magnified in results of local opinion
polls reported at more or less regular intervals. In effect, to the concerned
reader of SCMP, it is as if the reporting of the abode crisis was punctuated
by a refrain of several well-orchestrated unsympathetic voices, questioning
and challenging the legitimacy of the mainland immigrants’ claim to right
of abode.
10.5 Discussion and conclusion
The above analysis has demonstrated that examples of all of the discrimina-
tory discourse strategies in the composite taxonomy presented earlier in this
chapter are to be found in the Hong Kong corpus of news articles taken from
the SCMP regarding the right of abode of mainland immigrants. The taxono-
mies of discriminatory strategies used to account for data collected in other
places (mostly Europe) are thus applicable also in Hong Kong, with some local
characteristics. Although this finding does not allow us to claim by any means
that these strategies are universal, it does indicate that they occur in the Asian,
as well as the European, context. Perhaps more significantly, it applies to peo-
ple belonging to the same ethnic background, largely as a result of a negative
Othering, stereotypical portrayal of Chinese mainlanders in the Hong Kong
popular media, which helps account for Chinese Hong Kong people’s general
indifference to the plight of immigrants from the mainland.
This study is a modest attempt to unpack the underlying attitudes and
ideologies of the SCMP and reveal the intra-ethnic relations between the
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Chinese. Following van Dijk’s (1997)
characterisation, the practice of discrimination in the SCMP is an ‘intragroup
discourse about others’. The SCMP, a prestigious newspaper in Hong Kong,
plays a significant role in the reporting of the right-of-abode issue. In its
reports, the SCMP turns out to be the mouthpiece of the government and the
establishment in reproducing its anti-migrant rhetoric. It serves as a medium
through which the government and its associates are able to freely dissemi-
nate their prejudice and discrimination against the mainland migrants. The
intra-group ethnic relation is one of division and dichotomy between the
majority (the Hong Kong residents) and the minority groups (the right-of-
abode seekers). The discourse of discrimination, as reproduced in the SCMP,
serves to reinforce this intra-group division and discrimination.
Another interesting conclusion for this study points towards the differ-
ence between fact-oriented and opinion-oriented texts in the newspaper.
Gruber concludes from his study on the rhetoric of trivialisation in Austria’s
most popular tabloid that both fact-oriented and opinion-oriented texts
demonstrate a general tendency of trivialisation and disavowal of the
minority group (1997: 154), that is, a discriminatory attitude. This study
has focused on fact-oriented articles, but if the editorials of the SCMP on
the right-of-abode issue are considered, the newspaper’s stance is found to
be relatively more sympathetic towards the mainland immigrants than its
characterisation in the news reports. Although most of the editorials on
the right-of-abode issue focus on the threat to the rule of law posed by the
central government’s overruling of Hong Kong Court of the Final Appeal’s
verdict, the editor does criticise the prejudicial attitudes of the government
towards the mainland migrants. The following are quotations from three of
the six editorials published on the right-of-abode issue in the SCMP:
(a) SENSE OF URGENCY . . . Confused mainlanders continue to pour

into the Immigration Department seeking clarifications that are still not
available. Across the border, meanwhile, snakeheads are taking advantage
of the prolonged uncertainty to lure more illegal immigrants to Hong
Kong. . . . Every day of delay means another day in which such problems
can only continue to mount. But yesterday’s first meeting of the govern-
ment taskforce to implement the court’s decision displayed little sign of
the urgency with which this issue needs to be addressed. . . . To date, the
only tangible consequence of the judgment seems to be that Beijing has
banned those potentially affected from even visiting Hong Kong on two-
way permits. This means that their rights are now more restricted than
before the court ruled in their favour. If this continues to be the case,
some are sure to bring applications for judicial review which would stand
a high chance of success. . . . But when the legal rights of Hong Kong
permanent residents are involved, the administration has a duty to do all
it can to accelerate the process. . . . (990206)
(b) AMENDING THE LAW. . . It [the number of abode-seekers settling in

Hong Kong] will not, however, be on the scale of the Government’s dooms-
day scenario. Considerable re-alignment is necessary. . . . There are other
examples of this tendency to concentrate on the negative aspects of migra-
tion, and to overplay the SAR’s inability to cope. No account is taken of the
construction and service industry jobs it will help to generate and there is
no acknowledgment that migrants will help to offset skill shortages, nor
of their contribution to the economy. . . . But there is no disguising a taint
of unabashed prejudice against mainland migrants which is not pleasant.

It would be the subject of great criticism if it was voiced against Chinese
elsewhere in the world. . . . It would amount to the NPC overriding the
Court of Final Appeal ruling, and would rob Hong Kong of its promised
autonomy, as well as severely damaging its common law jurisdiction. . . .
It is local NPC delegates who are apparently content to surrender Hong
Kong’s autonomy, so long as it stems the ‘tidal wave’. . . . (990507)
(c) STAR PUPILS . . . The upheaval involved in adjusting to a strange city

and encountering, it must be said, an often hostile reception, raises the
stress by several notches . . . . Fomenting antagonism against migrants,
as is happening now, is irresponsible and potentially harmful . . . but it
is unity of purpose which will solve the problem. A ‘them and us’ culture
will only make the problem worse. (990512)
These editorial extracts indicate that the SCMP tries to uphold a relatively
sympathetic and understanding attitude in its editorials (opinion-oriented
texts) towards the migrants. Unlike the populist Austrian tabloid, the SCMP,
read as it is by members of the elite classes in a quasi-democratic society,
adopts a liberal and democratic stance in its editorials on the right-of-abode
issue. The interesting question is whether the discriminatory attitude, as
manifested in the news articles, or the more tolerant tone of the editor-
ials, represents the true institutional ideology of this prestigious English
language newspaper.
11
Globalisation Discourse: Continuity
with the Old
11.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the discourse of globalisation from the perspective of

Hong Kong following the change of sovereignty. The analysis shows how
the post-handover government maintained the previous colonial policy of
emphasis on free trade within the context of an authoritarian framework
of government. The chapter does this through the analysis of a speech given
by the chief executive of the SAR, Tung Chee-hwa (and thus links back with
Chapter 8), in London in October 2000. The speech highlights the SAR gov-
ernment’s measures to address the challenges posed by globalisation and its
ability in capitalising on the assumed benefits of the global phenomenon. The
analysis demonstrates how globalisation is discursively constructed as immut-
able and that it is the role of the government to manage the changes that are
made necessary by the new global economy. The chapter begins with a dis-
cussion of the notion of globalisation, then considers globalisation and Hong
Kong, before presenting the detailed textual analysis. The latter demonstrates
a range of discursive phenomena that realises the discursive construction of
globalisation and the role of government as referred to above.
11.2 Definition and characteristics of globalisation
Giddens (1990: 64) defines globalisation as ‘the intensification of worldwide

social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local hap-
penings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa’. It has
four dimensions: the nation-state system; the world capitalist economy; the
world military order; and the international division of labour.
For Robertson (1992: 9), globalisation refers ‘both to the compression of
the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole’.
It is concerned with the ‘increasing acceleration in both the concrete global
interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth
century’.
245
In their introductory textbook on sociology, Bilton et al. (1996) list the

following characteristics of the globalised world:
• political, economic and social activities are becoming global;

• states and societies are linked by rapid communication;
• people, ideas and cultural products move around, merge and influence
each other more rapidly;
• economic activity can create globally integrated production and
marketing;
• transnational political organisations go beyond the nation state and its
sovereignty;
• the world is no longer divided into huge superpower blocs.
To this could be added a shift from material to semiotic production as the

major form of productive economic activity.
Waters (1995: 3) defines globalisation as ‘a social process in which the
constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and
in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding’. For
Waters, globalisation is manifest in three areas of social life: the economy;
the polity; and culture. These three areas are characterised by different types
of exchange: material; political; and symbolic. The third of these, symbolic
exchange, includes ‘oral communication, publication, performance, teach-
ing, oratory, ritual, display, entertainment, propaganda, advertisement,
public demonstration, data accumulation and transfer, exhibition and spec-
tacle’ (p. 8). In other words, it is concerned with discourse, although Waters
does not use this term.
11.3 Globalisation, modernity, capitalism and progress
Globalisation theory is associated by many writers with the theme of moder-

nity (e.g. Bilton et al., 1996; Giddens, 1990; O’Brien et al., 1999; Robertson,
1992; Waters, 1995). As Giddens (1990) puts it, ‘modernity is inherently glo-
balising’ (p. 63). Pardo (2001) links globalisation with both modernity and
capitalism, neither of which, she rightly claims, can be considered without
the idea of progress. All of these phenomena are Western ideas and their
spread can be related to the rise of the European powers in the nineteenth
century, led by Great Britain and the so-called Pax Britannica (Pardo, 2001:
93). It was Britain and its philosophy of free trade that opened up the world
to international markets and standardised products.
11.4 Development and critique of globalisation theory
Some claim that there have been globalising tendencies for many centuries,
but in so far as it is linked in with notions of modernity, globalisation refers
to recent developments (Robertson, 1992: 8). Robertson relates the term to
Globalisation Discourse: Continuity with the Old 247
McLuhan’s (1964) idea of the ‘global village’, with its notion of ‘shrinking’
of the world through the shared simultaneous nature of mass media, particu-
larly television, of our times (see also Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989a). At the
same time that McLuhan’s ideas were becoming influential, Robertson notes,
there occurred a revolution in consciousness shared in many parts of the
world, based upon notions of liberation and love (p. 9). Other factors shap-
ing the concept of globalisation noted by Robertson include the two world
wars, the spread of international, transnational and supranational institu-
tions, and attempts to coordinate the so-called global economy (p. 9).
Robertson (1992: 104) notes the tendency in discussions of globalisation
to ignore the individual. Robertson insists that there are four elemental
points for any discussion of globalisation: ‘national societies; individual
selves; the world system of societies (international relations); and humankind’
[original emphases], and that any given element is constrained by the other
three. In a critique of Giddens, Anthias (1999) points to the homogeneous
and undifferentiated nature of his account of the experience of the glo-
balised world. Giddens’s depiction of globalisation and late modernity is,
for Anthias, too generalised and based on the experiences of an identifiable
privileged minority, a minority who partake of global communications,
travel, new technologies and a wide range of lifestyle choices. The picture
Giddens paints of late modernity is, for Anthias, on the one hand, a uni-
versalisation of the ‘West’ and, on the other hand, a form of exploitation of
the ‘subaltern’. As she puts it: ‘The self is presented as unitary within these
processes, thus downplaying issues of power and subordination within glo-
balisation and modernity’ (p. 156). To be fair to Giddens, however, he does
allow for the negative aspects of globalisation:
A pessimistic view of globalisation would consider it largely an affair

of the industrial North, in which the developing societies of the South
play little or no active part. It would see it as destroying local cultures,
widening world inequalities and worsening the lot of the impoverished.
Globalisation, some argue, creates a world of winners and losers, a few on
the fast track to prosperity, the majority condemned to a life of misery
and despair. (Giddens, 1999)
Another criticism of Giddens’s view of globalisation is of his claim that

national sovereignty has been eroded and that globalisation is an autonomous
development outside the scope of government. As Benton (1999: 47) notes:
To the extent that the economies of the industrialised countries are

more open to international competition and capital flows it is because
their governments have designed international trading and investment
regimes for that purpose. This can just as easily be seen as an exercise of
national sovereignty as an abandonment of it.
Benton goes on to argue that deregulation has been consistent with the
ideology of governments of the ‘New Right’ and has enabled them to
weaken labour movements and reduce state-sponsored welfare.
There is no doubt that pro-globalisation ideology masks a range of nega-
tive issues such as the poverty of the majority of the world’s population,
environmental degradation, lack of educational opportunities and exacerba-
tion of Third World debt. It is issues such as these that have given rise to the
anti-globalisation movement which has manifested itself in recent years in
violent demonstrations at intergovernmental trade and finance meetings.
11.5 Globalisation and discourse
With the shift from material to semiotic production, language has become
a more salient aspect of social practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:
vii, series preface). The semiotic output of the increasingly service-oriented
economies has a linguistic or partly linguistic nature. The expanded lin-
guistic dimension of production has led to a greater preoccupation on the
part of producers with how language is shaped most effectively to ‘sell’
their (linguistic or partly linguistic) products. The switch to more semiotic
types of production, often referred to as the ‘knowledge-based’ economy
(see Chapter 8), has permeated other spheres of social life and discourse
practices. For example, politicians, who increasingly have recourse to the
mass media in disseminating their messages, are paying more attention
to the language they use. Globalising discourse goes beyond national, and
indeed linguistic, boundaries. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 80) put
it, ‘commonalities of discourse practices increasingly transcend linguistic
differences’. Or in the words of Pardo (2001: 94):
In any kind of political expansion, language is one of the most powerful

resources for the transmission of values, economic, political and cultural.
States suffer a gradual loss as a result of the expansion of a language
that starts to be used as a market language or lingua franca and/or as an
academic, scientific or communication language, then becomes an alter-
native language with respect to the one proper to each nation, and may
eventually come to constitute a national, regional or global language ...
But to talk of a language is not only this, it is also to learn how to look at real-
ity in a different way, and to accept a new way of thinking about it. (original
emphasis)
The colonising effect of globalisation discourse has not gone unnoticed by

non-linguists. As Robertson (1992: 113) writes:
There has recently been considerable expansion of the rhetoric of

globality, globalisation, and internationalisation. In fact there appears to
have rapidly developed across the world a relatively autonomous mode

of discourse concerning such themes. Put another way, ‘globe talk’ – the
discourse of globality – has become relatively autonomous, although its
contents and the interests that sustain them vary considerably from soci-
ety to society and also within societies. The discourse of globality is thus a
vital component of contemporary global culture. It consists largely in the
shifting and contested terms in which the world as a whole is ‘defined’.
Images of world order (and disorder) – including interpretations of and
assertions concerning the past, present and future of particular socie-
ties, civilisations, ethnic groups and regions – are at the center of global
culture.
11.6 Hong Kong and globalisation
It could be argued that Hong Kong, since its inception as a colony, has been
an example of the globalising world. The whole purpose of setting up the
colony in 1841 was that of trade. The British government did not really
want to claim Chinese territory; their aim was to open up the Chinese
market (Flowerdew, 1998; Welsh, 1997). When China, which was a closed
country, refused to open its doors to large-scale trade, the solution was
to seize the small island of Hong Kong as a place from which the Royal
Navy could force China to open up its markets to international trade and
from which the (mainly British) traders who had conducted the little trade
that had been allowed thus far (mainly in opium, via Canton) could oper-
ate under British law. Following the seizure of Hong Kong, however, the
Western powers succeeded in opening up the whole of the Chinese coast to
trade with the West, through the so-called ‘treaty ports’. The importance of
Hong Kong was overshadowed by these other ports, particularly Shanghai,
and it became what at least one historian has described as a ‘colonial back-
water’ (Welsh, 1997).
Hong Kong only became a global player in trade terms following the
Communist Revolution in China and the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949. Until that time, since the forced opening up
of China by the Western powers, Shanghai had been China’s main indus-
trial city. Forced out by the Communists and earlier by the corruption of
the Nationalist Guomindang regime, Shanghai entrepreneurs moved to
Hong Kong, injecting capital and experience into the setting up of, first,
mainly textile and, later, plastic and electronic product factories. By 1955,
the Hong Kong government was able to speak of the ‘rapid emergence of
Hong Kong as an industrial producer’ (cited in Welsh, 1997). By 1971, nearly
half of the Hong Kong labour force worked in manufacturing (Lang et al.,
2001). Given Hong Kong’s tiny population at that time, this industrial
production was primarily for export.
Because of the territory’s small amount of available land and the fact
that labour was much cheaper on the Chinese mainland, beginning in the
1980s and continuing into the 1990s, Hong Kong’s manufacturing was
moved across the border. This was made possible by China’s new ‘open
door’ policy, which provided opportunities and cost incentives for capital-
ist entrepreneurs. Hong Kong’s manufacturing labour force was reduced
from 892,000 in 1980 to 327,000 by 1996 (Lang et al., 2001). Hong Kong
developed into a service-based economy that focused on finance, legal
services, shipping, entertainment, information and tourism – all activi-
ties with a global dimension. As an indication of the service-oriented
nature of today’s economy, two of the largest companies listed on the
Hong Kong stock market are HSBC (formerly known as the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation, but now, to reflect the global nature
of the operation, preferring the more impersonal acronym) and China
Mobile, a mainland telecommunications company. Hong Kong’s inter-
national economy is underpinned by a linked exchange rate with the US
dollar, which means that the SAR’s monetary policy is effectively in the
hands of the US government. In order to maintain the fixed exchange
rate link, rises and falls in interest rates have to match those in the US,
even if economic conditions in the territory do not merit such a change.
The SAR’s commitment to globalisation was reflected in Tung’s Council of
International Advisors, a group which included the heads or former heads
of companies such as Motorola, General Electric, American International,
Royal Dutch Shell, Philips, Siemens, HSBC, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi,
News Corporation (Rupert Murdoch), and a former head of the US Federal
Reserve Board.
Currently, a further shift is taking place within the Hong Kong economy,
with ‘low value-added’ aspects of major service-oriented companies’ opera-
tions being exported to the mainland or other countries. Thus, for example,
much of Cathay Pacific, Hong Kong’s major airline’s, data processing is con-
ducted in Australia. HSBC moved a large part of its ‘back-office’ work over
the Chinese mainland border to Guangzhou (Canton).
Finally, mention should be made of an important event affecting the
Hong Kong economy, the so-called Asian Financial Crisis or Meltdown.
The crisis began in 1997 when Thailand, following massive specula-
tion against its currency, was forced to devalue. This was followed by
similar speculative attacks and devaluations in other East Asian coun-
tries. Although affected by heavy speculation, the Hong Kong–dollar link
was maintained. However, this was at the expense of a massive drain on
financial reserves, massive government intervention in the stock market,
cripplingly high interest rates and a resultant economic slump, which
continued for several years.
As has been seen in previous chapters, in the years leading up to the
retrocession of Hong Kong to China as a Special Administrative Region
of that country, the last British governor, Chris Patten, made great efforts
to justify British rule in Hong Kong. He claimed the success of the colony
to be due to a free market economy, individual freedom, the rule of law
and democratic institutions. In spite of distancing itself from the colonial
regime, the post-colonial government, with Tung Chee-hwa as its leader,
nevertheless also referred to these features as essential elements of Hong
Kong’s system (see Chapter 8), especially to his international audiences.
However, it is other dimensions of globalisation that Tung chose to make
the centrepiece of his discourse, creating what might be termed a techno-
cratic form of political discourse, seeking to discursively construct Hong
Kong around the ideal of what he referred to as ‘a world class city’ (see
Chapter 12). This discourse accepts that globalisation is a fact of life and
that the Hong Kong government (and people) must do their utmost to
make globalisation a success for the SAR. This discourse is obvious in the
speech analysed in this chapter.
11.7 Analysis
The speech selected for analysis (see the Appendix at the end of this chapter)
is drawn from a corpus of Tung’s speeches, all of which are available on the
Hong Kong government website (http://www.info.gov.hk/). This particular
speech was selected because it is typical in its treatment of the theme of
globalisation. The speech was made in London at the Hong Kong Trade
Development Council annual dinner on 30 October 2000. For reasons of
space, only 18 of the 27 paragraphs of the speech are analysed.
In this speech there are a number of themes relating to globalisation.
Indeed, the main topic is the Hong Kong government’s desire to integrate
Hong Kong into the global system: ‘... we are positioning Hong Kong not
only as one of the major cities of China, but a world city in Asia with a status
comparable to London in Europe and New York in the Americas’ (para. 10).
The opening reference to London’s success (para. 1), which is attributed to
its having ‘seized on the opportunities presented by new IT developments
and the globalisation of trade’, a process which has reinforced its position
as ‘a cosmopolitan city and a world financial centre’, is not only a polite
compliment to the British guests who made up the audience, but a prelude
to the later development in the speech of Tung’s vision of Hong Kong devel-
oping along similar lines.
The other major theme of the speech is Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese
sovereignty. But what is emphasised with regard to this issue (para. 3) is the
continuity of the aspects of Hong Kong’s system which provide its creden-
tials as a member of the global economic network – ‘the rule of law, a level
playing field for business, clean and transparent government, and the whole
range of freedoms with which all of us can identify ...’. These are all features
of societies that are well integrated into the global economy.
Several paragraphs are devoted to Hong Kong’s response to what is referred

to as the ‘Asian Turmoil’. In an early reference (para. 2), Tung refers to the
‘overcoming’ of the Asian Financial Crisis, neatly reifying the process as
a fait accompli by the use of a nominalisation. This topic is reintroduced
as given information in paragraph 4; there is thus again no need for expla-
nation. It is as if it were an inescapable fact of life.
If there is no explanation of the causes of the financial crisis, the gov-
ernment’s action in its aftermath is presented in a very dynamic fashion
(para. 4), with a series of material process, or action, clauses, with ‘we’,
the government, as agent: ‘we introduced tax cuts ...’, ‘we have proceeded
with massive investments ...’, ‘we launched an incursion into the financial
markets’, ‘...we have managed the challenges ...’. Notice how the nominali-
sations which form the complements of these clauses (‘tax cuts’ as opposed
to ‘we cut taxes’; ‘massive investments’ as opposed to ‘investing massively’,
‘an incursion’ as opposed to ‘we entered into’) further emphasise action,
with both the verb and the complement of these clauses referring to
actions, or material processes (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). In addition,
following the principle of end focus (Quirk et al., 1985), the placement of
the primary action at the end of the clause means that emphasis is placed
here. Notice also the list-like presentation of these actions. As Fairclough
notes, the use of lists (of which there are many others in this speech – see
below) is related to what he refers to as the ‘categorical and authoritative
assertion of truisms’; through their accumulation they enhance the rhetori-
cal force of the text. The list-like presentation of the government’s action
in this paragraph, together with the repeated use of the agent ‘we’ in action
process clauses, present the government in a very dynamic and authorita-
tive light. Whereas the process of globalisation may be inevitable, according
to this reading, the capacity of the government to shape its development is
certainly emphasised.
Also worthy of attention in this paragraph is the way in which a very con-
troversial measure is insinuated as part of the list of measures: ‘We launched
an incursion into the financial markets to protect the integrity of our sys-
tems. It was controversial at the time. But by now, the move has received
wide international endorsement.’ Not only is there no specification of what
the ‘incursion into the financial markets’ was (it in fact took the form of
massive intervention in the stock market – a total reversal of Hong Kong’s
much touted ‘free market economy’), but neither is there any explanation
of how the ‘incursion’ was controversial, or how extensive the ‘international
endorsement’ was (in fact, right up to the time of writing, it is still highly
criticised in many quarters).
In paragraph 5, the results of the actions described in paragraph 4 are
set out. In the first sentence a succession of nominalisations allows a
series of effects, which would more congruently be described in individual
clauses (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), to be piled up: ‘increases in trade,
activities in the financial markets, tourist arrivals, Government investment

and consumer spending’. The second and third sentences, which are more
congruent, make use of mathematical representation to add authority to
the positive argument presented – ‘The economy grew at double digits in the
first quarter of this year. For 2000 as a whole, we forecast our economy will
grow at 8.5%, to be followed by 4% in 2001.’
The speech then describes three fresh challenges facing Hong Kong. These
are presented as a three-paragraph list (paras 7–9), with each consecutive
paragraph beginning, ‘First ... Second ... Third ...’. The first of the challenges
is economic globalisation itself. Hong Kong must respond to this challenge
by participating fully and producing sophisticated, high-quality goods and
services. There is no question of resisting or of an alternative course of
action. The idea that there is no alternative is insinuated by the presenta-
tion of ‘We will be able to compete ... only if ’, the presupposition being
that ‘we must be able to compete’. The second challenge is represented
by mainland China, which itself has rapidly become an important player
and hence competitor of Hong Kong in the global economy. Nevertheless,
in spite of this competition, this situation also offers ‘great opportunities’,
although these are not specified. According to proponents of globalisation,
countries which compete on a free trade basis are in a ‘win–win’ situation;
there are only advantages to be gained, even from strong competition. It is
also interesting to note that mainland China, in spite of being ruled by the
Communist Party, has introduced a market economy and is now a member
of the World Trade Organisation.
The third challenge is represented by a range of interrelated phenomena
which are bringing about a new phase of restructuring in Hong Kong’s econ-
omy. The factors leading to the need for this restructuring are ‘asset infla-
tion’, ‘globalisation’ and ‘competition from the mainland’. Restructuring
is to be brought about by turning to ‘innovative, knowledge-intensive eco-
nomic activities, mak[ing] the best use of information technology’. There is
no mention of the social costs of such a transformation, which will lead to
the export of jobs to the mainland and elsewhere and reduced job opportu-
nities for the less skilled workers in Hong Kong.
In paragraph 10, there is a shift to plans for the future. Here the com-
parison with London and New York, which was prepared for at the opening
of the speech, is made. Tung and his government are ‘positioning’ Hong
Kong to become a ‘world city’ in Asia (see Chapter 12). As noted earlier in
this chapter, according to some globalisation theorists (e.g. Giddens, 1999),
nation states have lost most of their sovereignty and politicians have lost
their power to influence national economies. However, the Hong Kong
government, in spite of its avowed philosophy of a free market economy,
believes it can transform the Hong Kong economy; hence the use of the
material, or action, process verb ‘positioning’. As noted in the introduc-
tion to this chapter, this ‘interventionist’ approach, it may be noted, was a
significant shift from the colonial government’s economic policy of ‘positive

non-intervention’ (Flowerdew, 1998).
In paragraph 11, Tung sets out what he sees as the characteristics of a world
city. Such cities have depth of talent in culture, technology and education
and they are strong in the areas of finance, trade, tourism, information and
transport. Their citizens enjoy a relatively high average income, although
it is notable that there is no mention of the great disparities between the
wealth of the rich and poor in such cities.
In paragraph 12, Tung lists those features of a world city that he considers
that Hong Kong already possesses. These aspects are described with the use
of building metaphors; they are presented as pillars and strengths of the
economy which can be consolidated and built upon. In paragraph 13, the link
with the mainland is added as an additional strength.
Paragraph 14 refers to weaknesses in the economy that were highlighted
by the Asian Financial Crisis. There are three points of interest here. First,
the crisis is presented in a positive light, as it serves to indicate areas in
need of attention. Second, these weaknesses are not specified; there is just a
reference to ‘some weaknesses’. What is specified, however, is the range of
measures taken to deal with these weaknesses. In this way, and this is the
third point of interest, the emphasis is put on the authority and decisive
nature of the government and its power over the economy. The range of
measures is presented in list form, illustrating again Fairclough’s point about
the authoritative and categorical nature of lists. The list is also in the form
of nominalisations, emphasising the technicist nature of the discourse and
allowing the list of measures to be presented in one extremely long clause.
The list includes:
the demutualisation, merger and listing of the security and future ex-
changes, the establishment of the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM)
modelled on NASDAQ, and measures to enhance the transparency and
efficiency of our financial market; the reorganisation of the provision
of municipal services to enable more efficient deployment of resources
and improve quality of services; and a range of measures to stream-
line and modernise the structure and management of the civil service to
enhance productivity.
The dynamic nature of the government’s action is further emphasised in

the use of the metaphors seized and vigorously promoting in this paragraph.
Significantly, at the end of this paragraph, there is the only mention of
the Hong Kong people themselves, with the expression ‘the enthusiastic
embracing of IT by our community’ (emphasis added). In a government run
by technocrats, actual people, it seems, from this speech at any rate, are of
very little interest. Indeed, there is no mention in the listing of these reform
measures of the effect on the people employed in the various organisations
listed. In actual fact, the reorganisation of the civil service, in particular,

led to many job losses and the introduction of reductions in conditions of
service. In addition, when Tung blithely lists the ‘reorganisation of the pro-
vision of municipal services ...’, he is omitting to mention the controversy
surrounding this measure, which involved the scrapping of the democrati-
cally elected municipal councils, an important feature in the little amount
of electoral democracy that Hong Kong possesses. This also illustrates, like
the mention of the stock market intervention in paragraph 4, how the use of
lists allows the insinuation of negative phenomena and camouflages them
under the cover of a range of other phenomena.
In the next two paragraphs (15–16), Tung moves on to two important
issues which figure largely in the globalisation literature: education and the
environment. The two are seen by Tung as interlinked. In an allusion to
the shift from a material to a knowledge-based economy, Tung states that
‘In the “New Economy”, we compete not on capital but on the pool of tal-
ent we have.’ But talent is not enough, according to Tung; it needs to be
retained, and this can only be done if the physical environment is attrac-
tive. Environmental measures are therefore designed not from an ecological,
health or aesthetic point of view, but for what they can do in enhancing
economic performance.
In education, using the listing device again, Tung reels off a series of
measures to improve this sector. By increasing the number of students in
post-high school institutions, Tung expects Hong Kong to be ‘on a par with
most other advanced economies’. (Incidentally, this is the second and final
mention in the extract of any people.) Education, like the environment, is
seen purely in terms of what it can do for the economy. There is no mention
either of the quality of these students. Simply by increasing the numbers
there is an expectation of improvement. Worthy of note, also, in Tung’s
statement on education is the emphasis on enhancing English standards.
English is seen as vital by the government to Hong Kong’s success as a glo-
bal player. As with education, the listing device and the use of agentive ‘we’
(also ‘I’ here) is used with the environment, further enhancing the authori-
tative nature of the presentation:
On the environment we have embarked on a number of major efforts

to improve air quality. These include conversion of diesel taxis to LPG
and the successful introduction of ultra-low sulphur diesel ... We have
also established ... We will soon be launching ... and are introducing ...
I am particularly pleased to welcome the launch of the ‘Integer Project
(emphases added).
In the final paragraph of the extract there is a range of references

to global issues. International organisations are mentioned: the World
Bank, the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement
group (NAFTA). Mathematical representation, which Fairclough (2000b)

notes, is inherent in the logic of capitalism, is used to compare economies.
Finally, to remind us that the purpose of the speech is to develop trade,
Tung encourages British companies to participate in the economic devel-
opment of Hong Kong and the region. In spite of the ostensibly narrative
and descriptive nature of the speech, like all political speeches, this is an
example of a persuasive genre.
Another feature worthy of comment in the speech is the role of modality.
There is not a great deal of the use of modal auxiliaries in the speech and
no modal adjuncts have been noted. That is not to say there is no modality,
however. Where verbs are used without modal auxiliaries, this expresses cer-
titude (Hodge and Kress, 1993) – there is no hedging. The absence of modal
adjuncts plays a similar role. The effect of this is to reinforce the assertive
and authoritative tone of the speech. In the few cases in which modals are
used, they express a high level of certitude. In paragraph 7, for example, we
have ‘We will be able to ...’ This is hedged in the next line by ‘only if ...’, it is
true; but the overall effect is one of certitude, of there being no alternative.
In paragraph 9 we have ‘... Hong Kong cannot continue ...’, again evoking
a high level of certitude. This is reinforced by ‘But we must ...’, expressing
obligation, later in the same paragraph. In paragraph 15 there is ‘we need
to do more and better’, again highly assertive; and in the single sentence of
paragraph 17 there is very strong certitude with ‘we know we will succeed’.
The only element of doubt occurs in paragraph 12: ‘If we can consolidate our
existing economic pillars and continue to build on our strengths, we should
be able to become a world city.’
11.8 Conclusion
The conclusion to this chapter will now summarise the most salient discur-
sive features of the speech from the perspective of globalisation discourse
and consider its function within the broader scheme of things. Features
which have been noted are the use of lists, both at the level of the noun
phrase and the clause; the omission of agency (by the use of nominalisa-
tion), on the one hand, and the assertion of (government) agency (through
the use of ‘we’), on the other; the use of metaphor; the use of statistics;
and the modality of certitude; in addition a one-sided picture of globalisa-
tion is presented, with negative effects omitted or downplayed.
What is the overall effect of this type of discourse? Fairclough describes
contemporary government discourse of this type as ‘technicist’:
Politics and Government become increasingly technicist – which is one

aspect of the widespread tendency to talk of ‘governance’ rather than
‘Government’. What were the ‘big issues’ which divided political ideolo-
gies are relocated, from the domain of politics to the domain of expertise,
from the domain of values to the domain of facts, from the domain of
‘ought’ to the domain of ‘is’. (Fairclough, 2000c)
Tung’s discourse could certainly be described as ‘technicist’, to use

Fairclough’s term. Tung was under particular constraints regarding the
‘big issues’ referred to by Fairclough, however. As a non-elected leader
(i.e. selected by a committee heavily influenced, directly and indirectly,
by the PRC government) of a Special Administrative Region of China, he
was bound to work within the constraints of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s
mini-constitution. As a local political analyst put it (S.K. Lau, 2001: 71),
‘... the [Hong Kong] SAR Government, by virtue of its political values and
all sorts of objective constraints, cannot satisfy the demands of the liberal
elements of society with regard to further democratisation, expansion of
human rights, and extension of personal freedom ...’. ‘The essence of the
[ruling] strategy lies in the Government’s attempt at depoliticisation in
a political environment largely beyond its control’ (S.K. Lau, 2001: 59).
Technicist discourse is an effective way of fulfilling such a policy. It is a
discourse which appeals to the business community and conservatives
(S.K. Lau, 2001), the main constituency which Tung and his government
sought to please.
The combined effect of Tung’s technicist discourse is to present an image
of a highly confident administration, capable of capitalising on the assumed
benefits of globalisation. As far as globalisation itself is concerned, however,
as already stated, its consequences are accepted as given and non-negotiable.
The omission of agency and the omission of negative consequences contrib-
ute towards this picture. It is the role of government to manage the effects
of globalisation, which, it must be assumed, are beneficial, if only because
no negative features are attributed to it; even the Asian Financial Crisis, as
noted above, is seen as a positive force for improvement. This approach,
with its emphasis on the power of the market and free trade, demonstrates
clear continuity with that of the British colonial government which had
preceded Tung and, in this respect, as with others (see Chapter 8), Tung’s
discourse is close to that of Patten (Flowerdew, 1998).
Appendix
Speech by the Hong Kong SAR chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, at the Hong
Kong Trade Development Council annual dinner in London on 30 October
2000.
1. Lord Chancellor, Peter, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, let me thank the Hong Kong Trade Development Council
for organising the dinner this evening and for bringing together such
a big gathering of distinguished guests and old friends of Hong Kong.
It is always a pleasure to be back in the UK. For me, it brings back a lot
of fond memories, going back to my student days in Liverpool. The
country has changed a lot even since my last visit three years ago. It
is full of vigour, optimism and is highly competitive. London in par-
ticular has seized on the opportunities presented by new IT develop-
ments and the globalisation of trade. Its position as a cosmopolitan
city and a world financial centre is growing stronger every day.
2. Hong Kong has gone through some momentous changes too in the
past three years. Indeed, since the handover, Hong Kong has seen two
very important achievements. The first one was the smooth estab-
lishment of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region under
Chinese sovereignty. The second was the overcoming of the Asian
Financial Turmoil, the worst economic downturn which Hong Kong
has faced in recent memory.
3. Anybody who has been to Hong Kong recently can see that, with
the strong support of the Central Government, the concept of ‘one
country, two systems’ has been transformed into an everyday reality.
Hong Kong remains as a vibrant international financial centre and a
bustling trade entrepot. The foundations upon which Hong Kong’s
success have been built – the rule of law, a level playing field for
business, clean and transparent Government, and the whole range
of freedoms with which all of us can identify, such as the freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, of movement, and
of assembly, are firmly intact and protected by the Basic Law.
4. To cope with the Asian Financial Crisis, we introduced tax cuts and
freezes or reductions in government fees and charges. We have proceeded
with massive investments in infrastructure such as roads, railways and
schools, not only as a means to stimulate the economy but also as a
way to build a better future for Hong Kong. We launched an incursion
into the financial markets to protect the integrity of our systems. It was
controversial at the time. But by now, the move has received wide inter-
national endorsement. With the recovery of the regional economy in
Asia, and the continued growth of the economy in the rest of the world,
Hong Kong’s economy is now rebounding strongly.
5. The recovery in Hong Kong has been led by increases in trade, activi-
ties in the financial markets, tourist arrivals, Government invest-
ment and consumer spending. The economy grew at double digits
in the first quarter of this year. For 2000 as a whole, we forecast our
economy will grow at 8.5%, to be followed by 4% in 2001.
6. By all accounts, we have managed the challenges we faced well.

However, while managing these challenges in the past three years,
we also continued to focus our eyes firmly on the future. Indeed,

as we move towards a new era, we are faced with three momentous
changes.
7. First, economy has become increasingly global. We will be able to

compete in the world market successfully only if we can provide a
wide range of high quality, innovative and technologically sophisti-
cated products and services.
8. Second, two decades of rapid economic growth on the mainland
have continued to narrow the gap between Hong Kong and the key
cities there. The wealth of talented people available in the mainland,
their increasing sophistication as they gain experience in dealing
with foreign businesses, and improved infrastructure developments
present us with great challenges. But we are also seeing great oppor-
tunities.
9. Third, Hong Kong cannot continue to count on a recovery led by
asset inflation. Also, some labour-intensive service industries have
followed the lead of the manufacturing sector and moved to the
mainland. These together with globalisation and the development of
the mainland’s economy, are leading to another phase of economic
restructuring for Hong Kong. Operating costs in Hong Kong have
lowered, and many firms have implemented internal restructuring to
enhance productivity. But we must develop and strengthen our advan-
tages further, turn increasingly to innovative, knowledge-intensive
economic activities, make the best use of information technology
and reduce our costs further to enhance our competitiveness.
10. To take on all these challenges, a little over two years ago I announced
the formation of a Commission for Strategic Development to help
Hong Kong formulate a long-term plan for the future. Drawing on
the advice of the Commission, we are positioning Hong Kong not
only as one of the major cities of China, but a world city in Asia,
with a status comparable to London in Europe and New York in the
Americas.
11. London and New York are cosmopolitan cities with a great depth of
talent in culture, technology and education. They are vibrant econo-
mies and possess the financial strength to serve the region and the
world in areas such as finance, trade, tourism, information and trans-
port. They are also home to numerous national and multi-national
enterprises. Their solid economic foundations have made it possible
for their residents to enjoy a relatively high average income.
12. Hong Kong already possesses many of the key features common to
London and New York. For example, we are already an international
centre of finance and a popular tourist destination, and hold leading

positions in trade and transportation, home to a host of multi-
national companies which provide services to the entire region.
These are all pillars of our economy. If we can consolidate our exist-
ing economic pillars and continue to build on our strengths, we
should be able to become a world city.
13. In addition, we enjoy a unique advantage and that is our strong link
with the mainland of China which is expected to grow economically
stronger and more important with China’s accession to WTO.
14. The Asian Financial Crisis, however, also highlighted some structural
weaknesses in our economy. We have seized on the opportunities
to tackle these weaknesses by implementing a range of reforms and
initiatives. These include the demutualisation, merger and listing of
the security and future exchanges, the establishment of the Growth
Enterprise Market (GEM) modelled on NASDAQ, and measures to
enhance the transparency and efficiency of our financial market; the
re-organisation of the provision of municipal services to enable more
efficient deployment of resources and improve quality of services;
and a range of measures to streamline and modernise the structure
and management of the civil service to enhance productivity. By
2004, civil service reform will save 5.8 billion HK dollars from our
annual recurrent expenditure. We are also vigorously promoting
innovation and technology and since last year, we have seen a mush-
rooming of start-ups in Hong Kong and the enthusiastic embracing
of IT by our community.
15. While these reforms and initiatives are producing results we know that
there are two specific areas we need to do more and better. The first
is education and the other is the environment. In the New Economy,
we compete not on capital but on the pool of talent we have. Having
talent is not enough, we need attractive living environment to retain
them. In my past two Policy Addresses, I have announced a range of
far-reaching initiatives to improve our education and our environ-
ment. On education we will improve the physical environment of
our schools, upgrade teaching standards and put more resources and
greater emphasis on enhancing the English standards of our stu-
dents. More importantly, I have set a target to increase the percentage
of high school graduates going to higher education from the present
30 per cent to 60 per cent in 10 years’ time. That will put us on par
with most other advanced economies.
16. On the environment, we have embarked on a number of major
efforts to improve our air quality. These include conversion of
diesel taxis to LPG, and the successful introduction of ultra-low
sulphur diesel. Indeed we were the first place in Asia to introduce

ultra-low sulphur diesel. We have also established a working group
and formulate a range of initiatives with Guangdong Province to
tackle cross-boundary pollution issues. We will soon be launching a
campaign to green urban Hong Kong and are introducing a new set
of design standards to encourage the construction of environmen-
tally friendly buildings. The UK is a pioneer of green and innovative
construction techniques. I am particularly pleased to welcome the
launch of the ‘Integer Project’ in Hong Kong next year. The ‘Integer
Project’ is a partnership among the UK Government, the Hong Kong
Government and private companies to show to the public and build-
ing professionals some best practice and green concepts and products
suitable for use in Hong Kong.
17. Reform in education and environment will take time, but with deter-
mination we know we will succeed.
18. Ladies and gentlemen, we have put in all these reforms and initia-
tives because we are optimistic about our future. At the dawn of the
21st Century, I see China’s economy continuing to grow strongly.
The World Bank has already predicted that China’s gross national
product, which currently ranks 7th in the world, will rise to 2nd
or 3rd place by 2020, with an enormous cumulative growth in the
interim. I also see the economy of Asia recovering from the impact of
the financial turmoil of the past two years and actively re-emerging
in size as large as that of the European Union or NAFTA. Hong Kong,
with our unique relationship with the mainland of China, and our
prime position within Asia – within five hours’ flying time of more
than 50 per cent of the world’s population – is ideally situated for
those UK companies who wish to participate actively in the growth
of the economy in the region.
12
The Discursive Construction of a
World Class City
12.1 Introduction
Following on from Chapter 11, where the theme was that of globalisation
and the SAR’s positive policy towards it, this chapter develops further the
theme of the Hong Kong government’s perpetuation of the colonial regime’s
pro-capitalist policies. It considers the SAR government’s attempt, under
Tung Chee-hwa, to develop Hong Kong as a World City. Although the con-
cept of a World City is very much a capitalist one and in this respect the SAR
government’s policy enthusiasm for the idea is in accordance with colonial
free market philosophy, the way the SAR government dealt with it, in adopt-
ing a very interventionist policy, marked a break with colonial policy, which
had always been one of ‘positive non-intervention’ (Flowerdew, 1998).
The chapter applies and develops various aspects of discourse theory,
specifically ideas from CDA, genre theory and branding. At the same time,
an attempt is made to throw some light on modern-day governance (in
Hong Kong, but also, increasingly in other jurisdictions, Fairclough, 2000c).
In relating social and discourse theory, a response is made to Fairclough’s
(2000c) call for a transdisciplinary approach to sociolinguistics, one which
takes sociolinguistic theory beyond mere categorisation and demonstrates
how such categories may be operationalised in actual empirical text-
oriented research.
Capitalism has demonstrated an ability to adapt itself to changing circum-
stances over time. In the present era, there has been a shift from a basis in
material production to a much greater emphasis on semiotic production.
The post-war economic boom from 1945 to 1973 was developed on a set of
principles involving certain relations of labour control practices, technol-
ogy, consumption and political–economic power (Harvey, 1989a). This has
given way subsequently to new systems which are characterised by a great
rate of change, flux and uncertainty (Giddens, 1990, 1999; Harvey, 1989a),
referred to by Harvey as ‘flexible accumulation’, by which he means the flex-
ible application of labour resources, products and patterns of consumption.
262
The Discursive Construction of a World Class City 263
It brings with it entirely new sectors of production, financial services,

markets and intensively faster rates of commercial, technological and
organisational innovation. This, in turn, has brought about a new round
of what Harvey calls ‘time-space compression’, in which the time taken for
the dissemination of both private and public decision-making has rapidly
lessened, due to the spread of satellite and other communication systems
and the declining cost of transport. As a result of these developments, there
has come about a much more uneven development in industrial sectors and
geographical regions.
Under such conditions, the state is now in a much more problematic posi-
tion. As Harvey puts it: ‘It [the state] is called upon to regulate the activities
of corporate capital in the national interest at the same time as it is forced,
also in the national interest, to create a “good business climate” to act as
an inducement to trans-national and global finance capital and to deter
(by means other than exchange controls) capital flight to greener and more
profitable pastures’ (p. 170). An important by-product of these developments
has been competition among cities to develop as national and/or regional
centres, to become what have come to be referred to as ‘World Cities’.
12.2 The concept of the World City
Since the inception of the World City discourse in the 1980s, much urbani-
sation and globalisation literature has developed around the concept,
conceiving different definitions of World City (or global city) and World
City paradigms in the debate. Some significant examples include the work
of Anthony King (1990), Saskia Sassen (1991, 1994), Paul Knox and Peter
Taylor (1995), Fu-chen Lo and Yue-man Yeung (1996), and the Globalisation
and World Cities (GaWC) Study Group and Network (Beaverstock et al.,
1999, 2000). The following is a range of characteristics of World Cities that
have been identified by various scholars.
According to Peter Hall (1996), probably the first to write about World
Cities, they are: usually major centres of political power, both national
governments and international organisations; the national centres of trade
with great ports and international airports; the leading banking and finance
centres of the countries in which they stand; centres of advanced profes-
sional activity such as medicine, law, higher learning, and the application
of scientific knowledge to technology; places where information is gathered
and disseminated; great centres of population; and centres for entertain-
ment and culture.
For Sassen (1994) global cities have three major characteristics, as
follows:
• they are strategic sites for the management of the global economy and
the production of the most advanced services and financial operations;
• they are key sites for the advanced services and telecommunications
facilities necessary for the implementation and management of global
economic operations; and
• they tend to concentrate the headquarters of firms, especially firms that
operate globally.
The work done by the GaWC Study Group and Network has focused upon
the use and analysis of detailed empirical data in constructing a global
urban hierarchy. The initial step in their research centred on producing an
inventory of World Cities in terms of their provision of advanced producer
or corporate services, notably the four key services of accounting, advertis-
ing, banking and law. The approach adopted is an Adamsonian approach
to taxonomy, that is to say, as much data as is available and comparable is
collected and weighed equally (Beaverstock et al., 1999).
A roster known as the ‘GaWC Inventory of World Cities’ was created as
a result of this research. World Cities were classified according to how they
scored in terms of their ‘global capacity or world-city-ness’ (Beaverstock et
al., 1999). The roster lists 55 World Cities at three levels, ordered in terms of
world city-ness, with values ranging from 1 to 12:
(A) 10 Alpha World Cities

12 – London, Paris, New York, Tokyo
10 – Chicago, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Los Angeles, Milan, Singapore
(B) 10 Beta World Cities
9 – San Francisco, Sydney, Toronto, Zurich
8 – Brussels, Madrid, Mexico City, São Paulo
7 – Moscow, Seoul
(C) 35 Gamma World Cities
6 – Amsterdam, Boston, Caracas, Dallas, Dusseldorf, Geneva,
Houston, Jakarta, Johannesburg, Melbourne, Osaka, Prague,
Santiago, Taipei, Washington
5 – Bangkok, Beijing, Montreal, Rome, Stockholm, Warsaw
4 – Atlanta, Barcelona, Berlin, Buenos Aires, Budapest, Copenhagen,
Hamburg, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Miami, Minneapolis,
Munich, Shanghai
The cities which qualified as Alpha World Cities are global service centres
in all four sectors. Beta World Cities are global service centres for at least
three of the four sectors and must be prime or major centres in at least two
sectors. Finally, Gamma World Cities are global service centres for at least
two sectors and at least one of those must be a major service provision.
Apart from the 55 cities listed, 68 other cities have been identified as hav-
ing evidence of World City formation processes but cannot be recognised as
having World City status.
Although there is wide consensus within both the academic and political
spheres that New York and London are undoubtedly the epitomes of World
Cities, the true international standing of other cities is less clear. Recent
strategic planning documents of various pre-eminent cities in the world
have adopted the phrase World City or ‘global city’ to mark their visions,
goals and objectives, or simply as a reiteration of their current position in
the world. Some examples are:
London: ‘Towards the London Plan’,

http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/strategies/sds/index.jsp
New York: ‘Preliminary Ten-Year Strategy: Fiscal Years 2002–2011’,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/pdf/typ1_03.pdf
Sydney: ‘2001–2004 City of Sydney Corporate Plan’,
http://ces.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/pdf/catz_corporate_
plan0802.pdf
Singapore: ‘Concept Plan 2001’, http://www.ura.gov.sg/concept-
plan2001/
Hong Kong: ‘Bringing the Vision to Life’,
http://www.info.gov.hk/cpu/english/evision.pdf
HK 2030, http://www.info.gov.hk/hk2030/hk2030content/
home_eng/2030_e.htm
The main body of this chapter examines how the bureaucracy develops
and controls the planning process and discursively constructs Hong Kong
as a World City. Before doing that, the theoretical and methodological
approaches employed are presented.
12.3 Theoretical and methodological preliminaries
12.3.1 CDA
This chapter, as with all of the others in this volume, applies CDA theory
and methodology. In particular this chapter involves the analysis of the
dialectical relationship between discourse and other forms of social practice.
It presupposes that discourse (which is instantiated in various forms of semi-
otic systems, including language, but also images, actions, gestures, etc.) is
an integral part of all social processes. In so far as forms of social practice
involve relations of power and that such relations are often inequitable, this
chapter is concerned with such inequalities as they are instantiated through
discourse. Individuals involved in power relations may not always be aware
of the power they wield or are subjected to; in such discourses it may be
said that language is naturalised. CDA, in this chapter, as in others in this
volume, takes on the role of identifying common-sense interpretations of
discourse and revealing any underlying inequalities. The exertion of power,
whether through language or other means, involves change. This chapter,
also, therefore, concerns itself with the relationship between discourse and
social change (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; see Chapter 1). The analytical tools
used in this chapter, as in others in this volume, are those of Halliday’s
systemic functional linguistics (SFL) (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), an
approach to grammar which, like CDA, places emphasis on the interrela-
tion between language and social context. SFL is the approach used in the
textual analysis in this chapter, although other concepts from pragmatics
are also employed.
12.3.2 Genre and genre systems

Discourse is instantiated in texts; texts can be analysed as belonging to par-
ticular genres. The term ‘genre’ goes back, in discourse studies, to Bakhtin
(1981, 1984, 1986). Genres are standardised forms of language, which,
through repeated use, develop clearly recognisable features, whether they
be at the level of subject matter, discourse structure, or linguistic forms
and structures. Genres may be more or less formulaic, depending upon the
degree to which they have been institutionalised in the society. Marriage
ceremonies, formal debates and legal contracts would be examples of the
former; casual conversation and creative writing would be examples of the
latter. A defining feature of any given genre is the communicative purpose,
or action, it performs. Genres can thus be characterised in terms of socio-
cultural process. Fairclough (1995b) identifies three main approaches to
analysis. The first approach, following Labov and Waletzky (1967), analyses
the schematic, routine, formulaic nature of genres. Fairclough associates
this with Australian systemic functional linguists (but see also Bhatia, 1993;
Swales, 1990). The second approach places more emphasis on the het-
erogeneity of genre. Fairclough cites the example of van Leeuwen (1987),
who emphasises how the different stages in a genre may be differentiated
on the basis of bundles of linguistic features. The third approach to genre
Fairclough labels ‘polyphonic’ and ‘heterogeneous’. Features representing
various stereotypical genres may be present in a given instance of a genre,
but it is not possible to demarcate them.
Since the initial interest in genre analysis, which focused on individual
genre types, attention has begun to be turned to the way genres interact
with each other as genre systems (Bazerman, 1994; Bhatia, 2004; Fairclough,
1995b). An example of a system of genres would be those surrounding a uni-
versity lecture, where associated genres might be a handout, a course book,
an examination, a tutorial, etc.
12.3.3 Intertexuality and voice

Where there are relations between genres there is intertextuality. The term
was used first by Kristeva (1981), but the notion was originally developed by
Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986). The meanings created through texts and their
linguistic formulations depend upon the meanings of other texts current in
the community. In addition, meanings can be created through the relations

with other texts that could not be made in the single text (Lemke, 1992).
Not only is there intertextuality between members of a genre system, but
a genre itself is a manifestation of intertextuality in so far as it follows the
conventions of previous examples of this particular type of text. Following
from this, any stretch of text will bear the imprint of previous texts. Bakhtin
(1981) called these imprints in sections of text ‘voices’. Voice ‘is the speaking
personality, the speaking consciousness. A voice always has a will or desire
behind it, its own timbre and overtones’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 434). Individual
texts or stretches of text, it follows, can be imbued with individual or multi-
ple voices (see also Chapter 9 on this). One way to analyse these is through
their linguistic features rather in the way that van Leeuwen (1987) analysed
the bundles of linguistic features that marked the different stages of a genre.
By studying the linguistic patterning of texts and sections of texts it is pos-
sible to reveal how they relate to their social, or ideological, contexts. This
is not to say that meanings can be read ‘directly off the text’; the analytic
process must be a hermeneutic one – a toing and froing between text and
context or action, analysis is a continual ‘shunting’, to use Halliday’s (1961)
term mentioned in Chapter 1. Because of their intertextual nature, voices
can cut across genres. The analyses that follow show how the same voices
reoccur in three very different genres, allowing the producer of these texts –
the Hong Kong government – to strongly influence how they are read.
12.3.4 Branding
An important part of Hong Kong’s strategy in developing and promoting
itself as a World City is done through the process of ‘branding’. A brand can
be defined as ‘a mixture of tangible and intangible attributes, symbolised in
a trademark, which, if properly managed, creates influence and generates
value’ (Clifton and Maughan, 2000: vii). Reference was made earlier to the
shift from material to semiotic production in the present era of capitalism.
Even where there is a material product, marketing professionals, through
the process of branding, have made the product become ‘mere filler for the
real production: the brand’ (Klein, 2000: 21). For companies such as Nike,
Apple, the Body Shop, Calvin Klein, Disney, Levi’s, Starbucks and a host of
others, the semiotic dimension of the marketing process has become more
important than the actual product on offer. A consensus has developed
among brand producers that the products that will flourish in the future
will be the ones presented ‘not as commodities: but as concepts: the brand
as experience, as lifestyle’ (Klein, 2000: 24).
It is now common practice for companies to instruct their marketers to work
around a set of pre-defined ‘core values’ with which they want their products
to be associated. Starting from a ‘brand essence’ or core ideology (Gilmore,
2001), ideas are created to develop that simple idea into a set of core values.
These ideas may involve any of the sensory perceptions – sight, sound, touch,
smell or even taste. Even where there is no visible product, core values are
important in performing the operation of ‘materialising’ the brand (Gilmore,
2001). The core values for Vodafone, for example, are as follows: dependability,
empathy, can-do attitude, innovation and joie de vivre (Gent, 2001). The core
values and the brand thus become more important than the product itself.
Even where there is no product or service, it is possible to create a brand. Pride
(2001: 173), in an article entitled ‘Wales: Can a Country Become a Brand?’,
answers his rhetorical question in the affirmative, as he describes the core val-
ues developed for the marketing of Wales as a tourist destination:
• Wales is honest, welcoming and romantic. It is a country to inspire

and revive.
• Wales holds a passion, which is drawn from a heritage of poetry and song,
legend and mystery. There is a spirituality about the natural and dramatic
beauty of the countryside. Wales is a land of nature and legend.
• Wales is atmospheric and mystical but down to earth and strong. Its
countryside has a compelling beauty.
• There is nothing trivial about the romanticism of Wales; ancient
tombs lend an air of mystery while the great Welsh castles appear part
of the solid natural Welsh landscape. Both are rich in the country’s
legend and myth.
In addition to these core values, a slogan was developed for promoting

Wales: ‘land of nature and legend’ (p. 45). While the ‘branding’ of Wales,
as described by Pride, was aimed at the tourist market, Temporal (2000) has
described how a country (in this case Britain) has been developed as a brand
for overseas marketing in another country (Malaysia). The market, in this case,
was not only tourism, but also industry and trade. As with Wales, the first step
was the establishment of a set of core brand values and a brand personality
(p. 43). The core values were: innovativeness, dependability, professionalism
and stylishness. This was followed by a logo: ‘Just between friends’.
From the above it is clear that branding is essentially concerned with dis-
cursive processes. These discursive processes, developing from the linguisti-
cally defined core values, are directed towards the creation (semiosis) of an
image or set of images, along with a logo that will define the brand. The
purpose of this semiotic process is social action, to persuade people to buy
the product or service represented by the brand.
12.4 The discursive construction of Hong Kong as

a World City
This section moves on to analysing the discursive processes and a number of

texts to illustrate how the concept of Hong Kong as a World City is discursively
constructed. Most democratic governments attempt to engage the public in the
planning process, although this, of course, can be manipulative (Fairclough,

2000c). Hong Kong, as a former colony with most of the attributes of a demo-
cratic society, including a free press, an independent judiciary, the rule of law
and a largely clean and corruption-free civil service, but with the exception
of democratic government elections,1 has always, under both the British and
as a Special Administrative Region of China, attempted to govern through a
process of consultation with the public. New legislation is usually introduced
only after a lengthy public consultation exercise. This process has been char-
acterised by Bhatia (1997) as the ‘five Cs’: conceptualisation, consultation,
consolidation, construction and communication of decision-making. These
stages are represented by Bhatia and given in Figure 12.1.
Because the Hong Kong government is not elected, policies that would
be set out in election manifestos in democratic societies are instead gener-
ated by the executive. Hence the first stage of the consultation process,
Conceptualisation
Preparatory stage
(Ad Hoc) Committee/Commission Reports/White Papers

Opinion Surveys
Documenting a plan for social change
Reviews and (Summary) Reports

Green/Consultation Papers
Consultation
Promoting plan for social change

Soliciting feedback on the plan
Consolidation
Analysing feedback from public

Reporting public opinion
Construction and Communication
Formalising decisions
Dissemination
Public information and guidance leaflet
Figure 12.1 Dynamics of decision-making (Bhatia, 1997)

the preparatory stage, is the most important. At this stage the government
either uses a committee or sets up a new one to investigate if there is a need
for a given social change. Alternatively, the government may commission
an opinion survey. The outcome of these exercises is the production of a
document for public consultation.
In the case of the plan to develop Hong Kong as a World City, the initiative
came from a committee set up in October 1997. ‘The Commission on Strategic
Development’ was announced by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in his first
annual policy speech (Hong Kong SAR Government, 1997). The Commission,
which was chaired by Tung himself, consisted of senior public and private sec-
tor representatives, with a remit to advise the government on the long-term
development needs and goals of Hong Kong. In his following policy speech
in October 1998 (Hong Kong SAR Government, 1998), Tung referred to the
Commission and the emphasis it had been putting on developing Hong Kong
as a city ‘enjoying a status similar to that of New York in America and London
in Europe’. Again, in his 1999 policy speech (Hong Kong SAR Government,
1999), he reiterated his long-term vision for Hong Kong to become one of the
top world-class cities on a par with London and New York.
The first published outcome of the work of the Commission was a report
published in February 2000, Bringing the Vision to Life: Hong Kong’s Long-
Term Development Needs and Goals (Hong Kong SAR Government, 2000). The
document emphasised the goal of developing Hong Kong as ‘Asia’s World
City’. The case of Hong Kong, in terms of branding, seems to have taken
the branding of a country (or, in this case a city) a step further than that
of Wales, in so far as its target encompasses tourism, internal investment,
exports, education, the environment, and creative and cultural activities.
These targets are represented diagrammatically in the Bringing the Vision to
Life’ document (p. 23) (Figure 12.2).
The five core values at the heart of the Brand Hong Kong programme were
stated in a press release, as follows: progressive, free, stable, opportunity and
high quality.2
The Bringing the Vision to Life report was followed in February 2001 by an
inception report, Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy (Hong Kong
SAR Government, 2001a), which further reiterated the goal of developing
Hong Kong as Asia’s World City. The final section of this report set out a
plan for public consultation concerning the work of the Commission. The
objectives of the consultation were not only to solicit views, but also to
develop awareness and consensus among the community at large. The goals
were set out in the inception report:
• to solicit views comments and suggestions and hence foster commu-

nity consensus . . .
• to instil a sense of partnership among the government and the stake-
holder groups on the preparation of Hong Kong 2030 and hence
Vision
Positioning
Hong Kong
as
ASIA’S A MAJOR
WORLD CITY IN
CITY CHINA
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Figure 12.2 Targets for Bringing the Vision to Life
promote ‘ownership’ and secure acceptance of the recommendations;

and
• to raise the awareness of the general public of the preparation of Hong
Kong 2030 and encourage public participation thereby gaining wider
recognition of the strategic planning efforts of the government.
This emphasis on awareness and consensus is in line with Bhatia’s (1997)

observation that there are two dimensions to the consultation process in Hong
Kong: ‘the first is promotion; second is consultation’ and that ‘promotion is
as important as feedback’ (p. 419). Indeed, in the documentation itself, there
is a strong element of promotion, as will be demonstrated later.
12.4.1 Genre chaining and genre colonies

The preceding section indicated a number of texts and genres that work
together in the discursive construction of Hong Kong as a World City.
In so far as these documents are presented in a sequential order, they
may be said to correspond to what Fairclough (2000c: 174) has referred
to as ‘generic chains’, i.e. ‘the regular sequential ordering of different
genres’. In addition to these genres, the Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision
and Strategy document lists a whole range of other genres relating to the
consultation process. These include public forums and exhibitions, focus
group discussions, presentations to statutory and advisory bodies, a web-
site, consultation documents, information leaflets and ‘other publicity
materials’ including consultation digests, information leaflets and videos.

Furthermore, ‘after receiving the public comments, consultation reports
highlighting our responses to the public views will be prepared and
issued’, the document states. It is not clear whether these genres are
all planned to be produced in a strict sequential process and can thus
be referred to as a generic chain. Perhaps Bhatia’s (2004) term, ‘genre
colony’, in which clustering of related genres occurs in the performance
of a given social practice, but not in a strict sequential order, might be
more appropriate. Nevertheless, there is a general direction in which
these genres serve first to generate the ideas, then to present them to the
public for feedback, before action is taken. In the following analysis, three
texts representing different genres are analysed to illustrate how they are
used in the process of public policy-making and how their deployment
is designed to win over the public as much as, if not more than, elicit
informed criticism.3 The analysis will emphasise the concept of ‘voice’, as
outlined earlier, supported by concepts from systemic functional linguis-
tics and pragmatics.
12.5 Text 1: Stage 1 public consultation
The first text to be analysed is a public consultation booklet (also available

on the government website) (Appendix 12.1). This text overtly foregrounds
an interpersonal voice, by beginning with three questions which immedi-
ately draw readers into the text. Although notice also in the first clause the
voice of promotion, with the epithets ‘most vibrant’ and ‘dynamic’ and the
presupposition of the final clause that Hong Kong is a good place in which
to live and work, with the question ‘Will Hong Kong be an even better place
in which to live and work?’ (emphasis added).
This interactive, participatory voice alternates, however, with the
voice of authority, with the language of telling, rather than asking. The
sentences in paragraphs 2–5, for example, are all declarative, statements
of fact. This voice of authority is reinforced by the use of numbers: ‘last
year, 4.5 million residents crossed the boundary on 97.1 million trips’
(note 97.1 million, not just 97 million); ‘The population of Hong Kong
has been increasing by about one million people in the past decade.’
Authority is further reinforced by the use of modal verbs expressing a
high degree of certitude: ‘many changes will take place’; ‘we need to con-
sider future changes in our population’; ‘Hong Kong needs an up-to-date
physical planning framework ...’. The interpersonal voice is not totally
neglected, however, with the introduction of the reader into the text and
the planning process with the expression ‘... we need to consider future
changes in our population.’, although even here there is also a modal
of high certitude, ‘need’, and it is not clear if ‘we’ and ‘our’ refer to the
people in general or the authors of the booklet, the government. At the

same time, paragraph 3 also has a promotional dimension. Hong Kong is
described as ‘the most popular destination in Asia’. The port is ‘one of the
busiest in the world’.
With paragraphs 6–11 the interpersonal returns firmly. Thus, on the
interpersonal level, we have repeated emphasis on participation: ‘... every
Hong Kong resident will have an opportunity to participate’; ‘By taking the
community’s views, expectations and aspirations into consideration ...’; ‘HK
2030 will involve widespread public consultation ...’; ‘There will be a consul-
tation report issued and a specific call for community views ...’; ‘Everyone’s
voice will be heard’ (subheading); ‘We call on every citizen ...’; ‘Future gen-
erations will thank you ...’.
But notice also the authoritative nature of the language mixed with the
interpersonal. This is achieved primarily by the use of the modality of high
certitude and the modal verb ‘will’: ‘... every Hong Kong resident will ..’; ‘...
this study will ...’; ‘The study ... will update ...’; ‘HK 2030 will involve ...’;
‘These components will be linked ...’; ‘There will be a consultation report ...’;
‘The comments received will then help ...’; ‘This will ensure ...’. Note also
the modal pre-modifier ‘best possible’. At the same time as creating an
authoritative tone, the use of the emphatic ‘will’ also introduces a sense of
urgency. This urgency is supported by the section heading, ‘The future starts
now’, the expression ‘... starting now’, and the exhortative ‘We call on every
citizen ...’. This is also the ‘voice’ of promotion, not in the sense of ‘selling’
the product, but as a call to action.
In the main body of the booklet, between the introduction and con-
clusion, the predominant voice is that of authority. The various sections
provide information in an impersonal way, with the repeated use of intro-
ductory statements such as ‘Here the study will aim to ...; ‘In this area the
study will ...’; ‘HK 2030 will ...’; ‘This ... will involve studying ...’; ‘Here, the
study will focus on ...’; ‘In this important area, HK 2030 will …’. None of
these statements involves an agent; in only one introductory statement do
we find one – ‘To build a better environment we need to ...’ – but even here
there is ambiguity as to whether ‘we’ is inclusive and refers to the reader-
ship and the government or exclusive and refers just to the government;
and whichever of these it is, the statement is still prescriptive, with the
modal of obligation, ‘we need to’. Indeed, the whole tone is prescriptive.
Although the government is ostensibly seeking the views of the public,
the scope of possible suggestions is prescribed in the way the main body
of the document is structured as a blueprint for the areas that will be cov-
ered. The field is set out by the government and the public are therefore
placed in the subject position of being restricted to these areas. As Bargiela-
Chiappini (n.d.: 5) puts it, we have a case of ‘depersonalisation through
the effacement of agency, embedded in a style purporting objectivity and
factuality, which has the effect of suggesting consensus, and therefore

discouraging dissent’.
The final two sections of the booklet very much stress the need for partici-
pation. The penultimate section, entitled ‘A focused approach’, begins with
the statement that ‘HK 2030 will use a focused approach aimed at broaden-
ing our vision by incorporating a regional perspective, greater flexibility,
and responsiveness to public opinions (emphasis added)’. The first element of
the approach is described as follows:
Public views will form an important base for HK 2030. In all four stages of
the study, members of the public will be kept aware of progress and given
a wide variety of opportunities to contribute feedback, through public
forums and debates, through the media, questionnaires, at exhibitions
and roadshows and via the Internet.
Public participation is emphasised in describing each of the working stages

of the project, [emphasis added]:
Stage I: Publication of this booklet, presenting the proposed approach,

planning objectives and key study areas to be examined. In addition, a pub-
lic forum will be held in February 2001, details of which are on the following
page. A publicity campaign will also be launched to generate widespread
awareness of the aims of HK 2030 and the public consultation stages.
Stage II: Examination of the key issues which materialise from Stage I.
Again, the public will be invited to comment and offer suggestions relating to
this examination and the evaluation criteria for assessing various scenarios and
options to be formulated in the next stage.
Stage III: Once the issues have been defined, various scenarios and
options will be formulated and evaluated. The public will be encouraged to
participate in this evaluation exercise.
Stage IV: The final stage will be the formulation of development strategies
and response plans. Members of the public will be invited to comment on the
HK 2030 recommendations before the document is finalised.
The final section of the booklet is entitled, ‘We welcome your views’. As
would be expected with such a title, there is again a heavy emphasis on the
interpersonal voice and public participation.
Every member of the community will be affected by some aspects of this

study. It will cater for the young and old, for entrepreneurs, planners and
developers; and for the workforce as a whole ...
As part of Stage I, the Planning Department is seeking public views on the

proposed approach, planning objectives and key study areas outlined in
this publication. The first public forum will be held on: ...
(The session will be in English and Chinese, with simultaneous transla-

tion provided.) In the meantime, everyone is invited to download and
fill out the feedback form, or make additional written comments to high-
light what we, as a community, consider important in preparing the new
development strategy.
Echoing the three questions at the beginning of the document, three ques-
tions addressed to the public occur again at the end:
Are there any other aspects that should be considered under the various
key study areas to be examined?
How should we ensure improved air quality in the future?
How can transportation links be improved to facilitate travel to the

mainland?
In a final conclusion, there is one last exhortation to readers to submit their

comments, which will be ‘invaluable’.
Your views and comments will be invaluable. Please forward your

comments to:
In this text, then, which is a booklet addressed to the general public,

three main voices are prominent. There is the interpersonal voice, which
seeks to win the support and cooperation of the public. This is what one
would anticipate in a booklet designed to canvas public opinion. However,
this voice only occurs in the first and final two sections. This interpersonal
voice is supported at the beginning by a promotional voice, extolling the
virtues of Hong Kong. The purpose of this promotional voice would seem
to be to support the interpersonal voice, in encouraging the public to
respond in a positive fashion. After this introduction, this voice falls silent.
Stronger than either the interpersonal or the promotional voices, how-
ever, is the voice of authority. This voice demonstrates to the public the
knowledge and authority of the government. It is dominant in the main
body of the document, but is also co-present with the interpersonal voice
of the introduction and final two sections. Even in a document ostensibly
seeking to involve the public, the voice of authority, the government, is
dominant.
12.6 Text 2: Hong Kong 2000
In addition to his two policy speeches and numerous other public speeches
in which Tung made reference to the notion of Hong Kong as Asia’s World
City, an interesting text occurs in the Hong Kong 2000 Yearbook (Hong
Kong SAR Government, 2001b). The Hong Kong Yearbook is a publication
of the Hong Kong SAR Government Information Department which aims
to provide, on an annual basis, the sort of basic information that anyone
interested in Hong Kong might find useful. For example, it begins with a
chronology of important events in the previous year. This is followed by
chapters on topics such as Hong Kong’s constitution, legal system, economy,
health, social welfare, transport, public order, travel and tourism, and even
history. A large number of appendices contain facts and figures on issues
ranging from the number of beds available in public hospitals to the bal-
ance of payments account, from the number of people unemployed to the
amount of inward investment according to country of origin.
In the 2000 edition, the first chapter was signed by Chief Executive Tung
himself, with the title of ‘Hong Kong: Asia’s World City’.4 The chapter,
which is just over 5 pages long (2744 words), is an upbeat account of Hong
Kong’s position as a World City, an outline of ‘The remarkable attributes that
provide a firm base for positioning the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region as a World City’, in the words of the editorial foreword to the chapter.
From the outset, therefore, readers are aware that this is a promotional text.
It fits into the ‘dissemination’ phase of Bhatia’s model of the Hong Kong
government policy decision-making process. However, what is remarkable is
that this text was produced before any public consultation had taken place.
The promotional voice of this text is manifested first of all in terms of its
argumentation strategy, which consists of ostensibly descriptive sections
setting out Hong Kong’s advantages as a World City. These are distributed
under the following section headings: International Financial and Trading
Centre, Synergy with the Mainland, China’s Accession to the World Trade
Organisation, Pearl River Delta and Asia’s World City: Future Prospects. The
first six paragraphs of this text will be analysed (Appendix 12.2).
The first paragraph contains a politeness strategy for those readers who
are from Hong Kong and, in describing the Hong Kong people in a positive
light, is promotional for readers from outside the SAR – Hong Kong workers
are adaptable. Noticeable also in this paragraph is how Tung first insinuates
himself into the text with the pronoun ‘I’, but then integrates himself with
the Hong Kong people with ‘our’ and ‘we’.
The second paragraph can be broken down into two distinct sections. In
the first of these there is a reference to the problems presented by the Asian
financial crisis and the mission of implementing the new political system.
Hong Kong is presented as the recipient of these problems. This is reported
in the simple past tense. There is then a switch to the present perfect tense,
demonstrating the new situation (present perfect tense describing a present

situation with antecedents in the past) and Hong Kong’s present potential,
as demonstrated through its past actions. The voice here is authoritative:
Hong Kong has been fully capable of overcoming great challenges.
In the third paragraph, we find a description of Hong Kong’s present
positive situation. By the use of paratactic clause relations (i.e. the clauses
are related to each other by juxtaposition rather than explicit subordina-
tion or coordination), the description is presented as a list. Because all
of the statements are positive and factual, the overall effect is one of
authority. Each of the members of the list serves to promote Hong Kong
and its economy, supporting the opening clause, or hypertheme (Halliday
and Martin, 1993; Martin, 1992), ‘Hong Kong’s economy has recovered’.
The relation between the clauses is very simple; indeed many of them
could be presented in a different sequence, without disturbing the mean-
ing. What is important, however, is to accumulate a number of positive
features, to present what Fairclough (2000b) refers to as ‘a range of evi-
dences’ rather than ‘explanations, causes and effects’. The authoritative
voice is supported also by the large number of figures referred to: ‘more
than 13 million visitors’, ‘a 15 per cent increase’, ‘the number of regional
headquarters ... increased from 2,500 to 3,000’, ‘a remarkable 20 per cent
increase’, ‘Hong Kong received more than US$64 billion in foreign direct
investment’, ‘... over 50 per cent of FDI into the mainland has been chan-
nelled through Hong Kong’. These figures are reeled off without putting
them into any sort of context that would allow an objective assessment of
their significance.
The opening sentence of the fourth paragraph, ‘Hong Kong is back on
track’, serves to sum up what has preceded it. The appeal here is to emo-
tion as much as, if not more than, logic. However, in the final sentence,
beginning with the contrastive ‘[b]ut’, there is at least an admission that
economic recovery will take some time.
In the fifth paragraph, Tung brings in outside voices to support the author-
ity of his positive image of Hong Kong, although just who these voices are
is not specified.5 They are referred to as ‘perceptions of Hong Kong inter-
nationally’ and ‘part of our review on international perceptions of Hong
Kong’. What these external voices have to say, not surprisingly, is positive.
‘HKSAR is considered to be innovative, up-to-date, dynamic, intelligent,
energetic, prestigious and distinctive.’ These epithets, are in fact ‘core val-
ues’ collected or developed by a public relations consultancy commissioned
by the Commission on Strategic Development. Note again here how, just as
the syntax of paragraph 4, with its use of parataxis, created a list, the jux-
taposition of the string of epithets here in the fifth paragraph has a similar
effect, one of the piling up of positive attributes. The appeal is again to feel-
ing rather than logic. In this paragraph also there are references to the need
for ‘positive change’. ‘While heartened by these views of the community we
are creating, we recognise that perceptions must be constantly reinforced by

positive change. Hong Kong is all about positive change.’ Positive change
is a characteristic feature of the discourse of globalisation and the so-called
new public management (Salskov-Iverson et al., 2000).
Whereas in his opening paragraph, Tung had stated that ‘we have created
Asia’s World City’, in the sixth paragraph he refers to ‘[O]ur aspiration’
(emphasis added) to put Hong Kong in the league of ‘World Cities like
London and New York’. There is thus a certain ambiguity here as to whether
Hong Kong is already a World City or simply has aspirations to be one. This
ambiguity runs right through the Hong Kong government discourse on
Hong Kong as a World City. On the one hand, the government wants to
promote it to outsiders as already having such a status; on the other hand,
it wants to identify areas which can be developed to fully comply with the
various criteria found in the literature on World Cities. For this reason, in
this paragraph, Tung first lists a string of attributes that apply to World
Cities and which, he claims, Hong Kong already has. He does this by again
using parataxis, both at the level of the clause and of the noun phrase,
thereby providing a voice of authority. In the last sentence of the paragraph,
however, instead of the additive parataxis which he has used up until now,
he introduces a contrastive clause, ‘We do, however, recognise that we have
to advance further in improving the quality of life … ’ (emphasis added),
thus acknowledging that improvements are needed.
This text, then, is overtly promotional in nature, extolling the virtues of
Hong Kong as a World City and its further potential. Coming, as stated ear-
lier, before public consultation, the text supports Bhatia’s contention that in
Hong Kong ‘promotion’ comes before ‘consultation’ and is more important
than feedback. One is tempted to believe that the Hong Kong government
has already decided that Hong Kong will become a World City, and this text,
read largely by a foreign audience, is aimed at promoting it as such, prima-
rily to this international audience.
12.7 Text 3: Gateways and Portals – a promotional video
The third text selected for analysis is a video produced to promote the con-
cept of Hong Kong as ‘Asia’s World City’, both to the outside world and the
local Hong Kong population. It was presented for the first time at a meeting
of international business people organised as the ‘Fortune Global Forum’ on
10 May 2001. The video was titled Gateways and Portals. Later videos were
made to highlight each of the core values identified in the branding proc-
ess. Each is untitled, but labelled on the government website as: ‘free’, ‘high
quality’, ‘opportunity’, ‘progressive’ and ‘stable’. The ‘Gateways and Portals’
video can be seen as attempting to incorporate all of these five values.
As a video, it is an example of a multi-modal text, involving spoken
text, visuals and music. The video is extremely fast-moving and presents
Hong Kong as a very dynamic city, highlighting many of the aspects of a

World City, as described in earlier sections of this chapter. The overwhelm-
ing voice of this text is promotional, although the semiotic devices used
to create this voice belong to the world of advertising and public relations
rather than government bureaucracy, as was the case in the two preceding
texts. Appendix 12.3 sets out the words and visuals.
To begin with the words, the text has many of the features of advertis-
ing language. There is much use of parallel structures. This parallelism is
reflected in the way the text is physically set out on the government website
(see Appendix 12.3). Examples of such parallelism are as follows:
Where global is local.

Where distant is present.
Where many are one.
The pace quickens.

Horizons expand.
Potential abounds.
These are just two from many examples. In fact just about every sentence
is paralleled with one or more others. The text is based on the metaphor of
Hong Kong as a gateway or portal. Note the polysemy of this word ‘portal’ –
as a doorway to a great building and its more contemporary use as the entry
point to a system of websites. This latter meaning, of course, fits in with the
theme of globalisation, which runs right through the text, with lines like
‘where global is local’; ‘where distant is present’; ‘we are open to the world,
open to the future’; and ‘in such a place, the world feels at home’, ‘innova-
tion is the new capital’, ‘talent the new machinery’, ‘information the new
currency’. Allied with this theme of globalisation is that of East meets West,
with the lines ‘where ancient wisdom meets the new millennium’, ‘[w]hen
East truly meets West’, and
A hub for Asia

A gateway to China
...
Hong Kong: Asia’s World City
The themes of globalisation and East meets West are reflected in the
visual dimension of the video. According to Stuart Hall (1996b: 600),
‘[d]iscontinuity, fragmentation, rupture, and dislocation’ are seen as a
common thread of readings of the nature of change in the postmodern
world of writers such as Giddens, Harvey and Laclau. Such a descrip-
tion could be applied to the frenetic nature of the video, with the very
rapid cutting from one image to the next and the simultaneous restless
movement of the camera during many of the shots. Turner (1994: 134)
writes about how ‘[s]kilful [film] editors can use the timing of their cuts
either to enhance the energy of the action, or to slow it down’; clearly we
have the former here. As Graddol (1994) writes, the camera provides ‘the
all-seeing narrative voice’. However, the narrative dimension, in the tradi-
tional sense of the word, is minimal here; at the beginning of the video we
see a young woman and a little girl passing through the gateway, or portal
(to Hong Kong in the new millennium) and towards the end this scene is
repeated. In between there is a rapid series of different shots of aspects of
Hong Kong life. Thus the main body of the video consists of shots of vari-
ous aspects of Hong Kong that could make it a World City. The images are
extremely numerous, but some can be mentioned here (see Appendix 12.3
for a complete list). There are images representing business activity, with
an emphasis on the use of technology such as computers and mobile
phones; media production technology; trade (the container port); vibrant
night life (neon signs); a modern transport system (the underground rail
system); the high-speed railway that links the centre of Hong Kong to the
new airport; the airport itself; the rule of law (lawyers in wigs and gowns,
the Legislative Council and its statue of Justice); a free press (a collage of
the logos of local and international print media); education (students
celebrating their graduation); global links (the chief executive meeting
Mickey Mouse [Hong Kong had an agreement for a Disneyland to be
built there]); and modern architecture (scenes of skyscrapers and other
modern buildings). The video culminates with the gradual appearance
of the visual symbol of the Brand Hong Kong, a stylised dragon on the
left side of which can be deciphered the words HONG KONG in English
and Chinese. This final image coincides with the final line ‘Hong Kong:
Asia’s World City’. Thus the logo and trademark coincide to conclude the
presentation.
Turning now to the soundtrack of the video, music is used as an intrinsic
part of the presentation as a whole. Frith (1986, cited in Turner 1994) sees
film music as assisting in the construction of the reality of time and place
and also as creating mood or atmosphere. It certainly fulfils these functions
here. At the very beginning of the video there is traditional Chinese music,
which then develops into a modern Western rhythm; these two tempi and
styles alternate throughout the video, emphasising the theme of East meets
West and globalisation, on the one hand, and the fast pace of Hong Kong
city life, on the other. Frith (cited in Turner, 1994) has pointed out how
the music in the film Zorba the Greek is responsible for much of the film’s
Greekness. Similarly, in the Gateways and Portals video, the contrast between
traditional Chinese music and modern Western music emphasises the
theme of East meets West and globalisation.
In terms of voice, the video Gateways and Portals is clearly promotional,
therefore. It can be seen as the manifestation of the ‘materialisation of the
brand’ referred to earlier. The text, images and sound combine to create one
unified voice in this text, that of promotion.
Within the context of the whole process, therefore, one might see the
video as the culmination. However, it was produced before the consultation
process had been concluded. It must be remembered, therefore, that, as
noted earlier, the objectives of the consultation are not only to solicit views,
but also – one might say more importantly – even, ‘to develop awareness
and consensus among the community at large’ and ‘to instill a sense of part-
nership among the Government and the stakeholder groups on the prepara-
tion of HK 2030 and hence promote “ownership” and secure acceptance of
the recommendations’ (Hong Kong SAR Government, 2001a). It is for this
reason that this video was shown on local television, as well as internation-
ally. The video thus serves two purposes: to promote the concept of Hong
Kong as Asia’s World City to the local population, while at the same time
persuading the international audience (and multinational companies with
operations – actual or potential – in Hong Kong) of the merits of Hong Kong
as a place to visit and invest.
12.8 Discussion
At the beginning of this chapter, it was stated that the chapter would dem-
onstrate how the bureaucracy develops and controls the planning process
in its discursive construction of Hong Kong as a World City. This has been
done through the analysis of three key texts. These texts are related inter-
textually in so far as they all focus on the same theme and have similar
goals – the promotion of Hong Kong as a World City. Logically, governance
by consultation should create a chain of texts or genres. The consultation
document should be followed by a consultation report and the promotional
texts should follow these, taking into account the feedback from the consul-
tation. However, in this case, the promotional texts precede the completion
of the consultation (the consultation report, although undated [Hong Kong
SAR Government, undated], lists submissions continuing right up to August
2001, while the two promotional texts analysed in this chapter were both
produced well before this).
It should be noted in this respect that the audiences for the promotional
texts seem not only to be the people of Hong Kong, but also an international
audience of potential visitors and investors. Instead of a genre chain, with
each link responding to the contents of its predecessor, what there is is a
genre colony, a number of genres related intertextually, but not in any logi-
cal sequence. This is possible, because the concept of Hong Kong as a World
City and its core values were developed before feedback was collected in the
formal consultation (the core values were in fact developed by a public rela-
tions company, based on its own research). This is consistent with branding
theory, which emphasises the importance of winning the support and belief
of employees in promoting the brand in addition to its promotion in the

market, what Gilmore (2001) refers to as ‘getting the inside on side’. This is
not to say that no use was made of the consultation feedback. It may well
have fed into later developments in the Hong Kong Brand campaign. But
even here, the feedback taken up is selective. The Stage 1 Consultation Report
(Hong Kong SAR Government, undated) is a comprehensive document, list-
ing all comments and responses received, accompanied by the government’s
reaction. However, it is notable, for example, that comments to the effect
that to be a World City Hong Kong needs to develop its constitutional
arrangements and strengthen its democratic institutions are rejected, on the
grounds that they are outside the remit of the consultation (e.g. pp. 37, 40).
12.9 Conclusion
This chapter has described and analysed the attempt by the government to
promote Hong Kong as a World City. In doing so, various aspects of discourse
theory, specifically ideas from critical discourse analysis, genre analysis and
branding have been applied. The emphasis has been on how the Hong Kong
government, through its discourse, controlled the consultation process. This
has been done primarily through the analysis of three key texts, showing
how the various voices in these texts, which are controlled by the govern-
ment, can cut across very different genres and impose the government’s view
on the reader/viewer. Thus textual analysis, grounded in the political situa-
tion, has revealed the manipulative nature of the consultation process. In
this, the SAR government is no different from its colonial predecessors.
On a broader level, the chapter has emphasised again the eagerness of the
Hong Kong SAR government to embrace globalisation and again, in com-
mon with the previous colonial regime, its essentially capitalist and free
market credentials, this in spite of a more interventionist approach, under
Tung, than that of the previous colonial regime.
Appendix 12.1 Hong Kong government public consultation

booklet
1. Hong Kong is one of the most vibrant and dynamic cities in the world,
but have you ever envisaged what Hong Kong will be like in 30 years’ time?
Will there be a clean and healthy environment for our next generation? Will
Hong Kong be an even better place in which to live and work?
2. Many changes will take place in a span of 30 years. In fact, rapid changes
are already occurring in Hong Kong. For example, there has been an increase
in cross-boundary activities. Almost three in every five Hong Kong residents
make frequent trips to the mainland. Last year, 4.5 million residents crossed
the boundary on 97.1 million trips, made mainly for business and holidays.
3. Adding to this passenger traffic, Hong Kong receives 11 million visitors a

year, making it the most popular destination in Asia. The port is one of the
busiest in the world.
4. Above all, we need to consider future changes in our population. The
population of Hong Kong has been increasing by about 1 million people in
the past decade, and this increase is likely to continue.
5. To accommodate these and other changes, Hong Kong needs an up-to-
date physical planning framework to guide development and to ensure the
efficient use of resources.
6. In formulating this new planning framework, starting now, every Hong
Kong resident will have an opportunity to participate in determining this
city’s land use, transport features and environment for the next 30 years.
By taking the community’s views, expectations and aspirations into consid-
eration, this study will become the best possible roadmap for insuring the
future lifestyle of Hong Kong citizens.
7. The study, entitled Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy ‘HK
2030’ will update and extend the Territorial Development Strategy, which
was last approved by the Executive Council in 1998.
8. HK 2030 will involve widespread public consultation, divided into
four stages, over the next two years. These components will be linked to
the four key stages of the study – identifying planning objectives and key
issues; examining the key issues and evaluative criteria; formulating scenarios
and options; and formulating development strategies and response plans.
9. There will be a consultation report issued and a specific call for commu-
nity views at each of the four study stages. Now is the Stage One public con-
sultation, which emphasises on planning objectives and key study areas.
10. The comments received will then help to guide the formulation of plan-
ning strategies for the following stages.
Everyone’s voice will be heard

11. We call on every citizen to take this opportunity to have a say in shap-
ing tomorrow’s Hong Kong. This will ensure our vibrant, living city is a
place that future generations will thank you for.
Appendix 12.2
Extract from Tung, C. H. (2000) Hong Kong: Asia’s World City. In

Government Information Service (pp.1–6) Hong Kong 2000. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
1. One of the many reasons I am proud to call Hong Kong home is our
people. The ability of Hong Kong people to turn adversity into opportunity
has proven time and again that we are able to reinvent ourselves when faced
with challenge. In the process, we have created ‘Asia’s World City’ and an
important centre for global business.
2. When the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997, bringing about one of the
worst recessions in memory, it was a difficult time for all. The economic
downturn, coupled with the mission of implementing ‘one country, two
systems’, presented Hong Kong with an unprecedented new challenge. In
the last four years, Hong Kong has not only proven that our unique form of
constitutional government is effective and our commitment to the rule of
law is strong, we have gone a step further. We have shown the world that we
can prosper as a Special Administrative Region of China and can continue to
serve as the international business hub for the Asia-Pacific region.
3. Hong Kong’s economy has recovered. Growth has resumed and unem-
ployment has come down from a peak of 6.4 per cent. We are also welcom-
ing increasing numbers of visitors from around the globe. In 2000, there
were more than 13 million visitors, a 15 per cent increase over arrivals
in 1999. The number of regional headquarters and offices established by
multinational corporations in Hong Kong increased from 2500 to 3000, a
remarkable 20 per cent increase over 1999. Foreign investment is also on
the rise with Hong Kong at the centre of much of the investment for Asia.
During 2000, Hong Kong received more than US$64 billion in foreign direct
investment (FDI). And since China opened its doors to the world in 1978,
over 50 per cent of FDI into the mainland has been channelled through
Hong Kong.
4. Hong Kong is back on track. As an externally oriented economy, we will
always be susceptible to the fortunes of our major trading partners such as
Japan and the United States. But the economic restructuring has started, and
it will take some time to complete.
5. Perceptions of Hong Kong internationally are keeping pace with our
economic development. Recent research carried out as part of our review on
international perceptions of Hong Kong establishes that the HKSAR is con-
sidered to be innovative, up-to-date, dynamic, intelligent, energetic, prestig-
ious and distinctive. While heartened by these views of the community we
are creating, we recognise that perceptions must be constantly reinforced by
positive change. Hong Kong is all about positive change.
Appendix 12.3 Video script – Gateways and Portals with

corresponding images
Words Images
There was a time, when gateways Large old-style Chinese memorial archway with
separated the known from the the words “弘傳不朽”
unknown. Image dissolves, a big red gate appears.
To pass through was to cross the Doors open, a woman and a girl (both dressed in
boundary between nature and red and white), holding hands, pass through the
civilisation. gate. Camera moves up, shows the sign of “正門”
(main entrance).
To pass through was to change Scene dissolves into a modern scene, with the
your destiny forever. woman and the girl holding hands, standing in
front of a pair of glass doors. The background
is the Fragrant Harbour. The doors open, the
woman and the girl enter from the verandah.
We have crossed the threshold Sequence of shots (27 shots in 20 seconds)
to a world where ancient wisdom portraying prosperity and vibrancy of Hong Kong
meets the new millennium. with images such as:
– The Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition
Centre
– City skyline of Hong Kong
– Commuters traveling on various types of public
transport moving in fast forward speed
– A sea of people on escalators inside an MTR
station
– Landing and take-off of planes
– Close-up of MTR train
– Bird’s-eye view of Ching Ma/Ting Kau Bridge
– Extreme close-up of fingers typing on a
computer keyboard
– A man, standing beside a busy pedestrian
crossing with people moving in fast forward
speed, is talking on his mobile phone
– Business meetings around conference tables
– Four youths with different ethnic background
chatting with each other
– Businessmen shaking hands
– Two men talking in front of an architectural
model
– Dynamic activities at the Container Terminal,
with trucks moving very fast, two men
convening, bird’s eye view of cargo ships
– Extreme close-up of a pen signing on a piece of
paper
(continued)
Appendix 12.3 Continued

Words Images
– Night scene of cars moving very fast along two

bridges
– Busy street scenes of Causeway Bay with neon
signs lighted up at night
Where global is local. Montage of more than 20 neon signs of
prominent international brands, popping up
sporadically with night scene of Victoria Harbour
as background.
A man checks the time on his watch. Then shots
of about eight white-collar workers from different
angles, exiting an office building one by one
through the same spinning glass door.
Where distant is present. Train moving very fast along railway track from
the driver’s point of view.
Where the many are one. White-collar workers walking on a pedestrian
crossing, shot from a low angle.
Shot of escalators inside a shopping centre, peo-
ple moving in fast forward speed.
The pace quickens. Bird’s-eye view of cars running along roads.
Horizons expand. Aerial view of the harbour of Hong Kong from
the point of view of the pilot, camera zooms into
the harbour.
Potential abounds. Shots of financial skyscrapers from a low angle.
Today, we have created the Sequence of fast computer graphic construction
perfect portal for innovation. images of buildings such as a sport stadium.
Graphic image of the interior of a cyber city (?).
For flashes of inspiration. Close-up shot of people working in front of com-
Glimpses of enlightenment. puter screens.
We create new worlds to explore. Sequence of shots on media production, such
And dispatch our thoughts to the as the filming of a Chinese martial art film,
four winds. and graphic display of kung fu actions on a
computer screen.
Extreme close-up of a fingertip touching a
computer screen.
The flags of China and HKSAR fluttering.
Scene dissolves to reveal long shot of the HK
Handover Ceremony.
We are open to the world, open Two barristers talking to each other as they walk
to the future. out from the Court of the Final Appeal.
Five youths wearing graduation gowns chatting
as they walk down a staircase.
(continued)

Words Images
Medium shot of Antony Leung and Donald Tsang

shaking hands, with Tung Chee-hwa in the mid-
dle, his hands on their shoulders, while the press
is taking photos.
Innovation is the new capital. Bird’s-eye view of Ching Ma Bridge.
Night scene of the HK Convention and
Exhibition Centre.
Camera shooting from outside, shot moves
upward along a transparent lift of a building.
Talent the new machinery. People working in front of computers and a large
TV screen, from the POV of a fish tank.
Information the new currency. Shots of people working and holding meetings
around conference tables. Then close-up shots of
people working in front of computer screens.
Computer graphic image of an office.
Aerial view of three large satellite dishes situated
on a coast.
All is seamless. Transparent. People working in front of TV screens in a studio.
Filming of a TV programme inside a studio.
A white-collar man is on an ascending escalator
inside a skyscraper. His body turns clockwise as
he gazes at the ceiling of the building.
A woman talks with three colleagues in her
office, then walks towards the window, gazes
out. Camera follows her gaze to reveal the
Legislative Council Building. Then shots of the
Blind Justice Statue on the top of the Legislative
Building from different angles.
Shot of a Legislative Council meeting, legislators
bow as someone enters the room.
Collage of logos of local and international
printed press.
When East truly meets West, Tung Chee-hwa shakes hands with Mickey Mouse
inside Government House, camera flashlights
flashing. Minnie Mouse, Anson Chan Fang
On-sang, Tung Chee-hwa, Walt Disney Attractions
chairman Judson Green, and Mickey Mouse stand
in one line while the press take photos.
when the best minds meet and A white-collar woman enters a room in an office,
join forces, a new kind of place shakes hands with two men. The three sit down
comes into being. for a meeting.
(continued)

Words Images
Where success is expected. A man walks towards a machine and answers the
phone. Long shot of a pair of escalators inside a
building.
Where success is applauded. Five university graduates in gowns throw their
mortarboards up into the air.
Where success can be savored. White-collar workers sitting down, talking to
each other.
Aerial view of the night scene of Tsim Sha Tsui,
traffic moving in fast forward speed.
The goal remains the same. Two trains operating on tracks at night, running
in opposite directions, with buildings in the
background.
Low angle shot from the ground of four skyscrap-
ers at night, a large full moon moves in quick
speed behind the roofs of the buildings.
To strive. To create. To say to our Sequence of quick shots, birds-eye view of rice
posterity: ‘This have I achieved.’ fields, pastoral plains and a bridge that stretches
across the sea.
In such a place, the world feels Long shot of a ship sailing, camera zooms in as
at home. the screen dissolves to show an extreme long
shot of the ship sailing right under Ching Ma
Bridge.
A flock of white birds flying towards the direc-
tion of the camera. Image dissolves.
Such a place is Hong Kong. Aerial view of the Peak Tower appears, shot flies
over to reveal a clearer picture of Hong Kong’s
skyline and harbour.
A hub for Asia. Image dissolves, a big red gate appears. Repeats
A gateway to China. the scene of the red gate from the beginning of
A portal to your future. the video: doors open, the same woman and girl,
holding hands, pass through the gate. Camera
moves up, passes the sign of ‘正門’ (main
entrance), scene dissolves into a white screen as
it reaches the sky.
Hong Kong: Asia’s world city. The Brand Hong Kong visual identity of the
dragon takes shape, the words of ‘HONG KONG’
appear on the left of the dragon.
Conclusion
13
Conclusion
13.1 The main findings of the study
The case studies presented in this book have highlighted various approaches
to the discursive construction of Hong Kong and its evolving political iden-
tity, beginning in 1992 and ending in 2004, seven years after the pivotal
1997 change of sovereignty.
In Part I, the analysis focused on what was labelled the discourse of colo-
nial withdrawal, a coherent discourse presented on behalf of the British
government by one charismatic leader, Chris Patten, a discourse which pro-
jected a rather British identity for Hong Kong in the lead-up to the change
of sovereignty. The three chapters in this part considered, in Chapter 2, the
discursive construction of Patten’s myth concerning Britain’s legacy to Hong
Kong; in Chapter 3, the rhetorical strategies used by Patten to promote his
myth; and, in Chapter 4, Patten’s use of discourse in a public meeting to
persuade the Hong Kong people to support his democratic agenda.
Part II, which straddled the handover in terms of the time period covered,
considered Hong Kong political discourse from an intercultural perspective.
Chapter 5 analysed the (conflictive) dialogue between Patten and representa-
tives of the PRC government in terms of a Chinese model of face. Chapter
6 contrasted two competing political discourses: a Utilitarian political dis-
course influenced by the West characterising the pro-democracy camp, on
the one hand, and a Confucianist political discourse, associated with tra-
ditional Chinese culture characterising the pro-Beijing camp, on the other.
Chapter 7 again contrasted Confucianist and Utilitarian discourses, this time
in the use of metaphors in discursively constructing the ideal Hong Kong
‘patriot’ in two newspapers in the post-handover period, one pro-Beijing and
the other pro-democracy.
In Part III, which covered the first seven years of the post-handover
period, a more mixed picture was presented of the discursive construction
of Hong Kong’s identity. In Chapter 8, the discourse of the first Hong Kong
SAR chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was analysed in a similar way to that
291
of Patten in Chapter 2 of Part I. Tung’s discourse, which exhibited a high

degree of intertextuality with Patten’s discourse, sought to maintain certain
of the values presented by Patten, but also introduced a more Chinese/
Confucianist element favourable to the new sovereign, Beijing. Chapter 9
focused on a history museum discourse, a discourse which tried to present
a balanced history of Hong Kong acceptable to both the pro-Beijing and the
pro-democracy camps. Chapter 10 turned the focus on to a news discourse
which constructed a negative discriminatory stance towards mainlanders,
highlighting the Othering strategies employed in discursively construct-
ing Hong Kong and its people. Chapter 11 showed how the post-handover
Hong Kong government discursively constructed itself as pro-globalisation.
Finally, Chapter 12 analysed a discourse which constructed Hong Kong as a
world class city. These last two chapters showed how the pro-capitalist poli-
cies of the colonial regime continued into the post-colonial period.
Considering the three parts of the book in relation to each other, the
following can be stated with regard to the Hong Kong identities projected
in each one. In Part I, the focus was on Chris Patten’s discourse, which
projected a Hong Kong identity built on the free market economy, the rule
of law, the freedom of the individual and democracy. Part II highlighted
competing discourses, emphasising an essentially Chinese/Confucian iden-
tity, on the one hand, versus a more Western-influenced Utilitarian identity,
on the other. In Part III there were two major elements at play in terms of
a desired identity. On the one hand, there was promotion of Hong Kong
as an essentially capitalist city. This discourse is fundamentally supported
by most parties up to the present day, whether they are pro-Beijing or
pro-democracy. On the other hand, there was the discursive struggle again
between Utilitarian and Confucian discourses, the former discourse being
characteristic of the pro-democracy forces and the latter characterising the
pro-Beijing camp. This economic consensus, on the one hand, set against
politico-cultural disagreement, on the other, might be interpreted in terms
of a dichotomy applied by Wodak et al. (1999) in the analysis of Austrian
national identity: that of Kulturnation and Staatsnation. In the context of
Hong Kong, Kulturnation is associated with consensus on the capitalist
cultural economic model and Staatsnation with disagreement concerning
autonomy and democracy.
In general terms, this study has shown how discourses have changed in
some respects during the period of transition, but in other areas have been
maintained. Specifically, with regard to political issues, official discourse
has come more in line with the ideology of mainland China. On the other
hand, concerning economic issues, the official position has remained
relatively constant, in line with Hong Kong’s continuing position as an
international centre for trade and finance. In terms of discourse theory
and method, the study has demonstrated the value of a longitudinal histo-
riographical approach, both in terms of the contribution that it can make
Conclusion 293
to discourse theory and in terms of the role that discourse can play in
developing an understanding of real-world issues and in historiography.
It has also demonstrated the possibility of a multi-method approach in
a long-term study, involving ethnography, textual pragmatics, rhetorical
analysis, cognitive linguistics, genre analysis, systemic functional linguistics
and corpus linguistics.
13.2 Theoretical contribution of the volume
The studies in each chapter of this book have worked with the fundamental
assumption that sociopolitical identity is constructed through discourse.
The studies have been created within a tripartite theoretical framework, as
presented in Chapter 1, incorporating CDA, historiography and identity.
The following sections of this concluding chapter will review the contribu-
tion of the volume in relation to each of these theoretical constructs.
13.2.1 Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

As stated in Chapter 1, CDA has the power to help in understanding real-
world issues, on the one hand, and to provide insights for discourse theory,
on the other. This volume has demonstrated the truth of this claim in its
analysis of the discourse surrounding Hong Kong’s change of sovereignty
and its evolving political identity.
CDA consists in a critical socially informed linguistic deconstruction,
description and interpretation of its chosen field of analysis. Each of the
chapters of the main body of this volume has been presented as a case study
of how CDA may be applied in this way to an ongoing historical process
located in one historical and geographical moment.
CDA identifies discursive strategies and linguistic devices used to articu-
late ideologies and beliefs and their associated practices. This study has
identified a host of such strategies and devices (see summary at the end of
Chapter 1).
CDA shows how discourse ‘constitutes situations, objects of knowledge,
and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of
people’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). Every chapter in this volume
has demonstrated this to be the case.
The study has also confirmed CDA’s claim that discourse is concerned
with power, this being the case because power relations may be discursively
constructed. CDA is interested in both institutional aspects of power, such
as who has the right to speak and under what conditions, but also discursive
strategies employed by groups or individuals to persuade or coerce subjects.
In the present volume, both aspects of this were seen in Chapter 4, for exam-
ple, where Chris Patten, because of his institutional position, was able to
dominate the proceedings of the ‘Question time’ meeting, on the one hand,
and where he deployed a whole range of strategies designed to persuade the
Hong Kong public to his point of view, on the other. This was seen again,
in Chapter 10, which showed how the leading Hong Kong English language
newspaper, South China Morning Post, because of its institutional position,
was able to set the discriminatory agenda on attitudes towards mainland
immigrants by directing a whole range of negative discursive strategies
directed towards these immigrants. In another later chapter (Chapter 12),
it was the post-handover Hong Kong government which, by virtue of its
institutional power, was able to set the agenda concerning Hong Kong’s role
in globalisation, doing this by means of a very different range of discursive
strategies from that of the South China Morning Post with the mainland
immigrants. In all of these cases, and others in this volume, these strategies
can be seen as the application of language power, and, as such, they can be
viewed as manipulative.
The study has demonstrated CDA’s claim that discursive players may
strive to create discursive hegemony, how they seek to dominate through
discursive means and naturalise their view of the world (Fairclough, 1992,
2003). This applies to those chapters just cited in relation to discourse and
power, and to others; for example, it is very clear in Chapter 6, where the
Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses are seen in hegemonic competition
in various extracts from public discourse. In all of the chapters in the study,
the discursive players have been seen to be projecting an identity onto sub-
jects as belonging to an autonomous community and expressing a single
identity and political culture (Smith, 2002), as noted in Chapter 1.
The study has also shown how CDA can integrate the historical and
social background into the analysis. An understanding of the historical
background has allowed a critical reading, for example, of Patten’s discursive
construction of Britain’s legacy to Hong Kong (especially Chapter 2). An
understanding of the historical background, of course, is also essential to a
critical reading of the history museum exhibition analysed in Chapter 9. An
understanding of the sociopolitical and economic situation of Hong Kong is
furthermore essential to an understanding of what is going on discursively
in Chapters 11 and 12, where Hong Kong’s identity as a globalised economic
hub is at issue. Similarly, knowledge of Hong Kong as an immigrant com-
munity which has developed its own identity distinct from that of the main-
land is fundamental to an understanding of the discriminatory discourse
practices directed against mainland immigrants analysed in Chapter 10.
CDA has been accused of bias. Readers need to be the judges as to whether
this applies to the present volume. However, some issues presented in an
earlier paper (Flowerdew, 1999) may be rehearsed here.
First of all, a social constructivist perspective on reality stresses how reality
is constructed through discourse. If this is the case, then discursive construc-
tions are open to diverse interpretations. There is no one ‘best’ reading of
any given discourse, or indeed utterance. The studies in this volume are
presented in this spirit.
Conclusion 295
Second, bias implies preconceived interpretation. However, this is to

ignore the reflexive nature of discourse and social context and the dialecti-
cal relation between the two in analysis in CDA. Analysis of language is
grounded in a study of the social context and analysis of the social context
takes account of its discursive construction. Interpretation may be adjusted,
as the shunting (Halliday, 1961) from one level to the other takes place. So,
the conclusion that Chris Patten was manipulative in his use of language
in the ‘Question time’ meeting of Chapter 4, for example, is not just based
on analysis of the language, but involves an understanding of the historical
context of the meeting in question.
If there is no one ‘best’ reading – and, as just indicated, CDA is open
to multiple readings – how does one choose which is the ‘best’ reading?
The answer to this question is that one does not. One needs to accept
multiple perspectives and that there are limits as to how far impartiality
can be taken. The following well-known quotation by Mao Zedong based
on a classical Chinese poem and referred to in the history exhibition
chapter (Chapter 8) is particularly apposite in this context. Mao said:
‘Letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought con-
tend is the policy for promoting progress in the arts and the sciences and
a flourishing socialist culture in our land.’1 Having said that, the studies
in the main body of this book incorporate triangulation of one sort or
another. All of the studies, for example, involve a dialectical focus on both
text and context, context including both the immediate extralinguistic
context (facilitated by ethnographic participant observation) and of the
historical context (based on historical sources). In addition, the book
applies triangulation of methods, involving various approaches to text
analysis, participant observation, interviews with participants and corpus
techniques.
If one is to accept multiple readings, however, some are likely to be more
plausible than others. There are systematic (although not one-to-one)
relations between language form and function. A principle of plausibility,
therefore, needs to be applied in interpreting CDA accounts. In this regard,
it is worth noting that the various chapters in this volume have all been
subject to peer review (and benefited from reviewers’ comments) when they
were published in their original form.
Finally, it has to be accepted that CDA is subject to the same limitations
of linguistic communication as any other discipline. Communication
is imprecise. It involves inferential processes derived from context. This is
the point emphasised by those subscribing to the linguistic turn in
historiography, as reviewed in Chapter 1. As in Chapter 1 again, where
limitations were put on this linguistic view, the same applies here. As lin-
guists, readers of this book will be well aware of the pragmatic properties
of rhetoric. They are fully able to apply their critical faculties and evaluate
its merits and demerits.
13.2.2 History and discourse

In the introduction chapter to this volume, a number of observations were
made about historical writing. Some of these observation can be grouped
together and summarised in the following list:
• It is historians who create history, not the events, situations or processes

which are used by historians as their raw material (Ankersmit, 1994,
2001; White, 1973, 1987, 1989; Jenkins, 1991, 2003).
• History does not follow an inevitable progression, but may develop by
chance and be influenced by power and interest (Foucault, 1970, 1978,
1988, 1991).
• Historical writing may to a certain degree be considered as a historical
trope and different versions of history may be preferred according to
one’s life experience (Ankersmit, 1994, 2001; White, 1973, 1987, 1989).
• History is layered and filtered down to the public at large by other play-
ers, such as teachers, journalists and politicians (Mitten, 1992).
• What happens in the past influences what happens in the present and
the future (Marwick, 2010).
All of these observations have become evident in the various chapters of this
volume. It is very clear, for example, that Chris Patten and Tung Chee-hwa
filtered down rather different perceptions of Hong Kong’s past to the Hong
Kong public. Patten, in his discourse, stressed the continuity that he wanted
to see from past to present to future (Chapters 2 and 3 especially), in order to
inculcate and perpetuate British values into Hong Kong society and identity.
Change, on the other hand, is clearest in the discourse of Tung Chee-hwa
(Chapter 8), who wanted to maintain a large part of the ideological legacy
of the British (see Chapters 11 and 12, with their emphasis on free market
economics), but at the same time a concern to adapt the historical under-
pinnings to correspond to a more Chinese/Confucianist reading of the past
which would carry over into the future. The museum curator, in Chapter 9,
juggled with perceptions of Hong Kong’s past, trying to balance interpreta-
tions of history coming from both ‘the left’ and ‘the right’.
Another observation in Chapter 1 with regard to history was the
following:
• Collective memory, like history, is a process that is situated in the present

and that uses fragments of the past to create a narrative that will be used
in the future (Achugar, 2008).
To take the examples of Patten and Tung again, with regard to this
notion of collective memory, these two players both manipulated Hong
Kong’s collective memory to suit their particular political agendas. Patten
wanted to remember positive aspects of Britain’s past in Hong Kong and
Conclusion 297
forget negative ones. This is most striking in his discourse on democratic

development, where Britain’s negative role in this area is unvoiced, leaving
Patten free to orchestrate constitutional reform. Tung, by way of contrast,
wanted to hold on to what he considered to be positive aspects of the colo-
nial experience, while rejecting what he considered to be negative ones,
most crucially in the field of democratic development. At the same time, he
wanted to be free to discursively construct the new Chinese/Confucianist
Hong Kong identity.
Considering collective memory in relation to other chapters in this book,
the curator of the history exhibition, in Chapter 9, in contrast to Patten
and Tung, tried to present a balanced view of Hong Kong’s history, while
the editors of Ta Kung Pao, in the metaphor chapter (Chapter 7), manipu-
lated memory to fit in with their conceptualisation of the ideal Hong Kong
‘patriot’, discursively constructing Hong Kong people as essentially ‘Chinese’
like their compatriots on the mainland, while in reality most Hong Kong
people, although ethnically Chinese, have created for themselves a rather
unique Hong Kong identity.
Two further observations on history in the introductory chapter were as
follows:
• History has to be learned and this learning comes from historians.

• Historians have taught the world a lot about historical processes, events
and situations.
This volume has again demonstrated the truth of these observations. For this
reason, while accepting the limitations of history enumerated in the first
list, this volume can be considered a small contribution, from a discourse
perspective, to the historiography of Hong Kong’s change of sovereignty.
The volume aims to help in the understanding of this historic transition:
to view the past from the perspective of the present and with an eye to the
future of Hong Kong.
A further group of observations on historiography from the introductory
chapter can be set out as follows:
• There is a role for the (critical) discourse analyst in deconstructing the

language used to purvey historical knowledge.
• A historiographical approach to (critical) discourse analysis will seek
to reveal the hidden assumptions in received and naturalised histori-
cal accounts, with a particular emphasis on the language used in their
elaboration.
• A historiographical approach to CDA may consider discourses as they are
developed synchronically and create critical first readings of discourses as
they are produced over time.
• A diachronic analysis allows for an understanding of what changes over

time and what stays the same.
• Discourses of or about history and the past are central to ongoing proc-
esses of reconciliation and understanding.
The greatest claim of the present volume is with regard to this set of observa-
tions. In each case study chapter, a particular discourse has been examined
from a critical perspective, seeking to reveal its ‘hidden assumptions’ and
its particular discursive strategies. The synchronic perspective, starting with
the beginning of Chris Patten’s governorship, leading up to the reversion
and following through to the post-reversion period of Tung Chee-hwa’s
chief executiveship, has provided a sense of how political discourse in Hong
Kong developed over time; of how discourses clashed; of what changed and
what remained more or less the same. At the same time, it is hoped that
this volume will, in a modest way – in helping to understand what went on
in discourse terms in Hong Kong’s transitional process – facilitate mutual
understanding.
Considering now the particular critical discourse analytic perspective of
the volume for studying discourse and historical development, this can be
considered with regard to Fairclough’s four conditions for studying discourse
and social change (Fairclough, 1992: 8–9), which were again presented in
the introductory chapter. These four conditions for studying discourse and
social change can be listed again as follows:
• It [such a study] should be multidimensional, capable of showing relations

between discursive change, social change and properties of texts.
• It should be multifunctional, showing how changing discourse practices
contribute to changes in knowledge, in social relations and in social
identities; the method of analysis should allow for the interplay of these
three.
• It should be a method for historical analysis. It should focus upon ‘articu-
latory’ processes in the structuring of texts and in the longer-term struc-
turing of the ‘orders of discourse’.
• It should be critical. Critical means showing how meanings may be hid-
den and at the same time demonstrating how there may be resistance
to discursive and social change and how this may also be indexed in
discourse and text.
A reading of the chapters of this volume should have made clear that
these conditions have been fulfilled. Not only have these chapters shown
how discourse has evolved in Hong Kong, but also how different dis-
courses (in particular, what have been labelled Utilitarian and Confucian
discourses) have come into conflict and been involved in a hegemonic
struggle.
Conclusion 299
Finally, another point about history was made in Chapter 1, with reference
to Wodak (2001: 72) and her study of the Waldheim affair, as follows:
• It was possible to follow the genesis and transformation of arguments,

the recontextualization throughout different and important public
spaces resulting from the social interests of the participants and their
power relations.
Again, these attributes of a historical approach to CDA have been fulfilled

in the present volume.
13.2.3 Identity
As has been already stated, the case studies in this book have all worked
with the fundamental assumption that sociopolitical identity is constructed
through discourse. Identities, however, are always in competition with each
other and may only be partially inculcated, not inculcated at all, or even
actively resisted (as by the questioner who walked out of Patten’s ‘Question
time’ meeting in Chapter 4, or the newspaper, Apple Daily, which resisted
the metaphors of Ta Kung Pao in Chapter 7). Unlike Wodak et al.’s (1999)
study of Austrian national identity, which brought together both public
and (semi-) private discourses (through focus groups), this book has been
limited to public discourses (except where interviews were involved). The
private discourses of the Hong Kong people have not been included. To
what extent the public discourses analysed in this book may have been
inculcated (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002) and to what extent their crea-
tors may have been successful in projecting their discourses onto subjects
(Kress, 1989) is a moot point. A partial view is to be expected, however, even
if private voices had been included. As Wodak et al. (1999: 186) have put
it: ‘We have … assumed that there is no such thing as one national identity
in an essentialist sense but rather that different identities are discursively
constructed according to context. …’
One important contextual variable in discursive identity construction
is that of time. Tung’s discourse contrasts with Patten’s partly because it
was created in a different time period. The discourse of globalisation con-
structed in Chapters 11 and 12 would not have been possible in the early
colonial period, before Hong Kong’s economic transformation in the 1980s
and 1990s. As has been seen, discursive change over time can be captured
through the notion of intertextuality (see, for example, the similarities and
differences in Patten and Tung’s discourse in Chapter 8). In spite of this par-
tial (and often conflictive) picture arising from the case studies, it is hoped
that, taken together, they have presented at least some of the major forces
contributing towards Hong Kong’s political identity, however evanescent
that might be.
One thing that can certainly be said about the picture of Hong Kong
political identity presented in this book is the important role played by
the Other. The Other pervades all of the identity construction that goes
on in the various case studies. For Chris Patten and the British, for exam-
ple, the Other was mainland China. Discrimination against mainlanders
(Chapter 10) is another clear example of the discursive creation of a nega-
tive Other. In the metaphors chapter (Chapter 7), the Hong Kong ‘patriot’
is set against ‘foreign’ Others in general and the British colonial regime
and the pro-democracy camp in particular. Even where there is an attempt
to bring discourses together, there is nevertheless tension. Tung Chee-hwa
(Chapter 8) tried to reconcile Western and Chinese values, but nevertheless
brought them into contrast. He wanted less politics, but in doing so he set
up an opposition between his preferred authoritarian ‘Confucian’ politics to
an open democratic one. In the history exhibition (Chapter 9), the curator
tried to balance opposing forces, but again there was the inevitable dichot-
omy between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy perspectives.
Another feature of identity construction identified in Chapter 1 is identi-
ty’s imbrication with power and resistance. Patten’s discursive construction
of identity for Hong Kong was so prominent by virtue of his political posi-
tion, on the one hand (he always had the right to speak in any forum he
chose and he had the government communications machine at his disposal),
and his individual language power (his rhetorical skill), as clearly shown in
all of the chapters devoted to him, on the other. This was perhaps most
clearly shown in the analysis of the public meeting in Chapter 4, where, in
spite of his claim that the meeting was a case study of democratic discourse,
Patten nevertheless held sway over the other participants, the audience, due
to a range of features under his control, including his choice of English as
the main language of the meeting, his control of the floor, and his superior
rhetorical skill. Resistance was also present in this meeting, although largely
ineffective. A more effective example of resistance, as already mentioned,
was in the Apple Daily newspaper’s opposition to the metaphors of its com-
petitor Ta Kung Pao in Chapter 7.
Narrative is a further feature of identity in many of the chapters in this
book. Patten’s narrative of the British legacy to Hong Kong, of course, stands
out. Various narratives are also very prominent in the history museum chap-
ter in Hong Kong identity creation. The chapter on Hong Kong as a world
class city presents an extremely complex narrative of Hong Kong’s identity,
with a plethora of images juxtaposed with each other.
The iconic status of certain historical events is another feature of discur-
sive identity construction mentioned in Chapter 1. Of course, 1997 pervades
all of the chapters in this book; 1989 and Tiananmen are present in some of
Patten’s discourse and they can be seen to underpin the counter-discourse
of Apple Daily in Chapter 7.
Conclusion 301
A final feature of identity construction mentioned in Chapter 1 is that of

its relation to collective memory. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, collective
memory is discursively constructed in line with national myths and these
myths take on a positive or negative load. Chapter 2 elaborated the myth
that Chris Patten tried to project onto Hong Kong and Chapter 8 showed
how Tung Chee-hwa adapted this myth to his own ends. Similarly, a myth
about Hong Kong’s globalised identity is projected in Chapters 11 and 12
and a myth about the Hong Kong ‘patriot’ is constructed in Chapter 7 by
a pro-Beijing newspaper. A more negative myth is created in Chapter 10 by
another Hong Kong newspaper, where negative features of mainland immi-
grants are stereotyped.
13.3 Concluding comment
Each reading of a discourse is a new one; each analysis has the potential to
provide new understanding and insight on what happened at a given his-
torical moment in a given discourse. This volume is thus but one reading
of Hong Kong public discourse during the transitional period from British
to Chinese sovereignty and of Hong Kong’s evolving political identity. The
approach has been a critical one, seeking to reveal the manipulative nature
of the discourses analysed. This should not be allowed to colour the overall
significance of the retrocession, however. Britain’s departure from most of
its former colonies was problematic and often tainted with violence. Hong
Kong’s decolonisation process, on the other hand, was entirely peaceful and a
thriving community passed from one sovereign nation to another. Any neg-
ative aspects of the handover thus pale into insignificance when compared
to the value that Deng Xiaoping’s concept of ‘one country, two systems’ had
in resolving what the Chinese government refers to as the ‘Hong Kong issue’
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). In the words of the PRC Foreign Ministry,
as cited in the preface of this volume, Deng’s formula allowed Britain and
China ‘to resolve the Hong Kong issue’; it represented ‘an important step
forward in the cause of China’s reunification’; and it made ‘a contribution to
world peace and stability’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). This is a good
positive note on which to conclude this volume.
Notes
1 Background on Hong Kong and Theoretical Framework

1. For a detailed account of the recent history of Hong Kong see Flowerdew (1998).
For earlier history see e.g. Tsang (2004) and Welsh (1997). For basic facts about
Hong Kong and an official view see the annual Hong Kong Yearbooks (http://www.
yearbook.gov.hk/).
2. ‘The Waldheim affair’ is described succinctly in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Kurt_Waldheim
3. Achugar (2008: 25), following Foucault (1982), defines discursive formation as
follows:
The term discursive formation comes from Foucault (1982) and refers to a systematic
ordering of relationships of meaning (statements) and discursive practices that
shape a group of social meanings. This term implies a coexistence, that is to say a
series of meanings (statements) that exist in a certain manner. A selection of mean-
ings (statements) that are transmitted, preserved, and valued at the institutional
level is assumed.
This notion is applied in the present volume, in particular, with regard to Chris
Patten (Chapter 2) and Tung Chee–hwa (Chapter 8).
4. In the latest survey, at the time of writing, the breakdown was as follows:
42 per cent Hong Kong people, 26 per cent Hong Kong Chinese and 22 per cent
Chinese (DeGolyer et al., 2010).
2 The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal

1. In interviews with Patten and his personal adviser, both men emphasised how
they were conscious of the historic nature of Patten’s governorship and both
said that they believed that the history of the British Empire would be viewed
‘through the prism of Hong Kong’ (Flowerdew, 1997c, undated).
2. There is some empirical support available for this idea of naturalisation in the
social psychology literature. Krugman (1972), for example, argues that subjects
pass through three stages for an advertisement to have its desired effect. These
are a ‘What is it?’ stage, a ‘What of it?’ stage and a ‘Reminder’ stage, with the
‘Reminder’ stage marking the beginning of disengagement, or acceptance (see
Severin and Tankard, 1992, for review).
3. Secret negotiations took place between the two governments as a result of the
Tiananmen Square incident in China in 1989. The events of Tiananmen had
created a loss of confidence in the Joint Declaration on the part of the Hong
Kong public. Britain, therefore, argued for greater democracy, to restore confi-
dence, while China, worried by support for the Tiananmen demonstrators in
Hong Kong, became less accommodating (see Flowerdew, 1997b).
4. Public meeting, ‘Question Time with the Governor’, 8 October 1992, City Hall,
Hong Kong. See Chapter 4 for detailed analysis of this meeting.
302
Notes 303
5. Most of the features identified here are also present in the 1992 speech, as cited
earlier. Space precludes an analysis of both extracts. The purpose of citing both
the 1992 and the 1995 speeches is to show the recurrence of the myth through-
out Patten’s discourse, an important aspect as far as naturalisation is concerned.
6. As demonstrated by a brief account in the conclusion to this chapter.
7. There is considerable literature on the politics of pronouns (see Brown and
Gilman, 1960; Johnson, 1994; Seidel, 1975; Wilson, 1990).
8. An important technique in the data analysis in this chapter is the use of word
frequency lists and keyword in context (kwic) concordances (Sinclair, 1987,
1991). As Morrison and Love (1996) note, computer-assisted text analysis does
not seem to have been incorporated in any major way into methodologies of
CDA (although this is changing). This is most surprising, as word frequency lists
and concordancing allow a researcher to conduct a systematic analysis of key
linguistic and semantic concepts within a corpus. Such techniques are particu-
larly valuable where large corpora are concerned, as in the present study, as they
allow the researcher to quickly discover to what extent a given feature occurs
across the whole or a large part of the corpus. In the present study, for example,
a reading of Patten’s first major policy speech showed it to be organised around
the key concepts of the free market economy, individualism, the rule of law and
democracy. The concordancer was quickly able to show that these key concepts
occurred consistently right through Patten’s governorship, and not just in his first
major policy speech. Another application of the frequency list and concordances
is in discovering the major semantic fields of the corpus and the items clustering
within these fields. In the present study, for example, economy was identified as
a very high-frequency item. The frequency list and keyword in context output
allowed the identification of other words, e.g. choice, freedom, virtue, benefit, etc.,
clustering in this semantic field. In addition to this broad survey-type approach,
the concordances also allow the researcher to examine in detail the linguistic
environment within which given items occur. It was Firth (1957) who stated
that we know the meaning of a word ‘by the company it keeps’. By looking at
large numbers of instances of given words or phrases in context the researcher
is able to establish the typical patterns they are used in and hence their typical
pragmatic, as well as semantic, meanings. In the present study, for example,
the concordances allowed the researcher to discover that the word economy was
invariably used in a positive and dynamic context and that the verbs which
typically collocated with it also carried a dynamic semantic component in their
meaning. Concordancing techniques are also used in Chapter 8 of this volume.
Since this study was originally conducted there have been further attempts to
combine CDA with corpus techniques (see e.g. Baker et al. 2008; Fairclough
2000a).
9. Downing and Locke (1992: 114) define the term ‘agent’, or actor, as ‘any entity
that is capable of operating on itself or others, usually to bring about some change
in the location or properties of itself or others. Typical agents are human.’
10. Thibault (1991: 284) characterises deverbal nouns as ‘a reified nominalised proc-
ess which takes on the semantic qualities of a participant’.
11. Notice how these contrastive items create an implied negative image of China.
12. In example 5, the human element is introduced by means of the metaphor
‘guardian angel’. In example 7, it is the attribute of rule of law, ‘role’, which
introduces the personal element. In example 9, as in 5, the human element is
introduced via the metaphor ‘glue’, which joins people together.
304 Notes
13. In this extract and the previous one, the use of presupposition, expressing the axi-
omatic nature of Patten’s claims, as discussed in the earlier section of the chapter,
is notable. The authority of Patten’s statements is conveyed through the use of
high probability modality (is and will) and the so-called present simple tense used
in its function of expressing ‘universal truths’.
14. In Patten’s discourse, there was little evidence of any sort of critical evaluation
of his ‘bedrock principles’ of this sort. It was up to the Chinese to develop an
alternative view. Certainly, the Chinese position on Hong Kong is radically dif-
ferent from that of Patten. For the Chinese, Hong Kong was seized by Britain
following Chinese defeat in the so-called First Opium War and the forced signing
of ‘unequal’ treaties.
15. Interview, ATV World, Newsline, 27 October 1996.
3 Rhetorical Strategies and Identity Politics in the Discourse

of Colonial Withdrawal
1. The question of the role of translation is an important one in the case of Patten.
Although he may have gone over the heads of the majority of the Hong Kong
public in his use of high-flown rhetoric, he still managed to effectively commu-
nicate with the Hong Kong public, even through a translator.
2. See Cockroft and Cockroft (1992) for a succinct overview of the classical tropes.
3. The dramatic unities are dealt with by Aristotle in his Poetics, not his Rhetoric,
where he deals with the other rhetorical figures discussed in this chapter. The
‘Rhetoric’ and the ‘Poetics’ are closely related, however, and the unities can be
considered as rhetorical figures.
4. Sometimes the beginning was the period before Patten’s arrival, the middle his
governorship and the end his departure.
5. This is again in the Poetics rather than the Rhetoric.
6. The hyphen between the two clauses is in the official transcript.
7. Personal interview with Kerry McGlynn, governor’s spokesperson, and Edward
Llewelyn, governor’s personal adviser, Government House, Hong Kong, 26 January
1996 (Flowerdew, undated).
8. During the period in question, although Chinese citizens were not officially
allowed to immigrate to Hong Kong, the government operated a ‘touch base’
policy; that is to say anyone managing to enter Hong Kong would be allowed to
stay. There are many stories of people swimming considerable distances to get to
Hong Kong to escape from China. It is images such as these that Patten would
probably have provoked in the imagination of many listening to this segment of
his speech.
9. It is significant in this context that two of the four speeches analysed in this chapter
were presented in the neoclassical Hong Kong Legislative Council building.
4 Discourse and Social Change in a Public Meeting

1. According to previous agreements, 20 of the 60 Legislative Council seats were
to be elected by popular franchise. Patten added 9 seats, representing broadly
defined ‘functional constituencies’ (defined by occupation); and he extended the
right to vote in the other 21 more narrowly defined functional constituencies.
The remaining 10 seats were elected by an ‘electoral college’ made up of elected
Notes 305
District Board members. This meant that all seats were now elected, although the
representativeness of electorates varied considerably. In many cases, people had
two votes: one in their functional constituency, according to their occupation,
and another in their directly elected constituency, according to where they live
(Hong Kong Government, 1992).
2. See e.g. Kwan (1994), Smith (1994) and Fong (1995) on Patten’s skill as a
communicator.
3. There are unfortunately no figures available for previous governors with which to
compare Patten. The fact that opinion polls relating to the personal standing of
the governor and his policies have only been instigated since the arrival of Patten
is another indication of the emphasis Patten put on accountability.
4. Patten’s 1992 policy address (Hong Kong Government, 1992) is where this
commitment is formally stated for the first time.
5. Time magazine, with its usual hyperbole, described the lead-up to the elections as
follows:
In the past few amazing weeks, interest and participation have surged in a
sphere that never before concerned the Hong Kong people: politics. Famously
apathetic about local elections – there weren’t many, and the results were
largely meaningless – Hong Kong is suddenly alive with public debate and
civic concern ... In Hong Kong’s narrow, neon-lit, urban caverns, a lusty little
democracy is aborning. A canny, articulate and startlingly responsible-talking
political class has emerged from law offices, newsrooms, brokerage firms
and family businesses to lead a sophisticated public debate on the issue that
concerns all: how to deal with China. That is the first surprise. The second is
the support being shown these neo-politicos – many with accents acquired at
Oxford and Stanford – by members of the factory and clerk class who finally
see a chance to seize their future.
The result is an almost new Hong Kong, taking on politics as it took on fresh
industries and economic competitors in the past. ‘We were never given the chance
to participate,’ says Suen Leung, a 65-year-old retired taxi driver who turned up to
query candidates at one of the many public forums held across the territory. ‘Now
we have the chance, and we’re going to go for it’ (Spaeth, 1995: 27).
6. Writing in the South China Morning Post, Yeung (1995b) said:
For the first time in colonial history, the administration is faced with a most
unpredictable LEGCO (Legislative Council], which is the price Mr Patten has
been, and is, ready to pay for his adventurous strides towards wider democracy.
A more assertive LEGCO could pose a greater challenge to the authority of the
executive-led government at a time when the territory enters its most sensitive
phase before the handover of sovereignty to China.
7. It is interesting to note that, as more legislators were elected to the Legislative

Council, as opposed to appointed (and therefore became more accountable to the
electorate), nearly all of them have now chosen to use Cantonese.
8. There is no way of knowing the balance of the two kinds of monolinguals and
bilinguals in the audience. However, on the basis of the laughter and applause,
these were more often in response to the Cantonese versions of questions
and answers (whether they were originally in Cantonese or a translation into
306 Notes
English). Laughter and applause were also longer in response to Cantonese.

Of the questions, seven were asked in Cantonese, as against four in English.
9. Mise en abyme can also be found in certain public discourse genres, especially where
there is a didactic or promotional purpose involved. Television advertisements are
a promotional genre which often exploit this textual structure. A typical example
would be an advertisement for soap powder in which, embedded within the overt
promotion of the product, would be an interaction between two homemakers who
use the soap powder. The discourse of the embedded interaction will highlight the
merits of the product – merits which will be more overtly promoted in the seg-
ments of the advertisement coming before and after the interaction.
In ‘Question time’, Patten’s use of mise en abyme has both a didactic and a
promotional function. The didactic function is in demonstrating to the people of
Hong Kong how democratic discourse operates. The promotional function is in
demonstrating – to Hong Kong people, to the international press, and especially
to China – that Hong Kong people are sophisticated enough to participate in
such discourse.
10. The reference to turn-taking is Sacks et al. (1974) and Schenkein (1978).
Fairclough (1992) notes that turn-taking is not always built around equal rights
and obligations.
11. Although no statistics are available for meetings comparable with ‘Question
time’ – in relation to, say, political interviews – one might have expected the
ratio of time taken up by Patten, compared to that of his questioners, to have
been higher. However, the reason for this is not that Patten was relatively concise.
Rather, it indicates how, compared with the similar speech events with which
parallels can be drawn (such as the Question Time television program, or Prime
Minister’s question time), some questions were more lengthy than might have
been expected. Some questioners asked more than one question, while others
took the opportunity to make statements of their own. Patten was clearly unset-
tled by the relatively long questions, as he asked the audience many times to
make their questions shorter.
The reasons for the relatively long questions are not clear. The most obvious
possible reason is that questioners wanted to undermine Patten’s control of the
meeting, and so held the floor for longer than Patten would have liked, in order
to make their own political statements. Another reason might be that question-
ers were not familiar with a genre which was new to Hong Kong, and so did not
realise that they should keep their questions short. A third possible reason is
intercultural: in Chinese cultures, a degree of ‘face-work’ is often required before
the topic of an interaction is announced (Scollon and Scollon, 2001).
12. Times cited here do not include time taken up by translation, which took approx-
imately the same amount of time as the original statements.
13. See Brown and Gilman (1960), Wilson (1990) and Johnson (1994) on the politics
of pronouns.
5 Face in Intercultural Political Discourse

1. The data for the empirical part of this study was collected over the five years
of Patten’s governorship. It is divided into two corpora: a collection of Patten’s
key speeches, interviews, public meetings, press conferences and other pub-
lic pronouncements, as used for Chapters 2 and 3, and a collection of several
thousand press articles and television programmes dealing with Hong Kong’s
Notes 307
political transition and Patten’s governorship. These corpora are further

supported by interviews with Patten and his advisers.
2. Wilson had studied Chinese at the beginning of his diplomatic career and later
temporarily resigned from the Foreign Service to write a PhD thesis on China and
edit the prestigious academic Journal, China Quarterly.
3. When interviewed for this research, Patten identified ‘standing up for Hong Kong
against China’, as one of the main communicative strategies of his governorship
(Flowerdew, 1997c: 37).
4. This list of epithets was recited to the author in an interview with Patten’s infor-
mation coordinator, Kerry McGlynn, on 25 January 1996 (Flowerdew, undated).
5. In interviews prior to his departure from Hong Kong, Patten repeatedly said that
his one regret was that he had not withdrawn from negotiations with China ear-
lier, realising all along that they would not lead anywhere.
6. Tannen (1986) prefers the more neutral terms ‘independence’ and ‘involvement’,
to avoid the evaluative connotations of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ politeness.
7. See Chapters 2 and 4 for applications of Brown and Levinson’s taxonomy of
politeness strategies in Patten’s interaction with the people of Hong Kong.
8. For this reason, for discourse analysts such as Tannen (1985: 203), the term cross-
cultural, or intercultural, is broadened to include such differences.
9. To forestall accusations that the above account of Chinese face is nothing but
essentialist stereotyping, it is worth pointing out that this work is grounded in
considerable ethnographic and psychological empirical work (see e.g. the papers
collected in Bond, 1996).
10. Family metaphors were also used locally in Hong Kong (see Chapter 7): Britain
was often depicted as a surrogate mother who has been looking after a child,
Hong Kong, while the real mother, China, due to the vicissitudes of recent his-
tory, has been unable to care for it (see Chapter 6). Now that the real mother
has returned to a stable state, Hong Kong may return to her. The metaphor is on
occasions extended further. At a public meeting held by Governor Patten and
attended by the author (Government Information Service, 1996), a questioner
asked Britain to issue Hong Kong people with full British passports as an insur-
ance policy in case things went wrong post-1997 under Chinese sovereignty.
Using the metaphor of Britain as the ‘adoptive’ mother, the speaker said that an
adoptive mother should be willing to take back responsibility for a child if the
child was again mistreated after returning to the real mother.
11. Given that face is a cultural rather than a specifically linguistic notion, the phrase
to give face is also commonly used by Hong Kong Chinese when speaking in
English.
12. This accusation was not limited to the Chinese, incidentally, but was also made
by those on the British side who disagreed with his policies.
13. Such behaviour is what Goffman (1967) calls sustained ritual disequilibrium, as
noted earlier.
14. Right up to the handover, Patten was denied any direct contact with Chinese
officials.
15. This emphasis on decorum and the saving of face initially seems contradictory
to China’s aggressive behaviour, not only towards Patten, but also in its dealings
with other governments, such as that of Taiwan. Observers are often puzzled by
the emphasis placed on harmonious relations and decorum in Chinese society,
on the one hand, and the aggressive nature of China in its dealings with foreign
governments, on the other. Governor Patten himself, for example, stated that he
308 Notes
attributed China’s behaviour towards him to owe more to communism than to

traditional Chinese culture (Wallen and Manuel, 1996). Observers find it hard to
comprehend China’s repeated threats of military intervention in Taiwan, its vilifi-
cation of the Taiwanese President Li Teng-hui, its firing of missiles over Taiwanese
territory, and its threat to drop a nuclear bomb on Los Angeles if the United
States interfered in its aggressive behaviour towards Taiwan. Similarly, they were
shocked when China threatened to take over Hong Kong before 1997 if Patten
failed to back down on his reform proposals. In order to understand this apparent
contradiction in China’s communicative behaviour, a distinction can be made
between relations within the in-group and with the out-group. Chinese rules of
social behaviour are determined primarily by a concern to maintain the harmony
of the in-group. Confucius provided rules of behaviour for five key relationships,
but had nothing to say about dealing with out-group members (Bond and Wang,
1981). In the cases such as that of President Li and the Taiwanese government
and of Patten, because these individuals, in the eyes of China, failed to comply
with the various precepts of face behaviour as outlined above, they have excluded
themselves from the social network and as such are legitimate targets for retalia-
tion according to the principle of reciprocity.
16. Patten said that for him face meant ‘being concerned with how you look to others’,
while honour was ‘about what you do to or for others’ (Patten, 1993: 11).
6 Competing Public Discourses in Transitional Hong Kong

1. While Patten supported what we shall see are the Utilitarian discourse values pro-
moted by the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong and often held this grouping
up as worthy of admiration (Sum, 1995), he nevertheless held them in check, in
practice, because they wanted more political reform than he was willing to allow.
This is a case of an appeal to Utilitarian values, in theory, but a manipulation of
them in practice, a common enough state of affairs among those purporting to
support these values, as will be pointed out below.
2. It is important to note that these values were only extended to an elite group.
Women and slaves, most notably, were excluded. As we shall see, in the colonial
period, also, the democratic values promoted in the mother country were not
applied to the colonised, a situation which remained right up to the retrocession
in Hong Kong.
3. In the context of colonialism it is also interesting to note, with Scollon and
Scollon (1994: 16), that Mill was an officer of the East India Company at one
time, in addition to being a philosopher.
4. Although not the other social groups, most notably women and slaves.
5. King (1991) stresses how Confucian social concepts remain strong in present-day
China, in spite of efforts on the part of the Communist Party to root out such
so-called ‘feudal’ elements.
6. For convenience, one English language press source is given for the reporting of
each event. However, each of the events was reported widely in the full range of
English and Chinese language newspapers, periodicals, radio and television.
7. The Preparatory Committee was an appointed body set up by China to prepare
for a provisional legislature and select the first post-handover chief executive.
8. The system known as guanxi, or personal relationships, is an important feature of
the Confucianist conception of social relations. It is the duty of the individual to
cultivate these relationships, within which the demonstration of sincerity and the
Notes 309
giving of ‘face’ is an important feature. As seen in previous chapters, the British

Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, was continually criticised by China for his
lack of sincerity, a failing which can be traced right back to his arrival in Hong
Kong and his refusal to consult with China before he presented his political reform
programme, in 1992. His lack of cultivation of guanxi, demonstration of sincerity
and giving of ‘face’, may help explain why he was totally ostracised by China. It
is accepted practice for foreign statesmen and diplomats who have dealings with
China to be dubbed a ‘friend of China’, an official acknowledgement that they have
followed the conventions of network-building and sincerity of relations between
friends. Richard Nixon, George Bush, Edward Heath, and significantly, Patten’s
predecessor as governor of Hong Kong, David Wilson, are examples of Westerners
who have received this accolade. Patten, on the other hand, received the epithets,
‘prostitute’, ‘tango-dancer’ and ‘sinner for a thousand years’, among others.
9. The Preparatory Committee, in addition to not appointing directly elected
LEGCO members, was also accused of being weighted too heavily in favour of
wealthy representatives of the commercial sector.
10. This is a reference to Frederick Fung, the only elected, pro-democracy appointee
on the Preparatory Committee. As Sally Blyth indicates, he voted against the
motion to set up the provisional legislature. This is the topic of example discur-
sive event no. 4, above.
11. China declared that the legislature operating under British rule would have to
be closed down, on the grounds that the electoral arrangements which brought
it into being were in contravention of previous agreements between Britain
and China (a view contested by Britain). The pre-handover legislature would be
replaced by a provisional legislature made up of appointees while fresh electoral
arrangements were made for a permanent body.
12. This is a prerequisite stated by those responsible for the selection committee.
A provisional legislature, however, was not foreseen in either the Joint Declaration
or the Basic Law, and was strongly criticised by the British Hong Kong govern-
ment and the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong.
13. The challenge for the analyst here is to sort out what is authentic and what is
cosmetic or manipulative.
7 Metaphors in the Discursive Construction of Patriotism:

the Case of Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform Debate
1. Some of the polls were conducted by the Public Opinion Programme at the University
of Hong Kong. Relevant poll findings can be found at http://hkupop.hku.hk
2. In the broader scheme of things, however, the pro-Beijing camp’s policy of pro-
moting ‘patriots’ and demonising ‘traitors’ must be deemed to have failed, as
evidenced by the level of support for the pro-democracy candidates in the elec-
tions referred to earlier. Thus the discourse, although successfully introduced, in
the broader context must be interpreted as not having been inculcated.
3. ‘Ancestral country’ here refers to what Hong Kong English language media refer
to as ‘the motherland’. It is, however, more literally appropriate to term it as
‘ancestral country’.
4. All translations are by Solomon Leung.
5. Wu Sangui is a historical figure in the Ming dynasty (approximately fourteenth to
seventeenth centuries) famed for betraying the Ming court by collaborating with
310 Notes
the Manchurians in the north-east of China, thereby hastening the downfall of

the Ming dynasty and the rise of the Qing dynasty towards the end of the seven-
teenth century.
8 Identity Politics and Hong Kong’s Return to Chinese

Sovereignty
1. This also applies to Patten, of course, who was the voice of the British govern-
ment and his advisers.
2. When travelling abroad, Tung also spoke in English.
3. The Chinese versions can be accessed by means of the Hong Kong government
website <http://search.info.gov.hk>
4. This provision, enshrined in Annex I of the Basic Law, stipulates as follows:
If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executives for
the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments must be made with
the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative
Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval.
(Available from http://www.tdctrade.com/blaw/blaw_ax1.htm)
5. In the 1970s, Tung’s shipping company had been in serious financial difficulties.
Tung was helped out financially by another local pro-Beijing tycoon (Flowerdew,
1998).
6. For example, according to one survey, only 16 per cent of people wanted Tung to
run for a second term (Asian Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2001).
7. See note 3 to Chapter 1 for a definition of this term.
8. It is notable, however, that this discourse has been downplayed since the bursting
of the dot.com ‘bubble’.
9. It should be noted that Patten also complimented the Hong Kong people for their
work ethic, family culture, and care for the elderly, which may be considered as
characteristics of Confucian culture. However, it must be emphasised that Patten
insisted that so-called Asian, or Confucian, values were universal and not specific
to Asian societies.
10. See e.g. editorials in two mainland-backed newspapers (Ta Kung Pao, 2001; Wen
Wei Po, 2001).
11. Insofar as many of these were instituted by Patten in the last 5 years of over
150 years of British rule, one can sympathise with Tung’s desire to distance him-
self from them. Nevertheless, the population at large generally accepted them
and Tung’s overall downplaying of them may be a cause of his very low popular-
ity ratings.
12. Results of popularity polls conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of Hong
Kong University show that although support ratings for Tung stayed in the high
50s during the first two years of his office, the ratings, on average, hovered around
the lower 50s from July 1999 on. At times, the ratings even dropped below 50, the
first time being in July 2000. Although Tung received a very high rating of 70.4 in
September 1997 and the highest rating that Patten ever received is about 6 points
less (64.1 in October 1992), Patten’s ratings remained in the high 50s throughout
his five years as governor of Hong Kong (Social Sciences Research Centre, 1997).
Notes 311
13. In fact, there was no need for one, as he was the only candidate. See e.g. A. Leung
(2002).
14. Chinese does not have tense as such. Hence, in the Chinese version, the axi-
omatic nature of the statements is expressed through the absence of specific
temporal markers, while present truths are anchored in the past through the use
of temporal markers such as 一直 (all along).
15. In Chinese, this is rendered by the 需要 (require/need).
16. This is rendered in the Chinese version by the expression祖国 (literally ‘the ances-
tral country)’; there is thus the same presuppositional effect.
17. ‘[T]he first step towards the ultimate reunification of China’ refers to the impend-
ing retrocession of Macau from Portuguese to Chinese sovereignty, which was
due to take place in 1999, and the goal of reunification with Taiwan.
18. Tung was in fact born in Shanghai, but emigrated with his family at the time of
the Communist takeover. He also spent long periods at school and university in
the UK and worked for a number of years in the US.
19. Although the English version of this speech has been used for analysis, there is
variation in the usage of indexicals. Where this is the case I have indicated so in
footnotes.
20. In the Chinese version ‘our (我們的) country’ is replaced with (國家) (literally ‘the
ancestral country’).
21. Again ‘our country’ is expressed with the term (國家) (the ancestral country).
22. Here ‘our roots’ is expressed as (中華民族的根) (literally ‘the roots of the (Chinese)
nation’), thus even more strongly integrating the Hong Kong people as part of
China’s heritage.
23. Here, in the Chinese version, ‘our society’ is rendered as (香港文化), literally ‘cul-
ture of Hong Kong’, while, because, in Chinese, the subject is often presupposed,
the equivalent for ‘we’ is absent.
24. In the Chinese version ‘our society’ is rendered as 香港 (Hong Kong).
25. In the Chinese version, because of the lesser need for the use of a grammatical
subject, ‘we’ (line 30) and ‘we’ (line 31) are absent. In addition, ‘our efforts’ is
realised in a verbal form, removing the need for the first person plural pronoun
in subject position.
26. Louw (1993) defines ‘semantic prosody’ as ‘a consistent aura of meaning with
which a form is imbued by its collocates’ (p. 157).
27. See Chapter 11 for a detailed analysis of Tung’s discourse on globalisation.
28. At the time of writing, the latest figures from the Hong Kong Transition project:
http://www.hktp.org/list/calm_after_the_storm_ndi_20.pdf (for August 2010) are
as follows:
Chinese 22 per cent; Hong Kong Chinese 28 per cent; Hong Kong 42 per cent.
9 Discourse as History: History as Discourse. ‘The Rise of

Modern China’ – a History Exhibition in Post-Colonial
Hong Kong
1. The data from the interviews with the historians were not used directly in this study.
2. Later in the interview, Dr Ting clarified that where an artefact or photograph
came with a text from Beijing, then this was retained. It was only the material
provided by Hong Kong and those artefacts from Beijing that did not have a text
that was accompanied by texts written in Hong Kong.
3. Sun Yat-sen received the most votes by far.
312 Notes
4. The exhibition was bilingual, in Chinese and English. The English text has been used
for analysis because (a) this is the language this researcher is best qualified in and (b)
the majority of the readership will not know Chinese. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that the majority of the visitors, especially the local ones, would have read the
Chinese versions. Nevertheless, the features analysed in the English versions of the
texts, which are pragmatic phenomena, are also present in the Chinese versions.
5. There is one anomalous use of ‘their’ (line 11) when referring to the Chinese peo-
ple, the function of which is perhaps to objectify the Chinese race and provide
the perspective of the outsider.
10 Discriminatory Discourse Directed towards Mainlanders

1. The reference to the source of the news article consists of six digits showing the
year, month and day, in that order. Thus ‘(990203)’ would mean ‘on 3 February
1999’. Where more than one news article is found on a particular date, the articles
are sequenced as follows: ‘sc’ stands for the first article, ‘sd’ the second, ‘se’ the
third, and so forth. Thus ‘(990429sc)’ refers to the first article on 29 April 1999,
whereas ‘(990429sd)’ denotes the second article appearing on that same date.
12 The Discursive Construction of a World Class City

1. South China Morning Post (27 June 2002) Editorial.
2. Hong Kong government press release: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/
brandhk/0427209.htm
3. In accordance with Hong Kong’s language policy, all government texts are made
available in Chinese and English. The English versions of these texts are analysed
here.
4. Although the chapter was signed by the chief executive, that is not to say that
he actually wrote it, bearing in mind Goffman’s (1981) distinction between the
animator, the author and the principal of a text.
5. The term ‘voice’ is used here in a different sense from the one I use in the rest
of the chapter. It is a very specific form of intertextuality referring to a specific
(albeit in this case anonymous) reference to another text.
13 Conclusion
1. Unfortunately, as mentioned in Chapter 8, not long after encouraging such a
policy in China, Mao retracted it and set loose the Cultural Revolution.
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Index
Abraham, T., 198 Baker, P. et al., 10

Achugar, M., 11, 20–1, 23, 296, 302 Bakhtin, M. M., 22, 37, 69, 78, 86, 207,
n.1.3 266–7
actualisation, 22, 31, 36, 68–9, 74, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, 250
79, 82 bao (reciprocity), 129, 131
advertising discourse, 66, 69, 246, 264, Bargiela-Chiappini, F., 273
279, 302 n.2.2, 306 n.4.9 Barristers’ Association, 168
Akihito, Emperor of Japan, 90 Bar-Tal, D., 218, 225, 227–9
ambivalence potential, 61 Barthes, R., 8, 12, 43, 61, 87, 196
American International, 250 Basic Law (1990)
Anderson, B., 153, 202 Annex I, 310 n.8.4
Ankersmit, F. R., 12, 14–15, 296 Article 24(3), 220–1, 232, 240
Anthias, F., 247 contravention of, 89, 97, 104, 106,
antithesis, 30, 36, 68–9, 73, 75, 78, 113, 134, 169
81, 211 and democracy, 150–1, 156
see also chiasmus and the discourse of Chee-hwa Tung,
apartheid, 20–1 190–6
APEC, 178 drafting of, 4, 24, 30, 162, 177–8, 182,
Apple Daily, 91, 155–72, 299–300 202
Aristotle, 66, 70, 83, 137 and freedom, 258
Poetics, 304 n.3.3 powers under, 147–8, 159, 257
Rhetoric, 304 n.3.3 and the preparatory committee, 141,
Asian Financial Crisis, 5, 187, 250, 252, 148
254, 257–8, 260, 276, 284 reinterpretation of, 157, 165, 168,
Asian Wall Street Journal, 310 n.8.6 170, 241
asymmetry of power, 31, 91, 98, 107–8, upholding of the, 189, 199
113, 226 Baudrillard, J., 15
Athens, 86 Baumeister, R., 84
see also Greco-Roman cultural tradition Bazerman, C., 266
Atkinson, M., 42, 68–9, 88, 109 Beaverstock, J. V. et al., 263–4
ATV World Television, 145–6, 304 n.2.15 Beijing
Newsline, 145–6, 304 n.2.15 Anson Chan’s visit to, 145–8
Australia, 4, 92, 226, 250 and Chinese cultural identity, 33,
see also Sydney 291–2, 301
Austria and Chinese history, 200, 203–8, 210,
‘Anschluss’ (1938), 18 217, 300, 311 n.9.2
and national identity, 292, 299 as a gamma world city, 264
Nazi occupation of, 18–19, 21 government in, 5–6, 155–62, 164,
and neo-Nazism, 224, 243–4 176–7, 215–16, 220, 222, 241, 243
see also Hitler, A.; Waldheim affair; legal experts from, 242
Wodak, R. Olympic games, 198
authoritarianism, 137–8 and patriotism, 32, 157, 163, 165– 72,
309 n.7.2
Baker, P., 10, 303 n.2.8 vs Peking, 128
329
330 Index
Beijing – continued Chang, K.-s., 121

see also Hong Kong; Museum of Chaplin, Charlie, 66
Chinese History; Patten, Chris; Great Dictator, The, 66
Tiananmen Square Charteris-Black, J., 10, 155
Bell, A., 85, 230 Cheng, Andrew, 143
Bell, A. and Garrett, P., 222 Cheng, T., 121, 177
Bender, J. and Wellbery, D., 65, 67, 87 Chek Lap Kok airport, 234
Bentham, J., 135 Chiang, Kai-shek, 208
Benton, T., 247–8 Chiapello, E. and Fairclough, N., 25,
Better Hong Kong Foundation, 236 198, 299
Bhatia, V. K., 97–8, 266, 269, 271–2, chiasmus, 75
276, 278 see also antithesis
Bill of Rights, 140 Chibnall, S., 159
Billig, M., 153–4 Chilton, P., 42, 86, 135
Bilton, T. et al., 246 China, ancient, 14, 73
Binks, M., 122 China, People’s Republic of (PRC)
Blair, Tony, 66 economic revolution of, 54, 189–90,
Blommaert, J., 10, 21–3 261, 276
Blyth, S., 90, 145–7, 309 n.6.10 flag of, 205, 286
Bond, M. H., 46, 307 n.5.9 as a high-context culture, 137–8
Bond, M. and Forgas, J., 138 Hong Kong representatives of, 9, 32
Bond, M. H. and Hwang, K.-k., 32, 36, ideology of, 35, 292
125–6, 132 inauguration of, 202–6
Bond, M. H. and Wang, S.-H., 308 as the ‘motherland’, 6, 11, 24, 126,
n.5.15 161, 307 n.5.10
branding, 29, 35, 37, 262, 267–70, 278, ‘open door’ policy of, 139, 250
281–2 policies of, 200
Braude, J., 90 Sino-British relations, 3–5, 23–4, 27–8,
Bray, M., 27 30–1, 41, 44, 47–8, 51, 65, 68, 70–1,
British Nationality Act (1990), 4 82, 85–7, 89, 93, 99, 104–9, 118–21,
Brown, P. and Levinson, S., 42, 88, 125–34, 144, 175–9, 202, 301, 307–8
123–4, 126–7, 132, 138, 307 n.5.7 n.5.15, 309 nn.6.6, 8, 11
Brown, R. and Gilman, A., 303 n.2.7, see also Beijing; Confucianist
306 n.4.13 discourse; Hong Kong; immigration
Bush, George W., 154, 309 n.6.8 China Mobile, 250
China Quarterly, 307 n.5.2
Canada, 4, 92 Chinese Cultural Revolution, 215
Canton, 249–50 Chinese language, 4, 118, 127, 137, 157,
Cantonese, 65, 64, 94–5, 99, 106, 108, 308 n.6.6
143, 165, 176, 178, 219–20, 305 nn. see also Cantonese
4.7, 8, 306 n.4.8 Chinese New Year, 197
see also Chinese language Chinese University, 198
Canto-pop, 219 see also Hong Kong’s Institute of
capitalism, 6, 246, 256, 262, 267 Asia-Pacific Studies
see also new capitalism Ching, Frank, 145–6
Carbaugh, D., 136 Ching Ma Bridge, 285, 287–8
Cathay Pacific, 250 Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N., 248
Causeway Bay, 286 chronographia, 22, 69, 82
Chan, Anson, 143, 145, 230, 233, 238, chronotope, 22, 69
287 Chu, David, 149–51
Index 331
Chua, E. and Gudykunst, W. B., 138 principles of, 3–13, 35, 42, 64,
Chung, R. T. Y., 62 88, 282
Churchill, Winston, 44, 66, 68 see also Fairclough, N.; Wodak, R.,
CIA, 14 van Dijk, T.
Cicero, 66 Crothall, G., 128
Clifton, R. and Maughan, E., 267 cultural imperialism, 11, 87, 210
Clinton, Bill, 45, 90, 129 cultural relativity, 32, 36, 132
Cockroft, R. and Cockroft, S., 22, 69, 73, Cupach, W. R. and Imahori, T. T., 124
304 n.3.2
Coffin, C., 22 de Cillia, R. et al., 64, 206
cognitive linguistics, 10, 35, 293 decision-making, dynamics of, 30, 263,
Cohen, S. and Young, J., 68 269, 276
Coleridge, S. T., 69 decolonisation, 46, 176, 202, 220,
collectivism, 36, 138–9 235, 301
commemoration, 18, 21–2 deconstruction, linguistic, 11, 17,
commodification, 18 293, 297
Commission on Strategic Development, defamiliarisation, 67
270, 277 DeGolyer, M. E. et al., 302 n.1.4
Communist Party (China), 26, 65, 139, Deignan, A., 155
199, 206–7, 209, 215, 253, 308 n.6.5 delegitimation, 224–5, 228–9, 240
Communist Revolution (1949), 79, 82, Democratic Party (China), 48, 63, 241
137, 139, 249 democratisation, 18, 30, 47
see also China (PRC); Communist of discourse in Hong Kong, 108,
Party 156–7, 257
Conservative Party (UK), 45–6, 58, 119 discourse, social change and, 90–3
Constitutional Development Task Force, the meeting as an index of, 96, 107
157, 164 and overt markers, 98
Confucianism, 46, 150, 180 Deng, Xiaoping, 24, 73, 81, 139, 164, 176,
Confucianist discourse, 9, 32, 133–4, 206–8, 219, 301
136–9, 142, 145, 147, 149, 151–2, Dimbleby, J., 44–5, 70, 85, 120–1, 129, 132
155, 291–2, 294, 296–7 discourse
Confucius, 137–8, 308 n.5.15 abstraction in, 37
Cook, G., 66 cultural approach to, 11
cooperative principle, 36, 135 ‘discourse historical’ approach,
see also Grice, H. P. see Wodak, R.
corpus linguistics, 10, 30, 35, 293 as history, 37, 199–217
and CDA, 303 n.2.8 and ideology, 37
Cottrel, R., 93, 104 myth in, 35, 37, 61
Counterfeiters, The, 96 and space, 22–4
Court of Final Appeal (CFA), 199, 221, systems, 32, 36, 169
233, 237–8, 241–4 see also historiography
CNN, 63, 90 discriminatory discourse
see also Larry King Live and CDA, 222, 227
Cradock, Sir Percy, 104, 118, 127, 130, against mainlanders, 34, 37,
133 218–44, 312 n.10.1
critical discourse analysis (CDA) see also immigration; metaphor,
criticisms of, 22 negatively connotated; racism,
evaluation of, 13, 15, 262, 265–6 discourses of
historiographical approaches to, discursive formation
16–17, 132, 293–4, 297, 299 definition of, 20, 302 n.1.3
332 Index
discursive formation – continued face threatening acts (FTAs), 123, 127

in the discourse of Chee-hwa Tung, face-work, 123, 127, 306 n.4.11
30, 177–9, 185, 189 and intercultural communication,
in the discourse of Chris Patten, 30, 117, 122, 124
45, 56, 59 in intercultural political discourse,
of national identity, 224 32, 36
Disney sustained ritual disequilibrium, 123,
as a brand, 267 126, 307 n.5.13
Hong Kong Disneyland, 280 universal models of, 32, 36
Judson Green, chairman of Walt see also Bond and Hwang; Brown and
Disney Attractions, 287 Levinson; Goffman, E; politeness;
Mickey Mouse, 280, 287 rationality; speech acts
Minnie Mouse, 287 Fairclough, N.
double voicing, 207, 212–14 on capitalism, 256
Downing, A. and Locke, P., 303 n.2.9 on combining CDA and corpus
dragon, Chinese, 280, 288 linguistics, 303 n.2.8
Du-Babcock, B. and Babcock, R. D., 124 discourse-historical method, 17–19
Dunn, Baroness Lydia, 121 discourse and social change, 88–94,
98, 107, 266, 298
East India Company, 308 n.6.3 and Foucault, 13
Eastern Express, 91–2, 142, 144 approach to genre, 266, 271
Eco, U., 66 and hegemony, 8, 152, 294
Edelman, M., 43 and intertextuality, 17, 51, 78, 86, 207
egalitarianism, 125, 138 on the use of lists, 252, 254
Ellison, J., 121 and his model of CDA, 6, 8, 28, 269,
English language 277
and Cantonese, 94–5, 143, 176, 306 ‘orders of discourse’, 134, 136
n.4.8 and political discourse analysis, 42,
and Chinese, 4–5, 85, 161, 275, 280, 47, 61, 66, 256–7
307 n.5.11, 312 nn.9.4, 12.3 and presupposition, 49, 51
and education, 255, 260 and systemic-functional linguistics,
meetings discussed in the, 108, 300, 266
310 n.8.2 and transdisciplinarity, 262
newspapers, 72, 91–2, 200, 218, 233, and turn-taking, 306 n.10
244, 294, 308 n.6.6, 309 n.7.3 and Widdowson’s critique of CDA, 10
speeches in the, 65, 176, 178–9, 183, Fairclough and Wodak, R., 293
311 n.8.19 discourse-historical method, 223
TV channels, 143–4, 146 and discriminatory discourse, 218,
Enlightenment, the, 12, 65–6, 135 226
Ensink, J. and Sauer, C., 21 model of CDA, 6–8, 293
Essed, P., 154 on the nature of CDA, 64–5, 83
ethnography, 22, 35, 293, 295, and systemic-functional linguistics, 7
307 n.5.9 Falun Gong movement, 181
Eu, Audrey, 114 Firth, J. R., 303 n.2.8
European Union (EU), 190 , 255, 261 Fiske, J., 43
evolutionary psychology, 10, 12 Flowerdew, J., 10
on Chris Patten, 44–5, 67–8, 72,
face 84–5, 104, 107, 118, 120, 122,
Chinese face, 32, 36, 120, 126, 131–2, 129–31, 150, 181, 302 n.2.1, 304
307 n.5.9 n.3.7, 307 n.5.4
Index 333
on discriminatory discourse, 219, 231, systems, 266

238 theory, 35, 262
evaluating CDA, 10, 29, 262, 294 Gent, C., 268
on globalisation discourse, 249, 254, Germany, 127
257 under Hitler, 14
on Hong Kong’s history, 302 nn.1.1, Turks in, 218
2.3, 310 n.8.5 Ghai, Prof. Yash, 233
on metaphor, 10 Giddens, A., 245–7, 253, 262, 279
positive discourse analysis, 12 Gide, A., 96
on power relations, 25–6, 44–5, 108 Gilmore, F., 267–8, 282
on rhetorical weight, 84–7 globalisation
Flowerdew, J. and Leong, S., 11 definition and characteristics, 18, 24,
Fong, B., 72, 305 n.4.2 34–5, 37, 187–8, 245–6
foregrounding, 161–2, 169, 172, 220 discourse of, 245–61, 262–3, 278–90,
Foreign Correspondents’ Club, 142 282, 299, 311 n.8.27
Foreign Ministry, Chinese, 301 and Hong Kong, 249–57, 292, 294
Fortune Global Forum, 52–3, 278 see also modernity
Foucault, M., 7, 13, 20, 25–6, 36, 43, 88, Globalisation and World Cities (GaWC),
91, 108, 296, 302 n.1.3 Study Group and Network, 263–4
Fowler, R. G., 67, 69, 87, 88, 185, 222, 226 Goffman, E.
Fowler, R. G. et al., 56, 58 face in discourse, 36, 122–5, 127, 132
Fowles, J., 97 forms of talk, 312 n.12.4
French Lieutenant’s Woman, The, 97 frame analysis, 158
framing, 158–61, 167, 171–2 interactional sociolinguistics, 42, 89,
France, 218 176
French imperialism, 61 participation statuses, 160, 216
Frankfurt School, the, 8 sustained ritual disequilibrium, 307
Free, B., 90 n.5.13
free market economics, 45, 62, 177, 181, Government Information Service, 77,
296 176, 283, 307 n.5.10
Frith, S., 280 Graddol, D., 280
Fung, Frederick, 141, 198, 309 n.6.10 Gramsci, A., 8, 43, 154
Graumann, C. F. and Wintermantel,
Galasinska, A. and Krzyzanowski, M., 218, 225, 227
M., 19–20, 23 Great Leap Forward, 208, 213
Gao, T. et al., 125 Greco-Roman cultural tradition, 86
Gastil, J., 42–4, 61–2, 88, 91, 113, 135 see also Athens; Greece; Rome
Geis, M. L., 43 Greece, 18
Gellner, E., 153 ancient, 66, 135, 137
genealogical approach to discourse, 13 Grice, H. P., 36, 110, 135, 137, 181
see also Foucault, M. see also cooperative principle, the
General Electric, 250 Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), 254,
genre 260
analysis, 35, 266, 282, 293 Gruber, H., 218, 224, 228, 236, 243
chaining, 29, 37, 271 Guangdong Province, 169–70, 261
colonies, 37, 271 Guangzhou, 250
literary, 69 guanxi, 308 n.8
mixing, 97 Guibernau, M., 84, 87
political, 29, 36–7, 47–9, 61, 64, 175, Guomindang regime, 249
179–80 Gurkhas, 79
334 Index
Habermasian discourse ethics, 12 employment situation in, 5, 104,

Hall, E. T., 137 233–8, 284
Hall, P., 263 environmental issues in, 248, 255, 261
Hall, S., 25, 84, 203, 279 foreign direct investment (FDI) in,
Halliday, M. A. K. 277, 284
and metaphor, 29 historical background, 3–4, 302,
and ‘shunting’, 267, 295 n.1.1
and systemic-functional linguistics housing in, 62, 99, 103–5, 110,
(SFL), 7, 9, 222, 266 233–4, 236–8
Halliday, M. A. K. and Hasan, R., 54 intercultural discourses in, 31
Halliday, M. A. K. and Martin, J. R., 277 keep clean campaign, 219
Halliday, M. A. K. and Matthiessen, knowledge-based economy, 33, 178,
C.M.I.M., 7, 9, 54–5, 182, 212, 252, 182, 187–8, 195, 219, 248, 255
266 Legislative Council (LEGCO), 77, 92,
Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P., 214 121, 143, 145–6, 149–50, 305 n.4.6,
harmony, Confucian notion of, 11–12, 309 n.6.9
130, 169 population density in, 234
Hart, C., 10 post-colonial, 33, 35, 37, 156, 199, 311
Harvey, D., 247, 262–3, 279 public discourses in, 30–1
Heath, Edward, 309 n.6.8 public protest (July 2003), 156
hegemony, 8–9, 26, 29, 37, 43, 152, 154, and the question of identity, 27–8
160, 167–8, 201, 217, 294 as a Special Administrative Region
Heinemann, W. and Viehweger, D., 224 (HKSAR), 27, 218, 220–2, 231, 277,
heteroglossia, 37, 207 284, 286
historical layering, 21 tourism in, 196, 250, 254, 259, 268,
historicism, 21 270–1, 276
historiography see also Basic Law (1990); Wilson,
and CDA, 16–22 David; Patten, Chris; Tsang, Donald;
and history, 12–13 Tung, Chee hwa; World City,
and the population, 15–16 concept of the
see also critical discourse analysis Hong Kong Bank, 195
(CDA) Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition
Hitler, Adolf, 14, 18, 21, 44, 66 Centre, 285
Ho, A., 108–1 Hong Kong Economic Journal, 198
Ho, D. Y. F., 124–5 Hong Kong Festival, 219
Hobsbawm, E., 49 Hong Kong History Museum, 34, 203
Hodge, R. and Kress, G., 88, 256 Rise of Modern China (Tsim Sha Tsui)
Hofstede, G. H., 124 exhibition, 33–4, 37, 199–200, 208,
Hofstede, G. H. and Bond, M., 138 311
Honchung, Cheung, 141 Hong Kong’s Institute of Asia-Pacific
Hong Kong Studies, 198
and branding, 270, 280, 288 see also Chinese University
constitutional reform debate, 32, 117, Hong Kong Island, 3
153, 157–8, 161–2, 164–5, 297, 309 Hong Kong Policy Research Institute,
and democracy, 4–6, 24–5, 30–2, 45, 241
47–9, 51, 58–63, 70, 85, 88, 89 Hong Kong Standard, 72, 90, 203, 233
education system in, 5, 27, 35, 62, 92, Hong Kong Trade Development
94, 113, 138, 141, 178, 182–3, 188, Council, 251, 257
195–6, 233–4, 236–8, 248, 254–5, Hong Kong Transition project, 311
259–60, 270, 280 n.8.28
Index 335
Hong Kong University, 198, 236, 310 Jackson, Jesse, 69

n.8.12 Jakobson, R., 67, 69
Hong Kong Urban Council, 217 Japan, 90, 127, 137, 206, 284
Hong Kong Urban Service Department, see also Akihito, Emperor
203 Jenkins, B. and Sofos, S., 153
Hong Kong 2000 Yearbook, 276 Jenkins, K., 12–13, 64, 296
Horvat, M. D. et al., 218, 225–7 Jiang, Zemin, 4
House of Commons (UK), 45, 94 Joint Declaration (1984/1997), 3–5, 24,
HSBC, 250 30, 47, 52, 62, 71–2, 89, 95, 97, 106,
Hsun-tze, 138 118, 128, 133–4, 141, 148, 177, 199,
Hu, H. C., 124 202, 302 n.2.3, 309 n.6.12
Hu, Jintao, 5 Johnson, D. M., 100, 303 n.2.7, 306
Hudson, K., 68 n.4.13
Human Rights Monitor, 231 Johnstone, B., 23
Hung, V., 180
Hurley, Fr. John, 142 Kan, F. Y., 145–7, 151
Hutcheon, L., 97 Kant, I., 65, 135
Kendall, G., 8, 22
identity, 3, 8, 19, 23–37, 43–4, 46, Kennedy, John F., 66, 68
299–300 King, A. D., 263
politics, 64–87, 175–98 King, A. Y.-c., 125, 139, 308 n.6.5
see also national identity King, Martin Luther, 69
ideology, 7, 8, 10, 25, 37, 43, 65 Kirkpatrick, A., 137, 139
see also Confucianism Kitis, E. and Milapides, M., 155
immigration, 10, 82, 221–3, 228, 235, Klein, N., 267
238–40, 243 Kohl, Helmut, 129
see also discriminatory discourse Korea, 137
indexicals, 36–7, 47, 51–2, 61, 64, 103, Kowloon peninsula, the, 3
109, 175, 179, 183, 185, 211, 311 Knox, P. L. and Taylor, P. J., 263
n.8.19 Kress, G.
see also involvement on CDA, 7, 134
indirectness, 36, 137, 152 on colonial discourse, 46
individualism, 36, 125, 138, 141, 303 on identity, 25, 28, 299
n.2.8 on political language, 42
Integer Project, 255, 261 Kress, G. and van Leeuwen, T., 87
interactional sociolinguistics, 42, 88 Kristeva, J., 78, 86, 266
interdiscursivity, 207 Krugman, H. E., 302 n.2.2
interpersonal function, 7, 222, 272–5 Krzyzanowski, M. and Wodak, R., 19–20
see also Halliday, M. A. K.; transitivity Ku, G., 180
intertextuality, 17–18, 20, 29, 37, 57, 78, Kulturnation, 292
86, 207, 266–7, 292, 299, 312 n.12.5 see also Staatsnation
see also Fairclough, N. Kwan, W.-L., 305 n.4.2
involvement, 18, 29, 36–7, 47, 51, 61,
100–9, 113, 148, 175, 179, 183, 307 Labov, W. and Waletzky, J., 266
n.5.6 Laclau, E., 25, 279
see also indexicals; turn-taking Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., 8
Ip Lau Suk-yee, Regina, 234, 238 laissez-faire economics, see free market
Iraq War, 154 economics
irony, 13, 107, 122, 200 Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M., 155
Isocrates, 66 Lakoff, R. T., 42, 88, 135
336 Index
Lang, G. et al., 249–50 MacPherson, S., 91

Larry King Live, 90 Major, John, 4, 41, 44, 118, 127, 133
see also CNN Malaysia, 268
Lau, C. K., 62 Manchurians, 310 n.7.5
Lau, Emily, 90, 113–14, 128, 144 Man-Kwong, Cheung, 143
Lau, N.-K., 180 McGee, C., 121
Lau, Rita, 143 McGlynn, Kerry, 72, 304 n.3.7, 307
Lau, S.-K., 257 n.5.4
Lau, S.-K. and Kuan, H.-C., 46 McLuhan, M., 247
Lee, A., 233 Malmkjaer, K., 69
Lee, C., 155 manipulative discourse, 12, 23, 36, 44,
Lee, Kwan Yew, 121 47, 51, 66, 103, 106, 110–11, 171,
Lee Chu-ming, Martin, 157, 170, 181, 181, 225, 227, 308 n.6.1
241 Mao, Zedong, 205–6, 212, 214–217, 295
Lemke, J. L., 267 Martin, D.-C., 25–6, 28
Lenin, V., 66 Martin, J. R., 277
see also Marxism–Leninism Martin, J. R. and Rose, D., 12
Leung, A., 287, 311 n.8.13 Martin, J. R. and Wodak, R., 19
Leung, Elsie, 241–2 Marwick, A., 14, 296
Leung, Solomon, 309 n.7.4 Marxism, 86–7
Leung, Suen, 305 Marxism–Leninism, 139
Levi’s, 267 Matsumoto, A., 124
Levinson, S. C., 181 Maynard, S. K., 100
Lewis, W. F., 43–4 memory, collective, 21, 27, 296–7, 301
lexical reiteration, 29, 36–7, 43, 47, 51, metaphor
54, 61, 82, 175, 179, 185, 265 grammatical, 212–13
lexical structuring, 29, 36–7, 47, 61, 175, negatively connotated, 229–30
179 Patten’s use of, 68, 72, 75, 78, 80–1, 83
Li, A., 180 and patriotism, 32–3, 36–7, 51,
Li, D. C. S., 219, 238 153–72
Li, Teng-hui, 308 n.5.15 poetic structures of, 13
liberalism see also Lakoff and Johnson
neo-liberalism, 18 metonymy, 13, 69
Western, 46 Meyer, M., 10
Littlemore, J., 155 MI5, 14
Llewelyn, Edward, 304 n.3.7 Middle Ages, the, 135
Lo, F.-c. and Yeung, Y.-m., 263 Miles, R., 155
Lock, G., 55 Mill, J. S., 135–6, 308 n.6.3
Locke, J., 135, 138 On Liberty, 136
London, 34, 195, 245, 251, 253, 257–9, Miners, N. J., 89, 107
264–5, 270, 278 Ming dynasty, 309–10 n.7.5
Los Angeles, 264, 308 n.5.15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), 3, 301
Lou, J. J., 23 mise en abyme, 31, 36, 96–7, 108, 113,
Louw, B., 311 n.8.26 306 n.4.9
Lu, Ping, 119, 128, 141, 143–4 Mitten, R. M., 15–17, 296
modality, 183, 211, 222, 256, 273, 304
Ma, E. K. W. and Fung, A. Y. H., 25, n.2.13
27–8, 201–2, 220 modernity, 246–7
Macleod, Iain, 45 see also globalisation
Macmillan, Harold, 68, 108–9 Montesquieu, 135
Index 337
Morrison, A. and Love, A., 303 n.2.8 Obama, Barack, 66

Movement Against Discrimination, 231 O’Brien, M. et al., 246
Mozartkugel, 15 O’Halloran, K., 10
Mulroney, Brian, 129 Oliver, R. O., 137–8
multi-modality, 278 opium, 82, 87, 249
Museum of Chinese History, 200 Opium War, The, 24, 204–6, 304 n.2.14
Museum of Vienna, 209 order of discourse, 18, 36, 91–2,
Mussolini, B., 66 112–13
mythic discourse, 42–3, 61 Oriental Daily News, 195
Orwell, G., 153–4
Nanjing regime, 206 Othering, 25, 166–9, 172, 220, 226–7,
national identity, 24–7, 36–7, 64–6, 242, 292
206–7, 210–12, 217, 224, 292, 299 over-lexicalisation, 56, 58, 226–7
and history, 201
theory, 217 parallelism, 31, 36, 68–9, 73, 75–6, 78,
National Museum of Modern Chinese 81, 106, 279
History, 203, 208 parataxis, 183, 277–8
National People’s Congress (NPC), 200, Pardo, M. L., 246, 248
221, 233, 310 n.8.4 passivisation, 55, 213, 222
nationalism, 153–4 patriotism, 32–3, 36, 141, 153–72, 210,
see also patriotism 214, 309
naturalisation, 8, 46, 302 n.2.2, 303 see also metaphor; nationalism
n.2.5 Patten, Chris,
NBC, 63 ‘The Bedrock Principles’, 49–50, 62,
negative Other presentation, 223, 226, 181, 304 n.2.14
232 and Chinese face, 120–6, 131–2
see also discriminatory discourse; and the discourse of colonial
Othering; positive Us-presentation; withdrawal, 30, 35–6, 41–64, 291,
racism 302, 304
neo-liberalism, 18 democratic discourse of, 4
neo-Nazism, 224 on free market economics, 62, 181,
new capitalism, 18 296
see also capitalism on individual freedom, 64, 128, 251
New China News Agency, 142 as an intercultural communicator,
New Right, the, 248 130–1
New Territories, the, 3 ‘Pattenese’, 45
New York, 104, 179, 251, 253, 259, policy speech (1992), 46, 49, 51, 60,
264–5, 270, 278 70, 74, 119, 303 n.2.8
New Zealand, 92 policy speech (1993), 77
News Corporation (Murdoch), 250 policy speech (1994), 53, 59
Nietzsche, F., 21 policy speech (1995), 50
Nixon, Richard, 309 n.6.8 policy speech (1996), 63
Ng, M., 147–9, 151, 194 political background, 44–5
Ng, S. H. and Bradac, J. J., 95 political and social reform
nominalisation, 37, 222, 252, 254, 256 programme, 59
Noonan, P., 66, 68–70 and the politics of identity, 65, 83
North American Free Trade Agreement ‘Question Time’ public meeting, 45,
(NAFTA), 255–6, 261 90–1, 94–5, 107–8, 112–14, 293,
Northern Expedition, the, 200, 206 295, 299, 306 nn.4.9, 4.11
Norval, A. J., 20 rhetorical strategies of, 64–87
338 Index
Patten, Chris, – continued Question Time (BBC), 94

on the rule of law, 45–6, 49–50, 54, Quintilian, 66
57–62, 91, 128, 175, 177–8, 181–2, Quirk, R. et al., 252
184, 251, 292, 303 n.2.8
speech at farewell ceremony, 79, 82, racism, 154, 223, 225–6
86–7 see also discriminatory discourse;
see also corpus linguistics; mythic immigration
discourse rationality, 123, 135
Pax Britannica, 246 see also face; politeness
People’s Liberation Army, 4, 199–200 Reagan, Ronald, 44, 66
Plato, 66 reconciliation, 19–20, 298
poetry, 66–7, 268 see also Truth and Reconciliation
politeness, 123–6, 276, 307 nn.5.6, 5.7 Commission (TRC)
see also face; rationality; speech acts reiteration, see lexical reiteration
Poole, Teresa, 77 relevance theory, 10
Popper, Karl, 170 Renaissance, the, 12, 14, 65
positive discourse analysis (PDA), 12 repetition, 77, 106, 109, 207–8
positive self-presentation, 223–4 rhetoric
see also discriminatory discourse; Chinese, 137
Othering; negative Other classical rhetoric, 22, 65, 69, 73, 86
presentation; racism and identity politics, 30, 36, 64–87,
postmodernism, 14, 279 304 n.3.3
post-structuralism, 7 rhetorical analysis, 35, 293
pragmatics, textual, 35, 266, 272, 293 rhetorical weight, 30, 67–9, 75, 83–7
Preparatory Committee, The, 140–50, see also under individual rhetorical
308 n.6.7, 309 nn.6.9, 6.10 tropes; see also Patten, Chris
presupposition, 29, 36–7, 42, 47, 49–51, Ricoeur, P., 26
61, 64, 167–72, 175, 179, 181–3, Rifkind, Malcolm, 145
185, 189, 211, 253, 272, 304 n.2.13, Rimmon-Kenan, S., 97
311 n.8.16 Roberti, M., 90, 104
Pride, R., 268 Robertson, R., 245–8
Prince Charles, 4, 79, 86 Rome, 66, 86, 264
Progressive Alliance of Hong Kong, 236 see also Greco-Roman cultural
pronouns, politics of, 303 n.2.7, 306 tradition
n.4.13 Roosevelt, F. D., 66
prosody Roosevelt, T., 66
see semantic prosody Royal Marines, 79
prosographia, 22, 69, 82 Royal Navy, 249
Provisional Urban Council, 202 Russia, 14
psychology, 69 Russian formalism, 67
evolutionary, 10, 12
see also social psychology Sacks, H. et al., 306 n.10
Public Opinion Programme Salskov-Iverson, D. et al., 278
(HK University), 197, 309 n.7.1, 310 SARS epidemic, 5
n.8.12 Sassen, S., 263
Putonghua, 176, 182, 184 scare tactics, 225–8, 232, 235
Schenkein, J., 306 n.4.10
Qian, Qichen, 141, 145 Schidlovsky, John, 142
Qing dynasty, 200, 206, 310 n.7.5 Schiffrin, D., 23, 88
Queen Elizabeth II, 79 Schwartz, S., 180
Index 339
Scollon, R., 136 Strauss, Johann, 209–10

Scollon, R. and Scollon, S. B. K., student demonstrations, 26
124, 138 subject positioning, 172
Scollon, R. and Scollon, S. W., 31–2, 36, Sum, N.-L., 308 n.6.1
125, 134–6, 155, 159, 306 n.4.11, Sun, Yat-sen, 200, 206, 311 n. 9.3
308 n.6.3 Sunday Morning Post, 142
Scots Guards, 79 Swales, J., 266
Scott, M., 185 Sydney, 264–5
Seidel, G., 183, 303 n.2.7 synecdoche, 13
semantic prosody, 185, 187, 311 n.8.26 systemic-functional linguistics (SFL), 7,
Severin, W. J. and Tankard, J. W., 302 9, 19, 22, 35, 222, 266, 272, 293
n.2.2 see also Halliday, M. A. K.
Shakespeare, William, 81, 97
Shamdasani, R., 180 Ta Kung Pao, 155, 157–71, 297, 299–300,
Shanghai, 178, 219, 249–50, 264, 311 310 n.8.10
n.8.18 Tacey, E., 132
Shi-xu, 10–12, 24 Taiwan, 113, 164, 201, 208, 307–8
Sinclair, J., 55, 303 n.2.8 n.5.15, 311 n.8.17
Singapore, 6, 52–3, 121, 192, 264–5 Tannen, D., 36, 42, 47, 51, 68–9, 88,
Sino-British wars, 3 100–1, 105–6, 117, 307 nn.5.6, 5.8
Slovenia, 225 technologisation, 18
Smith, A., 153 Temporal, P., 268
Smith, A. D., 8, 294 Teo, P., 218, 226–7
Smith, Adam, 135 Thatcher, Margaret, 42, 45, 66, 119
Smith, A. H., 137 Thibault, P. J., 303 n.2.10
Smith, M., 305 n.4.2 Third World, the, 248
social networking, 124, 308 n.5.15 Thomas, H., 90
social psychology, 138, 225, 302 n.2.2 Tiananmen Square incident (June 1989),
socialism, 81, 139, 206 4, 48, 85, 156, 208, 215–16, 302
sociolinguistics, see interactional n.2.3
sociolinguistics see also Beijing
sociology, 246 Tibet, 167, 200, 207
South Africa, 20, 23 Time, 305 n.4.5
see also Truth and Reconciliation Ting, Dr Sun-pao, 29, 203–5, 207–9,
Commission (TRC) 214–17, 311 n.9.2
South China Morning Post, The (SCMP), Ting Kau Bridge, 285
34, 44, 72, 90, 92, 140–2, 145, 147, Ting-Toomey, S., 36, 124, 137–8
149, 200, 218, 229, 231–2, 234–44, topographia, 22, 69, 82
294, 305 n.4.6, 312 n.12.1 transformational model, 37, 207–13
Spaeth, A., 305 n.4.5 transitivity, 222
speech acts, 96, 123, 127, 225 see also Halliday, M. A. K.;
Spencer, P. and Wollman, H., 153–4 interpersonal function
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D., 181 triangulation method, 10, 29, 295
Staatsnation, 292 Trompenaars, F., 155
see also Kulturnation Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Stalin, J., 14 (TRC) 20
Steiner, E., 135 see also South Africa; reconciliation
stereotyping, 31, 223, 226–7, 307 n.5.9 Tsang, Donald, 6, 114, 199, 287
see also Othering Tsang, Fr. J., 142
Strath, B. and Wodak, R., 26–7 Tsang, S., 131, 302 n.1.1
340 Index
Tsim Sha Tsui, 200, 288 racist and discriminatory discourse,

Tung, Chee-hwa 10, 222–4, 226–30, 235, 238, 240
on Chinese cultural values, 21, 195, semantics and pragmatics of
300–1 discourse, 96
corpus linguistic analysis of, 29, 175 van Dijk, T. A. and Smitherman-
on democracy, 193–5 Donaldson, G., 218, 230
discourse of, 24, 30, 33, 37, 161–5, van Leeuwen, T., 266–7
251–7, 291–2, 299, 311 n.8.27 Verdoolaege, A., 20–1, 23
and discursive formation, 177–9 Victoria Harbour, 286
political background of, 5–6, 8, 20, Vietnam
26–7, 80, 114, 311 n.8.18 economy of, 103, 110
public image of, 199, 220, 262, 282, as a high-context culture, 137
287, 296–8, 310 n.8.12 Vietnamese boat people, 102
on the rule of law, 192–3 Vietnamese gangs, 226
speeches and speech-writing, 34, 157, Vietnamese migration, 111–12
175–98, 245, 270, 276–8 Vines, S., 177
see also Patten, Chris voice
Tung, Mark, 143–4 in discourse, 37
Turner, G., 280 and genre, 272
turn-taking, 36, 94, 100, 102, 107, 306 historical, 209
n.4.10 institutional, 222, 226, 230, 241–2
see also involvement interpersonal, 272, 274–5
and intertextuality, 266–7, 312 n.12.5
Unger, J. W., 11 passive, 213
United States of America (USA), 4, 213, in print media, 160, 165–72
284 promotional, 276–82
9/11 attacks, 153–4
and emigration, 4, 127 Waldheim affair, 15, 299, 302 n.1.2
history of, 44 Waldheim, K., 18
and Taiwan, 308 n.5.15 Wales, 268, 270
and Utilitarianism, 135 Wales, K., 96
see also Clinton, Bill; Los Angeles; Wallen, D., 90
New York; Obama, Barack; Wallen, D. and Manuel, G., 308 n.5.15
Reagan, Ronald Wan, W. K. and Leung, A., 194
USA Patriot Act (2001), 154 Waters, M., 246
US Federal Reserve Board, 250 Wei, J. M., 155
unities, the classical, 31, 36, 68–70, 74, Welsh, F., 249, 302 n.1.1
76, 79, 83, 304 n.3.3 White, H., 12–13, 296
universal suffrage, 5–6, 58, 114, 147–9, Widdowson, H. G., 10
156, 163–9, 177, 193–4, 198 Wilson, Sir David, 4, 47, 89–90, 93,
Uruguay, 20, 23 118–19, 127, 133, 307 n.5.2, 309 n.6.8
Utilitarian discourse, 9, 32, 133, Wilson, J., 42, 68, 88, 107, 155, 303
135–9, 148–52, 155, 165, 169, n.2.7, 306 n.4.13
308 n.6.1 Wodak, R.
anti-Semitic discourse, 18, 21
van Dijk, T. A. discourse-historical approach, 9, 18
CDA, principles of, 6, 9–10, 88, 19, 22–3, 223–4, 299
108, 218 and discriminatory discourse, 226–9,
ideology analysis, 222–3 236
political discourse analysis, 37, 207, on national identity, 24, 299
242 principles of CDA, 6, 8
Index 341
Wodak, R. et al., 19, 24, 26, 218, Xin Hua, 157

292, 299
Women’s Rights Concern Alliance, Yang, K.-S., 138
239 Yeung, C., 93–4, 177, 180, 305 n.4.6
World Bank, the, 190, 255, 261 Yeung, C. and Cheung, J., 194
World City, concept of the, 35, 251, Yeung, C. and Fan, C.-w., 121
253–4, 256, 259–60, 262–88 Yeung, Justice Wally, 238
see also Hong Kong; London; Young, Lord, of Graffham, 61
New York Yuen, Mary, 142
World Trade Organization (WTO),
189–90, 198, 260 Zen, Bishop Joseph, 166–7
World War I, 14, 247 Zhang, H. et al., 12
World War II, 247 Zhou, Enlai, 206
Wu, D. Y. H., 125 Zhuhai, 240
Wu, Sangui, 170, 309 n. 7.5 Zorba the Greek, 280

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Critical Discourse Analysis

List of Figures viii

3.1 A diagrammatic representation of parallelism in extract 2 76

2.1 Positive environments of noun phrases containing the word

a history of giving in too easily to Chinese demands. Accordingly, after the

applied with a view to develop our understanding of real-world phenomena

John Benjamins Publishing Company, for ‘Rhetorical strategies and identity

Cambridge University Press, for ‘Discourse and social change in contempo-

De Gruyter Mouton, for ‘Face in cross-cultural political discourse’ in TEXT

1.2 Hong Kong1

Hong Kong is a former British colony and now a Special Administrative

Following Tung’s departure, his successor, Donald Tsang, was first

1.3 Critical discourse analysis

The model of critical discourse analysis (CDA) employed in this volume is

one hand, and the role of discursive structures in activating ideologies, on

participants of the current communicative events …’ (van Dijk, 2005: 95).

has become the focus of a powerful counter-discourse among Chinese people.

1.4 History and historiography

Historiography is concerned with how the past is written about. It is a meta-

of an impersonal style misleadingly encourages a reading whereby the text

… cannot not operate the other functions which modern linguistics

For White, the historical representation of the past is essentially a linguistic

[t]he connections between the people, events or situations presented in

arrangement or storyline (let alone some intrinsic value that is objectively

Following on from this line of reasoning, another historiographer,

… what happened in the past influences what happens in the present,

1.5 Historiography and the population at large

level of historical consciousness, according to Mitten’s metaphor. At the centre

1.6 A historiographical approach to (critical)

What is meant by a historiographical approach to discourse? By this is meant,

1.7 Other discourse analysts and history

This book is not unique in considering discourse in a historical context.

capable of showing relations between discursive change, social change, and

a differentiated examination of the official political and media recol-

past, of the often conflicting narratives on Austrian history and of some

… discourse must be seen from the perspective of its historicity: it is in

Accordingly, the systematic analysis should illustrate how on-going

One important way in which transformation comes about in discourse is

A historical focus is important because it allows us to notice the dynamic

Echoing another point about the value of a diachronic approach made

By analyzing a series of texts related by belonging to the same discursive

In focusing on memory, Achugar’s work resonates with other volumes

1.8 Discourse and space

in discourse). In more recent years, attention has begun to be given to the

And, in a similar vein, Johnstone (2004: 68) elaborates that:

A space becomes a place through humans’ interaction with it, both

1.9 National identity

Time and space together collaborate in the creation of identity. One’s

[t]he national identity of individuals who perceive themselves as belong-

practices, one of which is discursive practice. ... The discursive practice as

Given this important discursive dimension of identity, identity can be

(Foucault, 1980: 95). This is most clearly represented in Chapter 4 of the

1.10 Hong Kong and the question of identity

With such a sudden political change as that represented by Hong Kong’s

of what Martin (1995: 3) refers to as an identity having ‘nothing to do with

1.11 Modes of analysis of this book

In line with Fairclough’s conception of the relation between discourse

1.12 Summary of the rest of the book

The following is a chapter by chapter summary of the rest of this book.

Part 1: The Discourse of the Outgoing Administration

Chapter 2: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal

Chapter 3: Rhetorical Strategies and Identity Politics in the Discourse

Chapter 4: Discourse and Social Change in a Public Meeting