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The Solicitor General likewise
Sanlakas vs Executive Secetary Reyes (2004)
Summary Cases:
Subject:
Moot and Academic (Exceptions); Locus Standi;
Calling out power, Declaration of “state of
rebellion”;
Warrantless arrest for rebellion; Not a
declaration of Martial Law; Not an exercise of
emergency powers
by the President
Facts:
In the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers
demanded, among other things, the resignation
of the
President (Arroyo), the Secretary of Defense
and the Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the
President issued later in the day Proclamation
No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of
rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress
the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood
occupation had ended. After hours-long
negotiations, the
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The
President, however, did not immediately lift the
declaration of
a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1,
2003, through Proclamation No. 435.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before
this Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4.
Petioners (including members of Congress and
party-list organizations like Sanlakas, Partido ng
Manggagawa , and SJS Society) pose similar
contentions questioning the authority of the
President to
declare a state of rebellion in the exercise of the
“calling out power” granted under Section 18,
Article VII
of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues
that the petitions have been rendered moot by
the lifting
of the declaration.
questions the standing of the petitioners to bring
suit.
Held:
Moot and Academic (Exceptions)
1. The issuance of Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased
to exist, has
rendered the case moot.
2. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot
cases, judicial power being limited to the
determination of
"actual controversies.”
3. By way of exception, courts will decide a
question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of
repetition yet
evading review." Case in point, in 2001, the
President similarly issued a declaration of state
of rebellion
only to recall it five days later. The hasty recall
prevented the Court from acting on the petitions
filed in
the meantime questioning the validity of the
declaration. (see Lacson vs Perez)
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Locus Standi
4. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is
being challenged.
(a) Only petitioners Representative Suplico et
al. and Senator Pimentel, as Members of
Congress,
have standing to challenge the subject
issuances.
5. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof. An act of
the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress
can have a resort to the courts. (citing Philconsa
vs Enriquez)
(b) Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members, have no legal standing or
locus
standi to bring suit.
6. As a party list organization, it has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would
justify the resort to
the Court. It is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by
a conditions,
warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its
leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with
warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the
name of
the party whose legal rights has been invaded or
infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent
threat
of invasion or infringement. (citing Lacson vs
Perez)
7. That petitioner SJS officers/members are
taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily
endow them
with standing.
(a) A taxpayer may bring suit where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. No such
illegal disbursement is alleged
(b) A citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show
that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed
by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is
alleged in this case.
8. Even if the petition of the party list
organizations is treated as one for declaratory
relief, the same will
not prosper since the Supreme Court is without
jurisdiction to entertain such suits at the first
instance.
Calling Out Power
9. For the purpose of exercising the calling out
power the Constitution does not require the
President to
make a declaration of a state of rebellion.
10. Section 18, Article VII grants the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: (a) the calling out power, (b) the
power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and (c) the power to declare martial
law.
11. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the
Constitution requires the concurrence of two
namely, (1) an actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) that public safety requires the exercise of
such power.
However, these conditions are not required in
the exercise of the calling out power.
12. The only criterion for the exercise of the
“calling out power” is that 'whenever it
becomes
necessary,' the President may call the armed
forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion
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or rebellion.'"
13. The President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While
the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion,
none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual
basis.
Declaration of “state of rebellion”
14. The President has authority to declare a
state of rebellion, which authority springs in the
main from
her powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-
Chief
powers.
15. Statutory authority for such a declaration
may be found in the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987
which authorizes the President to issue
“Proclamations” declaring “a status or condition
of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which
the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to
depend”
16. Nevertheless, in calling out the armed
forces, a declaration of “a state of rebellion” is an
utter
superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the
nation that such a state exists and that the
armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. Such a
declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For
all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not
written.
Warrantless arrest for rebellion
17. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
protected rights.
Indeed, if a state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration
of a state of rebellion could not bring about these
conditions.
18. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners
is not based on the declaration of a 'state of
rebellion.' In
other words, a person may be subjected to a
warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion
whether or not
the President has declared a state of rebellion,
so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless
arrest
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
are present.
Not a declaration of Martial Law
19. The argument that the declaration of a state
of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
law and,
therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no
indication that
military authorities have taken over the functions
of civil government. There is no indication that
the
President has exercised judicial and legislative
powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President
has attempted to exercise or has exercised
martial law powers.
Not an exercise of emergency powers by the
President
20. Neither can the declaration constitute an
indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise
depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
21. The President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
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executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI.
| Page 1 of 6
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards of
the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs.
Energy Secretary Reyes (2015)
Summary Cases:
Subject: Courts may decide cases otherwise
moot and academic; Locus Standi of petitioners
Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards; Former
President Arroyo cannot be impleaded as an
unwilling
co-petitioner; Service Contracts are allowed
under the 1987 Constitution; Agreements
Involving
Technical or Financial Assistance are Service
Contracts with Safeguards; SC-46 is null and
void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the
1987 Constitution; General Law on Oil
Exploration (PD No.
87 not repealed by the enactment of the present
1987 Constitution); President was not the
signatory to
SC-46 and the same was not submitted to
Congress (alter-ego doctrine does not apply
since the
requirements are not mere formalities but
constitutionally placed safeguards); Service
Contract No. 46 in
violation of NIPAS Act and PD 1586 (non-
compliance with EIA and ECC for protected
areas);
Requirement of a law passed by Congress
specifically allowing exploration in the Tanon
Strait, a NIPAS
area
Facts:
In G.R. No. 180771, the “Resident Marine
Mammals” ,as petitioners, are the toothed
whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which
inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon
Strait, a
narrow passage of water situated between the
islands of Negros and Cebu. They are joined by
Gloria
Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio ,
to be collectively known as “the Stewards” who
allegedly
seek the protection of the aforementioned
marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling
co-petitioner
is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for
her express declaration and undertaking in the
ASEAN
Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among
others
In G.R. No. 181527, petitioners are the Central
Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC), a
non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization, established for the welfare of the
marginal
fisherfolk, and other individuals representing the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE),
entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with
Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a Japanese
company. This contract involved geological and
geophysical
studies of the Tañon Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX
formally converted GSEC-102 into Service
Contract No. 46
(SC -46), which allowed the exploration,
development, and exploitation of petroleum
resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers
offshore the Tañon Strait.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted
seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait.
JAPEX
committed to drill one exploration well during the
second sub-phase of the project. Since the well
was to
be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was
declared a
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact
Assessment(EIA)
requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1586.
Having obtained the required Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
JAPEX
| Page 2 of 6
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of
3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the
western
Cebu Province. The drilling began onNovember
16, 2007 and lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners filed the present Petitions for
Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction to enjoin
respondents
from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified
for willful and gross violation of the 1987
Constitution
and certain international and municipal laws.
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) filed a
Motion to Strike its name as a respondent on the
ground that
it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. SOS
claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics
contractor for
JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities in
the Philippines.
JAPEX PH, branch office of JAPEX (Japan)
alleged that it had already stopped exploration
activities in
the Tañon Strait way back in 2008, rendering
this case moot.
The various issues raised by the petitioners may
be condensed into two primary issues: (1)
Procedural
Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No.
180771; and
(2) Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No.
46.
Held:
I. Procedural Issues
Courts may decide cases otherwise moot
and academic
1. This Court makes clear that the “‘moot and
academic principle’ is not a magical formula that
can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case.” Courts have decided cases otherwise
moot and
academic under the following exceptions:
(a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) The exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved;
(c) The constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench,
the bar, and the public; and
(d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review
2. In this case, despite the termination of SC-46,
this Court deems it necessary to resolve these
consolidated petitions as almost all of the
foregoing exceptions are present in this case.
Both petitioners
allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution,
the environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the
respondents’ contested actions are capable of
repetition.
Locus Standi of petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards
3. The primary reason animal rights advocates
and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to
comply with the strict requirements in bringing a
suit to
court. The 1997 Rules of Court demand that
parties to a suit be either natural or juridical
persons, or
entities authorized by law. It further necessitates
the action to be brought in the name of the real
party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative.
4. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach.
While developments in Philippine legal theory
and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as
[granting]
legal standing for inanimate objects, the current
trend moves towards simplification of
procedures and
facilitating court access in environmental cases.
[For instance], the Court [recently] passed the
landmark
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any
Filipino
| Page 3 of 6
citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws.
5. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years
before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently
held that rules of procedure “may be
retroactively applied
to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights
in rules of
procedure.”
6. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce
our environmental laws. It is worth noting that
the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and
not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat
of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.
Former President Arroyo cannot be
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner
7. Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co- plaintiff. - If the consent of
any party who should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant
and the reason therefor shall be stated in the
complaint.
8. When the consent of a party who should be
joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or
she may be
made a party defendant to the case. This will put
the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the
Court,
which can properly implead him or her through
its processes. The unwilling party’s name cannot
be
simply included in a petition, without his or her
knowledge and consent, as such would be a
denial of due
process.
9. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners
Stewards for including former President Arroyo
in their
petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an
unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former
President as
an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in
the performance of the functions of her office, is
contrary to the public policy against embroiling
the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also
demands undivided attention. Therefore, former
President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be
impleaded as
one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name
is stricken off the title of this case.
II. Substantive Issues
Service Contracts are allowed under the 1987
Constitution
10. This Court has previously settled the issue of
whether service contracts are still allowed under
the
1987 Constitution. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we held that the
deletion of the
words “service contracts” in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them
per se. In fact, in that
decision, we quoted in length, portions of the
deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article
XII, they were
actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures
to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the martial law regime.
Agreements Involving Technical or Financial
Assistance are Service Contracts with
Safeguards
11. The phrase “agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance”, referred to in
paragraph 4,
| Page 4 of 6
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution are
in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the
1973
variety, the new ones are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one
hand; and on
the other, the government as principal or “owner”
of the works. In the new service contracts, the
foreign
contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in
the creation
and operation of large-scale mining/extractive
enterprises; and the government, through its
agencies
(DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and
supervision over the entire operation.
12. Such service contracts may be entered into
only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(i) The service contract shall be crafted in
accordance with a general law that will set
standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions
and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(ii) The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times
over
at different levels to ensure that it conforms to
law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(iii) Within thirty days of the executed
agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give
that branch of government an opportunity to look
over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.
SC-46 is null and void for noncompliance
with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution
13. While the Court finds that Presidential
Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a
general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to
SC-46, and
that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
(a) General Law on Oil Exploration (PD No. 87
not repealed by the enactment of the present
1987
Constitution)
14. The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of
1972. This was enacted by then President
Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and
production of
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of
government and/or local or foreign private
resources to
yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people
and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
PD No.
87, although enacted in 1972, before the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be
a valid law
unless otherwise repealed.
15. Likewise, the Court could not simply assume
that PD No. 87 had been impliedly repealed.
Implied
repeals are not lightly presumed. It is a settled
rule that when laws are in conflict with one
another, every
effort must be exerted to reconcile them.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to
be in conflict
with the Constitution, but a construction that it is
in harmony with the Constitution is also possible,
that
construction should be preferred.
16. Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners’
contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the
ground that
there is no general law prescribing the standard
or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements
for
service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction.
17. However, while PD No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a
law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait
is a
| Page 5 of 6
NIPAS area.
(b) President was not the signatory to SC-46
and the same was not submitted to Congress
(alter-ego doctrine does not apply since the
requirements are not mere formalities but
constitutionally placed safeguards)
18. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms
should have conformed not only to the
provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of
the 1987 Constitution. It is basic that the law is
deemed
written into every contract. Although a contract is
the law between the parties, the provisions of
positive
law which regulate contracts are deemed written
therein and shall limit and govern the relations
between
the parties. (see Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of
Appeals)
19. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter
into any service contract for the exploration of
petroleum. SC -46 appeared to have been
entered into
and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the
said
constitutional requirement. Moreover, public
respondents have neither shown nor alleged that
Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of
such contract.
20. The argument that, based on the “alter ego
principle,” the [Energy Secretary's] acts are also
that of
then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot
apply in this case.
21. The alter ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency recognizes the
establishment
of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive
departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the
Chief Executive.
22. While the requirements in executing service
contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII
of the
1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities,
they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As
we have
explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards
put in place by the framers of the Constitution to
“eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the martial law regime.” Thus, they are
not just mere
formalities, which will only render a contract
unenforceable but not void, if not complied with.
They are
requirements placed, not just in an ordinary
statute, but in the fundamental law, the non -
observance of
which will nullify the contract.
23. Our Constitution requires that the President
himself be the signatory of service agreements
with
foreign- owned corporations involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power
cannot be taken lightly. In contrast, under PD
No. 87, it is
required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the
execution of
any contract under said statute. Even if we were
inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal, it
must be
shown that the government agency or
subordinate official has been authorized by the
President to enter
into such service contract for the government.
Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the
President
subsequently approved of such contract
explicitly. None of these circumstances is
evident in the case at
bar.
Service Contract No. 46 in violation of NIPAS
Act and PD 1586 (non- compliance with EIA
and
ECC for protected areas)
| Page 6 of 6
24. True to the constitutional policy that the
“State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature” Congress
enacted the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act
of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to establish a
comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas.
25. Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a
protected area refers to portions of land and
water, set aside
due to their unique physical and biological
significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and
protected against human exploitation. The
Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No.
1234, was set
aside and declared a protected area under the
category of Protected Seascape. A management
plan
was designed to protect and enhance the
permanent preservation of its natural conditions.
Consequently,
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is
required prior to undertaking any activity outside
the
scope of the management plan. Unless an 29. The respondents’ subsequent compliance
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-
under the EIA 46 cannot
system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with and will not cure this violation.
the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be Requirement of a law passed by Congress
implemented. specifically allowing exploration in the Tanon
26. The Environmental Impact Statement Strait, a
System (EISS) was established in 1978 under NIPAS area
Presidential 30. SC-46 was not executed for the mere
Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, purpose of gathering information on the possible
partnership or corporation from undertaking or energy
operating in any resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides
declared environmentally critical project or areas for the parties’ rights and obligations relating to
without first securing an ECC issued by the extraction and petroleum production should oil in
President commercial quantities be found to exist in the
or his duly authorized representative. Under area.
Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as
environmentally critical area, having been the general law upon which a service contract
declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, for
any activity petroleum exploration and extraction may be
outside the scope of its management plan may authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
only be implemented pursuant to an ECC energy
secured after resource in the present case may be allowed
undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of only through a law passed by Congress, since
such activity on its ecological system. the Tañon
27. It is true that the restrictions found under the Strait is a NIPAS area.Since there is no such law
NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However, specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
while extraction in
an exploration done for the purpose of surveying the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation
for energy resources is allowed under Section and utilization may be done in said protected
14 of the seascape.
NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt
from the requirement to undergo an EIA under
Section
12. Stated differently, surveying for energy
resources under Section 14 is not an exemption
from
complying with the EIA requirement in Section
12— instead, Section 14 provides for additional
requisites
before any exploration for energy resources may
be done in protected areas.
28. The public respondents themselves admitted
that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior
to the
second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the
drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that
when
the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon
Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation
was done.
Unless seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon Strait, such
surveys were done in
violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and
Section 4 of PD No. 1586.
| Page 1 of 3
People v. Vera
Summary Cases:
Subject:
Jurisdiction over constitutionality challenge,
Equal protection of laws, Undue delegation of
legislative
powers, Pardon vs Probation
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a
judgment of conviction against Mariano Cu
Unjieng
sentencing him to imprisonment (under
indeterminate sentence) and to pay costs to
Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation. After several
unsuccessful motions, final judgment was
entered on
December 18, 1935.
Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for probation on
November 27, 1936 under the provisions of Act
No. 4221.
The City Fiscal of Manila opposed the granting
of probation and questioned the constitutionality
of Act
No. 4221 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands (i.e., nowhere in the law
is it stated that
it is applicable to a city like Manila; it is indicated
therein that only provinces are covered)
It is also alleged that Act No. 4221 is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of
several provinces because Section 11 of the
said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to
make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective provinces.
Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to
provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom.
Held:
| Page 2 of 3
Constitutionality Issue and Jurisdiction
1. The general rule is that constitutionality
should be raised in the earliest possible
opportunity, which
means during the proceedings in the inferior
court. However, Supreme Court is granted
concurrent
jurisdiction.
2. When the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional
statute, it
may be prevented by a writ of prohibition from
enforcing that statute. Since the CFI of Manila
sitting on
probation proceedings derived its jurisdiction
from Act No. 4221, it cannot determine whether
the statute
granting them jurisdiction is constitutionally valid
or not.
Non-delegation of legislative power
3. The power to make laws is vested in the
legislature and an attempt to abdicate the power
is
unconstitutional and void under the principle
potestas delegata non delegare potest (i.e., no
delegated
powers can be further delegated).
4. The non-delegation principle, however is not
absolute and inflexible and are subject to several
exceptions. The test of the propriety of
delegation lies on the completeness of the
statute in its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of legislature so
much so that nothing is left to the judgment of
the
appointee or delegate of the legislature.
5. The general rule is that an act of legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any
rule or definite standards by which the
administrative board may be guided in the
exercise of
discretionary powers.
6. The assailed Act does not have such rules or
definite standards. It is a “roving commission”
because the provincial board is completely left to
its arbitrary discretion to decide whether or not
they
should apply the Probationary Act. All it has to
do is to decline the appropriate amount needed
for the
salary of the probation officer. This becomes a
virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial
board, and is therefore unconstitutional.
Equal protection of the laws
| Page 3 of 3
7. Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 is also
unconstitutional for being violative of equal
protection of the laws.
8. Due to the undue delegation of legislative
power, there could be arbitrary application of the
law in the
different provinces. Statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in
operation. It is
possible that all the provinces could choose to
have a probationary officer, or all could choose
not to
have one, and then equal protection would be
maintained, but since this is just a likely
outcome, and it is
still possible that there could be obnoxious
discrimination based on each independent
provincial board,
the Supreme Court strikes down Sec. 11 of Act
No. 4221 on this level.
The entire Act should be Voided.
9. Section 11 is inseparable from the entire
Probation Act since it is the provision that
provides for a
probation officer. Without it, what is left is bare
idealism of the system, devoid of any practical
benefit to a
large number of people who may be deserving
of the intended beneficial results of that system.
Pardon versus Probation
10. The Act does not encroach upon the
pardoning power of the Executive.
11. Pardoning power belongs to the executive
and has the effect of granting full liberty.
Probation is
completely different, as it has the effect of
temporary suspension and operates under strict
terms and
conditions. It is a manner of enforcing
punishment, a lighter form of penalty, provided
that such terms
and conditions are deemed complied with.
Therefore, legislative has the power to enact
policies
regarding probation and empowering the
judiciary to decide on that penalty.
| Page 1 of 9
Disini, Jr. vs Secretary of Justice (2014)
Summary Cases:
Subject:
Strict Scrutiny Standard; Overbreadth Doctrine;
“As Applied” challenge in relation to Void for
Vagueness/Overbreadth; Equal Protection
Clause; Right to Privacy, Freedom of
Expression, Child
Pornography; Unsolicited Ads (“Spam”) as
Protected Commercial Speech; Libel; Use of ICT
as a
Qualifying Circumstance; Double Jeopardy;
Fixing of Penalties; Right to Privacy (Real Time
Collection
and Recording of Traffic Data); Right to Property
(preservation and Destruction of Computer
Data); Right
Against Unreasonable Search (Disclosure and
Blocking of Computer Data); Bill of Attainder;
Undue
Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. and
company, as taxpayers, file a Petition for
Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65, seeking to nullify
Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175
(Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012) for violating the
fundamental rights protected under the
Constitution.
Held:
Strict Scrutiny Standard
1. Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) --
which punishes Illegal Access to a computer
system-- fails
to meet the strict scrutiny standard and should
be struck down
2. According to the strict scrutiny standard, a
legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with
the exercise of fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect
class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is
necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to
assess the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
applications to
equal protection.
3. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that
calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard
since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially a
condemnable
act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned
conduct.
4. With respect to ethical hackers, a client’s
engagement of an ethical hacker requires an
agreement
between them as to the extent of the search, the
methods to be used, and the systems to be
tested.
Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission
would
insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).
Overbreadth Doctrine (Data Interference)
5. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers
from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage
data interference, it intrudes into the area of
protected speech and expression, creating a
chilling and
deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
6. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to
state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
| Page 2 of 9
invading the area of protected freedoms.
7. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a
form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying
without right the things that belong to others, in
this case
their computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to
guaranteed freedoms.
8. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have
of course an inherent chilling effect, an in
terrorem effect
or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on
the heads of citizens who are minded to step
beyond
the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent
the State from legislating criminal laws because
they
instill such kind of fear is to render the state
powerless in addressing and penalizing socially
harmful
conduct. Here, the chilling effect that results in
paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3)
clearly
describes the evil that it seeks to punish and
creates no tendency to intimidate the free
exercise of one’s
constitutional rights.
9. Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on
petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no
set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be
valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden
Overbreadth Doctrine (Aiding and Abetting)
10. Section 5 (Aiding and Abetting) in relation
to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography is
unconstitutional.
11. Section 5 renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or
attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating
a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression.
12. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers
of facts
to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting”
constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those
who express themselves through cyberspace
posts,
comments, and other messages.
13. In effect, actions such as “Liking”, or
Commenting” on or “Sharing” an online post that
is found to be
defamatory is not punishable as “aiding or
abetting” a cybercrime offense
14. However, if the “Comment” does not merely
react to the original posting but creates an
altogether
new defamatory story, then that should be
considered an original posting published on the
internet. Both
the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly
punish authors of defamatory publications.
15. But the crime of aiding or abetting the
commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be
permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section
4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse
of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section
4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section
4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section
4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of
expression.The
crime of willfully attempting to commit any of
these offenses is for the same reason not
objectionable.
“As Applied” challenge in relation to Void for
Vagueness/Overbreadth
16. Generally, the void for vagueness doctrine
does not apply to penal statutes. By way of
exception,
when a penal statute encroaches upon the
freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded
on the
| Page 3 of 9
void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
17. In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner
who claims a violation of his constitutional right
can
raise any constitutional ground – absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable
standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. One can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if
he
asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits
one from assailing the constitutionality of the
statute
based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as
the prohibition against third-party standing.
18. But this rule admits of exceptions. A
petitioner may for instance mount a “facial”
challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no
violation of his own rights under the assailed
statute
where it involves free speech on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The
rationale for
this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on
protected speech that comes from statutes
violating
free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or
vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence
Equal Protection Clause
19. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or
cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause in that,
not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user
using his real name to suffer the same fate as
those who
use aliases or take the name of another in satire,
parody, or any other literary device.
20. But there is no real difference whether he
uses his real name or a pseudo-name for it is
the evil
purpose for which he uses the name that the law
condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing
him for
acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others
who are
not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. The challenge to the
constitutionality
of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal
protection is baseless.
Right to Privacy
21. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer Related Identity Theft violates the
constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses
the freedom of
the press.
22. The right to privacy, or the right to be let
alone, was institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution as a
facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
But the Court
acknowledged that the right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty; it is
in itself
fully deserving of constitutional protection.
(Morfe v. Mutuc)
23. Zones of privacy are recognized and
protected in our laws. Two constitutional
guarantees create
these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is
the basis of
the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence.
24. In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.
25. The law punishes those who acquire or use
identifying information (such as name,
citizenship,
residence address, contact number, place and
date of birth, name of his spouse if any,
occupation)
without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners fail to show how government effort to
curb
| Page 4 of 9
computer-related identity theft violates the right
to privacy and correspondence as well as the
right to due
process of law.
26. Neither does the law violate freedom of the
press by restricting the ability of journalists to
access and
publish unrestricted information about a person
in the news. The theft of identity information
must be
intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover,
acquiring and disseminating information made
public by
the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of
theft. Moreover, theft requires the element of
“intent to
gain” which is not present in the situation
described.
27. Also, the charge of invalidity of this section
based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold
water
since the specific conducts proscribed do not
intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech.
Clearly,
what this section regulates are specific actions:
the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of
personal
identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire another’s personal
data.
Freedom of Expression
28. Petitioners claim that Section 4(c)(1) on
Cybersexviolates the freedom of expression
clause of the
Constitution, i.e., that private communications of
sexual character between husband and wife or
consenting adults, which are not regarded as
crimes under the penal code, would now be
regarded as
crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace.
29. The deliberations of the Bicameral
Committee of Congress reveal that the element
of “engaging in
a business” is necessary to constitute the
illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to
punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography
for favor and consideration.
30. In Nogales v. People, the Court weighed the
property rights of individuals against the public
welfare.
Private property, if containing pornographic
materials, may be forfeited and destroyed.
Likewise,
engaging in sexual acts privately through
internet connection, perceived by some as a
right, has to be
balanced with the mandate of the State to
eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of
women.
Child Pornography
31. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography
merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child
Pornography Act
of 2009 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace.
32. As to making the penalty higher by one
degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace, the
intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such
higher
penalty. The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when
uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Unsolicited Ads (“Spam”) as Protected
Commercial Speech
33. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications penalizes the transmission of
unsolicited commercial communications, also
known as “spam.”
34. The court did not uphold the argument that
spams should be outlawed as a form of
nuisance, stating
that what matters is that recipients have the
option of deleting or not reading the spams.
35. Commercial speech is a separate category
of speech which is not accorded the same level
of
protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless
entitled to protection. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expression.
| Page 5 of 9
Libel
36. Libel is not a constitutionally protected
speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation.
37. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation
of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another;
(b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and (d) existence of malice
38. Where the offended party is a public figure,
a showing of actual malice or malice in fact is
required. There is “actual malice” when the
offender makes the defamatory statement with
the
knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. Gross or
even extreme
negligence is not sufficient to establish actual
malice.
39. But, where the offended party is a private
individual, the prosecution need not prove the
presence
of malice. The law explicitly presumes its
existence (malice in law) from the defamatory
character of
the assailed statement. For his defense, the
accused must show that he has a justifiable
reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
40. Article 361 of the Penal Code recognizes
truth as a defense but under the condition that
the
accused has been prompted in making the
statement by good motives and for justifiable
ends.
Use of ICT as a Qualifying Circumstance
41. Section 6 merely makes commission of
existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. There exists a substantial
distinction between crimes committed through
the use of
information and communications technology
(ICT) and similar crimes committed using other
means. In
using ICT, the offender often evades
identification and is able to reach far more
victims or cause greater
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis
for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Double Jeopardy
42. Section 7 provides that “A prosecution
under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, or special laws.”
43. When two different laws define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one does not bar
prosecution of the
other although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some important
act which
is not an essential element of the other.
44. With the exception of the crimes of online
libel and online child pornography, the Court
would
leave the determination of the correct application
of Section 7 to actual cases.
45. Online libel is different. There should be no
question that if the published material on print,
said to
be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa,
that identical material cannot be the subject of
two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation
of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the
other
a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175
involve essentially the same elements and are in
fact one and
the same offense. Online libel under Section
4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already
punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another
means of
publication. Charging the offender under both
laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription
against double jeopardy
46. The same is true with child pornography
committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely
expands the
| Page 6 of 9
ACPA’s scope so as to include identical
activities in cyberspace.
Fixing of Penalties
47. The matter of fixing penalties for the
commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here
the legislature prescribed a measure of severe
penalties for what it regards as deleterious
cybercrimes.
They appear proportionate to the evil sought to
be punished. The power to determine penalties
for
offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or
omission was
but an element of another offense or might just
have been connected with another crime.
Judges can
only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the
legislative department. The courts should not
encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking
body
Right to Privacy (Real Time Collection and
Recording of Traffic Data)
48. Petitioners assail the grant to law
enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data
in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or
provide opportunities for official abuse.
49. The first question is whether or not Section
12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) has
a proper
governmental purpose since a law may require
the disclosure of matters normally considered
private
upon showing (1) that such requirement has a
rational relation to the purpose of the law, (2)
that there is
a compelling State interest behind the law, and
(3) that the provision itself is narrowly drawn.
Compelling state interest and rational
relation
50. The State has a compelling interest in
enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need
to put order
to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for
public good. To do this, it is within the realm of
reason that
the government should be able to monitor traffic
data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of
cybercrimes. The requirement of “real time”
collection is critical because there are many
ways the cyber
criminals can quickly erase their tracks. it is only
real-time traffic data collection or recording and
a
subsequent recourse to court-issued search and
seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting
them out.
51. Privacy is classified into two categories:
Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in
making certain important decisions, while
Informational privacy refers to the interest in
avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. It is the right to
informational privacy that those who oppose
government
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time
seek to protect.
52. Informational privacy has two aspects: (1)
the right not to have private information
disclosed, and
(2) the right to live freely without surveillance
and intrusion.
53. In determining whether or not a matter is
entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid
down a
two-fold test.
(a) subjective test, where one claiming the right
must have an actual or legitimate expectation of
privacy over a certain matter.
(b) objective test, where his or her expectation
of privacy must be one society is prepared to
accept as
objectively reasonable.
54. ICT users must know that they cannot
communicate or exchange data with one another
over
cyberspace except through some service
providers to whom they must submit certain
traffic data that are
needed for a successful cyberspace
communication. The conveyance of this data
takes them out of the
| Page 7 of 9
private sphere, making the expectation to
privacy in regard to them an expectation that
society is not
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Not narrowly drawn
55. Section 12 empowers law enforcement
authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or
record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-
time. But the cybercrime law fails to hint at the
meaning
it intends for the phrase “due cause”, thus
justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to
the use of a
general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits.
56. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law
enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing
expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently
threatens the right of
individuals to privacy. Section 12 is therefore
invalid.
Right to Property (preservation and
Destruction of Computer Data)
57. Petitioners claim that Section 13
(Preservation of Computer Data) constitutes
an undue
deprivation of the right to property. They liken
the data preservation order that law enforcement
authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment
of personal property in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Such
order prevents internet users from accessing
and disposing of traffic data that essentially
belong to them.
58. By virtue of Section 13, the law now requires
service providers to keep traffic data and
subscriber
information relating to communication services
for at least six months from the date of the
transaction
and those relating to content data for at least six
months from receipt of the order for their
preservation.
59. The data that service providers preserve on
orders of law enforcement authorities are not
made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance
of such orders. The process of preserving data
will not
unduly hamper the normal transmission or use
of the same.
60. Similarly, Section 17 (Destruction of
Computer Data) does not violate the user’s
right against
deprivation of property without due process of
law. The user has no clear demandable right to
require
the service provider to have that copy of the data
saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If
he
wanted them preserved, he should have saved
them in his computer when he generated the
data or
received it. He could also request the service
provider for a copy before it is deleted
Right Against Unreasonable Search
(Disclosure and Blocking of Computer Data)
61. Section 14 (Disclosure of Computer Data)
provides that “Law enforcement authorities,
upon
securing a court warrant, shall issue an order
requiring any person or service provider to
disclose or
submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or
relevant data in his/its possession or control ….”
62. Section 14 is being likened to the issuance
of a subpoena. The power to issue subpoenas is
not
exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as
an adjunct of
their investigatory powers.
63. The prescribed procedure for disclosure
would not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure nor would
it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only
after judicial
intervention.
64. Section 19 (Restricting or Blocking
Access to Computer Data), provides that
“When a computer
data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the Department of Justice
shall
| Page 8 of 9
issue an order to restrict or block access to such
computer data.”
65. Computer data, produced or created by their
writers or authors may constitute personal
property.
Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether
while stored in
their personal computers or in the service
provider’s systems
66. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that no search warrant shall issue
except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge. Here, the Government,
in effect, seizes
and places the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of
Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search
warrant.
67. The content of the computer data can also
constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19
operates as
a restriction on the freedom of expression over
cyberspace.
68. Section 19 is void for being violative of the
freedom of expression and against
unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Bill of Attainder
69. Petitioners claim that Section 20 (Non
Compliance) is a bill of attainder since the
mere failure to
comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt,
without regard to situations where non-
compliance would
be reasonable or valid.
70. But since the non-compliance would be
punished as a violation of PD 1829, Section 20
necessarily
incorporates elements of the offense which are
defined therein. If Congress had intended for
Section 20
to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would
not have had to make reference to any other
statue or
provision.
71. The act of non-compliance, for it to be
punishable, must be done “knowingly or
willfully.” There must
still be a judicial determination of guilt, during
which, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may
be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it
applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are
not
struck down by the Court
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
72. Petitioners contend that Congress invalidly
delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC)
the power to formulate a national cybersecurity
plan
without any sufficient standards or parameters
for it to follow.
73. In order to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted
two tests: Under the completeness test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is
to
enforce it. The sufficient standard test
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
74. Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself
when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, the law gave
sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when
it
provided a definition of cybersecurity.
75. Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools,
policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and
| Page 9 of 9
organization and user’s assets. This definition
serves as the parameters within which CICC
should work
in formulating the cybersecurity plan.Further, the
policy of the law is adopted in the interest of law
and
order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard. Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are
likewise
valid.
| Page 1 of 8
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
(2003)
Summary Cases:
Subject:
Statutory Construction (of the Constitution);
Reliance on Foreign Jurisprudence to Interpret
the
Constitution; Judicial Review and Separation of
Powers; Requisites for Exercise of Judicial
Review;
Locus Standi; Class Suits; Impeachment,
meaning of 'to Initiate'; Impeachment case vs
Impeachment
Proceeding
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint
(1st impeachment complaint) was filed by
former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for
“culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust and other high crimes”.
On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being
insufficient in substance, although it was
sufficient in form.
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
complaint or 4
months and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a
2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the
House’s
Secretary General by Representatives Teodoro,
Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”
The 2nd impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/
Impeachment”
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
Due to the events that took place, several instant
petitions were filed against the House of
Representatives, mostly contending that the
filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional
as it violates Article XI Section 5 of the
Constitution that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be
INITIATED against the same official more
than once within a period of one year”; and
that sections
16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 12th Congress
are
unconstitutional as well.
| Page 2 of 8
The House of Representatives argues that
sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
the present Constitution, contending that the
term "
initiate" does not mean "to file", and concludes
that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House
of Representatives, acting as the collective
body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the
interpretation of the term "initiate".
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution
3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:
1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by
any member of the House of Representatives;
or
2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member (of the House of
Representatives); or
3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules (of the 12th Congress)
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated:
1) if there is a finding by the House Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance; or
2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance; or
3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House
Held:
| Page 3 of 8
Statutory Construction (of the Constitution)
1. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible,
the words used in the Constitution must be given
their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed. We look to the language of the
document
itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin.
2. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis
est anima. The words of the Constitution should
be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. The object is to ascertain the reason
which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact
the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason
and calculated to effect that purpose.
3. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is
a -the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered
alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution
and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if
by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together. In other words, the court
must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every
word
operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.
Reliance on Foreign Jurisprudence to
Interpret the Constitution
4. In this case, the House argues that the
impeachment proceedings are outside the scope
of judicial
review in relation to Art XI Section 3(6) of the
constitution which says that the Senate has the
sole power
to try and decide impeachment cases. The
House also relies on American jurisprudence to
support their
claim.
5. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,
"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court]
should
not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of
which are hardly applicable because they have
been
dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs." Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can
trace its origins to that of the United States, their
paths of development have long since diverged.
6. There are also glaring distinctions between
the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment
proceedings.
| Page 4 of 8
impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation
-the Philippine Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to
initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner
of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one
year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same
official.
Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
7. The Court’s power of judicial review is
conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Article VIII
section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
8. Judicial review is an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican
form of
government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for
which it
serves.
9. When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority
over the other departments; rather, it only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the
Constitution to check the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence
to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
10. The power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment
proceedings.
Requisites for exercise of Judicial Review
11. The courts' power of judicial review is
subject to several limitations. In order for the
courts to exercise
its judicial review power, the following requisites
must be established:
| Page 5 of 8
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
Locus Standi
12. Locus standi or legal standing has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is
being challenged.
Citizen standing
13. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the
petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must
be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
that the
person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act
complained of.
14. When the proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
Taxpayer standing
| Page 6 of 8
15. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can
invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury
as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general
interest common to all members of the public. At
all events, courts are vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
16. In this case, the Court opts to grant standing
to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the
Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of
the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure
of public funds.
Legislator standing
17. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which
he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed,
a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in his
office.
Association’s standing
18. While an association has legal personality
to represent its members, especially when it is
composed
of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will
affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by
the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member
of the legal profession of the duty to preserve
the rule of
law and nothing more, although undoubtedly
true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing.
Its interest is
too general. It is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry.
19. However, a reading of the petitions shows
that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by
it.
Class suits
20. When dealing with class suits filed in behalf
of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently
| Page 7 of 8
numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned to enable the court to deal properly
with all
interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the class,
is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all
members of the class whether or not they were
before
the court.
21. Where it clearly appears that not all interests
can be sufficiently represented as shown by the
divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a
class suit
ought to fail.
22. However, since petitioners additionally allege
standing as citizens and taxpayers, their petition
will
stand.
Impeachment, meaning of “to Initiate”
(Impeachment case vs Impeachment
Proceeding)
23. The word "initiate" as it twice appears in
Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means
to file the
complaint and take initial action on it."Initiate" of
course is understood by ordinary men to mean,
as
dictionaries do: to begin, to commence, or set
going.
24. According to Father Bernas, an amicus
curiae, an impeachment proceeding is not a
single act. It is
a complexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a
middle and an end.
(a) The beginning or the initiation is the filing of
the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on
Justice.
(b) The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of
impeachment.
(c) The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate.
25. An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
The
Constitution provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case
to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No
other body can do it. However, before a decision
is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
proceeding must be "initiated."
26. An impeachment proceeding takes place
not in the Senate but in the House and consists
of
several steps:
| Page 8 of 8
(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives;
(2) the processing of this complaint by the
proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint
or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee
rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must
be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and
(4) the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-
third of all
the members.
(5) If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment
are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment
case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached. That is,
he or
she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
27. Father Bernas further explains: The
"impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when
the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is
the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is
the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when
the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by
the Committee, because something prior to that
has
already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation
or beginning. Rather, the impeachment
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the
series of steps that follow. He concludes that
when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," it means
that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
28. Therefore, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., along
with 7 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
on June
2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Teodoro, Jr.
and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within
a one-year period.
| Page 1 of 4
David vs. Arroyo
Summary Cases:
l David vs. Arroyo
Subject:
Moot and Academic, Locus Standi, Political
Question(Calling-out Power), Emergency
Powers of the
President, Facial Challenge (Overbreadth
Doctrine), Facial Challenge (Vagueness),
Section 17, Article
VII (Take Care Power or Control Power of the
President), Section 17, Article XII (Take Over
Power of the
President), 'As Applied' Challenge,Acts of
Terrorism, Right to Peacably Assemble,
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated
the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power
I,
President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) 'declaring a
state of national
emergency'. On the same day, the President
also issued General Order No. 5 implementing
PP 1017
and directing the AFP and PNP to take
appropriate actions 'to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism
and lawless violence'
Thereafter, during the dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant)
Randolf S.
David, a UP professor and newspaper
columnist, and Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list Akbayan.
Also, in the early morning of February 25,
2006,operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP,on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune
offices in
Manila.
One week after the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO No. 5, President Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.
Petitions were filed challenging the
constitutionality of and G.O. No. 5 and PP 1017.
The factual basis cited by the Arroyo camp for
the executive issuances was the alleged
existence of plot
attempts from the political opposition and NPA to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. The plot
attempts were a clear and present danger that
justified the orders.
Held:
Moot and Academic
1. A moot and academic case is one that ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.
2. As a general rule, courts decline jurisdiction
over cases rendered moot. However, courts will
decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the
following situations:
(i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(ii) the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved;
(iii) when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the
bar, and the public;
(iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
3. President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did
not render the present petitions moot and
academic.
During the eight days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers committed illegal
acts in
implementing it. Moreover, all the above
exceptions are present to justify the Court's
assumption of
jurisdiction over the petitions.
Locus Standi
4. In public suits, our courts adopt the 'direct
injury' test which states that the person who
impugns the
validity of a statute must have 'a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result.
5. However,being a mere procedural
technicality, the requirement of locus standi
maybe waived. Thus,
even where the petitioners have failed to show
direct injury,they have been allowed to sue
under the
principle of 'transcendental importance.'
6. Petitioners David, Llamas and the Tribune
suffered 'direct injury' resulting from the 'illegal
arrest' and
'unlawful search' committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.
| Page 2 of 4
7. KMU's assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violated its right to peaceful assembly may be
deemed
sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations
may be granted standing to assert the rights of
their
members. The courts took judicial notice of the
announcement by the Office of the President
banning all
rallies and canceling all permits for public
assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5.
8. The national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) have no legal
standing,having no
direct or potential injury which the IBP as an
institution or its members may suffer as a
consequence of
the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No.5.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the
rule of law istoo general an interest. However, in
view of the transcendental importance ofthe
issue, the
Court vested them with locus standi.
Political Question, Calling-Out Power
9. While the President's 'calling-out' power is a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom,
'this
does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion.'
10. As to how the Court may inquire into the
President's exercise of power, the standard is
not
correctness, but arbitrariness. The test is that
'judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy
the Court
not that the President's decision is correct,' but
that 'the President did not act arbitrarily.'(citing
Lansang v.
Garcia)
11. To show arbitrariness, it must be shown that
the President's decision is totally bereft of factual
basis'.
If this is not proven, the Court cannot thereafter
undertake an independent investigation beyond
the
pleadings.' (citing IBP v Zamora)
12. Petitioners failed to show thatPresident
Arroyo's exercise of the calling-out power, by
issuing PP
1017, istotally bereft of factual basis. The
government presented reports of events
leadingto the
issuance PP 1017 (i.e. escape and threats of
Magdalo group, defectionsin military, etc.) which
was not
contradicted by petitioners. Hence, thePresident
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid.
Facial Challenge (Overbreadth Doctrine)
13. The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in
free
speech cases. PP 1017 is not primarily directed
to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually
a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence.
14. Claims of facial overbreadth are entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to
regulate only 'spoken words' and 'overbreadth
claims have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.'
Facial Challenge (Vagueness)
15. Related to the 'overbreadth' doctrine is the
'void for vagueness doctrine' which holds that 'a
law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its
application.' It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is
also an
analytical tool for testing 'on their faces' statutes
in free speech cases. And like overbreadth,it is
said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only
if it isvague in all its possible applications.
Calling Out Power (First Provision of PP
1017)
16. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
'sequence'
of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
Citing IBP v.
Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that
'whenever
it becomes necessary,' the President may call
the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress
lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.'
17. Considering the circumstances then
prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary
to issue PP 1017.
Owing to her Office's vast intelligence network,
she is in the best position to determine the
actual
condition of the country.
18. There is a distinction between the
President's authority to declare a 'state of
rebellion' and the
authority to proclaim a ?state of national
emergency?. In declaring a state of national
emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling
on the
| Page 3 of 4
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section
17, Article
XII, a provision on the State's extraordinary
power to take over privately-owned public utility
and
business affected with public interest.
19. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.
It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo's
calling-out
power . As such, it cannot be used to justify acts
that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law
can be
done. specifically, (a) arrests and seizures
without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c)
take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief only where
there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
'Take Care' Power (Second Provision of PP
1017)
20. The second provision pertains to the power
of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution.
21. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate
'decrees.' Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial
Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative
power by
issuing decrees. Presidential Decrees are laws
which are of the same category and binding
force as
statutes because they were issued by then
President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.
22. President Arroyo has no authority to enact
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void
and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to
'laws,' she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement
certain laws, such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations
and contracts and the like. She can only order
the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to
its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Take Over Power (Third Provision of PP
1017)
23. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants the President, during a ?state of
emergency?,
authority to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, without
authority or delegation from Congress.
24. A distinction must be drawn between the
President's authority to declare 'a state of
national
emergency' and to exercise emergency powers.
While the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, the exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, requires a delegation
from Congress. The President has no absolute
authority to exercise allthe powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
25. Congressmay grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions,thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
'As Applied' Challenge
26. Courts do not declare statutes invalid merely government units. They have the power to issue
because they may afford an opportunity for permits and to revoke such permits after due
abuse in notice and
the manner of application. The validity of a hearing on the determination of the presence of
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were
general not
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end even notified and heard on the revocation of
desired, not from its effects in a particular case. their permits.
'Acts of Terrorism'
27. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP
to immediately carry out the 'necessary and
appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.'
28. The Court declares that the 'acts of terrorism'
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. Since
there is
no law defining 'acts of terrorism,' it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the
discretion
to determine what acts constitute terrorism.
Consequently,there can be indiscriminate arrest
without
warrants, breaking into offices and residences,
taking over the media enterprises. These acts go
far
beyond the calling-out power of the President.
Yet these can be effected in the name of G.O.
No. 5
under the guise of suppressing acts of terrorism.
| Page 4 of 4
Right to Peacably Assemble
29. David's warrantless arrest was unjustified.
David, et al. were arrested while they were
exercising their
right to peaceful assembly. They were not
committing any crime, neither was there a
showing of a clear
and present danger that warranted the limitation
of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880 were mere afterthought.
30. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to
rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that
'freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent.'
31. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to
regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with
the local