Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1462474517737274
1462474517737274
1462474517737274
David Garland
New York University, USA
Abstract
The last twenty years have seen a remarkable increase in the extent and range of
“punishment and society” scholarship. Together with this quantitative expansion, there
have also been important qualitative developments in research, analysis and explanation –
many of which can be counted as scientific advances. This article specifies a number of
dimensions along which theory, method and data in this field have been improved and also
identifies some continuing challenges and problems. Examples from the literature on the
emergence of “mass incarceration” and the nature of the “war on drugs” are used to
indicate the range of theoretical resources that scholars in this field have developed and to
point to empirical and theoretical questions that remain to be resolved.
Keywords
history, sociology, punishment, theory, mass incarceration, war on drugs
Sociological studies of punishment have been around for a long time, starting in the
1890s with the work of Emile Durkheim, and earlier still if we include the writings of De
Tocqueville or Montesquieu. But it is only in the last 20 or 30 years that the sociology
of punishment has emerged as an organized field of study and Punishment & Society
has played a central role in that development.1 In the essay that follows, I use the
occasion of the journal’s 20th anniversary to reflect on the ways in which the field has
developed in the last two decades, highlighting theoretical and methodological advan-
ces that have been made and detailing some problems that still need to be addressed.
Corresponding author:
David Garland, New York University, 40 Washington Square South, 340 Vanderbilt Hall, New York 10012,
USA.
Email: David.Garland@nyu.edu
Garland 9
The years between 1999 and 2018 saw a remarkable increase in the extent and
range of “punishment and society” scholarship. The movement of new scholars
into the field was partly a reaction to real-world developments and a new deploy-
ment of penal power that shifted penal issues closer to the forefront of social and
political life. But it was also fostered by the subject’s ability to combine intellectual
depth and challenging research questions with the promise of political and social
relevance. Precisely because the sociology of punishment was a newly emerging
field of study, it offered researchers the possibility of investigating large, relatively
unexplored questions and making empirical and theoretical contributions of a
fundamental kind. The result is that “punishment and society” has become, in
the course of a single generation, a rapidly expanding, highly productive field
that attracts increasing numbers of scholars from a range of different disciplines.
Research in this field is also increasingly integrated into the intellectual concerns
of the broader disciplines, with the result that “punishment and society” research-
ers more often approach their topics as specific cases of some larger phenomenon,
rather than a sui generis matter for penological specialists. Mass incarceration, the
penal state, felon disfranchisement, and the over-incarceration of racial minorities
are nowadays discussed as instructive cases of social stratification, state formation,
democratic citizenship, or racial ordering and “punishment and society” scholar-
ship is increasingly being published in the leading generalist journals in sociology,
history, law, and political science (Campbell and Schoenfeld, 2013; Goodman,
2014; Gottschalk, 2014; Savelsberg, 1994; Western and Beckett, 1999).
Along with the expansion of punishment and society scholarship came a certain
normalization of the field as it developed the characteristic attributes of an estab-
lished academic subject area. “Punishment and society” has come to be institu-
tionalized in textbooks, college courses, peer-reviewed journals, conference
sections, membership associations, and academic appointments. The young aca-
demics now publishing their first books were trained in an already-existing field of
graduate study—a formative experience that, for better or worse, was simply not
available to their supervisors a generation ago. The result is a new wave of schol-
arship that is perhaps less ground-breaking in character but is more theoretically
sophisticated, more methodologically mature, and more impressive in the consis-
tency and range of its contributions. If the scholars and researchers of my gener-
ation laid the foundations for a “punishment and society” enterprise in the 1980s
and 1990s, the consolidation and extension of that project has been the work of a
better-trained successor generation.
In simple numerical terms, there has certainly been an increase in the volume of
books, reports, articles, and reviews that address “punishment and society” ques-
tions. But along with this quantitative expansion, there have also been important
qualitative changes in sociology of punishment research, many of which must be
counted as scholarly or scientific advances. In this essay, I describe some of these
advances and point to some continuing problems, focusing particularly on ques-
tions of historical analysis and sociological theorizing—the areas of “punishment
and society” with which I am most familiar. Examples from the literature that
10 Punishment & Society 20(1)
Advances
There seems little doubt that, as a general matter, punishment and society schol-
arship has made considerable intellectual progress, becoming more systematic in
its methods, more consistent in its use of data, more theory-driven in its research,
and increasingly historical and comparative in approach. But what specifically has
changed? And which of these changes constitutes an intellectual advance? Consider
the following observations:2
Contemporary history and critical histories of the present have become a dominant
current.4 This shift of focus does not, in itself constitute a theoretical advance; and
insofar as some work of this kind comes close to being a Whig history in reverse,
projecting contemporary politics and meaning back into the past, it can be meth-
odologically problematic (Garland, 2016). But to the extent that these historical
studies highlight the complex paths and struggles out of which the present
emerged, they extend the empirical basis for sociological theorizing and encourage
a greater attention to detail, to variation and to contingency in the development
of general explanatory accounts (see Campbell and Schoenfeld, 2013; Goodman
et al., 2017).
with similar ambitions, written today, would likely be much more case- and place-
specific, more comparative, and more middle range in its theorizing.
With occasional exceptions—such as Phillip Smith’s attempt to rethink the
sociology of punishment through a neo-Durkheimian lens (Garland, 2009;
Smith, 2008)—contemporary theorizing addresses more closely specified, middle-
range phenomena. The result is that today’s theoretical debates are more focused
and more particular. They argue over the penal implications of neoliberalism
(Abbott, 2011; Wacquant, 2009); the analytical power of the “New Jim Crow”
(Alexander, 2010; Forman, 2012); or the character of American or Scandinavian
exceptionalism (Pratt, 2008; Reitz, 2017; Scharff-Smith and Ugelvik, 2017); not
about the relationship between punishment and social structure broadly conceived.
General theory has not disappeared—it continues to orient enquiry and to sensitize
analysts to recurring relationships and overarching structures. And the works of
Pierre Bourdieu and Giorgio Agamben have been added to the repertoire (Page,
2011, 2012; Spencer, 2009). But general theory is no longer expected to do the fine-
grained analytical work required for the explanation of specific penal practices and
institutions.7
Increased quantification
In recent years, the field has begun to attract scholars with highly developed quan-
titative skills who utilize sophisticated statistical techniques and who develop
and analyze large data sets (e.g. Manza and Uggens, 2006; Raphael and Stoll,
2013; Sutton, 2004; Travis et al., 2014; Western, 2006). The result has been an
improvement in the precision of empirical claims and in the analysis of the avail-
able data. But better quantification has also led to the development of theoretical
insights and the opening of new lines of inquiry. We now know much more about
the life-time effects of imprisonment on offenders and their families; about the
impact of a criminal record on life course events (marriage, employment, family
formation, health, etc.); and on the role that mass imprisonment plays in social
stratification and in labor markets (Western, 2006; Wakefield, 2010). Similarly,
Manza and Uggens (2006) transformed our understanding of the phenomenon
of felon disfranchisement when they demonstrated statistically that Florida’s mas-
sive exclusion of ex-felons from the voting-both had altered the outcome of the
November 2000 US Presidential election. Other quantitative studies have shown
that the determinants of penal outcomes can be understood in detail only if pros-
ecution and sentencing patterns are analyzed at a quite granular level (Greenberg
and West, 2008; Pfaff, 2017). Quantitative studies have enabled patterns of covari-
ation in penal and welfare policy to be established, lending credence and specificity
to theoretical claims that had previously been conjectural (Beckett and Western,
2001; Downes and Hansen, 2006; Garland, 1985, 2017). And quantitative estimates
of the labor market impact of mass imprisonment have opened up new interpre-
tations of the economic significance of American penal policy (Western and
Beckett, 1999).
Increased specificity
Whereas early sociological contributions to the field often wrote in broad-brush
terms about punishment and penal history, describing penality’s forms and func-
tions in a general way and making historical claims in relation to whole nations or
regions (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 2001; Melossi and Pavarini, 1981; Rothman,
1971) more recent work has been more fine-grained, using local sources and spe-
cific cases to complicate and revise more general theses and national narratives.
Histories of “American” punishment, based on secondary sources and pitched at a
high level of generality (Garland, 2001; Rothman, 1971) are now supplemented—
and significantly revised—by histories of specific states (Barker, 2009; Campbell
and Schoenfeld, 2013; Campbell, 2012; Goodman, 2014; Lynch, 2009; Page, 2011).
Accounts of “British” penal policy are being rethought in the light of work on
Scottish criminal justice and research on Northern Ireland’s penal system
14 Punishment & Society 20(1)
began in earnest with a special issue of this journal (Punishment & Society, 2000)
and which has since attracted a great deal of attention and many talented young
scholars—should enable me to show how the field has advanced theoretically and
methodologically and to identify some of the problems we still have to address.
Recent historical studies—many of them written by historical sociologists or
institutionalist political scientists—have played a notable role in advancing our
analytical understanding of the causal dynamics of penal change (Barker, 2009;
Campbell and Schoenfeld, 2013; Goodman, Page and Phelps, 2017; Forman, 2017;
Fortner, 2015; Lynch, 2009; Perkinson, 2010, etc.) These studies have worked at
the local rather than the national level, focusing on carefully selected states, uti-
lizing archival sources, and developing contrasts and comparisons that have
prompted significant revisions to the broad historical narratives that previously
shaped our understanding. More importantly, these studies have often been
theory-driven—undertaken in ways that tested existing explanations as well as
extending their empirical reach—and analytical—i.e. designed to identify causal
processes together with the recurring or contingent patterns of opportunity, incen-
tive, value, and action that produced them. Reflections on the cumulative findings
of these historical studies (Campbell and Schoenfeld, 2013; Goodman et al., 2017)
have gone beyond the emphasis on complexity and contingency (the historian’s
usual rebuke to the sociologist) to identify patterns of agency, interest-group for-
mation, and opportunity structures and to theorize about recurring social process-
es and causal mechanisms. The result is that we now possess a more analytical
and theoretically articulated account of penal change, and not just a more com-
plicated or variegated one. Here are some of the lessons we can draw from this
body of work.
First of all: the importance of establishing the phenomenon, which is to say,
providing a detailed, factual account of what exactly it is that needs to be
explained.11 This preliminary, descriptive work serves not just to dispense with
pseudo-factual misconceptions—a crucial task for any research—but also to move
inquiry in an empirically grounded direction and provide a basis upon which to
choose between competing explanatory hypotheses.12
From the late 1990s onward, scholars have been concerned to explain the
remarkable growth in US rates of imprisonment. Over time, we have come to
see that that “the rise of mass incarceration” (as this development is often
described) is in fact a cumulative outcome of multiple processes operating at dif-
ferent scales, in different jurisdictions, in different historical periods, prompted by
different events and motivations. That most of these processes moved in the same
direction, expanding and intensifying the deployment of penal power, and
that these expansionist processes continued for almost four decades, can make it
appear that “mass incarceration” has been generated by one, continuous, over-
arching causal process, such as neoliberalization or the New Jim Crow. But a more
fine-grained analysis, focused on historical and geographical variation, and on
system-level processes, makes it clear that such assumptions are unwarranted,
for the following reasons:
20 Punishment & Society 20(1)
time, and with no great uniformity. In some instances, the federal government took
the lead, providing model legislation and incentives for states to follow—as with
the “war on drugs” or “truth in sentencing.” At other times, the US Congress
passed laws that emulated legislation already enacted in the states—such as the
federal sentencing guidelines or the later Three-Strikes laws. There were, however,
phases of development: periods of time in which particular reform initiatives dom-
inated legislative agendas across the nation—notably the shift toward determinate
sentencing in the mid-1970s; the War on Drugs of the mid-1980s, and the tough on
crime legislation of the 1990s (see Campbell and Schoenfeld, 2013; Zimring, 2001;
Tonry, 2016).
The best work describes these three periods, each of which was characterized by
certain policies and practices that were subsequently disrupted by new waves of
reform undertaken by identifiable actors with specific motives and structured
opportunities for action. Each era provided a platform for the development of
the next, and for almost four decades, prison numbers continued to rise, even as
different kinds of offences and offenders shaped the expanding population. In each
successive phase, a sequence of developments occurred. New actors emerged, as
interest groups formed to represent crime victims, prison guards, local prosecutors,
and commercial corrections companies. New policy goals came to the fore: just
deserts and determinate sentencing; incapacitation; expressive punishment; or
punitiveness. New reform agendas developed: the sentencing guideline movement,
the war on drugs; the anti-recidivism of “three-strikes” or “truth in sentencing’; or
the cost-saving punitiveness of southern-style “cheap and mean” prison regimes.
New incentives and funding mechanisms were established—federal subventions to
fund the war on drugs; forfeiture laws; funding to enable prison building if states
agreed to restrict early release; and state financing devices enabling private prison
building without the need for a public bond approval or new taxes. New political
imperatives were established—a stance of “tough on crime” became a prerequisite
for anyone running for public offence; policies that favored the South and
Southwest became popular as these regions grew in electoral and political signif-
icance. New feed-back loops emerged—as developments at the federal level filtered
down to the states, and trends in state governance were taken up at the national
level (Campbell and Schoenfeld, 2013; Gottschalk, 2014). There is also some evi-
dence to suggest that America may currently be entering a new phase of penal
development, with slowed rates of overall growth; new processes of decarceration;
a growing public awareness of costs and injustices associated with “mass incarcer-
ation’; and the formation of coalitions that aim to reduce prison populations and
correctional spending (Gottschalk, 2014; Aviram, 2015).
they have definite limitations. They don’t capture the multi-layered texture of
actor’s meanings, the complexity of historical events, the role of contingency,
the operation of counter-forces, or the variations of local outcome. In the
nature of things, high-level narratives conceal as much as they reveal and only
fulfill their explanatory potential when they are supplemented by waves of subse-
quent research that correct their mistakes and fill in their omissions. Large-scale
structural forces—institutionalized racism, federalist political arrangements, a lib-
eral market economy, cultural conservativism—are always modified and inflected
as one moves closer to the penal action. These overarching structures are modified,
obstructed, deflected, enabled, or amplified in their effects by each impacting on
the other; by the intermediate institutions and organized fields through which they
operate; and by the countless on-the-ground actors who align themselves with, or
offer resistance to, the opportunities and obstacles that these structures place in
their way.
When we think of the social causes of penal outcomes we should always bear in
mind that social causes only affect penal outcomes to the extent that they operate on
and through legal or criminal justice processes—as we saw just now when discussing
proximate causes. Racism, neoliberalism, populist punitiveness, and so on only ever
impact penal outcomes to the extent that they enlist, realign or somehow change the
conduct of actors and decision-makers in the penal process. And that penal process
is itself complicated—involving multiple actors and decision-points—and capable of
generating effects that are unintended and counter-intuitive. Only detailed work can
illuminate how and why things turn out as they do.
that the war on drugs is unlikely to have been the lead cause of prison growth. It
also suggests that the release of non-violent, low-level drug offenders—a standard
proposal of many reformers—is unlikely to make a big impact on prison popula-
tions, however appropriate that reform would be (Gottschalk, 2014a).
Secondly, researchers have gone behind the slogan—a “war on drugs”—to
examine the political and legal phenomena to which it refers. Here again, details
matter. Commentators sometimes point to President Richard Nixon as the origi-
nator of the war, citing remarks he made in 1971 to that effect and connecting it to
the Southern Strategy of the Republican Party with its racialized intent. But in fact
Nixon’s approach to drug offending was much less punitive than this suggests
(Hinton, 2016) and it was not until the mid-1980s that a Republican Congress
under Ronald Reagan passed its landmark Anti-Drug Abuse laws. Similarly, many
scholars point to the passage of New York State’s Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973
as the beginning of that “war” and the start of a nation-wide pattern. But in the
years immediately following that enactment, the imprisonment of drug offenders in
New York actually declined (Pfaff, 2017).
Thirdly, there is the question of the political motivations that drove the crimi-
nalization of drug possession and sale. Here again, more detailed historical research
suggests that these policies cannot be reduced to a simple story of right-wing racial
politics. A crucial observation here is that the “War on Drugs” was in fact sup-
ported, initially at least, by African American community leaders and political
representatives (Forman, 2017; Fortner, 2015; Kohler-Hausmann, 2017). For
these communities, illegal drug use and drug markets were not crimes without
victims: they were a dangerous blight that brought robbery, burglary, violence,
and addiction to their neighborhoods. And while the communities typically called
for public health and pro-social policies, tougher policing and punishment were
usually the only responses on offer (Forman, 2017).
If the war on drugs was undertaken on a pretextual basis, there is reason to
think that an important motive was not to oppress Blacks but instead to control
violence—including violence affecting African American communities and African
American victims. According to writers such as Stuntz (2011), the main aim of
anti-drug legislation was to routinize the apprehension of violent offenders who
could then be convicted using lower standards of proof but nevertheless faced with
high penalties. As a crime-control tactic, the new focus on drug offences had a
series of tactical advantages. To prosecute crimes of violence, the authorities must
generally rely on witnesses coming forward and mens rea being proved. In contrast,
drug possession and possession with intent to distribute were virtually strict liabil-
ity offences that could be proactively addressed by police stops or by “buy and
bust” methods. For the proponents of the new drug laws, the war on drugs was to
be a more effective legal means of targeting violent offenders, gang leaders, orga-
nized criminals, and “drug czars.” Just as Al Capone had been convicted of tax
evasion, violent offenders could be brought to justice on account of their involve-
ment in drugs. For many of its supporters, the war on drugs was a proxy war,
Garland 25
directed not at recreational drug users but at the violent criminals working in this
illegal market (Stuntz, 2011).
An additional motivation for the war on drugs—perhaps the most significant
one in the long-term—derived from the fact that a focus on drug control provided
the federal government with a plausible basis on which to become more involved in
crime control, which by the 1980s was a social problem of great concern to large
sectors of the American public. Historically, criminal justice had been a matter for
local government and the US constitution limited the extent to which the federal
authorities could involve themselves in the business of crime-control. However,
such was the political salience of crime in the 1960s that federal politicians looked
for ways to involve themselves more actively, and thereby reap some of the polit-
ical rewards of responding to public concerns (Gottschalk, 2006; Hinton, 2016).
This involvement initially took the form of establishing federal agencies—such as
the LEAA—to co-ordinate or fund local law enforcement. But the criminalization
of drug use opened up a more direct federal involvement because drugs could be
deemed to be a form of interstate commerce—a domain over which the federal
government always had jurisdiction. Waging a war on drugs was, for the US
Congress and the Presidency, a means of circumventing constitutional constraints
on a federal politics of law and order.
From the 1980s on, Congress passed anti-drug abuse laws and federal prose-
cutors, federal courts and federal penitentiaries enforced them with great vigor.
But ultimately the war on drugs would be fought at the local level, by local police
and prosecutors, so the federal authorities contrived to incentivize local action by
providing generous subsidies for local drug-war enforcement and, notably, by
passing forfeiture legislation that allowed local law enforcement to seize and
retain cash or property deemed to be the proceeds of drug crime. Over time,
these lucrative incentives prompted a massive over-reach of enforcement: a drug
war supposedly aimed at serious violent offenders eventually swept up a mass of
petty offenders and low-level street dealers – most of them African American – and
sentenced them to prison terms that bore little relation to their culpability or public
threat (Hinton, 2016; Lynch, 2016; Tonry, 2016).
Today, the crime-control impacts of the war on drugs remain uncertain, even as
its racial impacts become more undeniable. We lack good data bearing upon that
question other than the street prices of banned drugs and the number of arrests—
the latter being a measure of police effort rather than underlying crime rates. So
though we can say that the rise in imprisonment rates has coincided in time with
the decline in property crime and violence, we can make no such claim about the
impact of the war on drugs in rates of illegal drug possession, sale, and
manufacturing.13
Conclusion
I have focused on the advances of the last 20 years but of course problems remain
and challenges await us. If the literature on the historical sociology of mass
26 Punishment & Society 20(1)
incarceration illustrates some of the advances that have been made, there are many
other areas where theory and research are much less well developed. A case in
point concerns the comparative question of why, on most dimensions, American
punishment appears harsher than that of comparable nations. This question
broadens the object of analysis beyond rates of imprisonment since America is
also an outlier in its use of extreme penalties, sentence lengths, collateral conse-
quences, correctional supervision, and in its limited use of monetary sanctions as a
penalty for ordinary crime (Garland, 2017). And being a comparative question this
research inquiry is rather more difficult to address than the question of change over
time that I have been discussing. For one thing, the underlying problems are dif-
ferent: history is about the tracing of actions and events and consequences—at the
level of the individual, the group, and the institution or structure. But tracing
differences of extent, intensity and scale across nations is a matter of identifying
factors that press toward high rates as opposed to low; of identifying risk factors or
preventatives; and of observing incentives and facilitators as well as limits or
brakes. And these various factors and processes are interactive. It is quite likely
that the explanation of American distinctiveness will not be a matter of causal
processes that are unique or distinctive but instead of forces and factors that more
powerfully motivate these processes or which weaken the counter-forces that limit
the growth of punishment elsewhere. Another basic difficulty is that we currently
lack good comparable data—indeed we haven’t even settled on a set of metrics.
And finally, although we have a series of plausible explanatory frameworks, each
of which is supported by empirical evidence of various kinds, these are all pitched
at a macro-sociological level and have yet to specify—let alone empirically prove—
the mechanisms, processes, and intermediating linkages through which the macro
structures come to shape penal patterns and outcomes (Garland, 2017).
Examples of such under-developed fields could be multiplied, but the point is
clear. For all the important advances made in the sociology of punishment over the
last 20 years, there is no shortage of challenging work awaiting us in the years
ahead.
Acknowledgment
I am grateful to Mona Lynch for helpful comments and suggestions and also to the Filomen
D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at NYU School of Law.
Notes
1. See Simon and Sparks (2012) “Introduction” for an account of the formation of
the field.
2. These reflections are not based on a systematic empirical “sociology of knowledge”
study (such as Abend (2006) has presented for sociology; Savelsberg (2004) for
criminology) but are personal impressions I have formed working continuously in
this field over a lengthy period of time. I will focus here on the sociology of pun-
ishment but readers should bear in mind that there are today many disciplines that
Garland 27
are brought to bear on “punishment and society”: political science; law; history;
economics; African-American studies; cultural theory; ethnography; political econ-
omy; and comparative social policy to mention the most prominent.
3. For an influential manifesto, see Thompson (2010). Of course historical studies of
other periods also continue to appear: McLennan (2008), Guy Geltner (2015).
4. See the special issues of two American historical journals—on the rise of the car-
ceral state: “Historians of the Carceral State” Journal of American History 102/1
(2015) and “Urban America and the Carceral State” Journal of Urban History 41/5
(2015). On the history of the present, see Garland (2014).
5. Scull’s work on decarceration (Scull, 1977) was a notable example of how analysts
can sometimes get it wrong.
6. See Whitman (2003) on the limits of what he terms the sociology of modernity
when dealing with specific cases, national histories, and local cultures of
punishment.
7. For a classic statement of the limits of general theory and the place of middle-range
theorizing in scientific development, see Merton (1996b).
8. On analytical sociology, see Bearman and Hestrom (2009).
9. Compare the comparative study of welfare states—comparative social policy—
which emerged decades before the sociology of punishment and which has achieved
an impressive level of maturity, as measured in these terms.
10. The processes to which I am pointing here are, of course, the subject matter of the
literature on the sociology of social problems (for an overview, see Best, 2015).
Theoretical understandings of how social problems are constructed, derived from
that literature, can therefore be mobilized as an element of the sociology of crime
and punishment.
11. On establishing the phenomenon, see Merton (1987) and Garland (2010).
As Merton observes: “Strongly held theoretical expectations or ideologically
induced expectations can lead to perceptions of historical and social ‘facts’ even
when these are readily refutable by strong evidence close at hand” (1987: 4).
12. Recurring misconceptions in this field include over-estimations of the impact of the
war on drugs on the prison population (which assume that the federal
prison population is typical of the state prisons when in fact it is quite different);
of the role of private prisons and the prison-industrial complex (only about 8% of
prison beds are commercial; commercial corrections took off long after the prison
build-up was underway); about the role of DNA excupatory evidence in the 150
plus death row exonerations (fewer than 20 have been based on DNA evidence),
and so on.
13. We need to remember that drug crime is not one of the index crimes reported by
the FBI and does not feature in the usual crime trends data. Pfaff (2017) gives
broad national estimates; Beckett et al. (2005) carefully estimate patterns for
Seattle.
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