INDIAN LAW OF EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE LAW ASSIGNMENT

 PROJECT-PROFILE

‘DOCTRINE
OF
ESTOPPEL’
Submitted to- Submitted by-
Gaurav Gupta Sir Azeem Mian
JMI B.A.LL.B (Hons.) Regular
VIIth Semester, 4th Year
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I take this opportunity to express my profound
gratitude and deep regards to my teacher Mr.
Gaurav Gupta sir for his exemplary guidance,
monitoring and constant encouragement
throughout the course of this assignment. The
blessing, help and guidance given by his time to
time shall carry me a long way in the journey of
life on which I am about to embark.

I also take this opportunity to express a deep

sense of gratitude to my friends for cordial
support, valuable information and guidance,
which helped me in completing this task through
exhaustive research.

AZEEM MIAN!
 TABLE OF CONTENT
 Meaning
 Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel
 Nature of Estoppel
 Kind of Estoppel
1. Estoppel of record or quasi-record
 Estoppel by record
 Lack of jurisdiction.
 The judgment obtained by fraud
2. Estoppel by deed
 Effects of recitals
 Fraud, force or forgery
3. Estoppel by matter in pais
 Conduct amounting to negligence.
4. Estoppel by election.
 Distinction between estoppel and Res Judicata
 Distinction between Estoppel and waiver
 Section 115
1. Representation- Necessary elements of-
 Intention to deceive.
 Who can take advantage of representation?
 Representation must be of existing facts.
 Estoppel should be pleaded
 Representation may include representation of law
 Representation must be unambiguous
 Result must not be ultra Vires
 Representation induced by party complaining
 Truth known to both the parties.
2. Intention of being acted upon.
3. The representation acted upon
 Representation revocable
 Prejudice
 Representation by an agent
 Intention to deceive
 Representation by statement
 Estoppel by conduct
 Who can take advantage of representation
 Estoppel- A rule of evidence
 Estoppel may have the effect of creating rights.
 No estoppel against statute and law
1. Tax laws
2. Clear provision of law cannot be evaded
3. The principles to determine maxim ‘no estoppel against statute’
 Estoppel and insurance Co.
 Estoppel and educational institution
 Estoppel and tenancy
 Estoppel and Employer
 Estoppel and employees
 Estoppel- not a bar to adjudicate legality of contract
 Estoppel not to apply to challenge by unsuccessful candidates the
qualifications for serviced provide by executive instructions.
 Estoppel and selection board
 Acquiescence and estoppel
 Estoppel and development Authority
 Estoppel and inquiry officers
 Promissory estoppel
 Estoppel does not bar filing of writ due to withdrawal of earlier writ petition.
 Estoppel by election or approbation and reprobation.
A. Approbation and reprobation in respect of remedies
B. Estoppel by election through family arrangement etc.
C. Applies also to the proceedings in court.
D. A party applying for sitting aside abatement cannot plead no
abatement.
E. To the successive stages of the same suits and one suit and other
F. Something done or some advantages taken under an order or decree.
G. Estoppel about jurisdiction of courts
H. No estoppel when the court had no jurisdiction.
I. Acceptance of cost
J. Cost accepted under protest
 K. cost accepted by counsel not authorized
 Admitting a person to be entitled to a legal benefit.
 Silence
 Waiver.
 Estoppel by negligence
 Estoppel mutual
 Origin and development of promissory estoppel
 Promissory estoppel as distinguished from real estoppel or actual estoppel
 Scope and object of promissory estoppel
 Estoppel against public and government.
 Application of doctrine of promissory estoppel to government
 Promissory estoppel creates right to sue.
 Promissory estoppel not to apply to ultra vires acts
 Estoppel subject to public interest.
 Promissory estoppel- No alteration of position within short time.
 Promissory estoppel not to apply in public interest.
 Section 116- Estoppel of tenant and of license of person in possession.
1. Scope
2. Tenant cannot deny the title of landlord
3. When the landlord cannot plead estoppel
4. During the continuance of the tenancy
5. Meaning of ‘during the continuance of tenancy’
6. At the beginning of the tenancy
7. Relation of landlord and tenant
8. Licence
9. Estoppel between mortgager and mortgagee.
 Section 117- estoppel of acceptor of bill of exchange, bailee or licensee.
 Conclusion
 Bibliography
 ESTOPPEL
MEANING/NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION
Meaning- “There is said to be an estoppel where a party is not allowed to say that a certain
statement of facts is untrue, whether in reality it is true or not. Estoppel, or "conclusion" as it is
frequently called by the elder authorities, may therefore be defined as a disability whereby a party
is precluded from alleging or proving legal proceeding that a fact is otherwise than it has been
made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability”.
Examples
(1) A trustee mortgaged the trust properties alleging that he was the owner of the properties.
The mortgagee, in good faith and without notice that the properties belonged to the trust
took the mortgage. He (the mortgagee) obtained a decree and the properties were sold. The
trustee subsequently filed a suit to recover the property from the auction-purchaser on the
ground that the properties were the trust properties and he had no power to mortgage them.
It was held that the trustee was estopped from saying that he was not the owner of the
property though it might be true.
(2) Where a tenant, having only non-transferable interest in a holding, sells it alleging that he
has a transferable right in it, he cannot be allowed, afterward to say that he had no
transferable interest in the property.
(3) A owned a plot measuring 3 Biswas. He mortgaged 1 Biswas of it to B. Subsequently in
execution of a money decree2 Biswas of the land was put to auction and it was purchased
by C. The mortgagee B accepted a part of sale consideration towards his mortgage money.
Giving out by this conduct of his that the area mortgaged to him was also sold. Afterwards
B sued C for the sale of 1 Biswas under his mortgage. It was held that he was estopped by
his own conduct.
Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel- The doctrine of estoppel applies in cases affecting rights.
Estoppel can be described as rule of creating or defeating rights.
Though estoppel is described as merely rule of evidence it may have the effect of creating
substantive rights as against person estopped. Estoppel which enable a party against another party
to claim right of property which in fact he did not possess is described as estoppel by negligence
or by conductor by representation or by holding out ostensible authority. Estoppel may itself be
foundation of right as against the person estopped.1
Nature of estoppel- Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence but the whole concept is
more correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law.

1
B.L.Shreedhar v. K.M. Mhmarireddy, AIR 2003 SC 578.
Kind of estoppel.
Estoppel properly so called is of four kinds, namely
(1) Estoppel by matter of record or quasi record,
(2) Estoppel by deed,
(3) Estoppel in pais i.e. estoppel by conduct, and
(4) Estoppel by election.
(1) Estoppel of record or quasi-record- Estoppel of record or quasi record arises (1) where an
issue of fact has been judicially determined, in a final manner between the parties by a tribunal
having jurisdiction concurrent or exclusive in the matter, and same issue comes directly in question
in subsequent proceedings between the same parties; (2) Where the first determination was by a
court having exclusive jurisdiction, and the same issue comes incidentally a question in subsequent
proceeding between the same parties; (3) in some cases where an issue of fact affecting the status
of a person or thing has been necessarily determined in final manner as a substantive part of a
judgment in rem of a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine that status, and the same issue comes
directly in question in subsequent civil proceeding between any party whatever.
Where the earlier decision is that of a court of record, the resulting estoppel is said to be “of
record”; where it is of any other tribunal, whether constituted by agreement of parties or otherwise,
the estoppel is said to be of quasi-record.
Estoppel by Record- Estoppel by record is created by a final judgment. A party relying on
estoppel by record should be able to show that the matter has been determined by judgment in its
nature final. The word ‘final’ here is used as opposed to ‘interlocutory’. A judgment which
purports finally to determine rights is nonetheless effective for the purposes of creating an estoppel
because it is liable to be reversed in appeal.
Estoppel by record in the name of res judicata has been dealt with in Civil Procedure Code.
Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act provide for the admissibilities of previous judgments. As
stated above there are two types of judgments: (1) judgments in rem, and (2) judgments in
personam. A judgment in rem may be defined as a judgment of a court of a competent jurisdiction
determining the status of a person or a thing; the judgment of a court of probate establishing a will
or creating the status of an administration, or divorce court dissolving or establishing a marriage
are examples of judgments in rem. A judgment in rem is binding on all the persons whether they
are party to proceeding or not.
The judgments in personam are those judgments which determine the rights of the parties to the
suit or the proceedings. They are binding on the parties or their privies.
Lack of jurisdiction- In order that estoppel by record may arise out of a judgment, the court which
pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to do so. The lack of jurisdiction deprives the
judgment of any effect whether by estoppel or otherwise.
Section 44 of Evidence Act lays down that if a judgment of a court is filed in a case to prove
estoppel it may be shown that the court delivering the judgment had no jurisdiction or that it was
obtained by fraud.
The judgment obtained by fraud- A judgment obtained by fraud or collusion, may be treated as
nullity and it will not work as an estoppel.
(2) Estoppel by Deed- Where, in a deed made between party and verified by their seals, there is a
statement of fact, an estoppel results, and is called estoppel by deed, if upon the true construction
of the deed the statement is that of both or all the parties, the estoppel is binding on each party; if
otherwise, it is only binding on the party making it. It seems that an estoppel also arises upon a
deed, all the mode of its execution being equally solemn with that of deed made inter parties.
Estoppel by deed is based on the principle that when a person has entered into a solemn
engagement by deed under his hand, he shall not be permitted to deny any matter which he has so
asserted. It is rule of evidence according to which certain evidence is taken to be of so high and
conclusive a nature as to admit of no contradictory proof.
Effect of recitals- A person is bound by the recitals in a deed to which he is a party. Whether they
refer to specific facts and are certain, precise and unambiguous he is not bound by inferences which
may be drawn from the statements on deed. But if the party does not rely on the estoppel by recital
and enters into an issue he cannot rely on the doctrine of the estoppel. 2
Fraud, force or forgery- In so far as a deed is void on the ground that it was obtained by fraud,
force or other foul practice, or a forgery, no estoppel can arise.
(3) Estoppel by matter in pais- Where one has either by words or conduct made to another a
representation of fact, either with knowledge of its falsehood or with the intention that it should be
acted upon, or has so conducted himself that another would, as a reasonable man, understand that
a certain representation of fact was intended to be acted on, and that other has acted on the
representation and thereby altered his position to his prejudice, an estoppel arises against the party
who made the representation, and he is not allowed to cover that the fact is otherwise than he
represented it to be.
Conduct amounting to negligence- The conduct amounting to representation may be negligence.
Negligence can only give rise to an estoppel When there is a duty, upon the person tried to be
estopped, towards the person complaining to use due care.
A branch of estoppel frequently in vogue in modern time and presenting itself in infinite variety is
that form of estoppel in pais which is generally known as estoppel by representation. Estoppel in
pais is now known as estoppel by c0nduct or representation. An estoppel in pais is that which
though not existing as a matter of record, or under the solemnity of a deed may nevertheless under
the circumstances conclude equally with the higher species of averment. It may exist in writing
not being under seal. The estoppel as it is commonly called, is a rule of evidence. A compromise
may work as an estoppel. The doctrine of estoppel in pais is now widely applied to an infinite

2
Rajendra Ram v. Devendra Das, AIR 1970SC 268.
varieties of cases. It embraces all the acts or statements of a party upon the faith of which another
party had been led to act and to change his position and which it would be unfair to permit the first
party to deny.
(4) Estoppel by election- Where the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease-deed revealed
that the allotment was made on "as is-where is" basis which was accepted by the respondent-
company without any protest, whatsoever and the lease-deed further enabled the appellant to
collect charges in case it decided to provide the approach road otherwise, it would be the obligation
of the respondent company to develop its own infrastructure and the same would include
development of the access road, the appellant was not under any obligation to provide the access
road. The Supreme Court held A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot-blow cold", "fast and
loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or
conveyance, or order upon himself. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species
of estopels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be
precluded by way of his actions, or conduct or silence when it is duly to speak, from asserting a
right which-he would have otherwise had.3
In Mangal Amusement Park (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh,4 a land was given on licence
to the appellant to establish amusement park. The document of allotment of land was a licence and
not one creating any interest. It was clearly stated that in the event of violation of any of the terms
and conditions on the part of the licencee, the decision of the Chairman was final. Since the
necessary action to establish the Amusement Park had not been taken half of the land remaining
undeveloped, it amounted to violation of conditions of licence. It was held that the doctrine of
estoppel could certainly not be permitted to be invoked on such a background.5
The estoppel dealt with under Sections115, 116 and 117, Indian Evidence Act, is a kind of estoppel
in pais.

3
The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Diamond and Gem Development
Corporation Ltd., AIR 2013 SC 1241.
4
AIR 2012 SC 3325.
5
Ibid., at p. 3335
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA
ESTOPPEL
1. Estoppel prevents a person from saying
one thing at one time and retreating
from it at another time.
2. Estoppel is rule of equity.
3. Estoppels is based on rule of equity,
justice and good consciences.
4. Estoppel originates from
representation or conduct of the party.
5. Estoppel prevents a person to rebut
what has been represented by him.
6. Estoppel shuts the mouth of parties.
7. Rules of estoppel are laid down under
sections 115 to 117 of Evidence Act,
1872.
8. Estoppel can be inferred from the
conduct of the parties.
Distinction between estoppel and waiver.
Estoppel
1. Estoppel is a rule of evidence and does
not form basis for institution a suit.
2. The knowledge of reality or truth is not
a factor or essential condition for
claiming estoppel.
3. In some circumstances, the
acquiescence amounts to estoppel.
4. Estoppel is used as defence and not
cause for bringing a suit.
RES JUDICATA
1. Res judicata prevents the jurisdiction
of the court on the subject matter
already decided by the competent court
on same issue, between same parties.
2. Res judicata is rule of legal
procedures.
3. Res Judicata is based on public policy.
4. Res Judicata originates from decision
of court.
5. Res Judicata prevents the court to hear
a case which has already been decided
by court of competent jurisdiction.
6. Res judicata shuts jurisdiction of
court.
7. The rule regarding res judicata is laid
down under section 11 of C.P.C. 1908.
8. Res judicata is claimed on the basis of
previous decision of competent court.
waiver
1. Waiver originates from contractual
relationship and may give birth to
cause of action.
2. In case of waiver, real facts or truth is
known to both the parties.
3. In case of waiver, some act or conduct
is necessary together with aquiscence.
4. Waiver may be cause to give rise a
right.
In Pravesh Chandra Dalui and others v. Biswanath Banerjee and others,6 the Supreme Court
explained the difference between waivers and is estoppel and said that the essential element in
waiver is that there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of known right or such
conduct as warrants the inference of the relinquishment of such right. It means forsaking the
assertion of a right or proper opportunity. Waiver is distinct from estoppel in that in Waiver the
essential element is actual intent to abandon or surrender right, while in estoppel intent is
immaterial. The necessary condition is the detriment of the other party by conduct of the one
estopped. An estoppel may result though the party estopped did not intend to lose any existing
right, Thus voluntary choice is the essence of waiver for which that must have been existed an
opportunity for a choice between the relinquishment and the conferment of right in question.
SECTION 115- Estoppel.- When one person has by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally
caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither
he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such
person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.
Illustration
A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and thereby induces
B to buy and pay for it.
The land afterwards becomes the property of A and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that
at the time of the sale, he had no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title.
Section 115 lays down that when one person by making false representation (either in words or by
conduct) has intentionally caused a person to believe to a thing to be true and to act upon such
belief, neither he nor his representatives in a subsequent proceeding will be allowed to say that the
representation was false. 7 The facts of the illustration of this section have been taken from Pickrd
v. Sears,8 in which the Court for the first time unequivocally stated the principle of estoppel by
conduct in these words:
"Where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of a
certain state of things, and induces him to act on that, behalf, or to alter his previous position, the
former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at that
time."
The principle of estoppel is that when a person by his words, whether written or spoken, or by his
conduct makes a representation that a certain state of things is true and the other person, relying
upon the truth of the representation, alter his position, the person making the representation will
be estopped from denying the truth of it.

6
AIR 1989 SC 834
7
Chaitanya Charan v. Manik Chandra, AIR 1972 Cal 20 (PB).
8
(1837) 6 Ad & EL 469.
There are four salient conditions before rule of estoppel can be invoked-
(1) One party should make a factual representation to the other party;
(2) The other party should accept and rely upon the aforesaid factual representation;
(3) On the aforesaid factual representation, the second party should alter his position;
(4) Altering of position should be such that it would be inequitable to require him to revert back
to original position. 9
In R. S. Maddanappa v. Chandramma,10 D-2 was the father of the Plaintiff. D-1 and the plaintiff
were sisters. The plaintiff filed a suit for half of the share in the property in the possession of D-2
and his second wife and their children. She claimed the property belonged to her deceased mother
and she made her sister the D-1 as she did not want to join in the case as the plaintiff. D-2’s defence
was that the property belonged to his first wife but she had settled the property orally on the
plaintiff and himself. After the death of his first wife, he had been in possession of the property
and enjoying it as a full owner. It was her last wish that he should enjoy the property as a full
owner. The plaintiff and D-l had expressly and impliedly abandoned their right in the property. He
was also in adverse possession for over than statutory period. He had spent money in the
improvement of the property partly from the income of his joint ancestral property and, partly from
the assets of third defendant. The improvements were made by him bona fide in the belief of having
a right to the suit property and therefore, he was entitled to benefit of Section 51 of Transfer of
Property Act. D-1 admitted the claim of the plaintiff and also claimed a decree against the other
defendants in respect of her half share in the suit property. The Trial Court decreed the claim of
the plaintiff but denied the claim of D-1 on the ground of estoppel as she had not given any reply
to the notice issued by the plaintiffs’ lawyer and she had also sent a letter to her step mother that
she had no desire whatsoever in respect of the property which belonged to her father and he had
the sole authority to do anything for which she was giving consent and that she would not do
anything. D-1 1 had also attested a will of D-2 in favour of D-3 to D-8. The High Court, on appeal,
allowed the claim of D1 and passed a decree in her favour for possession of her share in the
property and future mesne profits against the remaining defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal with costs and held-
The conduct of D-l in not replying to the notice and in not cooperating with the plaintiff in
instituting a suit for obtaining the possession of the property does not justify. The inference of
estoppel. Even the statements in the letter written by the D-1 to the step-mother cannot help the
appellants as D-2 i.e. the father knew that the property belonged to the deceased, his first wife, and
he had no authority to deal with the property. There was no possibility of erroneous belief about
his title being created in the mind of D-2. Regarding the attestation of the will, the appellants
position is no better. The will could take effect only on the death of D-2 and therefore, no interest
in the property had at all accrued to D-3 to D-8 even on the date of the suit. The improvements in
the property even before the execution of will do not help D-2. The argument that the present is

9
Pratima Chowdhury v. Kalpana Mukherjee, AIR 2014 SC1304
10
AIR 1965 SC 1312.
the case of equitable estoppel, confined to provisions of. Section 115, the Court expressed doubt
whether while determining the conduct of a particular party amounts to an estoppel, beyond the
provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act. The doctrine of acquiesce can also afford no help
because D-2 knew the true affairs and therefore, he could not say any mistaken belief caused in
his mind.11
Illustrations- One Shankar Lal died leaving his daughter Mohan Dei. Dispute arose between
Mohan Dei and Brij Lal, Shankar Lal's father's brother's son. Brij Lal claimed Shankar Lal's entire
estate by survivorship. The dispute was referred to arbitration and award was delivered. Mohan
Dei was given some properties as absolute owner. Rest of the estate was given to Brij Lal. Division
was effected according to arbitrator's award. Each branch entered in separate possession as
absolute owners. Mohan Dei died in 1929 leaving two grandsons D and I. Brij Lal died
in18901eaving his sons L and P. L died in 1949 leaving two sons K and N, K and N filed a suit
against D and J (grandsons) of Mst. Mohan Dei claiming the property given to Mohan Dei as next
reversioners as Mohan Dei's sons had predeceased her. It was held by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court that "even if the arbitrator was wholly wrong and even if he had no power to decide
as he did, it was open to both sides to accept the decision and by their acceptance recognised the
existence of facts which would in law give the other an absolute estate in the properties they agreed
to divide. That in our opinion, is representation of an existing fact or set of facts. Each would
consequently be estopped as against other and Brij Lal in particular would have been estopped
from denying the existence of facts which would give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest in the
property in suit. The plaintiffs claim their title through Brij Lal and so the estoppel descended to
them also. The main ingredients of estoppel as defined in Section 115 i.e. estoppel in pais are:-
(1) There must be some representation.
(2) The representation must be made with the intention to be acted upon.
(3) The representation must have been acted upon.
(1) Representation-Necessary elements of- The representation to form the basis of an estoppel
may be made either by (i) statement or by (ii) conduct and conduct includes negligence. Certain
general propositions are, however, applicable whatever manner the representation may be made.12
In Sarat Chandra Dey v. Gopal Chander Laha,13 Umed Ali Ostagar died on the 6th August, 1897,
possessed of considerable property and leaving his widow Arzoo Bibi, Ahmad Hussain,
Rahimunissa and Munni Jan, his children, by Arzoo and a son Palk Jan by a second wife who
predeceased him (Umed Ni). Sometimes before his death on 4th January, 1878, Umed Ali by a
deed, which purported to be Hiba-bil-Ewaz or a deed of gift in consideration of a sum of rupees
eleven thousand three hundred sixty one (Rs. 11,361) due to his wife lingo in respect of her fixed
dower, conveyed amongst other properties, the property in suit to Arzoo Bibi absolutely. There

11
Ganges Mfg. Co. v. Saurjmull, ILR 5 Cal 669; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad & E 469; Caimcross v. Lonmer, 3 Macq. 827;
Carr v. London and NW. Rly. Co., LR 10 CP 307; Sarad v. Gopal, LR 19 IA 203; Ramsdan v. Dyson, LR 1 HL App.
129, 140 referred to on the point of estoppel.
12
T. k. Ghosh Academy v. T.C. Palit, AIR 1947 SC 1495.
13
ILR 20 Cal 296 (PC).
was no mutation of names: but Arzoo executed a general power of attorney in favour of the
husband. Umed Ali under colour of such authority, managed the property as her Am-Mukhtar.
On the strength of this deed Arzoo Bibi on the 22nd April, 1879, mortgaged the properties covered
by it to one Kalimuddin to secure the repayment to him of an advance of Rs. 2,000. The mortgage-
deed was attested by Ahmad Hussain who held a power of attorney from her sister Rahimunnisa
dated 17th December, 1879. The mortgage debt was not repaid and Kalimuddin in 1881, brought
a suit against Arzoo Bibi on the mortgage and obtained a decree on 7th December, 1881. At an
auction sale on the 15th May, 1881 in execution of this decree Khettermohun Dey and Girish
Chandra Dey, the predecessors in title of the defendants No. 1 to 6 purchased the mortgaged
Property and obtained possession. Prior to the decree in the year 1881, Palk Jan instituted a suit in
the original side of the High Court for the administration of the estate of his father Umed Ali
Ostagar. The sale in execution of the mortgage decree took place before the written statements, in
which Ahmad Hussain and Rahimunnissa supported “Hiba” were filed by them in Palk Ian's suit.
On 4th May, 1884, Arzoo died, and on 28th July, 1885, Ahmad Hussain and Rahimunnisa, the son
and daughter of Arzoo sold their respective shares in the property in the suit which they had
inherited from their father Umed Ali Ostagar to the plaintiff, Gopal Chandra Laha. On the strength
of his purchase the plaintiff Gopal Chandra Laha, instituted a suit in the Court of Munsif for a
declaration of his right to the said shares of Ahmad Hussain and Rahimunnissa in the property in
suit.
It was contended on behalf of plaintiff that the deed of 4th January, 1878 was a benami transaction;
that it did not convey any estate in the property; and that as against the defendants 1 to 6 the
plaintiff was entitled to the shares of Ahmad Hussain and Rahimunnissa. It was also contended
that the mortgage of 22nd April, 1880, to enforce which the suit of 1881wasbrought did not pass
any interest in the property, and that, therefore, the defendants 1 to 6 did not require any interest
in it under the sale of the 15th May, 1882, in execution of the mortgage decree.
The defendants Nos. 1 to 6 contended inter alia that the ‘Hiba’ was a valid document, possession
having been given under it to Arzoo Bibi, that the plaintiff was estopped by the conducts of his
vendors and their predecessors in title from questioning the validity of ‘Hiba’ and that they were
bonafide purchasers for value without notice.
The material issues tried by the court of the first instance were:- Did Umed Ali make a valid gift
of the property to his wife. Even if the gift be not valid, is not the plaintiff estopped from disputing
its validity by the conducts of his vendors and their predecessors in title. The judgment was
delivered by Lord Wright.
It was held that Section 115 of the Evidence Act was applicable. The son had represented that
'Hiba' gave a right to his mother to mortgage, and consequently neither he nor his representative
in estate could be allowed to deny the truth of his representation, intentionally made on his part,
which also had been acted on by the mortgagee, and it made no difference the son had not had
fraudulent intention. As a result of the estoppel upon the son any purchaser of the mortgagee's
interest, at a sale regularly carried out, would have acquired a valid title to the property, although
such purchaser might have been aware of all the circumstances. 14
In Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Meerut,15 the
appellant, a proprietorship concern purchased one N.S.C. of Rs. 5,000 the maturity amount of
which was Rs. 10,075/-. The amount due were not paid on the maturity since NSC could be
purchased in the name of an individual only. Under Rule 17 of the PD. Savings Bank General
Rules, where the account is opened in contravention of any relevant rule, the account would be
closed and the amount refunded without any interest. On the plea of estoppel, the Court held- It is
not possible to accept the applicability of principle of estoppel. No representation is ever shown to
have been made to the appellant. It was the appellant’s individual decision to purchase the N.S.C.
No fraudulent representation was shown to be made to the appellant.
Intention to deceive- The main question, in determining whether estoppel has been occasioned,
is whether the representation has caused the person to whom it has been made to act upon the faith
of it. The existence of the estoppel does not depend on the motive, or on the knowledge of the
matter, on the part of the person making the representation. It is not essential that the act, or to
abstain from acting should have been fraudulent, or that he should not have been under a mistake,
or misapprehension.16
Who can take advantage of representation- Only the person to whom the representation was made
or for whom it was intended can make use of it. A man who receives statement as second hand not
meant for him, has no right to act upon such representation. If however, the declaration was
intended to be general, anybody may act upon it. The principle of estoppel must be confined to the
relief claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties there to.17
Representation must be of existing facts- Representation of a mere intention cannot amount to
an estoppel. In order to find an estoppel the representation must relate to an existing fact.18 If there
presentation relates to a promise de future it cannot be binding as an estoppel. “Besides these there
is a class of false representation which have no legal effect. There are cases in which person excites
expectation which he does not fulfil, e.g, where a person leads another to believe that he intends
to make him his heir, and then leaves property away from him. Though such conduct may inflict
greater loss on the sufferer than almost any breach of a contract, it involves no legal consequence".
When the employees represented that they were working as contractors they cannot be
subsequently allowed to change their stand to claim that they worked under principal employer.
Admission in pleadings cannot be allowed to be changed through its amendment. 19

14
Sarat Chandra Dey v. Copal Chandra Laha, ILR 22 Cal 296 (PC)
15
AIR 2015 SC 901; Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings, (1977) AC 890relied on.
16
Sarat Chandra Dey v. Copal Chandra Laha, ILR 22 Cal 296 (PC)
17
State of Madras v. Madras Tramway Co., AIR 1957 Mad. 169; Dawson's Bank v. Nippan Menkkeva Kabu, AIR
1935 PC 79.
18
Sunder Lal v. Suja, AIR 1956 SC 593.
19
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 0. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3229.
Estoppel should be pleaded- The rule of estoppel is a rule of evidence and it should clearly be
pleaded. A person intending to invoke the plea of estoppel must very clearly state the facts (in his
plaint or written statement) which led him to act upon certain representation. Where the plea of
estoppel is not set up in the pleading, it cannot be availed of later.20
Representation may include representation of law- A representation may be a representation of
facts, although it involves and includes that which is also a matter of law. Thus directors of a
company, by drawing a bill in the company’s name, may represent that there is private Act of
Parliament giving the company the requisite power. While a true statement of facts accompanied
by an erroneous inference of law, will not estop the person who made it from afterwards denying
the correctness of inference. But it has been held that a representation as to the legal effect of
document will create an estoppel. One who has by a fraudulent statement of a legal effect of an
instrument, obtained some advantage will not be allowed to retain it.
Representation must be unambiguous- A representation, to found an estoppel, must be clear and
unambiguous; not necessarily susceptible of only one interpretation, but such as will reasonably
be understood by the person to whom it is made in the sense contended for and for this purpose
the whole of the representation must be looked at.
Result must not be ultra vires- A party cannot by representation, any more than by any other
means raise against him an estoppel so to create a state of things which he is legally disabled from
creating. Thus, a corporate or statutory body cannot be estopped from denying that it has entered
into a contract which it was ultra vires for it to make.
Representation induced by party complaining- A representation will be deprived of any effect
as an estoppel if the making of it has been contributed to be some breach of duty on the part of the
person seeking to take advantage of it. No representation can be relied on as an estoppel if induced
by the concealment of any material fact on the part of the person who wishes to use it as such.
Truth known to both the parties- Where the party effected by the representation had come to
know before he acted upon it that the representation was false he cannot avail the rule of estoppel. 21
A candidate obtaining admission to educational course by fraud cannot claim to continue on the
basis of estoppel. 22
If the person to whom it is made known something calculated to influence the other to hesitate to
seek further information and has withheld that knowledge, the representation ought not to be
treated as an estoppel. The same principle has been applied where there has been perfectly innocent
conduct amounting to representation inviting the conduct relied on as an estoppel. The party
claiming the estoppel must not himself have been negligent.

20
Md. Ahmad v. Rourftic, AIR 1960 Cal 146.
21
Permanand v. Champ: La], AIR 1956All. 22.5
22
Madhuri Patel v. Add. Commissioner, Tribal Development, AIR 1995SC 97.
“Where the conditions of the title is known to both the parties or both have the same meaning of
ascertaining the truth there can be no estoppel.” Where both the parties are labouring under the
mistake of law and one party is not more to blame, no question of estoppel can arise. 23
(2) Intention of being acted upon- It is not necessary that the representation should be false to
the knowledge of the party making it provided that (1) it is intended to be acted upon in the manner
in which it was acted upon, or (2) the person who makes it so conducts himself that a reasonable
man would take the representation to be true, and believe that it was meant that he should act upon
it in that manner.
It has been held that the doctrine of estoppel by representation ought not to be, in most cases
applied unless the representation is such as to amount to the contract or the license of the party
making it.24
(3) The representation acted upon- To invoke the benefit of estoppel it has to be proved that the
representation has been acted upon. The representation must have been acted upon taking it to be
true by the party to whom it was made. Estoppel can arise only if a party to a proceeding has altered
his position on the faith of a representation or promise made by another. 25A representation made
to one person cannot be taken advantage of by another person to whom it was not made. It is not
sufficient that the party complaining acted in a manner consistent with the truth of the
representation if it appears that he was not influenced by it. On the other hand if he really has relied
upon the truth of the representation, it is no answer to say that if he had thought about it he must
have known that it was untrue.
In Bhopal Singh v. Chatter Singh and others,26 in consequence of settlement by the opposite
party the suit was withdrawn. It was held by Punjab & Haryana High Court that having taken the
benefit of settlement before the court and having got the site plan sanctioned for residential purpose
and raising construction opposite party was estopped from retreating his statement in the Court on
which the suit was withdrawn and settlement was made by plaintiff because on the opposite party's
statement the plaintiff will be presumed to have been acted.
If the representation is clear and unequivocal the person to whom it is made, need not make an
enquiry to ascertain whether the representation is true.
Representation revocable- A representation does not by reason of having been acted upon
become irrevocable. There is nothing to prevent the party who made it from withdrawing it and
requiring the other, for the future, to act as if it had not been made.
Prejudice- It is further necessary to estoppel by representation that in acting upon it the party to
whom it was made should have altered his position to his prejudice. A representation made to a
person after he has altered his position cannot give rise to an estoppel.

23
Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1959 SC 135.
24
B. Coleman & Co. v. RP. Das Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 426.
25
Mahindra v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 798.
26
A18 2000 P. & H. 34.
Representation by an agent- A representation made by an agent will be as effectual for the
purpose of estoppel as if it had been made by his principal.
Intention to deceive- The main question, in determining whether estoppel has been occasioned,
is whether the representation has caused the person to whom it was made to act upon the faith of
it. The existence of estoppel does not depend upon the motive or upon the knowledge of the matter
on the part of the person making the representation.27
Representation by statement- Estoppel by actual statement is probably less common than
estoppel by conduct or negligence. Instances occur in every department of affair, and are too large
in number to classify. Thus a false statement as to ownership of goods is a representation of this
kind. The defendant, a reversioner of the widow made a representation together with widow that,
she was major and competent to carry on her husband's business. The plaintiff entered in to
business relations with the widow. In suit by the plaintiff against the defendant he was estopped
from contending that the widow was minor and incompetent. A person inducing revenue
authorities to grant a lease in his favour and of another estopped from contending that the other
has no title.
Estoppel by conduct- As said before estoppel by conduct means that a party is prevented from
relying on true facts on account of his conduct. If a man by his conduct has intimated that he
consents to an act which has been done and that he will offer no opposition to that, although it
could not have been lawfully done without his consent and he thereby induces others to do that
from which they would otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act
he had so sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so believed his words. A Mohammeden
acquired land for constructing a school building there on. He constructed building. He over a
period of several years caused everyone concerned to believe that he was doing this on behalf of
certain school. He was held not to be entitled to transfer the school building for the institution of
an orphanage.28
Where in a sale of land by a Muslim father the son attested the sale deed and raised no objection
thereafter though sale was against his interest; the son is estopped from challenging the sale
subsequently. 29
Who can take advantage of representation- Estoppel must bind both the parties and that a
stranger can neither take the advantage nor be bound by them. Only the person to whom the
representation was made or for whom it was intended can make use of it. However, if a
representation w .s intended to be general, anybody may act upon it. The principle of estoppel must
be confined to the relief contained in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are
parties thereto.30

27
Sarat Chandra Dey v. Gopal Chandra Laha, ILR 20 Cal. 296 (PC).
28
Mohammad Imdadullah v. Mt Bishmillah, AIR 1946 All. 468.
29
Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail, AIR l995 SC 1205.
30
State of Madras v. Madras Tramway Co., AIR 1957 Mad. 169; Dawsons Bank v. Nippan Menkiya Kabushika
Kaisha, AIR 1935 SC 79 ; Nayansukhdas v. Govardhan Das, AIR 1948 Nag. 110; Banwari Lal v. Sukhdarshan, AIR
1953 SC 814.
Estoppel- A rule of evidence- An estoppel is only a rule of evidence cause under a certain
circumstances can be invoked by a party to an action. No cause of action arise son the estoppel
itself. 31
Estoppel is only a rule of evidence which can be invoked in certain circumstances, but is not
available to release party from legal obligations to obey a statute.32
Estoppel is a rule of evidence. It is not a cause of action. It may assist the plaintiff in enforcing a
cause of action by preventing a defendant from denying the existence of some facts essential to
establish the cause of action, or (put it in another way) by preventing a defendant from asserting
the existence of some fact, the existence of which would destroy the cause of action. 33
Estoppel may have the effect of creating rights- Though estoppel has been described as a mere
rule of evidence it may have the effect of creating some substantive right as against the person
estopped. Of the many forms which the estoppel may take, it is here only necessary to refer to that
type of estoppel which enables a party as against another party to claim a right of property which
in fact he does not possess. Such estoppel is described as estoppel by negligence. 34
There may be also a good title by estoppel to things which do not require any instrument to transfer
them as for instance goods.35
No estoppel against statute and law- As seen above that under estoppel a party is not allowed to
say that a certain statement of fact is untrue whether in reality it is true or not. Therefore the phrase
“no estoppel against statute” means that a person who makes a statement as to the existence of the
provisions of a statutory law is not estopped, subsequently, from contending that the statutory
provision is different from what he has previously stated.36
Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be treated to be sacrosanct when a public authority carries
out a representation or a promise which is prohibited by law or is devoid of authority of law. 37
The question of levy of excise duty arose. There was approval of classification of product by
department under residuary item. This would out estop the department from revising qualification
according to law. 38

31
Mantime E. Co. v. General Dairies, AIR 1937 PC 114; Samrendra v. Calcutta University, AIR 1953 Cal 172;
Sundraba v. Devaji, AIR 1954 SC 82.
32
Hard MB. v. H. Electric Supply Co., AIR 1964 MP 101.
33
Dawsons Bank v. NM. K.K (Jap Trading Co.), AIR 1935 PC 79; Maddanappa v. Chandrappa, AIR 1965 SC 1812;
Madhodas v. Mukund Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481 ; Maritime Electric Co. v. General Dairies Ltd., AIR 1973 PC 114;
Govindsa Marotisa v. Ismail, AIR 1950 Nag. 2; Ram Niwas v. State, AIR 1970 Punj 469 (FB)
34
Mercantile Bank 9. Central Bank, AIR 1938 PC 52
35
Sim v. Anglo American Telegraph Co., (1879) 50-8 188 at pp 215 and 216; Anglo India Jute Mills Co. v. Omada
Mill, 38 Cal 127 at 141; Bhagwandas v. A.J. Mills Co., AIR 1957 Cal 143. Estoppel Created title; Dattatraya v.
Raghunath, AIR 1971 SC 254
36
Air India v. Nergesh Mirza, AIR 1981 SC 1829.
37
Collector, District Gwalior v. Cine Exhibitors Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2012 SC 1239, Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India
Ltd., AIR 1998 SC 806
38
Plasmac Machine Manufacturing Co. v. Collector of Excise, AIR 1991 SC 999.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to render a transaction valid which the legislature has,
on the ground of general public policy enacted, shall be invalid or to give the court a jurisdiction
which is denied to it by the statute.39
In M. I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu,40 Mahapalika contracted out construction of
shopping complex in park to private builders. Subsequently finding out that action was contrary to
provision of law by which it was constituted, Mahapalika can change its stand. There cannot be
estoppel operating against Mahapalika Act.
Where the Chancellor of the University was competent under the statute to appoint the Committee
to examine illegalities or irregularities in selection process for the posts of Research Assistants,
the petitioners being aware of constitution of the Committee participated in it and took a chance
to obtain a favourable verdict from it but when they failed to do so, they turned around to challenge
not only the findings recorded by the Committee but even the authority of Chancellor to set up
such a Committee. Held-
The petitioners could assail the findings recorded by the Committee but the challenge to the
authority of the Vice-Chancellor to the setting up of the Committee is clearly untenable. 41
(a) Tax 1aws- If a particular income is not taxable under the Income-tax Act, it cannot be taxed
on the basis of estoppel, or any other equitable doctrine. 42 If a tax is to be collected, it cannot be
given up and any assurance that it would not be collected would not bind the State Government. 43
(b) Clear provision of law cannot be evaded- When there is clear and unambiguous provision of
law which entitles the plaintiff to the relief claimed, no question of estoppel arises. 44 If the terms
of a statute are absolute and do not admit of any relaxation or exemptions, then anything done
contrary to the terms of such statute will be ultra vires and will be void and no person can be
estopped from putting for contention that what he did was illegal or void, on the other hand if a
statue having presented certain conditions or qualifications for the doing of a certain thing itself
provides for exemption therefrom under certain circumstances or authorises some body to exercise
the power of exemption then anything done in terms of those conditions or qualifications will not

39
Batul Begum v. B. Hem Chandra, AIR 1960 All 519; New Delhi M. Co. v. H.S. Rikhi, AIR 1966 Punj. 181;
Maritime Electric Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies, AIR 1937 PC 114 ; Mohan Lal Chandramal v. Punjab Company Ltd.,
AIR 1961 Fun] 485 ; Thakur Amar Singh ji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504; Qurbanali v. Government of
Rajasthan, AIR 1960 Raj 152; Kanglu Baula v. Chief Executive Officer, AIR 1955 Nag. 49 (FB); Lala Baburam v.
Kishen Dei, AIR 1963 A11 50; GN Samada v. State at Mysore, AIR 1965 Mys. 47; Shwaram v. Shiv Charan Singh,
AIR 1964 Raj. 126; R. M. Maheshwari v. Municipal Committee Pipana, AIR 1963 MP 134; Liberty Talkies v. State
of Gujarat, AIR 1968 Guj 280; Elha & Co. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1955 Cal 166; Gopi Krishna Das v. Anil
Bose, AIR 1965 Cal. 59; I.T. Commissioner v Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216, Asif v. Jadunath Majumdar, AIR 1931
PC 79; Municipal Committee V. Salraisi Huji Co., AIR 1960 HP 217.
40
AIR 1999 SC 2468.
41
Hitendra Singh v. Dr. P.D. Krishi Vidyapeeth, AIR 2014 SC 1635.
42
I.T. Commissioner v. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216
43
Mathura Prasad v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 745.
44
Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1969 SC 135: J. J. S. Rodrigues 11. Union of India, AIR 1971 Goa 169
be ultra vires and will be said to be merely irregular and to such an act, the proposition that there
can be no estoppel against a statute will have no application. 45
(c) The principle to determine the maxim 'no estoppel against statute’- In order to apply
maxim of ‘no estoppel against statute’, (1) the parties must by bilateral agreement seek to contract
out of the statutory provisions of some Act. (2) The statutory provisions must have express
prohibition of the agreement entered into by the parties. (3) The provision of law must be made
for the public interest. (4) It must not be meant purely for benefit of particular class of persons. (5)
The agreement of parties should not have been merged into an order of the court which by the
conduct of the parties had been dissuaded from performing its statutory obligations. 46 The statute
provided that a tenant could not sublet and on subletting he was liable to ejectment. By a bilateral
agreement the landlord allowed the tenant, to sublet as he did so. The landlord brought a suit for
the ejectment of the tenant. It was pleaded that the plaintiff was estopped from suing for ejectment.
It was held by the Supreme Court that “the respondent is only seeking to enforce his right under
the statute and the appellant cannot be permitted to assert in the court of justice any right founded
upon or growing out of an illegal transaction.” The ejectment was ordered. 47
What is meant by ‘there being no estoppel against statute’ is that a person is not estopped by a
previous statement as to the existence of a statutory provision from contending that the converse
is the statutory provision. “There can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of
law. That which purports to be a law of a State is a law or it is not a law according as the truth of
the fact may be, and according to the shifting circumstances of the parties. Whether it be a law, or
not a law is a juridical question, to be settled and determined by courts and judges.” 48
Where the Act did not prohibit the fluctuation of fair rent by the bilateral agreement of the parties
and parties came to terms and filed a compromise fixing the standard rent and the court passed a
decree, the parties are estoppel from resiling from that judgment. The judgment would work as
estoppel by conduct.49
The general principle is that everyone has a right to waive and .0 agree to waive the advantage of
a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity
which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. Thus the
maximum which sanctions the non-observance of the statutory provision is cullibet licet
remunliare juri poo introducto.50 When there in any express prohibition against contracting out
of a statute in it then no question can arise of anyone entering into a contract which is so prohibited

45
Delhi University v. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1968 Del 131.
46
Autar Singh v. Sohanlal, AIR 1970 161K 26 (PB)
47
Waman Shriniwas v. Ratilal Bhagwandas, AIR 1959 SC 689.
48
Jai Jai Ram v. Srimati Laxhmi Devi, 1963 ALJ 832.
49
Popat Lal v. Kalidas, AIR 1968 Bom. 1; Vaa Dev Sharma v. Milkhi Ram, AIR 1960 Punj 514; Abdul Gani Malik
v. Mala Habib, AIR 1963 J & K 39; Daulatram v. Triloki Nath, AIR 1962 All 147; Prabhudayal v. Mahanlal, AIR
1966 J & K 22.
50
Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition pages 375 and 376
but where there is no such prohibition it will have to be seen whether an Act is intended to have a
more extensive operation as a matter of policy. 51
As a general rule. any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred upon
him by an Act of Parliament, or as it is said can contract himself out of Act, unless it can be shown
that such agreement is in circumstances of the particular case contrary to public policy. Statutory
conditions may however be imposed in such terms that they cannot be waived by agreement, and,
in certain circumstances, the legislature has expressly provided that any such agreement shall be
void.52
If the statute is solely for the benefit of a person he may waive his right or benefit, if he thinks fit
or give up the rights of a private or personal nature created under an agreement, but he cannot
waive a benefit conferred by a statute which has public policy for its object. 53
In National Oxygen Ltd., Madras v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board,54 the Schedule to Act gave
Tariff Concession to new industry for 5 years from commencement. A section of the Act conferred
power on State Government to amend provision of Schedule from time to time. Government
imposed condition in matter of concession before expiry of five years. It was held by the Madras
High Court that doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked against Government.
A statement made under misapprehension of legal right is not estoppel.55
Estoppel and Insurance Co- Life Insurance Corporation v. O. P. Bhalla and others56.-In this
case the policy lapsed since second instalment of the premium was not paid. The Corporation
accepted 3rd and 4th instalments and also second instalment along with interest. By the conduct
corporation waived its right to claim that policy lapsed on death of assured. His nominee entitled
to insured amount.
The insured had undergone, four years prior to the date of proposal made by him, operation for
Adenoma Thyroid but he did not disclose it. He died within six months from the date of taking the
policy. The insurance claim failed. Held- A person making a wrong statement with a knowledge
of consequences therefor would ordinarily be estopped from taking the plea that even if such a fact
had been disclosed, it would not have made any material change. 57
Estoppel and Educational Institutions- In Sanatan Gauda v. Baharampur University,58 the
appellant candidate while securing his admission in law college had admittedly submitted his mark
sheet along with the application for admission. The law college had admitted him. He had persued

51
Lachoo Mal v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1971 SC 2213: Sunil Kumar Ghose v. State, AIR 1970 Cal 384; A Pillai v.
Stale, AIR I972 Ker 39 (FB); Ranian v. Singh, AIR I972 Punj 331; G.R. Silk Mfg. Co. v. state, AIR 1973 Ker 35
(FB).
52
Halsbury, Law of England, Volume 1, Third Edition II page 143 paragraph 248.
53
Abdul Wahid Khan v. Reny Charles Pavey, AIR 1965 Mys. 303
54
AIR 1996 Mad. 229.
55
Shondhan Lal v. Narendra Baladin, 1984 ALJ 194; A. C. Jose v. Simon Pillai, AIR 1984 SC 971; Sukumar
Chakraborty v. Asst. Assesor Collector, AIR 1991 Cal. 181.
56
AIR 1989 Pat 269.
57
P.J. Chacko v. Chairman, LIC of India, AIR 2008 SC 424 at p. 426.
58
A1R1990 SC 1075
his study for two years. The University has also granted him the admission card for the pre-law
and intermediate law examination. He was also admitted to the final year of the course. The
University raised objection about his eligibility at the stage of declaration of result of pre and
intermediate stage. The University was clearly estopped from refusing to declare the result of
appellant examination or from preventing him from persuing the final year course.
Kumari Nilofar Insaf (Dr.) v. State of Madhya Pradesh.59- In this case, there was question as to
admission in M. D. Course in Medical College. The petitioner did not challenge the merit list
published for house-job. Subsequently, same merit list was published in respect of admission to
M. D. Course. The petitioner challenged the subsequent merit list. The petitioner was estopped on
equitable consideration because she had accepted the merit list published for first time.
Estoppel and Tenancy- In Dataram S. Victore v. Tukaram S. Victore,60 at the time of allotment,
the appellant indicated in form C submitted to the Board that his brother, respondent, along with
his wife would be occupying the premises. The Board accepted form C. It was held that the Board
was estopped from terminating tenancy on the ground of subletting. The Supreme Court held the
order of eviction illegal.
Estoppel and Employer- In Shiv Kumar Tiwari deceased represented by LR. v. Jagat Narain
Rai and others,61 the appellant was a temporary lecturer in the college. Approval was given to his
appointment by District Inspector on yearly basis. Approval to the appellant was not granted after
1973. Respondent was selected as lecturer by education department. Civil suit thereon was brought
by appellant only against college. The education department and respondent were not made parties.
Declaration given by the Civil Court that appellant was permanent lecturer of the college was not
binding on the education department and respondent. The Deputy Director of circle passed the
order that in view of judgment of Civil Court the appellant became permanent lecturer. The plea
of estoppel raised by appellant was not tenable since the Deputy Director could not have
legitimately chosen to adopt a judgment to which he was not a party. Moreover, the declaration as
given by the Civil Court could not have been granted in view of provisions of the Specific Relief
Act.
In Anil Bajaj (Dr.) V. Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research,62 the
appellant was granted permission to go abroad on condition that if appellant failed to resume duty
within two years, his leave would expire. The appellant did not resume duty within two years and
his services were terminated. It was held that he could not turn around and challenge the condition
of which sanction to go abroad was granted as the rule of estoppel would operate. The termination
of services of appellant was held proper.

59
AIR 1991 SC 1872.
60
AIR 2000 SC 103.
61
AIR 2002 SC 211.
62
AIR 2003 SC 240.
Estoppel and employees- Where the respondents were appointed on purely contractual basis and
accepted the terms of the appointment, they were estopped from challenging the terms of the
appointment.63
Estoppel- Not a bar to adjudicate legality of contract- On a dispute regarding termination of
services of the employees under the VRS Scheme, the plea that the employees having accepted the
benefit of VRS could not raise dispute about termination was held to be not tenable as the estoppel
did not bar the Courts from adjudicating on the validity of contract. 64
Estoppel not to apply to challenge by unsuccessful candidates the qualification for serviced provide
by executive instructions- In the instant case,65 the rules provided only essential qualification for
the post and procedure for selection was supplied by the executive instructions which provided for
the written examination and physical endurance test. The candidates appeared in the written test
as per such instructions and were subjected to physical endurance test. Thereafter, the candidates
who failed in the physical endurance test challenged the validity of executive instructions
regarding physical endurance test. The Court held- It is well within the power of the Executive
under Article 162 of the Constitution to provide for the required instructions with regard to
procedure for selection so long as they do not come in conflict with the rules. Apart from the
candidates having participated in the written examination and physical endurance test without any
objection cannot challenge the procedure.
Estoppel and Selection Board- In Central Airman Selection Board v. Surendra Kumar Das,66
it was held by the Supreme Court that the person who himself had misled the authority making
false statement could not invoke principle of promissory estoppel if his misrepresentation misled
the authority into taking decision, which on discovery of misrepresentation is sought to be
cancelled.
Acquiescence and estoppel- Where the dispute of termination to be wrongful and demand of
reinstatement was not raised for 14 years, the dispute does not remain alive and it is treated to be
dead. It can be said that the employee, in such a case, acquiesced in to the act of the employer in
terminating his services and therefore, accepted his termination. 67
Estoppel and Development Authority- Where the Development Authority despite office order
condoned default of allottee as per terms of allotment letter and restored his allotment, the
Authority was eetopped from raising a plea of application of office order.68
Estoppel and Inquiry Officer- Where the appellant did not raise any objection regarding the
appointment of inquiry officer and participated in the inquiry proceeding without any demur and
cross-examined a large number of witnesses examined in the proceeding and failed to establish

63
State of Maharashtra v. Anita, AIR 2016 SC 3333 pp. 3336, 3337.
64
Ariane Orgachem Pvt. Ltd. v. Wyeth Employees Union, AIR 2016SC 1761 p. 1771; Also see National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 170.
65
Karanti Ravi v. Commissioner, Survey Settlements and Land Records, AIR 2017 SC 3611
66
AIR 2002 SC 214.
67
Prabhakar v. Joint Director Structure, AIR 2016 SC 2984
68
D.D.A v. Joint Action Committee, Allotee of SFS Flats, AIR 2008 SC 130 at pp. 1355-1357.
any prejudice caused to her by reason of appointment of inquiry officer, she could not be permitted
to raise the contention later on. Held- The appointment of an inquiry officer may not vitiate the
entire proceeding. Such a right can be waived in relation thereto and the principle of Estoppel and
Acquiescence would apply. Superior Courts in a case of this nature may not permit such a question
to be raised for the first time. 69
Promissory estoppel- The doctrine of promissory estoppel differs certainly from the doctrine
embodied in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, which is not a rule of equity, but is a rule of evidence
that was formulated and applies in courts of law while the doctrine with which I am now dealing,
takes its origin from the jurisdiction assumed by the courts of equity to intervene in the case to,
prevent fraud. The doctrine in relation to the circumstances of this case is thus, formulated by Lord
King Down.70
“If a man, under verbal agreement With a landlord for a certain interest in land or what amounts
to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord, that he shall have
a certain interest, takes possession of such land with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith
of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord ; and without objection by him,
lays out money upon the land, a court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such
promise or expectation. That the Crown comes within the range of this equity is apparent from”. 71
Estoppel does not bar filing of writ due to withdrawal of earlier writ petition- Where the writ
petition challenging selection to the post of Principal before the commencement of interview was
filed but the same was withdrawn without any reservation and asking for liberty to challenge later,
the subsequent writ petition challenging whole selection process after. Announcement of select list
was not hit by estoppel because withdrawal of earlier writ petition did not muse any prejudice as
the select list had not been announced.72
Estoppel by election or approbation and reprobation- This estoppel arises in two cases : (1) the
election arises when there are two inconsistent rights or two rights the choice of one of which
necessarily precludes the choice of another, that when the party entitled or bound to make an
election chooses one of the rights or benefit she necessarily gives up the other; (2) and that when
a party entitled to a benefit and subject to a detriment under one and the same order of a court or
authority, takes the benefit of the order, he is precluded from refusing to take detriment as well.
The election may arise in contract or act of parties or it may arise in respect of statutory rights,
sections 180 to 190 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 35 of the Transfer of property Act
deal with the estoppel by election arising out of the act of the parties. Section 180 of the Indian
Succession Act lays down that where a person, by his will, professes to dispose of something
which he has no right to dispose of, the person to whom the thing belongs shall elect either to

69
H.V. Nirmala v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation, AIR 2008 SC 2440 at pp. 2442, 2443, 2444.
70
Ramsden v. Dyson, (1866) LR HL 129 (I70).
71
Pammer v. Mayor, R.C. of Wellinton, (1848) 9 App Cas 699; The Municipal Corporation, Bombay v. Secretary of
State, ILR 29 Bom 550.
72
Veerendra Kumar Gautam v. Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay, AIR 2016 SC 3373p. 3354; Pradeep Kumar Rai v. Dinesh
Kumar Pandey, AIR 2015 SC 2342, distinguished.
confirm such disposition or to dissent from it, and, in the latter case, he shall give up any benefits
which may have been provided for him by the will.
Section 35 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that where a person professes to transfer
property which he has no right to transfer and as part to the same transaction, confers any benefit
on the owner of the property, such owner must elect either to confirm such transfer, or to dissent
from it, and in the latter case, shall relinquish the benefit so conferred and the benefit so
relinquished shall revert to the transferor or his representative as if it has not been disposed of
subject to charge of the benefit of the disappointed transferee.
In order to create election under these sections the testator must dispose of and the transferor must
transfer some property not belonging to him and belonging to the beneficiary or the transferee.
And in order to raise a case of election under a will it must be clearly shown that the testator
intended to dispose of the particular property over which he had no disposing power. This intention
must appear on the fact of the will either by express words or by necessary conclusion from the
circumstances disclosed by the will. 73
As said above election only arises where the legatee has to choose between his property which
might have been willed away to somebody else and the property which belongs to the testator and
which the testator has given to the legatee by the will. 74
A doctrine of election means that a person who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must accept
it as a whole. 75
Election in the technical sense is confined to the case of gift or will where the donee or the legatee
is given a choice of accepting a property under the gift or the will belonging to the donor or the
testator, and in the alternative to fulfil some other condition which it is in his power to fulfil. 76
For detailed study on the subject see Section 35, T.P. Act and Sections 180 to 190. Indian
Succession Act.
(a) Approbation and reprobation in respect of remedies- On the principle that a person may
not approbate, and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate
between estoppel by record and estoppel by conduct. The principle that a person may not approbate
expresses two propositions first, that the person in question, having a choice between two courses
of conduct, is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile: second, that
he will not be regarded, in general at any rate having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under,
or arising out of the course of conduct which he has first perused and with which his subsequent
conduct is inconsistent.77
The doctrine of approbation and reprobation applies to those cases where a person has elected to
take benefit otherwise than on merits of the claim in the litigation under an order to which benefit

73
Mani v. Mani, AIR 1969 SC 1311.
74
Villiammai Achi v. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1967 SC 1153.
75
Bepathuma v. Shankaranarayan, AIR 1965 SC 241.
76
Nihor v. Anathnoth, AIR 1956 Pat 223.
77
Kupanna Counder v. Peruppa Gounder, AIR 1961 Mad. 511.
he could not have been entitled except for the order, and secondly he must have choice between
the two rights and that after his choosing the first right, the restitution was impossible or
inequitable. 78
Thus a plaintiff, having two inconsistent claims who elects to abandon one and persue the other,
may not, in general, afterwards choose to return to the former claim and sue on it, but this rule of
election does not apply where the two claims are not inconsistent and the circumstances do not
show an intention to abandon one of them. The common law principle which puts a man to his
election between alternative inconsistent courses of conduct has no connection with equitable
doctrine of election and relates mainly, though not exclusively, to alternative remedy in a court of
justice.
A party, after taking an advantage under an order (for example, payments of costs) may be
precluded from saying that the order is invalid and asking to set aside. The general principle of
this rule of estoppel is that a party cannot be allowed to affirm and disaffirm. Where a revisioner
took benefit under a family arrangement arrived at during the life time of a widow, he cannot after
the death of the widow, challenge the family arrangement and base his claim on heirship.
A party cannot at the same time blow hot and cold. He cannot say at one time the transaction is
valid and thereby obtain some advantage to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it
is valid and another say it is void for the purpose of securing some further advantage. 79
A plaintiff cannot be permitted to “approbate and reprobate”. The phrase is apparently borrowed
from the Scotch law where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election
that no party can accept and reject the same instrument.80
(b) Estoppel by election through family arrangement etc.- Doctrine of election is the principle
that the exercise of a choice by a person left to himself of his own free will to do one thing or
another binds him to the choice which he has voluntarily made, and is founded on equitable
doctrine that he who accepts benefit under instrument or transaction of his choice must adopt the
whole of it and renounce everything inconsistent with it. The court exercising the jurisdiction in
equity will bind him to his election and preclude him from going behind the same.
The fact that the alienation as such is void, is no bar to applicability of the doctrine of election. 81
If an arrangement is arrived at between Hindu widow and her next reversioner and all of them get
absolute right, they cannot resile from the arrangement after the death of the widow. Even if a

78
Bhau Ram v. Bag Nath Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1327; Sri Pratvlla Chandra Sinha v. Chhota Nagpur . Banking
Association, AIR 1965 Pat 502 ; Chennavernah v. R.A.T. Mysore, AIR 1971 Mys 66; Smt. Raj Rani v. Dwarkadas,
AIR 1972 Del 208
79
Smith v. Baker, 8 CP 350; Gulab Bhai v. Collector, AIR 1970 Goa 59 ; Ambu Nair v. Kebu Nair, AIR 1933 PC
107; Lakshmi Devamba v. Kesavarao, AIR 1935 Mad. 1066; Ram Sarup v. Ram Saran, AIR 1926 Lah 650; Bibi
Kundo v. Onkarnath, AIR 1939 Lab 63 ;Smt Suhashini Dasi v. Ali Bhusan De, AIR 1963 Cal. 520; Rohtas Industries
v. P.N. Gour, AIR 1957 Pat 16.
80
Sree Ramulu v. Venkatanarsimham, AIR 1938 Mad 1004.
81
K. Shanmugham v. S. Shanmugham, AIR 1956 Cal. 211.
reversioner is minor, but he is given benefit by the arrangement, he has a choice to elect when he
attains majority and if he select she cannot resile from it. 82
“If a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction
which settles his claims as well as the claim of his contents at a relevant time, he cannot be
permitted to go back on that arrangement, when a reversion actually falls opens.” 83
From various decisions, it may be inferred that an alienation by a Hindu widow without justifying
necessity is not void, but only voidable at the instance of the reversionary pair who may either
affirm or avoid it, but will be precluded from questioning it if he does something which amounts
to an affirmation of the transaction. 84 Such election to hold the sale good as it has sometimes been
expressed, may, it has been held take place even before the death of the widow while the
reversioner was only a presumptive heir.85 But where the plaintiff did not take any benefit directly
under the arrangement, but only as an heir of his mother after she dies while on the date of the suit
he claims directly under the last full owner, he cannot be estopped by the rule of estoppel by
election. 86
(c) Applies also to the proceedings in Court- The maxim applies also to the proceedings in court.
If a person takes a plea, that the executive court was not competent to decide the matter and he
succeeds, then in the civil suit by the plaintiff he cannot say that the matter would have been
decided by the executing court.87
Writ appeal before the Division Bench against the order of single Judge in continuation of
proceeding- Plea of giving up the plea of perversity of reversion order before Single Judge not to
operate estoppel before the Division Bench- A writ petition was filed against the reversion order
of the respondent, employee. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The Division Bench of the
Gauhati High Court set aside the order of the Single Judge and allowed the appeal. Before the
Supreme Court, it was pleaded inter alia, that the respondent had already given up plea of
perversity i.e. the finding was perverse before Single Judge yet the Division Bench considered the
same plea whereas the respondent could not agitate later before the Division Bench. Held- Since
the writ appeal was continuation of the original order passed in the writ jurisdiction by the Single
Judge, it cannot operate as estoppel against the respondent to press the same. 88
(d) A party applying for setting aside abatement cannot plead no abatement- If a party to a
suit or appeals applies for setting aside an abatement, he is estopped from arguing subsequently
that there is no abatement.89

82
Sahu Madho Das v. Mukund Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481; Seetharamayya v. Chandrayya, AIR 1955 AP 68.
83
Subhu Chetliar's Family Charities v. Raghav Mudaliar, AIR 1961 5C 797; Krishna Behnri v. Gulab Chand, AIR
1971 SC 1041.
84
S.S. Pillai v. K. S. Pillai, AIR 1972 SC 2009.
85
Virayya v. Bapayya, AIR1945 Mad 492 at p. 494
86
Ibid.
87
B. S. Lall v. Sardarmal Lalwani, AIR 1964 MP 124
88
Bongaigaon Refinery P.C. Ltd. v. Girish Chandra Sarnath, AIR 2007 SC 2860 at p.2864 (DB).
89
Hanuman Prasad v. Devendra Chand, AIR 1972 Goa 77; Union of India v. Sivram, AIR 1965 SC 1531.
(e) To the successive stages of the same suits and one suit and other- It is elementary rule that
a party litigant cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the court, to play fast and
loose to blow hot and cold, to the detriment of his opponent. This wholesome doctrine applies not
only to the successive stages of the same suit, but also to another suit than the one in which the
position was taken, provided that the second suit grows out of the judgment in the first. 90
(f) Something done or some advantage taken under an order or decree- When an order shows
plainly that it is intended to take effect in entirety and that the several parts of it depended upon
each other, a person cannot adopt one part and repudiate the other.91
If the benefit confirmed by the order was something apart from the merits of the claim involved in
the case, a person accepting a part cannot repudiate the other. A person who takes benefit under
an order dehors the claim or merit cannot repudiate that part of the order which is detriment to him
because the order is to take effect in its entirety.
The right of an appeal cannot be presumed to have come to an end because the appellant has in the
meantime abided by or taken advantage of something done by the opponent under the decree. The
principle of election must be limited only to these cases where a person has elected to take benefit
otherwise than on merits of the claim in the list under an order to which benefit he could not have
been entitled except for the order, and where the resolution is impossible. Withdrawing
presumption money is no bar to appeal. 92
(g) Estoppel about jurisdiction of courts- If upon the objection of a Party an appeal or a suit is
returned from one court to be represented to another, he is estopped from raising the question of
jurisdiction in the other court where the suit or the appeal has subsequently been presented.93
(h) No estoppel when the court had no jurisdiction- When the order or judgment of a court is
without jurisdiction or against a statute of law there Can-not be an estoppel by election. 94
(i) The sameness of the transaction and the parties- The maximum of approbate and reprobate
applies when the reliefs claimed by a party on both occasions arise out of the same transaction and
the parties are the same. 95

90
Devi v. Prasanno Kumar, AIR 1939 Cal. 22; Indramal v. Subordinate Judge Secondarabad, AIR 1958 AP 779;
Karnataka Bank v. Shamanna, AIR 1972 Mys 321 ; Radha Krishna v. Ramannu, AIR 1972 Mys 327.
91
Babu Ram v. Baijnath Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1327; Venkatarayudu v. Ram Krishnaiyya, AIR 1930 Mad 268.
92
Babu Ram v. Baijnath Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1327; Chemnaveeriah v. Mysore Revenue Tribunal, AIR 1975 Mys.
66.
93
Ram Khelawan Singh v. Maharaja of Benaras, AIR 1930 All 15; Udai Raj Singh v. Ram Bahal Singh, AIR 1946
All 436; Controller of Insurance Simla v. Venguard Co., AIR 1966 Mad. 437; Parendhamayya v. S. Temple Kotipalli,
AIR 1970 AP 394; A. N. Shah v. A. Annapuranamma, AIR 1959 AP 9 ; Indermal v. Sub-Judge Sikandrabad, AIR
1958 AP 779 ; Hemnarha Kumari Devi v. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1930 Cal 32 ; Annapumamma v. Raja Vijayanagram,
AIR 1935 Mad 367; Uttam Chand v. Salig Ram, AIR 1929 Nag 79 ; Mahadeo Singh V. Pudol Singh, AIR 1931 Oudh
23 ; Uma Rao V. Mansingh, AIR1972 Del 1.
94
Arun Kumar Sinha v. Union of India, AIR 1964 Patna 338; Raghuraj Prasad Singh v. Basudeo Singh, AIR 1950 Pat
318.
95
Nagu Bai v. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593.
(j) Acceptance of cost- If the court directs that the suit shall be restored on plaintiff’s paying cost
to the opposite party and if the opposite party accepts the cost he cannot challenge the order in
future.96
If an amendment was allowed on payment of cost and the other side accepted the cost he cannot
challenge the order on amendment. 97
(k) Cost accepted under protest- If the cost is accepted under protest and the right to challenge
the order is reserved at the time of accepting the cost it would be open to challenge the order. It
should be borne in mind that only the words “under the protest” is meaningless. The acceptance
must be with the reservation of the right to challenge. 98
(1) Cost accepted by counsel not authorized- If the cost is accepted by a counsel who is not
authorised there would be no estoppe1.99
Admitting a person to be entitled to a legal benefit- If a party to a proceeding represents that
the other party is entitled to the benefit of some legal provision he cannot resile from it. In an
execution proceeding the decree holder wanted to put the property of judgment-debtor on sale. The
decree-holder himself asked the executing court to secure the permission of the competent
authority for sale of the property on the ground that the judgment debtor belonged to Scheduled
Tribe. The judgment-debtor obtained permission to sell property to a person by private sale. The
decree-holder disputed that the judgment-debtor did not belong to Scheduled Tribe. It was held
that he was estopped.100
Silence- Mere silence or inaction is not, in the absence of a duty to speak, such conduct as amounts
to a representation. A duty to speak arises whenever a person knows that another is acting on an
erroneous assumption of some authority given on liability undertaken by the former, or is dealing
with or acquiring an interest in property in ignorance of his title to it. It is a duty if a man who
knows that another is relying on a document bearing a counterfeit of, his signature to give the
notice of forgery without delay.
Waiver- The generally accepted meaning of waiver is that there must be an intentional
relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, or conduct such as gives an inference of the relinquishment of a known right
or privilege.101

96
Venkatarayudu v. Rama Krishnayya, AIR 1930 Mad 263 at 270
97
Bali Ram v. Bapu Rao, AIR 1955 Nag 222; Mohan v. Keshav Chand, AIR 1934 Cal 554; Maniram v. Beharidas,
AIR 1955 Raj 145.
98
Venkatanyudu v. Rama Krishnayya, AIR 1930Mad 268 ;Sriram Sardarmul v. Gori Shankar, AIR 1961 Bom 136 ;
Where the cost is awarded on an unconditional order, Its acceptance would not work as an estoppel. Devaiah v.
Nagappa, AIR 1963 Myl. 102.
99
Maniram v. Behari Das, AIR 1955 Raj 145.
100
Raghunath Pradhani v. Damodar Mahapatra, AIR 1978 SC 1820.
101
Bishesar Nath v. S.T. Commissioner, 1959 SC 149; Associated Hotel of India v. Ranjit Singh AIR 1968 SC 938.
Where the persons having knowledge of the illegalities in election proceeding participated in it.
They should be precluded from challenging the validity of election on the principle of waiver. 102
Waiver means abandonment of right and it may be either express or implied from conduct but its
basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. There is no waiver unless
the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of
such right, he intentionally abandons it. 103 The Government of Uttar Pradesh published and
announced that the State has decided to give exemption from Sales Tax for three years under
Section 4-A of U.P. Sales Tax Act to all new industrial units. MP. Sugar Mills set up a plant for
manufacturing Vanaspati. The State Government went back upon its assurance and said that there
shall be only partial exemption of Sales Tax. The M.P. Sugar Mills accepted the partial exemption.
The Government afterwards resiled from the partial exemption also, the proprietors of Mill filed a
writ and claimed that the Government was bound by the promissory estoppel and so they were
entitled to the full exemption. The State Government pleaded that the petitioner by accepting the
partial exemption had waived the right. It was held that the law of promissory estoppel was so
difficult that the petitioner would not be expected to know it and therefore there was no waiver.104
Where the employee has put in sufficient service for voluntary retirement and sends a letter to the
employer titled as resignation requesting early retiral benefits because it is needed for his
sustenance and treatment, intention to waive the right to pension cannot be attributed to the
employee. The letter has to be treated as voluntary retirement and not resignation. The waiver of
legally enforceable rights has to be clear, unequivocal, conscious and with full knowledge of
consequences.105
Estoppel by Negligence- Before anyone can be estopped by a representation inferred from
negligent conduct, there must be a duty to use due care towards the party misled or towards the
general public of which he is one.
In Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd.,106 the Mercantile Bank of India
Ltd. (the defendant appellants) and the Central Bank of India Ltd. (the plaintiffs respondent) were
United Companies. They carried on the business of bankers of Madras. C.K. Narain and Sons were
a firm of merchants who carried on a business as buyers and exporters of groundnuts. Both the
plaintiff and defendants had been in the habit of advancing loans to the firm C.K. Narain and Sons
on security of goods covered by railway receipts. The practice of the firm CK. Narain and Sons
was to purchase the groundnuts from the up-country growers and have them despatched by rail to
Madras. The railway companies and the Madras Port Trust, which had its own railway system
within the port had a working arrangement between them under which the trust took over the
consignment of nuts on their arrival at the port and lodge in the first instant in their godowns. For
every consignment of the groundnut there was a 'railway receipt’ which contained the particulars
of the goods, the names of the consignor and consignee. The practice was that the merchants should

102
Deva Sharan Yadav v. State, AIR 1972 Pat 439.
103
M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 621.
104
Ibid.
105
Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India, AIR 2015 SC 2434 pp. 2440, 2441.
106
AIR 1938 PC 52.
deliver to the bank the railway receipts by way of pledge giving at the same time to the bank a
promissory note for the amount advanced and letter of lien, the Bank then sent the railway receipts
to their own godown keeper who obtained possession of the goods. The practice was that the
Bank’s godown keepers used to give the railway receipts back to the merchants for the purpose of
bringing the goods from the port trust and storing them in the bank godown. Thirty-five railway
receipts in respect of goods were pledged by the firm CK. Narain to the plaintiffs. As it was the
practice they got the railway receipts from the Bank godown keepers for the purpose of bringing
the goods from the port trust and storing in Bank's godowns. The firm C.K. Narain cleared the
goods from the port trust and instead of depositing them in the godowns of plaintiffs repledged
them to the defendants and obtained second advance from the defendants. The plaintiff respondent
filed a suit against defendant appellants for the conversion of their property (the goods pledged to
them). The suit of the plaintiff was decreed. In appeal before the Privy Council it was contended
on behalf of the defendants appellants that the circumstances in the case raised an estoppel and
that the respondents were precluded by their conduct (giving the railway receipts to the firm C.K.
Narain and Sons) from denying as against the appellants that the merchants had the right, which
they pretended to have, of pledging the goods as owners.
It was held that the plea of estoppel could not be availed of. The Central Bank of India, the plaintiff,
did not owe any duty to Mercantile Bank of India, the defendant, in the matter. There was no
relationship of contract or agency. There was also no representation by the plaintiff (The Central
Bank of India) which had no reason to think that it was representing to anybody that the Merchant
had any title to dispose of the goods. The railway receipt though a document of title, was in form
merely an authority to take delivery of goods and the possession of such a document contained no
representation that the holder had any implied authority or right to dispose of the goods. The
document on its face conveyed no representation, when presented, that the merchant was invested
with full disposing powers. The appeal was dismissed.
Estoppel mutual- Estoppel must bind both the parties and that a stranger can neither take the
advantage nor be bound by them. Only the person to whom the representation was made or whom
it was intended can make use of it. However, if a representation was intended to be general,
anybody may act upon it. The principle of estoppel must be confined to the relief claimed in respect
of the same transaction and to the person who are parties thereto.107
Origin and development of promissory estoppel- Doctrine of promissory estoppel has been
variously called 'promissory estoppel’, ‘requisites estoppel’, ‘quasi estoppel' and ‘new estoppel’.
It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named ‘promissory
estoppel’, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The true principle of
promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the
other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal
relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other
party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise
would be binding on the party making it and he would not been titled to go back upon it, if it would

107
State of Madras v. Madras Tramway Co., AIR 1957 Mad. 169: Devason's Bank v. Nippan Menkhevakahu, AIR
1935 PC 79.
be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between
the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship
between the parties or not. It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel that the promisee acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any
detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance
on the promise. But if detriment means injustice to the promisee which would result if the promisor
were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient.
The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the
promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed
to go back on the promisee. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be
present in every case of promissory estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the
promise would suffer if the promisor were to act differently from his promise, that the court would
consider it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise. In India, not only has
the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognised as
affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of
consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. 108
Promissory estoppel as distinguished from real estoppel or actual estoppel- There is
undoubtedly a clear distinction between representation of an existing fact and a representation that
something will be done in future. The former may, if it amounts to a representation as to some
facts alleged at the time to be actually in existence, raise an estoppel, if another person alters his
position relying upon that representation. A representation that something will be done in the future
may result in a contract, if another person to whom it is addressed acts upon it. A representation
that something will be done in future is not a representation that it is true when made. But between
a representation of a fact which is untrue and a representation expressed or implied to do something
in future, there is no clear antithesis. A representation that something will be done in future may
involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is
acted upon by another Person it may, unless the statute governing the person making the
representation, provides otherwise, result in an agreement enforceable at law, if the statute requires
that the agreement shall be in certain form, no contract may result from the representation and
acting therefor but the law is not powerless to raise in appropriate cases an enquiry against him to
compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation. 109
"When one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which
was intended to affect, the legal relations between them and to be acted upon accordingly, then,
once the other party has taken him at his word acted on it, the one who gave the promise or
assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to their previous legal relation, as if no such
promise or assurance has been made by him. But he must accept their legal relations subject to the
qualification which he himself has so introduced. This doctrine which is derived from a principle
of equity enunciated in 1877, has been subject of considerable recent development.”

108
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. U.P. State, AIR 1979SC 621; Assistant Commercial Tax Commissioner v.
Dharmendra Trading Co., AIR 1988 SC 1247; Intras System Pvt. Ltd. v. Stat. of Kerala, AIR 1996 Ker. 161.
109
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. v. Ulhasnagar Municipality, AIR 1971 SC 1021.
Scope and object of promissory estoppel- A promissory estoppel operates to preclude
perparation of fraud or causing injury in a case where the representation or promise has been made
to induce an action on the part of the party setting up the estoppel. In such case the party making
the promise is precluded from asserting want of consideration thereon. 110 Before the doctrine of
promissory estoppel can be invoked it must be proved, (1) that there was a representation or
promise in regard to something to be done in the future, (2) that the representation or promise was
intended to affect the legal relations of the parties and to be acted upon accordingly, and (3) that it
is one on which the other side has, in fact, acted to its prejudice. 111 The doctrine of promissory
estoppel applies when among other things there is clear and unequivocal promise relying on which
the other side acts to his prejudice. 112
The ‘estoppel’ is rule of equity. The rule has gained new dimensions in recent years. A new class
of estoppel, i.e., promissory estoppel has come to be recognised by the courts in this country as
well as in England. Where parties enter into an agreement which is intended to create a legal
relation between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the
other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promisee, the court will
treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act,
inconsistently with it even though the promise may not be supported by consideration in strict
sense.
Consideration is an essential element of contract but 'Promissory estoppel’ is an exception to it. In
Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.,113 in 1939, some flats were let out
by the plaintiff to the defendant on annual rent of E 2500. Some flats became vacant due to war
and therefore the plaintiff agreed to reduce the rent to E 1250in 1940. When the flats became full
in 1945, the plaintiff sued for full rent for the last six months and for future. Justice Denning held
the plaintiffs were entitled to full rent @ E 2500 per annum. Had he sued for the period during
1940 and 1945 for the rent @ £ 2500 p.a., he would have been estopped. According to Justice
Denning, if the defendant had instituted the suit for reduced rent against the plaintiff for this period,
he would have not been successful as the agreement was without consideration but m case of
defence against the suit for the full rent for this period, he would have been successful as the
estoppel would have applied against the plaintiff.
Estoppel against public bodies and the Government- The Crown cannot escape by saying that
estoppels do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown
escape by bringing in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown
cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive.114 “Whenever Government Officers, in their
dealings with a subject, take on themselves; to assume authority in matter with which the subject
is concerned, he is entitled to rely on their having the authority which they assume. He does not

110
Satnarain v. Union of India, AIR 1961 Punj 34.
111
A.C.E. Union of India v. G.B. Bhirede, AIR 1971 Bom288
112
Anchar Ali v. State of Assam, AIR 1989 Gau 12.
113
(1947) KB 130.
114
Roberson v. Minister of Executive Action Persons, (1949) 1 KB 227.
know, and cannot be expected to know the limits of their authority, and he ought not to suffer, if
they exceed it".
The Supreme Court while approving the above decision has observed “this case is in our judgment,
a clear authority that even though the case does not fall within the terms of Section 115 of Evidence
Act, it is still open to a party who has acted upon, representation made by the Government to claim
that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it even though the promise
is not recorded in the form of a formal contract”.115
Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representation of facts and
promises, made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their positions to their
prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual of his representation amounting to a promise
may be enforced ex-contractual by person who acts upon the promise. What the law requires that
a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the
manner prescribed by statute, the obligation if the contract be not in that form may be enforced
against it in appropriate cases of equity. 116
There is a clear distinction between a statutory obligation and a contractual obligation of the
Government. Statute imposes a public duty while the duties imposed by a contract is owed by the
Government, not to the public, but to an individual with whom the contract is entered into. A
contravention of statute makes the action of the Government illegal but not the breach of a contract.
A breach of a contract is enforceable. 117
The Government of Bombay passed the following resolution:- (l) Government approved of the site
and authorise its grant, (2) plans should be submitted for approval, the Government do not consider
any rent should be charged to the Municipality as the markets will be like other public buildings
for the benefit of the whole community.
Pursuant to the aforesaid resolution, possession of the site was made over to the then Municipal
Commissioner. The Municipal Commissioner got the site levelled at the Municipal cost. The plans
were approved by the Government and market buildings were erected at the cost of the
Municipality. The Government authorities assessed the land under Section 8 of the Bombay Act
(2 of 1876). The Bombay Corporation filed a suit claiming the relief that the Corporation was
entitled to hold the land for ever without payment of any assessment. Aiyar J. observed :- If the
resolution can be read as meaning that the grant was of rent free land the case would come strictly
within the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in Section 115 Evidence Act but even otherwise, that
is, if there was merely the holding out of a promise that no rent will be charged in future the
Government must be deemed in the circumstances of this case to have bound themselves to fulfil
it whether it is equity recognised to Rams Den's case or it is some other form to equity is not of
much importance. Courts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good faith as far as it

115
Union of India v. Anglo Afgan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718; Chowgule & Co.v. Union of India. AIR 1972 Goa
33.
116
Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipality, AIR 1971 SC 1021.
117
KC, Rout v. State, AIR 1979 Ori 120.
lies in their power.118 But when there is no representation by the Government to be acted upon the
principle of estoppel does not arise. 119
In S.V.A. Steel Re-rolling Mills Ltd. v. State of Kerala,120 with the desire of new industries to be
established, the Government of Kerala made a policy and latter on issued a G.O. and assured inter
alia, that on the completion of any project, power connection would be given irrespective of
whether a general power cut was in force or not. New units commencing industrial production
would be exempted for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production. Such
units would be exempted from payment of electricity duty for a period of five years from the date
of commercial production. However, the State could not supply the electricity to the appellants.
The new units suffered loss. The Government issued another order and extended the benefit which
had been given under prior G.O. to the new units by number of days during which supply of
electricity to them had been cut to the extent of 50% or more. The Court directed the respondents
to give the benefit by extending the period of incentive for the days when supply of electricity was
more than 50% but not 100% and held- The benefit extended by the respondent-State was not
sufficient. The respondent ought to have extended the period even for the days when supply of
electricity was more than 50% but not 100% as assured under G.O. The respondents cannot riggle
out of their liability. Before laying down any policy which would give benefits to its subjects, the
State must think about pros and cons of the policy and its capacity to give the benefits. Without
proper appreciation of all the relevant factors, the State should not give any assurance, not only
because that would be in violation of the principles of promissory estoppel but it would be unfair
and immoral on the part of the State not to act as per its promise.
There is necessity to balance individual rights and public interest when government is party with
the private person. In such a case freedom of contract is circumscribed by principles of
Administrative Law. 121
Application of Doctrine of promissory estoppel to Government- The doctrine of promissory
estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive
necessity has been categorically negatived. The government is not exempted from liability to carry
out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and
undisclosed grounds of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise made, solemnly by it.
The Supreme Court has refused to make any distinction between a private individual and a public
body so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned.2 But if the promise on behalf of
the government is unconstitutional and against public policy the question of promissory estoppel
against government does not apply.3 Where the Government makes a promise knowing or
intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in relianceon
it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would
be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there
is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract

118
Collector at Bombay v. Bombay Corporation, AIR 1951 SC 469 at p. 476; R.C. Sood Co. v. Union of India, AIR
1971 Del 170.
119
C. Shankamarayan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1971 SC 1997.
120
AIR 2014 SC 1086. Also see Devi Multiplex v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2015 SC 7348 pp. 2357-2358.
121
M.P. Mathur and others v. D.T.C. and others, AIR 2007 SC 414.
as required by Art. 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic, governed by the rule
of law, no one howsoever high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and
completely as any other and the Government is no exception. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v.
State of U.P.,122 on 10th October, 1968 a news item appeared in the National Herald in which it
was stated that the State of Uttar Pradesh had decided to give exemption from Sales Tax for a
period of three years under Section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act to all new industrial units in the
State with a view to enabling them to come on firm footing in developing stage. The news item
was based upon a statement made by the Secretary in the Industries Department of the
Government. The appellant, on the basis of this announcement, addressed a letter dated 11th
October, 1968 to the Director of Industries stating that in view of the Sales Tax Holiday, announced
by the Government, the appellant intended to set up a Hydro Generation Plant for manufacturing
of Vanaspati and sought for confirmation that this industrial unit, which they proposed to set up,
would be entitled to Sale Tax Holiday for a period of three years from the date it commences
production. The Director of Industries replied by his letter dated 14th October, 1968 confirming
that "there will be no Sale Tax for three years on the finished product of your proposed Vanaspati
factory from the date it get power connection for commencing production”. The appellant; later
addressed a letter dated 22nd January, 1969 to the respondent who was the Chief Secretary to the
Government. The respondent stated categorically in his letter in reply dated 23rd January, 1969
that the proposed Vanaspati factory of the appellant “will be entitled to exemption from the U. P.
Sales Tax for a period of three years from the date of going into production and that this will apply
to all Vanaspati sold during that period in Uttar Pradesh itself” and expressed his surprise that a
letter from Chief Secretary to the State Government stating this fact in clear and unambiguous
words would not carry conviction with the financial institutions. Giving the judgment, Justice
Bhagawati of the Supreme Court held-
It was clear from the letter of the respondent dated 23rd January, 1969 that a categorical
representation was made by the respondent on behalf of the Government that the proposed
Vanaspati factory of the appellant would be entitled to exemption from sales tax in respect of sales
of Vanaspati effected in Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement
of production. The letter dated 23rd January, 1969 clearly showed that the respondent made this
representation in his capacity as the Chief Secretary of the Government, and it was, therefore, a
representation on behalf of the Government. The appellant relying on this representation of the
Government borrowed money from various financial institutions, purchased plant and machinery
from M/s De Smith (India) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay and set up a Vanaspati factory at Kanpur. The facts
necessary of invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel were, therefore, clearly present and the
Government was bound to carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from Sales tax in
respect of sales of Vanaspati effected by it in Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the
date of commencement of the production. The Government was bound on the principle of
promissory estoppel to make good the prosecution made by it.

122
AIR 1979 SC 621.
Estoppel applies to executive function. In the case incentive scheme for Sugar industry was
declared by the Govt. Doctrine of estoppel can be invoked on the ground of equity. 123
But in a writ challenging the action of the Union of India in withdrawing a time bound exemption
Notification for the import of PVC resins, it was held that withdrawal cannot be challenged on
ground of promissory estoppel. 124 The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been invoked against
Government and the plea of executive necessity has been negativated. But this doctrine cannot be
invoked to prevent the Government from discharging its duty. 125
In Shanna Transport v. Govt. of A.P.,126 the Government of Andhra Pradesh by a notification
dated 5.6.2000 issued under Clause (b) of Section 9 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles
Taxation Act, 1963 an earlier order dated 1.7.1995 was cancelled which was issued pursuant to
the directive of the Central Government after discussion with the State Governments for
concession to be extended to tourist vehicles. The appellants, operators of tourist buses assailed
the validity of the notification. Rule 1 (4) of the Permit Rules made it clear that the conditions
prescribed in Rules 82 to 85-A of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 did not apply to permits
granted under the scheme governed by the Rules. It was alleged that in the garb of levying taxes
on fares and freights, the directives of the Central Government were being violated which was
impossible with reference to Articles 73, 256, 257 and 301 of the Constitution. As regards ground
on Article 301, it was taken for the first time before the Supreme Court which was not considered
to be taken into account. The High Court negatived all the contentions except the stand taken on
the ground of Article 301 of the Constitution. It was held that there was no law specifying
principles of taxation on the subject-matter of controversy so as to bring in application either
Article 256 or 259 of the Constitution.
It was held by Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat of the Supreme Court- "Entry 56 of the List II of VIIth
Schedule deals with the passengers and the Union has no power to levy taxes in respect of
passengers and therefore there was no substance in the plea that the letter of Joint Secretary to the
Government of India dated 30.8.1993 was in the nature of direction. In the background of Entry
35 List III, the Parliament may lay down the guidelines for the levy of taxes on mechanically
propelled vehicles but the right to levy such taxes vests solely on the State Legislature. The
communication by the Government of India to the States did not in any sense violate the power of
the State Legislature or its delegatee to levy or exempt taxes from time to time. Rule 1 (4) is not
intended to curtail the power of State to levy taxes under relevant enactments".
On the next plea of promissory estoppel, Justice Dr Arijit Pasayat held it to be without any
substance. He observed:
“It has to be noted that even though a concession is extended for a fixed period, the same can be
withdrawn in public interest. A notification granting exemption of tax can be withdrawn by any

123
M/s. Tungbhadra Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1989 Del NOC 35.
124
Kasink Trading v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 874.
125
M/s. Inoras System Pvt. Ltd. State of Kerala, AIR 1996 Ker. 161.
126
AIR 2002 SC 322.
point of time. There cannot be estoppel against any statute.Where it is in public interest, the Court
will not interfere because public interest must override any consideration of private loss or gain”. 127
In Shrijee Sales Corporation and another v. Union of India,128 it was observed that where there
was supervening public interest, the Government 15 free to change its stand and withdraw the
exemption already granted. One such reason for changing its policy decision can be resource
crunch and the loss of public revenue. There is preponderance of Judicial opinion that to invoke
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the
petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting
material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has
altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press
into aid the doctrine. The principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by this word
or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended
to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending
that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and
it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the
party making it and he Would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow
him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have been taken place between the parties. The
doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established one in the field of administrative law. The
foundation for the claim based on the principle of promissory estoppel in public law was laid by
Lord Deming in 1948 in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions.129 Prof. De Smith in his Judicial
Review of Administrative Action,130 observed that “the citizen is entitled to rely on their having
the authority that they have asserted".
Doctrine of 'Promissory Estoppel' has been evolved by the Courts, on the principles of equity, to
avoid injustice.
"This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It is neither in the realm of contract
nor in the realm of estoppel. Its object is to interpose equity shown of its form to mitigate the rigour
of strict law."131
"This Court refused to make distinction between the private individual and a public body to far as
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned." 132
"The Government cannot claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Equity will,
in a given case where justice and fairness demands, prevent a person from exercising strict legal
rights even where they arise no; In contract, but on his own Title deed or in statute. It is not
necessary that there should be some pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties. The
parties need not be in any kind of legal relationship before the transaction from which the
promissory estoppel takes its origin. The doctrine would apply even where there is no preexisting

127
Kasinka Trading and another v. Union of India and another, AIR 1995 SC 874.
128
1997 (3) SCC 308.
129
1949 (1) KB 227.
130 th
4 Edition at page no. 103
131
Union of India and others v. M/s. Anglo Afgan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718.
132
The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, 1970 (3) SCR 854.
legal relationship between the parties, but the promise is intended to create legal relations and
effect a legal relationship which will arise in future. It was further held that it is indeed pride of
constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a
private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned. The former is equally bound as
the latter. Therefore, the Government cannot claim any immunity from the doctrine of promissory
estoppel and it cannot say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner, i.e. fair and just or that
it is not bound by the considerations of honesty and good faith. In fact, the Government should be
held a high standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with citizens. Since the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield where the equity so requires. If it can
be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by
it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against
the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because
on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise
made by it. But the Government must be able to show that in view of the fact as have been
transpired, public interest would not be prejudiced. Where the Government is required to carry out
the promise the Court would have to balance, the public interest in the Government's carrying out
the promise made to the citizens, which helps citizens to act upon and alter his position and the
public interest likely to suffer if the promises were required to be carried out by the Government
and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough just to say that the public interest
requires that the Government would not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public
interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. In order to resist its liability
the Government would disclose to the Court the various events insisting its claim to be expect
from liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it
equitable and to enforce the liability against the Government.133
It is equally settled law that the promissory estoppel cannot be used compelling the Government
or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which
was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to
make. Doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the
equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public
authority for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold
the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The Court on
satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a
promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against Government
or the public authority.134

133
Grundt and others v. The Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd., 1938 (59) CLR 641 ; Central London Property
Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., 1947 KB 130; Union of India v. M /s. Anglo Afgan Agencies etc., AIR 1968 SC
718; Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and another v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another,
AIR 1971 SC 1021; M/S. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others,1979 (2)
SCR 641, referred to.
134
Vasant kumar Radhakishan Vora v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1991 SC 14 and Dr. Ashok
Kumar Maheshwari v. State of U.P. and another, 1998 (2) SCC 502.
In Badri Kedar Paper Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission,135 U.P. Electricity
Regulatory Commission constituted under the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999, on being
approved by the Rule 2 determined Tariff, the rate schedule of which was to apply to all consumers
of electric energy who contracted load of 75 KW (100 BHP) for industrial purpose. This rate
schedule was also to apply to the consumers for commercial purpose and power consumers subject
to the condition that they opt for it. Basic rate applicable to urban consumer was Rs. 130 per
KVA/month plus 390 paise/KWH. It was provided that in respect of consumers who opted for
power supply during restricted/peak hours, an additional surcharge of 15% on the amount billed
at the "Rate of Charge", i.e., demand charge and energy charge would be levied. In respect of
consumers getting power Supply on independent feeders emanating from 400/ 220/ 132 KW sub-
stations, an additional surcharge of 15% on demand and energy charges would be charged. These
consumers would get an assured supply of minimum 500 hours in a month. In case of shortfall in
the guaranteed hours of supply, a rebate @ 10% for each ten hours shortfall would be admissible
on the bill amount.
The tariff was framed on 7.8.2000 which came into force on 9.8.2000. The circular to this effect
was issued on 8.9.2000. The consumer exercised their option on 31.10.2000.
The U.P. Power Corporation issued a circular dated 15.12.2000 calling for options from the
consumers of electrical energy to have a continuous power supply of 500 hours in a month. The
appellant along with others in the option stated not to intend to have 500 hours of continuous
supply. Thereafter, the U.P. Regulatory Commission by a circular revised tariff for the year 2000-
2001 applicable to HV-2 rate schedule consumers getting supply from independent feeders for
levy of15°/o surcharge or the guarantee of 500 hours of power supply per month and the consumers
exercising option not to have would not be charged 15% surcharge from the very date of its
applicability i.e. 7.8.2000 and the consumers who submit their application after 31.12.2000 would
be entitled to this facility from the date of receipt of application. In a writ petition, L.M.L. Ltd. v.
State of U.P.,136 held the circular letters illegal and void as it was the Electricity Regulatory
Commission alone who could fix the tariff. The U.P. Power Corporation, therefore, issued a
circular on 31.8.2001 withdrawing its earlier circular dated 15.12.2000. The writ petitions, ten in
number, were filed before the Allahabad High Court challenging the withdrawal of circular dated
8.9.2000 by the U.P. Power Corporation, R-2 which were dismissed. In view of the binding
precedent in B.S.E.S. Ltd. v. Tata Power Co. Ltd.137 and Association of Industrial Electricity
Users v. State of A.P.,138 it was held that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the tariff. Heldlf on a representation made, a consumer of electrical energy had altered its position,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel shall apply. It is now well settled that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel applies also in the realm of a statute. Whether having regard to the doctrine
of promissory estoppel, the same could have been withdrawn or not, further determination in that
behalf was not warranted. L.M.L. Ltd. does not require reconsideration. The circular impugned
before the High Court was undoubtedly issued pursuant to the judgment of the Allahabad High

135
AIR 2009 SC 1783
136
AIR 2001 AII 321
137
(2004) 1 SCC 195.
138
(2002) 3 SCC 711
Court but then whether having regard to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the same could have
been withdrawn or not, further determination in that behalf was not warranted. The appeal was
allowed with the direction to refund the entire amount to the appellants paid by them to avoid
disconnection for which they had given an undertaking not to claim refund of the amount paid by
them even if writ petition was allowed within four weeks. Respondent was to bear the costs. 139
Promissory estoppel creates right to sue- The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be
inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable
principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only
a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory
estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, it necessary to satisfy the equity. 140
In State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone law House,141 the respondent alleged that the Law
Minister of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh had assured the respondent to purchase at least
500 sets of the books of the Local Laws from it and had given green signal for publishing the same
but no order was placed and therefore it was a clear case where the principle of promissory estoppel
and legitimate expectation would arise. The respondent and the High Court referred to oral
expression of desire by the Law Minister and some departmental note for taking views and
concurrence of the various departments and ministries. Held, the doctrine of promissory estoppel
and legitimate expectation were not applicable to the facts of this case. Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat
speaking for the Supreme Court observed:
"The decision-maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in
policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of the policy is for the decision-maker and not the
Court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change
of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one
which no reasonable person could have made. A claim based on merely legitimate expectation
without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers
entire span of time; present, past and future. How significant is the statement that today is
tomorrow's yesterday. The present is as we experience at, the past is a present memory and future
is a present expectation. For legal purposes, expectation is not same as anticipation. Legitimacy of
an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law." 142
"In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must
be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bold expressions without any
supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the
doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government, would not be
sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the
results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the

139
Badri Kedar Paper Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, AIR 2009 SC 1783 at p. 1787 ; State of
Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 465 and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co, Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector
and Etio, (2007) 5 SCC 447 referred to.
140
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. U.P. State, AIR 1979 SC 621.
141
AIR 2008 SC 2045.
142
State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone Law House, AIR 2008 SC 2045 at pp. 2048-49
applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity
must forever be present in the mind of the Court."143
Where the entrepreneur, failed to comply with terms and conditions of concessional tariff scheme
for new industrial units within a reasonable time, the principle of promissory estoppel would not
apply. 144
The entrepreneurs setting up power generating plants were granted exemption from payment of
electricity tax. The appellants had invested a large sum on the basis of exemption granted under a
notification issued Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 1962. The Tamil
Nadu Tax on Consumption of Electricity Act, 2003 by Section 14 made a provision for grant of
exemption in respect of sale of energy. It took away the power of exemption on consumption of
electrical energy. Under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the expression "unless a
different intention appears" were not inserted in sub-section (1) of Section 20 of 2003 Act. Sub-
sections (1) and (2) of Section 20 of 2003 Act were held to operate in different situations. Sub-
section (l) of Section 208 of 2003 Act provided the consequences for the repeal of earlier Act of
1962. Section 20 (2) provided for a legal fiction for continuation of certain things/proceeding on
the premise as if the said Acts had not been repeated. The doctrine of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectations were held to apply in case of the appellants although the scheme under
2003 Act was different from the earlier Act.145
Where the development rebate in tariff of electricity was granted to new industrial units in hill
areas under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the revocation of the same simply on
the ground that there was theft of energy was held to be not a ground to claim that the revocation
was in public interest. The benefit of rebate was granted by a notification by a delegated authority
in exercise of delegated authority. Since the revocation had no statutory flavour, the principle of
promissory estoppel was attracted. The benefit of rebate was not recognised by the U.P. Electricity
Reforms Regulation Act, 1999 and therefore, the benefit was held to be not available to the
Claimants w.e.f. the Act came into force as the estoppel would not apply against the primary Act
passed by the legislature as it had the power to pass an Act prospectively as well as retrospectively.
A notification passed by the delegated authority could not be treated at par with a primary Act
passed by the Legislature.146
Promissory estoppel not to apply to ultra vires acts- In Vasant Kumar Radhakisan Vora v.
Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay,147 the tenants of Bombay port trust were promised that on
deposit of certain amount they would be allotted flats after reconstruction of building. Since this
was an ultra vires act, promissory estoppel was held not to apply.

143
Ibid., at p. 2050.
144
AP. Steel Re-Rolling Mills Ltd. v. State of Kerala with Victory Papers and Boards India Ltd. v. State of Kerala,
AIR 2007 SC 797 at p. 805.
145
Southern Petro-chemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and E.T.l.0., AIR 2008 SC 1984 at pp. 2011,
2012.
146
UP. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 693 at pp. 707-708
147
AIR 1991 SC 14.
Estoppel subject to public interest- In State of Rajasthan v. M/s, Mahavir Oil Mills,148 when
new industry was setup on basis of incentive Scheme by the Government and by relying on promise
of benefits held out by it, the. Supreme Court held that the State Government was bound by the
promise held out by it. But it did not preclude the State Government from withdrawing the benefit
prospectively and even during the period of Scheme, if the public interest, so required. If the party
had acted on promise but there was any supervening public interest which required that the benefit
to be withdrawn or to be modified, the supervening public interest would prevail over promissory
estoppel.
1n D.D.A. Self-Financing Flats Owners Society v. Union of India,149 there was allotment of flats
by Delhi Development Authority and cost of flat was indicated in brochure inviting allotment
application by D.D.A. indicating estimated provisional cost. The petitioner applicant was fully
aware of the fact that the cost was subject to change as per prevailing rates at the relevant time.
Plea that cost indicated in brochure were final and binding on principle of promissory estoppel,
was not tenable.
Promissory estoppel- No alteration of position within short time- Where the mining leases for
Ilmenite, Rutile, Leucoxene Zircon and Sillimanite were sanctioned in favour of the respondent
for a period of 20 years on 15th September, 2004 but was cancelled on 25 September, 2004 for
taking detailed study on the environmental impact of the proposed leases, the estoppel was held
not to apply because within short time of ten days, the respondent could not have altered his
position so as to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 150
Promissory estoppel not to apply in public interest- Acquisition of land cannot be quashed by
applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation as both the concepts have
to give way to the public interest involved.151
The State Government in view of its executive policy granted hundred percent refund of Central
Sales Tax paid by the Small Scale Industrial Units in the State on raw material purchased from
outside the State for a period of five years to encourage entrepreneur investment in the State by
Small Scale Industrial Units but it modified/withdrew exemption on the ground of misuse of
scheme and fraudulent claims for refund of Central Sales Tax which caused revenue loss to the
State. The Court held that the withdrawal of exemption was for valid and germane reason and such
decision was taken in the public interest and the rule of promissory estoppel would not apply. 152
SECTION 116- Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession- No tenant of
immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the
tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy,
a title to such immovable property ; and no person who came upon any immovable property by

148
AIR 1999 SC 2302.
149
AIR 2001 Delhi 29.
150
State of Kerala v. Kerala Rare Earth and Minerals Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 1817 pp. 1842, 1843.
151
State of Haryana v. Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 451 at p. 455.
152
State of J&K v. Tikuta Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2017 SC 4982 p. 4985
the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a
title to such possession at time when such licence was given.
Scope- Section 116 deals with estoppel:
(1) Between a tenant and his landlord, and,
(2) Licensee and licensor.
Tenant cannot deny the title of Landlord- A tenant cannot dispute the right of his landlord by
saying that he had nothing in the property. The ground of the doctrine is that in as much as the
parties have approved that they should stand in the relation of landlord and tenant, and the one
accordingly receives possession from the other and enters premises, so long as he continues in
possession, he cannot be heard to deny the state of facts which he had agreed shall be taken as the
basis of the arrangement. In other words he cannot set up that the landlord had no legal title. A
tenant cannot deny the right of the person from whom he took the tenancy. A tenant put into
possession of land by one person cannot alter the character of his possession and make it adverse
to the landlord by going to another person and paying rent to him.
Where a landlord files a suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent the tenant who has been put into
possession of the property in suit by the landlord cannot be allowed to say that the landlord had no
interest in the property of suit.153 To be clear, the tenant only after vacating the premises and then
he can question the title of the Landlord. 154
In Shri S.K. Shanna v. Mahesh Kumar Verma,155 the respondent was a railway servant. He was
allotted premises in question as official residence while he was holding the post of chief relation
officer. The Supreme Court held- The provision of Section 138 of Railway Act can be invoked for
evicting respondent upon his retirement even though railway administration has no proof that
property was belonging to it since the respondent was estopped from disputing title of railway
administration over premises in question in view of Section 116 of Evidence Act.
Where the respondents did not dispute that they had been put in possession of the premises as
tenants thereof by the appellants, they could not dispute title of the appellants landlord in respect
of the said premises. 156
When the Landlord cannot plead estoppel- Where tenancy is itself in question, the tenants are
not estopped from disputing the landlord's title. Again, where the tenancy has been created by
fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or mistake, the tenant cannot be estopped from denying the title
of the landlord. But, in the absence of any such circumstance, as would avoid a contract, the
execution of a lease or a verbal agreement to hold as a tenant, would constitute a valid tenancy and
bring in the estoppel.157 Once a valid and subsisting lease is established between the parties the
lessee is bound by the principle of estoppel and is debarred from disputing the title of the lessor

153
Moti Lal v.Yar Md, AIR 1925 All 275.
154
Suraj Bali Ram v. Dhani Ram, AIR 1979 Ori 101.
155
AIR 2002 SC 3294.
156
Jaspal Kaur Cheema v. Industrial Trade Links, AIR 2017 SC 3995 p. 3998.
157
Devenkaia Raya v. RC. Rajieha, AIR 1923 Hyd 241.
but that does not prevent the alleged lessee to deny the lease and to deny his own status as a lessee.
He is bound by the rule of estoppel only when he acts as a lessee and in that capacity tries to refute
the title of his own lessor.158 The same principle applies between licensees and licensor.
However where there was no extinguishment of title of landlord even though some dispute existed
with the corporation and no jural relationship had come into existence, the exception to Section
116 of the Evidence Act cannot be pleaded. 159
During the continuance of the tenancy- By this section a tenant is only estopped from denying
the title of the landlord, during the continuance of the tenancy. 160 Having regard to Section 116 of
the Evidence Act, during the continuance of the tenancy, a tenant will not be permitted to deny the
title of his landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. It is also well settled that during the
continuance of the tenancy, the tenant cannot acquire by prescription a permanent right of
occupancy in derogation of the landlord's title by mere assertion of such right to the knowledge of
the landlord.161 Thus, it is clear that after the tenancy had ceased, the tenant is free to deny the title
of the landlord. The relation of landlord and tenant continues until it is proved to have ceased.
A tenancy ceases when the tenant who has been led to possession openly restores possession by
surrender to his landlord.162 So when A enters into possession of a house as a tenant of B, tenancy
of A and B, continues still A gives back the possession of house to B and till then' In any suit or
proceeding A cannot say that B had no title to the house. This section only operates as an estoppel
during the continuance of the tenancy and not after it has come to an end. After the tenancy has
ceased, the poison who was tenant previously is at liberty to say that the person who was once
landlord has no interest in the property.
Meaning of ‘during the continuance of tenancy’- The term 'during the continuance of the
tenancy’ means so long as the tenant continues to enjoy the benefits of the tenancy. 163
At the beginning of the tenancy- This section provides only that a tenant cannot be permitted to
deny that the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy had a title to the property. A tenant is not
estopped from saying that on death of the lessor the property did not devolve on the plaintiff but
devolved on somebody else. This section also is no bar to a tenant showing that his landlord has
no title at a date previous to the commencement of the tenancy. A tenant can always plead that the
landlord had lost his title by any act of his or by operation of law. 164
Relation of landlord and tenant- Relationship of landlord and tenant can be created by written
contract or by verbal contract. When the landlord has put the tenant in possession of the land. It
may also be inferred from the payment of the tent, attornment or other circumstances. If once the
relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the parties, the tenant would be estopped

158
Sheo Prasad v. Nilvaji Bali, AIR 1947 Pat 45.
159
E. Parashuram v. V. Doraiswamy, (2006) 1 SCC 658
160
Mst. Munia v. Manohar Lal, AIR 1941 Oudh 429
161
Veararaju v. Venkamma, AIR 1966 SC 629
162
Charubala v. German Company, AIR 1934 Cal. 499; Bilas Kumari v. Deshraj Ranjit Singh, ILR 37 All 557.
163
Udai Pratap v. Krishna Pradhan, AIR 1952 Ori 95; Krishna Prashad v. Baraoni Coal Concern, AIR 1937 PC 251.
164
India Electric Works v. Mrs. B.S. Montort, AIR 1956 Cal 148; B. Goweresh v. K. Subhdrama, MR 1957 AP 961;
Kunpa Singher v. Puran Chandra, MR 1973 Ori 44.
from disputing the landlord's title. The question in each case is not “whether a new tenancy has
arisen?" There is no word in Section 116 to show that the tenant may be put into possession by the
landlord in order that the tenant may be estopped from disputing the title of landlord. A tenancy is
created by attornment. A, a landlord of a house lents it to B. Afterwards. A sold the house to C and
B attorns and continues to pay rent to C. Here a relation of landlord and tenant is mated between
C and B.165
Licence- There is no distinction between the law of estoppel of a licensee and that of a tenant. A
licensee who has obtained possession through the licence, before he can show that his licensor had
no title when he granted the licence, he must first surrender possession of the premises. When the
occupation of the defendant is proved to be permissive, he is estopped from denying the title of
the plaintiff. This section clearly states that licensee ought not to deny the title of the licensor.
A asked B's leave to take some vegetable from his (B's) garden. Having received the key
fraudulently he took possession of the garden and then refused to vacate. In a suit for ejectment by
B, he (A) cannot be allowed to say that B had no title to the garden when he granted the permission.
Estoppel between mortgagor and mortgagee- When a property has been mortgaged by one
person to another and the mortgagee has been put into possession in pursuance of the mortgage,
the parties will be estopped to deny the right of each other under the mortgage. 166 The mortgagee
while the mortgage subsists, i.e. before the mortgage money is paid up and possession surrendered
to the mortgagor, cannot say that the mortgagor had no interest in the property and that, he could
not make a mortgage about it. The mortgagee cannot say that no right has been created by the
mortgagor in favour of the mortgagee. It should be borne in mind that the rule of estoppel between
the mortgagor and mortgagee applies only to cases where the suit is brought on the basis of
mortgage but where the suit is not based on the mortgage but is one of the repudiation of the
mortgage, the principle of estoppel does not apply.
SECTION 117- Estoppel of acceptor of bill of exchange, bailee or licensee- No acceptor of a
bill of exchange shall be permitted to deny that the drawer had authority to draw such bill or to
endorse it; nor shall any bailee or licensee be permitted to deny that his bailor or licensor had, at
the time when the bailment or licence commenced, authority to make such bailment or grant such
licence.
Explanation (1) - The acceptor of a bill of exchange may deny that the bill was really drawn by
the person by whom it purports to have been drawn.
Explanation (2) - If a bailee delivers the goods bailed to a person other than the bailor, he may
prove that such person had a right to them as against the bailor.
Scope- This section deals with further instances of estoppel by agreement. Under this section, an
acceptor of a bill of exchange cannot deny that the drawer had authority to draw such bill or to
endorse it but he may deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by whom it purports to
have been drawn. A bailee or licensee cannot deny that his bailor or licensor had, at the

165
Tej Bhan Madan v. IInd Additional D.J., AIR 1988 SC 1413.
166
Arjun Singh v. Mahasaband, AIR 1932 All 437; Mohammad Sharif v. Sayyad Kasim, AIR 1933 Mad. 635.
commencement of the bailment or license, authority to make the bailment or grant the license but
a bailee, if he delivers the goods bailed to a third person, may prove that such person had a right
to them as against the bailor.

CONCLUSION

The Doctrine of estoppel is an important principle which protects people against fraud or
misrepresentation. There are several instances where an innocent person becomes a prey to false
representations made to them by some party. Sometimes the case may be such that the plaintiff
suffered huge losses. This doctrine avoids such situations and charges the person for his wrongful
conduct.

This legal principle gives an incentive to every one of those people who tries to make false
representations to other and induces them to act upon it by planting their faith in them, and incur
losses as a result of such false representations, by not performing such acts, else they would be
held liable.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Online material source.

 SCC ONLINE

 LEGAL SERVICE INDIA

 LAWYERS CLUB

 THELEGALHIGHNESS

 SHODHGANGA

Book referred.

 BATUK LAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, CENTRAL LAW AGENCY,

ALLAHBAD, 22ND EDITION, 2018.