People of the Philippines vs.

Alberto Medina

Facts:
Alberto Medina was confined in the National Mental Hospital for schizophreniform
disorder, where he was subsequently released. Relatives say that his condition did not
seem to improve. He was referred to Dr. Adigue for further examinations. May 20, 1991,
a party was attended by both Dalisay and Medina, as well as Larry Andal, where both
Dalisay and Medina danced the chacha together. Afterwards, Dalisay invited Andal to go
home, with Dalisay walking in front of Larry. They were way laid by Medina who stabbed
Dalisay. Dalisay fell down and the two grappled on the ground. Dalisay was able to run
away but he was chased and once more stabbed repeatedly by Medina. Andal was so
stunned that he wasn’t able to help Dalisay, who was brought DOA to the hospital.

The Trial Court convicted Medina of murder & said that his defense of insanity is not
meritorious since Dr. Adigue was not qualified as an expert witness, that his sister’s
testimony didn’t constitute sufficient proof of insanity, and that he was actually mentally
agile during trial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not medina was insane therefore exempt from criminal liability.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating Medina’s voluntary surrender

Rulings:
1. No. The decision was not based on the qualifications of Dr. Adigue as a doctor but as
a witness. What mattered was the failure of Dr. Adigue’s testimony to establish the
legal insanity of Medina as shown in the results of the tests she conducted which
merely says that Medina has a mild depression and emotional disturbances. The
testimony also did not establish the complete deprivation of reason on Medina’s part.
Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a complete deprivation of rationality
in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no
consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of the
power to discern. The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil Code, always lies
in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is
presumed to be of sound mind. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously
lost his reason or was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
crime, the courts will always presume that he was in a normal state of mind. Care must
be taken to distinguish between insanity or lack of reason and failure to use reason or
good judgment due to extreme anger or passion. Moral insanity or mere mental
depravity – results not from the disease of the mind but from a perverted condition of
the moral system; person is sane and is not exempted from the criminal liability.

2. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor
of the appellant. The solicitor general concurs and notes that appellant, after having
earlier given himself up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20,
1992,or about an hour after the stabbing incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk
officer of the Batangas City Police Station. Hence, the evidence sufficiently
established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.
People v. Bonoan

Facts:
Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which
caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense
objected on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors,
production of the defendant’s complete record of mental condition from the hospital and
defendant’s admission to the hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose
Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan may be discharged for being a
“recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to
life imprisonment.

The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan
suffered dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of
abnormality, that the defense did not establish the defendant’s insanity and finding
accused guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which
consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San
Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the insane. This ruling was based on the following
evidence:

1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San
Lazaro Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of
the offense and recurrence of ailments were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they
have no control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression
psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days
prior to act according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest,
indicating the police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson
People vs. Bascos

Facts:
Donato Bascos was charged in an information filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arraignment, he entered a plea of
not guilty. The proof for the prosecution established that the accused was the one who
had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latter was sleeping. The defense was that of
insanity.

Following the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him to seventeen years, four
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the
heirs of Victoriano Romero in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs, provided, however,
that the execution of the sentence should be suspended in accordance with article 100 of
the Penal Code, and the accused placed in a hospital for the insane, there to remain until
such time as his mental condition shall be determined.

The errors assigned in this court are to the effect that the trial court erred in making
application to the present case of the provisions of article 100 of the Penal Code, and in
not making application of article 8 of the Code. The Attorney-General reaches practically
the same conclusion as counsel for the appellant. It is, therefore, for us to determine if
the plea of insanity is sustainable under article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, or if
the case falls under article 100 of the Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the defense of the accused of insanity is sustainable.

Ruling:

Yes, the defense of the accused of insanity is sustainable.

The rather strict doctrine "that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense
of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him," has been
adopted in a series of decisions by this court. The trial judge construed this to mean that
the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the very moment the crime was
committed.

In this case, the wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been
more or less continuously out of his mind for many years. Doctor Gonzalo Montemayor,
assistant district health officer, who, by order of the judge, examined the accused and
conducted an investigation, found that the accused is a violent maniac, and that from the
information he had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter had been insane
for some time. The physician expressed the opinion that the accused was probably insane
when Victoriano Romero was killed. The official declaration of Doctor Montemayor in his
capacity as acting district health officer was "that this accused, according to a physical
examination and investigation, is a violent maniac, and that this mental state has
continued through many years, constituting a danger both for himself and for the
community." The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the assumption
that the former was insane.

Therefore, the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony described in
the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability, and should be
confined in an insane asylum.
People vs. Formigones

Facts:
From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his
wife Julia Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones to find employment as harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and
stabbed his wife at the back, the blade penetrating the right lung which latter caused her
death. When she fall on the ground the defendant carried her up the house, laid her on
the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her.

He was convicted of parricide and was sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea
of not guilty. His counsel presented testimonies of two guards of the provincial jail where
defendant was confined. They said that he behaved like an insane person, that
sometimes he would remove his clothes in front of others, would not take a bath, and
remained silent and indifferent to his surroundings. His counsel claimed that he is an
imbecile therefore exempt from criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez told that Abelardo
Formigones was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to be exempt from criminal liability,
he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the
time of committing the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant who is suffering from feeblemindedness is exempt from
criminal liability.

Ruling:
No. In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary
that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that
he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. As to the strange
behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to
a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. He could
distinguish right from wrong.
People vs. Mancao and Aguilar

Facts:
Mancao and Aguilar appealed from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu convicting them of the
crime of homicide, alleging that the lower court erred in not holding that the accused
Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally liable.

Mancao who was accompanied by three men and several women, inquired if there was
still corn to be harvested. The unharvested and undivided portion of the corn field having
been pointed out to them, the accused Mancao ordered the persons with him to begin
harvesting said corn and divided between her and Roberto Villela by virtue of the lease.
Roberto Villela then asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest the corn. Crispino
Mancao, replied that he was the one who ordered them to do so and started towards
Roberto Villela. The latter then asked the former if he had an order from the court to
harvest the products. Crispino Mancao struck him with a bamboo stick and said: "This is
the order." Thus, Roberto Villela dodged the blow and snatched the cane. Having been
deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino Mancao took hold of his bolo and attempted to
strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded off with a stick he had in his hand. Crispino
Mancao continued to strike Roberto Villela inflicting but slight wounds. Upon being
attacked, Roberto Villela rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fight ensued. A
man dressed in khaki immediately appeared after Mancao had shouted for help and
struck RobertoVillela a blow on the thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. Crispino
Mancao then took hold of Roberto Villela by the hands and while thus held, the accused
Ciriaco Aguilar struck him with his sickle in the back as a result of which Roberto Villela
fell to the ground unconscious.

Issue:
Whether or not Crispino Mancao should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense and
for his alleged mental deficiency.

Held:
No. Based on a careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence
presented by both parties, the antecedents given and the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the criminal act, it has been proven that the accused Crispino Mancao was
the instigator and aggressor. Thus, the allegation of self-defense made by the accused is
groundless because the evidence sufficiently proves that he carried a stick and a bolo
while Roberto Villela was unarmed. Neither can the defense of lack of free will of the
accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an
epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may momentarily deprive him of his
mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his own life and the lives
of others, nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the influence of an
epileptic fit before, during, and immediately after the aggression. Hence, SC affirmed the
decision of the lower court having no errors found on the judgment of guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and each being criminally liable for having taken direct part in the
commission of the crime.
People vs. Taneo

Facts:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the
said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result
of her wound, and also the fetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he
was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to
indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this
sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he
was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it
was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a
severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he
fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was
trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up;
and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed
himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to
him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in
desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he
attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife,
but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao,
or have any motive for assaulting them.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of the defendant, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in
the sense of entailing criminal liability.

Ruling:

Yes, the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were
not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. In arriving at this conclusion, we
are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a
criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not
known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be
found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the
fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real
motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the
case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking
into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house
and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only
a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also
motives for not committing said acts. Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is
also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the
case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and
not in his right mind. We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the
wound of the deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict
it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to have
been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only
seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that
the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as
he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he
was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really
wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself. In view of all these considerations, and
reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the defendant is not criminally
liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the
Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof
finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de officio. So
ordered.
People vs Gimena
Facts:

Accused Gimena is charged with the crime of parricide. On April 9, 1930, in the
municipality of Ronda, Cebu, the defendant’s father-in-law Gregorio Diana saw the
defendant attacking Crispina, defendant’s wife, with a bolo. The justice of the peace
asked the defendant why he had attacked his wife and received the answer that it was
because she had given the sum of P2.70 to one Apolinar Sereno whom he, the defendant,
suspected of illicit relations with the wife. A few hours later on the same day Crispina
Diana died and the examination subsequently made disclosed ten wounds in different
parts of her body.

Defendant was found guilty of parricide and was sentenced to 14 years and 8 months
and 1 day of cadena temporal. The appellant’s argument was that he was in a state of
somnambulism when he attacked his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the state of somnambulism is a defense.
Ruling:
No, somnambulism is not a defense.

By order of the trial court the defendant was placed under observation for some time by
Dr. Luis B. Gomez, but the doctor apparently did not discover any somnambulism on the
part of the defendant. A defense of that character must be proven and such proof is
lacking in this case.

The defense that the offense charged was committed by the accused during the
prevalence of or in a state of somnambulism has been recognized; but the latest holding
of courts is to the effect that it does not constitute a defense other than that embraced in
a plea of insanity.
Appealed judgment is affirmed.
Pp vs Umanito
Facts:

Accused is charged with the crime of rape which took place on or about 9:00 PM of July
15, 1989 at La Union. The Complaint alleges that the accused, with the aid of a fan knife
and by means of force and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeeded in having a sexual intercourse to the undersigned who is unmarried woman
of good reputation, a woman who is over 12 but below 18 years old of age, to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party.

In January 1990, 6 months after the incident, private complainant [AAA's] mother, [BBB],
noticed the prominence on [AAA]'s stomach. It was only then when the victim, private
complainant [AAA], divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told her the details of
what had happened in July 1989.
Issue/s:
Whether or not DNA testing can be submitted as evidence to determine the guilt of the
accused.
Ruling:
The Court directed the appellant, AAA and AAA’s child to submit themselves to DNA
testing as allowed in the New Ruled on DNA Evidence.

DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to

link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological
evidence is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid immensely in determining
a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of
the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration
of justice in every case.

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA's
child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized,
after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this
Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on
the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the
course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the
case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due
notice to the parties.

The Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.

After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to
avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC,
in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation, shall assess the same as evidence in
keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the RTC shall consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
People vs. Baid

Facts:
That on or about the 22nd day of December 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a mental patient suffering
[from] schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge
with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.

He denied the allegations against him. He testified that, on the date and time referred to
by the complainant, he was asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located about ten meters
from the room where complainant was staying.
On cross-examination, he admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he could enter the patients’
room anytime to check their condition and see to it that the lights were turned off when
they were not needed.

The trial court rendered its decision finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Accused-appellant contends that the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina

belies the commission of the crime.

Issue: WON the absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina belies the commission of
the crime

Ruling: No, the absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina does not belies the
commission of the crime.
This contention has no merit. The absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of the victim
does not disprove rape since ejaculation is not an element thereof. What consummates
the crime is the contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to the vagina of
the victim without her consent. The Court has held in numerous cases that a medical
examination is not a requisite for a rape charge to prosper as long as the victim positively
and consistently declares that she has been sexually abused. In the instant case, aside
from the victim's unwavering testimony, the medical examination showed fresh
lacerations, indicating that she had recent sexual intercourse.
People vs. Alfredo Pascual Y Ildefonso,

Facts:
The conviction of accused-appellant stemmed from an Amended Information dated
February 23, 2001, filed with the RTC for the crime designated as Rape with Homicide
and Robbery. During trial, the defense presented as witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc,
forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Said witness testified on the result of the DNA analysis which she conducted on the
specimens submitted by the trial court consisting of the victim's vaginal smear and panty.
According to her, no DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid
specimens. On cross-examination, she declared that based on DNA testing, she could
not determine if a woman was raped or not. She further declared that in this case, it was
possible that the stained vaginal smear prevented a complete and good result for the
DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by the court, the forensic chemist confirmed that
DNA testing on the subject specimens was inconclusive and that the result was not good,
as the specimens submitted, i.e., the stained vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had
already undergone serological analysis.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's decision.

Hence, accused-appellant seeks for a final review of his case and makes much of the
result of the DNA analysis conducted by the NBI that his profile was not in the victim's
vaginal smear. As such, he argues he is innocent of the crime charged.

Issue:
Does the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal?

Ruling:
No, the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.

In People v Yatar, the Supreme Court held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, while the DNA analysis of the victim's vaginal smear showed no
complete profile of the accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that
said specimen was already stained or contaminated which, according to the forensic
chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete and good result for DNA profiling. She
explained in her testimony that generally, with the vaginal smear, they could see if there
is a male profile in the smear. However in this case, when they received the vaginal smear
on the stained slide, the same had already undergone serological analysis. Hence,
according to the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the specimen subject of this case
was inconclusive.

In light of this flawed procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not
entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
People vs. Anastacia Lacena

Facts:

Around 3 in the morning of August 16, 1938, Marciano Dante woke up startled because
his wife, the accused appellant, who was sick of fever, told him: "Patay ka ngayon" (You're
going to die now), nailing him in The abdomen a pair of scissors. The wound produced
was the cause of acute peritonitis that the injured person later died.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for the death of her husband while she is
suffering from malaria.

Ruling:

No, she is not criminally liable as she has been deprived of her intelligence during that
time.

It has been proven that, on the day of the event, attacked by a high fever, the appellant
raved and rushed anyone who lived with her in the house. In the analysis of his blood,
verified on October 12, 1938, it was found that she suffered from plasmodium
falcifarum or malignant malaria, a disease that causes disturbance in the nervous system,
causing among other complications acute mania, melacolia and exceptional madness,
sometimes, because its common sequel is neuralgia.

The circumstances in which the appellant murdered and threw the scissor to her husband,
reveal that she executed such an act at times that she suffered from madness as a result
of her illness, and therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, paragraph 1
of the Revised Criminal Code, has not incurred criminal liability. The testimony of the
Justice of the Peace, Mr. Jose Y. Baldos, to the effect that Marciano Dante told him that
his wife had probably been scolded because he had not been able to feed him, for having
fallen asleep, we believe he lacks value, because it is based on a simple conjecture of
the deceased, and because there is no such extreme in the declaration before
mortem lent by it.

The appealed sentence is revoked and the defendant is acquitted of the complaint, with
the ex officio costs.
Joel Jimenez vs Remedios Cañizares

Facts:

The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition
of her genitals at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he
left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

The wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint but did not file an answer.
The Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination
by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to
submit a medical certificate on the result thereof. The defendant was warned that her
failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would
be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence
presented by her husband would be rendered. After hearing, at which the defendant was
not present, the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage.

The city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree, upon the ground, among
others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required
by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be
examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for
contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a
medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door
to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other
by just alleging impotency of one of them.

Issue:

Whether or not, the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

Ruling:

It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about
of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to
annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit
to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. The Court may do
without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not
charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife
is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife.
People vs Malapo
Facts:

This is a case upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party hereto attached,
hereby accuses one Nixon Malapo of Iriga City of the crime of rape. That sometime on
the month of September 1991, the said accused entered the house of Nenita, aunt of
complainant Amalia Trinidad who was then and there alone, and by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of said Amalia Trinidad against here will and consent and as a result
she has become pregnant and delivered a baby at Iriga City Puericulture Center.

Amalia is seemingly and example of a pseudoretardate. She might have been deprived
of intellectual stimulations which explains her lag in cognitive development. She is still
categorized within the normal classification of children.

Amalia did not tell Nenita as to what happened to her at the time for she was threatened
by the accused-appellant that he’ll kill her if she ever told anyone. However on May 18,
1992, as she was about to give birth to her baby she told Bernardita Marquinez that she
had been raped by the accused-appellant.

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant Nixon Malapo of rape and sentencing hum to
suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay victim Amalia Trinidad the sum of
Php50,000.00 in moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the victim was already pregnant when she was raped by appellant.
Ruling:

A textbook on pediatrics states that infants delivered before thirty-seventh week of

gestation with birth weight of less than 2500grams (American) or 2275grams (Filipino)
are considered premature. An infant can therefore be considered a full-term baby if it
weighs more than 2275grams even of it is born before the thirty seventh week which is
less than 9.3 months. Since according to the medical certificate Amalia’s baby weighed
2.4kg or 2400grams, it was a full-term baby even if it was born before the normal gestation
period.
Art. 166 of Family Code provides:
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child because of:
(a) The physical incapacity if the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
(b) The fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible
(c) Serious illness of the husband which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been that of the husband, expect in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Art. 164
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that the
accused-appellant is alleged to have committed a crime, i.e. within 120 days from the
commission of the offense in September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code,
accused-appellant can overcome the presumption that Amalia’s child was begotten as a
result of her having been raped in September 1991 only if he can show either that it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious
illness which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia had
sexual intercourse with another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either
of these.

The testimony of Amalia, as corroborated by Nenita and Bernardita Marquinez, leaves no

doubt in our mind that accused-appellant is the father of the child. Therefore, in
accordance to Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should be
ordered to pay support.

In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape, proof that the child
was fathered by another man does not show that accused-appellant is not guilty,
considering the positive testimony of Amalia that accused-appellant had abused her.
Danilo A. Aurelio vs. Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential
marital obligations. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic)
personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that it failed to meet the
standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in
respondent’s petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to
comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
The RTC denied the motion. On appeal, the CA also dismissed the petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage are
sufficient.
Ruling:
Yes, the allegations are sufficient.

First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The Court agrees with the
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a
nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged
to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied
with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
Te vs Te

Facts:
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino-Chinese gathering
at a school campus.They did not have interest with each other at first but they developed
a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share the same angst with their
families.
In 1996, while still in college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they should elope.
Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he was still young and jobless. But due to
Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after
disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home.
Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court and had them be married.
After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth was
treated like a prisoner. Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home
otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he
was hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live
with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance
instead so that they could live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth
however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they
live separate lives from then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed a petition for annulment
of his marriage with Rowena. Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after
investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the two
parties. Eventually, the case was tried. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the
psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The
said relationship between Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties’ unreadiness to
commitment and their young age. Kenneth was still in the state of finding his fate and
fighting boredom, while Rowena was still egocentrically involved with herself. The trial
court ruled that the marriage is void upon the findings of the expert psychologist. The
Solicitor General (OSG) appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the OSG.
The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. The clinical psychologist did not personally
examine Rowena, and relied only on the information provided by Kenneth.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to
be followed as guidelines.
Issue:
Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the
guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.
Held:
Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly, the SC may have
inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining Psychological Incapacity in
the Molina case. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled
accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.” The SC
however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both
parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena
cannot perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and
impulsiveness.
The Psychological test result and evaluation result were both petitioner and respondent
are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their
marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage. Although
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
People vs. Cruz

Facts:
An information was filed against Jesus Paragas Cruz alleging that on or about June 6,
1998 in the City of Parañaque, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, 9 year old minor,
against her will.

There are two sides of the story. The version of the prosecution states that on the said
date, AAA, then a nine-year old, was at her house watching television with her cousin
Jady. When Jady left to go to her mother’s house, the accused abruptly entered the house
and turned off the television. He closed the windows and told AAA to remove her shorts.
Cruz later kissed AAA and touched her vagina. She felt pain as he inserted his penis into
her vagina. Out of fear, AAA did not do anything. Cruz threatened to kill her should she
report what happened. Because she was terrified, she only told her mother about what
happened a few months later which the latter subsequently told Cruz’s wife. BBB then
brought AAA to the barangay hall and then to the police station to report the matter to the
authorities. A medical examination was conducted on AAA which showed that she had
two hymenal lacerations. One was a deep-healed laceration at the 3 o’clock position and
one was a shallow healed laceration at the 5 o’clock position.

On the version of the defense, Cruz claimed that he was with Antonio Gonzales in
Multinational Village, Parañaque City at the time of rape, from 11 o’clock in the morning
to 5:30 in the afternoon, because he was allegedly conducting a survey of Gonzales’ land
to prepare it for a prospective buyer. A couple of months later, his wife told him of the
alleged rape. To further establish his defense, he maintained that it was impossible for
him to commit rape as he had been sexually impotent since 1995. He pointed a land
dispute he had with the victim’s family as a possible reason for the fabricated charge.
Cruz’s wife corroborated his story by saying that they seldom had sexual intercourse after
1995 because he had become impotent. The doctor also diagnosed him as suffering from
erectile dysfunction in 2001.

The RTC found Cruz guilty for the crime charged finding his defense too shallow. Cruz
filed an appeal in the CA. He alleged that AAA’s hymenal lacerations could have been
caused by means other than sexual intercourse. He further submitted that his erectile
dysfunction raised doubts as to his culpability. The CA found Cruz’s assertions without
merit. It pointed out that the medical finding of erectile dysfunction was based on an
examination more than three years ago after the rape occurred; thus, no categorical
conclusion could be made that Cruz was impotent when the rape was committed.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the victim’s hymenal lacerations could have been caused by a non-
sexual act and
(2) whether or not Cruz’s erectile dysfunction made it impossible for him to commit rape.

Ruling:
No, the victim’s hymenal lacerations could not have been caused by a non-sexual act.
The claim that AAA’s hymenal lacerations could have been caused by something other
than sexual congress is distinctly speculative and does not throw any doubt as to the fact
of rape. Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape so long as there is enough
proof of entry of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Most
important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the following elements: (1) that
the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12
years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. These
elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense
with any solid evidence to the contrary.
No, Cruz’s erectile dysfunction did not make it impossible for him to commit rape. While
Cruz was indeed diagnosed as suffering from erectile dysfunction, this does not preclude
the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with AAA. AAA was raped in 1998 while
the medical examination of Cruz was conducted in 2001. A good three years had already
lapsed since AAA had been sexually abused. The diagnose on Cruz in 2001 is, therefore,
useless to disprove his sexual potency at the time of the rape incident. It merely
corroborates his assertion that he is currently sexually impotent, and not that he has been
so since 1995. Cruz was not able to adduce hard evidence to demonstrate his impotency
prior to or on June 6, 1998 when the crime of rape was committed. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that he was indeed impotent since 1995, it does not discount the possibility that
his erection was cured by drugs like Viagra or Ciales. Erectile Dysfunction or ED can be
a total inability to achieve erection, an inconsistent ability to do so, or a tendency to sustain
only brief erections. The testimony of the doctor who examined Cruz in 2001 did not
specify what kind of ED Cruz was suffering from. Cruz’s impotency cannot, therefore, be
considered completely eliminating the possibility of sexual intercourse.
Agustin vs. CA and Minor Martin Jose Prollamante, represented by his
Mother/Guardian Fe Angela Prollamante

Facts:
Fe alleged that she was impreganated by Arnel sometime in 1994. She then asked Arnel
for support since she alleged that Arnel signed the birth certificate. However, this was
denied by Arnel. He said that he was in a secret relationship with Fe, however it ended
before Fe could have been impregnated.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court.

Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his
signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child
is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. In his motion, Arnel
manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe
(I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in
Martin’s birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the
certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the
birth certificate was forged.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.

Petitioner contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no
merit.

Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical
sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr.
de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from
the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s
vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the
blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the

admissibility of the results thereof as evidence.

The contention that it violates the rights against self-incrimination is untenable. The kernel
of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from
the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs, hair, and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional
several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women
accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth and the tracing of one’s foot
to determine its identity with bloody footprints. In Jimenez v. Cañizares, we even
authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her
husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis.
Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of
them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results are now similarly
acceptable.
Jesse U. Lucas vs. Jesus S. Lucas

Facts:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus
S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate
of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing
that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology;
(d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from
the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles
from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative
defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by
Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not
yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour
of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Issue:

Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

Ruling:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A
prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological
sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e)
The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that
a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of
the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in
various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required,
but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an
order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing
must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The
same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa vs. The Director, New Bilibid
Prisons
Facts:

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape committed against Aileen Mendoza, petitioner’s niece by affinity, who was then 12
years old.
The physician who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and
found in her hymen healed lacerations. On December 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby
girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.

Petitioner was sentenced to death, to indemnify the victim and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza.

On automatic review, the Supreme Court found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was
medically consistent with the time of the rape. Hence, the SC affirmed petitioner's
conviction for rape.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during
the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator
was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently
furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force,
which took over as counsel for petitioner.

Thus, petitioner sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine
the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.

Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from
saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a
classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn
readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-
relator. Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa.

Petitioner-relator requested the National Science Research Institute to conduct DNA

testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of
Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report which showed that
Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested,
due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's
sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's.
Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s conviction for rape must be set aside considering that the DNA
analysis on paternity shows that petitioner is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza.

Ruling:
Petition for habeas corpus and new trial was dismissed for lack of merit.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such
relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of
illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal
which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction
through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.

In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of
conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In
fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of
jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been
imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of
findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas
corpus proceedings. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge
of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an
individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere
errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction.

Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be
corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law.

The denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. A careful scrutiny
of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly
deprived. There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were tainted with any other
jurisdictional defect.

Petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-
examination of the records, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents
and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction.
This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus
must, therefore, fail.

Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a
new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.

It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the
issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an
entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her
child. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which
the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is
of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.

A motion for new trial is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited
grounds.

In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-
discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding
petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus has long attained finality. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, the Court does not find that the DNA evidence falls within the
statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".

It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate
the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, it
does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial.
Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the
trial was concluded carries no weight. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing
speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel.
In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner
and his counsel, the Court was not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright
acquittal. The pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape.
Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove that Reynaldo de Villa
should be discharged.
Herrera vs. Alba
Facts:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner
also denied physical contact with respondent's mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory.
She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City,
where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In
her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted
that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against
self-incrimination.

RULING OF TRIAL COURT: In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is
GRANTED and the relevant individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and
respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a laboratory of their common
choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to submit the
results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further
reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in
support of the petition.

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: On 29 November 2000, the appellate court

issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial
court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial court's
evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated
that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-
incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the
appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the
DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
Issues :

1. Whether or not a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation.

2. Whether or not the proposed DNA paternity testing violates petitoner’s right against
self-incrimination
Ruling:

1. Yes, DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdictio. In Vallejo, the DNA profile from
the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused's DNA profile. We
affirmed the accused's conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We
declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there
was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The
Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on
DNA testing: People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de
Villa. In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim
and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court,
following Vallejo's footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the physical
evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with
homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he
is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court
ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA
profile of the victim's child does not preclude the convict-petitioner's commission of rape.

Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise
excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.49 Section 49 of
Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue."

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving
credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
We also repeat the trial court's explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:

In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in
an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother
and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
father's profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile,
which match the paternal types in the child. If the man's DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.52
It is not enough to state that the child's DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative
father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest
standard adopted in an American jurisdiction,53 trial courts should require at least 99.9%
as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity inclusion. W
is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the
probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference
population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute
for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and
child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative
father and child alone.54

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof
of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis
should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher,
then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity
should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
2. No, Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent
in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the
right against self-incrimination. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." This privilege applies only
to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People v. Olvis, 154
SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination
is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body
when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to
extract virus from his body (as cited in People v. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting
from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US v.
Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US v.
Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants
for size was allowed (People v. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since
the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial compulsion."

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right
of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by
Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
Facts:

This is a Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation
was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio).
She and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into
love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo.

From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited. From this live-in
relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived. On the birth of Joanne, Rogelio
paid for the hospital bills and recognized Jinky as his own.

Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child. The RTC held that Joanne Rodjin
Diaz is the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz, and ordered
Ong to pay support.

The CA affirmed this decision, ruling that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence
affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity
dispute, and that the trial court may avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA
samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father.
Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred when it remanded the case to the trial court for DNA analysis
despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio
Ruling:

No, the CA did not err. The alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand
for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without
basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing,
either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation.

The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as may be available,
may be used for DNA testing.

The term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person’s
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing.
The People of the Philippines, vs. Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino alias Puke

Facts:

On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her
neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the
neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed
that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm,
still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a
tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he
was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already
told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police
requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied
and the clothes were submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the
NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs)
from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that
there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim,
while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O.

Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when
trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened
by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the
clothing of Daisy (including his clothing – which in effect is an admission placing him in
the crime scene – though not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy
waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the
trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this
rape-slay case.

The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and
for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample
is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible
results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).
In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine
the statistical significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
People of the Philippines, vs. Federico Lucero

Facts:

Jao, testified he saw the accused and a certain Digoy Tewok drinking outside the Olympic
Battery Shop, where the accused was employed as a cook. He noticed that the accused
was wearing green short pants. About 10 meters from where the accused was drinking,
Jao saw the victim, AAA, a certain May Laribas, and his daughter looking at pictures in
an album, inside the purok hut. He then told his daughter and her companions to go home,
as there were people drinking in the area, especially since he knew that the accused was
attracted to AAA.

On June 7, 1997, at around 2:00 a.m., Jao saw his daughter coming from the direction of
AAA’s house, followed by accused, who was being chased by Langgoy. Accused wore
white briefs with something covering his head. Jao recognized accused from a distance
of six feet, and the lighting came from a 40-watt fluorescent lamp about seven meters
away from accused.

At around 3:00 a.m. on June 7, 1997, Jao saw accused come out of the Patalinghug
Funeral Homes and proceed to his place of employment. He was barefoot, his feet were
muddy, and he wore the same green short pants he had been wearing the night before.

Sometime in the morning of June 7, 1997, through a hole in the wall of the room of
accused-appellant, Jao saw accused washing his green short pants, seemingly restless
and wary. Jao also saw scratches on the back and right thigh of accused, after accused
was told to take his shirt off by the police.

Langgoy was awakened by a voice calling for help, and he recognized the voice as that
of AAA. When he went to AAA’s house, which was five meters from his, and tried to enter
it, his hands were held by someone inside the house. When he stepped back, and the
one who had held his hands came out, Langgoy recognized the person as accused, who
was wearing only briefs and with green short pants covering his head. Langgoy positively
identified accused-appellant by the light of a 40-watt fluorescent lamp nearby, and was
familiar with accused-appellant as they were neighbors, with their houses only four meters
apart.

A post-mortem examination of AAA’s body revealed that she had had sexual intercourse,
as found by NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Rodaje. Dr. Rodaje found hymenal lacerations
on AAA’s hymen at 4 o’clock and 7 o’clock positions, with the edges of the hymen being
swollen and with clotted blood. The conclusion that AAA had had sexual intercourse was
supported by the findings of NBI Regional Chemist Dulay, from a vaginal swabbing from
AAA that gave positive results for seminal stains.

The accused testified in his defense, saying that he had been slicing ampalaya in the
kitchen when the police arrived, and he was told to just accompany them to the police
station. He put down his knife, but PO2 Gurrea picked it up, and then the accused was
brought to the police station. He was handcuffed and brought to the comfort room where
he was told that if he did not admit to killing AAA, he would be beaten to death. He was
also subjected to electric shock. He then confessed to the killing, even if he did not commit
the crime.
RTC Ruling:

The trial court held that enough circumstantial evidence was presented to prove the guilt
of the accused. The trial court finds accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the heirs of the victim AAA
P75,000.00 civil indemnity; P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary
damages.

In his appeal, Lucero questions the positive identification made by witnesses Jao and
Langgoy. He insists that the witnesses were unable to see the face of the perpetrator,
and identification was made solely on the basis of the green short pants worn by the
suspect. He also claims that a DNA test should have been done to match the
spermatozoa found in the victim’s body to a sample taken from him, and that since no
DNA test was done, he cannot be linked to the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not, the CA erred in disregarding the confession by accused-appellant Lucero,

as well as the evidence gained by searching his room.

SC Ruling:

No, the CA correctly disregarded the confession by accused-appellant Lucero, as well as

the evidence gained by searching his room.

Among the evidence considered by the RTC during the trial were a blood-stained white t-
shirt and knife found in the room of accused. However, these items were the result of a
search conducted after accused had been questioned without the presence of counsel,
nor had accused-appellant been apprised of his rights. Thus, the information elicited is
inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also
inadmissible, which is what the CA correctly concluded.

But even if the confession and evidence gathered as a result of it are disregarded, the
evidence that remains still supports the result of the conviction of accused. Langgoy’s
testimony dovetails with that of Jao, and serves to identify accused-appellant as the one
who ran from AAA’s house. Their descriptions of the man they saw running away match,
even if Langgoy was the only one who saw accused-appellant’s face. Their testimonies
place accused-appellant at the scene of the crime, and pinpoint him as the person leaving
the house where AAA’s body was found.

The Court also ruled that the DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence
pinning down accused as the perpetrator. Indeed, if accused honestly thought that the
DNA test could have proved his innocence, he could have asked for the conduct of said
test during his trial, instead of belatedly raising it on appeal, and attempting to dictate
upon the prosecution what course of actions it should have undertaken.

While, all accused presented is his bare denial that he committed the crime, the
prosecution was able to prove that accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, as per
the post-mortem findings and the vaginal swabbings examined found hymenal lacerations
from his examination of AAA’s body. NBI Regional Chemist Dulay’s findings that there
were seminal stains serve to bolster the conclusion that rape was committed.

As to the presence of force or intimidation, the several injuries and stab wounds suffered
by AAA are mute but eloquent statements of the violence inflicted upon her, resulting in
her death. Thus, the elements of the crime of rape with homicide are all present.
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and Angelita
Diamante.

Facts:

Petitioner Bienvenida herein serves as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita

Diamante. One day she was fetched by Angelita for an urgent laundry job, but since she
was on her way to market she asked Angelita to wait for her until she returns to do the
laundry. She also left with Angelita her four month old son, Edgardo, since she usually
left the child with her whenever she does the laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
the market Angelita and her husband were gone, she proceeded to the latter’s house but
she was told by the maid there that the spouses left already, after three days she learned
that the spouses already moved to another place, she complained to their barangay
chairman who seems to be deaf to her please. Although estranged from her husband
(father of Edgardo) she went to him for help so they can search for their missing son, as
fate would have it Bienvenida and her husband reconciled. They made serious efforts to
locate their son but to no avail they failed. Four years later, petitioner read on a tabloid
about the death of one Tomas Lopes allegedly the common law husband of Angelita, they
were in Hagionoy Bulacan, the petitioner wasted no time and went to the said place where
she saw her son Edgardo Tijing for the first time in four years, the boy was pointed to her
by Benjamin Lopez, brother of the deceased Tomas Lopez. Bienvenida and her husband
filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial curt to recover their son. They presented
two witnesses, the midwife who assisted Bienvenida’s delivery and Benjamin Lopez who
testified that Tomas Lopez cannot be the father of the child as he was sterile due to an
accident. The trial court ruled in favor of Bienvenida and her husband.

On appeal the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. Expressing its
doubts on the propriety of the writ of habeas corpus, and the evidence presented by the
petitioner was not enough to establish that she was indeed the mother of the said child.
Hence the appeal of this decision.
Issue:
WON habeas corpus is a proper remedy
Held:

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors the
question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining
the right of the custody over the child. In this case the identity of the minor is also crucial
in determining the propriety of the writ sought.
People vs. Lising
Facts:

In March 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman, asked Felimon Garcia, his townmate, if
he knew somebody who could allegedly affect the arrest of Robert Herrera, the suspect
in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili.

On April 21, 1990, Garcia called up Manalili and informed him that he already contracted
a policeman to help him.

On April 22, Garcia introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and another man to Manalili.
During the meeting, Manalili offered to pay them P50K for the job. On April 23-24, Lising’s
group met with Vic Lisboa and conducted a surveillance on the Castaños residence in the
hope of seeing Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to return the next day. On
April 25, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise Bernabe and
Beebom Castaños leave the Castaños residence in a green box type Lancer car. The
group followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and
Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle. The Lancer car stopped at Dayrit’s Ham and Burger
House on Timog Circle. Alighting from the car, they were accosted by Dizon and Manga.
On June 21, two security guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and
Jun Medrano, both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a man
and a woman in their warehouse. On June 23, Raul Morales was picked up and told his
story. On June 25, the body of Cochise was exhumed. The cause of his death was
multiple stab wounds. The next day, Beebom’s body was exhumed from a shallow grave,
2 kilometers from where Cochise’s body was found. One by one, the men responsible for
the killing of Cochise & Beebom fell into the hands of the authorities.

Lising, Garcia & Manalili executed extrajudicial statements. Upon arraignment, all the
accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 2 vital witnesses: Froilan Olimpia,
who witnessed the abduction of the young couple at Dayrit’s Ham and Burger House; &
Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of Cochise.

In the respondent’s defense, the accused policemen allege that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain their conviction. Each one also presented an alibi.

On July 1, 1992, the Court held Manalili, Lising, Garcia, Manga and Dizon guilty of the
crime of double murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by premeditation and
abuse of public position by Lising, Manga and Dizon. The Court also held Lising, Dizon
and Manga guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention aggravated by use of a motor
vehicle. The accused were acquitted of the crime of kidnapping, since the use of the car
was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of slight illegal detention.

Garcia, for his part, prays that his liability be mitigated on grounds of lack of intent or
motive, acts made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, and voluntary surrender,
which if considered would make him merely an accomplice to the crime

Issue:

WON Garcia’s liability is mitigated by (1) his lack of intent or motive, (2) his acts were
made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, & (3) his voluntary surrender, which
would make him merely an accomplice to the crime.
Ruling:

No.

To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable

fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument
who acted not only without will but against his will. That compulsion must be of some
character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for
escape.

In this case, Garcia's participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched,
up to the killing of the victims is undisputed. He was very well aware of Manalili's plans.
He was instrumental in introducing Lising to Manalili. Likewise, Lising's intentions to
silence both Cochise and Beebom at the end upon realizing an alleged mistake was
known to him. He did not do anything to deter the commission or to report the crimes
immediately thereafter. In fact, he stated that he and Lising saw each other after the
incident but never mentioned anything about it, which only goes to show their intention of
concealing the crime. Only after several months of being hunted, did he send feelers for
his surrender.

Therefore, there being conspiracy, all the accused should be equally guilty for the crimes
as charged. Unfortunately, Manalili and Garcia cannot be convicted for Kidnapping in
consonance with the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight
Illegal Detention should be qualified to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code considering that a female victim was involved.