alert his teammates. Thereupon, Capt.
Dilla and AiC Cabiao rushed toward the appellant,
4. Pre-Trial
a. Rule 118
People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 (1991) (LABBAY)
FACTS:
Benjamin Ramos, Jr. was arrested and charged before the RTC in an information filed by the
fiscal for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6245, Art. II, Sec. 4) for delivering and selling
to another 2.5 grams of dried marijuana leaves or Indian hemp".
After trial, the court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. From the judgment of conviction, Ramos appealed.
The Solicitor General summarized the People's version thus:
A civilian informant went to the NARCOM Office in Bitas, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, with
the information that there was a person selling marijuana leaves or Indian Hemp at the 'Hang
Out' restaurant located at the diversion road in Cabanatuan City. Upon hearing such
information, Capt. Maximo Dilla, the NARCOM District Commander, organized a team of
operation consisting of himself, Sgt. Danilo Maulon, AIC Francisco Cabiao and the said
informant.
"The group proceeded to the 'Hang Out' restaurant. Sgt. Maulon, together with the informant,
went inside, while Capt. Dilla and AIC Cabiao positioned themselves in a strategic place where
they could not be seen. While inside the restaurant, the informant approached appellant,
whispering to the latter that he had with him a man who wanted to buy marijuana leaves,
indicating Sgt. Maulon to be the buyer. After a brief conversation, appellant left for a while
and thereafter returned with a plastic teabag containing marijuana which he gave to Sgt.
Maulon. Sgt. Maulon, after ascertaining that what was given him was indeed marijuana
leaves, gave the marked 10-peso bill to the appellant. Sgt. Maulon then lighted a cigarette to
arrested him and brought him to the NARCOM District Office for booking and investigation.
Before Us, Ramos denies any "buy-bust" operation, claiming that the marijuana leaves were
planted evidence, that he was arrested because of a heated argument with the restaurant
owner, Dr. Melvin Garcia, over an alleged P30.00-unpaid account.
ISSUE:
W/N "THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 4
OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE, KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS (DRUGS) ACT OF
1972."
RULING:
The case of the prosecution is clear and positive. Ramos was caught in flagranti selling
marijuana. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the "buy-bust operation" or
entrapment, resorted to by the Narcotics agents has long been recognized as an effective
means of apprehending drug peddlers. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by the
Revised Penal Code, We defined entrapment as the "employment of such ways and means
for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker".
The defense attacks the prosecution's failure to present as witness, Capt. Maximo Dilla.
Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be presented as
witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of its necessity (People v. M. Ruedas, G.R. No.
83372, February 27, 1991 and other cases).
The prosecution was able to establish the "buybust" operation through the testimonies of the
arresting officers, Sgt. Danilo Maulon and Airman First Class Francisco Cabiao, then members
of the Narcotics Command stationed at Cabanatuan City, who, as rightly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, are entitled to full faith and credence as they are presumed to have acted
in the regular performance of official duty. The Solicitor General has pointed out that the
arresting officers were not shown to have had any ulterior motive to falsely accuse Ramos
with a serious offense, but that they were simply bent on apprehending violators of the law.
The presumption has always been that NARCOM agents are performing their functions when
they conduct buy-bust operations and entrap and arrest violators. The conviction of accused
Ramos is therefore in order.
Fule v. CA, 162 SCRA446 (1988) (Macabenta)
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting
petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution
and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. The facts stipulated upon
read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before January
21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January
24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was
dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this case.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-
appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a
Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-
appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8,
1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be a conviction despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction
was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial which was not signed by
the petitioner, nor by his counsel.
RULING:
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable
to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced
to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a
duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176).
And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are,
by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and
his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts
inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum,
confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both
the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have
done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by
Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying
solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said
evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that
evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has
been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set
aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is
hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
B. Trial
1. Rule 119
People v. Castro-Bartolome, 204 SCRA 38 (1991) (Martinez)
Facts: In a complaint dated January 23, 1973 filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XV (Makati), presided by respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome, petitioner George
Litton Sr. charged Leonor Sochayseng and Rogelio Paz with adultery.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondents Sochayseng and Paz filed their respective
demurrer to evidence (motions to dismiss) substantially raising similar grounds for the
dismissal of the adultery charge:
1. That the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of marriage
between Litton, Sr. and Sochayseng during the alleged period of commission of adultery;
2. That assuming arguendo that said marriage did in fact exist and that both respondents
committed acts of adultery during coverture, petitioner Litton, Sr. has condoned and
pardoned the adulterous acts of his wife and Paz.[2]
On June 23, 1976, or nine (9) months after the prosecution rested its case and before
respondent Judge could resolve the motions to dismiss submitted by Sochayseng and Paz, the
private prosecutor (Atty. Estanislao Fernandez) filed a motion to reopen the case for the
purpose of presenting the following additional evidence:
"1. A certified xerox copy of the Marriage Contract between George Litton, Sr., complainant
herein, and his accused-wife, Leonor Trinidad Sochayseng, dated August 28, 1959 at Binan,
Laguna. x x x ;
"2. A certified and duly authenticated xerox copy of the Marriage Certificate attesting to the
marriage of George Litton, Sr., complainant herein, and the accused Leonor Sochayseng,
celebrated on October 20, 1962 before the Justice of the Peace of Las Vegas, Nevada (USA) x
xx;
"3. A xerox copy of the affidavit of the accused Leonor S. Litton in the support case filed by
her against George Litton, Sr., Civil Case No. 16795 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated
October 11, 1972 wherein said Leonor S. Litton stated, under oath, among others, that she
and the defendant (George Litton, Sr.) were married on October 20, 1962 as per marriage
certificate x x x."[3]
Atty. Fernandez, who replaced Atty. Dakila Castro as private prosecutor, justified the move,
thus:
"These documents were not presented by the private prosecutor Dakila F. Castro at the close
of the evidence of the prosecution in his belief that he had sufficiently proven the marriage
between complaining witness George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Trinidad Sochayseng,
with the testimony, among others, of said George Litton, Sr., about said marriages. Granting
that said opinion of Atty. Castro is erroneous, in the highest interest of justice, we are
presenting this motion to enable us to present the above-mentioned documents to
conclusively prove the fact of marriage between the complaining witness, George Litton, Sr.
and the accused Leonor Sochayseng.”
Respondent Judge denied the motion to reopen trial. Hence, the present recourse assailing
respondent Judge for gravely abusing her discretion in refusing to reopen trial.
Issue: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to reopen trial.
Ruling: Additional jurisprudence is to the effect that:
"x x x It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after
the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except
where it has clearly been abused. (64 C. J. 160). More, it is within the sound discretion of the
court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of
evidence after a motion or request for a non-suit, or a demurrer to the evidence; and the case
may be reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request,
motion or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion had been
granted, if the order had not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64 C. J.,
164).
"In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their
respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been
held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court
where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong & Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil. 393; U.S. vs. Alviar,
36 Phil. 804). So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or
where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the
evidence is to correct evidence previously offered." (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163, cited in Alegre vs. Reyes, ibid, pp. 232-233; Agulto vs.
Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 52728, January 17, 1990, 181 SCRA 80).
The factual milieu of the case at bar, we find that respondent Judge correctly rejected
petitioner's motion to reopen the trial. Even the so-called paramount interests of justice
cannot free petitioner from his self-imposed predicament. His counsel took a big gamble in
not presenting the certificates attesting to the fact of marriage between petitioner and
Leonor Sochayseng on the erroneous belief that said marriage had been amply established by
the testimony of the aggrieved husband. Petitioner's counsel realized his folly when private
respondents understandably moved for the quashal of the complaint on the material ground
that coverture was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As wisely observed by respondent Judge in her August 11, 1976 denial order:
"x x x If the prosecution can be allowed to rectify a mistake pointed out in a demurrer to the
evidence, what will be the court's reason to deny him a second or a third or a fourth reopening
ad nauseam to rectify succeeding mistakes should the first reopening not serve the purpose?
It is obvious that a reopening of the case to allow the intro-duction of additional evidence
would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused."
Moreover, records show that petitioner had already consumed a great deal of the court's
time, or about three (3) years and five (5) months, and presented eight (8) witnesses, and that
it was only after nine (9) months from the date private respondents filed their separate
demurrer to evidence that Litton's private prosecutor underwent a change of heart, or to be
more accurate, a change of strategy in order to salvage what appeared to be a weak case for
George Litton, Sr.
Flores v. Sandiganbayan, 124 SCRA 109 (1983)(Maurin)
Can v. Galing, 155 SCRA 663 (1987) (Melendres)
Facts:
Petition for certiorari and mandamus to reverse and set aside the Orders of the respondent
Judge, dated 12 May 1980 and 10 June 1980, discharging Emilio Daria, one of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 500 for Robbery, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Domingo Can, Emilio
Daria, Sgt. Jesus Abion and Francisco Lizard" in order to be a witness for the State.
On 16 July 1980, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Judge
from hearing or receiving the testimony of the discharged accused Emilio Daria in said
Criminal Case No. 500, until further orders from the Court. On 6 February 1981, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and declare the case submitted for decision, after
considering the allegations, issues and arguments contained in the Petition for certiorari and
mandamus, the Comments thereon and the Reply to said comments.
On 31 May 1978, an information for Robbery was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon against the aforenamed accused. The case was assigned to Branch III, presided over
by respondent Judge.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
On 29 November 1979, the prosecuting fiscal moved to discharge the accused Emilio Daria
from the information, to be used as a state witness, on the following grounds:
1. That there are several defendants in the above-entitled case;
2. That the prosecution has no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed except the testimony of accused Emilio Daria;
3. That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused Emilio Daria, whose
discharge is hereby requested in this motion;
4. That the testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
5. That defendant Emilio Daria does not appear to be the most guilty considering the accused
Domingo Can is the master-mind of the robbery and the two other accused Francisco Lizardo
and Jesus Abion are non-commissioned officers of the Philippine Constabulary while accused
Emilio Daria appears to be the only unlettered [sic] but was merely asked by the accused
Domingo Can and Sgt. Jesus Abion to take part in the commission of the offense and the
accused Emilio Daria agreed having no Idea that robbery was to be perpetrated by the other
accused.
6. That defendant Emilio Daria has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude;
7. That said defendant consents to be a witness for the government.
The fiscal's motion was opposed by petitioner and the other accused Francisco Lizardo. On 12
May 1980, as aforestated, the respondent Judge issued the Order discharging Daria from the
information so that he may be utilized as a state witness. Motion for reconsideration of the
order of discharge was denied in the other Order dated 10 June 1980.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the discharge of accused, Emilio Daria, to be utilized as witness is meritorious.
Ruling:
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in force when this petition was brought to this Court,
provides:
Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution — When two
or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competent court,
at any time before they have entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to
be discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be witnesses for the government
when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Petitioner alleges that the above criteria have not been followed in the discharge of Daria
from the information.
We agree.
There was no absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused Daria to qualify him as a
state witness. The prosecution itself admitted that one of the government witnesses, named
Michael Yu, testified that he saw and recognized the accused, Domingo Can, as one of those
who committed the robbery. Such testimony is direct evidence of Can's participation and
clearly negates the absolute need for Daria's testimony in Identifying Can as one of the
perpetrators of the offense. If at all, Daria's testimony would be merely corroborative and not
essential.
The records of this case also disclose convictions of the accused Daria for various crimes, as
follows: attempted murder (Criminal Case No. 3533); carrying of deadly weapon (Criminal
Case No. 2657); slander by deed (Criminal Case No. 2175) slight physical injuries (Criminal
Case No. 2400) and carrying of deadly weapon (Criminal Case No. 3233). His
untrustworthiness as a witness on the ground of moral turpitude is apparent.
People v. Torrefranca, 151 SCRA 143 (1987) (Merin)
Accused Antonio Torrefranca alias "Tony", Sofronio Gilbolingo alias "Ponyong", Isaias Daro
alias "Ely", Tirso Melencio alias "Tirso", Olipio Arellano alias "Apyot" and Benedicto Botohoy
were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with Double Homicide before the Regional
Trial Court of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch I.
On the same day that the information was filed, the fiscal filed a motion requesting the
discharge of accused Botohoy. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested
its evidence (accused Botohoy was among the prosecution witnesses who testified) the trial
court granted the said motion for discharge and ordered Botohoy's release from detention.
In this appeal, the appellants assail the credibility of the testimony of their co-accused
Botohoy. They also contend that the discharge of Botohoy to become a state witness was in
violation of Rule 119, Section 9, for he appears to be the most guilty (Botohoy had been
working in the plantation of the deceased spouses and had known the extent of their
earnings) and has been a fugitive from justice for attempted rape, a crime involving moral
turpitude.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the discharge of Botohoy and making him as a state witness is violative of the
Rules of Court.
RULING:
No, it is not.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and We find no plausible reason to alter
the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of Botohoy's testimony.
In the discharge of a co-accused, the trial court may reasonably be expected to err Where
such error is committed, however, the error of the court in discharging such accused cannot
affect the legal consequences of his discharge (US vs. Mendiola, 82 Phil. 740). Neither can
such error affect the testimony and the quality of his testimony. Even if the discharged witness
should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded (US vs.
Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658; People vs. Jamero, 24 SCRA 206).
Thus, the trial court correctly gave credence to Botohoy's testimony in court, which confirmed
the material allegations of his extrajudicial confession, pointing to the appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime.
Well settled is the rule that conclusions of the trial judge, regarding the credibility of
witnesses, command great respect and consideration, specially when, as in this case, they are
supported by the evidence of record.
People v. Ocimar, 212 SCRA 646 (1992) (Mondigo)
People v. Beberino, 79 SCRA 694 (1977) (Janet Dawn)
Facts:
On February 3, 1960, the house of Gregoria Nuñez situated in sitio Balibayon, barrio
Lakandula, Placer, Suripo del Norte, was broken into and robbed by several persons of cash
and other articles of value amounting to P 605.00, on the occasion of which Gregoria Nuñez
was strangled to death.
On March 1, 1960, Cpl. Michael Desoloc was dispatched to Placer to conduct an investigation.
He received information that one Ignacio Calvario had knowledge of the crime and was willing
to testify if the authorities would utilize him as a witness in the case. Ignacio Calvario was
taken into custody, and after questioning, he executed an affidavit wherein he described the
means by which the crime was committed and the role he played in the commission thereof.
He also named (Bandong) Gerardo Casaña, (Nit) Anito Beberino, (Mandot) Rumaldo Guibao,
Floro Abas, Gario Estrada, Rose Bebang, Penoy, Busio and (Pelesio Simplicio) Guibao as his
confederates.
Judgment was rendered finding the accused Anito Beberino, Gerardo Casañ;a and Leodegario
Estrada guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused Ignacio Calvario was found
guilty as an accomplice in the crime of simple robbery since he did not actually participate in
the killing of Gregoria Nuñ;ez and no conspiracy was proved among the accused.
Gerardo Casaña, Anito Beberino, Leodegario Estrada, and Ignacio Calvario appealed.
However, the appeals of Gerardo Casaña Leodegario Estrada, and Anito Beberino were
subsequently withdrawn, so the appeal of Ignacio Calvario alone is left for consideration.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: In seeking a reversal of the judgment appealed from, the
appellant Ignacio Calvario claims that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain
a conviction because the extra-judicial confession upon which said judgment is based was
obtained from him by means of threats, and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. Further,
counsel for the appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting Calvario as an
accomplice in the crime of robbery although he had no knowledge of the criminal intent of
his c-oaccused
Issue:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is admissible in evidence
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Calvario as an accomplice in the crime of
robbery
Ruling:
Petitioners’ contention lacks merit.
1. Yes. Cpl. Desoloc denied having threatened or coerced the appellant into executing the said
extra-judicial confession and claimed that Ignacio Calvario furnished the statements
contained therein freely and voluntarily. His claim is corroborated by the Justice of the Peace
of Placer, Surigao, before whom Ignacio Calvario swore to the veracity of its contents, who
testified that he read the extra- judicial confession to the accused and asked the latter if he
understood what had been read to him; and that when the accused answered in the
affirmative, he requested the accused to affix his thumbmark on the document, which he did.
The appellant's claim that he had been threatened into executing the extra-judicial confession
in question appears to be more of an afterthought than a valid claim. The confession
document was executed freely and voluntarily and the only reason that prompted the
accused to do so was that he had been promised immunity from prosecution as he would be
utilized as a government witness. In fact, in the complaint filed before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Placer, Surigao Ignacio Calvario was merely listed as one of the witnesses for the
prosecution. However, after the preliminary investigation, the case was remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Surigao for trial wherein a re- investigation was conducted, during
which time Ignacio Calvario turned hostile, so that he was included in the information as one
of the accused.
Thus, because of the hostility and denial of the accused of the facts he first revealed in his
confession, the appellant was not used as a government witness anymore. This Court has
earlier held that where one of several co-defendants tums state's evidence on a promise of
immunity by the prosecuting attorney, but later retracts and fails to keep his part of the
agreement, his confession made under such a promise may then be used against him. In view
thereof, the extra-judicial confession of the appellant is admissible as evidence against him
2. No. Here, since the extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence may be used against
the appellant, he is found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The evidence thus
presented proves conspiracy and that appellant not only knew of the plan to rob Gregoria
Nuñez, but also participated in its commission by previous and simultaneous acts which lent
to the accomplishment of the criminal intent. Although the appellant may not have foreseen
the killing of the victim and did not take part in its execution, he is nevertheless guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide. The rule is that when homicide takes place as a consequence
of or on the Occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery shall be guilty as
principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless there is proof that they have tried to
prevent the killing. Here, there is nothing in the record which would tend to show that the
appellant ever attempted to prevent the homicide.
Modified in the manner above indicated, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, affirmed with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino v. Sison, 179 SCRA 648 (1989)( Ornopia)
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC Dagupan City charging private respondent Mejia with
the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm. In said information, nine (9) persons appear as
witnesses for the prosecution. Private respondent entered a plea of "not guilty". Complainant
Quinto was the prosecution's first witness. During the cross-examination, he admitted that
he and private respondent were subjected to paraffin tests. After the cross-examination of
Quinto, the defense verbally moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. Acting on said motion, and despite the vigorous objection of the prosecution, the
respondent Judge dismissed the case. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by respondent Judge. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari seeking to
nullify respondent Judge's Orders and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent Judge to reinstate the said criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution had been deprived of due process considering that only one
witness so far had been presented by it and that it has neither terminated the presentation
of its evidence nor rested its case.
Held:
Yes. Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is only after the
prosecution has rested its case that the accused may file a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is therefore clear that private respondent's motion to
dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence suffers from prematurity, having been
interposed at the time when the prosecution was still presenting its evidence.
The orders issued by the respondent judge dismissing the case was capricious and tainted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Double jeopardy would
therefore not attach in such a case. Respondent Judge's questioned act exhibits either a
blatant disregard of well-established, basic procedural laws or pathetic ignorance of the law.
C. Judgment
Rule 120
People v. Gazmen, 247 SCRA 414 (1995) (Penaroya)
CRIME: Arson
FACTS:
On November 5, 1989, Rosemarie Galamay, a resident of Baggao, Cagayan, was at home
resting in the company of her husband and their two children. Sensing that there was trouble
going on outside, she peeped through the window and saw Juanito Macasaddu arguing with
appellant. The protagonists were with their fathers, Manuel Macasaddu and Eleuterio
Gazmen, standing near them.
The altercation became more heated such that Juanito and appellant traded sling shots but
in the process, it was Eleuterio who got hit on the forehead.
Appellant then ran home closely followed by his father while the Macasaddus just stayed
behind. Appellant returned to the scene, holding a handgun, while his father carried a stone
and a pipe. Father and son gave chase to the Macasaddus who sought refuge inside the house
of Rosemarie.
Not wanting to be involved, Rosemarie asked the Macasaddus to get out of her house but
Juanito told her that they would get out as soon as the Gazmens stopped chasing them. The
Gazmens, meanwhile, stood guard outside. Later, appellant opened the window and upon
seeing Juanito, he shot the latter, hitting him at the left arm. This prompted Rosemarie to get
out and call for the assistance of the barangay captain. But she was stopped by the Gazmens.
Appellant then left and returned with a plastic container filled with gasoline. He poured the
contents thereof on the rooftop of Rosemarie's house and lit it up. The people around could
not stop appellant from burning the house since the latter menacingly pointed his gun at
those who wanted to help the Galamays. Eleuterio made no effort to stop his son from
burning the house. Rosemarie frantically asked the Macasaddus to get out of the house which
was already burning. Juanito and Manuel jumped out of the window and they were chased
by the Gazmens.
Avelino and Eleuterio Gazmen were charged with the crime of Arson under PD No. 1613.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT:
After trial, the lower court convicted Avelino Gazmen of the crime of arson and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua, but acquitted Eleuterio Gazmen for insufficiency of evidence.
Avelino Gazmen interposed the instant appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Avelino Gazmen guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of arson, because the judge who penned the decision was not the judge
who heard and tried the case.
RULING:
No. The trial court did not err in convicting Avelino Gazmen of the crime of arson. The trial
court’s decision was affirmed.
It is well-settled that the decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason
alone erroneous.
Accused-appellant's contention that the trial judge did not have the opportunity to observe
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses since he was not the same judge who conducted
the hearing is untenable. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would
be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, and
he is in a better position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine by their
demeanor whether they are telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it does not necessarily
follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision
since the latter can also rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as
the basis of his decision.
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not heard the controversy at all,
the trial having been conducted by then Judge Polig, who was indefinitely suspended by this
Court. Nonetheless, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were
complete and were presumably examined and studied by Judge Baguilat before he rendered
his decision. It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the
record. The fact that he did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the transcript of their testimonies does not for
that reason alone render the judgment erroneous.
Abay, Sr. v. Garcia, 162 SCRA 665 (1988) (Pesquera)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner, Dr. Felix Abay Sr. and Felix Abay Jr, together with other 2 accused were
charger with direct assault of an agent of a person in authority.
2. During arraignment, both petitioners pleaded not guilty.
3. Trial commenced and Romiro Garque testified on direct examination and cross-
examination.
4. Cross-examination was repeatedly moved, and when the next trial came both
accused appeared without counsel, Garque and the private prosecutor Atty. Trocino was also
not present.
5. And so, Judge Garcia verbally dismissed the case, and the assistant fiscal present did
not object.
6. 10 o’clock the same day, Garque and Atty. Trocino arrived and moved to have the
order of dismissal set aside.
7. Accused moved for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy since there was
a verbal dismissal by the judge and the accused did not consent to it.
8. It was denied by Judge Garcia, so accused filed MR, but Judge Coscolluela also
dismissed it saying that, the verbal order of dismissal was withdrawn as soon as it was dictated
by respondent and before it could be reduced to writing and signed. The same was affirmed
by Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case shall be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
RULING:
No.
Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of
dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether
based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a
judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order is also immediately executory.
However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120,
section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 120, section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure)
In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by
the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to
writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal,
so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order, now
in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.
People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985)supra, ( Quinones)
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
Facts:
On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before
the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar
S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the crime of theft, committed as "That on or
about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with three others whose true names, identities and whereabouts are
still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away the following property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade
Exportable round logs, valued at — P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN
B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of
P7,104.62, Philippine currency. Contrary to law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon
arraignment, pleaded "not guilty."
Proceedings were had on 7 July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L. Bocar (Branch XVI)
conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as well as to the
accused. At the end of the "investigation, " the Judge issued the order dismissing the case,
holding that the case is more civil than criminal. On 12 July 1967, the City Fiscal's Office
received a copy of the lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. On 18 July 1967, the private
prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"; and on 8 August 1967, the City
Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration. On 9 August
1967, the Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of said order
was received by the City Fiscal's Office on 11 August 1967.
Hence, the special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the CFI order of
7 July 1967.
Issue:
Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis for a claim
of double jeopardy.

Ruling:
No, the claim does not constitute double jeopardy.
The constitutional guarantee is that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee as "Former
conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double
jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a)
upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded
to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information."
The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the the
Judge. Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before
the Court. The Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical
and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court cannot permit. Thus,
the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the
same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
People v. San Miguel, 124 SCRA 733 (1983) ( Rabaya)
FACTS:
On or about the 2nd day of October, 1972, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and without any justifiable
motive, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one LUIS TARUM Y
BINAG by then and there stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which was the direct and immediate cause of his death
Only Blandino was arrested and adjudged by the Trial Court, finding the defendant Blandino
San Miguel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and although there is one
aggravating circumstance of treachery without any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, and merely imposed a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA instead of DEATH
The appellant was charged with homicide only but the trial court adjudged him guilty of
murder. The appellant complains with justification that the trial court treated him harshly.
ISSUE:
WoN the trial court erred in its decision finding the appellants guilty of murder?
HELD: YES. Blandino is only guilty of Homicide, not Murder.
The Supreme Court considered the following points:
1. On the matter of CONSPIRACY – “The words ‘conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another’ contained in the information, simply convey the allegation
of conspiracy. Otherwise, as the defense rightly argues, ‘every charge of conspiracy to commit
homicide, would result in a charge of murder’. There should be some other allegation in the
information showing that the accused did take advantage of superior strength and or with the
aid of armed men.”

2. On the matter of ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH – the trial court did not err when it
concluded; “Considering that three assailants, all armed with bladed weapons,
simultaneously and repeatedly stabbed and clubbed the defenseless victim, the killing was
thereby attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and with
the aid of armed men.”
“The common opinion of the appellant and the appellee has jurisprudential support in People
v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184, which held that if the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is not alleged in the information, it may only be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the corresponding penalty. (See also People v.
Jovellano, L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156.)”
To sufficiently allege ‘abuse of superior strength,’ or ‘with the aid of armed men,’ the
information does not have to use the language of the statute. Different words or phrases
equally describing the same facts may be used.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified in that the appellant shall be
convicted for the crime of homicide only and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The appealed judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs against the
Appellant.
Doctrine:
x x x where the charge is homicide, the accused cannot be convicted of murder x x x
x x x that the words "conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another" contained in the information, simply convey the allegation of conspiracy, and does
not necessary result in a charge of murder.
People v. Despavellador, 1 SCRA 205 (1961) ( Roda)
FACTS:
Defendant Despavellador is charged with damage to property through reckless negligence. It
is alleged in the information that he was the driver of a bus, and in July 27, 1955, he did then
and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the bus in a negligent,
reckless and imprudent manner causing as a consequence the said bus to strike and sideswipe
a passenger jeepney belonging to Librada Manalo, damaging the said passenger jeepney to
the extent of P200.00.
After due trial, under a plea of guilty, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision
that defendant did sideswipe the jeepney. The act of sideswiping produced an impact that
forced the jeepney to swerve to the center of the street, thereby causing it to strike, bump
into and collide against a post at the middle, as a result of which it' suffered damages in the
amount of P200.00, and the cargo of fish valued at P85.00 owned by one of its passengers,
Flaviana Enrique, totally destroyed.
CFI found the defendant guilty of damage to property thru reckless imprudence with
contributory negligence on the part of the other driver and ordered him to indemnify the
owner of the jeepney of in the amount of P100.00 and the owner of the destroyed fish cargo
in the amount of P85.00.
Defendant appealed the extent and damages sustained by the jeepney. CA remanded the case
back to CFI. After the case was deemed resubmitted for decision and another one was
rendered by CFI, defendant was ordered to indemnify only Flaviana Enriquez in the amount
of P85.00.
Defendant appealed the second decision of the CFI to the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the last decision of the lower court suffers from a fatal infirmity, namely, that it convicts
appellant herein of a crime not alleged in the information
HELD:
YES. Indeed, the same charges him with damage, through reckless negligence, to a jeep
belonging to Librada Manalo, to the prejudice of the latter in the sum of P200.00, whereas
the decision appealed from found appellant guilty of damage thru reckless imprudence, not
to the jeep, but to the wares, not of Librada Manalo, the owner of the jeep, but of a passenger
thereof named Flaviana Enriquez. We agree with the defense, that the crime of damage
through reckless imprudence, to the wares of said passenger is not charged in the information
and neither includes the facts alleged therein, nor is included in the latter. Thus, said decision
punishes appellant for a crime of which he was not legally informed and, hence, denied him
the due process of law.
Magat v. People, 201 SCRA 21 (1991) (Samaco)
FACTS:
The parties to the incident Dr. Rudolfo S. Magat, Mrs. Minerva F. Magat, Mrs. Ma. Luisa
Domocmat and Dr. Clarita Garcia were former friends and acquaintances connected with the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. The complainant and the accused all belong to the Seventh-
Day Adventists Church which operates the hospital. Somehow, there was a parting of ways
between the Magats on one hand and Mrs. Domocmat and Dr. Garcia on the other.
TRIAL COURT NARRATION:
1. on May 12, 1985, one Dr. Clarita F. Garcia was confined at Room 335 of the Manila
Sanitarium and Hospital located at Donada Street, Pasay City, due to a surgical operation;
2. that in the morning of said date, between 10:00 and 10:30, private complainant Ma.
Luisa Domocmat arrived at said room when, Dr. Garcia was confined bringing with her a
basket of fruits; that shortly thereafter, accused Dr. Rudolfo Magat and his wife, Minerva
Magat, entered the same room where Dr. Garcia and Ma. Luisa Domocmat were present,
whereupon both accused one after the other, immediately and in loud tones uttered the
above slanderous words to the complainant Domocmat;
3. that Dr. Garcia heard the same offensive words directed at the complainant; that
when Dr. Garcia tried to pacify them she (Dr. Garcia) was likewise shouted at by both accused,
all defamatory words uttered by both accused at her and complainant which tended to cast
dishonor and shame on them and their families;
4. that accused Minerva Magat later directly and specifically told Dr. Garcia: 'Ikaw Clarie,
yong asawa mo naman ang lalandian niya, palibhasa hindi na nakakantot ng asawa ko, kasi
nililigawan ng asawa mo,'
while Dr. Magat told his wife Minerva referring to Dr. Clarie Garcia: "Huwag mong pansinin
iyan, kilala ko ang pamilya niya, mga sira ang ulo niyan, mukhang mangkukulam:"
that both accused hurriedly left the room when they noticed complainant Domocmat calling
by phone Dr. Nehemias Garcia, husband of Dr. Clarita Garcia;
5. that it is a stipulated fact as contained in the Pre-Trial Order that when the alleged
defamatory and slanderous words were allegedly uttered by both accused against
complainant in the private hospital room, the only persons present were complainant Ma.
Luisa Domocmat, Dr. Clarita Garcia and accused-spouses Dr. Rudolfo Magat and his wife
Minerva. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)
PETITIONERS’ NARRATION:
1. In the morning of the said date at the lobby of the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital,
Mrs. Minerva F. Magat met Mrs. Ma. Luisa Domocmat and the latter uttered "Hi, Quitin. Hi!
Quintin. Kumusta ka Quintin (Quintin was a former boyfriend of Mrs. Magat prior to her
marriage)? Mrs Magat retorted. 'Ay ang kati. Ay ang kati,'
2. Immediately thereafter, Dr. Magat met Mrs. Magat. She then reported to her
husband the incident at the lobby. In an attempt to clear the air as to the actuations of Mrs.
Domocmat both decided to look for her at a place they knew she would be at that time.
3. Upon reaching Room 335 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Dr. Magat knocked
at the door, finding it open, they entered and saw Mrs. Domocmat and Dra. Clarita Garcia, a
patient confined at the same room.
Addressing Mrs. Domocmat after closing the door, Dr. Magat said 'Baby, bakit hanggang
ngayon ay ginaganoon mo pa si Miner, wala naman siyang ginagawa sa iyo.'
Mrs. Domocmat answered, 'Bakit ka ba galit na galit, Palibhasa'y hindi ka na nakakakantot.'
Dr. Magat retorted, napakasama naman ng bibig mo, and told his wife, 'Mommy, halika na,
umalis na tayo tutal sira na naman sa atin ang mga iyan.'
On their way out, Mrs. Domocmat followed them and said hayop, mga aso, mga putik.' (Rollo,
p. 106)
MTC Decision:
1. first MTC judge - refused to hand down a decision because he, the complainant, the
accused and the witnesses are all members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church and that the
Judge was being pressured one way or the other to come up with a verdict, thus, the Judge
rendered an Order of inhibition.
2. second MTC judge - He tried to disqualify himself reasoning that his own wife is also
a Seventh Day Adventist and that it would be unfair to decide a case with a voluminous
records he never heard. The RTC Executive Judge denied his request for disqualification and
re-raffle of the case, so that, he took over reluctantly.
“During the period that this MTC Judge was supposed to be reading and studying the almost
one-foot thick records, he became very sick that he had to take a leave. With an obvious
physical disability, the Judge returned to work. Under the circumstances, a persistent doubt
occurred that the Judge could not have read and studied the whole records of the case.
Incidentally, one morning, he invited your undersigned counsel to his Chamber. There, and
worse, he disclosed that he had two decisions, one for exoneration, and the other for
conviction of the accused. He advised your counsel to convince his clients, the accused, to
accept his verdict of fine only and not to appeal any more. To this, your counsel retorted, that
he can never accept a conviction of an innocent man and as a matter of principle, he has to
appeal his decision and thereafter left his chamber.”
RTC Decision: convicted the accused with imprisonment despite the fact that he could not
have observed the demeanor of the witnesses who testified for the prosecution and the
failure of the latter to submit any memorandum supporting its case against the accused. The
hereunder would show the glaring deficiencies committed by the trial courts – a travesty of
justic
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS SOLELY ON THE BASIS
OF THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WHOSE CREDIBILITY WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED
HELD: YES.
The recollection by the four persons inside the room of the disputed statements was
exact to the point of being verbatim and unambiguous. There was no reason for the
voluminous transcripts of stenographic notes, the referrals to the Ministry of Justice, the
many side issues like a hold departure order and the relevance of administrative proceedings,
the counter charges for libel and perjury filed against Mrs. Domocmat and other matters
which unnecessarily added to the burdens of our judicial system.
There was likewise the aversion of the trial Judge to firmly control the progress of the
proceedings and arrive at a decision either convicting or acquitting the accused. The inhibition
was for no valid reason. Being a member of a religious denomination to which all parties also
belong should have made it easier to decide the case objectively and purely on its merits as
no bias or partiality arising from religious persuasion could have been raised. We find merit
in the petition.
In the light of the foregoing, the case should have been dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial
Court as the light offense for which the petitioners were found guilty had already prescribed
when the complaint was filed. However, since either inadvertence, neglect, or a desire to be
vindicated led the petitioners to appeal a case where under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability had already been totally extinguished, we dismiss the complaint on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
In the case of Francisco v. Court of Appeals, (122 SCRA 538 [1983]) the Court held that where
an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver
offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To
hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on
prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
Incidentally, in the case of Felino Reyes v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of
the Philippines, (G.R. No. 69867, 7 July 1987) a Memorandum prepared by this ponente for
the court, entitled 'An Examination of the Rule Which Holds That One Cannot be Convicted
Of A Lesser Offense includible Within a Greater Offense, Where Prosecution For The Latter
Was Commenced After Expiration Of Limitations Applicable To The Lesser Offense,' discusses
a possible attempt to depart from the rule laid down in Francisco v. CA, (Francisco v. CA, supra)
by invoking the principle of presumption of regularity in the performance of official acts and
duties, and by interpreting the phrase 'prescription of a crime or offense' as merely 'a bar to
the commencement of a criminal action.' (Memorandum, pp. 2 and 10)
However, Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or
waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. (People v.
Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 433; Santos v. Superintendent, 55 Phil, 345) Hence, while it is the rule
that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections
which are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of
prescription, which under Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. To
apply the suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89, which
is a part of substantive law. (Page 694, Vol. I, The Revised Penal Code, by Ramon C. Aquino)
This position is further strengthened by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which added extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the
effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash. (Damasco v. Laqui, 166 SCRA 214;
217-218 [1988])
It is, therefore, evident that the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the
petitioners of a crime that had already been extinguished through prescription. It was likewise
error for the Regional Trial Court to try to correct the error by simply convicting the petitioners
of the higher offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners are ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE:
x x x waiver to objections which are grounds of a motion to quash does not apply when
prescription becomes a defense and extinguishes criminal liability x x x
Del Rosario, Jr. v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 183 (1983) (Suico)
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with theft of some articles valued at P375.00. Petitioner was detained
for failure to post bail. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded guilty. In a decision dated May
5, 1983 but promulgated on May 11, 1983 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, respondent Judge
sentenced him to an indeterminate imprisonment of six months as minimum to one year and
one month as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P375.00, crediting him
however with the entire period of his preventive imprisonment.
After the sentence was read to petitioner, respondent Judge issued a "Commitment on Final
Sentence" that very same day, addressed to the Provincial Jail Warden to whom the petitioner
was committed. Also, that very same day, petitioner prepared his application for probation
which was received by the Court.
Respondent denied the application for probation on the ground that "the sentence of
conviction became final and executory, when the accused actually commenced to serve his
sentence."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that his having been whisked to
jail did not constitute the commencement of the service of sentence as the judgment had not
yet become final when he filed his application for probation. Said motion was denied by the
respondent.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge committed grave error in denying petitioner’s application for
probation.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent Judge committed a grave error.
The judgment of conviction did not become final by the mere fact that petitioner was sent
back to jail. It should be stressed that petitioner's returning to jail after the reading of the
sentence, was simply a continuation of his detention due to his inability to post bail from the
time he was arrested, and petitioner thereby did not actually commence any service of the
sentence.
A judge cannot make his decision final by simply issuing a commitment order immediately
after the reading of the sentence that very same afternoon. The respondent Judge acted
precipitously in issuing the commitment order as well as in denying the application for
probation filed by petitioner. He failed to obey the principle that criminal laws should be
liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 75, amending the Probation Law of 1976, disqualifies from availing of
the benefits of the probation law, those: (a) sentenced to serve a maximum imprisonment of
more than six [6] years and one [1] day; (b) those convicted of any offense against the security
of the State; (c) those previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one [1] month and one [1] day and/or a fine of not more than
P200.00; and (d) those who have been once on probation under said decree.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 75 however allows even those sentenced to 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment on January 3, 1978 to apply for probation. The petitioner is entitled to greater
liberality in the application of the said probation law because his maximum sentence was only
one year and one day.
THE ORDERS OF RESPONDENT ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID AND THE
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF PETITIONER IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS HELD ON OTHER
VALID CHARGES.
Cal v. CA, 251 SCRA 523 (1995) (Tasong)
Facts:
• After an information for illegal recruitment was filed with the aforementioned trial
court on September 5, 1990, petitioner posted bail for his provisional liberty. On June 8, 1992,
a decision was rendered in the aforesaid criminal case wherein the petitioner herein was
found guilty of violation of Article 36(a) of the Labor Code as amended [illegal recruitment],
and sentenced to, among other things, suffer imprisonment of four years and pay a fine of
P20,000.
• The decision was promulgated on July 15, 1992, in the presence of the petitioner,
after which he was committed to jail by virtue of an order of commitment issued the same
day. The following day, July 16, petitioner, assisted by his counsel, filed with the court a quo
an application for probation, an affidavit of recognizance, and an application for release on
recognizance. Also on the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the petitioner to
report to the Provincial Probation and Parole Officer, and for the latter to conduct an
investigation of the applicant and submit his report and recommendation within sixty days.
• Almost two weeks later, petitioner filed with the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw
Application for Probation and Notice of Appeal", alleging that he "hastily filed his application
'because of the threats employed upon him by the authorities' and that 'he was not able to
intelligently consult with his lawyer and reflect on the legal consequences and effects of his
application for probation under the law' so that he may not be considered to have waived his
right to appeal the decision".
• After hearing the petitioner on such serious allegations, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion to withdraw application on the ground that it was determined that the
accusations were baseless, and that petitioner's counsel did in fact properly advise him as to
the effects and consequences of appeal and of probation. But it did not deter him, as in fact,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, however, the trial court denied on the ground that
petitioner had availed of the benefits of the Probation Law and therefore cannot avail of the
remedy of appeal. On appeal, the trial court was affirmed.
Issue:
Was CA correct in affirming the trial court’s order of July 15, 1992 for petitioner's immediate
confinement to jail after promulgation of judgment but before same became final and
executory, i.e., prior to the lapse of the period for filing appeal, notwithstanding that
petitioner had posted bail?
Ruling:
Yes, CA was correct.
• There is no dispute that, as a rule, and unless the trial court directs otherwise, the bail
bond posted by an accused remains in force at all stages of the case until its final
determination. Now, in this case, since the trial court, immediately after the promulgation of
judgment (and without waiting for the finality thereof), issued a commitment order despite
petitioner's being out on bail, petitioner should have challenged the legality of such
commitment order. However, instead of doing so, petitioner, after having been properly
advised by counsel on the effects and consequences of probation, voluntarily — and with the
assistance of counsel — filed an application for probation, along with an affidavit of
recognizance and an application for release on recognizance of his counsel. Petitioner's
actuations thus foreclosed his right to appeal.
• Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, pertaining to the grant of probation, was amended by P.D.
1990 in order to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. Thus, Sec. 4
provides specifically that "(T)he filing of the application (for probation) shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal"
• And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal and probation,
respectively, are diametrically opposed. This is because an accused applying for probation is
deemed to have accepted the judgment in fact, ". . . the application for probation is an
admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and . . . the application for probation is considered a waiver upon his part to file an
appeal, .
• Thus, in this case, the petitioner's application for probation had the effect of a final
determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail bond. Therefore, the respondent
Court of Appeals could not have done otherwise than to affirm the trial court's order of July
15, 1992 for petitioner's immediate confinement after promulgation of judgment, in view of
the subsequent application for probation which rendered the said judgment final and
immediately executory.
 In a decision petitioner, together with his co-accused, were found guilty of the crime of
falsification of commercial documents by respondent Judge Ceballos of the RTC of Tarlac.
Disposition: Petition Denied.

On the latter date, all the accused, except petitioner, were present. However, petitioner’s
Florendo v. CA, 239 SCRA 325 (1994) (Tudtud)
counsel was present at the promulgation and he moved for the resetting of the promulgation.
DOCTRINE: Respondent Judge denied the motion, finding no valid ground therefor. The promulgation
then proceeded. Petitioner’s counsel was furnished a copy of the Decision evidenced by his
• JUDGMENT (RULE 120) signature acknowledging receipt at the back of the last page of the original copy.
• JUDGMENTS; THE PRESENCE IN PERSON OF THE ACCUSED AT THE PROMULGATION
OF JUDGMENT IS MANDATORY IN ALL CASES EXCEPT WHERE THE CONVICTION IS FOR A LIGHT
OFFENSE. Respondent Judge issued an order, modifying her earlier decision with the deletion of the
name of accused Alejandro Dizon from the decision considering that he was never arraigned.
• ALL ACCUSED, REGARDLESS OF THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED AGAINST
THEM, MUST BE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF THEIR PRESENCE
The next day, Respondent Judge issued warrants of arrest against all the accused, including
• TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 6 OF RULE 120, A NEW petitioner, for their failure to renew their bail bonds.
PROVISION, ALLOWS THE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT IN ABSENTIA TO OBVIATE THE
SITUATION WHERE JUDICIAL PROCESS COULD BE SUBVERTED BY THE ACCUSED JUMPING
BAIL. A notice of appeal filed by petitioner on was denied by respondent Judge, in an order for
having been filed out of time.
• AN ACCUSED HAS FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM NOTICE OF THE DECISION WITHIN WHICH
TO APPEAL. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Promulgation of Judgment but the same was denied by
respondent Judge in an order. Likewise, a motion for the reconsideration of said order was
• AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT; WHEN A DECISION IS AMENDED IN A MANNER THAT
denied.
DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE CONVICTED PERSONS, THERE IS NO NEED TO HAVE THE SAME
RE-PROMULGATED. Petitioner appealed to the CA in a petition for certiorari and mandamus to question the orders
of respondent Judge. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
FACTS:
1. Whether or not promulgation of a decision convicting the accused on four counts,
each a less grave felony, may be made in absentiaI?
2. Whether or not the amended decision should be promulgated anew? There is no exception under this paragraph. All the accused must be present in person or
through counsel or a representative.
3. Whether or not petitioner’s appeal should be given due course?

In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of petitioner,
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.
therefore, he had only up to 15 days within which to appeal. The notice of appeal filed on July
6, 1992 was clearly out of time.

The resolution of the instant petition hinges on the proper interpretation of Section 6, Rule It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings are made
120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural requirement of the
recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner does not
1. Under the 1st paragraph of Sec 6 of the Rule, the presence in person of the accused question the non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of the judgment in the
at the promulgation of judgment is mandatory in all cases except where the conviction is for criminal docket.
a light offense, in which case the accused may appear through counsel or representative.
D. Post Judgment
2. Under the 3rd paragraph of Sec 6 of the Rule, all the accused, regardless of the gravity
of the offense charged against them, must be given notice of the promulgation of judgment 1. New Trial or Reconsideration
and the requirement of their presence. They must appear in person or in the case of those
a. Rule 121
facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or representative. If the accused fails
to appear at the arraignment, the second and third sentences of paragraph three become b. Cases
operative.
Ibabao v. People, 132 SCRA 216 (1984) (Villamor)
3. The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 is a new provision introduced by the 1985
Doctrine:
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of judgment in absentia
(Gupit Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The amendment was intended to SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The court shall grant a new trial on any
obviate the situation in the past where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused
jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. of the following grounds:

xxx

The first paragraph of the Rule deals with the personal presence of the accused at the (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
promulgation of judgment and its exception, i.e., in the case of a light offense where his reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
personal presence is dispensed with. The third paragraph of the same Rule deals with the admitted would probably change the judgment.
presence of all the accused at the promulgation regardless of the penalty imposed on them. Facts:
• A bystander-witness who was at Bankerohan terminal clearly saw an owner-type jeep Obugan v. People, 244 SCRA 263 (1995) ( Vivar)
bump a person; that the said jeep did not stop; that upon request of a security guard, he gave
chase, wrote down the plate number, overtook it, and recognized the driver as petitioner
Aniceto Ibabao.

• As such, Ibabao was charged with the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence.

• CA: modified the decision; increased the penalty 2. Appeal

• Subsequently, he filed a Motion for New Trial based on alleged newly discovered Rule 122
evidence, particularly, the recantation by prosecution eyewitness Jose Patalinghog.
Quemuel v. CA, 22 SCRA 44 (1968) (Tudtud)
Issues:
DOCTRINE:
Whether or not Patalinghog's affidavit of recantation is "newly discovered evidence"
warranting new trial. • APPEAL (RULE 122)

Ruling: • EFFECTS OF APPEAL; AUTHORITY TO ASSESS DAMAGES OR INDEMNITY VESTED IN

No. As has been the consistent ruling of this Court — recantations should be taken with great
caution. The reason is that if new trial should be granted at such instance where an interested
party succeeds in inducing some of the witnesses to vary their testimony outside of court
after trial, there would be no end to every litigation.|
As held in People vs. Saliling, et al. 5
"Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously testified in court will not
be countenanced for the purpose of securing a new trial. — It would be a dangerous rule for
courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one reason or another, for such
a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. Affidavits of retraction can be easily secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly
unreliable. There is always the probability that it may later be repudiated. So courts are wary
or reluctant to allow a new trial based on retracted testimony."
TRIAL COURTS ONLY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.—An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole
case for review and this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity, and the damages
involved. Although the authority to assess damages or indemnity in criminal cases is vested
in trial courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the
appellate court. Consequently, on appeal, the appellate court may increase the penalty,
indemnity, or the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party had not
appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a review of the decision was the
accused.
FACTS:
• Rufo Quemel (petitioner) was convicted by the CFI of Rizal of the crime of libel, with
which he is charged, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3)
months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prisión correccional, and to pay the costs.
1. YES. Appeal in the criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the
• Quemuel appealed to the CA, which affirmed the judgment of conviction, but penalty, which may be increased and indemnity is part of the penalty.
imposed, instead the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00, and added thereto a
a. On appeal, the authority to assess damages or indemnify criminal cases is passed to
P2,000.00 indemnity to the offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six
the CA. This court has in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the TC, although the
(6) months, in case of insolvency, aside from the costs.
only party who sought a review of the decision was the accused.
• Quemel maintains that the decision of the CA is erroneous because:

o It awarded said indemnity, despite the fact that the offended had not appealed from
the decision of the trial court, which made no award of such nature
o The assessment of damages in a criminal case, in which the civil action is impliedly
included, is "vested in trial courts (and not in appellate courts);
2. YES. By its very nature, libel causes dishonor, dispute and discredit. Injury to the
reputation of the offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory
words in libel cases. Introduction of evidence of actual damages is not required, at least when
the amount of the award is more or less nominal.

o There is no proof that damages had been sustained by the offended party; and
o Subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity constitutes
imprisonment for non-payment of debt, which is unconstitutional.
3. NO. Subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said liability does not violate the
constitutional injunction.
a. the civil liability arising from libel is not a debt, within the purview of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.

b. Debt – obligation to pay a sum of money arising from a contract – express or implied.
ISSUE:
The civil liability in the case at bar arises, from a tort or crime and thus from law.
1. Does the CA have the authority to assess the damage or indemnity in commercial
cases despite the fact that the offended party appealed from the decision of the trial court
but the accused? People v. dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 (1992) (Ornopia)

2. Was the award of damages proper, despite the allegedly lack of proof of damages? Facts: In an information filed with the then CFI of Cabarroguis, Quirino, on 28 October 1982,
Accused-appellants dela Cruz, Ayado and Ajedo, Jr. were charged with the crime of Murder
3. Was the penalty of subsidiary imprisonment in violation of the constitutional right
and that the commission of the offense was aggravated by the following circumstances: (1)
against imprisonment for non-payment of debt?
accused took advantage of their superiority in numbers; (2) the crime was committed with
insult to or disregard to the respect due to offended party by reason of his age;(3) the crime
was committed in the nighttime to facilitate its commission. Each of the accused entered a
HELD: Petitioner’s contention is untenable.
plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses. The trial court promulgated
its decision convicting the accused-appellants of the crime charged.
Accused-appellants filed a notice of appeal on 4 June 1984. On 5 June 1984, they filed a
petition for new trial alleging therein excusable neglect on their part in looking for the other
eyewitness, Millo, whose "new address is newly discovered," and that the testimony of said
witness is so vital and important that it could alter the judgment of conviction. On 8 June
1984, they filed a motion to withdraw their appeal as the same was incompatible with their
petition for new trial. They also prayed that their petition for new trial be given due course.
The trial court denied the petition for new trial since the statement or affidavit of Millo could
not be considered newly discovered evidence as it "existed during all the time when the case
was heard;" and even if it were to be admitted, it would not alter the judgment of conviction.
Accused-appellants then re-filed their notice of appeal. Accused-appellants Ayado and Ajedo,
Jr. put up the defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Jesus dela Cruz interposed the
justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.
Held: No. The trial court correctly denied the petition for new trial. Under Section 2, Rule 121
of the Rules of Court, a new trial may be granted based on any of the following grounds: (a)
That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant; and (b) That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted, would probably change the
judgment."
Accused-appellants candidly admit in their Brief that the main objective of their petition for
new trial is "to present either Millo or Cielo to testify and corroborate the version of dela
Cruz." The latter is a witness for the defense. In their petition for new trial, accused-appellants
mention only the name of Millo. Millo appears to have been investigated by police corporal
Gumpal on 26 July 1982. He signed a sworn statement on said date before the Municipal
Judge of Diffun, Quirino, which the prosecution marked and offered in evidence as Exhibit "I."
They invoke excusable negligence for their failure to present Millo as a witness allegedly
because he could not be reached by the subpoena issued on March 1984 as he had changed
his address. The records disclose, however, that at the hearing on 11 April 1984 for the
continuation of the presentation of evidence for the defense, counsel for the accused-
appellants, upon resting his case, expressly waived the presentation of Millo and any other
witness.
There is, moreover, another insurmountable obstacle which prevented favorable action on
the petition for new trial. Accused-appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 4 June 1984, a
copy of which was received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal on that same day. The
following day, the accused-appellants filed their petition for new trial. In criminal cases, an
appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal. Upon the perfection of
the appeal, the trial court loses its power to modify or set aside the decision, or order a new
trial. All it can do is to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated in the appeal. This does not mean, however,
that an accused is thereafter forever barred from filing a petition for new trial. In an
appropriate case, he may file it with the appellate court.
While it is true that accused-appellants filed on 8 June 1984 a motion to withdraw their appeal
to save their petition for review, the records do not show that the trial court favorably acted
on it. A notice of appeal, once filed, cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for new trial since the filing of the notice perfected the appeal
and the court thereby lost its jurisdiction over the case; hence, it can no longer act on either
the motion or the petition. The only valid withdrawal of an appeal would be one where an
accused decides to serve the sentence.
Bernardo v. CA, 190 SCRA 63 (1990) ( Pesquera)
FACTS:
1. Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes are married couples. The latter died first so
his estate was left to his wife, his cousins all family named Bernardo and Capili,
petitioners.
2. His executor is petitioner, Deogracias Bernardo.
3. When Hermogena died, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and her
heirs all family named Reyes.
 4. Petitioner filed a partition of properties, giving the collateral relatives the share of
Hermogena.
5. They protested, saying, they are entitled ½ of the shares of Eusebio since the
properties they have are conjugal.
6. Petitioner averred that they are only entitled to Hermogena’s share since the latter
donated her properties to her husband and questioning the validity of donation
must be raised in a separate civil action.
7. Probate Court declared the donation void, without any specification whether inter
vivos or mortis causa, and also disapproved the projects of partition.
8. Petitioner executor filed a motion for new trial reiterating and emphasizing the
contention previously raised that the probate court had no jurisdiction on the
question of title and nullity of donation.
9. Motion for new trial was dismissed, and so petitioner appealed, the same was
affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having
limited and special jurisdiction.
RULING:
No.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of
ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the
contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as paer of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be
deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding.
Certainly, the petitioners cannot be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of
their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory
as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the
opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of
partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were
donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the
question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the
probate court and just because of an opposition. Thereto, they cannot thereafter
withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly,
there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the
court in motion. They cannot be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing,
adjudges the question against them.
Abellera v. CA (Tuquib)
FACTS:
Petitioner Conchita L. Abellera and her "adoptive" parents, Roberto and Virginia Acebuche,
had resided in a semi-bungalow house at No. 571 A. Bonifacio St., Brgy. Bagong Silang, Quezon
City. In 1990, petitioner became a beneficiary of said lot under the urban housing program of
the Quezon City government. Sometime thereafter, she went to Samar for vacation and left
the house and lot to the care of her elder brother, private respondent Beltran Acebuche.
When she returned, private respondents refused to vacate the house despite petitioner's
demands. As attempts to mediate the dispute between the siblings at the barangay level
failed, petitioner sued private respondents for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City.
The MeTC, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Conchita L. Abellera ordering defendant
spouses Beltran and Nicerita Acebuche a.k.a. Beltran and Nicerita Abellera and all persons
claiming rights under them to vacate the premises.
Private respondents appealed the RTC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the MeTC.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the ground that the appellate court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it, in effect, conducted a trial de novo and ordered an ocular inspection of
the property.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred when it allowed the regional trial
court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an unlawful, detainer case covered by the
revised rules on summary procedure to conduct clarificatory hearings and allow a party to
submit additional evidence.
II. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred when it allowed the regional trial
court sitting as an appellate court to issue an order for the conduct of an ocular inspection.
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Regional Trial Courts could not, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, hear the case de novo in the guise of clarificatory hearings, during
which additional evidence was presented by the parties and an ocular inspection was
conducted. It held:
The extent of jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court on appeal is established as follows:
Sec. 22, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 —
Sec. 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. — Regional Trial Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis
of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The
decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review
to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima
facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal
or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. (emphasis ours).
Sec. 21(d), Interim Rules of Court —
Sec. 21. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts. —
(d) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in the
preceding paragraph, they may submit memoranda and/or briefs, or be required by the
regional trial court to do so. After the submission of such memoranda and/or briefs, or upon
the expiration of the period to file the same, the regional trial court shall decide the case on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed. (emphasis ours).
Sec. 45, Republic Act No. 6031 —
Sec. 45 . . . "Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties
may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested: Provided, however,
That if the case was tried in a city or municipal court before the latter became a court of
record, then on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de novo." (emphasis ours)
Thus, there can be no trial de novo. The appellate court must decide the appeal on the basis
of the records and memoranda/brief.
Nevertheless, it ruled that petitioner was estopped from claiming that the trial court acted in
excess of jurisdiction as she herself had participated in the trial de novo and failed to object,
through counsel, to the issuance of the order to conduct an ocular inspection.
Indeed, although Regional Trial Courts should decide cases on appeal on the basis solely of
the record of the proceedings in Municipal Trial Courts and other courts of equal rank,
nonetheless, the principle of estoppel may bar a parry from questioning the reception of
additional evidence, as in this case. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, this Court ruled:
[A] party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same.
In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court. And in Littleron vs. Burgess, the Court said that it is not right for a party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon the principle stated in Sibonghanoy, we hold that petitioner cannot be permitted to
question at this stage the reception of additional evidence and ocular inspection of property
after she participated but eventually lost in what she now calls the irregular proceedings of
the trial court. During the seven hearings conducted by Branch 106 of the RTC, Quezon City,
petitioner presented no less than seven witnesses in addition to several documentary
evidence to support her case.
We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents' motion
for execution pending appeal. For, indeed, the case was not with said court on appeal but on
a petition for certiorari. Thus, the appellate court's jurisdiction was only to pass upon the
validity of the orders of the RTC in the conduct of clarificatory hearings and ocular inspection.
Since the RTC has yet to act on private respondents' motion for execution pending appeal,
this matter should have been left for resolution by the trial court, not by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it denies petitioner's
petition for certiorari, but REVERSED insofar as it grants private respondents' motion to be
placed in possession of the disputed property.
People v. Bocar, supra, (Dandan)
Before Us is a special civil action seeking the annulment of the respondent Court of First
Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court for theft entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio" dismissing said case.
Facts:
The Assistant Fiscal accused CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION CLAUDIO of the
crime of theft. The said accused, conspiring and confederating together with three others
whose true names, Identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another
with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal
and carry away some exportable round logs, belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner. The three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not
guilty".
The respondent Judge conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the
complainant as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation," the respondent Judge
issued the order under review.
The City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower court's order.
The private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration" the city Fiscal's Office
joined the private prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the order.
Ruling:
WE find for petitioner.
It is not disputed that the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila had conducted a preliminary
investigation on the complaint of Juan B. Bañez, Jr., and that as a result thereof an information
was filed before respondent Court for theft against the three accused. The three accused were
arraigned, and all three pleaded "not guilty" of the charge. The propriety and validity of both
the information and the arraignment are not contested. The issues having been joined, the
case was ready for trial on the merits.
The subsequent proceedings. however, was marred with irregularities.
It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings that the parties were not placed
under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge. Verily, no evidence in
law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before respondent Court. respondent
Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a
veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to
introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. Verily, the
prosecution was denied due process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its
right to due process is thereby violated
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding
such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head".
Respondent Judge's dismissal order being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does
not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
The constitutional guarantee is that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense". Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court (substantially reproduced as
Section 7, Rule 117 in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on January 1,
1985) clarifies the guarantee as follows:
Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy.-When a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated
the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the
first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
E. Rule 123: Procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts
F. Rule 124: Procedure in the Court of Appeals
G. Rule 125: Procedure in the Supreme Court
H. Search and Seizure
Rule 126
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800 (1984) (Pajaron)
Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known
as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication
of said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have
filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the
validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches
(Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state
that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior
criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as
well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementioned address.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
4. Real properties were seized.
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities
against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be
issued by the Secretary of National Defense.
Issue:
Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.
Held:
In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower
court, this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of
the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all
metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise
its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the
petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial
efforts to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their
right to the possession of the seized property.
On the enumerated reasons: objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles
sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general.
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination hadindeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore,
President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
seized from petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants are declared null and void
warrants intended for one and the same place.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) ( Suico)

3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may Facts:
not be owned by him.
Respondents issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners and
the corporations of which they were officers to search books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
wrappers).

Petitioners allege that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and and the Rules of Court — because they do not describe with particularity the documents,
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would books and things to be seized.
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
On March 22, 1962, the Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations; but,
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
in the residences of petitioners.
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures.
Ruling:
As regards the first group, the petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners.
Castro v. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477 (1976) (Labbay)
Facts:
Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of
Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his
witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer.
Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the report
that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio
Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete
description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was
in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue:
WON the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was tainted by illegality because it does
not comply with the constitutional requirements
Held:
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As was
admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the
residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil
when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that
they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be admitted
that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. That
requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain why the searching party felt
it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects,
which respondent Judge himself would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a
"major objective" of this constitutional provision, the elimination of general warrants, was
thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the
doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be
strictly complied with.
Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search
warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."
Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a
generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes.
People v. del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 (1994) (Ilandag)
People v del Rosario
Facts:
Normando del Rosario was charged before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth
Judicial Region stationed in Cavite City with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions in
Criminal Case No. 236-91 and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs in Criminal Case No. 237-91.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, and after joint trial
of the two cases, the court a quo rendered a decision, finding the accused guilty.
From said decision, the instant appeal has been interposed.
The prosecution's version of the case, as set forth in appellee's brief, is as follows:
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Cavite City, Regional Trial Court Judge Arturo de Guia issued in the morning of September 4,
1991 a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the
premises of appellant's house located at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City. However, the
search warrant was not implemented immediately due to the lack of police personnel to form
the raiding team.
At about 9 o'clock in the evening of that day, a raiding team was finally organized. SPO3
Untiveros headed the raiding team with PO3 Rogelio Francisco, SPO1 Eduardo Novero, SPO3
Reynaldo de la Cruz, PO1 Carlito Barbuco, PO3 Onrubio and SPO2 Villegas as members.
In the final briefing of the raiding team at the police station, it was agreed upon that PO1
Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return from appellant's house,
the raiding team will implement the search warrant. A marked money consisting of a P100 bill
bearing serial no. PQ 329406 was given by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered
in the police logbook. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house to
implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario and appellant
witnessed the search at appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3 Francisco found a black
canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used
ammunitions in a cup and three wallets, one containing the marked money. SPO1 Novero
found inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search?
Ruling: No, there was no valid search.
The Court held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The trial court gave much weight to the testimonies of the police members of the buy-bust
operation. However, the prosecution did not present as witness the supposed poseur-buyer.
Such omission casts serious doubt on appellant's guilt because without the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, there is no convincing evidence to show that appellant sold marijuana. The
testimonies of the rest of the buy-bust operation are hearsay in view of the fact that the
poseur-buyer, was never presented at the trial. There was even no testimony that when the
accused-appellant handed the stuff to the poseur-buyer that the latter in turn handed the
marked money. The failure of the prosecution to present the alleged buyer of the marijuana
was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused.
According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust operation, accused-
appellant handed over to Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu,
and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant a marked P100 bill and then returned to the police
station and informed the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from accused-
appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of accused-appellant to
implement the search warrant. The version of the prosecution is highly incredible. The record
is devoid of any reason why the police officers did not make any attempt to arrest accused-
appellant at the time he allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied
by another police officer. That was the opportune moment to arrest accused-appellant. The
version foisted by the prosecution upon this Court is contrary to human experience in the
ordinary course of human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the
police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous
drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the very reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-
bust" operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys" dangerous drugs from the pusher and
"busts" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police officer.
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually
seized or confiscated at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the
police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon
bargaining into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down
and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the
other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the
witnesses were called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's
residence, and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu.
Corollary to the constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Sec. 14(2), Article III, Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances
of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence
(People vs. Tanchoco; 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653 [1964]; People
vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that
accused- appellant is innocent.
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a
canister and allegedly seized at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu
with the information alleging that the "accused, without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur
buyer an aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale is totally
different from possession.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure
of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
shabu and its paraphernalia".. Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and
paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2,
Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no
authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less
described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun
was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was
far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible
in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly ordains the
exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. (Section 3[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines).
With the exclusion in evidence of the illegally seized firearm, there is, therefore, a total
absence of evidence to support the charge of illegal possession of firearm, against accused-
appellant.
The same may be said of the charge of illegal possession of ammunition.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 236-91 and Criminal Case No. 237-91.
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) (Merin)
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita
Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed
inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making
the box ready for shipment.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening
on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence
of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane
wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained
inside the cellophane wrappers.
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package
which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried
marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custodyof the said effects.
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist.
The accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
Ruling:
No, the appellants cannot invoke his Constitutional rights in this case.
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is
his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886];
In the case at bar, the search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to Manila, the latter replied that
citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind they would be bringing Chinese drugs.
a travel case containing the evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed
cans of tea. Since the bags were not closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were
them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
cleared. In Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without a taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in the taxi’s compartment. Lim Cheng Huat
the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court followed them in another taxi.
sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas
of the offense charged.
around the airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda
People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991) (Anino) Avenue, the CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to
stop his vehicle. The CIS team asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. The
FACTS:
CIS team asked permission to search their luggage.
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open
about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of
and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling
contraband items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and
crushed alum came out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had
“deep penetration agents” under OPLAN SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the
the three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin
dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of
cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the
suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of Oplan Sharon 887, in turned informed the
second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape. However, they were later
Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia’s activities.
captured.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. Lim
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects were indicted
wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and
for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng
was hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho
Huat were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo
Wing), the later turning out to be Tia’s intended companion.
Tia was discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hong Kong on October 4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. government agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
Palmera that they would return to the Philippines on October 6. From Hong kong, the two were in their favor.
proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland China. There, appellant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans
ISSUES:
of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for examination. That evening, they went
to Lo Ho Wing’s room and he saw two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while 1. Was the warrantless search valid?
the other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance.
HELD:
1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to
the valid warrantless search and seizure. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to
effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the appellee's
brief, that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in
any proceeding.
People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174 (1994) (Fernandez)
FACTS: The fiesta of Barangay Tanabag, Puerto Princesa City, on June 24, 1988, was marred
by the death of Marianito Merced. He died of internal hemorrhage caused by multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-appellant Alfredo Fernandez. Accused-appellant
Fernandez was found guilty of the crimes of Homicide1 and for violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm). The prosecution evidence shows that on
June 24, 1988, Isagani Merced, his younger brother Marianito Merced, Nonoy Stag, Barangay
Tanod Melchor Nollan, Santiago Abrina, Carlito Radam, and Moises Radam were among the
house guests of Barrio Captain Ruben Asebuque of Barangay Tanabag, Puerto Princesa City.
They had a drinking spree. Arlando Fernandez, son of accused-appellant Alfredo Fernandez,
came and earnestly invited them to their house. The guests were imbibing hard drinks at the
lawn. It was Isagani Merced who saw accused-appellant descend from his room. He went
behind his brother, Marianito Merced with a gun concealed in his jacket. He swiftly aimed his
gun at Marianito Merced's shoulder and pulled its trigger. Marianito slumped on the ground.
Immediately after the incident, accused-appellant fled and hid in the forest of Barangay
Concepcion. After three (3) days in the mountains, he paddled his way to Barangay Tagburos
then proceeded to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. There he stayed at his sister-in-law's house.
Four (4) days thereafter, or at around 8:00 o' clock in the evening of June 28, 1988, Patrolman
Roberto Pamintuan of the Investigation and Follow-up Section of the Integrated National
Police, Puerto Princesa Station, received a confidential report on the hiding place of accused-
appellant. Acting on that information, Pat. Roberto Pamintuan, Pat. Servando Alonzo, and
Pat. Golifardo rushed to the house indicated, cordoned the area, and identified themselves
as police authorities. Accused-appellant gave himself up. The owner of the house then turned
over accused-appellant's suitcase to the police officers. They inspected the suitcase without
any objection from accused-appellant. The suitcase yielded a homemade twelve (12) gauge
shotgun, one (1) empty shell, and one (1) live ammunition. Accused-appellant had no license
to carry the said shotgun. 1 He was arrested and taken to the police headquarters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted without jurisdiction in admitting evidence.
RULING: No. The Trial court did not act without jurisdiction in admitting the evidence. The
rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute.
Jurisprudence recognizes five (5) generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement.
They are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in
plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The evidence reveals that on June 28, 1988, Pat. Pamintuan,
Pat. Alonzo, and Pat. Golifardo cordoned the house where accused-appellant sought refuge
at Sitio Abanico. They were not armed with a warrant of arrest. Without any protest, however,
accused-appellant came out of the house and gave himself up to the police officers. The
owner of the house then turned over his luggage to said police authorities. With the
acquiescence of accused-appellant, his suitcase was searched and it yielded the subject
firearm and ammunition. He then signed and acknowledged a Receipt certifying that one
homemade shotgun with one (1) live ammunition and one (1) empty shell was confiscated
from him. Under this special circumstance, it cannot be held that accused-appellant was
subjected to a search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. He waived his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure by his acquiescence. Since accused-appellant was found in
flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, his arrest without
warrant was proper. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person who is actually committing an
offense in his presence.

I. Rule 127: Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases