NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

II. Environment and the Philippine Constitution

• Constitutional Provisions: Right to health and environment
o Sec. 15 and 16, Article II, Const.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.cralaw

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.cralaw

o Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 789
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six
per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation
of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-
billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has
led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as
the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in
the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly
53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the
entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary
growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151,
6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two
(2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse
of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order,
not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have
also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due
notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777
as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless,
We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare
that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers 

the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for
the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and
the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to
the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of
the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared
a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation
as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]
lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the
law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry
or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In
the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause;
it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler 

Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment
of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that
of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 • Ysmael v Deputy Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990]
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of
the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources
[MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the
Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an
order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public
forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"],
Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to
presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of
the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING
OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF
LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS
FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to
alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging
531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No.
87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on
July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal
award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986
denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause
of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and
that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses
were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva
Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all
logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons
of conservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers
itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the
present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well documented. Their financial
demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its
enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and democratic way of
life of its people.
xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request that TLA No. 356
issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated
September 15, 1986. stating in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty
Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the
process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3,
otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the
national interest so requires.

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the
basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among
others, where movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person
or entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an
unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per
MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of
Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a resolution dated July
6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied
petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed,
the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14,
1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for
certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its
consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate against the
issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered
by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a
memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in
1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No.
705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its
letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau
actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v.
Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to
have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983
order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely
different from the charges of fraud against officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public
respondents herein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation
practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner
until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding
of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he
failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public respondents
herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn
administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the
nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were
issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions
reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is
fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must
nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is
the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the
institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566,
571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to
the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628,
December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2,
1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged
right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are
vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v.
David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the
period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating
at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general
application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by
the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial interference in the
case at bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve
the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements
entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative
departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the
utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over
the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system.
The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice
of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and
fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The
delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply
of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the
forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal,
79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v.
Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352,
November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta
v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No.
L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging
company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this
Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to
be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing
these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended.
Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to
interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the
adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber
license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure
outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The
alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this
power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on
the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court
win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the
Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs
sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 • Henares vs. LTFRB, G.R. No. 158290, Oct 23, 2006
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996,1 the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila
Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low
turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered
motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for
judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying
in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel
emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with
hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation
and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely
burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged
exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6

Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil
and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10
years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain
the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027,
stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer
PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.
8 The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:

· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.

· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.

· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and
five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a
decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million
cases.9

Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions
in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary
tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms
among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in
Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these
are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG.
According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts
of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much
less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel;
reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and
releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces
more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.11

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the
LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our
ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean
Air Act of 1999."

Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to
command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there
being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence,
the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.

The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline
and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even
mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as
alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.

The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB
nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that
is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for
improved efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or
modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for
mandamus without merit.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to implement
measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 218 and
Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the
benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its
use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the
environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.

Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO
USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20

Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us? Second,
Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the
people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation
of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file
the instant petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their
right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the
government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power to
regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and knowledge that the
PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under
respondents' functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the
LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the
function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law
only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative
engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a
policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to
decide if what petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue
that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court.
Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners,
their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We
brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if
these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they
breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of
petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue against
respondents.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any
tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case
any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,

…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to
control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty
be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is
not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory
policy already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of
implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:

SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set
pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall
review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum
limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the
general public.

Paragraph (b) states:

b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the
control and management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality
Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use
and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the
line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the
said right.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are
general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an
executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290,
entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24,
2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the
potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the
beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its
objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of the
program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the country to
serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002,
designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR,
through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the
DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs
and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders
providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened
routes…" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being
addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the
doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and
the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par.
4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason
that neither is inferior to the other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with
and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address
by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of
future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners
and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now
explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,… it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second,
the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come. . ."29

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of
the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present
fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and
urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in
particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will
justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more
properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared
by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

• SJS v Atienza G.R. No. 156052, Feb. 13, 2008

In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.

The antecedents are as follows.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor
approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.4

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle
described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general
welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of
land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in
the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded
by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which
to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:

Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU,
undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing
of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx

Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint
operations and management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with
international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently,
the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated
areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint
operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.

Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be
taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole
responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.

The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:

Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of
implementing the spirit and intent thereof.

Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL
COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the
joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this
MOU.

Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and
shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the Sangguniandeclared
that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also
called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11

The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:

1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12

Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government
Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.

Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.14However,
he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not
amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in
any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere
guideline for its full implementation.15

Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act
required to be done.17

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which
is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS
states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to
have many members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly
residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public
right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded
as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of
petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of
the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we
stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to
be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful,
unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and
Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a
terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila,
is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

SO ORDERED.

o MMDA vs Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, G.R. No. 171947-48, Dec. 18, 2008
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other
critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct
statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by
human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high
national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so
many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly
because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated,
stemmed from:
xxx
[The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in
the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which
reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the
pollution of the ManilaBay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
 (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of
the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from
different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most
probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other
forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4]

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners,
testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its
part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being
conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-
government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to
make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant
DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic
places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities
for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities
to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and
liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and
restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation
of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the
bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering
arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other
non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to
have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving
and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms
of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of
Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
 On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five
other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a
Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD
1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising
concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is
not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in
toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.[7]

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and
supporting arguments:THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE
HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD]
1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND
DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION
INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF
PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that requires neither
the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.[10] Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal
systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that
the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply with
and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners,
the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether
or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such
services.
 We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how
they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court
directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil
players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the effectivity
of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the
MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs
and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land
fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste.
(Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which
prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating
requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and
37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled
dumps.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code
(PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized
as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to
perform or not to perform.[14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-
related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to
the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004
(RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts
Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes
and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to
prevent and abate such pollution.
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering
the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That
the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the
status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the
framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area
governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of the
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under
RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in
partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final
draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the
concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks
and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of
Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:

(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other
uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the
minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The
LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage
disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide
sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency
tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and
fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to
ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.
[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality

standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA
9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and
conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide
integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems in
accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to flood
control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects
for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system.

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the
agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the
implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in
violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,
[24] or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations
governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter
for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other
man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the
Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or
out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or
mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary
of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides,
or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of
pollution of such water.
 (7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law
on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters
and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the
police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement
of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in
Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to
enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25]

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a
rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA
has police authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement
bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement
within the port of watercraft.[27]

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the
provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid
wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Baywaters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When
the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have
jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29]

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in
public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping,
burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as
enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH,
LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of
RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila
Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and
other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned
agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules
and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or
municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies,
shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation
of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII
of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by
private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of
sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to
integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in
collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a
nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the
integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33]

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development
objectives.[34]

One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses
that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the
quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to
streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water
resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues
related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public
health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution
prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the
countrys development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what
are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the
cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water
pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the
quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water
pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or
entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes
pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove
and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for
utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to
immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to
have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to
the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it
is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the
matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would
have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as
follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to
restore it to pre-spill condition.
 h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents
such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to
undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning
operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of
oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the
containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that
Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have
indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources
of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution
incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their
respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that
petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup
operations and accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated
to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies,
when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a
specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to
perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bayonly when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not
undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of
the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution
incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on
the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident.In this regard, what the CA said
with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152
aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17
& 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.[35]

Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem
to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to
draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by
polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into
the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies,
which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that
the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless
and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be
almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the
apprehension, if any, of the Manila Baypolluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and
undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a
general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation
of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the
wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching
the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus
behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing
notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus,[36] the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to
clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge
their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one
factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of
the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all
efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39] which
prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject
to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to
stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any
kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of
the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions,
some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable
period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage
waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying
establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we
cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied
in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some
highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an
alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the
earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding
areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into
ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40]

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and
possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated,
nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid
waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21,
2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has
yet been set up.
 In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in
roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge
companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends
up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,
groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of
sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to
the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products
of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances,
from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all
concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks,
some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life
that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated,
with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This
means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or
imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different
government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning
up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be
a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It
implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even
be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the
absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and
clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No.
74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision
shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate,
and preserve ManilaBay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as
the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at
the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies
to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of
1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing
waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes
along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If
none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic
tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate
waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is
ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible
time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of
the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in
developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to
prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and
other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage
services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the
rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period
of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of
its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of
the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean
Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,
determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within
which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to
inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to
cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the
countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of
our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and
also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each
submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 • Constitutional Provisions: Utilization of Natural Resources

• Regalian Doctrine
o Sec. 2, Art. XII, Const.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.cralaw
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.cralaw
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.cralaw
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.cralaw
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.cralaw

o Ysmael v Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
o Miners Assoc vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 98332, Jan 16, 1995
The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders
promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers.

Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the
system of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. No longer is the utilization of
inalienable lands of public domain through "license, concession or lease" under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions1allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

The adoption of the concept of jura regalia2 that all natural resources are owned by the State embodied in the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only
for national economic development, but also for its security and national 

defense,3 ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full control and supervision by the State" in the
exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through
direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering
into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or product-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.

xxx xxx xxx

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted provision, legislative acts4 were successively issued by the President in
the exercise of her legislative 

power.5

To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
turn promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and constitutionality of which are being challenged
in this petition.

On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1
of the Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No.
211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development
and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and
activities and to hasten the development of mineral resources. The pertinent provisions read as follows:

Sec. 1. Existing mining permits, licenses, leases and other mining grants issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, including existing operating agreements and mining
service contracts, shall continue and remain in full force and effect, subject to the same terms and conditions as
originally granted and/or approved.

Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, including renewal
applications for approval of operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and
may be approved; concomitantly thereto, declarations of locations and all other kinds of mining applications shall be
accepted and registered by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.

Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications, declarations of locations, operating
agreements and service contracts as provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, other existing mining laws and their implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that the
privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions thereof shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those
agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals. The pertinent provisions relevant to this petition are as follows:

Sec. 1. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as "the
Secretary") is hereby authorized to negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture, co-
production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources
with any Filipino citizens, or corporation or association at least sixty percent (60%) of whose capital is owned by Filipino
citizens. Such joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and shall include the minimum terms and conditions
prescribed in Section 2 hereof. In the execution of a joint venture, co-production or production agreements, the
contracting parties, including the Government, may consolidate two or more contiguous or geologically — related
mining claims or leases and consider them as one contract area for purposes of determining the subject of the joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreement.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of this Executive Order.

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall
continue in force and effect.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative
Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order
No. 279."6 Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all
existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements
within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.

On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the
"Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."7

Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to
submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the
effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period
shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. Section 3 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 82 provides:

Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The following shall submit their LOIs and MPSAs within two
(2) years from the effectivity of DENR A.O. 57 or until July 17, 1991.

i. Declaration of Location (DOL) holders, mining lease applicants, exploration permitees, quarry applicants and other
mining applicants whose mining/quarry applications have not been perfected prior to the effectivity of DENR
Administrative Order No. 57.

ii. All holders of DOL acquired after the effectivity of DENR A.O. No. 57.

iii. Holders of mining leases or similar agreements which were granted after (the) effectivity of 1987 Constitution.

Failure to submit letters of intent and MPSA applications/proposals within the prescribed period shall cause the
abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.8 to file the instant petition assailing
their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent
Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section
6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the 

non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No.
82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years
from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry
and sand gravel permits.

On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's urgent ex-parte petition for issuance of a restraining order/preliminary
injunction, issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00 bond, enjoining the enforcement and
implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990, respectively.9

On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble Corporation, 10 thru its President, Felipe A. David, sought to intervene 11in
this case alleging that because of the temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San
Fernando, Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that its
rights and interests are prejudicially affected by the implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, it
joined petitioner herein in seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and prayed that the DENR, Regional
Office No. 3 be ordered to issue a Mines Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of
the suit.

Public respondents were acquired to comment on the Continental Marble Corporation's petition for intervention in the
resolution of November 28, 1991.12

Now to the main petition. If its argued that Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 have the effect of repealing or
abrogating existing mining laws 13 which are not inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279. Invoking
Section 7 of said Executive Order No. 279, 14 petitioner maintains that respondent DENR Secretary cannot provide
guidelines such as Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 which are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order
No. 279 because both Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of
declarations of location and all other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until Congress opts to modify or alter the same.

In other words, petitioner would have us rule that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR
Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both contravene or subvert
the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace matters not covered, nor intended to be covered, by
the aforesaid laws.

We disagree.

We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. 15 The scope of the
exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 16decided in
1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying
into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however,
as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid."

Recently, the case of People v. Maceren 17 gave a brief delienation of the scope of said power of administrative
officials:

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as
it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo
Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans
Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic prevails
because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil.
1091).

Considering that administrative rules draw life from the statute which they seek to implement, it is obvious that the
spring cannot rise higher than its source. We now examine petitioner's argument that DENR Administrative Order Nos.
57 and 82 contravene Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as both operate to repeal or abrogate Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, and other mining laws allegedly acknowledged as the principal law under Executive Order Nos.
211 and 279.

Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the
acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279
which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral
resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and,
therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management
of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still
govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall
continue in force and effect.

Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, on lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII,
quarry permits on privately-owned lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter XIII and other related
provisions on lease, license and permits are not only inconsistent with the raison d'etre for which Executive Order No.
279 was passed, but contravene the express mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force and
effectivity is thus foreclosed.

Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, 18 the State assumed a more dynamic role in the
exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter
explicitly ordains that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. Consonant therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
may be undertaken by means of direct act of the State, or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements, or it may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country.

Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds
demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of
discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such supplementary
rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover, the subject
sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive
Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative Order No. 57, in relation to Administrative Order No. 82, impairs vested
rights as to violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution because Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates and automatically converts mining
leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from effectivity of said
guideline, while Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 82, declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and
MPSAs within two (2) years from the effectivity of Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand gravel permits.

In Support of the above contention, it is argued by petitioner that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate
automatic conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article
9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and
MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers
the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and
conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into
mining agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.

To begin with, we dispel the impression created by petitioner's argument that the questioned administrative orders
unduly preterminate existing mining leases in general. A distinction which spells a real difference must be drawn. Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or lease" granted by the
government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. The
intent to apply prospectively said constitutional provision was stressed during the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, 19 thus:

MR. DAVIDE: Under the proposal, I notice that except for the [inalienable] lands of the public domain, all other natural
resources cannot be alienated and in respect to [alienable] lands of the public domain, private corporations with the
required ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease the same. Necessarily, insofar as other natural resources are
concerned, it would only be the State which can exploit, develop, explore and utilize the same. However, the State may
enter into a joint venture, co-production or production-sharing. Is that not correct?

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.

MR. DAVIDE: Consequently, henceforth upon, the approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest concession, permits
or authorization can be exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to any corporation qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain?
MR. VILLEGAS: Would Commissioner Monsod like to comment on that? I think his answer is "yes."

MR. DAVIDE: So, what will happen now license or concessions earlier granted by the Philippine government to private
corporations or to Filipino citizens? Would they be deemed repealed?

MR. VILLEGAS: This is not applied retroactively. They will be respected.

MR. DAVIDE: In effect, they will be deemed repealed?

MR. VILLEGAS: No. (Emphasis supplied)

During the transition period or after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 until the first Congress
under said Constitution was convened on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws, Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
were promulgated to govern the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals. To carry out the purposes of said laws, the questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, now
being assailed, were issued by the DENR Secretary.

Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides:

ARTICLE 9

TRANSITORY PROVISION

9.1. All existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant
to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less shall be subject to these guidelines. All such leases or
agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreement within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines. However, any minimum firm which has established mining rights under Presidential Decree 463 or other
laws may avail of the provisions of EO 279 by following the procedures set down in this document.

It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It
bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the
privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations
which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the 

non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution 20 do not apply to the aforesaid
leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They
can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her
legislative power has the force and effect of a statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly modified or altered
the privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases and agreements under Executive Order
No. 211 after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial
assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by
the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations
through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 21 where the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 34 changing the 50-50 sharecropping system in existing agricultural tenancy
contracts to 55-45 in favor of tenants was challenged, the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized
the superiority of the police power of the State over the sanctity of this contract:

The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against: impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute
one and it is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such provisions are restricted to
contracts which respect property, or some object or value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice,
and have no application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the
State, and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent a
proper exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be affected; for such
matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the State shall regulates and control them. 22
In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos 23 where the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 authorizing the
tenants to charge from share to leasehold tenancy was challenged on the ground that it impairs the obligation of
contracts, the Court ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such
power is exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the
accomplishment of that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.

The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in
Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in
the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity
as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest
and the general welfare of the people. The recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources was
expressed as early as the 1984 Constitutional Convention. In connection therewith, the 1986 U.P. Constitution Project
observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention recognized the importance of our natural resources not only for its
security and national defense. Our natural resources which constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation,
should be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their prosperity. This will ensure the
country's survival as a viable and sovereign republic."

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional
restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements
granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being
co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs.
The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the
DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the questioned
order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements
within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on
the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into 

production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so
minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A
mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived
at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.

We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the
purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public,
their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be
sustained, and their force and effect upheld.

We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
intervention in a case is proper when the intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. "Continental Marble Corporation has
not sufficiently shown that it falls under any of the categories mentioned above. The refusal of the DENR, Regional
Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga to renew its Mines Temporary Permit does not justify such an intervention by
Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of obtaining a directive from this Court for the issuance of said permit.
Whether or not Continental Marble matter best addressed to the appropriate government body but certainly, not
through this Court. Intervention is hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is
hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

o PICOP vs Base Metal Mining, G.R. No. 163509, Dec 6, 2006

PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2003 and its
Resolution2 dated May 5, 2004, which respectively denied its petition for review and motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts quoted from the appellate court's Decision are as follows:

In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines
Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining
for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual
commercial operation of CMMCI's eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing
it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit
was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.

Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del
Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition
of each other's right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its
mining claims.

In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA for brevity).

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests
over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base
Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well
as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by
Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as
the new operator of its claims.

On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the
Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area
clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were
submitted, as required.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals' amended MPSA applications were published in accordance with
the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office
No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS WILL VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT.

II. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION WILL DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN ADVERSE CLAIMANT
AND/OR OPPOSITOR.

In its Answer to the Adverse Claim and/or Opposition, private respondent Base Metals alleged that:

a) the Adverse Claim was filed out of time;

b) petitioner PICOP has no rights over the mineral resources on their concession area. PICOP is asserting a privilege
which is not protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution;

c) the grant of the MPSA will not impair the rights of PICOP nor create confusion, chaos or conflict.

Petitioner PICOP's Reply to the Answer alleged that:

a) the Adverse Claim was filed within the reglementary period;

b) the grant of MPSA will impair the existing rights of petitioner PICOP;

c) the MOA between PICOP and Banahaw Mining provides for recognition by Banahaw Mining of the Presidential
Warranty awarded in favor of PICOP for the exclusive possession and enjoyment of said areas.
As a Rejoinder, private respondent Base Metals stated that:

1. it is seeking the right to extract the mineral resources in the applied areas. It is not applying for any right to the forest
resources within the concession areas of PICOP;

2. timber or forest lands are open to Mining Applications;

3. the grant of the MPSA will not violate the so called "presidential fiat";

4. the MPSA application of Base Metals does not require the consent of PICOP; and

5. it signified its willingness to enter into a voluntary agreement with PICOP on the matter of compensation for
damages. In the absence of such agreement, the matter will be brought to the Panel of Arbitration in accordance with
law.

In refutation thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged in its Rejoinder that:

a) the Adverse Claim filed thru registered mail was sent on time and as prescribed by existing mining laws and rules
and regulations;

b) the right sought by private respondent Base Metals is not absolute but is subject to existing rights, such as those
which the adverse claimant had, that have to be recognized and respected in a manner provided and prescribed by
existing laws as will be expounded fully later;

c) as a general rule, mining applications within timber or forest lands are subject to existing rights as provided in
Section 18 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and it is an admitted fact by the private respondent that
petitioner PICOP had forest rights as per Presidential Warranty;

d) while the Presidential Warranty did not expressly state exclusivity, P.D. 705 strengthened the right of occupation,
possession and control over the concession area;

e) the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and Section 15 of IRR expressly require the written consent of the forest right
holder, PICOP.

After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order dated December 21, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which reads as:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Mineral Production Sharing Agreement Application Nos. (XIII) 010, 011, 012 of
Base Metal Resources Corporation should be set aside.

The disapproval of private respondent Base Metals' MPSA was due to the following reasons:

Anent the first issue the Panel find (sic) and so hold (sic) that the adverse claim was filed on time, it being mailed on
November 19, 1997, at Metro Manila as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 26714. Under the law (sic) the date of
mailing is considered the date of filing.

As to whether or not an MPSA application can be granted on area subject of an IFMA3 or PTLA4 which is covered by a
Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it can not, unless the grantee consents thereto. Without the grantee's
consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40). The Panel believe (sic)
that mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government
to a qualified person or entity. If it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to
be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected to mining operation.

Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not
exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the other operate.

On the other hand, Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation can not insist the MPSA application as assignee of
Banahaw. PICOP did not consent to the assignment as embodied in the agreement. Neither did it ratify the Deed of
Assignment. Accordingly, it has no force and effect. Thus, for lack of consent, the MPSA must fall.

On January 11, 1999, private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB and alleged
in its Appeal Memorandum the following arguments:
1. THE CONSENT OF PICOP IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE APPROVAL OF BASE METALS' MPSA APPLICATION.

2. EVEN ASSUMING SUCH CONSENT IS NECESSARY, PICOP HAD CONSENTED TO BASE METALS' MPSA
APPLICATION.

In Answer thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged that:

1. Consent is necessary for the approval of private respondent's MPSA application;

2. Provisions of Memorandum Order No. 98-03 and IFMA 35 are not applicable to the instant case;

3. Provisions of PD 7055 connotes exclusivity for timber license holders; and

4. MOA between private respondent's assignor and adverse claimant provided for the recognition of the latter's rightful
claim over the disputed areas.

Private respondent Base Metals claimed in its Reply that:

1. The withholding of consent by PICOP derogates the State's power to supervise and control the exploration,
utilization and development of all natural resources;

2. Memorandum Order No, 98-03, not being a statute but a mere guideline imposed by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), can be applied retroactively to MPSA applications which
have not yet been finally resolved;

3. Even assuming that the consent of adverse claimant is necessary for the approval of Base Metals' application (which
is denied), such consent had already been given; and

4. The Memorandum of Agreement between adverse claimant and Banahaw Mining proves that the Agusan-Surigao
area had been used in the past both for logging and mining operations.

After the filing of petitioner PICOP's Reply Memorandum, public respondent rendered the assailed decision setting
aside the Panel Arbitrator's order. Accordingly, private respondent Base Metals' MPSA's were reinstated and given due
course subject to compliance with the pertinent requirements of the existing rules and regulations.6

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted
the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the
request of the Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential
Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of
the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.

Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession, occupation and exploration of the
concession areas covered. If that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to
control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources.

On PICOP's contention that its consent is necessary for the grant of Base Metals' MPSA, the appellate court ruled that
the amendment to PTLA No. 47 refers to the grant of gratuitous permits, which the MPSA subject of this case is not.
Further, the amendment pertains to the cutting and extraction of timber for mining purposes and not to the act of mining
itself, the intention of the amendment being to protect the timber found in PICOP's concession areas.

The Court of Appeals noted that the reinstatement of the MPSA does not ipso facto revoke, amend, rescind or impair
PICOP's timber license. Base Metals still has to comply with the requirements for the grant of a mining permit. The fact,
however, that Base Metals had already secured the necessary Area Status and Clearance from the DENR means that
the areas applied for are not closed to mining operations.

In its Resolution7 dated May 5, 2004, the appellate court denied PICOP's Motion for Reconsideration. It ruled that
PICOP failed to substantiate its allegation that the area applied for is a forest reserve and is therefore closed to mining
operations because it did not identify the particular law which set aside the contested area as one where mining is
prohibited pursuant to applicable laws.

The case is now before us for review.

In its Memorandum8 dated April 6, 2005, PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base
Metals' MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOP's written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules
and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.

PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-
Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly
also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092),9 and overlaps the wilderness area
where mining applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586.10 Hence, the area is closed to mining operations
under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.11

PICOP further asserts that to allow mining over a forest or forest reserve would allegedly be tantamount to changing
the classification of the land from forest to mineral land in violation of Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of
RA 3092.

According to PICOP, in 1962 and 1963, blocks A, B and C within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve under
Proclamation No. 369 were surveyed as permanent forest blocks in accordance with RA 3092. These areas cover
PICOP's PTLA No. 47, part of which later became IFMA No. 35. In turn, the areas set aside as wilderness as in PTLA
No. 47 became the initial components of the NIPAS under Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586. When RA 7942 was signed into law,
the areas covered by the NIPAS were expressly determined as areas where mineral agreements or financial or
technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed. PICOP concludes that since there is no evidence
that the permanent forest areas within PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 have been set aside for mining purposes, the
MAB and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reinstating Base Metals' MPSA and, in effect, allowing mining
exploration and mining-related activities in the protected areas.

PICOP further argues that under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40 implementing RA 7942, an exploration
permit must be secured before mining operations in government reservations may be undertaken. There being no
exploration permit issued to Banahaw Mining or appended to its MPSA, the MAB and the Court of Appeals should not
have reinstated its application.

PICOP brings to the Court's attention the case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez,12 wherein the
Court of Appeals ruled that the Presidential Warranty issued to PICOP for its TLA No. 43 dated July 29, 1969, a TLA
distinct from PTLA No. 47 involved in this case, is a valid contract involving mutual prestations on the part of the
Government and PICOP.

The Presidential Warranty in this case is allegedly not a mere confirmation of PICOP's timber license but a commitment
on the part of the Government that in consideration of PICOP's investment in the wood-processing business, the
Government will assure the availability of the supply of raw materials at levels adequate to meet projected utilization
requirements. The guarantee that PICOP will have peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession
areas is impaired by the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA in that the latter's mining activities underneath the area in
dispute will surely undermine PICOP's supply of raw materials on the surface.

Base Metals' obtention of area status and clearance from the DENR is allegedly immaterial, even misleading. The
findings of the DENR Regional Disrector and the superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary are
allegedly misplaced because the area applied for is not inside the Agusan Marsh but in a permanent forest. Moreover,
the remarks in the area status itself should have been considered by the MAB and the appellate court as they point out
that the application encroaches on surveyed timberland projects declared as permanent forests/forest reserves.

Finally, PICOP insists that it has always maintained that the forest areas of PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are closed to
mining operations. The grounds relied upon in this petition are thus not new issues but merely amplifications,
clarifications and detailed expositions of the relevant constitutional provisions and statutes regulating the use and
preservation of forest reserves, permanent forest, and protected wilderness areas given that the areas subject of the
MPSA are within and overlap PICOP's PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 which have been classified and blocked not only
as permanent forest but also as protected wilderness area forming an integral part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve.

In its undated Memorandum,13 Base Metals contends that PICOP never made any reference to land classification or
the exclusion of the contested area from exploration and mining activities except in the motion for reconsideration it
filed with the Court of Appeals. PICOP's object to the MPSA was allegedly based exclusively on the ground that the
application, if allowed to proceed, would constitute a violation of the constitutional proscription against impairment of
the obligation of contracts. It was upon this issue that the appellate court hinged its Decision in favor of Base Metals,
ruling that the Presidential Warranty merely confirmed PICOP's timber license. The instant petition, which raises new
issues and invokes RA 3092 and RA 7586, is an unwarranted departure from the settled rule that only issues raised in
the proceedings a quo may be elevated on appeal.
Base Metals notes that RA 7586 expressly requires that there be a prior presidential decree, presidential proclamation,
or executive order issued by the President of the Philippines, expressly proclaiming, designating, and setting aside the
wilderness area before the same may be considered part of the NIPAS as a protected area. Allegedly, PICOP has not
shown that such an express presidential proclamation exists setting aside the subject area as a forest reserve, and
excluding the same from the commerce of man.

PICOP also allegedly misquoted Sec. 19 of RA 7942 by placing a comma between the words "watershed" and "forest"
thereby giving an altogether different and misleading interpretation of the cited provision. The cited provision, in fact,
states that for an area to be closed to mining applications, the same must be a watershed forest reserve duly identified
and proclaimed by the President of the Philippines. In this case, no presidential proclamation exists setting aside the
contested area as such.

Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement between Banahaw Mining and PICOP is allegedly a clear and tacit
recognition by the latter that the area is open and available for mining activities and that Banahaw Mining has a right to
enter and explore the areas covered by its mining claims.

Base Metals reiterates that the non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial
or quasi-judicial power. The Constitution prohibits the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner
changes the intention of the contracting parties. The decision of the MAB and the Court of Appeals are not legislative
acts within the purview of the constitutional proscription. Besides, the Presidential Warranty is not a contract that may
be impaired by the reinstatement of the MPSA. It is a mere confirmation of PICOP's timber license and draws its life
from PTLA No. 47. Furthermore, PICOP fails to show how the reinstatement of the MPSA will impair its timber license.

Following the regalian doctrine, Base Metals avers that the State may opt to enter into contractual arrangements for the
exploration, development, and extraction of minerals even it the same should mean amending, revising, or even
revoking PICOP's timber license. To require the State to secure PICOP's prior consent before it can enter into such
contracts allegedly constitutes an undue delegation of sovereign power.

Base Metals further notes that Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), under which PTLA No. 47, IFMA No. 35 and the
Presidential Warranty were issued, requires notice to PICOP rather than consent before any mining activity can be
commenced in the latter's concession areas.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Memorandum14 dated April 21, 2005 on behalf of the MAB, contending
that PICOP's attempt to raise new issues, such as its argument that the contested area is classified as a permanent
forest and hence, closed to mining activities, is offensive to due process and should not be allowed.

The OSG argues that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process and non-impairment
clauses. The Presidential Warranty merely guarantees PICOP's tenure over its concession area and covers only the
right to cut, collect and remove timber therein. It is a mere collateral undertaking and cannot amplify PICOP's rights
under its PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. To hold that the Presidential Warranty is a contract separate from PICOP's
timber license effectively gives the latter PICOP an exclusive, perpetual and irrevocable right over its concession area
and impairs the State's sovereign exercise of its power over the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources.

The case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez, supra, cited by PICOP cannot be relied upon to
buttress the latter's claim that a presidential warranty is a valid and subsisting contract between PICOP and the
Government because the decision of the appellate court in that case is still pending review before the Court's Second
Division.

The OSG further asserts that mining operations are legally permissible over PICOP's concession areas. Allegedly,
what is closed to mining applications under RA 7942 are areas proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. The law does
not totally prohibit mining operations over forest reserves. On the contrary, Sec. 18 of RA 7942 permits mining over
forest lands subject to existing rights and reservations, and PD 705 allows mining over forest lands and forest
reservations subject to State regulation and mining laws. Sec. 19(a) of RA 7942 also provides that mineral activities
may be allowed even over military and other government reservations as long as there is a prior written clearance by
the government agency concerned.

The area status clearances obtained by Base Metals also allegedly show that the area covered by the MPSA is within
timberland, unclassified public forest, and alienable and disposable land. Moreover, PICOP allegedly chose to cite
portions of Apex Mining Corporation v. Garcia,15 to make it appear that the Court in that case ruled that mining is
absolutely prohibited in the Agusan-Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve. In fact, the Court held that the area is not open to
mining location because the proper procedure is to file an application for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest
and Development.
In addition, PICOP's claimed wilderness area has not been designated as a protected area that would operate to bar
mining operations therein. PICOP failed to prove that the alleged wilderness area has been designated as an initial
component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order. Hence, it
cannot correctly claim that the same falls within the coverage of the restrictive provisions of RA 7586.

The OSG points out that the Administrative Code of 1917 which RA 3092 amended has been completely repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1978. Sec. 4, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, provides that Congress
shall determine the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground.
Once this is done, the area thus covered by said forest lands and national parks may not be expanded or reduced
except also by congressional legislation. Since Congress has yet to enact a law determining the specific limits of the
forest lands covered by Proclamation No. 369 and marking clearly its boundaries on the ground, there can be no
occasion that could give rise to a violation of the constitutional provision.

Moreover, Clauses 10 and 14 of PICOP's IFMA No. 35 specifically provides that the area covered by the agreement is
open for mining if public interest so requires. Likewise, PTLA No. 47 provides that the area covered by the license
agreement may be opened for mining purposes.

Finally, the OSG maintains that pursuant to the State's policy of multiple land use, R.A. No. 7942 provides for
appropriate measures for a harmonized utilization of the forest resources and compensation for whatever damage
done to the property of the surface owner or concessionaire as a consequence of mining operations. Multiple land use
is best demonstrated by the Memorandum of Agreement between PICOP and Banahaw Mining.

First, the procedural question of whether PICOP is raising new issues in the instant petition. It is the contention of the
OSG and Base Metals that PICOP's argument that the area covered by the MPSA is classified as permanent forest
and therefore closed to mining activities was raised for the first time in PICOP's motion for reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals.

Our own perusal of the records of this case reveals that this is not entirely true.

In its Adverse Claim and/or Opposition16 dated November 19, 1997 filed with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators, PICOP
already raised the argument that the area applied for by Base Metals is classified as a permanent forest determined to
be needed for forest purposes pursuant to par. 6, Sec. 3 of PD 705, as amended. PICOP then proceeded to claim that
the area should remain forest land if the purpose of the presidential fiat were to be followed. It stated:

Technically, the areas applied for by Base Metals are classified as a permanent forest being land of the public domain
determined to be needed for forest purposes (Paragraph 6, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended) If
these areas then are classified and determined to be needed for forest purpose then they should be developed and
should remain as forest lands. Identifying, delineating and declaring them for other use or uses defeats the purpose of
the aforecited presidential fiats. Again, if these areas would be delineated from Oppositor's forest concession, the
forest therein would be destroyed and be lost beyond recovery.17

Base Metals met this argument head on in its Answer18 dated December 1, 1997, in which it contended that PD 705
does not exclude mining operations in forest lands but merely requires that there be proper notice to the licensees of
the area.

Again in its Petition19 dated January 25, 2003 assailing the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA, PICOP argued that
RA 7942 expressly prohibits mining operations in plantation areas such as PICOP's concession area. Hence, it posited
that the MGB Panel of Arbitrators did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that without PICOP's consent,
the area is closed to mining location.

It is true though that PICOP expounded on the applicability of RA 3092, RA 7586, and RA 7942 for the first time in its
motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision. It was only in its motion for reconsideration that PICOP
argued that the area covered by PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are permanent forest lands covered by RA 7586 which
cannot be entered for mining purposes, and shall remain indefinitely as such for forest uses and cannot be excluded or
diverted for other uses except after reclassification through a law enacted by Congress.

Even so, we hold that that the so-called new issues raised by PICOP are well within the issues framed by the parties in
the proceedings a quo. Thus, they are not, strictly speaking, being raised for the first time on appeal.20 Besides, Base
Metals and the OSG have been given ample opportunity, by way of the pleadings filed with this Court, to respond to
PICOP's arguments. It is in the best interest of justice that we settle the crucial question of whether the concession
area in dispute is open to mining activities.
We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end that the
country's natural resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized and conserved. The Whereas clauses and
declaration of policies of PD 705 state:

WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the lands of the public domain to maximize their
productivity to meet the demands of our increasing population is urgently needed;

WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to reassess the multiple uses of forest lands and resources
before allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the benefits that can be derived therefrom;

Sec. 2. Policies.—The State hereby adopts the following policies:

a) The multiple uses of forest lands shall be oriented to the development and progress requirements of the country, the
advancement of science and technology, and the public welfare;

In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor
the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be
properly compensated for any damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. The pertinent
provisions on auxiliary mining rights state:

Sec. 72. Timber Rights.—Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, a contractor may be granted a right to
cut trees or timber within his mining areas as may be necessary for his mining operations subject to forestry laws, rules
and regulations: Provided, That if the land covered by the mining area is already covered by existing timber
concessions, the volume of timber needed and the manner of cutting and removal thereof shall be determined by the
mines regional director, upon consultation with the contractor, the timber concessionair/permittee and the Forest
Management Bureau of the Department: Provided, further, That in case of disagreement between the contractor and
the timber concessionaire, the matter shall be submitted to the Secretary whose decision shall be final. The contractor
shall perform reforestation work within his mining area in accordance with forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Sec. 76. Entry into Private Lands and Concession Areas.—Subject to prior notification, holders of mining rights shall
not be prevented from entry into private lands and concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires
when conducting mining operations therein: Provided, That any damage done to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided
for in the implementing rules and regulations: Provided, further, That to guarantee such compensation, the person
authorized to conduct mining operation shall, prior thereto, post a bond with the regional director based on the type of
properties, the prevailing prices in and around the area where the mining operations are to be conducted, with surety
or sureties satisfactory to the regional director.

With the foregoing predicates, we shall now proceed to analyze PICOP's averments.

PICOP contends that its concession area is within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve established under
Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to mining application citing several paragraphs of Sec. 19 of RA 7942.

The cited provision states:

Sec. 19 Areas Closed to Mining Applications.—Mineral agreement or financial or technical assistance agreement
applications shall not be allowed:

(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by the government agency
concerned;

(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;

(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy
forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by
law in areas expressly prohibited under the National Ingrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No.
7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws. [emphasis supplied]

We analyzed each of the categories under which PICOP claims that its concession area is closed to mining activities
and conclude that PICOP's contention must fail.

Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed
reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations,21 such does not necessarily preclude mining
activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining
applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation.

Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be
undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. It provides:

Sec. 6. Other Reservations.—Mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken
by the Department, subject to limitations as herein provided. In the event that the Department cannot undertake such
activities, they may be undertaken by a qualified person in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary. The right to develop and utilize the minerals found therein shall be awarded by the President under such
terms and conditions as recommended by the Director and approved by the Secretary: Provided, That the party who
undertook the exploration of said reservations shall be given priority. The mineral land so awarded shall be
automatically excluded from the reservation during the term of the agreement: Provided, further, That the right of the
lessee of a valid mining contract existing within the reservation at the time of its establishment shall not be prejudiced
or impaired.

Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed aswatershed
forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed
as watershed forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not
necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOP's obvious misreading of
our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the
forest reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as
amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for
a permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.

Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights and reservations. It
provides:

Sec. 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations.—Subject to any existing rights or reservations and prior agreements of all
parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall
be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise
under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators.

Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent
forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.22 It states:

Sec. 47. Mining Operations.—Mining operations in forest lands shall be regulated and conducted with due regard to
protection, development and utilization of other surface resources. Location, prospecting, exploration, utilization or
exploitation of mineral resources in forest reservations shall be governed by mining laws, rules and regulations. No
location, prospecting, exploration, utilization, or exploitation of mineral resources inside forest concessions shall be
allowed unless proper notice has been served upon the licensees thereof and the prior approval of the Director,
secured.

Significantly, the above-quoted provision does not require that the consent of existing licensees be obtained but that
they be notified before mining activities may be commenced inside forest concessions.

DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and clearance or
consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest lands, military and other
government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing
DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining
applications subject to area status and clearance.
To this end, area status clearances or land status certifications have been issued to Base Metals relative to its mining
right application, to wit:

II. MPSA No. 010

1. Portion colored green is the area covered by the aforestated Timberland Project No. 31-E, Block A and Project No.
59-C, Block A, L.C. Map No. 2466 certified as such on June 30, 1961; and

2. Shaded brown represent CADC claim.23

III. MPSA No. 011

1. The area applied covers the Timberland, portion of Project No. 31-E, Block-E, L.C. Map No. 2468 and Project No.
36-A Block II, Alienable and Disposable Land, L.C. Map No. 1822, certified as such on June 30, 1961 and January 1,
1955, respectively;

2. The green shade is the remaining portion of Timber Land Project;

3. The portion colored brown is an applied and CADC areas;

4. Red shade denotes alienable and disposable land.24

IV. MPSA No. 012

Respectfully returned herewith is the folder of Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, applied under Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA (XIII) 012), referred to this office per memorandum dated August 5, 1997 for
Land status certification and the findings based on available references file this office, the site is within the unclassified
Public Forest of the LGU, Rosario, Agusan del Sur. The shaded portion is the wilderness area of PICOP Resources
Incorporated (PRI), Timber License Agreement.25

V. MPSA No. 013

1. The area status shaded green falls within Timber Land, portion of Project No. 31-E, Block-A, Project No. 59-C,
Block-A, L.C. Map No. 2468 certified as such on June 30, 1961;

2. Colored brown denotes a portion claimed as CADC areas;

3. Violet shade represent a part of reforestation project of PRI concession; and

4. The yellow color is identical to unclassified Public Forest of said LGU and the area inclosed in Red is the wilderness
area of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI), Timber License Agreement.26

Thirdly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area
designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or
executive order as required by RA 7586.

Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586 provides:

Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System.—The establishment and operationalization of the System shall
involve the following:

(a) All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside, pursuant to a law, presidential
decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife
sanctuary, wilderness area, strict nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical
landmark, protected and managed landscape/seascape as well as identified virgin forests before the effectivity of this
Act are hereby designated as initial components of the System. The initial components of the System shall be
governed by existing laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this Act.

Although the above-cited area status and clearances, particularly those pertaining to MPSA Nos. 012 and 013, state
that portions thereof are within the wilderness area of PICOP, there is no showing that this supposed wilderness area
has been proclaimed, designated or set aside as such, pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential
proclamation or executive order. It should be emphasized that it is only when this area has been so designated that
Sec. 20 of RA 7586, which prohibits mineral locating within protected areas, becomes operational.
From the foregoing, there is clearly no merit to PICOP's contention that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is, by
law, closed to mining activities.

Finally, we do not subscribe to PICOP's argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a
contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's
commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate
possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex.
The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the
utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.

The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. We agree with
the OSG's position that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its timber
license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran27 that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-
impairment clause is edifying. We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:

"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case.

'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it a property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x
x x"

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:

"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302]."

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

"Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

cannot be invoked.28 [emphasis supplied]

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of
exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete
abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development
and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

In closing, we should lay emphasis on the fact that the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA does not automatically
result in its approval. Base Metals still has to comply with the requirements outlined in DAO 96-40, including the
publication/posting/radio announcement of its mineral agreement application.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals November 28,
2003 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 o DENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 167707, Oct 8, 2008
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their
occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition
for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-
shaped island’s three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation
Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular
3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants 

Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with
the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on
their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they
had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced.
Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were
presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees
and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed
any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan
PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles
were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a
title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections
8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since
time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of
pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land.
Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the
required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public
forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same
issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle
for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED
BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141
[AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR
SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE
SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
(a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great
leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would
be ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the
Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under
certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after
the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took
various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the
Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3)
grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also
provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands"
under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act.
The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act.
The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning
the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was
sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land
Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA
No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration
Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands
under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially

delimited and classified."82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private
claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting
the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of
the evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda.
De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before
it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were
decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then
were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption
on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public
domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination
did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically
made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act
No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It
certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end,
dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the
particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as
we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each
case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show
that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land
may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified
as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands
in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved
in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its
superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until
private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except
those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a
justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there
was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation
having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to
determine the property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was
decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,
102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,
whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified
lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply
here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate
opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to
certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion
of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,
mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified
land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered
public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with
the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island
has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest"
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of
lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other
is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach
resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is
nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
"private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands
are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be
classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular
recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and
disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both,
he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island,
together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of
the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the
areas’ alienability.119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro,
Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin
Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone
makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the
proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the
same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to
classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails,
which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to
make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further
assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under
PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of
RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting
it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified
lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests,
the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral
or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis
supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We
agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where
there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural
lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry
Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither
do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay
Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land.
Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and
applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not
alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with
the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note
that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the
tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on
June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long
time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued
possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested
right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court
is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied
portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-
word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of
their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to
exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the
House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private
ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the
vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy
rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets
prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to
forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the
trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

• National Parks
o Secs. 3 and 4, Art. XII, Const.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead,
or grant.cralaw
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.cralaw
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands
and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and
national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The
Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered
forests and watershed areas.cralaw

• Preferential Use of Resources

o Sec 7, Art XIII; par 2&3, Const.

SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,

especially of local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to
such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share
from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

o Sec 2, Art XII; foreign part: par 4, Const.

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural

resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

• Local Government Share

o Sec. 7, Art. X; Local Government Code

Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the

proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within
their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing
the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
• Acess to Information
o Sec 7, Art. III, Const.

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
• People’s Participation
o Sec 16, Art XIII, Const.

SECTION 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective
and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate
the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

• Constitutional provisions: Indigenous People’s Rights

o Sec. 5, Art. XII, Const.

SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and

national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain.

o Cariño vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 (1909)

Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in
the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of
land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of
Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed
of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running
1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño, H. Phelps Whitmarsh,
and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land
of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of
115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines
running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and
Mayengmeng.

By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo
and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that
the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the
former petition.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the
whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was
never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresionfrom the State.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land
Registration rendered its judgment in these terms:

Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed
exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which
Cariño constructed the house now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and
1898, and Cariño held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the
property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the property in
question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court
below are the following:

From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses
for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and
utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property
now in question, property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No.
561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893
Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to
Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the
plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father
and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..

In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located
on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having
constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in
the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has
undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of
exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the
superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan
filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares,
inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive
proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory
information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same
month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein
described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to
the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land,
as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a
considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west
side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information
mentioned.

2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is
made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now
actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the
possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the
class called public lands.

3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect
the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title
of egresionof this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any
possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4,
The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this
being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the
present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred
to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions
required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an
uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the
same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and
has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the
three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been
possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years,
notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the
testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following
reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal
decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose
of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish
Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said
royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is
as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the
possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the
expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to
obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession
reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said
possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal
or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five
years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this
chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal
lands in accordance with common law."

5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it
be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of
average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period
of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase
had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record
of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested
in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go
to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the
expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity
with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe
by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law
— remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it
could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which
condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which
classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing
them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time
pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal
decree of February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing
with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and
acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth
merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government,
in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in
conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No.
648,2herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which
appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions
contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The
petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by
that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time
immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of
obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in
extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if
we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to
the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it
follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was
strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of
same, according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent
of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not
been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the
event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño.
And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in
granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have
already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is
shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or
gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance
thereof with the assistance of these new laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:

1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not
possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;

2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this
decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let
the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So
ordered.
 o Cruz vs NCIP, G.R. No.135385, Dec 6, 2000; read opinion of Justice Puno
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.
1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under
the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the
Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one
of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion
to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention.
They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors
filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in
their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found
within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition
of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely,
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation
of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment

and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section
1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6,
7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he
believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:
PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche
entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on
Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the
most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree,
ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom,
seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering
history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the
energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone
who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it

introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide
with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history.
After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional
mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral
land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our
indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control
and supervision in their development and exploitation.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters
of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is
allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be
harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International

Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE

LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the
feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western
legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies,
i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the
Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in
our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands
which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they
belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,
audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,
and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only
their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we
may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period
within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to
them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or
by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored
to us to be disposed of at our will."4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest.

Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by
issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private
land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the
various modes of land grant from the Crown.6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law
of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles
and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands
pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura
Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the
Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or
registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government,
through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land:
long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of
the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court
ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not
objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that
their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against
everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not
validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public
lands in the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special
laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if
so, to what extent was it recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence
of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be
followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands
should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of
1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those
lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or
by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there
might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the
idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some
private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of
the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the
authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those
who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is
apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of
time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without
any action on the part of the authorities."12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in
his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those
lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such
lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title
deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered
the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication
of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the
date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to
said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x
x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case
of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just
and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and
they will be granted to others."15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous
legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case
fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did
under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that
he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain
from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute
owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in
force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these
lands by prescription, without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other
than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was
deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary.
In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to
obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American
Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion
of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government
and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land
Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in
scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the
passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present
Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference
between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens
and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and
corporations.24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system
under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine
Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the
Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts
Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure
of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned
it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires
that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the
person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.26 The
certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of
land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land
conveyance and negotiation.27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization
and conservation of the natural resources of the country.28There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.
29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to

secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation,

development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was
introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and

Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on
the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the
State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being
violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities

or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,

subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if
the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the
ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right
to self-governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to
preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of
the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs
from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest
of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of
the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and
Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by
former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and

practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is
granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12
years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40

A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is
used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international
language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the
United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group

of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common
bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority
of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the
time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions
and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have
been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of

people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These
groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories
under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority.
ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time
of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic,
cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their
traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of

Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group
of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg,

Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and
Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya;
Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of
Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon;

Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and
Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog,

and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay,
Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of
Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.

6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the
Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental;
the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental,
the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the
Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the
Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del
Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur
and South Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal,

and Iranon.43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as
early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled
largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups
eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant
influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and
Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic
strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese
porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural
aspect of pre-colonial society.45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the
cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our
ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of
life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago
was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical
climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.
47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form.
They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and
used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the
expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the
world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They
had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the
soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom
they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental
spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals
and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be
respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life,
indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature.51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the
Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.
52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to

one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a
"dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their
welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions
of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme
commander in time of war.53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down
orally from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the
barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder
persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his
elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known
written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D.
Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.
56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as

inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property

rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided
peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay
elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were
resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays
acted as arbiters.57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private

property in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the
barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the
higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the
community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of
the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the
concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status,
was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant
and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of lands.59 Marine
resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities
depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to
those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders,
by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and
benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their
responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them with the
leadership and means of survival.61

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in

Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over
territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan
and Subanon.62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward
Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still
held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim
Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It,
however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive

economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the
fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and
profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership
and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small
and separate communities.66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found
the Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and
river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the
encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As
early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance"
and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to
construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the
same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos
through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal
point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos
law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them
ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as
well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to
be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from
the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of
the concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of
Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the
owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the
natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and
religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and
divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who
generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the
Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by
the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards.
The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were
driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the
hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland
societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the
cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing
the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to
colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved
Christian community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept
constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally
mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one
hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an
otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that
exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7,

1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of
our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should
be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path
of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one
more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience."81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and
the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief,
but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of
a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities."82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903,

they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
(BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to
conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was
modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a
keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth
of valuable materials about them.83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos.
The raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the
Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a
more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political
advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to
render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural
minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of
integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this
purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was
given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The
post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce
resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands
of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in
Mindanao.86Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens
system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names.
With government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several
indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced
by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development.87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the
"cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and
they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their
"uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation and
implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities
(PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought
full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of
those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In
short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the
right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as

the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land
occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were
given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a
mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000
Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River
dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon
saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In
Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979
to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie
plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.
93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and

other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the
indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their
natural environment.94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to
one of preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution,
President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all
under the Office of the President.95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right
of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further
than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal
Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their
right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld
their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly
upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws
of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of
life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the
population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with
colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western
concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies"
which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural
perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were
still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and
authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of
labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and
forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments
were kept constantly vibrant.98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no

traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the
land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners.
Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only
belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land
except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.
100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which

could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by

blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not
be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under
customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized
mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team
occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it
natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds
should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to
a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are
shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also

sanctions individual ownership.The residential lots and terrace rice farms are
governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while
the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not
possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.
103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly

discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial
needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be
alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can
purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social
system. The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to
them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental
policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal
ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous

peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and
approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The
law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos.
1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular
Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a
background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long
suffered from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority.
Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory
and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the
intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of
their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and
supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive
during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to
the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to
legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to
migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and
cared for the land long before any central government was established. Their
ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other
tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the
water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality.
Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through
political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living
and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it;
and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier

proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the
principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian
Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional
laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine."
This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular
Government where:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of
the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is
termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in
subsequent cases."111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D.
705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively,
recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and
domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has
not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its
observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth
and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and
supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess
their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens
patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in
Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious
disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in
their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators
voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee
on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and
defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113

Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar

implications that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure
and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as
well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established
shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these
matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the
aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year
2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land
was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that
they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American
regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE

CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of

Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public
Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral

domains and ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral
domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right
Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas

generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,

possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including,
but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden
farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds,
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators.116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not
merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of
1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral
domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral
Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This

means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their
domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth
in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification
of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and
upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual
or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT).124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before
the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as
far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall
be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT),
which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified
and delineated.128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native

title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/
IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to
have never been public lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v.
Insular Government.130 Cariñofirmly established a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration
court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that
this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial;
that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that
his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance
with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws,
but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a
possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American
colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on
the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration
court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed
over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the
property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.
Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration
court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed
the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and
contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of
June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period of
time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure
gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S.

Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that
all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering
nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory,
sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may
assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary
in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are
matters for it to decide."137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice
was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept
of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It
was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of
1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the
United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American
Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is
obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was
different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice
to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July
1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and
rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by
the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude
in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends
those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the
declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United
States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become
such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had
heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by
long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish
law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by
this title is presumed to "never have been public land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees
upheld in the 1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court
found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary,
the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned
some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the
preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed
that titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover
such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not
own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel
for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were
recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines
into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of
the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in
Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when
it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the
characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the
King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that
titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond
this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway
over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a
manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always
been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not
to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine
of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant
might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent
ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be
given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due
process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.
142 This title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and

entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it
proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and
the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed.
Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice
require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be
deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148
hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the
title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in

his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under
the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not
certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that
province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the
Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question
good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow
that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island
of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have
permitted and had not the power to enforce."145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the
entire length of the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the
term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting
Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University
Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law
Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article
was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the
country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws.147 He
discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title
as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native
title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal
title" of the American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch,
considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs
was consistently made in reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the

provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a
permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to
comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was
imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming
deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on
the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a
permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans,
introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the
public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court
said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the
United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it
is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government
of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward.
It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be
terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are
not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that
Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from
different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is
that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere
to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful
reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States."153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the
use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of
Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom
and prescription.155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It

also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal
right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the
tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute
definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right
which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing
their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and
adjusting their boundaries.158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to

land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by
the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on
the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee
v. M'Intosh.159

In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by
the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this
conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European
discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the
potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but
in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery
was made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and
establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to
be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other
power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in
no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to
their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to
grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive
right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer-
whether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any
other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not
extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or
conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it."
Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were
held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was
only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not
convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to
the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the
exclusive power of acquiring that right."162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day,
proves the universal recognition of this principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native
lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many
U.S. citizens.164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the
State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the
Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any
violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white
missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of
the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as
the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the
relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some
foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from
lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed
their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the
extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of
that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of
the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no
other power. They assumed the relation with the United States which had before
subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting
as subjects to the laws of a master."166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within
their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.
All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged,
but guaranteed by the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent

political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region
claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on
themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to
them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our
Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the
discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,
169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title

of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to
retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land.
The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-
either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the
Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone
asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe
respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate
dominion and title to be in themselves.170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title
to the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested
in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the original 13
States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was
nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of
respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it
accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest
simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere
possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that
this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right.173 It
is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign,
possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will.174 Thus,
aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual,
exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land
owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs,
and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such title
as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual
Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends
upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal
ownership.177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily
used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general
laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public
domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set
apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper
authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is
extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict
the nation's power to dispose of, them.181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral
land claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal
title is recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From
a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine
IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal
title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on
American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes
the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is
deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal
title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by
Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment
by persons other than the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms
against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,
186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over
the ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy
and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American
Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in
the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native
title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only case
that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of
cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character of
ancestral domains and lands. Cariñowas cited by the succeeding cases to
support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act
which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to
be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in
Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The
land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that
the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho,
however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was
cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public
agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the
concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and members of the
national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that
the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public
Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral
land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be
first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To
wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall
have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are
hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years
from the approval of this Act."196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not
domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested
by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of
registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in
character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming
purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of
whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with

the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the
Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions
apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have
not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or
which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the
Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural
lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to
avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent
(18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act
has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20)
years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.

Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article
XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of
the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral
lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four
categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes
will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct
concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major
problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in
terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for
the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct
rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life
into this constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral

domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the
concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse
possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act
on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and
Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who
shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free
patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four
hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied

and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be
entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not
the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of
the Public Land Law.203

x x x.

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b)
hereof."204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally
public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free
patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private.
Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed
judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled
to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines
defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman
Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of
1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It
primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And
the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing
what it produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate,
encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude
from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has
not transmitted such thing.208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a
torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally
recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership

sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral

domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in
common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself
provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are
presumed to be communally held.209 These communal rights, however, are not
exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership
gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common.
The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral
domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the
very community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real
property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only
for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any
single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the
corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or
involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of
the land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and
future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept
within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed
to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The
lands are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the
following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with
customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/
IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/
IPs.

Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA,
by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept
that has long existed under customary law.217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the
Civil Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide
that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In
other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of
a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the
civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper

title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from
Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned
ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness"
to the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land
since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's
brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of
stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings
between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.
222

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine
Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of

ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
include:

a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof,

the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within
the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant
to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior
informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable
areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant
settlers and organizations into their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have
access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air
space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral
domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and
intended for common and public welfare and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with

customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof
shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws
and traditions of the community concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property

rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/
IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to
redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to
develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the
right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of
migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of
the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in
accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the
ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or
property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in
keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the
ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the
Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural
Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural

resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by the
State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization
of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may
undertake the same in four (4) modes:

1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing

agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino

citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum

and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by
itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production,224joint
venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress,
may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the
large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial
assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale
mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or
heavy mining equipment."229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right
of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is
expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:

"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not
occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional
hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred
places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral
domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all other natural
resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as
belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section
7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the
Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands,

waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within
the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right
over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to
exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and
natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost
through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable
price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over
"lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of
those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and
jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not
necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on
or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and
natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the
land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that
speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later,
do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the
inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7
(b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied,
owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the
areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain
as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of
the natural resources found therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and

implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon
the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and
conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from
their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for
their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental
protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their
exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend
to the exploitation and development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and
share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At
the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within
their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization"
of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national
and customary laws.234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from
large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in
the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of
the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly
situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and
survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and
conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within
the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a
large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA

Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs
concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the
natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for
not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement
is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its
own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally,
That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to
safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights'
therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale
utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other
extensive use that require technology other than manual labor.236 The law recognizes
the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the
development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such
participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by
the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and
conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority
rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference.
Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that
owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over
the resources to whosoever itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of

the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong
to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that
the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in
relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources,
may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found
by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said
agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or
enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such
non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State
decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/
IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of
25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral

domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of
and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into
an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter
into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical,
local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement
with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to
automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it
is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is
nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale
development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must
undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates
that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their
exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs
who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have
traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the
following provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental

agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement.
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based
investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the
free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided,
further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing
agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any
project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation

of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject
of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification
shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and
the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-
compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or
suspend any project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be
issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any
ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other
agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or
license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/
IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been
obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources
that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found
within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE

INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism

stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus
during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa
brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies.
Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on
Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the
attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New
Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and

during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of
the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international
indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out
successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and
they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene.
This came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect
for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples'
environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal with the
situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the
international agenda.242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for
example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects
in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to
some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the
projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of
national unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of
ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international
standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist
orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples
to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic
and religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the
Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly
foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has
resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of
Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It
is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand
Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in
the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a
democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole
are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's
duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country
and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

IV. Biodiversity Conservation and Protected Areas Management

• National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act (R.A. No. 7586)
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF

NATIONAL INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM, DEFINING ITS SCOPE
AND COVERAGE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title – This Act shall be known and referred to as the "National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992″.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy – Cognizant of the profound impact of man’s

activities on all components of the natural environment particularly the effect of
increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and
recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural
biological and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with
biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant
and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino
people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the
Constitution.

It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, posses

common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of this area is
possible only through cooperation among national government, local government
and concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected
areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas

System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and
biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species
of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected areas".

Section 3. Categories – The following categories of protected areas are hereby

established:

a. Strict nature reserve;

b. Natural park;

c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;

e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;

f. Resource reserve;

g. Natural biotic areas; and

h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements

which the Philippine Government is a signatory.

Section 4. Definition of Terms – For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:

1. "National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS)" is the classification and

administration of all designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological
processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure
sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions
to the greatest extent possible;

2. "Protected Area" refers to identified portions of land and water set aside by reason
of their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and protected against destructive human exploitation;

3. "Buffer zones" are identified areas outside the boundaries of and immediately
adjacent to designated protected areas pursuant to Section 8 that need special
development control in order to avoid or minimize harm to the protected area;

4. "Indigenous cultural community" refers to a group of people sharing common

bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits and who
have since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized a territory;

5. "National park" refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness

character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of
exploitation except in conformity with approved management plan and set aside as
such exclusively to conserve the area or preserve the scenery, the natural and
historic objects, wild animals and plants therein and to provide enjoyment of these
features in such areas;

6. "Natural monuments" is a relatively small area focused on protection of small

features to protect or preserve nationally significant natural features on account of
their special interest or unique characteristics;

7. "Natural biotic area" is an area set aside to allow the way of life of societies living
in harmony with the environment to adapt to modern technology at their pace;

8. "Natural park" is a relatively large area not materially altered by human activity
where extractive resource uses are not allowed and maintained to protect
outstanding natural and scenic areas of national or international significance for
scientific, educational and recreational use;

9. "Protected landscapes/seascapes" are areas of national significance which are

characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing
opportunities for public enjoyment through the recreation and tourism within the
normal lifestyle and economic activity of these areas;

10. "Resource reserve" is an extensive and relatively isolated and uninhabited area
normally with difficult access designated as such to protect natural resources of the
area for future use and prevent or contain development activities that could affect the
resource pending the establishment of objectives which are based upon appropriate
knowledge and planning;

11. "Strict nature reserve" is an area possessing some outstanding ecosystem,

features and/or species of flora and fauna of national scientific importance
maintained to protect nature and maintain processes in an undisturbed state in order
to have ecologically representative examples of the natural environment available for
scientific study, environmental monitoring, education, and for the maintenance of
genetic resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state;

12. "Tenured migrant communities" are communities within protected areas which
have actually and continuously occupied such areas for five (5) years before the
designation of the same as protected areas in accordance with this Act and are
solely dependent therein for subsistence; and

13. "Wildlife sanctuary" comprises an area which assures the natural conditions
necessary to protect nationally significant species, groups of species, biotic
communities or physical features of the environment where these may require
specific human manipulations for their perpetuation.

Section 5. Establishment and Extent of the System – The establishment and

operationalization of the System shall involve the following:

1. All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside,

pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order
as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness area, strict
nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical
landmark, protected and managed landscape/seascape as well as identified virgin
forests before the effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as initial components
of the System. The initial components of the System shall be governed by existing
laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this Act;

2. Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall submit to the
Senate and the House of Representatives a map and legal descriptions or natural
boundaries of each protected area initially comprising the System. Such maps and
legal description shall, by virtue of this Act, constitute the official documentary
representation of the entire System, subject to such changes as Congress deems
necessary;

3. All DENR records pertaining to said protected areas, including maps and legal
descriptions or natural boundaries, copies of rules and regulations governing them,
copies of public notices of, and reports submitted to Congress regarding pending
additions, eliminations, or modifications shall be made available to the public. These
legal documents pertaining to protected areas shall also be available to the public in
the respective DENR Regional Offices, Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENROs) and Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENROs) where NIPAS areas are located;

4. Within three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall study and
review each area tentatively composing the System as to its suitability or non-
suitability for preservation as protected area and inclusion in the System according to
the categories established in Section 3 hereof and report its findings to the President
as soon as each study is completed. The study must include in each area:

1. A forest occupants survey;

2. An ethnographic study;

3. A protected area resource profile;

4. Land use plans done in coordination with the respective Regional Development
Councils; and

5. Such other background studies as will be sufficient bases for selection.

The DENR shall:

1. Notify the public of proposed action through publication in a newspaper of general

circulation, and such other means as the System deems necessary in the area or
areas in the vicinity of the affected land thirty (30) days prior to the public hearing;

i. Conduct public hearings at the locations nearest to the area affected;

ii. At least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing, advise all Local Government
Units (LGUs) in the affected areas, national agencies concerned, people’s
organizations and non-government organizations and invite such officials to submit
their views on the proposed action at the hearing not later than thirty (30) days
following the date of hearing; and

iii. Give due consideration to the recommendations at the public hearing; and provide
sufficient explanation for his recommendations contrary to the general sentiments
expressed in the public hearing;
2. Upon receipt of the recommendations of the DENR, the President shall issue a
presidential proclamation designating the recommended areas as protected areas
and providing for measures for their protection until such time when Congress shall
have enacted a law finally declaring such recommended areas as part of the
integrated protected area systems; and

3. Thereafter, the President shall send to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his recommendations with respect to the designations as protected
areas or reclassification of each area on which review has been completed, together
with maps and legal description of boundaries. The President, in his
recommendation, may propose the alteration of existing boundaries of any or all
proclaimed protected areas, addition of any contiguous area of public land of
predominant physical and biological value. Nothing contained herein shall limit the
President to propose, as part of his recommendation to Congress, additional areas
which have not been designated, proclaimed or set aside by law, presidential decree,
proclamation or executive orders as protected area/s.

Section 6. Additional Areas to be Integrated to the System. – Notwithstanding the

establishment of the initial component of the additional areas with outstanding
physical features, anthropological significance and biological diversity in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5d.

Section 7. Disestablishment as Protected Area. – When in the opinion of the DENR

a certain protected area should be withdrawn or disestablished, or its boundaries
modified as warranted by a study and sanctioned by the majority of the members of
the respective boards for the protected area as herein established in Section 11, it
shall, in turn, advice Congress. Disestablishment of a protected area under the
System or modification of its boundary shall take effect pursuant to an act of
Congress. Thereafter, said area shall revert to the category of public forests unless
otherwise classified by Congress: Provided however, that after disestablishment by
Congress, the Secretary may recommend the transfer of such disestablished area to
other government agencies to serve other priority programs of national interest.

Section 8. Buffer Zones. – For each protected area, there shall be established
peripheral buffer zones when necessary, in the same manner as Congress
establishes the protected area, to protect the same from activities that will directly
and indirectly harm it. Such buffer zones shall be included in the individual protected
area management plan that shall prepared for each protected area. The DENR shall
exercise its authority over protected areas as provided in this Act on such area and
designated as buffer zones.

Section 9. Management Plans. – There shall be a general management planning

strategy to serve as guide in formulating individual plans for each protected area.
The management planning strategy shall, at the minimum, promote the adoption and
implementation of innovative management techniques including if necessary, the
concept of zoning, buffer zone management for multiple use and protection, habitat
conservation and rehabilitation, diversity management, community organizing,
socioeconomic and scientific researches, site-specific policy development, pest
management, and fire control. The management planning strategy shall also provide
guidelines for the protection of indigenous cultural communities, other tenured
migrant communities and sites for close coordination between and among local
agencies of the Government as well as the private sector.

Each component area of the System shall be planned and administered to further
protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. A
management manual shall be formulated and developed which must contain the
following: an individual management plan prepared by three (3) experts, basic
background information, field inventory of the resources within the area, an
assessment of assets and limitations, regional interrelationships, particular objectives
for managing the area, appropriate division of the area into management zones, a
review of the boundaries of the area, and a design of the management programs.

Section 10. Administration and Management of the System. – The National

Integrated Protected Areas System is hereby placed under the control and
administration of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. For this
purpose, there is hereby created a division in the regional offices of the Department
to be called the Protected Areas and Wildlife Division in regions where protected
areas have been established, which shall be under the supervision of a Regional
Technical Director, and shall include subordinate officers, clerks, and employees as
may be proposed by the Secretary, duly approved by the Department of Budget and
Management, and appropriated by the Congress. The Service thus established shall
manage protected areas and promote the permanent preservation, to the greatest
extent possible of their natural conditions.

To carry out the mandate of this Act, the Secretary of the DENR is empowered to
perform any and all of the following acts:

a. To conduct studies on various characteristic features and conditions of the

different protected areas, using commonalities in their characteristics, classify and
define them into categories and prescribe permissible or prohibited human activities
in each category in the System;

b. To adopt and enforce a land use scheme and zoning plan in adjoining areas for
the preservation and control of activities that may threaten the ecological balance in
the protected areas;

c. To cause the preparation of and exercise the power to review all plans and
proposals for the management of protected areas;

d. To promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act;
e. To deputize field officers and delegate any of his powers under this Act and other
laws to expedite its implementation and enforcement;

f. To fix and prescribe reasonable NIPAS fees to be collected from government

agencies or any person, firm or corporation deriving benefits from the protected
areas;

g. To exact administrative fees and fines as authorized in Section 21 for violation of

guidelines, rules and regulations of this Act as would endanger the viability of
protected areas;

h. To enter into contracts and/or agreements with private entities or public agencies
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

i. To accept in the name of the Philippine Government and in behalf of NIPAS funds,
gifts or bequests of money for immediate disbursements or other property in the
interest of the NIPAS, its activities or its services;

j. To call on any agency or instrumentality of the Government as well as academic

institutions, non-government organizations and the private sector as may be
necessary to accomplish the objectives and activities of the System;

k. To submit an annual report to the President of the Philippines and to Congress on

the status of protected areas in the country;

l. To establish a uniform marker of the System, including an appropriate and

distinctive symbol for each category in the System, in consultation with appropriate
government agencies and public and private organizations;

m. To determine the specification of the class, type and style of buildings and other
structures to be constructed in protected areas and the materials to be used;

n. Control the construction, operation and maintenance of roads, trails, waterworks,

sewerage, fire protection, and sanitation systems and other public utilities within the
protected area;

o. Control occupancy of suitable portions of the protected area and resettle outside
of said area forest occupants therein, with the exception of the members of
indigenous communities area; and

p. To perform such other functions as may be directed by the President of the

Philippines, and to do such acts as may be necessary or incidental to the
accomplishment of the purpose and objectives of the System.

Section 11. Protected Area Management Board. – A Protected Area Management

Board for each of the established protected area shall be created and shall be
composed of the following: The Regional Executive Director under whose jurisdiction
the protected area is located; one (1) representative from the autonomous regional
government, if applicable; the Provincial Development Officer; one (1) representative
from the municipal government; one (1) representative from each barangay covering
the protected area; one (1) representative from each tribal community, if applicable;
and, at least three (3) representatives from non-government organizations/local
community organizations, and if necessary, one (1) representative from other
departments or national government agencies involved in protected area
management.

The Board shall, by a majority vote, decide the allocations for budget, approve
proposals for funding, decide matters relating to planning, peripheral protection and
general administration of the area in accordance with the general management
strategy. The members of the Board shall serve for a term of five (5) years without
compensation, except for actual and necessary traveling and subsistence expenses
incurred in the performance of their duties. They shall be appointed by the Secretary
of the DENR as follows:

a. A member who shall be appointed to represent each local government down to

barangay level whose territory or portion is included in the protected area. Each
appointee shall be the person designated by the head of such LGU, except for the
Provincial Development Officer who shall serve ex officio;

b. A member from non-government organizations who shall be endorsed by heads of

organizations which are preferably based in the area or which have established and
recognized interest in protected areas;

c. The RED/s in the region/s where such protected area lies shall sit as ex officio
member of the Board and shall serve as adviser/s in matters related to the technical
aspect of management of the area; and

d. The RED shall act as chairman of the Board. When there are two (2) or more
REDs in the Board, the Secretary shall designate one (1) of them to be the
Chairman. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

Section 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. – Proposals for activities which are
outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an
environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and
the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required

Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to
be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will
minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial action when
appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.
Section 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights Over Them. – Ancestral lands and
customary rights and interest arising shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR
shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected
areas: Provided, that the DENR shall have so power to evict indigenous communities
from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent:
Provided, however, That all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said
communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by
members of concerned indigenous community.

Section 14. Survey for Energy Resources. – Consistent with the policies declared in
Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks,
may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on
energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to
surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program
approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the
public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any
exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be
allowed only through a law passed by Congress.

Section 15. Areas Under the Management of Other Departments and Government
Instrumentalities. – Should there be protected areas, or portions thereof, under the
jurisdiction of government instrumentalities other than the DENR, such jurisdiction
shall, prior to the passage of this Act, remain in the said department or government
instrumentality; Provided, That the department or government instrumentality
exercising administrative jurisdiction over said protected area or a portion thereof
shall coordinate with the DENR in the preparation of its management plans, upon the
effectivity of this Act.

Section 16. Integrated Protected Areas Fund. – There is hereby established a trust
fund to be known as Integrated Protected Areas (IPAS) Fund for purposes of
financing projects of the System. The IPAS may solicit and receive donations,
endowments, and grants in the form of contributions, and such endowment shall be
exempted from income or gift taxes and all other taxes, charges or fees imposed by
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

All incomes generated from the operation of the System or management of wild flora
and fauna shall accrue to the Fund and may be utilized directly by the DENR for the
above purpose. These incomes shall be derived from:

a. Taxes from the permitted sale and export of flora and fauna and other resources
from protected areas;

b. Proceeds from lease of multiple use areas;

c. Contributions from industries and facilities directly benefiting from the protected
area; and
d. Such other fees and incomes derived from the operation of the protected area.
Disbursements from the Funds shall be made solely for the protection, maintenance,
administration, and management of the System, and duly approved projects
endorsed by the PAMBs, in the amounts authorized by the DENR.

Section 17. Annual Report to Congress. – At the opening of each session of

Congress, the DENR shall report to the President, for transmission to Congress, on
the status of the System, regulation in force and other pertinent information, together
with recommendations.

Section 18. Field Officers. – All officials, technical personnel and forest guards
employed in the integrated protected area service or all persons deputized by the
DENR, upon recommendation of the Management Board shall be considered as field
officers and shall have the authority to investigate and search premises and buildings
and make arrests in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure for the violation
of laws and regulations relating to the protected areas. Persons arrested shall be
brought to the nearest police precinct for investigation.

Nothing herein mentioned shall be construed as preventing regular law enforcers

and police officers from arresting any person in the act of violating said laws and
regulations.

Section 19. Special Prosecutors. – The Department of Justice shall designate

special prosecutors to prosecute violations of laws, rules and regulations in protected
areas.

Section 20. Prohibited Acts. – Except as may be allowed by the nature of their
categories and pursuant to rules and regulations governing the same, the following
acts are prohibited within protected areas:

a. Hunting, destroying, disturbing, or mere possession of any plants or animals or

products derived therefrom without a permit from the Management Board;

b. Dumping of any waste products detrimental to the protected area, or to the plants
and animals or inhabitants therein;

c. Use of any motorized equipment without a permit from the Management Board;

d. Mutilating, defacing or destroying objects of natural beauty, or objects of interest to

cultural communities (of scenic value);

e. Damaging and leaving roads and trails in a damaged condition;

f. Squatting, mineral locating, or otherwise occupying any land;

g. Constructing or maintaining any kind of structure, fence or enclosures, conducting

any business enterprise without a permit;
h. Leaving in exposed or unsanitary conditions refuse or debris, or depositing in
ground or in bodies of water; and

i. Altering, removing destroying or defacing boundary marks or signs.

Section 21. Penalties. – Whoever violates this Act or any rules and regulations
issued by the Department pursuant to this Act or whoever is found guilty by a
competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the preceding section shall be
fined in the amount of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing
damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6)
years, or both, as determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area requires
rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the court, the offender shall be required
to restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages: Provided, further, that
court shall order the eviction of the offender from the land and the forfeiture in favor
of the Government of all minerals, timber or any species collected or removed
including all equipment, devices and firearms used in connection therewith, and any
construction or improvement made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an
association or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible for
the act of his employees and laborers: Provided, finally, that the DENR may impose
administrative fines and penalties consistent with this Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. – If any part or section of this Act is declared
unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the other parts or sections of this
Act.

Section 23. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with any provisions of this Act shall be deemed
repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 24. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

• Mt. Kanlaon Natural Park Law (R.A. 9154)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9154 August 11, 2001

AN ACT ESTABLISHING MT. KANLA-ON LOCATED IN THE CITIES OF BAGO, LA

CARLOTA, AND SAN CARLOS AND IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF LA
CASTELLANA AND MURCIA, ALL IN THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
AND IN THE CITY OF CANLAON AND MUNICIPALITY OF VALLEHERMOSO,
BOTH IN THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, AS A PROTECTED AREA AND
A PERIPHERAL AREA AS BUFFER ZONE PROVIDING FOR ITS MANAGEMENT,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
 ARTICLE I

TITLE, POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the Mt. Kanla-on Natural Park (MKNP)
Act of 2001. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. - Considering the diversity of Mt. Kanla-on's biological

resources and its aesthetic, socio-cultural, economic and ecological importance to the
Island of Negros, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure its protection
and conservation including its communities of people and their culture and way of life
insofar as they are in harmony with nature. The protection and conservation of MKNP
shall be pursued through sustainable and participatory development, advancing and
protecting the interests of its legitimate inhabitants, and honoring customary laws in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas
System (NIPAS) Act of 1992, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) of 1997, and international conventions to which the Philippines is a
signatory.chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - The following terms are hereby defined for purposes of
this Act:

(a) "Bioprospecting" shall refer to the research, collection, and utilization of biological
and genetic resources for purposes of applying the knowledge derived therefrom for
scientific and/or commercial purposes.

(b) "Commercial" shall mean involving market sale in volume or value in excess of
that required to maintain basic subsistence for workers and their dependents.

(c) "DENR" shall refer to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

(d) "Exotic Species" shall refer to species or subspecies that do not naturally occur
within the biogeographic region of the MKNP at present or in historical time.

(e) "Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs)" shall refer to

the indigenous peoples as defined in the IPRA, specifically, the Atis and Bukidnons of
the MKNP.

(f) "Natural Park" is a relatively large area not materially altered by human activity,
where extractive resource uses are not allowed, and maintained to protect outstanding
natural and scenic areas of national or international significance for scientific,
educational, and recreational use.

(g) "Nongovernment Organization (NGO)" shall refer to any civic, developmental,

environmental or philantrophic non-stock, non-profit organization, duly registered,
having by-laws, democratically-elected representation, and multi-sectoral in character.

(h) "Non-Renewable Resources" shall refer to those resources found within the MKNP,
the natural replenishment rate of which is not known.

(i) "PAMB" shall refer to the Protected Area Management Board, as provided herein.
(j) "PASu" shall refer to the Protected Area Superintendent, as provided herein.

(k) "People's Organization (PO)" shall refer to any group of people formed to advance
the interests of the sector they represent.

(l) "Protected Species" shall refer to any plant or animal declared protected under
Philippine laws. These shall include all species listed under the Convention of
International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) and all its Annexes, the Bonn
Convention on Migratory Animals, those specified under the redlist categories of the
International Conservation of Nature (UCN), or any plant or animal which the PAMB
may deem necessary for conservation and preservation in the MKNP.

(m) "Tenured Migrant" shall refer to any person who has actually and continuously
occupied an area of five (5) years prior to its designation as part of a protected area
and is usually dependent on that area for subsistence.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 4. Declaration and Scope. - Pursuant to and in accordance with the NIPAS Act,
Mt. Kanla-on in the Island of Negros is hereby declared and established as a protected
area under the category of a natural park.

The boundaries of the Mt. Kanla-on Natural Park are hereby described as follows:

Beginning at a point marked "1" on the map which is marked on plan N.P. or P.B.M.
No. 4 between Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental under Pontevedra Cadastre No.
60, B.L. Case No. 2 of Negros Oriental;

Xxx

of beginning at plan NP or P.B.M. No. 4 between Negros Occidental and Negros

Orriental recorded in Pontevedra Cadastre No. 60, B.L. Case No. 2, Negros Orriental,
containing an approximate total land area of 24,388 hectares. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 5. Establishment of a Buffer Zone. - An area for the exploration development and
utilization of geothermal energy resources as well as other exploration activities is
hereby established as the buffer zone with the following technical description:

Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S 6624'43.616"E, 2591.09 meters

from PBM no 29, Bago City;

Xxx

Containing an area of one hundred sixty-nine (169) hectares, more or less. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Any geothermal exploration for or development of energy or mineral resources within

the MKNP shall not be allowed except by an Act of Congress. Moreover, permits for
geothermal activities shall be pursuant to relevant forestry and environmental
regulations: Provided, That areas within the buffer zone which shall not be used
directly for the development and utilization of geothermal energy shall remain under
the control and jurisdiction of the PAMB.

The proponent of the geothermal project shall contribute to the Integrated Protected
Are Fund (IPAF) to be established by the DENR pursuant to the NIPAS Act and
pertinent DENR rules and regulations. Moreover, the PAMB of the MKNP shall be
represented in the multi-partite environmental monitoring committee for the
geothermal operation undertaken within the buffer zone subject to Presidential Decree
No. 1586 or the Environmental Impact Statement System, DENR Administrative Order
96-37, Series of 1996 (Strengthening the Implementation of the Environmental
Impact Statement System), and pertinent DENR rules and regulations.

ARTICLE II

MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND ZONING

Sec. 6. Management of the MKNP. - The management and administration of the MKNP
shall be vested with the PAMB: Provided, That the management of zones to be
established within the MKNP shall be consultative and participatory.chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 7. Local Government Units. - Local government units shall participate in the
management of the MKNP through representation in the PAMB. To allow the
integration of the objectives of the MKNP with the development plans for the Island of
Negros, the local government units shall ensure that local ordinances relating to the
environment including the allocation of funds for environmental programs are
consistent with this Act and the Management Plan as herein provided. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 8. Management Plan. - In order to achieve the objectives of this Act, there shall
be a Management Plan which shall provide a long-term basic framework on the
management of the MKNP, govern all activities within the MKNP, and serve as guide in
the preparation of its annual operations and budget. The Management Plan shall
identify the allowed uses for each zone. For specialized uses such as academic and
scientific purposes, consultations shall be conducted by a committee of four (4) PAMB
representatives and four (4) representatives from concerned LGUs: Provided, That the
PAMB representatives shall not come from any of the involved LGUs. The Management
Plan shall be consistent with the nature of the MKNP as a protected area under the
category of a natural park.

Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the PASu shall prepare the
Management Plan in accordance with the General Management Planning Strategy as
provided for in the NIPAS Act in coordination with the appropriate officers of the
DENR, local communities, and experts who may offer their services. It shall contain,
among others, the following:

(a) A period of applicability for thirty (30) years subject to periodic review every five
(5) years;cralaw

(b) Key management issues; cralaw

(c) Goals and objectives of management in support of Sec. 2 hereof; cralaw

(d) Site management strategies; cralaw

(e) Zoning in accordance with Sec. 9 hereof; cralaw

(f) Management programs to include enforcement of laws, habitat and wildlife
management, ecotourism, sustainable use management, infrastructure development
and maintenance, fire prevention and pest control; cralaw

(g) Mechanisms for protection of ICCs/IPs and tenured migrants in the exercise of
their rights;
cralaw

(h) Sustainable and non-destructive livelihood activities; cralaw

(i) Regulations in furtherance of the preservation and conservation objectives of the

MKNP as a protected area such as the issuance of permits, resource-use restrictions,
among others; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Management Plan shall be reviewed and adopted by the PAMB and certified to by
the DENR Secretary that it conforms to all laws, rules and regulations issued by the
DENR. The Management Plan shall not be revised nor modified without prior
consultation with the PAMB and must be in accordance with the procedure herein set
forth.

The Management Plan shall be periodically reviewed and shall be updated every five
(5) years pursuant to the NIPAS Act.

A year before the expiration of the current Management Plan, the PASu shall cause the
publication of notices for comments and suggestions on the successor plan in a
newspaper of local circulation and the posting of such notices in the provincial,
municipal and barangay halls of the local government units comprising the MKNP, and
in three (3) other conspicuous areas frequented by the public within the MKNP. Two
public hearings on the same calendar year shall be conducted on the successor plan.
The proposed Management Plan shall be made available for public perusal at the Office
of the PASu.

The Management Plan shall be prepared in English, Tagalog, Ilonggo, and Cebuano,
plainly written, and available for public persual at the office of the PASu.
chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 9. Zoning. - Zones shall be established within the MKNP giving primary
consideration to its protection and conservation. Zoning shall also take into account
the tenurial and livelihood concerns of communities to ensure the efficient protection
of habitats, fragile ecosystems, and unique areas.

The establishment and management of zones must involve the community concerned
by undertaking such steps as dialogue consultations, and land and resource-use
mapping with thee aid of Geographic Information System (GIS) and the latest
technologies. Zones shall be demarcated on the ground and indicated on maps with
the participation of communities, local government units, and other stockholders.

ARTICLE III

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS, ROLES, AND FUNCTIONS OF MANAGEMENT

Sec. 10. Institutional Mechanisms. - (A) The PAMB shall be the policymaking body of
the MKNP. It shall be composed of:
(1) The Regional Executive Directors (RED) of DENR Regions VI and VII, with the RED
of Region VI as PAMB chair; cralaw

(2) The Governors of Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental, or their respective duly
authorized regular representatives; cralaw

(3) The mayors of municipalities and cities with territory within the MKNP, or their
respective duly authorized regular representatives; cralaw

(4) All barangay captains of barangays with territory within MKNP, or their respective
duly authorized regular representatives; cralaw

(5) Three (3) representatives from NGOs based in Negros Occidental which are
accredited with the DENR and the LGU and with tangible projects at the time of their
membership in the PAMB; cralaw

(6) A PO representative chosen from among themselves for each municipality and city
with territory within the MKNP: Provided, That the POs are accredited with the DENR
and the LGU and with tangible projects at the time of their membership in the PAMB; cralaw

(7) The Provincial Planning and Development Officers (PPDO) of Negros Occidental and
Negros Oriental;cralaw

(8) An ICC/IP representative for each tribal community within the MKNP; and

(9) A duly authorized representative with environmental expertise of the Philippine

National Oil Company Energy Development Corporation (PNOC EDC). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(B) There shall be an Executive Committee (Execom) within the PAMB to whom the
PAMB may delegate some of its powers and functions. It shall be composed of:

(1) The RED or DENR Region VI as chairman; cralaw

(2) The Governors of Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental, or their respective duly
authorized, regular representatives; cralaw

(3) Two (2) mayor representatives, to be chosen from among themselves, or their
respective duly authorized, regular representatives; cralaw

(4) Two (2) barangay captain representatives, one each from Negros Occidental and
Negros Oriental, to be chosen from among themselves; or their respective authorized,
regular representatives; cralaw

(5) One (1) from the NGO representatives; cralaw

(6) One (1) from the PO representatives; cralaw

(7) One (1) from the ICC/IP representatives; and

(8) One (1) from the PNOC EDC. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(C) Except for government officials who shall serve ex officio, every PAMB member
shall serve for a term of five (5) years: Provided, That he/she remains connected with
the sector he/she is supposed to represent: Provided, further, That the term of office
of an NGO/PO representative in the PAMB shall be conterminous with the duration or
existence of the organization's projects within the MKNP. Whenever a vacancy occurs
during the term of a nongovernment PAMB member, a new member shall be chosen in
the same manner as the original selection process: Provided, That he/she shall only
serve for the remaining term.

(D) The PAMB en banc shall hold regular meetings at least once a year. The PAMB
Execom shall hold regular meetings at least once every trimester. Special meetings
may be called upon proper notice as the need arises.

(E) PAMB members shall be entitled to reimbursement of actual travelling expenses

incurred in attending the meetings of the PAMB or its committees subject to existing
accounting and budgeting rules and regulations. These expenses shall be included in
the MKNP budget. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 11. Functions of the PAMB. - The PAMB shall decide by a majority vote and shall
have the following powers and functions:

(a) Issue all rules and regulations to prohibit and regulate acts that may be prejudicial
to the MKNP pursuant to the policy declarations herein set forth; cralaw

(b) Issue all necessary permits within the MKNP in accordance with the Management
Plan and pertinent laws and DENR forestry and environmental rules and regulations; cralaw

(c) Recommend to the DENR Secretary the criteria on fees for the issuance of permits
for activities regulated by this Act or the Management Plan; cralaw

(d) Evaluate and approve project or program proposals to be implemented within the
MKNP; cralaw

(e) Adopt rules of procedures for the conduct of business, including the creation of
committees to whom its powers may be delegated; cralaw

(f) Approve the Management Plan and oversee the Office of the PASu; cralaw

(g) Deputize though the PASu, interested individuals for the enforcement of the laws,
rules and regulations governing conduct within the MKNP and prescribe the necessary
qualifications therefor; cralaw

(h) Accept donations, approve proposals for funding, budget allocations and exercise
accountability over all funds that may accrue to the MKNP; cralaw

(i) Coordinate with appropriate agencies of the government, such as the regulation of
flight patterns of aircraft going over the area in terms of altitudinal limits and
emissions; and

(j) Retain legal counsel, either on a permanent or temporary basis, to defend cases
against the PAMB, the PASu staff and deputized individuals whenever they are used in
connection with the performance of their duties under this Act, and to assist in other
PAMB legal matters. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The DENR, through the RED of Region VI, shall ensure that the PAMB acts within the
scope of its powers and functions. In case of conflict between administrative orders
issued by the DENR pursuant to the NIPAS Act and the rules and regulations or
resolutions issued by the PAMB, the DENR Secretary shall decide whether to apply the
rule or withdraw its application from the MKNP. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 12. The Office of the PASu. - There shall be an Office of the Protected Areas
Superintendent within the DENR to be headed by the PASu who shall serve as the
Chief Operating Officer of the MKNP. The PASu shall possess the qualifications required
for appointment to the position of Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) in the DENR. The PASu shall be directly accountable to the PAMB and
the RED of Region VI. The PASu shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Prepare the Management Plan as herein provided; cralaw

(b) Serve as head of the Secretariat for the PAMB with the duty to provide the PAMB
with all the information necessary for it to make appropriate decisions; cralaw

(c) Hire and supervise the necessary personnel to support operations which shall be
included in the annual budget of the DENR; cralaw

(d) Establish a productive partnership with the local community, including groups
interested in the achievement of the goals and objectives of the MKNP, and in the
planning, protection and management thereof; cralaw

(e) Develop and implement a park information, education and visitor programs; cralaw

(f) Enforce laws, rules and regulations relevant to the MKNP and assist in the
prosecution of offenses;cralaw

(g) Monitor all activities within the MKNP for conformity with the Management Plan;
and

(h) Perform such other functions as the PAMB may assign.

ARTICLE IV

ANCESTRAL LANDS/DOMAINS AND TENURED MIGRANTS

Sec. 13. Ancestral Lands and Domains. - The rights of ICCs/IPs in the MKNP to their
ancestral lands and domains shall be recognized subject to existing and prior property
rights. Traditional property regimes exercised by ICCs/IPs in accordance with their
customary laws shall govern the relationship of all individuals within their communities
with respect to all land and other resources found within their ancestral lands and
domains.

The provisions of this Act shall be construed liberally in favor of the ICCs/IPs in
accordance with the preservation and conservation objectives of the MKNP. Nothing
herein shall be construed to impair, diminish or derogate any prior or existing right
currently enjoyed by ICCs/IPs under existing laws. chanrobles virtualaw library
Sec. 14. Tenured Migrants and Transient Farmers. - Tenured migrants are those
members of households that have actually and continuously occupied by MKNP since
June 1, 1987 and are solely dependent on the MKNP for their livelihood. For purposes
of official documentation of rights and extent of occupation within the MKNP, the
tenured migrant household shall be issued a tenurial instrument over such areas as
have been occupied or cultivated but not to exceed a maximum of three (3) hectares.
If despite consideration paid to current practices, areas occupied by tenured migrants
are designated as zones in which no occupation or other activities are allowed,
provisions for their transfer to multiple-use zones shall be accomplished using
humanitarian considerations.

To effectivity provide a social fence to prevent encroachment into the MKNP, the
tenurial instruments to be issued pursuant to this Act must be community-based,
limited solely to multiple-use zones, promote clustering, and comply with the zoning
and Management Plans, as provided herein.

In no case shall the tenurial instruments or the rights and interests therein be
transferred, sold, leased, encumbered, or made as a collateral, security or joint
venture capital, otherwise it shall be void: Provided, That said rights can only be
transferred to direct descendants.

Any violation of the terms and conditions of the tenurial instruments or any provision
of this Act or abandonment by a tenured migrant shall constitute sufficient ground for
he revocation of his/her tenurial right.

Upon cancellation of a tenured migrant instrument for cause or by voluntary surrender

of rights, the PASu shall take immediate steps to rehabilitate the area in order to
return it to its natural state prior to the cultivation or other act by the tenured
migrant.

Occupants who do not qualify as tenured migrants but have been occupying areas of
the park prior to the enactment of this Act shall be relocated to the multiple-use areas
or available alienable and disposable (A and D) lands of the public domain that are
proximal to their original abode. Occupants who shall be relocated within the multiple-
use zones shall quality for usufruct use while those relocated to A and D areas may
apply for ownership titles. Park occupants shall be given priority in the government's
relocation programs.

ARTICLE V

PROHIBITED ACTS

Sec. 15. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be the prohibitions and penalties
applicable within the MKNP:

(A) A fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) and imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years shall be imposed upon any
person who:
(1) Hunts, collects, destroys, traps, disturbs or possesses anywhere within the MKNP
any wild plant or animal or product derived therefrom without prior PAMB permit.

(2) Possesses without a permit from PAMB any wild plant or animal or product derived
therefrom outside the MKNP or any zone of MKNP where the specie is not endemic.

(3) Cuts, gathers, collects or removes timber or other forest products as well as
undertakes any activity not compatible with the use of the respective zones within the
MKNP without prior PAMB permit: Provided, That any permit issued shall be valid for
only (1) month from the date of issue either to tenured migrants within sustainable
monitored and controlled quotas or for scientific purposes necessary for protected
area management in accordance with existing guidelines, and outside the strict
protection zones.

(4) Establishes or introduces exotic species within the MKNP with allelopathic effect or
those detrimental to endemic species, or without prior PAMB permit.

(5) Engages in kaingin or in any activity that causes forest fire inside the MKNP.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(B) A fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) and/or imprisonment of not less than six
(6) months but no more than six (6) years and the restoration and rehabilitation of
the damage shall be imposed upon any person who:

(1) Violates the Management Plan, or any resolution issued by the PAMB.

(2) Vandalizes, mutilates, transports, destroys, excavates, or in any manner

intentionally damages any natural formation or object of natural beauty inside the
MKNP, or the burial or religious sites including artifacts and other objects belonging to
ICCs/IPs.

(3) Dumps, burns or otherwise disposes of any substance deleterious to the

ecosystem, plants and animals, or human inhabitants in the protected area or
committing the same in buffer and multiple use areas without appropriate authority or
permit.

(4) Uses or possesses a motorized equipment anywhere within the Strict Protection
Zone of the MKNP without a prior permit from the PAMB.

(5) Uses or possesses chainsaws and band saws without prior PAMB permit; Provided,
That permits may only be issued for multiple-use zones.

(6) Grazing or raising of poultry and other livestock for commercial purpose within the
MKNP: Provided, that existing grazing or poultry and other livestock farms within the
MKNP shall be phased out within five (5) years.

(7) Damaging or leaving roads and trails in damaged condition.

(8) Occupies any portion of land inside the MKNP without a prior PAMB permit.
Clearing, construction of residence or any introduction of improvements shall
constitute prima facie evidence of occupation or settlement.
(9) Altering, removing, destroying or defacing boundaries, marks or signs.

(10) Constructs and maintains a building, edifice or any kind of structure or conducts
any business enterprise within the MKNP without prior PAMB permit.

(11) Enters he MKNP without prior PAMB permit for purposes of trekking, mountain
climbing, camping, spelunking, and the like.

(12) Conducts bioprospecting within the MKNP without prior PAMB permit in violation
of existing guidelines.

(13) Engages in treasure hunting within the MKNP. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(C) A fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) and/or imprisonment of not less
than six (6) months but not more than six (6) years shall be imposed upon any public
officer, or officer of law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office shall maliciously
refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall
tolerate the commission of offenses. Conviction of this offense shall also carry the
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.

(D) Any provision to the contrary notwithstanding, the commission of any unlawful act
enumerated under Sec. 15(A) herein shall carry the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day but not more than twenty (20) years and
a fine or not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) in addition to the accessory penalties provided in the
immediately succeeding paragraph, in case the species involved is a protected species
as defined herein. Furthermore any citizen may institute the necessary charge against
the offender for commission of the acts enumerated under Sec. 15(A) involving
protected species.

(E) A conviction under this Sec. shall likewise carry the penalty of eviction from the
MKNP, payment of damages for rehabilitation and restoration, and the forfeiture of all
equipment, device weapon/s used in the commission of the offense as well as the
protected area resources caught in the possession of the accused. In case the offender
is not a citizen of the Philippines, he/she shall be immediately deported to his/her
country of origin after service of his/her sentence. If the offender is an association or
corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible for the act of his/
her employees and laborers.

(F) The PASu or his/her duly deputized personnel may arrest even without a warrant
any person who has committed or is committing in his/her presence any of the
offenses defined in this Sec. . He/she may also seize and confiscate in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense and the
resources caught in the possession of the offender and file the necessary charges
therefor: Provided, That the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties in
accordance with law.

(G) In case of conviction, the penalty consisting of fines and damages shall directly
accrue to the IPAF as provided therein. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 16. Special Prosecutors. - Within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act,
the Department of Justice shall designate a special prosecutor to whom all cases of
violation of laws, rules and regulations in the MKNP shall be assigned. Such special
prosecutor shall coordinate with the PAMB and the PASu in the performance of his/her
duties and assist in the training of wardens and rangers in arrest and criminal
procedure.

ARTICLE VI

PROCEEDS AND FEES

Sec. 17. Integrated Protected Areas Fund. - There is hereby established a trust fund
to be known as the Integrated Protected Areas Fund (IPAF) for purposes of financing
projects of the system. All incomes generated from the operation of the system or
management of wild flora and fauna in the MKNP shall accrue to the Fund. These
income shall be derived from proceeds from fees from permitted sale and export of
flora and fauna and other resources from the protected area and its buffer zones other
than protected species as may be set by the DENR and the PAMB, proceeds from lease
of multiple-use areas, contributions from industries and facilities directly benefiting
from the protected area and such other fees and incomes derived from the operation
of the protected area.

The Fund may be augmented by grants, donations, endowments from various sources,
domestic or foreign for purposes related to their functions: Provided, That the Fund
shall be deposited as a special account in the national treasury and disbursements
therefrom shall be made solely for the protection, maintenance administration, and
management of the system, and duly approved projects endorsed by the PAMB in
accordance with existing accounting and budgeting rules and regulations; Provided,
further, That no amount shall be disbursed for the operating expenses of the
Department and other concerned agencies.

Current sources of revenue of the local government units shall excluded from the IPAF.

The PAMB shall have the power to disburse the IPAF. Twenty-five per cent (25%) of
the IPAF shall be for the use of the national government for the support of the
National Integrated Protected Areas System: Provided, That twenty-five per cent
(25%) thereof shall be allocated to the local government units comprising the MKNP.

ARTICLE VII

EXISTING FACILITIES

Sec. 18. Existing Facilities within the MKNP. - Within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act, all commercial facilities existing within the boundaries of the
MKNP with a total capitalization of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) shall submit to the PAMB through the PASu a sworn statement
containing the following information:

(a) Potential for disbursement of protected species and other habitats, reproductive
cycles, nesting and feeding grounds and migratory paths; cralaw

(b) Noise levels at all stages of operation; cralaw

(c) Emissions and effluent at all stages of operation; cralaw

(d) Energy requirements and sources of energy; cralaw

(e) Water supply requirements and sources of water; cralaw

(f) Volume of resources extracted from the MKNP; cralaw

(g) Future plans for the next five (5) years.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Based on these submissions, the PAMB, with the assistance of the DENR, shall
determine whether the existence of such facility and its future plan and operation will
be detrimental to the MKNP.

Failure to submit the required information shall constitute a violation of this Act and
subject to the penalties imposed under Sec. 15(B) hereof. The PAMB may prescribe
further conditions for the operation of the facility to ensure that it does not contradict
the management objectives of the MKNP. Without prejudice to the filing of the
necessary case under Sec. 15(B) hereof, if any of such conditions is violated, an
administrative fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) for every day of violation shall
be imposed upon the owners of said facility but not to exceed a total of Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00). At anytime whenever necessary, the PAMB, through
the PASu or other government entities, shall cause the cessation and demolition of the
facility at the cost of its owners.

Existing facilities that rely heavily on resources within the MKNP which are allowed to
remain within the MKNP may be charged reasonable fees or subject to reasonable
conditions by the PAMB. All incomes derived from such fees shall accrue to the IPAF.

ARTICLE VIII

UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES

Sec. 19. Utilization of Resources. - Except for protected species or whenever

detrimental to the ecosystem, use of resources derived from the MKNP by tenured
migrants and ICCs/IPs for their domestic needs or for their subsistence shall not be
restricted.

Livelihood activities requiring the use of resources derived from the MKNP shall be
allowed only when sustainable consistent with the Management Plan and only upon
prior PAMB approval. Only non-timber products can be used for livelihood purposes.

No exploration, exploitation or utilization of non-renewable resources within the MKNP

for commercial purposes or by non-tenured migrants or non-ICCs/IPs shall be allowed.
Commercial utilization of resources by tenured migrants and ICCs/IPs shall be allowed
only upon prior PAMB approval and in accordance with the Management Plan.

Commercial exploitation of water resources within the MKNP shall require prior PAMB
approval, must be in accordance with the Management Plan and should undergo the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System.
 ARTICLE X

TRANSITORY AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 20. Appropriations. - The Secretary of the DENR shall include in its program the
implementation to this Act, the funding of which shall be charged against the
Integrated Protected Areas Fund authorized under Sec. 17 hereof and from the
appropriations authorized under the annual General Appropriations Act. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 21. Construction. - The provisions of this Act shall be construed liberally in favor
of tenured migrants and ICCs/IPs and with due consideration to the protection of
biodiversity. The NIPAS Act shall be suppletory in the implementation of this Act. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 22. Separability Clause. - If any part or section of this Act is declared
unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the other parts or sections hereof. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 23. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the organization of a new PAMB in

accordance with this Act, the incumbent PAMB members shall continue to hold office
until the new PAMB has been convened within three (3) months from the effectivity of
this Act. The current staff comprising the PASu Office shall be retained in the Office of
the PASu created herein.

Within three (3) months from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR in coordination with
the PAMB, the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives, the
Senate Committee on Environment and Natural Resources, and the concerned district
representatives or their representatives shall undertake the preparation of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of this Act. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 24. Repealing Clause. - All laws, proclamations, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 25. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall be translated in English, Filipino, Cebuano,
and Ilonggo and shall be published once every week for three (3) executive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation which is readily available in the areas in and around
the MKNP. This Act shall likewise be simultaneously posted in the appropriate language
in a conspicuous place in the provincial, municipal and barangay halls within the area
as well as in three (3) other places frequented by the public. Fifteen (15) days after
the last publication and posting, this Act shall have full force and effect.

• Sagay Marine Reserve Law (R.A. 9106)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9106 April 14, 2001

AN ACT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF SAGAY MARINE

RESERVE, DEFINING ITS SCOPE COVERAGE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the "Sagay Marine Reserve
Law."

Section 2. Establishment. - There is hereby established as part of the National

Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586 protected
landscapes and seascapes in the City of Sagay, Province of Negros Occidental to be
known as the Sagay Marine Reserve, hereinafter referred to as Reserve.

Section 3. Scope. - The Reserve shall be located at 11°0'59"N and 123°29'E

comprising the islands of Molocaboc, Molocaboc Diut, Matabas and Suyac, and their
surrounding reefs as well as the reefs of Carbin, Macahulom and Panal, and the
coastal waters of barangays Himoga-an Baybay, Old Sagay, Taba-ao, Bulanon,
Molocaboc and Vito, all in the City of Sagay, Province of Negros Occidental. More
particularly, the Reserve shall have the following technical description:

NORTHING

EASTING

10°57'28"

123°21'42"

11°7'35"

123°26'37"

11°6'55"

123°28'13"

10°56'39"

123°36'50"

5
10°54'23"

123°30'45"

10°56'16"

123°30'37"

10°56'26"

123°30'4"

10°56'7"

123°28'59"

10°55'19"

123°28'11"

10

10°56'11"

123°26'52"

11

10°57'28"

123°24'19"

12

10°56'37"

123°23'35"

13

10°57'30"

123°23'16"
14

10°57'41"

123°22'14"containing

an area of 32,000 hectares, more or less.

Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) shall mark the boundaries of the Reserve on the
ground and at sea with visible and permanent markers and shall thereafter see to it
that the same are maintained.

Section 4. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms are
defined as follows:

(a)"Buffer zones" are identified areas outside the boundaries of and immediately
adjacent to the Reserve that need special development and control in order to avoid
or minimize harm to the Reserve.

(b)"Ecotourism" is a kind of tourism wherein no damage to the ecology is sustained

by the influx of visitors to the Reserve.

(c)"Fish production" refers to the capacity of the species found within the Reserve to
multiply to achieve a certain density offish population.

(d)"Management plan" is the plan described in Section 8(1) thereof.

(e)"Management manual" is the manual relating to the management of the Reserve

described in Section 8(2) thereof.

(f)"Maximum sustainable yield" is the greatest amount of fish and fish products taken
or harvested from within the Reserve without affecting sustainability.

(g)"Multiple-use zones" shall refer to areas where settlement, traditional or

sustainable activities and other income-generating or livelihood activities may be
allowed to the extent prescribed in the management plan.

(h)"Secretary" shall refer to the Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources.

(i)"Small fisherfolk inhabitant" shall refer to any person who has actually and
continuously lived within the Reserve for a period of five (5) years before the
passage of this Act and is solely dependent on fishing for sustenance and livelihood

Section 5. The Protected Area Management Board for Sagay Marine Reserve. -
There is hereby created a Protected Area Management Board for Sagay Marine
Reserve (PAMB-SMR) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting
body of the Reserve and its buffer zones.

In addition to the powers enumerated in Republic Act No. 7586, the PAMB-SMR shall
decide by a majority vote and shall have the following powers and functions:

(a)Formulate the management plan and management manual of the Reserve;

(b)Decide matters relating to planning, peripheral protection and general

administration of the Reserve in accordance with the management plan;

(c)Plan the proper utilization of the annual budget allocations and the proper
disposition of fees and other funds generated or held by the Reserve;

(d)Control and supervise the office of the Sagay Marine Reserve Superintendent
(SMRSu);

(e)Delineate and demarcate management zones such as strict protection zones,

multiple-use and buffer zones;

(f)Promulgate rules and regulations to promote development programs and projects

on biodiversity conservation and sustainable development consistent with the
management manual;

(g)Control and regulate the construction, operation and maintenance of buildings,

roads, trails, waterworks, sewerage, fire protection and sanitation systems, and other
public utilities within the Reserve;

(h)Fix prescribed fees to be collected from the government agencies or any person,
firm or corporation deriving benefits from the Reserve and exact administrative fees
or fines for violation of the provisions of this Act;

(i)Grant entry permits to ecotourists, campers, research groups or individuals and

visitors;

(j)Grant permits for sustainable utilization of marine resources in accordance with

existing rules and regulations governing the same;

(k)Enter into contracts and agreements with private entities or public agencies as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

(l)Accept funds, gifts or donations for the Reserve;

(m)Call on any agency or instrumentality of the government as well as academic

institutions, nongovernment organizations and other sectors as may be necessary to
accomplish the objectives of this Act;
(n)Conduct studies on various characteristics, features and conditions of the
Reserve;

(o)Adopt and enforce plans or schemes for the control of activities that may threaten
the ecological balance of the Reserve in consultation with the local government units
in the area and other government agencies and instrumentality;

(p)Retain legal counsel to defend cases against the PAMB-SMR and the office of the
Marine Reserve Superintendent whenever they are sued in connection with the
performance of their duties under this Act.

The DENR, through the Regional Executive Director, shall ensure that the PAMB-
SMR acts within the scope of its powers and functions. In case of conflict between
administrative orders issued by the DENR pursuant to Republic Act No. 7586 and the
resolutions issued by the PAMB-SMR, the secretary shall decide whether to apply
the rule or withdraw its application from the Reserve.

Section 6. Composition. - The PAMB-SMR shall be composed of the following:

(a)The regional executive director of the DENR Region VI, as ex officio chairperson;

(b)The mayor of the City of Sagay, as ex officio co-chairperson;

(c)The chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Sagay, as ex officio member;

(d)The chief of police of Sagay City, as ex officio member;

(e)The punong barangays of Himoga-an Baybay, Old Sagay, Taba-ao, Bulanon, Vito
and Molocaboc, all of Sagay City, Negros Occidental, as ex officio members;

(f)The city planning and development officer of Sagay City, as ex officio member;

(g)Five (5) representatives from nongovernment organizations, as members, who

shall be endorsed by heads of organizations which are based in the City of Sagay,
Negros Occidental, and have established and recognized interest in protected areas.
These representatives shall include: two (2) representatives from fisherfolk
organizations, one (1) representative from duly registered commercial fishing
associations, one (1) representative from the youth sector and one (1) representative
from the civic-oriented organizations;

(h)A representative of Sagay Ecumenical Council, as member;

(i)A representative of the Department of Agriculture (DA) appointed by the Secretary

of Agriculture, as member; and

(j)The Reserve Superintendent (hereinafter provided), as member.

The members shall choose from among themselves the vice chairperson of the
PAMB-SMR.

The non ex officio members of the PAMB-SMR shall serve for a term of five (5)
years. The two (2) co-chairpersons, the vice chairperson and the members shall not
receive compensation but shall be entitled to reasonable per diem incurred in the
performance of their duties in accordance with existing budgeting and auditing rules
and regulations.

Section 7. Removal from Office. - A PAMB member may be removed for cause and
upon majority vote on the following grounds:

(a)More than three (3) consecutive unexcused absences in regular PAMB en banc
meetings;

(b)Commission of any of the prohibited acts as provided in this Act, the Republic Act
No. 7586 or other rules and regulations governing protected areas and protected
species;

(c)Graft and corruption; and

(d)Conviction of any criminal offense.

The non-ex officio members of the PAMB-SMR shall serve for a term of five (5)
years. The two (2) co-chairpersons, the vice chairperson, and the members shall not
receive compensation but shall be entitled to reasonable per diem incurred in the
performance of their duties in accordance with existing budgeting and auditing rules
and regulations:

Section 8. Management Plan and Manual.- Within one (1) year from the effectivity of
this Act, a management manual which contains the Marine Reserve Management
Plan and supporting data shall be prepared in accordance with the General
Management Planning Strategy as provided in Republic Act No. 7586. The
management plan shall serve as the basic long-term framework plan in the
management of the marine reserve and guide in the preparation of the annual
operations plan and budget. The management manual shall be drafted with the
assistance of experts in such fields as socioeconomic planning, ecology and marine
reserve management, reviewed and endorsed by the PAMB-SMR, and approved by
the Secretary.

(1)The management plan shall promote the adoption and implementation of

innovative management techniques, including:

(a)buffer zone management;

(b)habitat conservation and rehabilitation;

(c)diversity management;

(d)community organizing;

(e)socioeconomic and scientific researches;

(f)site-specific policy development;

(g)pest management; and

(h)others which the PAMB-SMR may deem appropriate.

(2)The management manual shall include:

(a)basic background information;

(b)field inventory of the resources within the Reserve;

(c)assessment of the assets and limitations;

(d)regional interrelationships;

(e)particular objectives for managing the Reserve;

(f)divisions of the Reserve into management zones;

(g)review of the boundaries of the Reserve; and

(h)design and management programs.

Section 9. Sagay Marine Reserve Office. - There is hereby created the Sagay
Marine Reserve Office headed by the Sagay Marine Reserve Superintendent,
hereinafter referred to as the Reserve Superintendent, who shall be the chief
operations officer of the Reserve.

Section 10. Powers and Functions of the Reserve Superintendent. - The Reserve
Superintendent shall have full responsibility for the protection of the resources within
the Reserve. As such, he/she shall have the following duties and responsibilities in
addition to those provided under existing rules and regulations:

(a)Serve as secretariat to the PAMB-SMR with the duty to provide the PAMB-SMR
with all the information necessary to make appropriate decisions for the
implementation of this Act;

(b)Hire and supervise the necessary personnel to support operations as the budget
may allow;

(c)Establish a productive partnership with local communities, including groups

supporting the achievement of the goals and objectives of this Act;
(d)Develop and implement marine reserve information, education and visitor
programs;

Enforce the laws, rules and regulations and PAMB-SMR resolutions relevant to the
Reserve and its buffer zones, and assist in the prosecution of offenses;

(e)Monitor all activities within the Reserve and its buffer zones in conformity with the
management plan; and

(f)Perform such other function as the PAMB-SMR may assign.

Section 11. Small Fisherfolk Inhabitants. - Small fisherfolk inhabitants shall be

allowed to fish within the Reserve subject to the rules and regulations promulgated
by the PAMB-SMR.

Section 12. Other Activities within the Reserve. - Proposals for activities which are
outside the scope of the management plan shall be subject to an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) as required by existing laws, rules and regulations. Results
thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process of the
PAMB-SMR. No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment System and PAMB-SMR approval. For purposes
of this Act, the following are provided:

(a)Existing Infrastructure.- Existing infrastructure established within the Reserve by

government and nongovernment institutions shall be subject to inventory and
evaluation as to whether it conforms to the management plan and assessed in terms
of their significance to the public interest and impact to the Reserve. In case they are
found significant to public interest, but with no adverse impact to the Reserve, a
contract or agreement may be entered into by PAMB-SMR including negotiations of
payment fees based on profit-sharing agreement in accordance with law: Provided,
That infrastructure which do not conform to the management plan shall not be
allowed to be repaired, renovated or improved until they are naturally destroyed and
vacated. Repairs, renovation and improvement of the existing infrastructure allowed
by the PAMB-SMR within the Reserve shall be in conformity with the management
plan and duly approved by the PAMB-SMR.

(b)Special-Use Infrastructure. - Special-use infrastructure such as power lines,

telecommunications equipment and military installations may be allowed in the
Reserve if they conform to the management plan: Provided, That construction of
these special use infrastructures shall be subject to EIA and the issuance of ECC by
the DENR and approval of the PAMB-SMR: Provided, further, That power lines and
telecommunications equipment must not traverse through strict-protection zones and
preferably be constructed within the multiple-use zones only. Military installations
shall not be constructed of permanent materials and must be covered by a
memorandum of agreement with the PAMB-SMR providing for regulation of facilities.
(c)Livelihood and Other Economic Activities.- Except as otherwise provided herein,
only small fisherfolk inhabitants shall be allowed within the multiple-use or buffer
zones of the Reserve to engage in livelihood and economic activities, in conformity
with the management plan and subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the
PAMB-SMR.

The PAMB-SMR, upon recommendation of the Reserve Superintendent, when

findings show that fish production exceeds the maximum sustainable yield, may
open certain portions of the multiple-use zones and buffer zones to economic
activities which shall be in accordance with the management plan and in all cases
use ecologically sustainable methods.

(d)Energy and Mineral Use. - Survey for energy and mineral resources within the
Reserve shall be allowed for the purpose of gathering information on energy and
mineral resources: Provided,That such activity is carried out without damage to the
area and conducted in accordance with a program approved by the PAMB-SMR. The
result of such surveys shall be made available to the public. The PAMB-SMR shall
submit such energy and mineral survey findings to the President for recommendation
to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy and mineral resources within
the Reserve shall be allowed only following approval of the PAMB-SMR, compliance
with the EIA System and other applicable laws, rules and regulations and through a
law passed by Congress.

(e)Special Activities.- All other activities such as ecotourism and related activities,
scientific research, marine life rescue by other agencies, government programs
affecting the Reserve, and military activities shall be properly coordinated with and
approved by the PAMB-SMR.

Section 13. Reserve Trust Fund.- A trust fund shall be created for the Reserve for
purposes of financing projects and activities provided in the Management Plan. For
this purpose, the PAMB-SMR may Solicit and receive donations, endowments and
grants in the form of contributions: Provided, That donations generated by the
PAMB-SMR shall accrue to the Reserve for its use. A minimum of five percent (5%)
of the total amount shall be remitted to the Integrated Protected Areas Fund of the
DENR.

Disbursement from the Reserve trust fund shall be made solely for the protection,
maintenance, administration and management of the Reserve, and duly approved
projects by the PAMB-SMR in accordance with the guidelines developed by the
PAMB-SMR for the purpose.

All incomes generated within the Reserve shall accrue to the trust fund and may be
utilized directly by the PAMB-SMR for the above purpose. These incomes shall be
derived from taxes from the permitted sale and export of flora and fauna and other
resources of the Reserve; proceeds from the lease of multiple-use or buffer zone
areas; contribution from industries and facilities directly benefitting from the Reserve;
and such other fees and incomes derived from the operation of the Reserve.

Section 14. Prohibited Acts.- The following acts are prohibited within the Reserve:

(a)Hunting, destroying, disturbing or mere possession of any marine resources or

products derived therefrom without a permit from the PAMB-SMR;

(b)Dumping or otherwise disposing of any waste products detrimental to the Reserve

or to plants, animals or inhabitants therein;

(c)Use of any motorized equipment without a permit;

(d)Mutilating, defacing or destroying objects of natural beauty or ecological

importance found within the Reserve;

(e)Mineral or energy exploration or any entry into the Reserve which has a tendency
to damage its ecological balance;

(f)Constructing or maintaining any kind of structure, fence or enclosures and

conducting any business enterprise without a permit;

(g)Altering, removing, destroying or defacing boundary marks or buoys; and

(h)Performing any other act analogous to the foregoing:

Provided,That the establishment of submarine electric power transmission cables,

submarine water pipelines, submarine telecommunication wires, and ports and
wharves shall not be prohibited notwithstanding the provisions of this Act.

Section 15. Penalties.- Any person found guilty of any of the offenses enumerated
above shall be punished with fine in an amount not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000), exclusive of
the value of the things damaged, or imprisonment of not less than one (1) year and
not more than six (6) years, or both, as determined by the court. Prohibited acts
mentioned in paragraph (a) of Section 14 of this Act shall be punished with penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. If the Reserve
requires rehabilitation and restoration as determined by the court, the offender shall
be required to restore or compensate for the restoration of the damage. The court
shall order the forfeiture of all mineral, flora or fauna collected or removed, including
all equipment, devices and firearms used in connection therewith, and any
construction or improvements made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an
association or corporation, the president or manager shall be responsible for the act
of his/her employees and laborers.
Section 16. Appropriations.- The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law and thereafter.

Section 17. Transitory Provision.- Pending the organization of a new PAMB in

accordance with this Act, the incumbent PAMB members shall continue to hold office
until a new PAMB has been convened.

Section 18. Separability Clause.- If any part of this Act shall be declared
unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the other parts or sections hereof.

Section 19. Repealing Clause.- All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, and
rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be deemed
repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 20. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

• Wildlife Conservation Act, RA No. 9147

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9147

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION

OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND THEIR HABITATS, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:

CHAPTER I

General Provisions

SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Wildlife Resources

Conservation and Protection Act.”

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It shall be the policy of the State to

conserve the country’s wildlife resources and their habitats for
sustainability. In the pursuit of this policy, this Act shall have the following
objectives:

(a) to conserve and protect wildlife species and their habitats to promote
ecological balance and enhance biological diversity;
(b) to regulate the collection and trade of wildlife;

(c) to pursue, with due regard to the national interest, the Philippine
commitment to international conventions, protection of wildlife and their
habitats; and

(d) to initiate or support scientific studies on the conservation of biological

diversity.

SECTION 3.  Scope of Application. — The provisions of this Act shall be

enforceable for all wildlife species found in all areas of the country,
including protected areas under Republic Act No. 7586, otherwise known
as the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, and
critical habitats. This Act shall also apply to exotic species which are
subject to trade, are cultured, maintained and/or bred in captivity or
propagated in the country.

SECTION 4.  Jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources and the Department of Agriculture. — The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall have jurisdiction over
all terrestrial plant and animal species, all turtles and tortoises and
wetland species, including but not limited to crocodiles, waterbirds and all
amphibians and dugong. The Department of Agriculture (DA) shall have
jurisdiction over all declared aquatic critical habitats, all aquatic resources,
including but not limited to all fishes, aquatic plants, invertebrates and all
marine mammals, except dugong. The secretaries of the DENR and the
DA shall review, and, by joint administrative order, revise and regularly
update the list of species under their respective jurisdiction. In the
Province of Palawan, jurisdiction herein conferred is vested to the
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7611.

CHAPTER II

Definition of Terms

SECTION 5. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the term:

(a) “Bioprospecting” means the research, collection and utilization of
biological and genetic resources for purposes of applying the knowledge
derived therefrom solely for commercial purposes;

(b) “By-product or derivatives” means any part taken or substance

extracted from wildlife, in raw or in processed form. This includes stuffed
animals and herbarium specimens;

(c) “Captive-breeding/culture or propagation” means the process of

producing individuals under controlled conditions or with human
interventions;

(d) “Collection or collecting” means the act of gathering or harvesting

wildlife, its by-products or derivatives;

(e) “Conservation” means preservation and sustainable utilization of

wildlife, and/or maintenance, restoration and enhancement of the habitat;

(f) “Critically endangered species” refers to a species or subspecies that is

facing extremely high risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future;

(g) “Economically important species” means species which have actual or

potential value in trade or utilization for commercial purpose;

(h) “Endangered species” refers to species or subspecies that is not

critically endangered but whose survival in the wild is unlikely if the causal
factors continue operating;

(i) “Endemic species” means species or subspecies which is naturally

occurring and found only within specific areas in the country;

(j) “Exotic species” means species or subspecies which do not naturally

occur in the country;

(k) “Export permit” refers to a permit authorizing an individual to bring out

wildlife from the Philippines to any other country;

(l) “Gratuitous permit” means permit issued to any individual or entity

engaged in noncommercial scientific or educational undertaking to collect
wildlife;
(m) “Habitat” means a place or environment where a species or
subspecies naturally occur or has naturally established its population;

(n) “Import permit” refers to a permit authorizing an individual to bring in

wildlife from another country;

(o) “Indigenous wildlife” means species or subspecies of wildlife naturally

occurring or has naturally established population in the country;

(p) “Introduction” means bringing species into the wild that is outside its
natural habitat;

(q) “Reexport permit” refers to a permit authorizing an individual to bring

out of the country a previously imported wildlife;

(r) “Secretary” means either or both the Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources and the Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture;

(s) “Threatened species” a general term to denote species or subspecies

considered as critically endangered, endangered, vulnerable or other
accepted categories of wildlife whose population is at risk of extinction;

(t) “Trade” means the act of engaging in the exchange, exportation or

importation, purchase or sale of wildlife, their derivatives or by-products,
locally or internationally;

(u) “Traditional use” means utilization of wildlife by indigenous people in

accordance with written or unwritten rules, usage, customs and practices
traditionally observed, accepted and recognized by them;

(v) “Transport permit” means a permit issued authorizing an individual to

bring wildlife from one place to another within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines;

(w) “Vulnerable species” refers to species or subspecies that is not

critically endangered nor endangered but is under threat from adverse
factors throughout their range and is likely to move to the endangered
category in the near future;
(x) “Wildlife” means wild forms and varieties of flora and fauna, in all
developmental stages, including those which are in captivity or are being
bred or propagated;

(y) “Wildlife collector’s permit” means a permit to take or collect from the
wild certain species and quantities of wildlife for commercial purpose; and

(z) “Wildlife farm/culture permit” means a permit to develop, operate and

maintain a wildlife breeding farm for conservation, trade and/or scientific
purposes.

CHAPTER III

Conservation and Protection of Wildlife Resources

ARTICLE ONE

General Provision

SECTION 6.  Wildlife Information. — All activities, as subsequently

manifested under this Chapter, shall be authorized by the Secretary upon
proper evaluation of best available information or scientific data showing
that the activity is, or for a purpose, not detrimental to the survival of the
species or subspecies involved and/or their habitat. For this purpose, the
Secretary shall regularly update wildlife information through research.

SECTION 7. Collection of Wildlife. — Collection of wildlife may be allowed

in accordance with Section 6 of this Act: Provided, That in the collection of
wildlife, appropriate and acceptable wildlife collection techniques with
least or no detrimental effects to the existing wildlife populations and their
habitats shall, likewise, be required: Provided, further, That collection of
wildlife by indigenous people may be allowed for traditional use and not
primarily for trade: Provided, furthermore, That collection and utilization for
said purpose shall not cover threatened species: Provided, finally, That
Section 23 of this Act shall govern the collection of threatened species.

SECTION 8.  Possession of Wildlife. — No person or entity shall be

allowed possession of wildlife unless such person or entity can prove
financial and technical capability and facility to maintain said wildlife:
Provided, That the source was not obtained in violation of this Act.
SECTION 9.  Collection and/or Possession of By-Products and
Derivatives. — By-products and derivatives may be collected and/or
possessed: Provided, That the source was not obtained in violation of this
Act.

SECTION 10. Local Transport of Wildlife, By-Products and Derivatives. —

Local transport of wildlife, by-products and derivatives collected or
possessed through any other means shall be authorized unless the same
is prejudicial to the wildlife and public health.

SECTION 11.  Exportation and/or Importation of Wildlife. — Wildlife

species may be exported to or imported from another country as may be
authorized by the Secretary or the designated representative, subject to
strict compliance with the provisions of this Act and rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto: Provided, That the recipient of the wildlife
is technically and financially capable to maintain it.

SECTION 12.  Introduction, Reintroduction or Restocking of Endemic or

Indigenous Wildlife. — The introduction, reintroduction or restocking of
endemic and indigenous wildlife shall be allowed only for population
enhancement or recovery purposes subject to prior clearance from the
Secretary or the authorized representative pursuant to Section 6 of this
Act.

Any proposed introduction shall be subject to a scientific study which shall

focus on the bioecology. The proponent shall also conduct public
consultations with concerned individuals or entities.

SECTION 13. Introduction of Exotic Wildlife. —  No exotic species shall be

introduced into the country, unless a clearance from the Secretary or the
authorized representative is first obtained. In no case shall exotic species
be introduced into protected areas covered by Republic Act No. 7586 and
to critical habitats under Section 25 hereof.

In cases where introduction is allowed, it shall be subject to environmental

impact study which shall focus on the bioecology, socioeconomic and
related aspects of the area where the species will be introduced. The
proponent shall also be required to secure the prior informed consent from
the local stakeholders.
SECTION 14.  Bioprospecting. — Bioprospecting shall be allowed upon
execution of an undertaking by any proponent, stipulating therein its
compliance with and commitment(s) to reasonable terms and conditions
that may be imposed by the Secretary which are necessary to protect
biological diversity.

The Secretary or the authorized representative, in consultation with the

concerned agencies, before granting the necessary permit, shall require
that prior informed consent be obtained by the applicant from the
concerned indigenous cultural communities, local communities,
management board under Republic Act No. 7586 or private individual or
entity. The applicant shall disclose fully the intent and scope of the
bioprospecting activity in a language and process understandable to the
community. The prior informed consent from the indigenous peoples shall
be obtained in accordance with existing laws. The action on the
bioprospecting proposal by concerned bodies shall be made within a
reasonable period.

Upon submission of the complete requirements, the Secretary shall act on

the research proposal within a reasonable period.

If the applicant is a foreign entity or individual, a local institution should be

actively involved in the research, collection and, whenever applicable and
appropriate, in the technological development of the products derived from
the biological and genetic resources.

SECTION 15.  Scientific Researches on Wildlife. — Collection and

utilization of biological resources for scientific research and not for
commercial purposes shall be allowed upon execution of an undertaking/
agreement with and issuance of a gratuitous permit by the Secretary or
the authorized representative: Provided, That prior clearance from
concerned bodies shall be secured before the issuance of the gratuitous
permit: Provided, further, That the last paragraph of Section 14 shall
likewise apply.

SECTION 16.  Biosafety. — All activities dealing on genetic engineering

and pathogenic organisms in the Philippines, as well as activities requiring
the importation, introduction; field release and breeding of organisms that
are potentially harmful to man and the environment shall be reviewed in
accordance with the biosafety guidelines ensuring public welfare and the
protection and conservation of wildlife and their habitats.

SECTION 17. Commercial Breeding or Propagation of Wildlife Resources.

— Breeding or propagation of wildlife for commercial purposes shall be
allowed by the Secretary or the authorized representative pursuant to
Section 6 through the issuance of wildlife farm/culture permit: Provided,
That only progenies of wildlife raised, as well as unproductive parent stock
shall be utilized for trade: Provided, further, That commercial breeding
operations for wildlife, whenever appropriate, shall be subject to an
environmental impact study.

SECTION 18.  Economically Important Species. — The Secretary, within

one (1) year after the effectivity of this Act, shall establish a list of
economically-important species. A population assessment of such species
shall be conducted within a reasonable period and shall be regularly
reviewed and updated by the Secretary.

The collection of certain species shall only be allowed when the results of
the assessment show that, despite certain extent of collection, the
population of such species can still remain viable and capable of
recovering its numbers. For this purpose, the Secretary shall establish a
schedule and volume of allowable harvests.

Whenever an economically important species become threatened, any

form of collection shall be prohibited except for scientific, educational or
breeding/propagation purposes, pursuant to the provisions of this Act.

SECTION 19.  Designation of Management and Scientific Authorities for

International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. —
For the implementation of international agreement on international trade in
endangered species of wild fauna and flora, the management authorities
for terrestrial and aquatic resources shall be the Protected Areas and
Wildlife Bureau (PAWB) of the DENR and the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) of the DA, respectively and that in the
Province of Palawan the implementation hereof is vested to the Palawan
Council for Sustainable Development pursuant to Republic Act No. 7611.
To provide advice to the management authorities, there shall be
designated scientific authorities for terrestrial and aquatic/marine species.
For the terrestrial species, the scientific authorities shall be the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB) of the DENR,
the U.P. Institute of Biological Sciences and the National Museum and
other agencies as may be designated by the Secretary. For the marine
and aquatic species, the scientific authorities shall be the BFAR, the U.P.
Marine Science Institute, U.P. Visayas, Silliman University and the
National Museum and other agencies as may be designated by the
Secretary: Provided, That, in the case of terrestrial species, the ERDB
shall chair the scientific authorities, and in the case of marine and aquatic
species, the U.P. Marine Science Institute shall chair the scientific
authorities.

SECTION 20.  Authority of the Secretary to Issue Permits. — The

Secretary or the duly authorized representative, in order to effectively
implement this Act, shall issue permits/certifications/clearances with
corresponding period of validity, whenever appropriate, which shall include
but not limited to the following:

(1) Wildlife farm or culture permit 3 to 5 years;

(2) Wildlife collector’s permit 1 to 3 years;

(3) Gratuitous permit 1 year;

(4) Local transport permit 1 to 3 months; and

(5) Export/Import/Reexport permit 1 to 6 months.

These permits may be renewed subject to the guidelines issued by the

appropriate agency and upon consultation with concerned groups.

SECTION 21.  Fees and Charges. — Reasonable fees and charges as

may be determined upon consultation with the concerned groups, and in
the amount fixed by the Secretary shall be imposed for the issuance of
permits enumerated in the preceding section.

For the export of wildlife species, an export permit fee of not greater than
three percentum (3%) of the export value, excluding transport costs, shall
be charged: Provided, however, That in the determination of aforesaid fee,
the production costs shall be given due consideration. Cutflowers, leaves
the like, produced from farms shall be exempted from the said export fee:
Provided, further, that fees and charges shall be reviewed by the
Secretary every two (2) years or as the need arises and revise the same
accordingly, subject to consultation with concerned sectors.

ARTICLE TWO

Protection of Threatened Species

SECTION 22.  Determination of Threatened Species. — The Secretary

shall determine whether any wildlife species or subspecies is threatened,
and classify the same as critically endangered, endangered, vulnerable or
other accepted categories based on the best scientific data and with due
regard to internationally accepted criteria, including but not limited to the
following.

(a) present or threatened destruction, modification or curtailment of its

habitat or range;

(b) over-utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific or educational

purposes;

(c) inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; and

(d) other natural or man-made factors affecting the existence of wildlife.

The Secretary shall review, revise and publish the list of categorized
threatened wildlife within one (1) year after effectivity of this Act.
Thereafter, the list shall be updated regularly or as the need arises:
Provided, That a species listed as threatened shall not be removed
therefrom within three (3) years following its initial listing.

Upon filing of a petition based on substantial scientific information of any

person seeking for the addition or deletion of a species from the list, the
Secretary shall evaluate in accordance with the relevant factors stated in
the first paragraph of this section, the status of the species concerned and
act on said petition within a reasonable period.
The Secretary shall also prepare and publish a list of wildlife which
resembles so closely in appearance with listed threatened wildlife, which
species shall likewise be categorized as threatened.

SECTION 23.  Collection of Threatened Wildlife, By-Products and

Derivatives. — The collection of threatened wildlife, as determined and
listed pursuant to this Act, including its by-products and derivatives, shall
be allowed only for scientific, or breeding or propagation purposes in
accordance with Section 6 of this Act: Provided, That only the accredited
individuals, business, research, educational or scientific entities shall be
allowed to collect for conservation breeding or propagation purposes.

SECTION 24.  Conservation Breeding or Propagation of Threatened

Species. — Conservation breeding or propagation of threatened species
shall be encouraged in order to enhance its population in its natural
habitat. It shall be done simultaneously with the rehabilitation and/or
protection of the habitat where the captive-bred or propagated species
shall be released, reintroduced or restocked.

Commercial breeding or propagation of threatened species may be

allowed provided that the following minimum requirements are met by the
applicant, to wit:

(a) Proven effective breeding and captive management techniques of the

species; and

(b) Commitment to undertake commercial breeding in accordance with

Section 17 of this Act, simultaneous with conservation breeding.

The Secretary shall prepare a list of threatened species for commercial

breeding and shall regularly revise or update such list or as the need
arises.

SECTION 25. Establishment of Critical Habitats. —  Within two (2) years

following the effectivity of this Act, the Secretary shall designate critical
habitats outside protected areas under Republic Act No. 7586, where
threatened species are found. Such designation shall be made on the
basis of the best scientific data taking into consideration species
endemicity and/or richness, presence of man-made pressures/threats to
the survival of wildlife living in the area, among others.

All designated critical habitats shall be protected, in coordination with the

local government units and other concerned groups, from any form of
exploitation or destruction which may be detrimental to the survival of the
threatened species dependent therein. For such purpose, the Secretary
may acquire, by purchase, donation or expropriation, lands, or interests
therein, including the acquisition of usufruct, establishment of easements
or other undertakings appropriate in protecting the critical habitat.

ARTICLE THREE

Registration of Threatened and Exotic Species

SECTION 26.  Registration of Threatened and Exotic Wildlife in the

Possession of Private Persons. — No person or entity shall be allowed
possession of wildlife unless such person or entity can prove financial and
technical capability and facility to maintain said wildlife. Twelve (12)
months after the effectivity of this Act, the Secretary shall set a period,
within which persons/entities shall register all threatened species collected
and exotic species imported prior to the effectivity of this Act. However,
when the threatened species is needed for breeding/propagation or
research purposes, the State may acquire the wildlife through a mutually
acceptable arrangement.

After the period set has elapsed, threatened wildlife possessed without
certificate of registration shall be confiscated in favor of the government,
subject to the penalties herein provided.

All Philippine wildlife which are not listed as threatened prior to the
effectivity of this Act but which may later become so, shall likewise be
registered during the period set after the publication of the updated list of
threatened species.

CHAPTER IV

Illegal Acts
SECTION 27. Illegal Acts. — Unless otherwise allowed in accordance with
this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully and knowingly
exploit wildlife resources and their habitats, or undertake the following
acts:

(a) killing and destroying wildlife species, except in the following

instances;

(i) when it is done as part of the religious rituals of established tribal

groups or indigenous cultural communities;

(ii) when the wildlife is afflicted with an incurable communicable disease;

(iii) when it is deemed necessary to put an end to the misery suffered by

the wildlife;

(iv) when it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a

human being; and

(v) when the wildlife is killed or destroyed after it has been used in
authorized research or experiments.

(b) inflicting injury which cripples and/or impairs the reproductive system
of wildlife species;

(c) effecting any of the following acts in critical habitat(s):

(i) dumping of waste products detrimental to wildlife;

(ii) squatting or otherwise occupying any portion of the critical habitat;

(iii) mineral exploration and/or extraction;

(iv) burning;

(v) logging; and

(vi) quarrying

(d) introduction, reintroduction or restocking of wildlife resources;

(e) trading of wildlife;

(f) collecting, hunting or possessing wildlife, their by-products and
derivatives;

(g) gathering or destroying of active nests, nest trees, host plants and the
like;

(h) maltreating and/or inflicting other injuries not covered by the preceding
paragraph; and

(i) transporting of wildlife.

CHAPTER V

Fines and Penalties

SECTION 28. Penalties for Violations of this Act. — For any person who
undertakes illegal acts under paragraph (a) of the immediately preceding
section to any species as may be categorized pursuant to this Act, the
following penalties and/or fines shall be imposed:

(a) imprisonment of a minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and/or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) to
One million pesos (1,000,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
species listed as critical;

(b) imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years and/or a
fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against endangered species;

(c) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years and/or
a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against vulnerable
species;    ADEHTS

(d) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and/or a
fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against other threatened
species; and

(e) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and/or
a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife
species.

For illegal acts under paragraph (b) of the immediately preceding section,
the following penalties and/or fines shall be imposed:

(a) imprisonment of a minimum of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6)
years and/or a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species
listed as critical;

(b) imprisonment of two (2)years and one (1) day to four (4) years and/or
a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against endangered
species;

(c) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and/or a
fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against vulnerable species;

(d) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and/or
a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against other threatened species;
and

(e) imprisonment of one (1) month to six (6) months and/or a fine of Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), if
inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species.

For illegal acts under paragraphs (c) and (d) of the immediately preceding
section, an imprisonment of one (1) month to eight (8) years and/or a fine
of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00)
shall be imposed.

For illegal acts under paragraph (e), the following penalties and/or fines
shall be imposed:

(a) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years and/or
a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species listed as
critical;

(b) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and/or a
fine of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) if inflicted or undertaken against endangered species;

(c) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and/or
a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against vulnerable species;

(d) imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months and/
or a fine of Five hundred pesos (P500.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species listed as other
threatened species; and

(e) imprisonment of ten (10) days to one (1) month and/or a fine of Two
hundred pesos (P200.00) to Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), if
inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species.

For illegal acts under paragraphs (f) and (g) of the immediately preceding
section, the following penalties and/or fines shall be imposed:

(a) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years and a
fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species listed as
critical;

(b) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and a
fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against endangered
species;

(c) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and a
fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against vulnerable species;

(d) imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months and a
fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species listed as other
threatened species; and

(e) imprisonment of ten (10) days to one (1) month and a fine of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), if
inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species: Provided, That in
case of paragraph (f), where the acts were perpetuated through the
means of inappropriate techniques and devices, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed.

For illegal acts under paragraphs (h) and (i) of the immediately preceding
section, the following penalties and/or fines shall be imposed:

(a) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and a
fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species listed as critical
species;

(b) imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day to six (6) months
and a fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against endangered
species;

(c) imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to three (3) months
and a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against vulnerable species;

(d) imprisonment of ten (10) days to one (1) month and a fine of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) if
inflicted or undertaken against species listed as other threatened species;

(e) imprisonment of five (5) days to ten (10) days and a fine of Two
hundred pesos (P200.00) to One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), if inflicted
or undertaken against other wildlife species.

All wildlife, its derivatives or by-products, and all paraphernalia, tools and
conveyances used in connection with violations of this Act, shall be ipso
facto forfeited in favor of the government: Provided, That where the
ownership of the aforesaid conveyances belong to third persons who has
no participation in or knowledge of the illegal acts, the same may be
released to said owner. The apprehending agency shall immediately
cause the transfer of all wildlife that have been seized or recovered to the
nearest Wildlife Rescue Center of the Department in the area.

If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported after service of sentence

and payment of fines, without any further proceedings.

The fines herein prescribed shall be increased by at least ten percent

(10%) every three (3) years to compensate for inflation and to maintain
the deterrent function of such fines.

CHAPTER VI

Miscellaneous Provisions

SECTION 29. Wildlife Management Fund. — There is hereby established

a Wildlife Management Fund to be administered by the Department as a
special account in the National Treasury. It shall finance rehabilitation or
restoration of habitats affected by acts committed in violation of this Act
and support scientific research, enforcement and monitoring activities, as
well as enhancement of capabilities of relevant agencies.

The Fund shall derive from fines imposed and damages awarded, fees,
charges, donations, endowments, administrative fees or grants in the form
of contributions. Contributions to the Fund shall be exempted from donor
taxes and all other taxes, charges or fees imposed by the government.  
CDEaAI

SECTION 30.  Deputation of Wildlife Enforcement Officers. — The

Secretary shall deputize wildlife enforcement officers from nongovernment
organizations, citizens groups, community organizations and other
volunteers who have undergone the necessary training for this purpose.
The Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and other law
enforcement agencies shall designate wildlife enforcement officers. As
such, the wildlife enforcement officers shall have the full authority to seize
illegally traded wildlife and to arrest violators of this Act subject to existing
laws, rules and regulations on arrest and detention.
SECTION 31.  Establishment of National Wildlife Research Centers. —
The Secretary shall establish national wildlife research centers for
terrestrial and aquatic species to lead in the conduct of scientific
researches on the proper strategies for the conservation and protection of
wildlife, including captive breeding or propagation. In this regard, the
Secretary shall encourage the participation of experts from academic/
research institutions and wildlife industry.

SECTION 32. Wildlife Rescue Center. — The Secretary shall establish or

designate wildlife rescue centers to take temporary custody and care of all
confiscated, abandoned and/or donated wildlife to ensure their welfare
and well-being. The Secretary shall formulate guidelines for the
disposition of wildlife from the rescue centers.

SECTION 33.  Creation of Wildlife Traffic Monitoring Units. — The

Secretary shall create wildlife traffic monitoring units in strategic air and
seaports all over the country to ensure the strict compliance and effective
implementation of all existing wildlife laws, rules and regulations, including
pertinent international agreements.

Customs officers and/or other authorized government representatives

assigned at air or seaports who may have intercepted wildlife commodities
in the discharge of their official functions shall, prior to further disposition
thereof, secure a clearance from the wildlife traffic monitoring unit
assigned in the area.

SECTION 34.  Exemption from Taxes. — Any donation, contribution,

bequest, subsidy or financial aid which may be made to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources or to the Department of Agriculture
and to NGOs engaged in wildlife conservation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission as certified by the local government
unit, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources or the
Department of Agriculture, for the conservation and protection of wildlife
resources and their habitats shall constitute as an allowable deduction
from the taxable income of the donor and shall be exempt from donor’s
tax.

SECTION 35.  Flagship Species. — Local government units shall initiate

conservation measures for endemic species in their areas. For this
purpose, they may adopt flagship species such as the Cebu black shama
(copsychus cebuensis), tamaraw (bubalus mindorensis) Philippine tarsier
(tarsius syrichta), Philippine teak (tectona philippinensis), which shall
serve as emblems of conservation for the local government concerned.

SECTION 36.  Botanical Gardens, Zoological Parks and Other Similar

Establishments. — The Secretary shall regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of botanical gardens, zoological parks and
other similar establishments for recreation, education and conservation.

SECTION 37. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within twelve (12)

months following the effectivity of this Act, the secretaries of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Department
of Agriculture, in coordination with the Committees on Environment and
Ecology of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
shall promulgate respective rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act. Whenever appropriate, coordination in the
preparation and implementation of rules and regulations on joint and
inseparable issues shall be done by both Departments. The commitments
of the State to international agreements and protocols shall likewise be a
consideration in the implementation of this Act.

SECTION 38.  Appropriations. — The amount necessary to initially

implement the provisions of this Act shall be charged against the
appropriations of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
in the current General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such sums as may
be necessary to fully implement the provisions of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SECTION 39. Separability Clause. — Should any provision of this Act be

subsequently declared as unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the
validity or the legality of the other provisions.

SECTION 40.  Repealing Clause. — Act Nos. 2590 and 3983,

Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1219,
as amended, Republic Act No. 6147, and other laws, orders and
regulations inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
SECTION 41. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

• Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA; Republic Act No. 8371)

Republic Act No. 8371 October 29, 1997

AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF

INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, CREATING A
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, ESTABLISHING
IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled::

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997."

Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. - The State shall recognize and promote
all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs)
hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:

a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework
of national unity and development;

b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure
their economic, social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domain;

c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve
and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in
the formulation of national laws and policies;

d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall
equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinctions or
discriminations;

e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned,
to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure
that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and
opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the
population and

f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the
ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the
direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to
render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these
communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary
mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into
consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, their rights to their ancestral
domains.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally

belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/
IPs, themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals, corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral land, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which their traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,

possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,continuously, to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including,
but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden
farms and tree lots;
c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the
rights of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains
identified and delineated in accordance with this law;

d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights
of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;

e) Communal Claims - refer to claims on land, resources and rights thereon,

belonging to the whole community within a defined territory

f) Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages,

customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and
observed by respective ICCs/IPs;

g) Free and Prior Informed Consent - as used in this Act shall mean the consensus
of all members of the ICCs/IPs to; be determined in accordance with their respective
customary laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference and
coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a
language an process understandable to the community;

h) Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people

or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by other, who
have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial,
occupied, possessed customs, tradition and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and culture, became historically differentiated from the majority
of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the
time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions
and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have
been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains;

i) Indigenous Political Structure - refer to organizational and cultural leadership

systems, institutions, relationships, patterns and processed for decision-making and
participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders,
Council of Timuays, Bodong Holder, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature;

j) Individual Claims - refer to claims on land and rights thereon which have been
devolved to individuals, families and clans including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies and tree lots;

k) National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the office created

under this Act, which shall be under the Office of the President, and which shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation
of policies, plans and programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights of ICCs/
IPs;

l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back
as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs,
have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest;

m) Nongovernment Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary

organization that has been organized primarily for the delivery of various services to
the ICCs/IPs and has an established track record for effectiveness and acceptability
in the community where it serves;

n) People's Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization of

members of an ICC/IP which is accepted as representative of such ICCs/IPs;

o) Sustainable Traditional Resource Rights - refer to the rights of ICCs/IPs to

sustainably use,manage, protect and conserve a) land, air, water, and minerals; b)
plants, animals and other organisms; c) collecting, fishing and hunting grounds; d)
sacred sites; and e) other areas of economic, ceremonial and aesthetic value in
accordance with their indigenous knowledge, beliefs, systems and practices; and

p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go,
certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner,
and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or
inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.

CHAPTER III 

RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands/domains shall

include such concepts of territories which cover not only the physical environment
but the total environment including the spiritual and cultural bonds to the area which
the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use and to which they have claims of ownership.

Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept of ownership

sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's private but community
property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.

Section 6. Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands and

domains shall consist of all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs as referred under
Sec. 3, items (a) and (b) of this Act.
Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession
of ICCs/IPs t their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
shall include:

a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof,

right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned,
or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold
the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate
the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to
receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they sustain as a result of
the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interfere with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

c. Right to Stay in the Territories- The right to stay in the territory and not be removed
therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed
consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is
considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place
only with the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and
whenever possible, they shall be guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral
domains, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. When such return is
not possible, as determined by agreement or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/
IPs shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at
least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for
their present needs and future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be
fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury;

d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of

natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in
suitable areas where they can have temporary life support system: Provided, That
the displaced ICCs/IPs shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands until
such time that the normalcy and safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided,
further, That should their ancestral domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of
the previous settlements are not possible, displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of
tenure over lands to which they have been resettled: Provided, furthermore, That
basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them to ensure that their needs are
adequately addressed:
e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers
and organizations into the domains;

f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have
access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air
space;

g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral
domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and
intended for common and public welfare and service; and

h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with

customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof
shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary.

Section 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. - The right of ownership and possession of

the ICCs/IPs, to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a. Right to transfer land/property. - Such right shall include the right to transfer land
or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned.

b. Right to Redemption. - In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property

rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/
IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to
redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer.

Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. - ICCs/IPs

occupying a duly certified ancestral domain shall have the following responsibilities:

a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced

ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas,
and other reserves;

b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the

reforestation of denuded areas and other development programs and projects
subject to just and reasonable remuneration; and

c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules
and regulations for its effective implementation.

Section 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. - Unauthorized and unlawful

intrusion upon, or use of any portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the
rights herein before enumerated, shall be punishable under this law. Furthermore,
the Government shall take measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs from taking advantage
of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure ownership,
possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs.

Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to

their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.

Section 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title under Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496. - Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in -interest, have been in continuous possession and
occupation of the same in the concept of owner since the immemorial or for a period
of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure
title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are
hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this Section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years
from the approval of this Act.

CHAPTER IV

RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT

Section 13. Self-Governance. - The State recognizes the inherent right of ICCs/IPs
to self-governance and self-determination and respects the integrity of their values,
practices and institutions. Consequently, the State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/
IPs to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Section 14. Support for Autonomous Regions. - The State shall continue to
strengthen and support the autonomous regions created under the Constitution as
they may require or need. The State shall likewise encourage other ICCs/IPs not
included or outside Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera to use the form and content
of their ways of life as may be compatible with the fundamental rights defined in the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and other internationally recognized
human rights.

Section 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions and Peace

Building Processes. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own commonly
accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or
mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective
communities and as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.

Section 16. Right to Participate in Decision -Making. - ICCs/IPs have the right to
participate fully, if they so choose, at all levels of decision-making in matters which
may affect their rights, lives and destinies through procedures determined by them
as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous political structures.
Consequently, the State shall ensure that the ICCs/IPs shall be given mandatory
representation in policy-making bodies and other local legislative councils.

Section 17. Right to Determine and Decide Priorities for Development. - The
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to determine and decide their own priorities for
development affecting their lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, and the
lands they own, occupy or use. They shall participate in the
formulation,implementation and evaluation of policies, plans and programs for
national, regional and local development which may directly affect them.

Section 18. Tribal Barangays. - The ICCs/IPs living in contiguous areas or

communities where they form the predominant population but which are located in
municipalities, provinces or cities where they do not constitute the majority of the
population, may form or constitute a separate barangay in accordance with the Local
Government Code on the creation of tribal barangays.

Section 19. Role of Peoples Organizations. - The State shall recognize and
respect the role of independent ICCs/IPs organizations to enable the ICCs/IPs to
pursue and protect their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means.

Section 20. Means for Development /Empowerment of ICCs/IPs. - The

Government shall establish the means for the full development/empowerment of the
ICCs/IPs own institutions and initiatives and, where necessary, provide the resources
needed therefor.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs. - Consistent

with the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and
International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of their distinct
characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights,
protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to them
the same employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and other
rights and privileges available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State
shall likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force of coersion against
ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.

The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as
enshrined in the Constitution and relevant international instruments are guaranteed
also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no provision in this Act shall be
interpreted so as to result in the diminution of rights and privileges already
recognized and accorded to women under existing laws of general application.

Section 22. Rights during Armed Conflict. - ICCs/IPs have the right to special
protection and security in periods of armed conflict. The State shall observe
international standards, in particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, for the
protection of civilian populations in circumstances of emergency and armed conflict,
and shall not recruit members of the ICCs/IPs against their will into armed forces,
and in particular, for the use against other ICCs/IPs; not recruit children of ICCs/IPs
into the armed forces under any circumstance; nor force indigenous individuals to
abandon their lands, territories and means of subsistence, or relocate them in special
centers for military purposes under any discriminatory condition.

Section 23. Freedom from Discrimination and Right to Equal Opportunity and
Treatment. - It shall be the right of the ICCs/IPs to be free from any form of
discrimination, with respect to recruitment and conditions of employment, such that
they may enjoy equal opportunities as other occupationally-related benefits, informed
of their rights under existing labor legislation and of means available to them for
redress, not subject to any coercive recruitment systems, including bonded labor and
other forms of debt servitude; and equal treatment in employment for men and
women, including the protection from sexual harassment.

Towards this end, the State shall within the framework of national laws and
regulations, and in cooperation with the ICCs/IPs concerned, adopt special
measures to ensure the effective protection with regard to the recruitment and
conditions of employment of persons belonging to these communities, to the extent
that they are not effectively protected by the laws applicable to workers in general.

ICCs/IPs shall have the right to association and freedom for all trade union activities
and the right to conclude collective bargaining agreements with employers'
conditions. They shall likewise have the right not to be subject to working conditions
hazardous to their health, particularly through exposure to pesticides and other toxic
substances.

Section 24. Unlawful Acts Pertaining to Employment. - It shall be unlawful for any
person:
a. To discriminate against any ICC/IP with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment on account of their descent. Equal remuneration shall be paid to ICC/IP
and non-ICC/IP for work of equal value; and

b. To deny any ICC/IP employee any right or benefit herein provided for or to
discharge them for the purpose of preventing them from enjoying any of the rights or
benefits provided under this Act.

Section 25. Basic Services. - The ICC/IP have the right to special measures for the
immediate, effective and continuing improvement of their economic and social
conditions, including in the areas of employment, vocational training and retraining,
housing, sanitation, health and social security. Particular attention shall be paid to the
rights and special needs of indigenous women, elderly, youth, children and
differently-abled persons. Accordingly, the State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs
to government 's basic services which shall include, but not limited to water and
electrical facilities, education, health and infrastructure.

Section 26. Women. - ICC/IP women shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities with
men, as regards the social, economic, political and cultural spheres of life. The
participation of indigenous women in the decision-making process in all levels, as
well as in the development of society, shall be given due respect and recognition.

The State shall provide full access to education, maternal and child care, health and
nutrition, and housing services to indigenous women. Vocational, technical,
professional and other forms of training shall be provided to enable these women to
fully participate in all aspects of social life. As far as possible, the State shall ensure
that indigenous women have access to all services in their own languages.

Section 27. Children and Youth. - The State shall recognize the vital role of the
children and youth of ICCs/IPs in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. Towards
this end, the State shall support all government programs intended for the
development and rearing of the children and youth of ICCs/IPs for civic efficiency
and establish such mechanisms as may be necessary for the protection of the rights
of the indigenous children and youth.

Section 28. Integrated System of Education. - The State shall, through the NCIP,
provide a complete, adequate and integrated system of education, relevant to the
needs of the children and Young people of ICCs/IPs.

CHAPTER VI

CULTURAL INTEGRITY

Section 29. Protection of Indigenous Culture, traditions and institutions. - The

state shall respect, recognize and protect the right of the ICCs/IPs to preserve and
protect their culture, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies.

Section 30. Educational Systems. - The State shall provide equal access to
various cultural opportunities to the ICCs/IPs through the educational system, public
or cultural entities, scholarships, grants and other incentives without prejudice to their
right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions by providing
education in their own language, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of
teaching and learning. Indigenous children/youth shall have the right to all levels and
forms of education of the State.

Section 31. Recognition of Cultural Diversity. - The State shall endeavor to have
the dignity and diversity of the cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations of the
ICCs/IPs appropriately reflected in all forms of education, public information and
cultural-educational exchange. Consequently, the State shall take effective
measures, in consultation with ICCs/IPs concerned, to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among
ICCs/IPs and all segments of society. Furthermore, the Government shall take
effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural
diversity. The State shall likewise ensure the participation of appropriate indigenous
leaders in schools, communities and international cooperative undertakings like
festivals, conferences, seminars and workshops to promote and enhance their
distinctive heritage and values.

Section 32. Community Intellectual Rights. - ICCs/IPs have the right to practice
and revitalize their own cultural traditions and customs. The State shall preserve,
protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures as
well as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious, and spiritual
property taken without their free and prior informed consent or in violation of their
laws, traditions and customs.

Section 33. Rights to Religious, Cultural Sites and Ceremonies. - ICCs/IPs shall
have the right to manifest, practice, develop teach their spiritual and religious
traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect and have access to
their religious and cultural sites; the right to use and control of ceremonial object; and
the right to the repatriation of human remains. Accordingly, the State shall take
effective measures, in cooperation with the burial sites, be preserved, respected and
protected. To achieve this purpose, it shall be unlawful to:

a. Explore, excavate or make diggings on archeological sites of the ICCs/IPs for the
purpose of obtaining materials of cultural values without the free and prior informed
consent of the community concerned; and

b. Deface, remove or otherwise destroy artifacts which are of great importance to the
ICCs/IPs for the preservation of their cultural heritage.
Section 34. Right to Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Practices and to
Develop own Sciences and Technologies. - ICCs/IPs are entitled to the
recognition of the full ownership and control and protection of their cultural and
intellectual rights. They shall have the right to special measures to control, develop
and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human
and other genetic resources, seeds, including derivatives of these resources,
traditional medicines and health practices, vital medicinal plants, animals and
minerals, indigenous knowledge systems and practices, knowledge of the properties
of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literature, designs, and visual and performing arts.

Section 35. Access to Biological and Genetic Resources. - Access to biological

and genetic resources and to indigenous knowledge related to the conservation,
utilization and enhancement of these resources, shall be allowed within ancestral
lands and domains of the ICCs/IPs only with a free and prior informed consent of
such communities, obtained in accordance with customary laws of the concerned
community.

Section 36. Sustainable Agro-Technical Development. - The State shall

recognize the right of ICCs/IPs to a sustainable agro-technological development and
shall formulate and implement programs of action for its effective implementation.
The State shall likewise promote the bio-genetic and resource management systems
among the ICCs/IPs and shall encourage cooperation among government agencies
to ensure the successful sustainable development of ICCs/IPs.

Section 37. Funds for Archeological and Historical Sites. - The ICCs/IPs shall
have the right to receive from the national government all funds especially
earmarked or allocated for the management and preservation of their archeological
and historical sites and artifacts with the financial and technical support of the
national government agencies.

CHAPTER VII

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (NCIP)

Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities /

Indigenous Peoples (NCCP). - to carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall
be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies,
plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.

Section 39. Mandate. - The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-
being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and
institutions.

Section 40. Composition. - The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the
Office of the President and shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners
belonging to ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the Chairperson. The
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a list of
recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the following
ethnographic areas: Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island
Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas;
Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be
women.

Section 41. Qualifications, Tenure, Compensation. - The Chairperson and the six
(6) Commissioners must be natural born Filipino citizens, bonafide members of ICCs/
IPs as certified by his/her tribe, experienced in ethnic affairs and who have worked
for at least ten (10) years with an ICC/IP community and/or any government agency
involved in ICC/IP, at least 35 years of age at the time of appointment, and must be
of proven honesty and integrity: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be the members of the Philippine Bar: Provided, further, That
the members of the NCIP shall hold office for a period of three (3) years, and may be
subject to re-appointment for another term: Provided, furthermore, That no person
shall serve for more than two (2) terms. Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for
the unexpired term of the predecessor and in no case shall a member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity: Provided, finally, That the
Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance
with the Salary Standardization Law.

Section 42. Removal from Office. - Any member of the NCIP may be removed from
office by the President, on his own initiative or upon recommendation by any
indigenous community, before the expiration of his term for cause and after
complying with due process requirement of law.

Section 43. Appointment of Commissioners. - The President shall appoint the

seven (7) Commissioners of the NCIP within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act.

Section 44. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the NCIP shall
have the following powers, jurisdiction and function:

a) To serve as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs can seek
government assistance and as the medium, thorough which such assistance may be
extended;

b) To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing laws and
policies pertinent thereto and to propose relevant laws and policies to address their
role in national development;
c) To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects for the
economic, social and cultural development of the ICCs/IPs and to monitor the
implementation thereof;

d) To request and engage the services and support of experts from other agencies of
government or employ private experts and consultants as may be required in the
pursuit of its objectives;

e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;

f) Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements, or arrangement, with

government or private agencies or entities as may be necessary to attain the
objectives of this Act, and subject to the approval of the President, to obtain loans
from government lending institutions and other lending institutions to finance its
programs;

g) To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or properties in
whatever form and from whatever source, local and international, subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and
administer the same in accordance with the terms thereof; or in the absence of any
condition, in such manner consistent with the interest of ICCs/IPs as well as existing
laws;

h) To coordinate development programs and projects for the advancement of the

ICCs/IPs and to oversee the proper implementation thereof;

i) To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review, assess as well as

propose policies or plans;

j) To advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to the ICCs/IPs
and to submit within sixty (60) days after the close of each calendar year, a report of
its operations and achievements;

k) To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to carry out the

policies under this Act;

l) To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the President;

m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of permit, lease,

grant, or any other similar authority for the disposition, utilization, management and
appropriation by any private individual, corporate entity or any government agency,
corporation or subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain
taking into consideration the consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;

n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various offices within
the Commission:
o) To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this
Act;

p) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by the President
of the Republic of the Philippines; and

q) To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences and

conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and other related concerns.

Section 45. Accessibility and Transparency. - Subject to such limitations as may

be provided by law or by rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, all
official records, documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, as well as research data used as basis for policy development of the
Commission shall be made accessible to the public.

Section 46. Officers within the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the following offices
which shall be responsible for the implementation of the policies herein after
provided:

a. Ancestral Domains Office - The Ancestral Domain Office shall be responsible for
the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land/domains. It shall also
be responsible for the management of ancestral lands/domains in accordance with
the master plans as well as the implementation of the ancestral domain rights of the
ICCs/IPs as provided in Chapter III of this Act. It shall also issue, upon the free and
prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned, certification prior to the grant of
any license, lease or permit for the exploitation of natural resources affecting the
interests of ICCs/IPs in protecting the territorial integrity of all ancestral domains. It
shall likewise perform such other functions as the Commission may deem
appropriate and necessary;

b. Office on Policy, Planning and Research - The Office on Policy, Planning and
Research shall be responsible for the formulation of appropriate policies and
programs for ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, the development of a Five-Year
Master Plan for the ICCs/IPs. Such plan shall undergo a process such that every five
years, the Commission shall endeavor to assess the plan and make ramifications in
accordance with the changing situations. The Office shall also undertake the
documentation of customary law and shall establish and maintain a Research Center
that would serve as a depository of ethnographic information for monitoring,
evaluation and policy formulation. It shall assist the legislative branch of the national
government in the formulation of appropriate legislation benefiting ICCs/IPs.

c. Office of Education, Culture and Health - The Office on Culture, Education and
Health shall be responsible for the effective implementation of the education, cultural
and related rights as provided in this Act. It shall assist, promote and support
community schools, both formal and non-formal, for the benefit of the local
indigenous community, especially in areas where existing educational facilities are
not accessible to members of the indigenous group. It shall administer all scholarship
programs and other educational rights intended for ICC/IP beneficiaries in
coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
Commission on Higher Education. It shall undertake, within the limits of available
appropriation, a special program which includes language and vocational training,
public health and family assistance program and related subjects.

It shall also identify ICCs/IPs with potential training in the health profession and
encourage and assist them to enroll in schools of medicine, nursing, physical therapy
and other allied courses pertaining to the health profession.

Towards this end, the NCIP shall deploy a representative in each of the said offices
who shall personally perform the foregoing task and who shall receive complaints
from the ICCs/IPs and compel action from appropriate agency. It shall also monitor
the activities of the National Museum and other similar government agencies
generally intended to manage and preserve historical and archeological artifacts of
the ICCs /IPs and shall be responsible for the implementation of such other functions
as the NCIP may deem appropriate and necessary;

d. Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns - The Office on Socio-

Economic Services and Special Concerns shall serve as the Office through which
the NCIP shall coordinate with pertinent government agencies specially charged with
the implementation of various basic socio-economic services, policies, plans and
programs affecting the ICCs/IPs to ensure that the same are properly and directly
enjoyed by them. It shall also be responsible for such other functions as the NCIP
may deem appropriate and necessary;

e. Office of Empowerment and Human Rights - The Office of Empowerment and

Human Rights shall ensure that indigenous socio- political, cultural and economic
rights are respected and recognized. It shall ensure that capacity building
mechanisms are instituted and ICCs/IPs are afforded every opportunity, if they so
choose, to participate in all level decision-making. It shall likewise ensure that the
basic human rights, and such other rights as the NCIP may determine, subject to
existing laws, rules and regulations are protected and promoted;

f. Administrative Office - The Administrative Office shall provide the NCIP with
economical, efficient and effective services pertaining to personnel, finance, records,
equipment, security, supplies, and related services. It shall also administer the
Ancestral Domains Fund; and

g. Legal Affairs Office - There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall advice the
NCIP on all legal matters concerning ICCs/IPs and which shall be responsible for
providing ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in litigation involving community interest. It
shall conduct preliminary investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the ICCs/
IPs against a natural or juridical person believed to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On
the basis of its findings, it shall initiate the filing of appropriate legal or administrative
action to the NCIP.

Section 47. Other Offices. - The NCIP shall have the power to create additional
offices as it may deem necessary subject to existing rules and regulations.

Section 48. Regional and Field Offices. - Existing regional and field offices shall
remain to function under the strengthened organizational structure of the NCIP. Other
field office shall be created wherever appropriate and the staffing pattern thereof
shall be determined by the NCIP: Provided, That in provinces where there are ICCs/
IPs but without field offices, the NCIP shall establish field offices in said provinces.

Section 49. Office of the Executive Director. - The NCIP shall create the Office of
the Executive Director which shall serve as its secretariat. The office shall be headed
by an Executive Director who shall be appointed by the President of the Republic of
the Philippines upon the recommendation of the NCIP on a permanent basis. The
staffing pattern of the office shall be determined by the NCIP subject to existing rules
and regulations.

Section 50. Consultative Body. - A body consisting of the traditional leaders, elders
and representatives from the women and youth sectors of the different ICCs/IPs shall
be constituted by the NCIP from the time to time to advise it on matters relating to
the problems, aspirations and interests of the ICCs/IPs.

CHAPTER VIII

DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 51. Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains. - Self-delineation

shall be guiding principle in the identification and delineation of ancestral domains.
As such, the ICCs/IPs concerned shall have a decisive role in all the activities
pertinent thereto. The Sworn Statement of the Elders as to the Scope of the
territories and agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs, if any, will be
essential to the determination of these traditional territories. The Government shall
take the necessary steps to identify lands which the ICCs/IPs concerned traditionally
occupy and guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and
possession thereto. Measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the
rights of the ICCs/IPs concerned to land which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators.

Section 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral

domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:

a. Ancestral Domains Delineated Prior to this Act - The provisions hereunder shall
not apply to ancestral domains/lands already delineated according to DENR
Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1993, nor to ancestral lands and domains
delineated under any other community/ancestral domain program prior to the
enactment of his law. ICCs/IPs enactment of this law shall have the right to apply for
the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) over the area without
going through the process outlined hereunder;

b. Petition for Delineation - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be

initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition
for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

c. Delineation Paper - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries

including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken
by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs
concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned
and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members
of the communities concerned;

d. Proof required - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of
elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting
to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs
in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic
documents:

1. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3. Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial
grounds, sacred places and old villages;

4. Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries

entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

5. Survey plans and sketch maps;

6. Anthropological data;

7. Genealogical surveys;

8. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting

grounds;

9. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains,

rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and

10. Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e. Preparation of Maps - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact
based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter
map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features
and landmarks embraced therein;

f. Report of Investigation and Other Documents - A complete copy of the preliminary

census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains
Office of the NCIP;

g. Notice and Publication - A copy of each document, including a translation in the

native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place
therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at
the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow
other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of such
publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting
in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall
be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;

h. Endorsement to NCIP - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the
inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP
endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.
However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains
Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP:
Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in
coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the selection below.

i. Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government

Agencies - The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an
ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction
over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal
basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed;

j. Issuance of CADT - ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been officially

delineated and determined by the NCIP shall be issued a CADT in the name of the
community concerned, containing a list of all those identified in the census; and
k. Registration of CADTs - The NCIP shall register issued certificates of ancestral
domain titles and certificates of ancestral lands titles before the Register of Deeds in
the place where the property is situated.

Section 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands. -

a. The allocation of lands within any ancestral domain to individual or indigenous

corporate (family or clan) claimants shall be left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide
in accordance with customs and traditions;

b. Individual and indigenous corporate claimants of ancestral lands which are not
within ancestral domains, may have their claims officially established by filing
applications for the identification and delineation of their claims with the Ancestral
Domains Office. An individual or recognized head of a family or clan may file such
application in his behalf or in behalf of his family or clan, respectively;

c. Proofs of such claims shall accompany the application form which shall include the
testimony under oath of elders of the community and other documents directly or
indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the areas since time
immemorial by the individual or corporate claimants in the concept of owners which
shall be any of the authentic documents enumerated under Sec. 52 (d) of this act,
including tax declarations and proofs of payment of taxes;

d. The Ancestral Domains Office may require from each ancestral claimant the
submission of such other documents, Sworn Statements and the like, which in its
opinion, may shed light on the veracity of the contents of the application/claim;

e. Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land
claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the publication of the application
and a copy of each document submitted including a translation in the native
language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen
(15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and
regional offices of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file
opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of such publication:
Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio
station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be
deemed sufficient if both newspapers and radio station are not available

f. Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
investigate and inspect each application, and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a
parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The Ancestral Domains office shall
reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains office shall give the applicant
due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The
denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case of conflicting claims among individual
or indigenous corporate claimants, the Ancestral domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62
of this Act. In all proceedings for the identification or delineation of the ancestral
domains as herein provided, the Director of Lands shall represent the interest of the
Republic of the Philippines; and

g. The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and
every application surveyed and delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in turn, evaluate
or corporate (family or clan) claimant over ancestral lands.

Section 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written
request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been fraudulently
acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired
by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due
notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

Section 55. Communal Rights. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the
ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally
held: Provide, That communal rights under this Act shall not be construed as co-
ownership as provided in Republic Act. No. 386, otherwise known as the New Civil
Code.

Section 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be
recognized and respected.

Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. - The ICCs/IPs shall
have the priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs
concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the
natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for
not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement
is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its
own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally,
That the all extractions shall be used to facilitate the development and improvement
of the ancestral domains.

Section 58. Environmental Consideration. - Ancestral domains or portion thereof,

which are found necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined by the
appropriate agencies with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be
maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned
shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such
areas with the full and effective assistance of the government agencies. Should the
ICCs/IPs decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be
made in writing. The consent of the ICCs/IPs should be arrived at in accordance with
its customary laws without prejudice to the basic requirement of the existing laws on
free and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and
will ultimately revert to the ICCs/IPs in accordance with a program for technology
transfer: Provided, further, That no ICCs/IPs shall be displaced or relocated for the
purpose enumerated under this section without the written consent of the specific
persons authorized to give consent.

Section 59. Certification Precondition. - all department and other governmental

agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement,
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain. Such certificate shall only be issued after a field-based
investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domain Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certificate shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation
may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while
there is pending application CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the
right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not
satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

Section 60. Exemption from Taxes. - All lands certified to be ancestral domains
shall be exempt from real property taxes, specially levies, and other forms of
exaction except such portion of the ancestral domains as are actually used for large-
scale agriculture, commercial forest plantation and residential purposes and upon
titling by other by private person: Provided, that all exactions shall be used to
facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 61. Temporary Requisition Powers. - Prior to the establishment of an

institutional surveying capacity whereby it can effectively fulfill its mandate, but in no
case beyond three (3) years after its creation, the NCIP is hereby authorized to
request the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) survey
teams as well as other equally capable private survey teams, through a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), to delineate ancestral domain perimeters. The
DENR Secretary shall accommodate any such request within one (1) month of its
issuance: Provided, That the Memorandum of Agreement shall stipulate, among
others, a provision for technology transfer to the NCIP.

Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there

are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan,
and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the
proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains:
Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the
traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall
be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry
out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That in any decision, order, award or
ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be
brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof.

Section 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the
ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall be applied first with respect to
property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the application of laws shall be resolved in favor
of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 64. Remedial Measures. - Expropriation may be resorted to in the

resolution of conflicts of interest following the principle of the "common good". The
NCIP shall take appropriate legal action for the cancellation of officially documented
titles which were acquired illegally: Provided, That such procedure shall ensure that
the rights of possessors in good faith shall be respected: Provided, further, That the
action for cancellation shall be initiated within two (2) years from the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, finally, That the action for reconveyance shall be a period of ten (10)
years in accordance with existing laws.

CHAPTER IX

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Section 65. Primary of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve
ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided,
however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

Section 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. - Decisions of the NCIP shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.

Section 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders. - Upon expiration of the

period here provided and no appeal is perfected by any of the contending parties, the
Hearing Officer of the NCIP, on its own initiative or upon motion by the prevailing
party, shall issue a writ of execution requiring the sheriff or the proper officer to
execute final decisions, orders or awards of the Regional Hearing Officer of the
NCIP.
Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the power
and authority:

a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of

cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas

requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books,
papers, contracts, records, agreements and other document of similar nature as may
be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing
conducted in pursuance of this Act;

c. To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate

penalties therefor; and

d. To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending therefore it
which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of
the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity.

Section 70. No restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. - No inferior court of

the Philippines shall have the jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction against the NCIP or any of its duly authorized or designated
offices in any case, dispute or controversy to, or interpretation of this Act and other
pertinent laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.

CHAPTER X

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS FUND

Section 71. Ancestral Domains Fund. - There is hereby created a special fund, to
be known as the Ancestral Domains Fund, an initial amount of the One Hundred
thirty million pesos(P130,000,000) to cover compensation for expropriated lands,
delineation and development of ancestral domains. An amount of Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000) shall be sourced from the gross income of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from its lotto operation, Ten millions pesos
(P10,000,000) from the gross receipts of the travel tax of the preceding year, the
fund of the Social Reform Council intended for survey and delineation of ancestral
lands/domains, and such other source as the government may be deem appropriate.
Thereafter such amount shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Foreign as well as local funds which are made available for the ICCs/IPs through the
government of the Philippines shall be coursed through the NCIP. The NCIP may
also solicit and receive donations, endowments shall be exempted from income or
gift taxes and all other taxes, charges or fees imposed by the government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
 CHAPTER XI

PENALTIES

Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any person who commits
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to, authorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10,
Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and
24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in accordance with
the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such penalty shall
be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the
death penalty or excessive fines be imposed. This provision shall be without
prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In
which case, any person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more than
twelve (12) years or a fine not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000)
nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and
imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay
to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter
as a consequence of the unlawful act.

Section 73. Persons Subject to Punishment. - If the offender is a juridical person,

all officers such as, but not limited to, its president, manager, or head of office
responsible for their unlawful act shall be criminally liable therefor, in addition to the
cancellation of certificates of their registration and/or license: Provided, That if the
offender is a public official, the penalty shall include perpetual disqualification to hold
public office.

CHAPTER XII

MERGER OF THE OFFICE FOR NORTHERN CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (ONCC)
AND THE OFFICE FOR SOUTHERN CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (OSCC)

Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC. - The Office for Northern Cultural

Communities (ONCC) and the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC),
created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are hereby
merged as organic offices of the NCIP and shall continue to function under a
revitalized and strengthened structures to achieve the objectives of the NCIP:
Provided, That the positions of Regional Directors and below, are hereby phased-out
upon the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That officials and employees of the
phased-out offices who may be qualified may apply for reappointment with the NCIP
and may be given prior rights in the filing up of the newly created positions of NCIP,
subject to the qualifications set by the Placement Committee: Provided, furthermore,
That in the case where an indigenous person and a non-indigenous person with
similar qualifications apply for the same position, priority shall be given to the former.
Officers and employees who are to be phased-out as a result of the merger of their
offices shall be entitled to gratuity a rate equivalent to one and a half (1 1/2) months
salary for every year of continuous and satisfactory service rendered or the
equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of the highest
salary received. If they are already entitled to retirement benefits or the gratuity
herein provided. Officers and employees who may be reinstated shall refund such
retirement benefits or gratuity received: Provided, finally That absorbed personnel
must still meet the qualifications and standards set by the Civil Service and the
Placement Committee herein created.

Section 75. Transition Period. - The ONCC/OSCC shall have a period of six (6)
months from the effectivity of this Act within which to wind up its affairs and to
conduct audit of its finances.

Section 76. Transfer of Assets/Properties. - All real and personal properties which
are vested in, or belonging to, the merged offices as aforestated shall be transferred
to the NCIP without further need of conveyance, transfer or assignment and shall be
held for the same purpose as they were held by the former offices: Provided, That all
contracts, records and documents shall be transferred to the NCIP. All agreements
and contracts entered into by the merged offices shall remain in full force and effect
unless otherwise terminated, modified or amended by the NCIP.

Section 77. Placement Committee. - Subject to rules on government

reorganization, a Placement Committee shall be created by the NCIP, in coordination
with the Civil Service Commission, which shall assist in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel in order that the best qualified and most deserving persons
shall be appointed in the reorganized agency. The placement Committee shall be
composed of seven (7) commissioners and an ICCs/IPs representative from each of
the first and second level employees association in the Offices for Northern and
Southern Cultural Communities (ONCC/OSCC), nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) who have served the community for at least five (5) years and peoples
organizations (POs) with at least five (5) years of existence. They shall be guided by
the criteria of retention and appointment to be prepared by the consultative body and
by the pertinent provisions of the civil service law.

CHAPTER XIII

FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 78. Special Provision. - The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by
its Chapter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain
as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior
land rights and titles recognized and/or required through any judicial, administrative
or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided,
further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the
City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act.

Section 79. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to finance the initial

implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current year's appropriation
of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its
continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 80. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days
immediately after appointment, the NCIP shall issue the necessary rules and
regulations, in consultation with the Committees on National Cultural Communities of
the House of Representatives and the Senate, for the effective implementation of this
Act.

Section 81. Saving Clause. - This Act will not in any manner adversely affect the
rights and benefits of the ICCs/IPs under other conventions, recommendations,
international treaties, national laws, awards, customs and agreements.

Section 82. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act or any portion
thereof is declared unconstitutional by a competent court, other provisions shall not
be affected thereby.

Section 83. Repealing Clause. - Presidential Decree NO. 410, Executive Order
Nos. 122-B and 122-C, and all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 84. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days (15) days upon its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 29 October 1997.

o Cruz vs. Sec. DENR, supra

➢ Experiential Learning to a Protected Area in Panay