The End of #WeirdBaseball?

by Cody Stumpo

Major League Baseball is considering changing the rules of the game in the most significant
way since the introduction of the Designated Hitter 40+ years ago. The idea is to start each half
of each extra inning with the last batter of the previous inning on second base! The goal is to
limit extra inning games from taking forever and getting ridiculous. A little ridiculous once in
awhile is great for a lot of fans, but I can at least see the argument that it might be worth
pursuing less extreme extra inning games. Playing when tired is a great way to get hurt, and a
marathon game not only creates tired players that day but for the rest of the week.

There’s enough data to say fairly well what the effect of the rule change will be, so I interrogated
that data (every pitch of 2014-2016, more than 2 million of them) to find out the answers to a
few questions.
1) Are extra innings “like” regular innings?
2) What happens now in extra inning games? What’s the distribution of how long they go?
3) Can we simulate the statistical distribution of today’s extra inning game length?
4) What is the distribution of runs scored after a “man on second, no outs” situation occurs?
5) What will the distribution of game-length be under the new rule?
If the answers to numbers 1 and 3 are yes, we can put the power of the full data set behind
number 4 in order to answer number 5 and compare that to what we learn from number 2. Once
we have these fundamental questions answered, we’ll also be in position to think about the
situation a little more deeply.

Are extra innings “like” regular innings

exactly N runs scored Regulation Extra

(Top-half only, to avoid counting walkoffs)

0 73.4% 74.5%

1 14.7% 13.5%

2 6.6% 7.0%

3 3.1% 2.7%

4 1.3% 1.2%

5 0.6% 0.6%

Yes, extra innings are “like” regular innings. Since the two types of innings are similar, this lets
us draw conclusions about all innings and apply them to extra innings. This is kind of
extraordinary, with all the reasons to suspect they would be different.
What happens now in extra inning games? How many innings do they last?

Can we simulate the statistical distribution of today’s extra inning game length?

Pretty close. Purely using the distribution of all major league teams scoring runs, and not
focusing on the fact that some are better than others at scoring and some are better than others
at preventing scoring, I approach the empirical distribution. This is again kind of extraordinary,
as all the strategy and maneuvering in the actual history doesn’t seem to produce much
different results than drawing each inning’s runs scored from a hat.

Methodology is just sampling with replacement from the empirical distribution of runs scored per
inning in MLB 2014-2016 and applying rules for if those were extra inning sides, when would the
game end.

Note also that 90-95% of extra inning games are over after 13 or 14 innings.
What is the distribution of runs scored in an inning after a “man on second, no outs”
situation occurs?

exactly N runs scored Bases Empty Man on Second

0 74% 38%

1 15% 35%

2 7% 14%

3 3% 7%

4 1% 3%

5 0.5% 1.5%

As expected, this affects things dramatically! The chance of a shutout inning is cut in half. The
chance of scoring multiple runs also doubles, so it would become a pretty wild affair with a
pretty decent chance of the visiting team scoring a run or two and the home team fighting back.

What will the distribution of game-length be under the new rule?

Using the same methodology of sampling with replacement from the observed run distribution of
“man on second, nobody out” innings and applying rules for if those were extra inning sides,
when would the game end, we see the expected dramatic effect.
Now, 70% of games would end after just 1 extra inning, and 90-95% would be over after 2 to 3
extra innings. Recall that 90-95% of extra inning games now are not over until after 4-5 extra
innings.

Instead of 2.3 expected extra innings once the game goes to extra innings, we would have 1.4.

What else would change?

The law of unintended consequences probably applies here. While MLB executives would
achieve their desired effect of shortening extra inning games severely, we should consider what
other impacts the rule change might have.

One reason baseball rules rarely change is the explicit value fans place on that continuity, and
the ability to compare statistics and records across eras. As less obvious rules and
enforcements have affected the run-scoring environment over time, we now have
well-understood methods for this based on how much better (worse) a player is than his
contemporaries, but the records and benchmarks that stick in peoples’ minds are not these
adjusted ones. This rule change seems significant enough to potentially be a discontinuity in
how we understand baseball statistics.

It’s worth asking then, how often extra innings happen. In these 3 seasons, 8.7% of games
went to extra innings. At first, that does sound significant, but more to the point of interpreting
season statistics, only 2.2% of innings were extra innings. And if this rule were to be adopted,
while extra innings would be entered with the same 8.7% frequency, presumably extra-inning
games would end much more quickly, and much less than 2.2% of innings would be extra.

Doing the math, we can confirm only 1.4% of innings would be extra under the proposed rule.
While there would be this enhanced run-scoring environment introduced fairly often (still 8.7% of
games), it would be in force so briefly each time that the overall effect on season statistics
would not be large.

More interestingly, the inflated run-scoring of extra innings could mean the home team will win
more often. Currently, the home team wins 50.2% of extra inning games (as opposed to 53.4%
of all games). The inning-at-a-time rules of extra innings combined with the high chance of
scoring 0 runs in any one particular inning means if the visiting team does manage to score a
run in the top half, they have a good (about 3/4) chance of the home team not coming back.
That home-team advantage evaporates in extra innings is a persistent and real effect -
http://retrosheet.org/Research/PankinM/Pankin-sabr42posters.pdf​.

The same inning-at-a-time rule but coupled with the proposed start-with-a-man-on-second rule
would change the dynamics a lot. Now, the home team could expect to win 51.8% of extra
inning games. And further impact on the home team winning more often should be seen when
we explore the implications of the home team choosing its strategy for the inning only after
seeing how many runs the visiting team scored.

TIME FOR SOME GAME THEORY!

All this so far ignores the issue of human behavior. Managers would be sorely tempted to bunt
that initial runner over and have the situation be man on third, one out.

Running a similar exercise as before, but starting from man on third & one out (let’s just say for
now that teams execute this sacrifice successfully every time) how does that affect the runs
scored distribution of the inning?

exactly N Bases Empty; Man on 2; Man on 3;

runs scored 0 outs 0 outs 1 out

0 74% 38% 33%

1 15% 35% 50%

2 7% 14% 10%

3 3% 7% 5%

4 1% 3% 2%
As expected, there’s a higher chance of scoring 1 run but a lower chance of scoring more than
one run. You’ve taken your run expectancy down from 1.09 to 0.95, which might be OK if you’re
playing for one run to win the game.

The visiting manager has two choices, to bunt or not to bunt. The home team manager has
those same two choices, but the advantage of knowing how many runs they need to win or tie.

What if the visitor always bunts (assuming the home team never does)? Well, like you might
expect, the strategy to go for one run at the expense of the multi-run inning is suboptimal when
the other team can (relatively) easily score multiple runs in the bottom half and win the game.
The home team winning percentage goes back up to 53.4% in this scenario.

What if the visitor still bunts, but the home team decides to bunt only if the visitor scores 0 or 1
runs in the top half? That’s when it seems to make sense to play for one run, but it doesn’t
move the needle. The home team remains with a 53.4% winning percentage.

So what if the visitor refuses to bunt then? Well, that’s a good idea. Then even if the home team
continues to bunt only if down 0 or 1, home team winning percentage falls back to 52.4%, the
best the visitors can do. Here, we find the Nash equilibrium of the game, and the recommended
strategy for each team.

Visitor Strategy
Home Winning Percentage
Never Bunt Always Bunt

Never Bunt 51.8% 53.4%

Home
Strategy Bunt Down 0 or 1 52.4% 53.4%

Always Bunt 50.7% 52.4%

We see for either team, always bunting is a strictly dominated strategy (no matter what the other
team strategy ends up being, it works out worse to always bunt).

Appendix: Code Repository

https://github.com/CodyStumpo/MLB-Extra-Inning-Rule-Change