Partido Manggawa vs. Comelec, 484 SCRA 671 (’06) 1. Edgar L.

Valdez
The petition at bar involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-list elections. 2. Ernesto G. Pablo
The antecedents are undisputed. Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the 3. Sunny Rose A. Madamba
formula to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. In AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!) - 3 seats
response, COMELEC issued Resolution 6835, adopting the simplified formula of "one additional seat per additional two 1. Loreta Ann P. Rosales
percent of the total party-list votes." The resolution reads: 2. Mario Joyo Aguja
Considering that the simplified formula has long been the one adopted by the Commission and is now the formula of 3. Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel
choice of SC in its latest resolution on the matter, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG (BUHAY) - 2 seats
simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the 1. Rene M. Velarde
party-list winners in the coming May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. 2. Hans Christian M. Señeres
In finding that this simplified formula is the "formula of choice of the Supreme Court," respondent Commission quoted ANAKPAWIS (AP) - 2 seats
the memorandum of Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, Commissioner-In-Charge for Party-List concerns, viz: 1. Crispin B. Beltran
By way of review, following is a highlight of the legal discourse on the 2% vote requirement for the party-list system and 2. Rafael V. Mariano
the corollary issue on additional seat allocation. CITIZEN'S BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) - 1 seat
Sec. 11(b) and Sec. 12 of RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) provide that "the parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each, provided that those garnering GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY (GABRIELA) - 1 seat
more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. COMELEC shall Liza Largoza-Maza
tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) - 1 seat
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by Renato B. Magtubo
each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system." BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) - 1 seat
These provisions of the statute were transformed into the following formulas by SC in Veterans Federation Party v. Benjamin A. Cruz
COMELEC (2000). For the party-list candidate garnering the highest number of votes, the following formula was adopted: ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS (AVE) - 1 seat
Number of votes of first party Eulogio R. Magsaysay
Total votes for party-list system = Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for the party-list system ALAGAD (ALAGAD) - 1 seat
VETERANS FREEDOM PARTY (VFP) - 1 seat
And for the additional seats of other parties who reached the required 2% mark, the following formula applies: Ernesto S. Gidaya
Additional seats concerned party = No. of votes of concerned party COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO) - 1 seat
No. of votes of first party x No. of additional seats allocated to the first party Guillermo P. Cua
AN WARAY (AN WARAY) - 1 seat
The applicability of these formulas was reiterated in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of SC in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Florencio G. Noel
Party v. COMELEC, et al., and Bayan Muna v. COMELEC, et al. penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban, wherein the Court ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) - 1 seat
declared that party-list BUHAY was not entitled to an additional seat even if it garnered 4.46 [percent] of the total party- Mujiv S. Hataman
list votes, contrary to BUHAY's contention which was based on the COMELEC simplified formula of one additional seat per
an additional 2% of the total party-list votes. However, on November 10, 2003, SC promulgated a Resolution in the same Subsequently, ALIF was also proclaimed as "duly-elected party-list participant and its nominee, Hadji Acmad M. Tomawis,
case, this time penned by Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., granting BUHAY's motion for reconsideration of the June 25, as elected representative to the House of Representatives." On June 22, 2004, petitioners PM and BUTIL, together with
2003 Resolution, to wit: CIBAC, filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation with the respondent Commission en banc. They prayed that they
It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained be declared as entitled to 1 additional seat each and their respective second nominees be proclaimed as duly elected
more than 4% of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the members of the House of Representatives. As basis, they cited the formula used by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first four whose additional nominees are now holding office as member of the Labor Party v. COMELEC, viz:
House of Representatives, BUHAY should be declared entitled to one additional seat. Effectively, SC, with Justices Jose Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Vitug and Panganiban registering separate opinions, adopted the simplified COMELEC formula of one additional seat per Votes Cast for First Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
additional two percent of the total party-list votes garnered when it declared BUHAY entitled to one additional seat and
proceeded to order the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee. Party-List Canvass Report No. 205 showed that On June 25, 2004, petitioners and CIBAC filed a Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate Proclamation) to justify
the total number of votes cast for all the party-list participants in the May 10, 2004 elections was 12,721,952 and the their entitlement to an additional seat, as follows:
following parties, organizations and coalitions received at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system 5. To compute the additional seats that movants are entitled to using the Veterans formula of SC in the aforesaid Ang
Based on the simplified formula, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. NBC 04-0046 proclaiming the following Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna cases, and Party List Canvass Report No. 20, the following process is
parties, organizations and coalition as winners and their qualified nominees as representatives to the House of done: Bayan Muna is the "First Party" with 1,203,305 votes. To determine the number of seats allocated to the first party,
Representatives: we use the Veterans formula, to wit:
BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA) - 3 seats Number of votes of first party
1. Saturnino C. Ocampo Total Votes for party-list system = Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system
2. Teodoro A. Casiño, Jr.
3. Joel G. Virador Applying this formula, we arrive at 9.4585%
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC) - 3 seats 1,203,305
12,721,952 = 9.4585% e) to immediately proclaim similarly situated parties' second nominees as duly elected representatives to the House of
6. Having obtained 9.4585%, the first party, Bayan Muna, is allotted 3 seats. Representatives. They submit as sole issue:
7. The number of additional seats that the movants are entitled to are determined as follows: WHETHER the RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC, AS NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
COULD BE COMPELLED BY THE HONORABLE COURT TO MECHANICALLY APPLY THE FORMULA STATED IN ITS RESOLUTION
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party IN ANG BAGONG BAYANI CASES IN THE DETERMINATION OF QUALIFIED PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATIONS AND IN THE
Votes Cast for First Party x Allotted Seats for First Party PROCLAMATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NOMINEES.

For BUTIL, the computation is as follows: We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent Commission, through the Office of Solicitor General, submits
Additional Seats = 429,259 that petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus with this Court is improper. It raises the following procedural issues:
1,203,305 x3 = 1.0701 (a) the proper remedy from the assailed resolution of the respondent Commission is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
For CIBAC, the computation is: of Rules of Court; (b) the instant action was filed out of time; (c) failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Additional Seats = 495,193 resolution with the respondent Commission is fatal to petitioners' action. In assailing petitioners' recourse to a petition for
1,203,305 x3 = 1.2345 mandamus, respondent Commission relies on Section 7, Article IX(A) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any
For PM, the computation is: decision, order or ruling" of the respondent Commission "may be brought to SC on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
Additional Seats = 448,072 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof." It contends that in Aratuc v. COMELEC and Dario v. Mison, this provision was
1,203,305 x3 = 1.1171 construed as the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and not the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. Respondent
8. All the foregoing results are greater than 1; therefore, the movant-party list organizations are entitled to 1 additional Commission further contends that its duty to proclaim the second nominees of PM and BUTIL is not ministerial but
seat each. On July 31, 2004, respondent Commission en banc, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011, viz: This pertains to the discretionary, hence, it is not subject to the writ of mandamus.
06 July 2004 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee, National Board of Canvassers, submitting its The arguments fail to impress.
comment/recommendation on the petition filed by Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Citizens Battle Against Corruption Under the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. We
(CIBAC), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela Women's Party for additional seat and to immediately proclaim their have consistently ruled that where the duty of the respondent Commission is ministerial, mandamus lies to compel its
respective second nominees to the House of Representatives, and the letter of Atty. Ivy Perucho, Legal counsel of CIBAC, performance. A purely ministerial act, as distinguished from a discretionary act, is one which an officer or tribunal
relative to the Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed by BUTIL, CIBAC, PM requesting to calendar for resolution performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
the said Joint Motion. The Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee reads: to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
"This has reference to the Urgent Motion for Resolution (re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation dated 22 June The case at bar is one of mandamus over which this Court has jurisdiction for it is respondent Commission's ministerial
2004) filed on July 1, 2004 by movants BUTIL, CIBAC and PM, NBC Case No. 04-197 (195) and a similar motion filed by duty to apply the formula as decided by this Court after interpreting the existing law on party-list representation. It is given
party-list Gabriela Women's Party (NBC No. 04-200) through counsel, praying to declare that the herein movants are that this Court has the ultimate authority to interpret laws and the Constitution. Respondent Commission has no
entitled to 1 additional seat each, and to immediately proclaim the second nominees, to wit: discretion to refuse enforcement of any decision of this Court under any guise or guile.
SC, in its latest Resolution promulgated on November 10, 2003 in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, et al. In any event, it is the averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties, that determine the
and Bayan Muna v. Comelec, et al., laid down a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2 percent of the nature of the action. Though captioned as a Petition for Mandamus, the same may be treated as a petition for certiorari
total party list votes. The same simplified formula was adopted by the Commission in its Resolution No. 6835 promulgated and mandamus considering that it alleges that the respondent Commission acted contrary to prevailing jurisprudence,
08 May 2004, to quote: "The additional seats of other parties who reached the required two percent mark, the following hence, with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction. In previous rulings, we have treated differently labeled
formula applies: actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as "justice, equity and fairplay"and "novelty of
Additional seats for = No. of votes of concerned party the issue presented and its far-reaching effects." The petition at bar involves the rightful representation in the House of
concerned party No. of votes of the first party x No. of additional seats allocated to first party Representatives of the marginalized groups by the party-list winners and their constitutional claim merits more than a
disposition based on thin technicality.
The aforenamed party-list organizations have not obtained the required additional 2% of the total party-list votes for them Next, respondent Commission contends that the petition at bar was filed belatedly. Under Article IX(A), Section 7 of the
to merit an additional seat. For your Honors' consideration." Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the instant petition must be filed within 30 days from receipt of
the notice of the decision, order or ruling to be reviewed. Since more than 30 days have lapsed from the time PM and
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to direct the Supervisory Committee to BUTIL allegedly received notice of respondent Commission's Resolution 6835, it is urged that the instant petition was filed
cause the re-tabulation of the votes for Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Partido ng out of time. Again, the contention is without merit.
Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela) and to submit its comment/recommendation, together with the We have interpreted Art. IX(A), Sec. 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to mean final orders,
tabulated figures of the foregoing parties, for appropriate action of the Commission. Let the Supervisory Committee rulings and decisions of the respondent Commission rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
implement this resolution and to furnish copies hereof to the parties concerned for their information and guidance. SO Before resolving whether Resolution 6835 was rendered in the exercise of respondent Commission's adjudicatory or quasi-
ORDERED. judicial powers, we recapitulate the pertinent events.
On May 8, 2004, respondent Commission issued Resolution 6835. On June 2, 2004, it also issued Resolution NBC 04-004
For failure of respondent Commission to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners and to cause the re-tabulation holding petitioners entitled to only 1 nominee each on the basis of Resolution 6835. On June 22, 2004, petitioners filed a
of the party-list votes despite the lapse of time, petitioners PM and BUTIL filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004. Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation with party-list co-participant CIBAC, claiming entitlement to an additional seat
They seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commission: using the formula stated in Ang Bagong Bayani. Thereafter, they filed their Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate
a) to convene as National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System; Proclamation). On July 1, 2004, they filed an Urgent Motion for Resolution (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation
b) to declare them as entitled to 1 additional seat each; dated 22 June 2004) and again, on July 12, 2004, they filed their Motion to Resolve (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate
c) to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees; Proclamation filed on 22 June 2004). In response, respondent Commission en banc issued Resolution NBC 04-011 quoted
d) to declare other similarly situated party-list organizations as entitled to 1 additional seat each; and above, which directed the Supervisory Committee "to cause the re-tabulation of the votes" of CIBAC, GABRIELA and
petitioners PM and BUTIL. The resolution referred to the Memorandum of Supervisory Committee which adopted the
simplified formula in Resolution 6835. Without further ado, petitioners BUTIL and PM filed the instant petition on August
18, 2004 or 18 days after the promulgation of Resolution NBC 04-011. Clearly, the instant petition was timely filed. We
hold that Resolution 6835 was not rendered in the exercise of respondent COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers. Its issuance
was not brought about by a matter or case filed before the Commission. Rather, it was issued by the Commission in the
exercise of its administrative function to enforce and administer election laws to ensure an orderly election.
Finally, respondent Commission contends that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration of Resolution 6835
is fatal. Again, the argument is without merit. Under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, order or decision of the respondent Commission is not allowed. Moreover, the issue of
what formula applies in determining the additional seats to be allocated to party-list winners is a pure question of law that
is a recognized exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We now resolve the substantive issue: the formula for computing the additional seats due for winners in party-list
elections.
Petitioners cite the formula crafted by the Court in the landmark case of Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC. They
allege that the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC "reiterated that the
additional seats for qualified party-list organizations shall be computed in accordance with the above formula in Veterans"
and that the November 20, 2003 Resolution33 of the Court in the same case "had not departed from its 25 June 2003
Resolution." A review of the pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence on the party-list system is appropriate.
The Constitution provides:
Art. VI, Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Pursuant to the Constitution's mandate, Congress enacted RA 7941, also known as the "Party-List System Act," to
"promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-
list system." The law provides as follows:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
the proportion of their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than 3 seats.
Sec. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. - The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
These provisions on the party-list system were put to test in the May 11, 1998 elections. In the landmark case of
Veterans, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for issuance of temporary restraining
orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed by some parties and organizations that had obtained at least 2% of the
total party-list votes cast in the May 11, 1998 party-list elections, against COMELEC and 38 other parties, organizations and
coalitions which had been declared by COMELEC as entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
following issues were raised: 1) whether the 20% constitutional allocation is mandatory; 2) whether the 2% threshold
requirement and the 3-seat limit under Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional; and 3) how the additional seats of a
qualified party should be determined. In said case, the Court set the "4 inviolable parameters" of the party-list system
under the Constitution and RA 7941, to wit:
First, the 20% allocation - - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the 2% threshold - - only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the 3-seat limit - - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of 3 seats; that is, one "qualifying" and 2 additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."
Likewise, the Court spelled out the formula for allocating the seats for party-list winners, thus:
Step 1. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of
this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by
the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least 2% of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step 2. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the
most number of votes.
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The formula is as follows:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of
Total votes for Party-list system = first party relative to total votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least 6% of the total valid votes
cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total of 3 seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than 4%, but less than 6%, then the first party shall have
one additional or a total of 2 seats. And if the proportion is less than 4%, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
Step 3. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based
on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of concerned party
Additional seats for concerned party = Total No. of votes for party-list system
No. of votes of first party x No. of additional seats
Total No. of votes for party-list system allocated to the first party
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
Additional seats for concerned party = No. of votes of concerned party x No. of additional seats allocated
No. of votes of first party to the first party
Applying this formula, the Court found the outcome of the May 11, 1998 party-list elections (data here)…
The case of Ang Bagong Bayani arose during the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. Two petitions for certiorari were filed
by several party-list candidates: (a) to challenge a resolution of the COMELEC approving the participation of some 154
organizations and parties in the May 14, 2001 party-list elections; and (b) to disqualify certain parties classified as "political
parties" and "organizations/coalitions" by COMELEC. In a Decision dated June 26, 2001, the Court established the 8-point
guideline for screening of party-list participants. The case was then remanded to COMELEC for the immediate conduct of
summary evidentiary hearings to implement the 8-point guideline.
In due time, COMELEC submitted its compliance reports to the Court. Based on the compliance reports, the Court issued
several resolutions proclaiming BAYAN MUNA with its 3 nominees and AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC, with one
nominee each, as party-list winners.
Subsequently, several motions for proclamation were filed by other party-list participants. In resolving the motions, the
Court had to consider, among others, the effect of the disqualification after the elections of many party-list participants to
the total votes cast for the party-list elections. In the previous case of Labo v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that the votes
cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered "stray" except when the electorate is fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In its Resolution dated June 25, 2003, the Court held that
the Labo doctrine cannot be applied to the party-list system in view of Sec. 10 of RA 7941 which expressly provides that
the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted." The
Court then proceeded to determine the number of nominees the party-list winners were entitled, thus:
We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the formula in
Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest
number of votes) is considered the first party. The applicable formula is as follows:
Number of votes of first party
Total votes for party-list system = Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system
Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent: Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to 3 seats. This
finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans.
We shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties - - BUHAY, AMIN,
ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at
0.51:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Votes Cast for First Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
= 290,760
1,708,253 x 3
= 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat. It is entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the
other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3: (table here)
The additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC, if any, were not determined in the Court's Resolution dated
June 25, 2003, as there was a separate pending motion filed by BAYAN MUNA to set aside the resolution of COMELEC
proclaiming APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC's respective additional nominees. Dissatisfied by the Court's June 25, 2003
Resolution, BUHAY filed a motion to have it declared as entitled to 1 additional seat. On November 20, 2003, in the same
case of Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court computed the additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC in accordance
with the formula stated in the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003, and found the results as follows:
APEC - - 1.40
AKBAYAN - - 0.66
BUTIL - - 0.58
CIBAC - - 0.56
Then, the Court resolved pro hac vice to grant BUHAY's motion, reasoning that: It is thus established in the Resolution of
25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained more than 4% of the total number of votes
validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first
four whose additional nominees are now holding office as member of the House of Representatives, BUHAY should be
declared entitled to additional seat. In light of all these antecedents, we deny the petition.
The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails.
First, the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani referred to the Veterans case in determining the
number of seats due for the party-list winners. The footnote on said resolution in computing the additional seats for the
party-list winners states: "for a discussion of how to compute additional nominees for parties other than the first, see
Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282..." The Court likewise held that:
We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of
nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government,
especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list
candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.
Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court gave an additional seat to BUHAY only
because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN which "had obtained more than 4% of the total
number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well to note,
the grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice, thus: ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVES, pro hac vice
1. To consider closed and terminated the issue regarding the proclamation by COMELEC of the additional nominees of
APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, such nominees having taken their oath and assumed office;
2. To DECLARE that BUHAY is entitled to 1 additional seat in the party-list system in the elections of May 2001 and;
3. To ORDER the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.
SO ORDERED.
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion." A ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot
be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the
November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned. The confusion in the petition at
bar must have been created by the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani. Be that as it may, we reiterate that the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for
party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans:
Additional seats for concerned party = No. of votes of concerned party x No. of additional seats
No. of votes of the first party allocated to first party
Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass Report 20, we do not find petitioners entitled to any
additional seat. Thus:
Additional seats for PM = 448,072
1,203,305 x 2
= 0.74
Additional seats for BUTIL = 429,259
1,203,305 x 2
= 0.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
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CIBAC v. Comelec- G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 7, 2006 COMELEC Resolution
06-0248,2 which rejected the Motion for Proclamation of Second Nominees of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
et al. under the party-list system in connection with the May 2004 National and Local Elections.
The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System, issued Resolution NBC 04-
0043 promulgated on June 2, 2004, which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those which qualified to occupy a seat in
Congress having received the required 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List
Canvass Report 19,4 CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-list
participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by SC in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, resulted in a
percentage of 3.9084.6 In the computation for additional seats for the parties, COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of
one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-
list system for having received less than what was prescribed by the poll body.
On June 22, 2004, petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), filed a
Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation entreating COMELEC en banc to recognize their entitlement to an additional seat
and that their second nominees be immediately proclaimed. They based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna), applying the following Veterans formula:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Votes Cast for First Party for First Party x Allotted Seats
On March 7, 2006, COMELEC en banc issued the challenged Resolution 06-0248 contained in the Excerpt from the
Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of COMELEC, which adopted the March 6, 2006 Memorandum of the Supervisory
Committee relative to the Urgent Motion to Resolve the Motion for Proclamation of the Second Nominees of CIBAC,
BUTIL, and PM party-lists, in connection with the May 2004 elections for party-list representatives. The pertinent portion
reads: "On 01 May 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, then CIC on Party-List Concerns, acting on queries from several
party-list candidates regarding the formula to be used by the Commission in determining the additional seats for party list
winners in the 10 May 2004 elections, issued a memorandum on the matter to the Commission en-banc. As a result, on
the 08 May 2004, the Commission en banc promulgated Resolution 6835 (Annex ‘A’) the resolutory portion of which
reads… ‘RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2% of the total party-list votes in
the proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections.’
The Party List Canvass Report No. 22 of the National Board of Canvassers, (Annex ‘B’) shows that CIBAC, BUTIL and PM
have the following percentage of total votes garnered:
CIBAC - 3.8638
BUTIL - 3.3479
PM - 3.4947
Following the simplified formula of the Commission, after the first 2% is deducted from the percentage of votes of the
above-named party-lists, they are no longer entitled to an additional seat. It is worth mentioning that the Commission,
consistent with its formula, denied the petition for a seat of ABA-AKO and ANAD after garnering a percentage of votes of
1.9900 and 1.9099 respectively. For consideration."
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the
Supervisory Committee to deny the foregoing Motion of CIBAC, BUTIL and PM party-lists for proclamation of second
nominees, following the simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution 6835 promulgated
08 May 2004.
The Issues
Undeterred, CIBAC filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before this Court, raising two issues:
A. WHETHER COMELEC, IN ADOPTING THE SIMPLIFIED FORMULA OF 1 ADDITIONAL SEAT PER ADDITIONAL 2% OF THE
TOTAL PARTY-LIST VOTES IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PARTY-LIST WINNERS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 NATIONAL and
LOCAL ELECTION, THUS, ADJUDGING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS ENTITLED ONLY TO 1 SEAT, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE of
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
B. WHETHER CIBAC, and OTHER PARTY-LIST GROUPS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE ENTITLED TO 1 ADDITIONAL SEAT BASED
ON THE FORMULA CRAFTED BY SC IN THE CASES OF ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND BAYAN MUNA.
In gist, the core issue is whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner CIBAC an additional seat
in the House of Representatives under the party-list system by using the simplified formula instead of the claimed Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula.
Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that COMELEC committed a serious departure from settled jurisprudence amounting to grave
abuse of discretion when it mistakenly relied on the "simplified formula" as basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed
that COMELEC simplified formula runs counter to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the "number of
allotted seats for the first party" as multiplier. If Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula were applied, CIBAC would
be entitled to one additional seat, thus:
Additional seats = 495,193 x 3
1,203,305 = 1.2345
Lastly, petitioner faults COMELEC for its failure to act on and so dismiss the petitions for disqualification filed by the other
party-list groups which could have enabled COMELEC to "make an accurate determination of the votes that each party-list
group has actually obtained." It therefore asks the Court to set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolution 06-0248; and direct
COMELEC to declare CIBAC as entitled to 1 additional seat and to immediately proclaim Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, its
second nominee, as member of the House of Representatives.
The Court’s Ruling
Entitlement to an additional seat: In deciding the controversy at hand, a second look at the enabling law, RA 7941, "An Act
Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,"
is in order. The objective of the law was made clear in Section 2:
Declaration of Policy.––The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
In determining the number of seats a party-list is entitled to, Sec. 11 prescribes that: The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided,
that those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats.
The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the 4 inviolable parameters to determine the winners in a Philippine-style
party-list election mandated by the Constitution and RA 7941, as follows:
First, the 20% allocation––the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the 2% threshold––only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the 3-seat limit––each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of 3 seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation––the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold, "proportional
representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the
entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans:
How do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least 2% of the total votes shall be entitled to 1 seat. Proportionally, if the first party was to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The formula,
therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first party relative to
Total votes for party-list system = total votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least 6% of the total valid votes
cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total of 3 seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than 4%, but less than 6%, then the first party shall have
one additional or a total of 2 seats. And if the proportion is less than 4%, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat. We adopted the 6% bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of
additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to 3 seats each. In such scenario,
the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation. In simplified form, it is written as follows:
Additional seats No. of votes of concerned party
for concerned party = No. of votes of the first party x No. of additional seats allocated to first party
The above formula does not give exact mathematical representation of number of additional seats to be awarded since, in
order to be entitled to 1 additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute
proportional representation is restricted by the 3-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of 2 additional slots. An increase in
the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate
proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within
such extant parameter.
On June 25, 2003, the formula was put to test in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In determining the additional
seats for the other qualified parties—BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS, and ABANSE! PINAY––the following
computation was made:
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Votes Cast for First Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
= 290,760
1,708,253 x 3
= 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than 1, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.
From a scrutiny of Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formulae in determining the additional seats for
party-list representatives, it is readily apparent that the Veterans formula is materially different from the one used in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the multiplier used was "the number of additional seats allocated to the first
party," while in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for first party" was applied.
The dissimilarity in the multiplier used spells out a big difference in the outcome of the equation. This divergence on the
multiplier was pointed out and stressed by respondent COMELEC. Nevertheless, petitioner insists that the correct
multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party referring to the 3 seats won by Bayan Muna which emerged as the
winning first party, as allegedly prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. On this issue, petitioner ratiocinates
this way: It cannot be emphasized enough that the formula in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna cases rendered in
2003, effectively modified the earlier Veterans formula, with the clear and explicit use of the "allotted seats for the first
party". Considering that the first party, Bayan Muna, was allotted to the maximum 3 seats under the law, it is therefore
clear that the multiplier to be used is 3, the allotted seats for the first party. However, this postulation is bereft of merit
and basis. A careful perusal of the 4 corners of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna betrays petitioner’s claim as it did not
mention any revision or reshaping of the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, the Court had in mind the application of
the original Veterans formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. This conclusion is based on the aforequoted formula
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna, as follows: Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Votes Cast for First Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
= 290,760
1,708,253 x 3
= 0.51
The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY" admits of no other conclusion than that the Court
merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in resolving the additional seats by the other
qualified party-list groups. But it appears that there was an inaccurate presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court
used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the "number of
additional seats allocated to the first party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is apparent that the phrase "number of
additional" was omitted, possibly by inadvertence from the phrase "allotted seats for First Party." The disparity is material,
substantial, and significant since the multiplier "number of additional seats allocated to the First Party" prescribed in the
Veterans formula pertains to a multiplier of 2 seats, while the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna formula can mean a multiplier of maximum 3 seats, since the first party can garner a maximum of
3 seats.
Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna states that "for a discussion of how to compute
additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans." It clarifies the confusion created by the imprecise
formula expressed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. Thus, the Court rules that the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna formula has not modified the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, there was really no other formula
approved by the Court other than the Veterans formula in fixing the number of additional seats for the other qualified
party-list groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC, the Court found that the confusion in the computation of
additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups arose "from the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June
25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani." We reiterated that "the prevailing formula for the computation of
additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans."
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional
seat. Party-List Canvass Report 2018 contained in the petition shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest
number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes.
It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of 3 seats based on June 2, 2004 Resolution
NBC 04-004 of COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result:
No. of votes of concerned party No. of additional seats
No. of votes of the first party x allocated to the first party = Additional Seats for concerned party
Applying this formula, the result is as follows:
495,190
1,203,305 x 2 =
0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986
This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier "allotted seats for
the first party":
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Votes Cast for First Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:
Additional seats = 495,190
1,203,305 x 3 = 1.2345
Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formula that petitioner alleges. Since CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than 1, then it did not
obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that "in order to
be entitled to 1 additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to additional seat.
COMELEC’s application of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna is incorrect: The Court laments the fact that the
COMELEC insisted in using a simplified formula when it is fully aware of the ruling in the Veterans case. The COMELEC
explained that it "merely based its judgment on Comelec Resolution 6835 which cited SC Resolution dated 20 November
2003 granting BUHAY’s Motion for Reconsideration and entitling it to 1 additional seat for having garnered more than 4%
of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system, thus recognizing once again the simplified formula."
However, in said Resolution, the Court, in granting BUHAY an additional seat, meant to apply it on that specific case alone,
not being a precedent––pro hac vice (for this one particular occasion); thus, this Resolution cannot be applied as a
precedent to future cases. The simplified formula having already been abandoned, COMELEC should have used and
adhered to the Veterans formula.
The Court has consistently reminded the COMELEC of its "function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election." As judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, the COMELEC cannot just
ignore or be oblivious to the rulings issued by the Court. Basic is the rule that lower courts and quasi-judicial tribunals must
bow to the decisions and resolutions of the highest court of the land. COMELEC is not an exception.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed March 7, 2006 Comelec Resolution 06-0248 is hereby
AFFIRMED only insofar as it denied petitioner CIBAC’s motion for the proclamation of its second nominee to an additional
seat under the 2004 party-list elections. The portion of Comelec Resolution 06-0248, which adopted and applied the
"simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004," is annulled
and set aside. Comelec is ordered to strictly apply the Veterans formula in determining the entitlement of qualified party-
list groups to additional seats in the party-list system.
---
Banat vs. Comelec, GR. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, assails the Resolution promulgated on 3 August 2007 by COMELEC in NBC 07-041 (PL). COMELEC’s resolution
in NBC 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in the case: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition
of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, 11 BATAS 386,361
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and 12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
prohibition, assails NBC Resolution 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, 13 ARC 338,194
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. COMELEC 14 ABONO 337,046
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC. PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC 07-250, all the
intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least 1 seat under the
The Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted party-list system of representation in the meantime.
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. 144, RA 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and
papers that COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
formula in allocating party-list seats." There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a 1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
memorandum on 19 July 2007. 2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
On 9 July 2007, COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution 07-60, proclaiming 13 parties as winners in 3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption 4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA
(CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s 5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak 6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc. A TEACHER
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution 07-60 in its entirety below: 7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN
WHEREAS, COMELEC sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 8 Alagad ALAGAD
2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of 15,283,659 votes under the Party-List System of 9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007; 10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the 11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than 16,723,121 votes given the following statistical data: 12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections 13 Abono ABONO
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated -- 15,283,659 This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred) 1,337,032 established to have obtained at least 2% of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System. The total number of
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party v.
Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao) 102,430 COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results. The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang
Maximum Total Party-List Votes: 16,723,121 Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC 07-250, in order not to
WHEREAS, Sec. 11 of RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part: The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving render the proceedings therein moot and academic. Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to 1 seat each: provided, that those garnering organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their
more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, respective cases. Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats. the House of Representatives of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive 2% threshold
can be pegged at 334,462 votes; Pursuant to NBC Resolution 07-60, COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution 07-72, which declared the
WHEREAS, SC, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) vs. COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans
Party vs. COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receiving more than formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
the required 2% votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed 13 qualified parties,
canvassed; organizations and coalitions based on the presumptive 2% threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least 334,462 votes are as follows: number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given 1 guaranteed party-list seat each;
RANK | PARTY/ORGANIZATION/COALITION | VOTES RECEIVED WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the
1 BUHAY 1,163,218 projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730 not included in Report 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is
3 CIBAC 760,260 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the 13 qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are as
4 GABRIELA 610,451 follows:
5 APEC 538,971 Party-List Projected total number of votes
6 A TEACHER 476,036 1 BUHAY 1,178,747
7 AKBAYAN 470,872 2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
8 ALAGAD 423,076 3 CIBAC 755,964
9 BUTIL 405,052 4 GABRIELA 621,718
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029 5 APEC 622,489
 6 A TEACHER 492,369 GABRIELA 1
7 AKBAYAN 462,674 APEC 1
8 ALAGAD 423,190 This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
9 BUTIL 409,298 established to have obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to 1 guaranteed
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920 seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to 1 additional seat. Finally, all proclamation of the
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165 nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until
12 ARC 375,846 final resolution of their respective cases. Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,
13 ABONO 340,151 furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among
the 13 qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Acting on BANAT’s petition, NBC promulgated NBC Resolution 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows: This
Party v. COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC; pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT). Acting on the foregoing Petition of the
have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
the SC in Veterans; National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is: 041 (PL)], which reads:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS: Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in
Total votes for party-list system = party-list system its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following
reliefs, to wit:
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats: 1. That the full number -- 20% -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Sec. 5, Art. VI of Constitution shall be
Proportion of votes received by the first party Additional seats proclaimed.
Equal to or at least 6% 2 additional seats 2. Paragraph (b), Sec. 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5,
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% 1 additional seat Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-
Less than 4% No additional seat list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage: 3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
1,178,747 4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received
16,261,369 = 0.07248 or 7.2% and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the
which entitles it to 2 additional seats. percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine,
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847
Additional seats for a concerned party = No. of votes of concerned party No. of additional seats allocated dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for the purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list
No. of votes of first party x to first party groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat .
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Sec. 11 of RA 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: list representative prescribed by Sec. 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
Party List Percentage Additional Seat R E C O M M E N D A T I O N: The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1 COMELEC En Banc in NBC Resolution 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and
CIBAC 1.28 1 Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May
GABRIELA 1.05 1 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
APEC 1.05 1 organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula upon
A TEACHER 0.83 0 completion of the canvass of the party-list results."
AKBAYAN 0.78 0 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
ALAGAD 0.71 0 adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for
BUTIL 0.69 0 being moot and academic. Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. SO ORDERED.
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0 BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution 07-88. BANAT did not file a
ARC 0.63 0 motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked COMELEC,
ABONO 0.57 0 acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution 07-60 because the
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, EO 144, RA 6646, Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of RA 7941. On the same day, COMELEC denied reconsideration
7166, 7941 and other elections laws, COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as during the proceedings of the NBC. Aside from the 13 party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, COMELEC
it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit: proclaimed 3 other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List
Party List Additional Seats System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), Anak Mindanao (AMIN), and An Waray. Per the
BUHAY 2 certification by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
BAYAN MUNA 1 Party-List No. of Seat(s)
CIBAC 1 1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2 Ruling of the Court
1.3 CIBAC 2 The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least 4 inviolable parameters
1.4 Gabriela 2 as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
1.5 APEC 2 First, the 20% allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
1.6 A Teacher 1 total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
1.7 Akbayan 1 Second, the 2% threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
1.8 Alagad 1 party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
1.9 Butil 1 Third, the 3-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1 maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
1.11 Anak Pawis 1 Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
1.12 ARC 1 proportion to their total number of votes."19
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1 But because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of term "proportional representation,"
1.15 AMIN 1 this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Number of Party-List Representatives:
Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC 07-250. Sec. 5, Art. VI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by
Issues: BANAT brought the following issues before this Court: law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
is it merely a ceiling? and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
2. Is the 3-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? sectoral parties or organizations.
3. Is the 2% threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (2) Party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? under the party-list. For 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition: indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
I. COMELEC, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number
qualified party-list organizations as said rule: of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly: Sec. 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party" violates the principle members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and
of proportional representation under RA 7941. party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
2. The use of 2 formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and another for the qualifying Representatives.
parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941. Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941; number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC. Number of seats
II. Presuming that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it available to legislative districts x .20 = Number of seats available to party-list representatives
implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in .80
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives
issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives,
and are of transcendental importance to our nation. there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following .80 x .20 = 55
issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008: After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
or merely a ceiling? Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
2. Is the 3-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
3. Is the 2 percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? and the Three-Seat Cap
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? party-list votes. But there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of RA 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats"
under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans We examine what RA 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives. Sec. 11(a) of RA 7941 prescribes the
presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula as an alternative. The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted RA 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section elections. Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
11 and Section 12 of which provide: garnered during the elections.
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the Rank Party Votes Garnered Rank Party Votes Garnered
following procedure shall be observed: 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
(a) Parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
they garnered during the elections. 3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
(b) Parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be 4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in 5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to 6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
not more than 3 seats. 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
Sec. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. —COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, 8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party- 9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition 10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through 3 formulas to allocate party-list representative seats. The 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Sec. 12 of RA 7941. 14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
BANAT described this procedure as follows: 15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total Members of the House of Representatives including 16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
and Comelec Resolution 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there 18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed. 19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted 1 seat for every 2% of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
that no party-list groups shall have more than 3 seats (Sec. 11, RA 7941). 21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding 22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be 23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum 3 seats under the 2% threshold 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. 25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
44 party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation. 26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and 28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of RA 7941. BANAT states that COMELEC: 29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS33,691
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis; 30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and, 31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, 32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 33 ABAKADA166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received 34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a 35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."34 party-list seats will be awarded under 36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
BANAT’s second interpretation. 37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and the 38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas 39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421
do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher 40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
reject the 3-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is 41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats 42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. 43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats 44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation 45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining 46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 47 ABC 90,058
TOTAL: 15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the 2- representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Sec. 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total shall be observed:
number of votes cast for all party-list candidates. Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list. they garnered during the elections.
Rank Party Votes Garnered Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in % Guaranteed Seat 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1 In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 allocated, at one seat each, to every 2-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats"
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 the absence of a provision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 In declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the
11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1 2-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the 2-
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
Total 17 allocation. Finally, we apply the 3-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 Thus: Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 Rank Party Votes Garnered Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % (A) Guaranteed Seat (First
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 Round) (B) Additional Seats (Second Round) (C) (B) plus (C), in whole integers(D) Applying the three seat cap (E)
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
"entitled to one seat each," or guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. 3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 provides that "those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in 6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of RA 7941. 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for the 931 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list 11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. 14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in 15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us 16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party- 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. 21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
We therefore strike down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the 23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
second clause of Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A. probably to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A. system?
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A. register for the party list system.
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. TADEO. The same.
33 ABAKADA166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. OPLE. In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
Total 17 55 common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations.
36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of 3 seats for each party, are shown in their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions
column (D). that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of COMELEC
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in
elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus: the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling It is also a fact well known to all that in United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only? institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system. power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party
list system? RA 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Sec. 3 of RA 7941 reads:
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates. Definition of Terms. (a) The Party-list System is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system? representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors thereof registered with the COMELEC. Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
that we shall designate in this Constitution. provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
he qualify? (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify. the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its
pass on whether he is a farmer or not? constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political constituency is spread over geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
sectoral lines. hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
Would the Commissioner agree? (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party and/or election purposes.
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved Congress, in enacting RA 7941, put the 3-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections. Neither
din ito sa political parties. the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary,
the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates
in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," RA 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and RA 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, RA 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be
a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or
sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election,
and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the
urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Sec. 9 of RA 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election, and is at least 25 years of age on the day
of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue until the
expiration of his term.
Under Sec. 9 of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity"as there is no financial status required in law. It is enough that the nominee of sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents
the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior
citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of
the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. But we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The 3-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
But by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate
party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in
NBC 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the 2%
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System
shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from
participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
--
Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211
At bench are two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA 7854 as unconstitutional. RA 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A.
No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati."
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino
Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52
of RA 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of
every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails
section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. We find no merit in the petitions.
I. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati
in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local
government units. In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless
to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in
section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land
area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established
land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the
present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact
which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using
the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent
Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at
bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold
that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein,
viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with
technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to
serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog
in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in
the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56
Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule
must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II. Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as
the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held
and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative,
have a term of 3 years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners
point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the
coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said
section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge
the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
III. Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after
the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu
of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6
cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3)
Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only 450,000.
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through
a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a
new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article
VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to
to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte,
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested
have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality
the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District
details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the were not disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as
provisions are germane to such general subject." follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. SO ORDERED. First District: Population Registered Voters (1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
-- 2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
Montejo v. Comelec, GR 118702, Mar. 19, 1995 4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First 5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain 6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged 7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. 8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. ———— ————
We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by TOTAL 303,349 178,688
the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment.
Second District: Population Registered Voters (1990) (1994)
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 legislative districts. 1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan 2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
and Tolosa. 3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, 4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga. 5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, 6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba. 7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and 8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
Palompon. 9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, 10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
Mahaplag, and Matalom. 11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the 13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.7 ———— ————
TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein." Third District: Population Registered Voters (1990) (1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran 2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
became a regular province. It provides: 3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a 5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
plebiscite to be held in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by 6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this code. The new legislative districts 7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected representatives of ———— ————
the original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were created until their own representatives shall have TOTAL 214,499 125,763
been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified.
Fourth District: Population Registered Voters (1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140 xxx xxx xxx
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889 Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873 made.
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474 Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
———— ———— two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number
TOTAL 269,347 155,995 of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
Fifth District: Population Registered Voters (1990) (1994) which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682 be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13 and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871 The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659 Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. 11 She then exercised
6. Inopacan,16,894 10,401 legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.12
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616 The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a distinguished member of
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247 this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicial issues before
———— ———— authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the
TOTAL 309,148 181,242 members of the House of Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.14 Commissioner Davide, Jr.
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to the offered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2)
inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First District empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance
has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the options were discussed by Commissioners Davide,
voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates in extenso, viz.:16
transferred from the First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent
Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
territorial composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment by substitution and this was, I believe, a prior
or a proposed amendment. Also, the chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote first
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation by the Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and cities on the one hand, or by legislative districts
ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that respondent COMELEC violated "the on the other. So I propose this simple formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE
constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the
another's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, proposed amendment.
opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2)
assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution. We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void. MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et
al. proposal would also provide for a mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will in
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional power of the effect embody what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within three years following the return of every
respondent COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district in the province census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in
black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all the proponents can work together.
but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the It was 3:33 p.m.
Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
RESUMPTION OF SESSION. At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines
under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, Commissioner Davide is recognized.
and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the Commission will allow this. We will just delete MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe the Committee on the Legislative has
the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what would be left precisely worked on this matter and they are ready with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole
would only be the following: "Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a country into various districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready with the list and if this
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." body would wish to apportion the whole country by district itself, then I believe we have the time to do it because the
Committee on the Legislative is ready with that particular report which need only to be appended to the Constitution. So if
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF this body is ready to accept the work of the Committee on the Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to
THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY give that information so that the people here would be guided accordingly when they vote.
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND
SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS." MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he so desires.
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to the provinces and to the cities, without MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
indicating the municipalities comprising each of the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to the first election after the enactment
make the actual apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for and allocated to each province by us. of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election; on the basis of the Sarmiento
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer. proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution — the reapportionment based on the COMELEC study and
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to COMELEC to do the redistricting. between the approval of the Constitution and the first election — the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that
Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful practices of cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other words, even a bit.
gerrymandering. This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible situation
under the circumstances to undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time because in the first THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
place, the Committee on the Legislative has prepared the report on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner Davide?
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment and considering the fact that there will
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino in this respect. We know that the be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would there be instances representation of under non-representation?
reapportionment of provinces and cities for the purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in
the legislative power. And I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it is one of the MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission that there will be no case of inequitable
constitutional offices created under this Constitution. We have the assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the distribution. It will come out to be one for every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
Committee on the Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in the life of this Commission, there is no
reason why we cannot complete the work of reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the Constitutional Commission.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most
reasonable, and the most workable approach that is available to this Commission. MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say: MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment itself or whether we will leave it to
the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial question for the body to decide. I would propose that the
Commission should now decide what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or should it be
the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative will act accordingly on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate
COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had
some kind of meeting of minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial question, an amendment to the
amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall
make the redistricting. So may I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into a motion
so we can vote on that first as an amendment to the amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.


MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the apportionment of the legislative districts instead of
the proposal that COMELEC be given the mandate to undertake the responsibility.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and
5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4
because that should not really appear as a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution
where we mandate a Commission that will become functus officio to have the authority. As a matter of fact, we cannot
exercise that authority until after the ratification of the new Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the approval of this proposed amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment legislative districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion?
Would it not be right for him to move that the COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the Commission that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it
itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of
the Commission, viz.:
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the Commission on Elections is empowered
to make minor adjustments on the apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of amendments a proposal is made. The
authority conferred would be on minor corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have
forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one district. That we shall
consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be possible that one municipality in a district be
transferred to another district and call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no change in the
allocations per district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the
territory of one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular municipality because of
changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa
enacted by both the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the municipalities is not mentioned in the
ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data regarding a division of a municipality
by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother
municipality and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for example, my municipality is in
the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power
granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending
on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it
may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4),
Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled
and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs. SO ORDERED.
--
Bengson v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of
service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service
to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in,
the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil
and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen
on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled
that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view
of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine
citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors
and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He
insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated
since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court
is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a
lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political
economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he
had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath
of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined
in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he
does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-
born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of the latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of
grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.