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Analysis WP Last Draft
Analysis WP Last Draft
Analysis WP Last Draft
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- Group 8 -
Activity ratios
The asset turnover (sales/NOA) shows how efficient is the company. In FY09 WP’s asset
turnover has been 1.441, which is quite high compared to NYT(0.99). In order to explain the
difference, we will try to estimate industry’s trend. The industry’s trend from two of the biggest
publishing companies shows WP’s results are outstanding: McGraw Hill’s ratio has been 0.38 for
FY09 and Gannett Co.’s ratio 0.56 for FY08 (we have not been able to access FY09 data).
Therefore, the difference can be attributed to the fact that the publishing segment is no longer the
main driver of WP’s revenues.
In order to see if Kaplan plays an important role in the result, we have tried to disclose its ratio
for FY09. We know Kaplan’s revenues for FY09 ($2,636.6) and we have found its identifiable
assets in the annual report ($2,188.3). The main problem is that this figure includes financial
assets and we haven’t information about the proportions. We have decided to assume a
percentage of FA similar to Apollo Group Inc., a competitor in the education industry, as we
believe it will be closer than WP’s percentage. Apollo Group Inc.’s FA/TA is equal to 13.8%.
Using this proportion, we can find Kaplan’s ratio, which has been 1.36 for FY09. In addition, we
have computed the ratio for Apollo Group Inc. (1.41).
After this overview, we reach the conclusion that Kaplan affects widely WP’s asset turnover.
Washington Post’s Working Capital turnover is similar to NYT’s, both standing between 3 and 4.
It implies $1 invested in NWC generate between $3 and $4 of sales.
If we analyse Receivables turnover ratio (10.04 in FY09) and Payables turnover (5.46 in FY09),
we can conclude WP manages efficiently its operations. WP obtains financing from their
suppliers and receives more than 90% of the sales in cash. This proportion is lower in NYT
(85%).
We use the term Operational leverage to describe how a company obtains financing from
operating activities. WP’s OLLEV fluctuates between 0.3 and 0.4, with a low tendency to
increase. NYT’s OLLEV is less volatile and stays close to 0.2. These figures strengthen what we
have pointed above: WP is more efficient in managing payments.
Liquidity ratios
Liquidity is key in a company because problems with it may suppose bankruptcy. Our company
doesn’t have liquidity problems. Current liabilities are in average 70% of current assets.
Cash represents more than 60% of CA in FY09. High percentages have been a constant during
the past years. A possible explanation is that WP’s growing strategy is mainly based in
acquisitions. Moreover, FY09 has been the slowest year in a long time in the acquisition front,
what resulted in an increase of cash. NYT, on the other hand, has percentages of cash/current
assets lower than 10%. This huge difference can be also consequence of the proportion
cash/receivables between the two companies. While our main competitor‘s proportion has been
steady at 1/10 during the last 5 years, WP’ cash represented 3/5 of the receivables in FY05 and
has increased to 2/1 in FY09.
McGraw Hill doesn’t help us very much as its proportion was 4.5/10 in 2008 and 12.5/10 in
2009. As we did before, we need to compare our results with Gannett Co. as well. Using 2007
and 2008 data, we obtain a mean of 1/10.
Therefore, comparing our company to the industry, we can conclude WP’s huge amount of cash
is due its specific (growing) strategy.
Solvency ratio measure a company's ability to meet long-term obligations. It provides a
measurement of how likely a company will be to continue meeting its debt obligations. WP’s
solvency ratio has been 18.51% in FY09. As a general rule, a solvency ratio of greater than 20%
is considered financially healthy. However, as WP’s debt can be considered as low, shareholders
shouldn’t perceive it as a risk.
Profitability ratios
Profitability is the measure which best describes the health of a company, at the same time that
allows us make previsions for the future (forecast).
We use Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) and Return on Common Equity (ROCE).
RNOA has been decreasing from FY05, when it was 10.66%. Last year it was 4.15%. The
decrease has been steady. However, its composition has changed substantially. We can split
RNOA into asset turnover (widely discussed above) and margin. WP’s margin has decreased by
more than 2 thirds within the last 5 years. It has been the main driver for the decrease in RNOA,
what has received a strong impact from the economic crisis and the changing newspaper industry.
NYT’s situation is similar. Its RNOA has followed the same tendency (6.80% in FY05 and
2.35% last year). In this case it has been more volatile (11.73% in FY06). Both turnover and
margin have followed the same evolution, so NYT RNOA’s composition has not changed.
Hence, we can’t disclose which of the two effects has had a higher influence in the profitability.
What we can say is that WP has managed more efficiently its assets, as the turnover is higher.
Return on Common Equity has a positive correlation with RNOA. It is also affected by the Net
Borrowing Cost and the Financial Leverage. RO(C)E is the ratio which best describe a
company’s profitability. It adds the capital structure leverage ratio to the margin and the asset
turnover.
The tendency over the last 5 years has been negative. WP’s ROE has decreased by 10 points from
FY05. Last year, WP’s ROE has been 3,21%, while it was 13.49% in FY05.
In FY08 we find a 71.73% drop from 9.04% to 2.34%. The main reason is the increase of the
NBC, caused by the increase of financial expenses together with a decrease in financial
obligations, which jumped from -0.32% to 13.2%. RNOA fell in this period by one half.
The drop can be also a consequence of the global crisis scenario. In order to strengthen our
assumption we look at NYT’s ROE. NYT’s ROE’s evolution is very irregular. The main
difference we can see is the financial leverage. While WP finances an important part of its
operations with equity, NYT basically uses debt. .
WE ANALYSE THE AVERAGE PAID DAILY CIRCULATION IN THE FIRST INICIATIVE.
I HAD WRITTEN A PARAGRAPH BUT IT WAS TOO REPETITIVE. WE ALREADY
PROVIDE NUMBERS AND CHANGES THERE
Risk factors that have an impact on future profitability
We identified many risks that in our opinion could have major impacts on WP’s profitability. We
have classified these factors according to the business. We include some management initiatives
which can help to compensate these factors.
EDUCATION:
It is a main issue for Kaplan to maintain its eligibility to participate in Title IV Program. If
Kaplan fails to comply with Statutory and Regulatory Requirements, it may loose its access to
U.S. Federal Student Financial Aid Program under Title IV, which would imply a significant loss
of students. Other changes in U.S. Department of Education regulations could lead to new
operational risks and requirements. New resolutions on the tests required, licensing of
examinations can also negatively affect Kaplan’s demand. Therefore, is very important for the
company to be flexible and adaptable to future changes, in order to guarantee its future position.
PUBLISHING/BROADCASTING:
The publishing industry has been strongly affected by the recent Financial Market Crisis and
Economic Downturn. Not only newspapers’ demand has decreased but also many of its
advertisers reduced their advertising expenditures. This decrease on advertising investment has
also affected the Broadcasting industry. Possible solutions could be focus in online publicity and
create new possibilities for the advertisers. Nevertheless, changes in consumer preferences can
also affect WP’s revenues, as rates that the company can charge for advertising are directly
related to the number of readers and viewers. In addition, increased competition resulting from
new technologies creates a difficult scenario for WP’s publishing and broadcasting businesses.
Changes in the prices of raw materials, especially newsprint; or significant disruptions in its
supply are also potential risks when we look to the future. Morgan Stanley predicts that newsprint
prices will rise to €500 per ton in 2011, $674.05 using the current €/$ exchange rate (at 17 th
November) while average prices for FY09 have been around $520. In 2009, WP’s consumption
of newsprint was higher than 150.000 tons. Hence, the increase in WP’s COGS would be higher
than $23 million. Although it only represents a 1.15% increase in COGS, RNOA decreases from
4.15% to 3.29% and ROCE from 3.29% to 2.40%.
WP can anticipate this scenario and make use of derivatives to cover price volatility risk.
CABLE:
In case of any patent infringement claims, which has been a common issue in the industry in last
years, Cable One’s operating results may be adversely affected. Also restrictions on certain types
of advertising and limitations on pricing flexibility can affect Cable One’s revenues.
Apart from the factors commented above, there are other risk factors associated with the market
and to WP as a whole business. Changes in equity prices and interest rates, as well as failure to
successfully assimilate acquired businesses, are the main ones.
Future trends and their effects on WP’S profitability Management decision affecting WP’s
profitability
We detected some management decisions which have affected and can also affect future WP’s
market position.
During the last 3 years, WP raised its daily and Sunday newsstand prices from $0.75 to $1.00 and
from $2.00 to $2.50. This increase represents 33% for the daily newspaper and 25%for the
Sunday publication.
From FY07 to FY09, average paid circulation fell by 6.4% daily (from 657,918 to 615,628) and
7.3% on Sunday (912,433 to 845,587). As the price sensitivity (elasticity) in the industry is high,
we doubt it has been an appropriate initiative. It is a risky decision, especially in a period when
newspapers’ average paid daily circulation is decreasing.
However, the effect of the crisis and free newspapers make it very difficult to disaggregate the
impact of this management decision. Anyway, we believe this decision have had a negative
impact on asset turnover (due to a decrease in sales without any substantial variation of NOA)
and an uncertain effect on margin. The overall effect on RNOA will probably be negative. ROE,
therefore, may also decrease. In addition, inventory can suffer the consequences of a lower
amount of sales (in unities).
If we assume that due to this decision daily sales decline by 3.475% (average daily decrease from
2007 to 2009) we find that sales would decrease by $10.5 million. This would result in a decrease
on both RNOA and ROCE. RNOA would drop from 4.15% to 3.76% and ROCE from 3.21% to
2.84%.
Regarding the industry, we have found out that NYT increased its prices a year before (FY07) as
well and did so to a higher extent than WP did. Last year, NYT suffered a drop of 7.1% on its
daily sales and 3.1% on Sunday publication. This numbers don’t strengthen our theory about the
drop on WP circulation due to the increasing prices decision. As the publishing industry is
expected to grow in FY10, it can be an opportunity to measure the results of the initiative in
terms of customer loyalty and relative growth.
WP’s growth strategy was based very much on acquisitions in the last few years, although a
decline can be observed in FY09. Apart from companies in the education industry, WP has
acquired some free newspapers and local publications. The main reason is the potential growth of
this type of newspapers. Also synergies opportunities and power can affect WP decisions.
The revenues from these free newspapers come almost entirely from advertising. Reports on the
industry show advertising revenues have been decreasing as they have increased in online
newspapers. Therefore, free newspapers’ acquisitions may not be an appropriate strategy to face
future scenarios.
Regarding the effect on RNOA, as it increases operating assets and we doubt about the increase
in sales (advertising contracts), we assume it will be negative. It can increase its market share in
the publishing industry but, as WP has disclosed, growth opportunities are more attractive in the
online industry and other businesses. It is very difficult to estimate detailed effects as synergies,
economies of scale, and other intangibles play an important role in acquisitions
Selling, general and administrative costs have been increasing every year and WP fails to disclose
concrete numbers regarding this expenses. Also there is an important lack of data for the different
businesses (especially Kaplan, but also Cable one, Newsweek etc.). WP provides us with
information about revenues but we have been unable to find specific numbers for costs.
In addition, WP mentions increasing costs in advertising, marketing and inventory for Kaplan
without providing any numbers. Last but not least, any kind of information about deferred
charges is provided in the annual statements.
Regarding possible manipulations, intangible assets are especially problematic. As WP’s growing
strategy is based in acquisitions, Goodwill accounts for 30% of total assets in WP’s BS. Goodwill
and intangible assets valuation is based on estimates, so it can easily be manipulated. Also Other
Liabilities account can suffer manipulations by modifying the fiscal period when deferred
revenues are recognized.
Sources:
http://www.iciforestal.com.uy/el-mundo/5674-morgan-stanley-predicts-higher-newsprint-prices-for-2011
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