People vs.

Puno (Crim1)

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique
Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants

En Banc

Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place

 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

 After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money"
from her

 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

 But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

 The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento
to issue a check for P100,000

 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check

 Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga

 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of
the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood
because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped
out of the car
  The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according
to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step
out of the car

 He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride

 He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway

Issue:

1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

1. No.

2. No.

Ratio:

1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

 For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty

 In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders

 This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country,
roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against
robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)

 PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by

outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim

 The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case

 This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as
actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code

"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of
Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is
an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into
the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim
both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial
and alibi as their evidence against the charge.

*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the
existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of
the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.

appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:

TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.

For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:

a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity

to defend himself

b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted

in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and
killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that
modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.

Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the
three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and
stabbed.

HELD:

APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO
HOMICIDE)

G.R. No. L-7280 February 13, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO ELVIÑA, defendant-appellant.

Macario Adriatico, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment convicting the accused of the crime of misappropriation of public
funds upon the following information:

That from the 1st of July, 1909, until the 31st day of January, 1910, the said accused, who was
municipal treasurer of San Juan de Guimba, Nueva Ecija, had in his possession various properties and
sums of money pertaining to his office, but during said time maliciously and criminally disposed of
said properties and money for the sum of P2,505.61 and refuse to render an account of the same in
spite of having been required by the District Auditor to do so.

It is undenied in this case that the sum of P2,505.61 with the embezzlement of which the accused is
charged was actually paid by him and that such payments were made under resolutions of the
municipal board authorizing him to do so. The sole basis for the present proceeding against the
accused is that he did not furnish to the auditor such vouchers and proofs of the payments conceded
to have been made as the auditor thought under the law he was required to have.

Without going into the question whether the information is sufficient to charge misappropriation of
public funds, or whether it merely alleges a failure on the part of the accused to render an account
of his acts as such treasurer (United States vs. Saberon, 19 Phil. Rep., 391), we are of the opinion
that the defendant must be acquitted in either case.

Certainly one cannot be convicted of the crime of misappropriation of public funds when such funds
have actually been paid out by him in good faith to persons who have rendered services to the
municipality of which he is treasurer and under and in accordance with resolutions of the municipal
council authorizing him to make such payments. Such disposition of the moneys of the municipality
lacks many essential elements going to make up the crime of misappropriation of public funds. There
is no criminal intent. There is no such conversion of the money to the use of the accused or to the
use of any other person as is contemplated by the criminal law. There is no such deprivation of the
municipality of its funds as is required to make the act criminal. It is true that section 2 of Act No.
1740 provides that "the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the
funds and property properly in his charge on the demand of an officer authorized to examine or
inspect such person, office, treasury, or depository, shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that
such missing funds or property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends by such
person within the meaning of the preceding section;" but it must be borne in mind that along with
the proof of the absence of the sum of P2,506.61 goes also the proof that the accused had paid out
said money in the interest and for the benefit of the municipality, in good faith and in the honest
belief that he had the right and that it was his duty to do so. If he honestly erred in the payment of
said moneys, if he paid them out upon insufficient vouchers, if he did not furnish precisely
the kind of proof required by law, that does not necessarily mean that he is a criminal. If he made
an honest mistake as to the law or the facts as to his duties relative to the expenditure of the public
funds, although he might be liable civilly he is not criminally. The mere absence of the funds
establishes against him merely a prima facie case which can be overcome by the production of
evidence negativing the implication of criminally springing from such absence.

In the case of the United States vs. Catolico (18 Phil. Rep., 504, 506), the court said:
The case made against the appellant lacks many of the essential elements required by law to be
present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The accused did not convert the money to his
own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he feloniously permit anybody else to convert
it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief that he was acting judicially and
correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants-appellants in
the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after the
appeals had been dismissed and the judgments in his court had become final, and that he delivered
the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment which he held in those cases, cannot be
considered an appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. He
believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right under
the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him that the sureties thereon were
insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings, giving the parties ample time within which to do
so, to dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were not filed, and to declare the judgment final.
He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment had become final, the
sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments in the actions in which said
sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially and legally in making such applications.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.

In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of justice of the
peace. He had jurisdiction of the actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to require the
payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper undertaking with solvent
sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in said cases, he
may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and
power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far as appears from the record, at
most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state of facts. Giving the act
complained of the signification most detrimental to the appellant, it nevertheless, was simply the
result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not an intention to deprive any person
of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not to
embezzle property. He acted that honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally
and justly due, and not to enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was an error
committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.

It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a
criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act
charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for the
accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such
presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may
have been an error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been
declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It may well be
that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly to subject him to
reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of record, it was
not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act.
Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even though it
be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in
Act No. 1740. It is true that the Act provides that "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding
section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person described in said
section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds and property
properly in his charge on the demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person,
office, treasury, or depository shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or
property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends by such person within the
meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and
constitutes only a prima facie case against the person accused. If he present evidence showing that,
in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end
and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was unnecessary for the accused to offer
any such evidence, for the reason that the people's own pleading alleged and its own proofs
presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had
not been put to personal uses or used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution
demonstrated, both by the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs
on the trial, that the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the
accused, thus affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted,
arises from the absence of the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts
which were presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by other
facts which absolutely prevented its creation.

This case disposes, in our judgment, of the case at bar. We refer, however, in closing to the case of
the United States vs. Acebedo (18 Phil. Rep., 428). The court in that case said:

It is unquestioned that the appellant was unable to turn over to the justice of the peace the said
P29.90, together with certain other sums, making nearly P40, and that he alleged as an excuse that
said sums had been collected by his secretary, Crisanto P. Urbina, to whom he had confided their
collection and who, he believed, had turned them over to the proper official. From this the learned
attorney for the people argues that the accused must necessarily be guilty of the malversation of
said sum. We do not think that this conclusion necessarily follows. Under the provisions of the law a
person is guilty of malversation of public funds only when he converts them to his own use or to the
use of some other person, or when he handles them so negligently as to permit someone else to
convert them. In this case it was unquestioned, from the evidence, that the accused did not convert
said sums or any portion of them to his own use, nor to the use of any other person. It appears
proved beyond question that said sums were converted by his secretary, Crisanto P. Urbina, to his
own personal use and not to the use or benefit of the appellant in this case. That portion of the law
which provides that the failure on the part of a person to account for public funds which have come
into his hands is prima facie evidence of his guilt does not meet the situation here presented. Such
presumption simply takes the place of affirmative proofs showing the actual conversion. It obviates
the necessity of proving acts of conversion on the part of the accused, a thing almost always
extremely difficult to do. Therefore, such presumption stands, making a prima facie case against the
accused only until such time as he rebuts it by proofs showing the contrary. In the case at bar the
appellant has presented proofs conclusively showing that such presumption is not applicable in his
case, inasmuch as he did not receive the money, never had it in his physical possession, and did not
convert the same.
The judgment is reversed, the accused acquitted, and his discharge from custody forthwith ordered,
unless he be detained for some other reason.

G.R. No. 168217 June 27, 2006

JOY LEE RECUERDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Recuerdo, a dentist, was charged with the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 of Revised Penal
Code for, with intent to gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations,
and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Unitrust Makati Commercial Center Branch, PCI
Bank Makati-De La Rosa Branch, and Prudential Bank Legaspi Village Branch, did willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue checks amounting to P132,000, P78,000, and
P600,000, to complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro, who is engaged in the business of buying and
selling of jewelry, as payment for jewelry she obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well
at the time the checks were issued that her representations were false for she had no sufficient
funds in the said bank, so much that upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for
encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an
“Account Closed”, and in spite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank, the said accused
failed and refused to do so.
Recuerdo argued that her act of issuing the dishonored checks does not constitute the offense of
Estafa considering that the subject checks were not issued and delivered to Floro simultaneous to
the purchase of the pieces of jewelry, but only several days thereafter, when she had already
thoroughly examined the jewelry and is fully satisfied of its fine quality; that out of the 17 subject
checks, nine were honored by the drawee banks; that she made partial payments of the amounts of
the subject checks while the case was pending in the CA, contrary to the findings of the courts that
she acted with deceit when she drew and delivered the checks.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Recuerdo committed the crime of estafa.

Held:
Yes, Recuerdo committed the crime of estafa.
Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:
By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and (3) damage to the payee thereof.It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is
made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of a debt. Deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or misleading
allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Concealment which the
law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party ought to
have. The postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check
is a false pretense or a fraudulent act.
Petitioner’s defense of good faith is even belied by the evidence of the prosecution and her own
evidence. When the postdated checks issued by petitioner were dishonored by the drawee banks
and the private complainant made demands for her to pay the amounts of the checks, she
intransigently refused to pay; she insisted that she issued and delivered the postdated checks to the
private complainant after the subject pieces of jewelry had been delivered to her. Petitioner never
offered to pay the amounts of the checks after she was informed by the private complainant that
they had been dishonored by the drawee banks. It was after the CA promulgated its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court, that petitioner made several payments to the private
complainant; however, there is no showing as to which checks they were made in payment for. In
fine, it was the spectre of a long prison term which jolted petitioner into making remittances to the
private complainant, after the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and increased the penalty
meted on her, and not because she had acted in good faith in her transactions with the private
complainant. To reiterate, petitioner rejected the demands of the private complainant to pay the
amounts of the dishonored checks.
While it is true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered to the private
complainant were honored by the drawee banks, such a circumstance is not a justification for her
acquittal of the charges relative to the dishonored checks. The reimbursement or restitution to the
offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does not extinguish the criminal liability of the
latter. Estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State on its own
motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or damage suffered by the
offended party. The consent of the private complainant to petitioner’s payment of her civil liability
pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate
the criminal liability already incurred. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise
between petitioner and the private complainant on the former’s civil liability.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.

US vs Catolico GR No 6486 18 Phil 504 02 March 1911

13MondayJul 2015

Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Criminal Law I

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Facts: The justice of peace of Cagayan had before him 16 separate civil cases initiated by Juan
Canillas for damages resulting from breach of contract. All cases were decided in favour of Canillas
and all defendants appealed the decision and deposited Php 16 and a bond of Php 50 as required by
law. It appears that the sureties of the bond were insolvent and new bonds were not presented on
the extension given. Canillas appealed. The justice of peace dismissed the appeals and ordered the
sm of money attached and delivered to Canillas in satisfaction of the judgment. The judge was
prosecuted for malversation of funds.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of felony.

Decision: Judgment of conviction is reversed and defendant ordered to be discharged from custody.

The judge decided in good faith under the belief that he was acting judiciously and correctly. It was a
result of erroneous exercise of judicial function and not an intention to deprive any person of his
property feloniously. He acted that debts might be paid t those who they are legally and justly due
and not to enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was a mistake not a crime.

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

 The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province

 Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho

 "Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building

 No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward
the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the
side of the building

 This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height

 The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
 inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair

 On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened
by some trying to force open the door of the room

 He called out twice, "Who is there?"

 He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room

 The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."

 Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate
Pascual

 Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded

 Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds

 Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day

 The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident,
and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the
door and acquaint his companion with his identity

 The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because
of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley

 Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite the defendant's warnings

 Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
(mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law

Issue:

 Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

 No.

Ratio:

 By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was
 actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense),
but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of
homicide/assassination)

 The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith

 "The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"

 The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist

 "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."

 If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide

 The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense

 He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in

falling into his mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

People vs. Oanis (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
defendant-appellants.

July 27, 1943

Moran, J:

Facts:

 Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the
Constabulary Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with
bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.

 Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada
Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was
sleeping with her paramour.

 Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door, they simultaneously fired at him.

 Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.

  It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man
named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

Issue:

 Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.

Held:

 Yes

Ratio:

 No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or
unreasonable force in making an arrest.

 Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in
the fulfillment of their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity.

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts:

 Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release
to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.

 Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country.

 An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6,
Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
  Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out
or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form
out of the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists
and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine
foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign
exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors
bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

 Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the
trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws
or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a
fine of no less than P50,000.00.

 At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong,
that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country
with his business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the
money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.

 Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was
urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the
Philippines.

 Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon
for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross

ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law.

Held:

 Yes.

Ratio:

 Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the
amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations
presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations
belonging to other people.
  In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Magno vs. CA (Crim1)

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:

 Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair
shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

 VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if
LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

 The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez
to look for third party who could lend him that amount.

 Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

 As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the
rest had no sufficient fund.

 Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out
the equipment.

 Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

 Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

 No

Ratio:
  To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was
not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust
debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.

Garcia v. People (GR 157171, March 14 2006)

AUGUST 27, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY

FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino
Pimintel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and
unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.

Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due
to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act
6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation
to BP Blg. 881.

Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no motive
on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se.

(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a
candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.

(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the
board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in
the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is
AFFIRMED.

People v Hassan; G.R. No. L-68969; 22 Jan 1988; 157 SCRA 261

FACTS:
Accused-appellant, an illiterate 15-year-old pushcart cargador, was accused of murder. During the
investigation of the case, the investigating officer brought Hassan to the
sole eyewitness for identification. Accused-appellant was later convicted of murder based on the
testimony of said eyewitness.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.

RULING:
YES. The accused-appellant was presented alone – not in a police lineup – and unaccompanied by a
counsel to the eyewitness, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the
victim. Such procedure is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the
same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection.

Decision is REVERSED and accused Hassan is ACQUITTED.

017. People vs. Temblor

G.R. No. L-66884/ May 28, 1988

Defendant-appellant: Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald”

Decision by Grino-Aquino; Digest by: Luisa Mauricio

SHORT VERSION: While Cagampang and wife Victoria were manning a store adjacent to their house,
Temblor came and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a
pack of cigarettes, Temblor shot Cagampang. Temblor and another man demanded from Victoria to
bring out Cagampang’s firearm which she did. Temblor took Cagampang’s .38 caliber revolver and
fled. Temblor was charged with murder. CFI and SC found him guilty. One of Temblor’s contentions
was that he lacked motive for killing Cagampang. But the court held that he had enough motive (he
was NPA and NPA had an agaw-armas campaign) and that, moreover, proof of motive is not
essential in this case because Victoria positively identified Temblor as the person who shot her
husband.

FACTS:

At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, Julius Cagampang (Cagampang), his wife Victoria
and their two children were in the store adjacent to their house in Brgy. Talo-ao, Agusan del Norte.
Accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang
instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. Victorina, upon seeing that her
husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul"!

Two persons barged into the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that Victoria
brings out her husband’s firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they
shouted. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the
maleta where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after
inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.

Some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by the
Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the man who killed her
husband.

Temblor and his companions, admitted members of the NPA (New People’s Army) were not
apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong. Temblor surrendered to
Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was
arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981. Temblor
was later on charged with the crime of murder.

CFI: found him guilty of Murder, reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties under Article
41 and 42 RPC and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

He appealed.
ISSUE: WON TEMBLOR IS GUILTY OF MURDER – YES

RULING: Judgment appealed affirmed in all respects, Temblor guilty.

RATIO

Identity of the accused

Temblor: Victorina did not know him by name. hence, the identity of the accused was not
established

Court: untenable.

G.R. No. L-46370

ROMERO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated December 20, 1976 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16628-CR entitled "People of the Philippines v. Antonio Avecilla" modifying
the decision of July 16, 1973 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1 at Pasig finding the
accused-petitioner guilty of simple theft by convicting the accused-petitioner instead of qualified
theft and imposing on him accordingly, a higher penalty.

The accused-petitioner, Antonio Avecilla and one Juana Doe were charged before the said lower
court of the crime of theft, allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 16th day of November, 1971, in the municipality of Mandaluyong, province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away one Registered Letter number 247341, delivery number 3752, valued at
$500.00 belonging to one Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforementioned amount of $500.00, U.S. Dollar.

Contrary to law."[1]

Upon arraignment, Antonio Avecilla entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.[2]

On the other hand, to prove his guilt, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:

1. Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson, an employee of Litton Mills, Inc., testified that her sister, Maria Paz,
a resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.A., sent her a registered letter containing a bank draft worth
$400.00 (not $500.00 as alleged in the information). She came to know about this registered letter
through another sister Carmencita Rodriguez, who, on December 17, 1971, also received another
letter from Maria Paz, inquiring whether she (witness) had received Registered Letter No. 247341,
which was addressed to her at Litton Mills, Inc.[3]
Since she did not receive the registered letter with the bank draft, Lourdes went to the
Mandaluyong Post Office and inquired about it. She was informed by the Postmaster and the teller
that Registered Letter No. 247341 addressed to her was claimed on November 16, 1971 by one
Antonio Avecilla, whom they knew had been messenger of Litton Mills, Inc. for more than two years.
That Avecilla got the subject letter was shown by the registry notice duly signed by him.[4]

Lourdes further testified that she filed a complaint in their office, as a result of which an
investigation was conducted by the personnel officer of Litton Knitting Mills. Antonio Avecilla
admitted in her presence that he took the said registered letter, but when she demanded its return,
he refused to do so. Hence, she filed a complaint with the police.[5]

On cross-examination, Lourdes stated that on December 23, 1971, she made an overseas call to her
sister, Maria Paz, to request her to stop the payment of the bank draft. As a result, she was informed
by Maria Paz through their sister, Carmencita Rodriguez, that a "stop payment" order had already
been made to the drawee bank.[6]

2. Rosalinda Cervo, Clerk-in-charge of the registry section of Mandaluyong Post Office, declared that
on November 15, 1971, she received a letter for Mrs. Lourdes Lacson, with a given address at "Litton
Knitting Mills." She then issued the corresponding registry notice to the addressee which she sent
through the letter carrier. The following day, November 16, 1971, Antonio Avecilla went to the post
office to claim the registered letter. He presented the registry notice addressed to Lourdes Lacson
with her signature appearing thereon, signed it in her presence and introduced to her a woman as
Mrs. Lourdes Lacson who signed the control book.

She further testified that inasmuch as Antonio Avecilla had been the authorized messenger of Litton
Knitting Mills since 1969, she entrusted Registered Letter No. 247341 to him. However, she got to
meet the lady who seemed to be the true Mrs. Lacson when the latter went to the post office to
complain about the letter that she (Mrs. Lacson) had not received. When shown the control book
with her alleged signatures, Mrs. Lacson repudiated the same as hers.

Subsequently, when Rosalinda Cervo informed Avecilla about Mrs. Lacson's complaint, he declared
that he had placed the letter on the table of Mrs. Lacson.[7]

3. Federico Rivera, Sr., Postmaster of Mandaluyong, Rizal, testified that Litton Mills, through George
Litton, Sr., had previously written him a letter, authorizing one Antonio Avecilla to accept "registered
mails, i.e., checks, parcels and letters" for their company and employees.[8] He recalled that on
November 16, 1971, a registered letter addressed to Mrs. Lourdes Lacson c/o Litton Mills was
delivered to Mr. Avecilla.[9]

The defense, before presenting the accused to testify in his own behalf, called Mrs. Lourdes R.
Lacson to the witness stand and asked her to produce the letter of the cashier of Guardian State
Bank, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, dated October 27, 1972 addressed to Maria Paz R. Prado, stating that
"Cashiers Check No. 27166, payable to Miss Carmencita S. Rodriguez, has not been paid as of this
date. "[10]

4. Antonio Avecilla declared that as messenger of Litton Mills, it was his duty to get all the incoming
and outgoing mails of both the Pasig and Mandaluyong branches of Litton Mills, Inc. He knew the
complainant, Mrs. Lacson, because the latter was his co-employee at Litton Mills. He often mailed
the letters of Mrs. Lacson for her and would also get her mail from the post office.

On November 16, 1971, he admitted having gotten from the Mandaluyong Post Office a registered
letter addressed to Mrs. Lacson by signing the name of Mrs. Lacson and his name on the registry
receipt. Once in the office, he left said letter on the table of Mrs. Lacson because at that time she
was already out as it was past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. He also said that when he left the letter
on the table, nobody was in the office.[11]

On July 16, 1973, the trial court[12] rendered its decision finding accused-petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple theft. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Theft, pursuant to Article 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS, TWENTY-ONE (21)
DAYS of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED."[13]

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 20,
1976, promulgated a decision finding accused-petitioner guilty of qualified theft instead of simple
theft. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in the sense that the crime committed is
hereby designated as qualified theft; and that the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
of prisionmayor, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision is affirmed with costs against
accused-appellant.

IT IS SO ORDERED."[14]

The motion for reconsideration having been denied,[15] petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme
Court by way of the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that his constitutional right to due process had been violated both substantially
and procedurally. He was convicted of qualified theft instead of simple theft and imposed a penalty
eight times longer than his original sentence, and his motion for reconsideration of the appellate
court's decision was "denied in one stereo-typed sentence."[16] He adds that his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him provided for in Art. IV, Sec. 19
of the 1971 Constitution and reiterated in Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (c) of the Rules of Court had also
been violated.

Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him of qualified theft just
because the information used the term "registered letter" when "not all registered letters is (sic)
mail matter." Because the information alleges that the registered letter belonged to Lourdes
Rodriguez de Lacson and considering Art. 723 of the Civil Code which provides that a letter becomes
the personal property of the addressee after it has been delivered, the crime charged is only simple
theft.

Petitioner bewails the vagueness of the information which resulted in his "bewilderment" as to what
precisely he had allegedly stolen for a registered letter per se cannot be worth $500.00. He notes
that the information does not state that the registered letter contained a check. Moreover, he avers,
the essential elements of theft, whether simple or qualified, had not been substantiated by the facts
proven. Thus, petitioner adds, it had not been shown that he knew about the contents of the letter;
there was no unlawful taking because the delivery of the letter was made in the manner prescribed
by postal regulations; the allegedly stolen property had not been produced at all, and the
prosecution relied solely on the "sheer self-serving testimony" of the complaining witness.[17]

Petitioner's allegations necessitate a scrutiny of the information imputing to him the commission of
a crime. It need not be overly stressed that the averments in the complaint or information
characterize the crime to be prosecuted and determine the court before which the case must be
tried.[18] What controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in
the information.[19]

A thorough examination of the information reveals that it contains all the essential elements of the
crime of theft, to wit: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things. [20]

While it is true that petitioner could not have been "bewildered" as to the nature of the charge
against him had the information been more accurately crafted, it nonetheless contains all the
elements of the crime of theft. Thus, it is alleged therein that petitioner, with the aid of and in
conspiracy with an unidentified woman, willfully took away Registered Letter No. 24341 belonging to
Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson to her damage and prejudice. Although intent to gain is not explicitly
alleged in the information, it may be presumed from the allegation that the said mail matter was
unlawfully taken.[21] Since there is no allegation that the taking was accomplished with violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things, it is apparent that the charge is for the crime of
theft rather than robbery.

The allegation that the subject of the taking is a registered letter categorizes the theft as a qualified
rather than a simple one. This is clear from the provision of Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that qualified theft is committed if the property stolen is mail matter. In this regard,
petitioner's contention that not all registered letters are mail matter is incorrect. Under Sec. 1945 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, first class mail matter includes letters. For the greater
security of valuable mail matter, Sec. 1962 of the same Code established a registry system "under
which the senders or owners of registered matter may be indemnified for losses thereof in the mails,
the indemnity to be paid out of postal revenues x x x."

From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had not been deprived of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Moreover, he may be convicted of a
crime and sentenced to the corresponding penalty as long as the facts alleged in the information and
proved at the trial constitute the crime for which he is convicted although different from the crime
designated and charged in the information.[22] The allegations in the complaint against petitioner had
been established beyond reasonable doubt at the trial. In this regard, it should be pointed out that
absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law as basis for conviction of any criminal charge
but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense.[23]Moral certainty convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience that a crime has indeed
been committed.[24] This quantum of proof has been satisfied in this case.

In his defense, petitioner relied solely on his own unsupported testimony. His story that after taking
delivery of the registered letter addressed to complainant Mrs. Lacson, he left it on her desk after
office hours when no one else was in the office strains credulity. In his attempt to prove that he did
not benefit from the bank draft of $400.00, he presented Mrs. Lacson herself with a letter from the
cashier of the Guardian State Bank in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to the effect that the bank draft had not
been paid. However, as in the crime of robbery, the fact that the accused did not benefit from the
articles taken does not affect the nature of the crime because from the moment the offender gained
possession of the thing, the unlawful taking is complete.[25]

Petitioner's assertion that he took Mrs. Lacson's registered letter by following the postal regulations
and hence, he may not be liable for its "misdelivery," falls flat in the face of the unrebutted proof
that he even used a woman to misrepresent herself as Mrs. Lacson. Although no one else witnessed
the deception, and Rosalinda Cervo could no longer describe the woman, the undisputed fact
remains that someone else other than Mrs. Lacson did sign the control book and that, thereafter,
petitioner took the letter with the bank draft of $400.00 which Mrs. Lacson never received.

Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial,[26] the intent to gain or animuslucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed from all
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator.[27] As earlier noted, the intent to gain may be
presumed from the proven unlawful taking.

The Court of Appeals considered P6,000.00 as the equivalent of $400.00. Under Art. 309 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for theft involving said amount is prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, but considering that qualified theft is punishable by a penalty two
degrees higher,[28] petitioner should be imposed the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods. In the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the penalty should
be the medium period of said penalty or nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and imposed the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional maximum as minimum penalty to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium as maximum penalty.

WHEREFORE, the modification of the decision of the trial court by the Court of Appeals finding the
accused-appellant guilty, not only of simple but qualified theft, being in order, the above imposition
of the penalty prescribed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law is CORRECT. Costs against the
appellant.

SO ORDERED.
The People of the Philippine Island, plaintiff-appellee

vs.

Francisco Sara, defendant-appelant

Facts:

On August 2, 1930, Francisco Sara was out to shoot birds. At the same Gabriel Catapang and
his wife Ruperta Mendoza were out collecting bananas. A gunshot was heard and hit Gabriel
Catapang. The gunshot came from Francisco Sara hitting Gabriel in the right lower part of the
abdomen. Death followed as a result of the wound.

The accused contended, “seeing a bird sitting on the tree, raised his gun intending to shoot
when Gabriel Catapang approached and asked that he be permitted to shoot the bird, at the same
time seizing the barrel of the gun and pulling it around towards his own body. As the accused at this
moment has his finger on the trigger, the weapon was discharge and Gabriel receives the load at his
abdomen. Upon seeing Gabriel fall, he seized with fright and ran away”.

Issue:

Whether or not Francisco Sara if guilty of homicide?

Held:

No. The killing was not intentionally committed thus the Supreme Court held that the
homicide should be attributed at least to the reckless and imprudent act of the accused in handling
and discharging the weapon in his hands. Therefore, the accused is not guilty of homicide but
instead guilty of homicide by reckless imprudence.

EOPLE V. NANQUIL-- 43 Phil 232Facts:

Juan Rosas’ cart and carabao disappeared, he requested the assistance of theConstabulary to
recover them and find the suspect. A sergeant and twosoldiers were commissioned to investigate.
During the investigation, theycalled Severino Ramiscal, and one of them, surnamed Masiglat,
examinedRamiscal. He did not obtain any clear information from Ramiscal so he turnedhim over to
the other soldier, Antancio Nanquil for further examination.Sergeant who commanded that patrol
was feeling ill so he remained in ahouse in a neighborhood. As Atanasio Nanquil examined Ramiscal
on a road,Masiglat was 20 brazas from them. All of a sudden, Masiglat heard a blowand saw
Ramsical fall to the ground. Nanquil struck him with his gun whichconsequently killed Ramiscal.
Atansio Nanquil was prosecuted for the crimeof homicide and sentence by the trial court to fourteen
years, eight monthsand one day of reclusion temporal. The defendant appealed.

Issue

:W/N Nanquil should be charged with homicide through reckless imprudence.

Held

:No. The court finds a mitigating circumstance of the accused not having hadthe intention to cause
the death of the deceased. For this reason the penaltyof reclusion temporal must be imposed in its
minimum degree. The judgmentappealed from is modified, and the appellant sentenced to twelve
years andone day of reclusion temporal, to the accessory penalties provided by article59 of the
Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of Severino Ramiscal in theamount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000), and to pay the costs of bothinstances.

Ratio

:Nanquil had no intention to commit so serious an evil as that which resulted,the crime committed
by him cannot be that of homicide through recklessimprudence, because he did have the intention
to do some evil unlawfully(maltreating the deceased), and this intention, although it was not that of
killing, is inconsistent with reckless imprudence.

PEOPLE V BINDOY

FACTS: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for appelant was stenced to 12
years and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with the amount
of P1,000. The crime charged against the accused is homicide.

In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered
some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she already have one, but Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to
take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see
what;s happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the
left behind the accused and with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's
chest who was then behind Bindoy.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?

HELD: Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused, Pacas and Bindoy were
actually for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently
that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up and who
was therefore hit in the chest without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused
accidentally and without malicious intent because he was only defending his possession of the bolo
which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court
therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.

PEOPLE V. NEPOMUCENO, JR. Article 3 of RPC- Felonies are committed either thru dolo (deceit) or
culpa (fault) Facts: Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. has appealed in regard to the
decision finding him guilty of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246 of
RPC for the death of Grace Nepomuceno. On May 2, 1994 in Manila, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one GRACE
NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ, his wife, with whom he was married in lawful wedlock, by then and there
shooting her with a gun of unknown caliber hitting her on the left hip, thereby inflicting upon the
victim a fatal gunshot wound. The prosecution presented Monserrat de Leon, sister of the
victim,who declared that Grace would confide to her that accused-appellant was jobless and that
Grace had problems with the low income of the store she owned at Zurbaran Mart as compared to
her expenses. Accusedappellant would force sex on Grace especially when he was drunk. Defense
claimed that the accused was initially thinking about ending his life by shooting himself because of
the financial woes and his wife’s relentless pestering and nagging, but in the process of both
spouses’ struggle to take possession of the gun, it went off and hit Grace. Issue: 1) WON THE KILLING
WAS ACCIDENTAL, AND THAT THE DECEASED WAS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY (NO!) 2)
MAIN ISSUE AS TO ARTICLE 3: WON THE KILLING WAS DUE TO SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE (NO!) 3) WON
ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF PARRICIDE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (YES!) HELD: 1) No. First, accused-
appellant cannot Paragraph 4, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code in order to be exempted from
criminal liability. Said provision pertinently states: Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: 4) Any person who, while
performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention
of causing it. Accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however, the
act of accusedappellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self-
defense, is unlawful -- it at least constitutes light threats (Article 285, par. 1). There is thus no room
for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption. The gun was not even licensed or
registered hence, he could have been charged with illegal possession of a firearm. Secondly,
appellant's claim that the shooting happened when he tried to prevent his wife from killing herself
and he and his wife grappled for the possession of the gun is belied by the expert testimony of Dr.
Arizala of the who conducted a second post mortem examination. Moreover, the act of accused
ordering Eden Ontog to call a taxi in which he brought the wounded Grace to the hospital is "merely
an indication or act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant. Accusedappellant's
voluntary surrender is not sufficient ground to exculpate him from criminal liability. The law merely
considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. Nonflight is not proof of innocence. 2) No. What
qualifies an act of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent
in the execution thereof. Moreover, if the version of grappling for the gun were to be believed, there
should have been nitrates on both hands of Grace, as examined by the NBI doctor who conducted
the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim. Thus, these physical evidence, the lack
of powder burns or nitrates on the hands of Grace and the trajectory of the bullet that entered her
left thigh being slightly upwards and from left to right instead of downwards, repudiate
accusedappellant's claim of simple negligence. 3) Yes, but with mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The prosecution has sufficiently established the elements of parricide by its evidence.
These elements are: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that she was killed by the accused; and (3)
that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused (Article 246). The first and third elements were stipulated during the pre-trial stage of the
case, thus: the victim and the accused are legally married, and that immediately after the shooting,
the accused voluntarily and bodily carried the victim into a taxicab and proceeded to the hospital
where she died.” Further, accusedappellant having admitted that he shot his wife, he has the burden
of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison
mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to
sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario
Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they
were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani,
took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay
not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the
criminal responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the
existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of
the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the
meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is
to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and
Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of
them is liable only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased.
- GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never
INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

Bill of Rights

Ivler vs. San Pedro

G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to
the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including
the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the
filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the
MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Petition granted.