University of San Jose - Recoletos

School of Law

Magallanes Street, Cebu City, Philippines

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Statutory Construction

Submitted to:

Atty. Hyacinth T. Jadraque

Submitted by:

GROUP - II

Abangan, Shaira Cristy F.

Adolfo, Dawn Maryam C.

Armentano, Roque Jr.

Ladub, Franchesca Bea B.

Rizon, Louray Maria L.

Socia, Andrew Laurien R.

Suson, Angelyn D.
 Table of Contents

LEGAL MAXIMS PAGE NO.

Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis ………………………………………… pg. 1

Ratio Legis …………………………………………………………… pg. 4

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius ……………………………… pg. 7

Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex …………………………… pg. 9

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 Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis

It is not the letter of the law that killeth, it is the spirit of the law that giveth life.

The principle “it is not the Letter of the Law that Killeth, it is the Spirit of the Law that
Giveth Life” is deeply rooted on the ecclesiastical verse found in the bible.

Rebutting that no overlap exists between the Church and the State is difficult in
certain cases. This overlap is evident in the laws passed by the Legislation and inspired by
the rules and laws of the Church. A good example is on the application of “psychological
incapacity” as a ground for dissolution and making void a marriage. Certain statutorical
construction and interpretation are closely related to certain guidelines found in
bibliographical and religious manuscripts. An example would be the principle “it is not the
Letter of the Law that Killeth, it is the Spirit of the Law that Giveth Life” found in 2
Corinthians 3:6. Although this principle is indirectly extracted from the religious
manuscripts, it has been used by the Judiciary to provide meaning and expound it in their
efforts to judge and decide the merits of a controversy.

In YSIP v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF CABIAO, NUEVA ECIJA, ET AL., the

presiding judge pronounced that if choosing between strict and literal interpretation and a
liberal and reasonable interpretation of the law is necessary, and we must choose between
the letter of the law that “killeth” and the spirit of the law that “giveth life,” then the latter

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should be adopted because it will produce beneficial results. A basic principle in statutory
construction stipulates that the law must be given a reasonable interpretation at all times.
Moreover, “the court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and reason of a statute,
over the literal meaning when the literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
or injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter”.

A. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis — the reason of the law is its soul

The legal maxim provides for the literal meaning, that is, the reason of the law is its
soul. Justice Kapunan explained this maxim in his concurring opinion for the case of the
City Government of Makati City versus Civil Service Commission.

The legal axiom “the reason of the law is the life of the law” is a consecrated one.
However, the reason of a law may cease in a given situation. This situation may occur in
cases when the purpose of the law sought to be achieved is accomplished, or the mischief
sought to be repressed is prevented by an event independent of the statute itself. In such a
case, the law finds no application in the situation even though it remains to be in force and
effect (Agpalo, 1990).

Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis is one of the maxims employed in aid to construe
constitutional provisions.

In CHAVEZ versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL ET AL., the judge

explained the three well-settled principles of constitutional construction. The first one is
verba legis. Such principle merely indicates that the words in the Constitution should be
given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed. The second one
is the presence of ambiguity - ratio legis est anima legis. In such case, the words in the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The third

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one is ut magis valeat quam pereat. Such principle dictates that the Constitution must be
interpreted as a whole. This notion is further affirmed by the court in FRANCISCO, JR.
versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES when it pronounced that the Constitution must
be taken in its most literal sense as much as possible. However, when ambiguity arises —
ratio legis est anima — the Constitution must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit
of the law and intent of its framers.

This maxim was applied by the court in its decision in the case of NITAFAN
versus COMMISSIONER on INTERNAL REVENUE. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. Thus, ascertainment of intent is in
accordance with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction wherein the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
Furthermore, the court explained through its decision in CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY that a yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. One should instil “in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied” in construing the Constitution. The objective is to ascertain the
reason that the framers of the Constitution induced to enact a particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby to construe the whole and make the words
consistent with that reason and calculated to effect that purpose (Maxwell versus Dow).

References:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1922/apr1922/gr_l-18947_1922.html

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/feb2002/gr_131392_so_2002.html

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. (1990).

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_78780_1987.html#fnt10

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https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/feb1991/gr_83896_1991.html

Maxwell vs. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597.

Ratio Legis

The logical element of the law, or the purpose that animated the legislator in the issuance
of the law.

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,

Respondent.

Facts

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by
virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national named YOSHINO

MINORO. A case for divorce was filed by herein petitioner in Japan and after due

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proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Court.

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear
anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage.

Issue

Whether the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?

Ruling

The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of
the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the

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Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have
used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still,
the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of
Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the

manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found

under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the
mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for
an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

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 Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others.

G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioners. v. HON. RUBEN

TORRES, et. al., Respondents.

Facts

This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his
capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with
the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone
(SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare RA
7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free)
importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. Petitioners contend that the wording
of RA 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives tothe importation of raw materials,
capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of EO 97-A for being violative of their
right to equal protection.

They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different
from the retail establishments located outside. The respondent moves to dismiss the
petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and unreasonable delay in filing of the
petition

Issue

Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause?

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Ruling

NO. The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment” was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities
operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius", on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their
restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.

The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 97-A cannot be,

likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be
valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3)
not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, the Court finds no violation of the
right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the
establishments inside and outside the zone.

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 Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex

The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself ceases.

GR No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellant, v. WENCESLAO

ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA,
Defendants-appellees.

Facts

Herein defendants-appellees were tenants at the riceland of Margarita Fernando,

who accused them of pre-threshing a portion of their respective harvests of five (5)
cavans of palay each without giving notice to her and without her consent, in violation of
Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954. The section states that “it shall be
unlawful for either the tenant of landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh
portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing.”

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 Subsequently, the defendant-appellees filed a motion to quash the information which
was granted by the lower court on August 11, 1996. Hence this appeal from the
prosecution.

Issue

Whether or not herein defendants-appellees should be charged with violation of the

prohibition on pre-threshing as contained in Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law
of 1954.

Held

NO; the Court affirms the the order of dismissal of the lower court.

Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 was based on the rice share
tenancy system. Its raison d’etre was to prevent tenants and landholders from defrauding
each other during harvest.

However, majority of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 has since been
superseded by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which took effect of September 10,
1971. Under Section 34 of the new law, lessees are obligated to pay a fixed rental instead,
and hence the prohibition on pre-threshing ceases to be an offense.

The legal maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex - the reason for the law
ceasing, the law itself ceases - was applied herewith. Section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law of 1954, or the prohibition of pre-threshing ceased to be relevant due to the
shift from the rice share tenancy system under which it was based to the leasehold
system. Accordingly, holding anyone in offense thereof would be “repugnant or
abhorrent to the policy and spirit” of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1971 and
“the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing
without notice to landholder.”

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