OBLICON NOTES – by: Atty. Joanne Marie A.

Coma
PRESCRIPTION
Article1106.
Article 1106.ByByprescription,
prescription,one
oneacquires
acquiresownership
ownershipandandother
otherreal
realrights
rightsthrough
throughthethelapse
lapse of
of time
timeininthe
themanner
mannerand
andunder
underthe
theconditions
conditionslaid
laiddown
downby
bylaw.In
law. Inthe
thesame
sameway,
way,rights
rightsand
and
conditions are lost by prescription.
conditions are lost by prescription.

 Purpose of prescription
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising
the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the
lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses

 DEFINITION - Acquisition of a right by the lapse of time

Right to property is acquired by prescription.
2 Kinds of Prescription
1. Acquisitive Prescription – Acquisition of a right by the lapse of time; also called adverse
possession or usucapcion
2. Extinctive prescription – rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time; also called
limitation of action

Basis of acquisitive prescription

Based on the assertion by a usurper of an adverse right for such a long time, uncontested by
the true owner of the right, as to give rise to the presumption that the latter has given up such
right in favor of the former.

Basis of extinctive prescription

To protect the diligent and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his rights.

Laches or “Doctrine of Stale Demands”

Based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, and the
discouragement of stale claims.
TN: it applies independently of prescription

In order that the defense of laches may prosper, the following elements must be present:
(1) conduct on the part of defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of, (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after knowledge or notice of
defendant's conduct and an opportunity to sue, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that complainant would assert the right on which he bases suit, and (4) injury

1 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
or prejudice to defendant in the event relief is accorded.

Pangasinan v. Almazora (READ THE FULL TEXT)

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Definition
of Laches)

Purposes of Laches
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize
neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation.

The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose
claim or demand has become "stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of
time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the discouragement of
claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to
permit.

1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or
the suit is not held to be barred

In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the elements of laches were present. First,
Aurora and her family entrusted to Conrado the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title of
the subject property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado’s
family had been staying in the subject property since 1912. Second, it took five decades, from
1945 to 1996, before Aurora and petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third,
respondents who lived all their lives in the disputed property apparently were not aware that
Aurora would one day come out and claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no question
that respondents would be prejudiced in the event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.

2 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
How about if the action has prescribed?

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the
acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106.
Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind
is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined
in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is
litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.

In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive
prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the
case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which
barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because
respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their
suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

Article 1107. Persons who are capable of acquiring property or rights by the other legal
modes may acquire the same by means of prescription. Minors and other incapacitated
persons may acquire property or rights by prescription, either personally or through their
parents, guardians or legal representatives.

 Prescription is a mode of acquiring property or rights

 A person who is of majority age and who is qualified to do all acts of civil life may
acquire property by prescription.
 Acquisition of minor of property/rights without assistance of parents or guardian –
annulable; subject to ratification
 Acquisition of minor is through parents/ guardian – valid acquisition

Article 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:(1) Minors and
other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal
representatives;(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before
their disappearance, or appointed by the courts;(3) Persons living abroad, who have
managers or administrators;(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to claim
damages from their legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of
prescription.

3 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 Article 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements or by judicial decree.
Neither does prescription run between parents and children, during the minority or insanity
of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the continuance of the guardianship

Why is there no prescription as to these relationships?

 Marriage – special contract (Take note of the exceptions; Review Persons)

 Parent and child – natural bond of filiation
 Guardian and ward – fiduciary relationship

Article 1110. Prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, runs in favor of, or against a
married woman.

Article 1111. Prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or a co-owner shall benefit the

others.

Illustration:
Alex, Carla and George co-own a particular land and by virtue of such co-ownership, they all
reside in the same. If george occupies as a co-owner with Alex and Carla, a portion of land
adjoining the co-owned property, and he adversely and publicly holds such adjacent property
of land continuously to the exclusion of all others who are not in the co-ownership for the
required period of time, there can be a valid acquisition not only in his favor, but also in favor
of Alex and Carla, even though they do not actually possess the said portion.

Article 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription
already obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed
to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply
the abandonment of the right acquired.

Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

4 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 Republic v. Espinosa, GR 171514
(Refer to the full text)
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.

Public Land Act's Changes over the years

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

5 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a
period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

PD 1521

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

Sec. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.

Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the
subject property being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2)
categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under
Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use,
public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private. In
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, this Court held that there must be an official declaration
to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:

SO, it is only the patrimonial property of the State which can be subject to prescription.

Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It
is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that
those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for

6 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period
of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.

Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an
aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership.
The property, albeit allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is
not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates
observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.

For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was an official
declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or the
development of national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued
at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of the application
for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the conversion of the
property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the
prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the
development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable, possession and
occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would
defeat that of the State’s if such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section
14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No.
1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper,
Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12,
1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand, applying
Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As
to whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel
were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered
7 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

HEIRS OF DELFIN V. NHA

(Refer to the full text)

Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive prescription under Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is established to be private
in character; and second the applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had passed.

Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs
to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth." Land that belongs to the state but which is not or is no
longer intended for public use, for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth, is patrimonial property; it is property owned by the State in its private capacity.

Private property "consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively," as well as "the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities.

Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article
1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of the state, which are not patrimonial in character,
as being not susceptible to prescription:

Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.Cha

Contrary to petitioners' theory then, for prescription to be viable, the publicly-owned land must
be patrimonial or private in character at the onset. Possession for thirty (30) years does not
convert it into patrimonial property.

For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an
express declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law" - that "the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial."

8 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is "intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth"

A mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or presidential proclamation
required for converting land of the public domain into patrimonial property and rendering it
susceptible to prescription. There then was no viable declaration rendering the Iligan property
to have been patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of
petitioners' possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts.

Republic v. Malijan-Javier
(refer to the full text)

It is well-settled that a CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to establish that a land is
alienable and disposable. It should be "accompanied by an official publication of the DENR
Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

These provisions, read with Victoria v. Republic, establish the rule that before an inalienable
land of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR Secretary must first approve the

9 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
land classification into an agricultural land and release it as alienable and disposable. The
DENR Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.

Article 1114. Creditors and all other persons interested in making the prescription
effective may avail themselves thereof notwithstanding the express or tacit renunciation
by the debtor or proprietor.

Article 1115. The provisions of the present Title are understood to be without prejudice to
what in this Code or in special laws is established with respect to specific cases of
prescription.

 Other provisions in the Civil Code which provides for prescriptive periods in specific
cases.
 Annulment of contract due to fraud - 4 years from the time fraud is discovered
 Oral contract - 6 years
 Written contract - 10 years

Article 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire
period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be
applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required

 If the prescriptive period provided under the old law has already lapsed before the
effectivity of the 1950 Civil Code, such prescriptive period shall apply.

 If the prescriptive period under the old law is still running upon the effectivity of the
1950 Civil Code, which however provides for a different period for the same situation,
the 1950 Civil Code shall prevail provided that such period counted from the
effectivity of the 1950 Civil Code has already lapsed, although under the old law, the
period has not yet lapsed.

 If the prescriptive period under the old law is still running upon the effectivity of the
1950 Civil Code and the remaining balance of such period since the effectivity of the
1950 Civil Code is shorter than that provided in the 1950 Civil Code for exactly the
same situation, the old prescriptive period will apply.

Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights

10 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 Article 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of
things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

 Ordinary Prescription - Requires uninterrupted possession for the required statutory

period of years in good faith and with a just title.

 EXTRAORDINARY PRESCRIPTION - Requires an uninterrupted possession for the

statutory period of years but without need of just title and good faith on the part of the
possessor.

Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful

and uninterrupted

“In the concept of an owner”

 The possessor asserts dominion on the property to the exclusion of all others.
 Must be an adverse possession.
 A mere lessee, mortgagee, usufructuary, agent, antichretic creditor - cannot
ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription

 Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor

through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership,
possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken
and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own
use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The
party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence
of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

 Case Study: YAMBAO V. YAMBAO

(Refer to the Full Text)

As pointed out by the CA, the R TC overlooked the fact that the subject property is co-
owned by the parties herein, having inherited the same from Hermogenes. Feliciano's

11 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 free patent application indicated that he merely tacked his possession of the subject
property from Hermogenes, his father, who held the property in peaceful, open,
continuous, and adverse manner in the concept of an owner since 1944. This is an
implicit recognition of the fact that Feliciano merely co-owns the subject property with
the other heirs of Hermogenes. Indeed, the heirs of Feliciano have not presented any
evidence that would show that Hermogenes bequeathed the subject property solely to
Feliciano.

Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open,

continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s.
In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or
other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other
co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear
and convincing.

The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation of
any trust. In such a case, an action to demand partition among co-owners prescribes in
10 years, the point of reference being the date of the issuance of certificate of title over
the property. But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property, the right to demand partition does not prescribe.

Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano on November 29,
1989, the prescriptive period within which to demand partition of the subject property,
contrary to the claim of the heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs
of Hermogenes were still in possession of the property. It was only in 2005 that the
heirs of Feliciano expressly prohibited the heirs of Hermogenes from entering the
property. Thus, as aptly ruled by the CA, the right of the heirs of Hermogenes to demand
the partition of the property had not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the RTC committed a
reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for partition that was filed by the heirs
of Hermogenes.

Article 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere

tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession.

ABALOS V. HEIRS OF TORIO

(Refer to the Full Text )
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten
(10) years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
12 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30)
years.

Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is
"just title" when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

It is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners acknowledged
ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly
shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents'
immediate predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment.

Thus, having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of
the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as
to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court
agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance
of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character executed
due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
prescription.

Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de

dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the
period of prescription.

As evidenced by their declaration of the same for tax purposes under the names of their
predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls short of the required period of thirty (30)
years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax
Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-
year period was completed in 2004. However, herein respondents' complaint was filed in
1996, effectively interrupting petitioners' possession upon service of summons on them.
Thus, petitioners’ possession also did not ripen into ownership, because they failed to meet
the required statutory period of extraordinary prescription.

Article 1120. Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or

civilly.

13 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
  When prescription is interrupted, all the benefits acquired so far from the possession
cease; when prescription runs again, it will be entirely a new one. (Tolentino)

Article 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause it should
cease for more than one year. The old possession is not revived if a new possession
should be exercised by the same adverse claimant.

 Natural interruption is an interruption in fact, which takes place whenever by some act
we cease truly to possess what we formerly possessed.

 It is said to be either “natural” or “civil,” the former being caused by the act of the party;
the latter by the legal effect or operation of some fact or circumstance.

Article 1122. If the natural interruption is for only one year or less, the time
elapsed shall be counted in favor of the prescription.

When the possession is suspended and not interrupted, the old possession is tacked to the
new one.

Article 1123. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the

possessor.

Heirs of Azardon v. Crisologo

(Refer to the full text)
 Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial
summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons,
Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have
been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack
of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow
the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

 Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character
of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have

14 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse
Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim
which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession.

 Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion
of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice
of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial
validity.

 What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the
Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against
respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of
Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil
interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able
to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive
prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of
Adverse Claim.

Article 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and
shall not give rise to interruption:(1) If it should be void for lack of legal
solemnities;(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse;(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.In
all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the prescription.

Instances when there is judicial summon, but would not interrupt the running of prescriptive
period:
 Judicial summons is void for lack of legal solemnities
 Plaintiff should desist from the complaint or allow the proceedings to lapse -
desistance (voluntarily having the case dismissed)
 When the possessor is absolved from the complaint.

Article 1125. Any express or tacit recognition which the possessor may make of the
owner's right also interrupts possession.

Article 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary

prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of
a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the time
shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.As to lands registered under
the Land Registration Act, the provisions
15 |O B L I of
C Othat
N Nspecial
O T E Slaw
- shall
P r e govern.
scription
Doctrines:
 Prescription cannot apply to registered lands
 Laches can however be applicable.

SUPAPO V. DE JESUS
(Refer to the full text)

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of
acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land
because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].

The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the
Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is
Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land
is also entitled to the possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is
an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right
of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property.
Again, this right is imprescriptible.

In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens
Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all.

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a
piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run

16 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not
only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the
system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even
violent.

Case Study: Lausa v. Quilaton

(Refer to the full text)

In the present case, the Deed of Assignment between Antonio and Alejandro was
cancelled three months after it was executed. The Deed, executed on September 13,
1915, was inscribed with the phrase: "Cancelled December 21, 1915. See letter #
12332."

Both the trial court and the CA found this inscription to be sufficient proof that the
Deed of Assignment had been cancelled three months after its execution. As a
consequence, the Deed of Assignment could not have vested Antonio's rights over
Lot No. 557 to Alejandro.

Thus, Lot No. 557 reverted to its original status after the Deed of Assignment was
cancelled. It remained subject to the conditional sale between the government and
Antonio; under the Certificate of Sale between the Bureau of Lands and Antonio, the
government should transfer title to Lot No. 557 to Antonio upon full payment of the
lot's purchase price.

According to jurisprudence, Section 15 of Act No. 1120 reserves to the government

the naked title to the friar lands, until its beneficiaries have fully paid their purchase
price. Since the intent of Act No. 1120 was to transfer ownership of the friar lands to
its actual occupants, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to them the
moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. This right is
subject to the resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price
shall not be paid in full.

While the records of the case do not show any documents or paper trail showing the
actions of the parties to the Certificate of Sale after the Deed of Assignment was
cancelled, we can, with certainty, rule out the possibility that Alejandro acquired title
to it through prescription.

First, Antonio could have completed payment of the purchase price of Lot No. 557.
Upon full payment, the lot would have then been registered in Antonio's name.

Second, Antonio could have failed to complete payment of Lot No. 557's purchase
price; thus, the naked title to Lot No. 557 remains with the government.

17 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
Third, Antonio could have sold his rights to Lot No. 557 to another person. Assuming
he did, only that person could have stepped into his shoes, and could have either
completed payment of the purchase price of Lot No. 557 and had it registered in his
name; or, he could have failed to pay the purchase price in full, in which case the
naked title to the lot remains government property.

Mauricia's title, as earlier established, is fabricated; thus, her situation falls within the
exception expressed under Section 1 of RA No. 9443, viz:

This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all respects be entitled to like
effect and credit as a decree of registration, binding the land and quieting the title
thereto and shall be' conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national
government and all branches thereof; except when, in a given case involving a
certificate of title or a reconstituted certificate of title, there is a clear evidence that
such certificate of title or reconstituted certificate of title was obtained through fraud,
in which case the solicitor general or his duly designated representative shall
institute the necessary judicial proceeding to cancel the certificate of title or
reconstituted certificate of title as the case may be, obtained through such fraud.

Mauricia's claim that she bought Lot No. 557 from Antonio is contradicted by the
contents of TCT No. 16534.

For a new TCT to be issued, the owner's duplicate of the seller should have been
surrendered to the Registry of Deeds, along with a copy of the TCT's Deed of Sale.
Thus, the seller's TCT would be cancelled, and the new TCT of the buyer would
indicate the seller's TCT as its TCT of origin.

The text of TCT No. 571 shows that it originated from TCT No. 16534. If indeed TCT
No. 571 was issued to Mauricia because the latter bought Lot No. 557 from Antonio,
then TCT No. 16534 should have reflected this transaction.

With respect to Alejandro, his claim to Lot No. 557 rests on the Deed of Assignment
executed between him and Antonio, which had been cancelled; hence, it cannot be
confirmed through Republic Act No. 9443.

Our decision in the present case does not settle the ownership of Lot No. 557. To
recapitulate, our examination of the records and the evidence presented by the
petitioners and the respondents lead us to conclude that neither of them own Lot No.
557.

Despite the intent of Act No. 1120 and Republic Act No. 9443 to transfer ownership
of the Banilad Friar Estate Lands to its occupants, we cannot settle the ownership of

18 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 Lot No. 557 in the present case.

Indeed, the petitioners and the respondents are the actual occupants of Lot No. 557,
and they and their families (with the exception of Rosita Lopez) have resided in the
lot since 1915.

However, as we have discussed above, neither party had been able to establish their
right of ownership, much less possession, of Lot No. 557. The petitioners anchor
their claim on acquisitive prescription, which does not lie against registered land or
the government. The respondents, on the other hand, presented spurious TCTs. Thus,
no amount of liberal interpretation of Act No. 1120 or Republic Act No. 9443 could
give either party the right over the lot.

Neither can we ignore the evidence showing that none of them could rightfully own
Lot No. 557. The petitioners' cancelled deed of assignment and tax declarations
cannot establish their ownership over Lot No. 557; especially since the operation of
pertinent laws prevented the possibility of acquisitive prescription. The respondents'
TCT No. 571, on the other hand, had several discrepancies indicating that it was a
fake.

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.

To be in good faith, the possessor must believe that the title for his acquisition is sufficient; it
is not enough that he knows of no defect in it. This belief must be founded and there is
sufficient basis when he believes that the transferor was the owner of the thing and could
transmit ownership thereof. (Tolentino)

Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in Articles 526, 527, 528,
and 529 of this Code are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the
prescription of ownership and other real rights.

Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.

Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.

19 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the
concept of owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the
ownership pertaining to another person.
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of
a possessor rests the burden of proof.
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in
which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.

Art. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.

Art. 1130. The title for prescription must be true and valid.

Art. 1131. For the purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never
presumed.

For purposes of prescription, the title of the possessor must be:

 Just
 True
 Valid

20 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
  Proved

Just title

 Has for its purpose the transmission of ownership

 Sale, donation, dation in payment, succession

True title

Must exist actually and not merely in the mind of the possessor.
Not simulated; if by will (not revoked); not a false title

Valid Title

It must be sufficient to transmit the right if the grantor had been the owner.

A applied for registration of a parcel of land from B, which the latter purchased from X.
X opposed the registration because what was sought to be registered is a property
under his administration. X denied that he sold the same to B. Can A acquire the land
by prescription?

The title for prescription must be true and valid. X’s possession was exercised under
some right other than that of owner. Therefore, no title could have been acquired by
prescription under the circumstances.

Title must be proved

Refers to the creation or acquisition of the right of ownership and therefore demands
greater guaranty of the existence of a title.

Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession

for four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted
possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he
has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public
sale, fair, or market, or from a merchant's store the provisions of Articles 559 and
1505 of this Code shall be observed.

Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may

21 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
recover it from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through
prescription by the offender.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Constructive Possession

Constructive possession is a legal fiction to describe a situation where an individual has

actual control over chattels or real property without actually having physical control of the
same assets. At law, a person with constructive possession stands in the same legal
position as a person with actual possession.

Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession

Art. 1135. In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less
than that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession.

Republic v. CA and Spouses Santos

(Refer to the full text)
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents.

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in a rare
and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the

22 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of
justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby
thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals.

We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept is
understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular.

In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude's titles in
1996 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct and recover the
alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against
its cause, as it is tantamount to laches, which means "the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do what which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

No damages caused by retention

Application of equitable principle of laches – to avoid injustice to innocent purchasers for
value
So that public confidence in certificate of title is not impaired.

Art. 1136. Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open, shall not be counted
in favor of the adverse claimant.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.

Case Study: Andres v. Sta. Lucia

(refer to the full text)
However, it was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,
that only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership,

23 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. And if the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must
first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the
requisite acquisitive prescriptive period.

Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is an

unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain, petitioners, in
order to validly claim acquisition thereof through prescription, must first be able to show that
the State has expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation
issued by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.

In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of ownership
over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles. Conversely, they cannot
demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for lack of personality.

Art. 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall
be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking
his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous
time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof
to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included.

Prescription of Actions

 Also called “limitation of actions”

 Time within which the an action may be brought.
 Claims which are valid are not usually allowed to remain neglected and that the lapse
of years without any attempt to enforce a demand creates a presumption against its
original validity or that it has ceased to exist.

Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.

24 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
The lapse of the period of prescription provided by law has the effect of extinguishing the
action.
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the
possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by
prescription for a less period, according to Articles 1132, and without prejudice to the
provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133.

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership
and other real rights by prescription.

Maybank v. Spouses
Art. 1142. Tarrosaaction prescribes after ten years.
A mortgage
Maybank v. Spouses Tarrosa

Maybank v. Spouses Tarrosa

An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years
from the time the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of
his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the
mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage. However, mere delinquency in payment
does not necessarily mean delay in the legal concept. To be in default is different from mere
delay in the grammatical sense, because it involves the beginning of a special condition or
status which has its own peculiar effects or results.

In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be
demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the creditor
requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not necessary – i.e.,
when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so provides; when the
period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation;
and where demand would be useless. Moreover, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation
fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly that after the period lapses,
default will commence. Thus, it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary in case of the
aforementioned circumstances, or when required, such demand is made and subsequently
refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default and the mortgagee obtains the right
to file an action to collect the debt or foreclose the mortgage.

25 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
5. In the event that the Mortgagor herein should fail or refuse to pay any of the sums of
money secured by this mortgage, or any part thereof, in accordance with the terms and
conditions herein set forth, or should he/it fail to perform any of the conditions stipulated
herein, then and in any such case, the Mortgagee shall have the right, at its election to
foreclose this mortgage

This provision merely articulated Maybank’s right to elect foreclosure upon Sps. Tarrosa’s
failure or refusal to comply with the obligation secured, which is one of the rights duly
accorded to mortgagees in a similar situation. In no way did it affect the general parameters
of default, particularly the need of prior demand under Article 1169 of the Civil Code,
considering that it did not expressly declare: (a) that demand shall not be necessary in order
that the mortgagor may be in default; or (b) that default shall commence upon mere failure
to pay on the maturity date of the loan.

In the absence of showing that demand is unnecessary for the loan obligation to become
due and demandable, Maybank's right to foreclose the real estate mortgage accrued only
after the lapse of the period indicated in its final demand letter for Sps. Tarrosa to pay, i.e.,
after the lapse of five (5) days from receipt of the final demand letter dated March 4, 1998.

Art. 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not
extinguished by prescription:
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance.

Easement of Right of Way is the easement or privilege by which one person or a particular
class of persons is allowed to pass over another’s land, usually through one particular path or
line.

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

26 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all
the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall
consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate
surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a
permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's
own acts.
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not
included in the foregoing definition.

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.

An action based on a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right
of action accrues.

A cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violation thereof
occurs.

27 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 REPUBLIC (PMO) v. ANTONIO BANEZ

A written acknowledgment of debt or obligation effectively interrupts the running of the

prescriptive period and sets the same running anew.

Hence, because Hojilla’s letter dated 15 August 1984 served as a written acknowledgement
of the respondents’ debt or obligation, it interrupted the running of the prescriptive period and
set the same running anew with a new expiry period of 15 August 1994.
An action based on a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the
right of action accrued. Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract accrues only when
an actual breach or violation thereof occurs.
A cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff.
By the contract between the herein parties, the cause of action accrued at the point when the
reasonable time within which to present the title lapsed. The parties did not determine the
date when the respondents must present the title and other documents to the petitioner. The
parties only agreed that the respondents must present the same within a "reasonable time."
Reasonable time means "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires
that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other
party

The accrual of the cause of action to demand the titling of the land cannot be earlier than 15
August 1984. So that, the petitioner can sue on the contract until 15 August 1994. Prior to
the expiration of the aforesaid period, the petitioner sent a demand letter to Hojilla dated 29
May 1991.

A few months thereafter, petitioner sent another demand letter to Hojilla dated 24 October
1991. The prescriptive period was interrupted on 29 May 1991.

The consequence is stated in Article 1155 of the Civil Code. It states, "[t]he prescription of
actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor."

28 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
Following the law, the new ten-year period for the filing of a case by the petitioner should be
counted from 29 May 1991, ending on 29 May 2001. The complaint at bar was filed on 10
April 2000, well within the required period.

Notably, before the expiration of the new prescriptive period, the petitioner again sent a new
demand letter on 6 July 1999, which again caused the same to run anew, which will expire on
6 July 2009. The complaint filed on 10 April 2000 was timely.

Bentir v. Leanda

The remedy of reformation of an instrument is grounded on the principle of equity where, in

order to express the true intention of the contracting parties, an instrument already executed
is allowed by law to be reformed. The right of reformation is necessarily an invasion or
limitation of the parol evidence rule since, when a writing is reformed, the result is that an oral
agreement is by court decree made legally effective.

A suit for reformation of an instrument may be barred by lapse of time. The prescriptive period
for actions based upon a written contract and for reformation of an instrument is ten (10)
years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions like
the one at bar which facts had become so obscure from the lapse of time or defective memory.
In the case at bar, respondent corporation had ten (10) years from 1968, the time when the
contract of lease was executed, to file an action for reformation. Sadly, it did so only on May
15, 1992 or twenty-four (24) years after the cause of action accrued, hence, its cause of
action has become stale, hence, time-barred.

AINZA V. PADUA
Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract.

AINZA V. PADUA
The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract, the action to
annul the same must be commenced within six years from the time the right of action
accrued.

29 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
Eugenia sold the property in April 1987 hence Antonio should have asked the courts to
annul the sale on or before April 1993.

No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its
annulment was extinguished by prescription.

Art.
Art.1146.
1146.TheThefollowing
followingactions
actionsmust mustbebeinstituted
institutedwithin
withinfour
fouryears:
years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2)
(2)Upon
Upona aquasi-delict;
quasi-delict;
However,
However, whenthe
when theaction
actionarises
arises from or or
from outout
of any act,act,
of any activity, or conduct
activity, of any
or conduct public
of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including including thethe
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. (1) year.

 Counted from the day quasi-delict occurred or was committed

 Tortious interference

MONTERO v. TIMES TRANSPO

Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or
means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal
from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code,
which must be brought within four years.

The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14,
1998 but withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of
the four-year prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had
already ruled that the prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the
case as though no action has been filed at all.

In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the
petitioners in exactly the same position as though no complaint had been filed at all.
The withdrawal of their complaint effectively erased the tolling of the reglementary
period.

A prudent review of the antecedents of the claim reveals that it has in fact prescribed
due to the petitioners’ withdrawal of their labor case docketed as NLRC RAB-I-01-
1007.

30 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 Hence, while the filing of the said case could have interrupted the running of the
four-year prescriptive period, the voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners effectively
cancelled the tolling of the prescriptive period within which to file their illegal
dismissal case, leaving them in exactly the same position as though no labor case
had been filed at all.

The running of the four-year prescriptive period not having been interrupted by the
filing of NLRC RAB-I-01-1007, the petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed
in four years after their cessation of employment on October 26, 1997 and
November 24, 1997. Consequently, when the petitioners filed their complaint for
illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and damages in 2002, their
claim, clearly, had already been barred by prescription.

Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(1) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation.

Art. 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to 1147
are without prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code of
Commerce, and in special laws.

Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must
be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.

Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.

Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the
enforcement of obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last
payment of the annuity or of the interest.

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

31 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
 Art. 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs from the day
the persons who should render the same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs from the date when
said result was recognized by agreement of the interested parties.

Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from
enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.

Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

Virtucio v. Alegarbes

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the
acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names
for acquisitive prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is
extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in
Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of
action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.

Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions.
Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of
the same Code. Thus, Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of
acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the
period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption.

Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When
no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the
respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead
application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well
as jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said
period.
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision
resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In
such an instance, no civil interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts

32 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n
may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession. Records show that it was
only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct in
ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of
it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of
alienable public land.

33 |O B L I C O N N O T E S - P r e s c r i p t i o n