Turkish Studies

ISSN: 1468-3849 (Print) 1743-9663 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20

Women’s rights organizations and Turkish state

in the post-2011 era: ideological disengagement
versus conservative alignment

Berrin Koyuncu & Aylin Özman

To cite this article: Berrin Koyuncu & Aylin Özman (2018): Women’s rights organizations and
Turkish state in the post-2011 era: ideological disengagement versus conservative alignment,
Turkish Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2018.1539622

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1539622

Published online: 03 Nov 2018.

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TURKISH STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1539622

Women’s rights organizations and Turkish state in the

post-2011 era: ideological disengagement versus
conservative alignment
Berrin Koyuncua and Aylin Özmanb
a
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Hacettepe University, Ankara,
Turkey; bDepartment of Political Science and International Relations, TED University, Ankara,
Turkey

ABSTRACT
In this article, we aim to explore the shift in the relationship between the state
and women’s rights organizations (WROs) in Turkey in the post-2011 period,
which was evinced in rising tensions between gender equality and gender
complementarity discourses. We argue that, in the process of the
vernacularization of global and/or international gender norms in Turkey,
the conservative gender policy of the government corresponded to the
endorsement of ‘gender justice,’ a particularistic approach formulated with
reference to Islam. As such, the vernacularization of universal gender norms
opened the way for the state in Turkey to solidify its legitimacy by
instrumentalizing social divisions, marginalizing opposition WROs, and
aligning with government-oriented organizations.

KEYWORDS Women’s rights organizations; gender equality in Turkey; gender justice; conservatism;
authoritarian state

Introduction
In the early 2000s, the Turkish political arena witnessed substantial steps
toward democratization and the promotion of women’s rights, particularly
due to the impetus of the Europeanization process. During this period, one
can observe a symbolic compromise between the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) government (/the state1) and
women’s rights organizations (WROs).2 However, after 2011, the authoritar-
ian tendency within the government changed the promising political atmos-
phere, specifically altering its policies regarding gender equality3 and turning
the state–WRO relationship into an ideologically polarized process of
disengagement.

CONTACT Berrin Koyuncu bkoyuncu@hacettepe.edu.tr Faculty of Economics and Administrative

Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Hacettepe University, Beytepe
Campus, Beytepe, Ankara 06800, Turkey; Aylin Özman aylin.ozman@tedu.edu.tr
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

The conservative gender policies/practices of the AKP4 – the major axis of

polarization between the state and WROs – have been shaped by a new patri-
archal power network of authoritarian actions framed in neoliberal terms
whereby gender policies have been grounded on ‘conservative familialism,’5
defining the existential boundaries of women through prioritizing their
roles in the domestic/private sphere. Despite some commonalities with the
Early Republican Era (1923–1946) regarding state–WRO relations in an
authoritarian context, what distinguishes the new patriarchy in the post-
2011 era has been the threat posed to gender equality through the encounter
between ‘maleist political principles and feminist activism’6 and a retreat from
the early achievements of the Turkish women’s movement in the 1980s and
1990s.7 Indeed, though there was no indication of any support for women’s
rights and gender equality in AKP party literature even pre-2011, the
current power rebalancing taking place in Turkey has signified the end of
its relatively women-friendly incarnation.8 What has been notable in the
state–WRO relationship in the post-2011 period on the other hand has
been increasing ideological disengagement in the relationship alongside the
establishment of new government-oriented WROs. The most prominent
example has been the establishment of the Woman and Democracy Associ-
ation (Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği, KADEM) in 2013. Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, the then-prime minister of the Turkish Republic, declaring his
support for KADEM as an alternative WRO with a narrative of gender com-
plementarity epitomized the transformation that had occurred: the gradual
forcing of opponent WRO to the margins of the political sphere and the dee-
pening of the rift in the government–WRO relationship in Turkey.9
Set against this background, in this article we aim to explicate the shift in
the state–WRO relationship in Turkey during the post-2011 period, which
was evinced through the gender equality vs. gender justice debate. We
contend that the gender policy of the authoritarian government in Turkey
since 2011 corresponds to the endorsement of ‘gender justice’, a particularistic
conservative approach formulated with reference to Islam. Women’s status is
defined within the contours of the family paving the way for the ideological
disengagement of the AKP government from the opponent WROs and the
formation of a conservative alignment in tandem. Thus, although the state/
government formally supported women’s rights packages articulated by inter-
national conventions and organizations and enforced their implementation,
there has been a gap between the government’s gender policy preferences
and codes/opportunities based on universal norms of gender equality. This
perplexing situation has led us to ask: why does the state in Turkey
promote gender complementarity discourse but at the same time adopt inter-
national and universal agreements and conventions based on gender equality?
Borrowing Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry’s conceptualization of ‘vernaculariza-
tion’, ‘the process of appropriation and local adaptation of global norms,’10 we
 TURKISH STUDIES 3

argue that while traversing the local, what awaits universal norms of gender
equality in Turkey is a conservative move towards the norms of ‘gender com-
plementarity’, resulting in a tense relationship between the WROs advocating
the former and the state, which supports the latter. As observed in other
authoritarian contexts,11 we claim that, in Turkey, the vernacularization of
universal gender norms has helped the state to solidify its legitimacy, instru-
mentalize social divisions and marginalize opponent WROs by the establish-
ment of government-oriented organizations (GONGOs) as the legitimizing
agents for the government’s discourse and practice concerning gender norms.
The study consists of four main parts. The first part provides the theoretical
framework concerning the state–WRO relationship in an authoritarian
context. The second part is devoted to an overview of the state–WRO relation-
ship in Turkey with particular emphasis on the post-2000 period. The third
part introduces the field research. The fourth part discusses our research
findings through a qualitative analysis of the encounter between the state
and selected WROs to explain the repercussions of the shift in the WRO–
state interface in the post-2011 period.

Gender politics, the authoritarian state and WROs: theoretical

insights
The literature on the relationship between the state and civil society organiz-
ations (CSO) in an authoritarian context reveals a rather different picture
from the Toquevillian understanding of civil society, which has long been a
reference for comprehending such a relationship in democratic settings.
Rather than emphasizing the distinct position of civil society from the state
and its autonomy as a sphere of resistance to hegemonic politics and dis-
courses, they highlight a multiferous understanding of the state–civil society
relationship.12 The relationship crystallized in the state–CSO interface is por-
trayed as a ‘multi-layered network of material transactions, personal connec-
tions, and organizational linkages.’13 The ideological and strategical tools
employed by authoritarian states are decisive in molding these multi-
layered interface dynamics.
In their research on gender politics and authoritarianism, Jasmin Lorch
and Bettina Bunk delineate three patterns of authoritarian survival strategies
– legitimation, co-optation and divide-and-rule. While focusing on the
employment of gender politics as a legitimization strategy, they highlight
the implications of authoritarianism on the WRO–state relationship, i.e. the
selective instrumentalization of WROs as mechanisms of co-optation as
well as the reinforcement of polarization by the state.14
Focusing on the Nicaraguan case, Katharina Obuch points at the govern-
ment’s distrustful approach towards (critical) elements of civil society as a
threat to its power. She asserts that the state was employing a divide-and-
4 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

rule strategy based on the formation of pro-government CSOs and/or the

establishment of a patrimonial relationship with certain CSOs. In doing so,
the government in Nicaragua hindered the former’s acting autonomously
by fostering the development of non-autonomous organizations which
would act in line with governmental preferences. This has led to polarization
within civil society between the ‘opponent’ and ‘loyalist’ CSOs.15
In the Middle Eastern context, polarization regarding women’s rights
issues usually takes place between secularist and conservative-Islamist
WROs – setting the strategic ground for governments to (re)produce author-
itarian policies through de-legitimizing either secular or Islamist tendencies.16
Hence, in contradiction to the mainstream theoretical assumption regarding
the role of CSOs in enhancing democracy, (selected) CSOs operating in an
authoritarian milieu may undertake a role in the opposite direction as to
reproduce authoritarian politics.17
The strategies employed by states with authoritarian tendencies serve to
obfuscate the gap between the discourse and practice concerning gender
equality policies generated in the process of ‘vernacularization.’ Focusing on
the cases of Peru, India, China and the U.S, Levitt and Merry underline the
decisiveness of social and cultural context(s) in the practice of women’s
rights and contend that vernacularization may produce a set of ideas and
practices that are remote from the original documents and intentions articu-
lated by international organizations/ agreements. Thus, while retaining part of
their originality, the global packages – the embrace of gender equality,
women’s empowerment, and secular concerns regarding the status of
women – are affected by the ideological and social attributes of a particular
context mostly translated into the local in contradictory terms.18
There have been discussions in the literature on the credentials of democ-
racy in Turkey since 2011, pointing to an authoritarian shift under the hege-
monic politics of the AKP government. The regime in Turkey, in this context,
is described with reference to differing conceptualizations: ‘electoral authori-
tarianism of a markedly Islamic character,’19 ‘competitive authoritarianism,’20
or ‘new authoritarianism.’21 The gender policies adopted by the state and the
pattern of WRO–state relationships provide explicit clues for observing the
regime transformation in the country in similar political contexts. On that
account, we argue that the state–WRO relationship in Turkey is mainly deter-
mined by the state’s instrumentalization of women’s rights through strategies
such as polarization, divide-and-rule, disengagement from opponent WROs,
alignment with pro-government WROs, and the transformation of state insti-
tutions. Hence, the process of vernacularization of universal gender norms
signifies the limitations of democratic/participatory politics and the (re)pro-
duction of a conservative-authoritarian climate with a Janus-faced state/gov-
ernment formally stating its willingness to comply with international norms
of gender equality yet promoting gender complementarity.
 TURKISH STUDIES 5

Gender politics, the state and WROs in Turkey: contextual

borders
To trace the state–WRO relationship in Turkey, we should first glance back at
the history of women’s associations dating back to the late Ottoman and Early
Republican Era.22 As Arat asserts, it is relatively hard to find a well-structured,
institutionalized women’s associational life in the country during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.23 Yet, among the relatively few women’s organiz-
ations, the Turkish Women’s Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği) stands as a critical
case for its unique position vis-à-vis the state.24 As an organization established
during the early years of the Republic in 1924, under the directive of the ruling
Republican People’s Party/the state itself, the Union is exemplary for the
instrumentalization of women’s rights and WROs by the state/government
in line with the goals of Westernization/modernization.25 From the dissol-
ution of the Union later in 1935 on the grounds of ‘completing’ its mission
– defined as securing women’s political rights and supporting their active par-
ticipation to social life – up until the early 1980s, women’s associations in
Turkey were mainly established for realizing ‘philanthropic or professional’
aims26 and did not have a rights-based agenda.
Women in Turkey had to wait until 1980s, the years that witnessed the
development of feminist activism and the formation of WROs as rights-
based actors demanding recognition and reacting against patriarchal state
policies, to fight for a rights-based agenda. Yet, as Kardam argues, though
the 1980s associations aimed to influence the public agenda through public
campaigns on issues such as sexual harassment and gender-based violence,
their engagement with the state was limited to ‘policy advocacy and partner-
ship’ until the next decade.27
The 1990s in Turkey marked a turning point regarding the institutionali-
zation of the women’s movement, particularly in terms of the shift in the
nature of WROs ‘from charity to service delivery and policy advocacy’28 as
well as their proliferation29 and institutionalization.30 Purple Roof
Women’s Shelter Foundation (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınma Vakfı, MOR ÇATI
– 1990) and the Association for the Support and Training of Women Candi-
dates (Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği, KA.DER – 1997), are important
cases in this sense as they ‘channelled demands for autonomy into generating
power from civil society.’ Women started to speak and act for themselves
through the institutions established by women themselves, not by the
state.31 Although WROs during the 1990s were divided along ideological
and ethno-religious lines, representing the Kemalist, Feminist, Islamist, and
Kurdish movements,32 as Simel and Cindoğlu have stated, they all contributed
to the women’s movement by fostering the collective capacity of women to
determine gender politics in Turkey through transformation in terms of
agency, commitment, and ways of conducting politics.33 Under the pressure
6 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

of international organizations such as the UN and the EU and agreements

such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), the state had to take institutional initiatives for
achieving gender equality.34 The establishment of the General Directorate
on the Status of Women (Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü-KSGM –
1990) as a women’s policy agency was one significant attempt that provided
the grounds for WROs to establish dialogue among themselves,35 to collabor-
ate with the state, and to influence and participate in policy-making process.36
The establishment of the KSGM opened the way for the active and horizontal
engagement of the WROs with the state in developing an agenda for the
enhancement of gender equality and hence creating space for public debate.37
The WROs utilized Turkey’s international obligations to channel their
demands to the state and further their struggle for gender equality during
the early 2000s. Their demands regarding state accountability38 and their par-
ticipation to the gender policy-making processes as international require-
ments (e.g. CEDAW) were at that time the major determining features of
the feminist agenda. In this regard, the inclusion of WRO representatives in
the government delegation attending the Beijing Plus Five Conference in
2000 proved to be a significant gain both for the feminist movement and
the WROs.39 The deepening of Turkey-EU relations, particularly after the
Helsinki Summit in 1999, constituted the cornerstone of improvements
regarding the pattern of the state–WRO relationship inside the country.40
The feminist movement and the WROs considered the process ‘as a
window of opportunity’ for transforming the patriarchal state structure
through forcing the government to carry out legal amendments to meet the
Copenhagen criteria.41 During the early 2000s, WROs with different ideologi-
cal and political affiliations collaborated among themselves and with the state
for the restructuring of the legal framework, particularly throughout the
amendment processes of the Civil and Penal Code in 2001 and 2004
respectively.
The headscarf (freedom) issue, which was brought onto the political
agenda in 2008 by the AKP government as one of the most prominent
policy preferences of the party, constituted a critical juncture with divisive
implications within both the feminist movement and WROs during the
2000s. Henceforth, the AKP government’s ‘positive’ attitude toward WROs
turned into a ‘symbolic negotiation’42 and WROs’ demands began to be colo-
nized by the ‘Islamists versus secularists’ cleavage.43 The Islamist-laicisist
polarization, which also damaged other CSOs with universalistic claims
such as human rights organizations, particularly undermined the political
power of the secular front, which was further exacerbated and consolidated
by the uninstitutionalized communication channels between the state and
WROs.44 The fractionalization of civil society in 2000s opened the way for
a new pattern of CSO/WRO–state relationships: henceforth politics in
 TURKISH STUDIES 7

Turkey witnessed the strengthening of CSOs/WROs which had an ideological

affinity with the AKP government, and the ineffectiveness and isolation of the
‘others’ per se.45
Set against this background, it is our contention that the post-2011 period,
deserves special attention as it hosts two mutually-feeding processes signifying
a transformation in gender politics and inter-WRO relations, as well as state–
WRO encounters. Firstly, the authoritarian shift under the hegemonic politics
of the AKP must be emphasized. This culminated in the restoration of an
extremely religio-conservative ‘gender climate’46 and a (new) patriarchal
gender regime through the regulation of reproduction, sexuality, and
family.47 The state/government attempted to put into circulation a (new)
vision of women and notion of ‘equality’ built around the family and
related role patterns. The establishment of family education and pro-marriage
programs by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (Aile ve Sosyal Politi-
kalar Bakanlığı, ASPB); women’s education and cultural centers, family
centers and Information Houses led by AKP municipalities; and Family Gui-
dance Offices with the task of raising women’s awareness regarding religious
dictates on family matters, are exemplary in this respect. The president’s anti-
feminist discourse48 and provocative declarations such as ‘abortion is
murder’49 and that he did ‘not believe in gender equality’50 explicitly
reflected the government’s conservative-nationalist perspective on gender
issues. Hinting at Islam and Turkish nationhood as the reference points for
defining ‘traditional family values’, such discursive jumps further strength-
ened the boundaries between opponent WROs and the government as
these jumps were usually put into circulation in an authoritarian manner, a
priori rejecting all the alternatives.
The second point is the radicalization and consolidation of the previous
fractionalization in the post-2011 era that we conceptualize as the rivalry
between pro-government (loyal) and opponent WROs. Crosscutting the Isla-
mist-laicist polarization in certain respects, the (new) context of polarization
signified a turn from the rather polyphonic/multipolar nature of the feminist
movement and the WROs of the early 2000s to a bipolar structure. Thus what
feminist politics has witnessed in the post-2011 era has been a gradual displa-
cement of the opponent WROs by pro-government WROs in the decision and
policy-making process. Yet, alongside the increasing prominance of pro-gov-
ernment WROs such as the Women’s Rights Organization Against Discrimi-
nation (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği, AKDER – 1999), the
distinguishing feature of the post-2011 period has been the new governmental
strategy of establishing government-organized WROs, the most prominent
example of which is KADEM. KADEM in this context is the major agency
for the divide-and-rule and polarization strategies employed by the state, by
creating its ‘own civil societal’ actors, instrumentalizing women’s rights and
legitimizing its rule. In fact, as Bilge Yabancı drew attention to in her study
8 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

of AKP populism, both KADEM and AKDER are ‘dependent associations

serving the government to transform the women’s struggle in line with the
governmental agenda.’51 In the same vein, focusing on Islamist women’s acti-
vism, Hürcan Aksoy hints at the emergence of AKP-built CSOs (particularly
charity organizations), emphasizing their lack of support for women’s
rights.52 KADEM, in this respect, is unique, with an assertive and influential
position among WROs mainly arising from its organic relationship with the
state/government. Despite the authorities’ repeated statements that they are at
an equal distance from all WROs, Erdoğan’s bold support for KADEM and its
activities through his frequent emphasis on ‘its peculiar position’53 among the
WROs are explicit evidence to the contrary. As the founding and the current
chairperson of KADEM highlighted, the association strongly adheres to ‘con-
servative democracy’,54 a concept introduced by AKP to define its ideological
identity in the early 2000s pointing at the party’s emphasis on ‘social and
moral values.’55 Likewise, KADEM supports the gender/pro-family policies
of the AKP,56 and advocates ‘gender justice’ as the major axis of its ideological
position. According to its chairperson, gender justice refers to,
an inherent equality in the view of Islam which assumes a mutual relationship
between men and women having different characteristics by nature and con-
siders them as inseparable parts of a whole that complement each other with
regard to their respective functions and duties.57

The gender equality vs. gender justice debate that put its stamp on gender
politics in Turkey culminating in tense relations between the state and
opponent WROs can be read in relation to the process of the vernaculariza-
tion of women’s rights operating mainly through the transformation of uni-
versal norms of gender equality in the particularistic frame of gender
complementarity. The translation of the universal into the particular so as
to reproduce the conservative-patriarchal structure has its reflection in the
policy preferences of the AKP as well as explicit connotations for current
WRO–state encounters in Turkey.

Methodology
This article is based on research (2014–2017) on the patterns of interactions
between the state and rights-based CSOs in Turkey, with a particular focus on
opponent and pro-government WROs’. It should be noted that the research
does not make any claim to generalization. We contend that the selected
WROs provide us sufficient data to sketch out the ongoing shift in the
state–WRO relationship in Turkey due to their prominent position within
their respective categories.
The opponent WROs are delineated as those with a critical stance towards
the gender policies of the government and which prioritize universalistic
 TURKISH STUDIES 9

claims of gender equality. The pro-government WROs are assessed as those

supporting governmental policies and leaning on rather particularistic inter-
ests/concerns. In the first category, we focus on MOR ÇATI, ‘a symbol of fem-
inist opposition to domestic violence’ and ’one of the major voices in feminist
organizing’58 in Turkey; and KA.DER, the sole WRO targeting the equal rep-
resentation of women and men in politics and in decision-making processes,
which stands as ‘one of the most visible women’s groups in Turkey.’59 These
two WROs have a secular stance. In this category, we also included the Capital
City Women’s Platform (Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği, BKPD – 1995), a
prominent WRO advocating a pious interpretation of women’s rights with its
mission ‘to solve the problems stemming from traditional religious interpret-
ations … as well as discrimination against pious women.’60 This ‘pious’ iden-
tity with a critical approach to gendered interpretations of Islam provides
BKPD with a unique position among the conservative WROs. In chairper-
son’s words, ‘we stand just at the center, between the secular and the conser-
vative pro-government WROs; we are pious but we have never been affiliated
with the government though we include members of parliament from the
AKP.’61
For the second category, we take up AKDER, a pro-government conserva-
tive organization, renowned for its struggle for headscarf freedom62 and
KADEM, a strongly pro-governmental conservative WRO working closely
with the state and affiliated with the government by its explicit emphasis on
the traditional roles of women and a gender justice perspective as a
defining aspect of its position.
As representative state institutions, we included KSGM and ASPB. The
KSGM works for the advancement of the status of women and the elimination
of all forms of gender-based discrimination and sets the policy agenda con-
cerning Turkey’s responsibilities in terms of achieving international equality
regimes.63 The ASPB is responsible for improving the status of women and
providing services for family, children, disabled, the elderly, and veterans.
The study primarily draws on the semi-structured in-depth interviews that
we conducted with the chairpersons of the selected WROs and the key infor-
mants from the concerned state institutions. The data are supported by an
additional interview with a dedicated civil society volunteer who is a
member of the governing board of Women Health Workers Association for
Solidarity (Kadın Sağlıkçılar Dayanışma Derneği, KASAD-D-2005) and docu-
ment analysis through survey of secondary sources i.e. reports, publications
and websites belonging to the WROs and institutions concerned.
The interviews were each assessed to trace the defining features of the
interaction, power relations and disparities at issue, to reach an understanding
of the interrelated processes underlying these features and the ways they affect
WROs position in gender policy-making process and draw up a topography of
the state–WRO relationship during the post-2011 period.
10 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

The borders of conservative enclosure: the WROs’ encounter

with the state
The polarization among the WROs and the increasing authoritarianism on
the part of the government since 2011 has had paradoxical implications for
the WRO–state relationship, which is rooted in the vernacularization of
global women’s rights in Turkey. During this process, politics in Turkey wit-
nessed a disengagement between opponent WROs and the state on the one
hand and an alignment of pro-government WROs and the state on the
other. At this juncture, for analytical purposes, we classify the vernaculariza-
tion strategies of the state under three closely interrelated and complementary
categories, each defining the ideological and strategic position of the state in
its encounter with the WROs. The first is the ‘Politics of Adherence’, referring
to the process of alignment with the pro-government WROs and the division
of opponent WROs through a divide-and-rule strategy. Here, the state
adopted a divisive strategy mainly on the basis of the gender equality vs.
gender justice debate and supported pro-government WROs that aligned
with the neoliberal conservative ideology. The second one refers to the ‘Poli-
tics of As-If’, which epitomizes the strategy adopted by the state authorities
whereby, while seemingly conforming to its (international) obligations con-
serning gender equality, it de facto ignored them. Relatedly, the process com-
prises the exclusion of opponent WROs from decision- and policy-making
processes on gender issues, yet on the basis of an inclusive discourse. The
third category is the ‘Politics of Estrangement’, denoting the transformation
of the state institutions established to promote women’s rights – ASBP and
KSGM – into legitimizing agents of the conservative-authoritarian state.
Therefore, we assert that the vernacularization of universal gender norms
into local ones through the gender equality vs. gender justice debate, taken
as the crosscutting/circumscribing dynamic regarding these three processes,
has its implications for each phase as a foundational determinant in gender
policy-making and thus the state–WRO relationship in Turkey.

‘The politics of adherence’: the formation of and alignment with the

loyal; the encapsulation of the opponent
The strategic preferences of the AKP government in the post-2011 period
regarding gender issues signify an attempt to redraw the borders of civil
society in line with its own interests and create its own ‘civil society actors.’
While engendering its own civil-ideological stakeholders, the process has a
weakening effect on feminist politics, as Coşar and Kerestecioğlu have
asserted.64 In this context, the ‘Politics of Adherence’, referring to the align-
ment between the state and pro-government WROs and the enclosure of
opponent groups through a divide-and-rule strategy, is the AKP’s political
 TURKISH STUDIES 11

preference, providing clues for comprehending the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of the
instrumentalization of women’s rights.
Violence against women (VAW) is one of the critical issues that spotlights
the polarization between opponent and pro-government WROs, explicitly
confirming the all-embracing character of the gender equality vs. gender
justice debate and its divisive implications for feminist politics. While
opponent groups problematize VAW within the contours of gender inequal-
ity, the loyal WROs and the state appear to take it at the individual level, as an
‘anger management’ problem endemic to men, totally ignoring the patriarchal
norms and implications of the structural dynamics in line with the masculine
official discourse. As Akyüz and Sayan-Cengiz have stated in their study on
KADEM’s campaign against VAW in 2013, the differing perceptions on
VAW are a clear example of the marginalization of feminist efforts to question
gender inequality.65 MOR ÇATI explicated the discrepancy between the per-
spectives regarding VAW as follows:
[T]here are deep differences between our approaches regarding the problem of
VAW. While we take it as a gender inequality problem, the AKP’s approach
embedded into patriarchal codes tries to fight violence by strengthening the
institution of the family … We cannot have effective communication with
any government which doesn’t relate violence to gender inequality …

They speak of rehabilitating men. We say ‘prevent them’ (from violence) … ’

The reason is patriarchal relations.’ The problem between the state and us is
not that of communication but of a very deep-rooted discrepancy in our
world-views.66

To the state authorities, the position of the opponent WROs including MOR
ÇATI on the VAW issue signified an ‘ideological’ initiative (used in pejorative
sense, as dogmatic).67 The state authorities’ claims regarding the critical pos-
ition of opponent groups, and particularly of MOR ÇATI towards the state
policies on VAW, can in fact be read as implicit confirmation of the (new)
alignment between the state and KADEM and other pro-government WROs.
Defining its worldview as pious, BKPD’s position in the gender equality vs.
gender justice perspective is illuminating in comprehending the ideological
dynamics/roots of the conservative alliance. Its chairperson asserts: ‘Though
we have different groups/views on the platform, the Association [officially]
does not advocate a traditional religion perspective in essence … Thus, they
[the government] react towards us as well. We may look alike yet we are
different in essence.’68 The rather unique profile of the association among
WROs can be seen in its vision for equality, which largely contradicts that
of the government and pro-government WROs adopting the gender justice
perspective. BKPD clarifies its view as follows:
You cannot talk about justice without reaching equality … . In Scandinavian
countries, they are talking about justice because there are injustices brought
12 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

by on equality. They are trying to solve those problems. But you can not talk
about justice without being equal.69

While drawing attention to the polarized ideological milieu, the opponent

WROs have announced their concerns, particularly those regarding the estab-
lishment of GONGOs like KADEM, considering them ‘mimicking insti-
tutions’ threatening Turkey’s prospects for democracy.70 Hence, rather than
operating as autonomous civil society actors, these WROs mainly act as the
agents of the government in legitimizing its gender policy preferences. In
fact, as Levitt and Merry have shown, this is also the case in China where
the long tradition based on collectivism and family values led the government
to utilize women’s rights discourse in a way that centralized its power through
instrumentalizing women’s rights through the support of GONGOs.71
The establishment of GONGOs are regarded as a critical juncture within
the women’s movement in Turkey signaling a crack in solidarity. There
have always been various factions/cliques within the movement, yet these fac-
tions had their own ways and means to compromise among themselves and
mostly appeared to act in solidarity in conveying their demands to the state
rather than being captivated by a particular gender ideology that reflected
governmental priorities. A former chairperson of KA.DER voiced the
group’s concerns as follows:
There are a lot of new members in the movement yet with no engagement, no
rules, no ideals, in a state of total disconnect. These women have solidarity
neither among themselves nor with us. These new players are only individual
players who divide the women’s movement into pieces. The “hard-earned
tacit contract of solidarity” among the divergent factions within the movement
has become null and void.72

KA.DER is a member of all women’s platforms. We have together achieved

important amendments in laws in the early 2000s. It was very promising that
although we had different worldviews, there was solidarity and tolerance
between the WROs. Today, the government has established its own WROs
and it is a pity that day by day the movement is becoming fragmented.73

The support provided to pro-government WROs is accompanied by the

process of the besieging of civil society through the capture of certain WROs
and platforms by the close relatives – usually the wives and daughters – of
male members of the AKP government.74 As Kandiyoti has mentioned, this
has been a strategy also witnessed in authoritarian Arab states whereby
female relatives of the ruling elites get actively involved in the WROs.75 In
the Turkish context, KADEM, whose vice-chair is the president’s daughter
and the KADEM Foundation established in 2015, whose founding members
all have close connections either with the president himself or the AKP, are
exemplary in this respect. Alongside the (governing) member profiles, the
organizational dynamics of KADEM also provide clues for the support given
 TURKISH STUDIES 13

by the state/government. It is noteworthy that in a five-year period, KADEM

has massively expanded both the number of its branches and its sphere of
activity geographically, and now covers nearly all the regions of the country.
The participation of leading national (ministers and AKP deputies) and local
political actors (mayors and governors) in each and every opening ceremony
also evinces the operation of the association as a women’s auxiliary movement
to the AKP. The following excerpt from a speech by the group’s chairperson in
2016 can be read as a strong indicator of the association’s affinity with and
loyalty to the AKP government: ‘We are fond of following your (the president’s)
path, fond of imitating you … We know and believe that a strong woman builds
up a strong family … a strong society … a strong economy … a strong state.’76
One other means for the besieging of opponents has been the attempt of
the state to limit WRO representation in the decision and policy-making pro-
cesses to pro-government WROs. The GREVIO77 candidate (s)election
process – a mechanism established to assess and improve the implementation
of the Istanbul Convention against domestic violence signed by the state in
2012 – was an ‘event’ engraved in feminist memory with its provision of con-
crete clues regarding the newly emerging alliance. The significance of the
GREVIO process lies in its implication of the unique position of pro-govern-
ment WROs, as all the required WRO representatives during the process were
selected from the three WROs with organic ties with the government, namely
AKDER, KADEM, and KASAD-D. Signifying segregation on the part of the
state, the process provoked reaction both among feminist circles and
opponent WROs. BKPD defined the process as the ‘GREVIO Disaster’ and
strongly criticized the attitudes of the ASPB and KSGM for not being trans-
parent and deliberative.78 MOR ÇATI prepared a bulletin entitled ‘The
Turkish government cannot prevent VAW with government-organized
‘non-governmental’ organizations.’79 During the interview MOR ÇATI
voiced the dissatisfaction shared by the opponent groups as follows:
The Istanbul Convention is the first international document which puts serious
obligations and sanctions on the state, and the state authorities are proud to be
the first to sign the Convention … However, the state used it as a tool for clean-
ing up its bad reputation at the international arena surrounding women’s dete-
riorating status in Turkey …

We, the Istanbul Convention Turkey Monitoring Platform consisting of 85

WROs, including KA.DER and MOR ÇATI, sent two petitions to the state
demanding to be invited to the formal meetings regarding the Convention
and describing the criteria to be adopted for Turkey’s GREVIO candidates.
The Ministry did not respond … They had to involve us in the process; this
is a requirement of the Convention … 80

The state authorities, the deputy minister and general director of KSGM, on
the other hand had drawn a diverse picture drawing attention to the
14 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

democratic and participatory nature of the selection process. The general

director particularly emphasized the colloborative and inclusive attitude of
the state and its workings in line with the impartial workings of the state.
Yet, the deputy minister accused the opponent groups of reacting ideologi-
cally: ‘ … Some WROs politicized the issues and it is an ideological attitude
… This is not an appropriate field for prejudice.’81 In the end, despite the
ASPB’s declaring one of the candidates of the platform, Prof. Feride Acar,
as Turkey’s candidate for GREVIO, this incident enlarged the already existing
chasm among the WROs.82
The gap between discourse and practice can be attributed to the conserva-
tive- patriarchal dynamics dominating the vernacularization of universal
gender norms in the Turkish context, whereby the opponent WROs, here
MOR ÇATI, KA.DER and BKPD, are trapped within the state-drawn bound-
aries of civil society as disqualified actors. Hence the political stage is prepared
solely for the ‘legitimizing’ actors supported and/or created by the state.
However, this is not specific to Turkey. Emanuela Lombardo pinpoints to
similar political dynamics in the Spanish case. Accordingly, despite the fact
that the adoption/translation of EU gender policy having positive implications
on the mobilization of the women’s movement, due to the masculine perspec-
tive of the state, the process did not result in substantial change in terms of
gender equality.83 Here, we should underline the socio-culturally and politi-
cally bound nature of the vernacularization process and decisiveness of con-
textual borders in the practice of women’s rights. Accordingly, the infused
conservative-patriarchal mentality, and the authoritarian political climate in
Turkey defines the margins, direction and the pattern of the localization of
gender norms. The rise of conservative-authoritarian politics is much
visible in the operation of pro-government WROs and the partisan attitude
of the state in its imposition of the ‘local’ defined by itself rather than civil
societal actors.

The ‘politics of as-if’: the illusion of inclusion and the reality of

exclusion
One of the major strategic devices adopted by the state within the vernacular-
ization process which explains the shift in the WRO–state encounter post-2011
is the political state of ‘as if’ referring to ‘pretend politics’ under the hegemony
of a Janus-faced state. The double-edged mechanism operates through the
inclusion-exclusion strategy of the state, based on its adoption of an inclusion-
ary motto at the discursive level towards opponents regarding their partici-
pation in the decision and policy-making procesess, yet acting on an
exclusionary political pattern. Transforming the collaborative partnership
achieved between the state and the WROs during the first and second terms
of the AKP governments (2002–2011) to a process of monologue, the
 TURKISH STUDIES 15

inclusion-exclusion strategy had been an effective tool for the state to reduce
its opponents to passive-consultative agents. The scripts taken from inter-
views with the general director of the KSGM and the chairperson of BKPD
respectively illustrate the contextualization of the shift and the erosion of
collaboration:
… I can definitely state that we have a collaborative interaction with WROs. We
always ask them their opinions before the development of any policy regarding
women.84

As a matter of fact, between 2002 and 2010 serious readjustments were carried
out. The Civil Code, Criminal Code … these are achievements of the women’s
movement … 2010 is the breaking point. We experienced a serious fall into
decline. Out of nowhere, in the midst of this period, civil society organizations
started to be excluded … 85

Operating on the basis of state priorities, consultation is in effect only when

deemed necessary by the state authorities and it does not end up with a col-
laborative engagement. Rather, it either reproduces the passivization of the
WROs, as their opinions are mostly not taken into consideration, or very
rarely results in a conflict. KA.DER, MOR ÇATI and BKPD all highlighted
the ‘as if’ stance of the state, emphasizing its destructive implications for
the state–WRO relationship as follows:
The consultation process is nothing more than a show in Turkey. The govern-
ment and state authorities act as if they are taking the WROs into consider-
ation. They are not sincere … For instance, just to pretend to take our views
into account, they send us an invitation with an expired date. This cannot be
explained by the AKP’s disorganization; it is intentional … 86

Every government has lots of unique features, yet for the AKP there is only one.
That is, to do everything in ‘as if’ manner denoting the government’s authori-
tarian profile. While presenting the Istanbul Convention, a wonderful law, ‘as if’
it is a women’s day gift, it provides you with institutional arrangements trap-
ping women into the family … The government’s ‘as if’ stance highly limits
our sphere of struggle.87

They held the Action Plan [and the Strategy Document for Strengthening
Women] meeting on October 26, 2017. … They sent the invitations at the
last moment. Everything works ‘as if’.88

In fact, such exclusion is no secret. In 2015, 60 WROs working actively on and

struggling against VAW were not invited to the meeting held by the Commis-
sion of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the Investigation of VAW;
the political preferences of the state/government were protested against by
124 WROs. MOR ÇATI, as one of the excluded groups, criticized the
policy-making process, operating on the basis of the priorities set by the
state (and its allies): ‘ … the Commission has made it clear from the start
that it is only willing to work with WROs who share the government’s
16 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

political views, rather than working with expert organizations.’89 The exclu-
sion/inclusion strategy also proved to be applicable regarding the workings
of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission on Divorce established to
make recommendations for strengthening the family in 2016. WROs were
largely excluded from the reporting process, with the exception of KADEM
and AKDER, yet the chairperson of the latter was only invited on the basis
of her professional expertise as a doctor.90
Drawing attention to this two-faced pattern of relations, MOR ÇATI
defined its encounter with the state authorities as a ‘state of schizophrenia’:
There had been a mechanism through which we could directly establish a
relationship with the state authorities … Now it’s all over.

There seems to be a relationship between us; in reality there is not … In this

sense, we have a schizophrenic relationship. It is not that they do not under-
stand our perspective. They do understand, yet do not care … 91

The perspective of the state authorities expressed through the statements of

the general director, on the other hand, decisively pointed to a responsive
and all-embracing stance by both ASPB and KSGM towards all the WROs.
Yet, she also referred to the workload of the state institutions, the high
number of WROs, and tiredness of staff as factors which may have led to ‘mis-
communication’ between the state and the WROs. The foremost obstructive
aspect of the communication process from the director’s perspective was the
‘ideological’ stance of the WROs:
All the parties from time to time can be under the influence of certain ideol-
ogies. However, the public interest should be detached from ideologies … We
cannot have progress when only one of the sides adopts the appropriate atti-
tude. Each side should know where it stands.92

Such an account provides insights into the public authorities’ conceptualiz-

ation of civil society actors. The pro-government WRO-state encounter
reveals that an ‘ideal’ WRO is a certifier, providing total compliance with
the government as the sole authority defining the public interest. Hence,
unlike the opponent WROs, the chairperson of KADEM did not mention
any problem in their relations with the state:
[A well-functioning state–WRO relationship] is somewhat in the hands of the
CSOs, you have to follow up the meetings, you have to participate, the Govern-
ment and the Ministries have too much work to do, you have to follow … You
can make a difference only working with the government. … We deem to share
our work with the government as our mission … We share all our work with
the relevant channels of the government and the Ministries. We inform our
President regarding our work on the struggle against VAW that our President
had initiated two years ago … 93

A similar assessment is also expressed by AKDER:

 TURKISH STUDIES 17

The ASPB invites us [to meetings] and we attend as much as we can. … They
send us the action plan on VAW to take our views. When we see our views/sug-
gestions in the final [reports/policies] product, we understand that we can be
inspiring for them … It is the power of civil society.94

The exclusion of opponent WROs from the policy-making process by the gov-
ernment mainly opens the way for them to more strongly embrace their
follow-up roles through preparing reports, submitting press releases to raise
public awareness, and informing the state authorities. To be qualitatively
effective95 as opponent stakeholders, WROs pay attention to preserving
their autonomy and distance from the state in order to check the state’s
power in terms of monitoring the undemocratic and discriminatory policies
and practices. Yet, while considering such distance necessary for being ‘quali-
tatively effective’, ironically, their resistance to the conservative-authoritarian-
patriarchal mentality of the state limits their effectiveness. Although their pro-
posals are seldom taken into account by the state, both KA.DER and MOR
ÇATI asserted that their monitoring role has become much vital for control-
ling the gender policy-making process in Turkey:
Unfortunately, we have to spend most of our time following what the govern-
ment does and does not do … We have been following the implementation of
Law No. 6284. We sent a lot of petitions and letters to the ASBP to get infor-
mation about the number of women applied to the shelters and the number of
women rejected. … [W]e managed to get the statistics, which revealed that the
state has not been so responsive … 96

The inclusion-exclusion mechanism, operating through ‘as if politics’, sets the

grounds of the gradual shift in the role patterns of opponent WROs. WROs,
left on the margins of (participatory) politics, are losing their relatively secure
place in decision and policy-making processes they had during the late 1990s
and early 2000s. Accordingly, they have begun playing the game through fol-
lowing up, controlling the processes as outsiders. Yet, their recommendations
do not have the expected reflection through the improvement of gender pol-
icies in line with the norms of gender equality. What is noteworthy here is that
while the government dissimulates in the sense that seemingly fulfilling its
responsibilities with regard to the enhancement of universal gender norms
and democratic politics by consulting and/or hearing the claims, it does not
provide the necessary space for the opponent WROs to realize their capacity
either as participants in the policy-making and implementation processes or
as monitoring and controlling agents.

‘The politics of estrangement’: the transformation and ‘familiazation’

of institutions
The strategic-political preferences of the state/government in Turkey regard-
ing the process of vernacularization in the post-2011 period have also led to
18 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

the transformation of the state institutions – here, the ASBP and KSGM –
established for the promotion of universal women’s rights. What we mean
by ‘politics of estrangement’ in this regard is the gradual shift in the founda-
tional purposes and decision-making mechanisms of the institutions, which,
in the last instance, conflict with universal gender norms and democratic poli-
tics. In the current state, ‘the politics of estrangement’ signifies a shift centered
on the initiatives for developing policies and norms in line with ‘gender
justice’ in a conservative-authoritarian context that limit the participation
of critical civil society actors: here, opponent WROs.
The restructuration of the ASPB in 2011 and the change in its name from
the Ministry for Women and Family Affairs (2005–2011) to the Ministry of
Family and Social Policies is one such strategy of localization that was
regarded by the opponent WROs as a substantial and intentional shift from
the Ministry’s founding motives, and thereby a backward step for the achieve-
ment of gender equality.97 With the transformation of the regime in the 2018
elections from a parliamentary governmental system to a presidential one,
Turkey witnessed a similar initiative taken by the state/president concerning
the (re)structuring of the administrative/bureaucratic mechanism whereby
the ASPB was merged with the Labor Ministry and renamed the Labor,
Social Service and Family Ministry.
Explaining their concerns about the malfunctioning and degradation of the
administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms relating to gender equality,
KA.DER, MOR ÇATI and BKPD point to a radical turn in the approach of
bureaucratic and political officials, particularly in terms of their willingness
to cooperate with the feminist movement and their attachment to universal
women’s rights. Such a turn can be observed in the changing pattern of
relations of the opponent WROs with the family ministers themselves.
Three ministers, Güldal Akşit (2003–2005), Fatma Şahin (2011–2013), and
Ayşenur İslam (2013–2015) are associated with divergent patterns of inter-
action both with the WROs and the feminist movement. The chairperson
of BKPD evaluated the shifts as follows:
Between 2011 and 2015, I was working in the ASPB together with Şahin.
During her term of office, she respected us a lot … When she was recalled by
the government, women’s rights went into a decline. The Ministry–WRO
relationship stopped as well. I was also working in the ministry during the fol-
lowing years. It was a period of deathly agony for me. As none of your words
were taken seriously, as if they had dropped in from the sky and were not aware
of anything. As if you were lying regarding violence, as if you were exaggerating
… 98

Similarly, the former chairperson of KA.DER claimed that while the state–
WRO relationship was much effective during the terms of Akşit and Şahin,
due to their rather concerned and gender-sensitive stances, it turned to be
highly limited in following terms, which she recalled by the ministers’
 TURKISH STUDIES 19

distant and unenthusiastic profile. As the former chairperson of KA.DER

stated:
Akşit and Şahin followed an open policy. They highly improved their positions
on women’s rights … Şahin was always at the end of the telephone line … She
was sincere to us … . She always worked closely with her team including the
director of the KSGM … I do not even know who the current director is. We
have neither got into contact nor talked to each other up until now … 99

Although AKDER drew a similar and positive picture concerning the state–
WRO relationship under Şahin’s administration, the association voiced its
discontentment regarding the gender policies of the term:
… [R]elations could have been better during that era but the consequences are
not … In our circle, people have different views regarding Şahin’s term. During
that period, with a highly Western/EU [motivation], things were accepted –
including the Istanbul Convention – which deformed our family structure
and increased violence, things that did not fit our essence and cultural
values … Some say that ‘we are now experiencing its harmful effects.’100

These rather incidental shifts spotlight the state/government’s preference for

the vernacularization of gender norms as gender complementarity revolving
around traditional gender roles and family values through institutional trans-
formations. In that regard, the categorical and explicit support provided to
KADEM by ASBP for organizing ‘Women & Justice Summits’ in 2014 and
2016 respectively with the participation of the president himself as the
keynote speaker is illustrative for comprehending the implications of the
shifts in institutional priorities. Lastly, the appointment of the Ankara repre-
sentative of KADEM as the minister in July 2018 can be read as the consoli-
dation of both KADEM’s power at the state level and the institutional
transformation process, as well as a strong sign of the recognition of
‘gender justice-as gender complementarity’ as the official gender ideology
hereafter.

Conclusion
In this article, we aimed to explore the relationships between WROs and the
state in Turkey in the post-2011 period with a view to the (re)establishment of
gender norms in a conservative-authoritarian context. It is our contention
that WRO–state relationships in Turkey are shaped by the dynamics of the
vernacularization process in which the state employs three closely interrelated
and complementary strategic devices, each corresponding to a different politi-
cal phase in its encounter with the WROs. Thus, the ‘politics of adherence’
serves the consolidation of the polarization both within the women’s move-
ment as well as between WROs through the state’s divide-and-rule strategy
in its establishment and support of pro-government WROs that align with
20 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

its neoliberal conservative ideology. The ‘politics of as-if’ point at the see-
mingly conforming position of the state regarding gender equality but with
de facto inaction, comprising the exclusion of opponents from the decision
and policy-making processes on gender issues on the basis of an inclusive dis-
course. Accompanying these two strategies, the ‘politics of estrangement’
denotes the transformation of the state institutions established to promote
women’s rights – ASBP and KSGM – into legitimizing agents of the conser-
vative-authoritarian state.
All in all, operating through these intersecting phases, state–WRO relation-
ships in the post-2011 period in Turkey have been shaped by the gender
equality vs. gender justice debate, which is intrinsic to the vernacularization
of universal gender norms in a neo-patriarchal-authoritarian context, embra-
cing a bold family-centered gender regime. This vernacularization process as
such serves the authoritarian state itself, a self-claimed authority in the local-
ization of the universal, in instrumentalizing women’s rights to consolidate its
hegemony and reproduce Islamic-nationalist ideology. Therefore, the
expected contribution of this article is to provide a groundwork for future
studies focusing on the instrumentalization of women’s rights in an authori-
tarian neoliberal-conservative setting in general and the state–WRO relation-
ship in contemporary Turkey in particular.

Notes
1. We use the state and the AKP government interchangeably as, since 2011, the
AKP government and the state merged through monopolization of power
under the personal rule of Erdoğan. See Öniş, “Monopolizing Center,” 25.
2. See Arat, “Religion, Politics,” 880.
3. See Ibid.; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, “New Grounds for Patriarchy,” 563; Cindoglu
and Unal, “Gender and Sexuality,” 7; and Kandiyoti, “Locating politics of
gender.”
4. See Çitak and Tür, “Women between Tradition and Change”; Coşar and
Yeğenoğlu, “New Grounds for Patriarchy,” 556; and Cindoglu and Unal,
“Gender and Sexuality.”
5. Kandiyoti, “Locating politics of gender,” 103.
6. Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu “Feminist Politics in Turkey,” 159, 162. See
also Acar and Altunok, “Politics of Intimate,” 20.
7. For a similar account, see Özkan-Kerestecioğlu and Özman, “Academic Femin-
ism in Turkey.”
8. Cosar and Yeğenoğlu, “New Grounds for Patriarchy,” 565.
9. See Erdoğan’s opening speeches in KADEM’s 1st and 2nd International
Women and Justice Summit, November 24, 2014, November 25, 2016, www.
kadem.org.tr.
10. Levitt and Merry, “Vernacularization on the ground,” 446.
11. Lorch and Bunk, “Gender Politics, Authoritarian Regime.”
12. Lewis, “Civil Society, Authoritarian State,” and Lorch and Bunk, “Gender Poli-
tics, Authoritarian Regime.”
 TURKISH STUDIES 21

13. Lewis, “Civil Society, Authoritarian State,” 326.

14. Lorch and Bunk, “Gender Politics, Authoritarian Regime,” 8–11.
15. Obuch, “Challanges and Limits of CSOs,” 8, 10.
16. For different country experiences, see Al-Ali, “Gender and Civil Society,” and
Salhi (ed.), Gender and Diversity.
17. The Vietnamese case is a striking example in this context. See Wischerman,
“Civic Organizations.”
18. Levitt and Merry, “Vernacularization on the ground,” 446. For vernaculariza-
tion of women’s rights in Turkey, regarding women’s employment policy, see
Alnıaçık et al., “Gender Policy Architecture.”
19. Özbudun, “Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift,”
20. Levitsky and Way, “Competitive authoritarianism,” and Esen and Gumuscu,
“Rising competitive authoritarianism,” 1582–4.
21. Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown,” 482.
22. See Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız İnkılap, and Çaha, Civil Society in Turkey.
23. Arat, “Toward A Democratic Society,” 243.
24. See also Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu “Feminist Politics,” 152.
25. For a detailed elaboration see Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız İnkılap.For a critical account
on the early period from a feminist perspective, see Tekeli, Kadınlar ve Siyasal
Toplumsal Hayat.
26. Ibid. The exceptions were left-wing Progressive Women’s Association (İlerici
Kadınlar Derneği) and Revolutionary Women’s Organization (Devrimci Kadın-
lar Birliği) established in the 1970s. See Kardam, Turkey’s Engagement, 42.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 69.
29. By 2000, there were 211 WROs in Turkey. Ibid.
30. Arat, “Contestation and Collaboration,” 400; Cosar and Yeğenoğlu, “New
Grounds for Patriarchy”; and Ertürk, “Turkey’s Modern Paradoxes,” 97.
31. Arat, “Toward A Democratic Society,” 106.
32. Coşar and Onbaşı, “Women’s Movement in Turkey,” 325, and Esim and Cin-
doglu, “Women’s organizations.”
33. Esim and Cindoglu, “Women’s organizations,” 178.
34. Kardam, Turkey’s Engagement, 26–7, and Müftüler-Baç, Divergent Pathways,
119.
35. Ertürk, “Turkey’s Modern Paradoxes,” 99.
36. Kardam and Ertürk, “Gender Accountability,” 179.
37. Kardam, Turkey’s Engagement, 46–53, 69.
38. Kardam and Ertürk, “Gender Accountability,” 169.
39. Ibid., 71.
40. Kubicek, “Grass-Roots Democratization,” 367, and Müftüler-Baç, Divergent
Pathways, 115. Also see Aldıkaçtı Marshall, “Shaping Gender Policy.”
41. Kandiyoti, “A Tangled Web,” and Müftüler-Baç, Divergent Pathways.
42. Müftüler-Baç, Divergent Pathways, 326.
43. Keyman and Gumuscu, “Civil Society,” 159.
44. Özler and Sarkissian, “Role of Civil Society,” 378.
45. Keyman and Gumuscu, “Civil Society,” 160.
46. Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, “Gender Politics of the AKP.”
47. Cindoglu and Unal, “Gender and Sexuality,” 2.
48. This anti-feminist stance is taken as AKP’s negation and resistance to gender
equality and women’s rights, see Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, “New Grounds for
22 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

Patriarchy,” 564. AKP government’s endorsement for Islamic patriarchal norms

against gender equality is emphasized by Arat, “Religion, Politics,” 874–5.
49. Stated on May 26, 2012, quoted in Kandiyoti, “Locating politics of gender,” 104.
Erdoğan’s approach to abortion was harshly criticized by the feminist circles
and led MOR ÇATI’s suspension of its relations with the state.
50. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-kadin-ve-adalet-
toplantisinda-konustu-27640428. The opponent WROs regarded the declara-
tion as a violation of international conventions and stated their discontentment
for the state’s ignorance of the Constitution as its reference, and its adoption of
a religious perspective that subjugate women. See www.morcati.org.tr, Novem-
ber 26, 2014.
51. Yabancı, “Populism as the problem child of democracy.”
52. Aksoy “Invigorating Democracy,” 159.
53. www.bianet.org, November 24, 2014.
54. KADEM.
55. Ibid.
56. Acar and Altunok, “Politics of Intimate,” 16; Kandiyoti, “Locating politics of
gender”; and Yilmaz, “Strengthening Family,” 371.
57. Aydın Yılmaz, “Gender Justice,” 112.
58. Arat, “Contestation and Collaboration,” 404.
59. Ibid., 410.
60. www.baskentkadin.org.tr.
61. BKPD.
62. http://www.ak-der.org/. See also Kadıoğlu, “Civil Society, Islam and Democracy
in Turkey.”
63. Ertürk, “Turkey’s Modern Paradoxes,” 98–9, and Müftüler-Baç, Divergent
Pathways, 119.
64. Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu “Feminist Politics in Turkey.”
65. Akyüz and Sayan-Cengiz, “Overcome your anger,” 1.
66. MOR ÇATI.
67. ASPB.
68. BKPD.
69. Ibid.
70. KA.DER, MOR ÇATI.
71. Levitt and Merry, “Vernacularization on the ground,” 455.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. See also, Aksoy “Invigorating Democracy,” 152.
75. Kandiyoti, “A Tangled Web.”
76. www.kadem.org.tr, January 21, 2017.
77. Group of Experts on Action Against VAW and Domestic Violence.
78. http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?page_id=784.
79. www.morcati.org.tr, January 3, 2015.
80. MOR ÇATI.
81. ASPB.
82. www.mfa.gov.tr, May 5, 2015, Press Release, No: 130.
83. Lombardo, “EU gender policy,” 169.
84. KSGM.
85. BKPD.
86. KADEM.
 TURKISH STUDIES 23

87. MOR ÇATI.

88. BKPD
89. www.morcati.org.tr, February 6, 2015.
90. See report “Aile Bütünlüğünü Olumsuz Etkileyen Unsurlar” (May 14, 2016).
91. MOR ÇATI.
92. KSGM.
93. KADEM.
94. AKDER.
95. Şimşek, “Transformation of Civil Society,” 48–9.
96. MOR ÇATI.
97. The Platform for Women’s Equality comprising 57 WROs in Turkey wrote a
letter to the Prime Minister asking the real intention of the government for lim-
iting ministry to family affairs. See http://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/130585-
kadin-bakanligi-kaldirildi-kadin-orgutleri-ofkeli, June 01, 2011.
98. BKPD.
99. KA.DER.
100. AK-DER.

Acknowledgements
The initial stage of the research (2014–2015) was carried under the project, ‘Citizens
First’. We want to thank to Oxfam Novib for providing fund for the field research and
for collaboration between Oxfam Novib, Peace, Training and Research Organization
(PTRO), and Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO). We would
also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions and the
participants for their contribution to our research.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
The initial stage (2014–2015) of the research was funded by Oxfam Novib Peace,
Training and Research Organization (PTRO) and Afghanistan Public Policy Research
Organization (APPRO).

Note on contributors
Berrin Koyuncu is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science
and Public Administration of Hacettepe University (Ankara, Turkey). She received
her MA and Ph.D. degrees from Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey). She has pub-
lished articles on local politics in Turkey and gender, the headscarf issue in Europe,
Turkish political thought, and Turkish political economy. She is the author of
various articles in Women’s Studies International Forum, Feminism & Psychology,
and Review of International Political Economy.
Aylin Özman is Professor of Political Science in Department of Political Science and
International Relations at TED University (Ankara, Turkey). She received her MA
and Ph.D from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at
24 B. KOYUNCU AND A. ÖZMAN

Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey). Her works mainly concentrate on political theory
and Turkish politics. She has published on political and social thought in Turkey,
Turkish politics, and gender, both in Turkish and in English. She is the author of
various articles in Contemporary Politics, Social and Legal Studies, Der Islam, Orient,
Turkish Studies, Journal of Third World Studies, and Journal of Language and Politics.

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Websites
AK-DER, http://www.ak-der.org/.
ASPB, www.aile.gov.tr.
BKPD, www.baskentkadin.org.tr.
KADEM, www.kadem.org.tr.
KA.DER, www.ka-der.org.tr.
KSGM, www.kadininstatusu.aile.gov.tr.
MOR ÇATI, www.morcati.org.tr.

Interviews
AKDER, the chairperson - İstanbul, December 5, 2017.
ASPB, the then deputy minister - Ankara, January 13, 2015.
BKPD, the chairperson -Ankara, November 13, 2017.
KADEM, the chairperson -Ankara, November 2, 2017.
KA.DER, the former chairperson of - Istanbul, November 21, 2014.
KA.DER, the then chairperson - Istanbul, November 21, 2014.
KASAD-D, a member of governing board - Ankara, October 22, 2017.
KSGM, the general director - Ankara, November 20, 2014.
MOR ÇATI, a volunteer - Istanbul, November 21, 2014.