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Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia

a
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman
a
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies , Nanyang
Technological University , Singapore
Published online: 02 Jul 2009.

To cite this article: Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman (2009) Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:7, 646-663, DOI: 10.1080/10576100902945527

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DOI: 10.1080/10576100902945527

Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia

MOHAMED NAWAB MOHAMED OSMAN

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
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Operating in over 43 countries in the world, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is presently active in
Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and more recently in Asia. Today, HT is becoming
increasingly prominent in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia. Yet
despite its rapid growth in the region, little is known about HT chapters in Southeast
Asia, especially in Malaysia. In light of the dearth in scholarship on Hizbut Tahrir
Malaysia (HTM), this article aims to shed some light on the HTM and analyze the
likelihood of its emergence as a political force in the country.

The advent of terrorism, perpetrated by extremist elements within Muslim societies, has
thrust Islamic movements into the spotlight. Most Islamic movements and groups like
Al Qaeda often frame their ideology in terms of the re-establishment of the Caliphate, a
political institution that unified the Muslim world in the first few centuries of Islam. Perhaps
the most prominent of these groups is the Hizbut Tahrir (HT). While Al Qaeda attempts
to achieve the desired Caliphate by overturning the current world order through acts of
terror and violence, HT has been more focused on developing a core group of cadres to
prepare for the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. Operating in over 45 countries
in the world, HT is presently active in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and more recently
in Asia. Today, HT is a becoming increasingly prominent in Southeast Asia, especially in
Indonesia and Malaysia. The growth of HT in Malaysia has become worrisome for many
within the Malaysian political system. Today, members of the ruling party, the United
Malay National Organization (UMNO), perceive the threat of HT to be bigger than that
of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian terror network linked to Al Qaeda.1 Yet, such
an observation could be viewed merely as paranoia, caused by a lack of understanding of
the group’s aims and objectives. In light of such opinions, it is the aim of this article to
probe into these issues, by analyzing the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) as
a political force in the country. The article will be divided into three parts. The first part
will discuss the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir, its aims and objectives. The second part of the
article will capture the organizational history, activities, and transnational linkages of HTM.
The last part will analyze the potential of HTM to successfully implement its objectives in
Malaysia.2

Received 16 December 2008; accepted 14 December 2008.

Address correspondence to Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, S. Rajaratnam School of Inter-
national Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Blk S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore
639798. E-mail: ismnawab@ntu.edu.sg

646
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 647

Hizb ut-Tahrir: History and Founder

HTM is a chapter of the larger HT organization. The party was founded by Sheikh Taqiuddin
Nabhani in 1953 at Jerusalem. An-Nabhani sought to establish a political party with an
ideology based on Islam. An-Nabhani received his early education at the prestigious Al-
Azhar University in the year 1928. He worked in the field of Shariah education in the
ministry of education until the year 1938. He started as a Head Cleric in Central Haifa
Court, then Consultant (i.e., Deputy Judge) and then the Judge of Al-Ramla Court until
the year 1948, when he traveled to Damascus after the Jewish occupation of Palestine. He
returned in the same year to be appointed as a Judge in the Shariah Court of Jerusalem.3
An-Nabhani’s approach to Islam is indeed unique and interesting. Unlike most Muslim
reformers and Salafi scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi who reject
Islamic traditions as espoused by classical Muslim scholars, An-Nabhani did not reject
these traditions. Instead, he offered an interesting fusion of the modernist Islamic political
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ideology and traditional Islamic teachings. His traditional influence came mainly from
his maternal grandfather, the esteemed traditional scholar of Islam, Yusuf An-Nabhani,
who was critical of Muslim modernists such as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.4 Yusuf An-Nabhani was also a strong advocate of Sufism. The
influence of Yusuf An-Nabhani or Taqiuddin An-Nabhani could be clearly seen in the
latter’s understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. For An-Nabhani, the Quran, Sunnah (The
Doings and Sayings of the Prophet), Ijma’ Al-Sahabah and qiyas are the legal evidences
that could be used in determining a ruling on a particular issue.5 This could be contrasted
with the views of Salafi scholars that generally reject Ijma’ and qiyas as sources that could
be used to derive Islamic laws.6 In addition, An-Nabhani is more lax in his attitude toward
Sufism and Sufis. Contrary to many of the modernist thinkers, he did not regard Sufism as
an un-Islamic concept. An-Nabhani’s fusion of traditional and modernist ideas is expressed
in his espousal of the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate. An-Nabhani rejected the Western
conception of the nation-state and sought to revive the medieval Caliphate with its traditional
accompanying institutions and functionaries.7 To achieve this aim, An-Nabhani set-up the
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation).
To differentiate itself from other Islamic organizations, An-Nabhani stated explicitly
that HT is not an academic, educational, or a charity group but is manifestly a political party.
Among its stated objectives are the revival of the Muslim World from its perceived current
decline, the liberation of Muslims from the thoughts, systems, and laws of unbelievers, and
the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate.8 In terms of its membership, it is stated clearly
that members must be Muslims regardless of their race and mazhab (Schools of Thought).
Women are also allowed to be members of the party through the formation of women’s
circles, which are to be separate and distinct units from those of men. For HT, the only
way for Islam to be fully implemented is through an Islamic Revolution. HT claims that
it defers to Prophet Muhammad’s method of setting up the state of Madinah in their own
efforts toward establishing a Caliphate. The party took from his supposed method of action,
the stages of his action and his deeds. Based on this, the party divides its method of work
into three stages. In the first stage, known as the stage of culturing, it aims to produce
people who believe in the idea and the method of the party, so that they form the Party
group. At the second stage, known as the stage of interaction with the Muslim community,
the party seeks to let the Muslims embrace and carry Islam, so that they can take up its
issues, and thus work to establish it in their affairs of life. At the third stage, known as the
stage of the ruling, the party works toward establishing a government, implementing Islam
comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the world.9
 648 M. N. M. Osman

During the lifetime of An-Nabhani, the party expanded to most of the Middle Eastern
and North African countries. The death of An-Nabhani in 1977 did not cripple the organiza-
tion. The leadership of the party was taken over by Sheikh Abdul Qaleem Zalloum. Under
his leadership, the party expanded further. Partly due to prosecution in the Arab countries,
many party members left for the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, the United States,
and other European countries.10 By the 1990s, the party became so established in the West
that many observers speculated that its key leadership was based in Jordan and the United
Kingdom. Following the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991, party members from the
United Kingdom traveled to the Muslim republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus to
spread its ideology.11 It was also the Western chapters of the party that was responsible for
the spread of its ideology to Southeast Asia.12 It is also interesting to note that most works
on HT are focused on the chapters in Western countries especially Europe.
The most acclaimed of these works is a book written by Ed (Mahbub) Husain titled
The Islamist. The book documented the author’s experiences in HT. In particular, Husain’s
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comparison of HT to the Marxist-Leninist strategy of creating a group of core activists

traveling the country setting up closed cells is useful in understanding the structure of
HT. This structure will be elucidated in greater detail later in this article.13 However,
some inaccuracies and inconsistencies already highlighted by others exist in this work.14
Husain noted that HT is a thuglike organization that employed intimidation tactics to
coerce its nemesis. This is a gross misrepresentation of the party. One should not base
their assessments of HT on the period of Omar Bakri’s leadership. The period witnessed
a HT that was hijacked by Omar Bakri’s personal agenda of radicalizing HT’s politics.
This led to his dismissal from the party. The case of HT in Malaysia also shows that
the party is in fact a highly intellectual body that is careful to act within the confines of
Malaysian laws. In addition, Husain’s suggestion that HT ideology was re-founded in the
United Kingdom is problematic. While the Western chapters of the party remain important
in the recruitment process, the Middle Eastern leadership still wields control over the party
chapters exemplified by the sacking of Omar Bakri. In the case of the Malaysian chapter
of HT, it remains firmly controlled by the party leadership in the Middle East. Olivier
Roy, the esteemed French sociologist on Islam, also assessed HT’s role in the development
of Islamism in Europe in his widely acclaimed book, Globalised Islam. He noted in this
book that HT in Europe is a political movement that is uprooted and deterritorialized.
He added that the Caliphate that it wants to establish has no territorial basis.15 Although
this description is probably true of HT in Europe where Muslims are in the minority, it is
clear that in Muslim majority states like Malaysia, HT intends to overthrown the current
government and establish an Islamic state as will be shown later in the article.

History of Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia

The Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) is perhaps one of the most secretive mainstream Islamic
groups in Malaysia. Its first entry into Malaysia was believed to be through graduates of
U.K. universities such as Imperial College, University of Sheffield, and School of Oriental
and African Studies (SOAS) in the early 1990s.16 While it cannot be ascertained whether
members of HTM had been influenced by members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI),
the sister chapter of the party in the region, the author confirmed with members of HTM
and HTI that leaders of HTI traveled to Malaysia to assist their Malaysian counterparts in
building the party structure.17 Similar to the HTM, little is known about the activities and
actual power of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).18
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 649

During its formative years, owing to fears of prosecution, the HTM utilized several
front organizations, such as Network of Intellectuals in The Malay World (IKIN), and
several student organizations in various tertiary institutions to conduct their activities.
Prior to 1997, there were scattered pockets of HT halaqahs (discussion circles) all over
Malaysia. By 1997, many more Muslim graduates from the United Kingdom, who had
been influenced by the group, came back and decided to consolidate the HT movement, in
part due to assistance from HTI. At this point, the HT central leadership viewed Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore as being in the same wilayah (province).19 This meant that HTM
was guided by HTI. Members of HTM also felt that the political climate was not right
for them to use the name Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia.20 This was due to the fact that there
were massive antigovernment activities and the Malaysian government had detained many
opposition leaders under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows the government to
detain a person without trial for an indefinite period of time. As such they formed IKIN and
went by this name between 1997 and 2004. This was also seen to be the stage of culturing
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in the history of HTM.21 The main training and tarbiyah (education and upbringing of
persons within an Islamic group) process occurred with the assistance of the leaders of
HTI. The culture of secrecy was an important trait of HTM politics during this period. For
instance, HTM members tended to use pseudonyms during this period to ensure that the
organization was not discovered by the Malaysian authorities. After seven years of working
in this manner, leaders of HTM eventually decided to start using the name Hizbut Tahrir
Malaysia in 2004. This was also the point when the leadership of HT decided to recognize
Malaysia as a separate wilayah.22 HTM began openly publishing several publications such
as books and pamphlets under the name Hizb ut-Tahrir Malaysia. Subsequently, HTM also
began distributing pamphlets at mosques during the weekly Friday prayers in Johor Bahru,
Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, and Kuantan. For HTM members, this was the stage of interaction in
its struggle to revive the Islamic Caliphate in Malaysia. Since 2005, HTM began organizing
seminars, mass demonstrations, and expanding its network throughout Malaysia. In 2006,
HTM officially sent in an application to the Malaysian authority to be registered as a
political organization. However, it is unlikely that the Malaysian authorities would allow
the HTM to be registered, due to the antigovernment nature of the party.

Membership and Recruitment

While the exact number of HTM members cannot be ascertained, the author has observed
that the participants at HTM functions vary from three hundred to two thousand participants.
Today, it has established local branches in all of the eleven states of Peninsular Malaysia.23
HTM is extremely careful about selecting its members and often prefers to maintain its
adherents as supporters rather than members. The key difference between a member and a
supporter is that a member can communicate with the higher echelon of the HT leadership
in other parts of the world whereas a supporter cannot. Similar to the core of its membership
in other countries, the membership of HTM comprise young professionals, including top
academics, lawyers, and teachers as well as tertiary students. Many of its members were
educated in the United Kingdom. Many also possess Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from both
local and overseas universities. One of its key leaders, Hakim Osman, was the lawyer to
Malaysian pop star Siti Nurhalizah before deciding to quit practice and focus his time on
building the HTM. Hakim Osman is the current official spokesperson of the party. Others
include top academics, among whom are Dr. Sharifuddin Md Zain, a chemical engineering
lecturer who graduated with a Ph.D. from Imperial College. One of the key leaders and
thinkers of the party, Ahmad Mustafa, was trained in religion and was a frequently featured
 650 M. N. M. Osman

speaker at HTM’s seminars and talks. Both Ahmad Mustafa and Hakim Osman are full-time
members of HTM.24 The leaders of HTM are generally fluent in English and Arabic, which
seems to lend added credence to their message to the larger Malaysian public. Unlike its
membership in other countries, most HTM members did not have an Islamic background.
One of the HTM member said that he was in fact a jahil (ignorant) person prior to his
involvement with HTM. With the exception of Ahmad Mustafa, the only exposure to Islam
that many of HTM leaders had was through HT. Many of the HTM leaders are also young,
mostly in their 30s or 40s. From this it can definitely be seen that the membership of the
HTM is growing rapidly in Malaysia.25
Another important group of its members are the tertiary students. Its effective and
aggressive recruitment methods have attracted large numbers of tertiary students to become
members. It is believed that the HTM are in control of several student unions in Malaysia,
including the student union in University Technology Malaysia (UTM) in the state of Johor
and the University of Malaya (UM). This is in part due to the strong support students in these
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universities receive from members of HTM, who are academics in both institutions. Several
members of HTM teach at the engineering departments in UTM and another member is a
head of department in the engineering faculty in UM.26 The more senior HTM members
also strongly encourage the student members to excel in their studies to ensure that they
will be looked on favorably by fellow students and can then influence them to become
members of HTM.27
Perhaps the key base of its supporters and members are graduates from U.K.
universities. Between 1997 and 2005, several members of Hizbut Tahrir Britain who
were of Malaysian origin were instrumental in recruiting Malaysian students studying in
the United Kingdom. One of these members, Mohamed Azree, was married to a British
Pakistani lady and was working in an engineering firm in the United Kingdom.28 He was
known to be particularly effective in recruiting students from Malaysia and Singapore to
become members of the organization. He did this by frequenting the Malaysian House.
The Malaysian House is a hostel cum gathering center for students from Singapore and
Malaysia. The Malaysian House also hosts a Malaysian restaurant serving halal (lawful
within Islam) Malaysian food and a prayer room.29 Students who were feeling homesick
tended to frequent the Malaysian House. Azree and other members of HTM frequented
the Malaysian House for the purpose of recruiting. The focus of recruitment seemed to
be students from the upper echelon of Malaysian society. Among those that Azree tried
to recruit, albeit unsuccessfully, was Khairy Jamaluddin, the current UMNO Deputy
Youth chief and son-in-law of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi.30 Azree
was also successful in recruiting students from Singapore and indirectly starting a HT
chapter in Singapore. The formation of the Singapore chapter and its links to HTM will
be extrapolated later in the article. The author is unsure about the development of this
recruitment process when Azree left London for Kuala Lumpur in the middle of 2005.
Michael Whine had argued that looking at the backgrounds of HT leaders and known
members, one can see that HT in the UK is not a populist movement like the Brotherhood
or other Islamist movements. Similarly, the organization tends to be elitist and recruits from
amongst the elites in Malaysia. This could also be seen in its attempts to recruit as many of
the top graduates in both local and overseas universities.

Leadership Structure of HTM

The leadership structure of HTM is similar to that of the larger HT. HT divides the Muslim
World into different provinces known as wilayahs. These wilayahs are demarcated along
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 651

the lines of how the future Caliphate will be divided.31 At the top of the country leadership
is the wilayah committee. The wilayah committee is headed by a Mu’ tamad (head of an
HT province). Under the provinces are the local-level urban centers managed by a local
committee headed by a local head known as naqib. The naqib is essentially in charge of
various study circles within the locality. For most of its history, Malaysia was placed in the
same wilayah as Indonesia and Singapore. This means that the head of the Malaysian chapter
was seen as the naqib and reported to the Mu’ tamad in Indonesia. The Singapore chapter
may also have reported to the Mu’ tamad in Indonesia. In 2001, the Malaysian chapter was
accorded the status of wilayah.32 This means that the Malaysian chapter had its own Mu’
tamad who reported directly to the amir and leadership committee of HT. As HTM began to
expand, naqibs were appointed at the state level. This means that in each of the Malaysian
states where HTM has a presence, there will be a local naqib reporting to the Malaysian Mu’
tamad. Similar to the chapters of HTM in other countries, HTM closely guard the hierarchy
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of its leadership. While many of their prominent members are known, they are careful not
to disclose who among these members are the Mu’ tamad and naqib. Unlike many HT
chapters in other countries, HTM does not have an official spokesman or chairman. Often,
it is assumed that the official, either the spokesman or the chairman, is the Mu’ tamad.
However, this is often not the case, the Mu’ tamad often being one of the more prominent
members of the party. Only members of the wilayah committee will know who the actual
Mu’ tamad is. The leaders of HTM often organize their meetings in the two offices that they
run, one situated in Batu Caves in the state of Selangor and the other in Johor Bahru in the
state of Johor. Leaders based in the southern states of Malaysia would meet in Johor Bahru
whereas those based in Kuala Lumpur and the northern states would meet in Batu Caves.

Funding
Little is known about the funding of the organization. Yet, it is apparent that the party makes
money through several of its activities. First, HTM sells books at all its functions. These
books are bought from publishers linked to HTI such as Pustaka Thariqul Izzah and sold
at a profit. In some other cases, HTM members simply photocopy and bind books written
by HT leaders and sell these books. HT members do not believe in the law of copyright
and feel that because books are an open source of knowledge, people should be allowed to
photocopy without paying copyright fees. One such book that the author bought at a HTM
seminar was a book written by its former leader in the United States, Iyad Hilal, titled
International Agreements From the Islamic Perspective, which was sold at the price of RM
12. Second, HTM also charge between RM 5 to RM 10 for participations in their functions.
Often this would be enough to cover the rental cost for the venue, refreshments, and seminar
packages that are given to participants. Third, HTM members similar to members in other
parts of the world contribute a portion of their pay to the party. In the case of the United
Kingdom, members contribute about 20 percent of their pay to the party.33 It is possible
that this is the case for Malaysia as well. Little is known about the financial relations
between the HT central leadership and HTM. Members are secretive about whether money
is contributed to the center or whether the center provides financial assistance to HTM. The
party funds are used to finance the pay of its full-time members. In addition, it is used to
finance HTM activities and publications.
Disseminating the Ideas
In their efforts to publicize and educate the Muslim public in Malaysia about HT and the
need to revive the Islamic Caliphate, HTM utilized various modes of communication. This
is also in line with the first stage of its strategy of engaging the Muslim public.
 652 M. N. M. Osman

Publications. HTM produces a weekly pamphlet, Sautun Nahdhah, distributed in mosques

and prayer halls around Malaysia by HT members. Sautun Nahdhah features HTM’s views
about contemporary issues affecting Muslims in Malaysia and other parts of the world
and publicizes upcoming events and activities organized by HTM. The first copy of Sautun
Nahdah was published on 14 January 2005. The HTM sees this as a form of culturing process
to interest the Malaysian public to be acquainted with its ideas. HTM also promoted the sale
of books produced and translated by HTI in Malaysia. These books could be translations
of key HT books such as the System of Islam, Economic System of Islam as well as books
written by HTI leaders and journals or monthly magazines produced by HTI. The Fajar
Ilmu Baru Enterprise imports these books and also sells them at their bookstore located
in the Jalan Masjid India area in Kuala Lumpur. Subsequently, these books are bought
and distributed by HTM among their members and potential recruits throughout Malaysia.
Besides Sautun Nahdah, HTM also attempted to produce its own journal, titled Al-Afkar.34
This journal was first published in April 2005 but went out of print after the first copy was
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published. This was mainly due to poor sales and little response to the publication. Many
Malaysians preferred reading Sautun Nahdah, which was considered to be an easier read.
As such, HTM decided to do away with its publications. HTM also published seminar
papers presented during its seminars. In addition to the papers, additional research papers
related to the themes of the seminars are published.35 To date, only one member of HTM
has attempted to write a book on the ideas of HTM. The book, entitled Building on the
Potential of Muslim Youths to Think in an Islamic Manner, was published in 2005. The
book addresses the need for Muslim youths to build on their potential and utilize it for
the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.36 It also highlights some problems facing
Muslim youths in Malaysia.

Online Resources. The party also utilizes its website, www.mykhilafah.com, to spread the
party’s message. The website features a daily reporting of various domestic and international
news related to the Muslim World. These articles are often followed by commentaries about
the articles from members of HTM. The website also provide links to the website of other
chapters of HT as well as features photographs and videos about developments within HT
worldwide. Visitors to the website can also provide feedback and comments to HTM and
inform the friends about the website through an automated online system. Interestingly, the
party also has sections within the website featuring articles in Arabic and English. Members
of HTM are also active contributors to various Muslim online forums often utilizing these
platforms to introduce HT ideas and promote events organized by HTM. These forums
include the Ummah Online Forum and Melayu.com.37 Another online platform utilized
by HTM is the YouTube website. HTM members have posted snippets of their seminars
and talks.38 These videos are often videos produced by HT Britain, inserted with Malay
translation or a voiceover in Malay. In addition, several HTM members are also beginning
to utilize the increasingly popular networking site, Facebook, to encourage their friends
to attend HTM functions. Some HTM members are also part of various groups that form
part of the Facebook Online groups such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, the Revival of the
Khilafah group, and the International Khilafah Conference 2007 group.39

Seminars and Talks. Besides the printing of Sautun Nahdhah, the party also organizes
seminars on a monthly basis. These seminars are held in different parts of the country.
However, the larger seminars tend to be organized in Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru. In
such seminars, HTM senior members would speak in a panel of two to three speakers. Often
one of the speakers featured will be from other Muslim groups or even senior religious
scholars. Some of these figures include the Mutfi of the state of Johor, Dato’ Nooh Gadut; the
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 653

Mufti of the state of Perak, Dato’ Harrunsani Zakaria; Abdul Razak Baginda, a prominent
academic; and Ustaz Nazri Chik, a member of PAS Youth wing.40 The theme will often be
couched around local issues to draw the interest of potential participants, but in reality will
lead to discussions about the need to revive the Caliphate.41 These seminars are often seen
to be a way of interaction between the party and the public. Participants who seem to be
more interested in the issues discussed will then be invited to join the group’s halaqah or
discussion circles. The halaqahs, organized on a weekly basis, are meant to identify the key
members of the group as well as indoctrinate the potential members of the group. The most
significant seminar organized by HTM was the Caliphate Seminar held on 12 August 2007.
This function was held in conjunction with the International Caliphate Conference held in
Indonesia, the largest ever event to be organized by HT in its history. The seminar, held at
one of the largest universities in Malaysia, the Mara Technological University, drew more
than 500 participants. Some key leaders of HT from other countries such as the United
Kingdom and Indonesia also attended the event.42
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Student Organizations. HTM members also utilized their links in the universities to or-
ganize events in the campuses to promote HTM’s ideas. In several universities, such as
University of Malaya and Malaysian Technological University, HTM has formed its own
student groups to contest in student elections against student groups linked to both PAS
and UMNO.43 It is believed that these groups have done extremely well as many students
are becoming disenchanted with student groups linked to PAS and UMNO. The ability of
HTM to galvanize student groups is also partly linked to the fact that many of its members
are academics teaching in these institutions. One of these academics is active at promoting
the ideas of HTM even in his lectures. He also organized various activities on campus,
such as the video screening of the fall of the Ottomon Empire and the Arab–Israeli conflict,
which constitute a very important strategy in trying to get students to support HTM ideas.

Public Demonstrations. Unlike in other chapters of HT, HTM has avoided using demon-
strations to create awareness about their ideology. This is mainly due to fear that the
Malaysian authorities may place them under arrest. However, this fear began to gradually
dissipate as the HTM grew in numbers and influence. On 2 September, 2002, HTM be-
gan organizing their first public demonstration. HTM members stood outside the National
Mosque in Kuala Lumpur with banners to call for the re-establishment of the Islamic
Caliphate. Hakim Osman, one of the HTM party workers, spoke about the Western con-
spiracy to destroy the Ottoman Caliphate and Islam. He added that the current leaders in
all Muslim countries are agents of the Western imperialist powers. He went on to suggest
that the only solution to the current problems in the Muslim World is the revival of the
Caliphate.44 The other major demonstration held by HTM was during the height of the
Israeli-Hizbollah conflict in 2006. HTM held a demonstration on 28 July 2006 during U.S.
Secretary of State Condaleeza Rice’s visit to Malaysia. The demonstration drew several
hundred members and supporters of HTM to the streets.45

Issues Championed by HTM

The methods employed by HTM have been largely successful in spreading the ideology of
the group. Yet, it is important to note that HTM also shrewdly select issues they deem as
being most suitable in attracting support from the local Muslim population.
 654 M. N. M. Osman

Reconstructing Malayo-Islamic History. The Malay World is often regarded as an area that
is peripheral to the Islamic World. It is perceived that the links between Islam in the Middle
East and Southeast Asia are weak.46 In his seminal work on Islam in Indonesia, Jacob
Van Leur has argued that Islam in the country was no more than a thin veneer, underneath
which one could easily discern a different form of the religion from that of Middle Eastern
Islam.47 Scholars such as he tend to underplay the significance of the links between the
Middle East and Southeast Asian Muslims. Yet groups like HTM are emphasizing and
in some ways reconstructing Malay history to emphasize the strong links between the
ancient Malay kingdoms in Indonesia and Malaysia with that of Islamic Caliphates in
the Middle East. In a seminar held in Johor called Khilafah Dan Alam Melayu (Sejarah
Yang Disembunyikan), Dr. Sallehuddin, one of the leaders of HTM, conducted a seminar
titled “Caliphate and the Malay World (The Hidden History).”48 Relying heavily on the
research conducted by the esteemed scholar of Southeast Asian history, Anthony Reid, Dr.
Sallehuddin spoke about the links between the Ottoman Empire and the Malay states and
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the Johor and Aceh Sultanates.49 For instance, he noted that the Sultan of Johor had met
the Ottoman Caliph, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, in Istanbul. It was added that the excellent
relationship between the two had led to the Caliph presenting the Sultan with a Turkish
woman by the name of Ruqaiyah Hanim whom the Sultan married. It was argued that
the relationship between the two is that of a tributary state (Johor) and a central power
(Turkey). The fact that this relationship was due to practical considerations such as trade
was completely left out. Dr. Sallehuddin also conveniently left out the fact that the state
of Johor also had good relations with the British.50 In fact, the Sultan was known to
be more at ease with Western sports such as billiards, cricket, and horseback-riding and
was also known to be interested to stimulate revenues to finance his luxurious lifestyle.51
Dr. Sallehuddin also tried to bring HT into his account by suggesting that Yusuf An-
Nabhani, grandfather of Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, was sent by the Ottoman Caliph to Aceh,
Indonesia to assist in the war efforts between the sultanate of Aceh and the Dutch.52
Such a visit could not be ascertained by any authentic historical source. The absence
of this evidence was justified with the rhetoric that the narrative of history had been
fabricated by colonial powers to weaken Muslims. This was a clear attempt by HTM to
reconstruct history and link the Malay World with the larger Ottoman Empire. While the
Malay states never constituted part of the larger Caliphate empire, HTM tried to posit it
as such. This, it hoped, would help to serve as a useful tool for HTM to galvanize support
from the Muslim populace in Malaysia. Despite these errors, many of the participants
were completely sold on the history presented by HTM. In conversations with participants
of the seminar, the author noted that many of the participants, even those who did not
subscribe to HTM’s ideology, were convinced of the links between the Malay World and
the Ottoman Caliphate. In subsequent seminars organized by HTM, presenters from HTM
constantly emphasized the need to revive the Caliphate that once existed in the Malay
World.

Domestic Issues. HTM also tends to champion domestic issues. A scan of the themes
addressed in more than 150 editions of HTM’s main publication, Sautun Nahdah, will
reveal that more than half of its publications focus on domestic rather then international
issues. Some of the themes HTM focused on include climate change, socioeconomic issues,
domestic politics, the emergence of liberal Muslim groups, deviationist teachings, and a
myriad of other issues. Many of these issues affect the daily lives of Malaysian Muslims
and thus connect well with the HTM’s targeted audience. In one of the earlier issues of
Sautun Nahdah, HTM addressed the problem of poverty in Malaysia. The issue began by
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 655

highlighting a newspaper report about the number of poor in Malaysia. HTM intelligently
noted that this number did not include people who are relatively poor, which in their
projection include the large majority of Malaysians. They argued that the capitalist system
is designed to ensure that very few people in society will control the economy of the country.
HTM then proceeded to offer a viable solution to the problem of the poor by highlighting
excerpts from one of HTM’s main books, The Economic System of Islam. The article ended
with a call for Muslims to revive the Islamic Caliphate.53 Another important issue tackled
by the HTM is that of apostasy in Malaysia. This issue arose when a Muslim lady, Azlina
Jailani (Lina Joy) converted to Christianity and sought the permission of the government to
drop Islam from the religion stated on her national identification card.54 The Malaysian High
Court rejected her application. HTM expressed their joy over the court’s verdict. However,
HTM felt that the problems of apostasy would not arise if Shariah law was implemented in
the country. They then proceeded to cite the views of Muslim scholars about the problem
of apostasy advocating that Lina Joy should have been executed for the “crime” of leaving
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Islam. HTM ended the article calling on Malaysian Muslims to revive the Shariah and
Caliphate.55

International Issues. HTM does not limit their focus to domestic issues. They constantly
comment and advocate for other international issues. Beyond arguing and demonstrat-
ing against the War on Terror, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Arab–Israeli conflict, HTM
focuses significant attention on developments affecting HT chapters in other countries as
well as regional issues. On its website, HTM has allotted a whole section titled “Info
Hizbut Tahrir.” In this section HTM covers stories about HT chapters in other countries,
especially in Indonesia and Uzbekistan. This aims to create a sense among Malaysian
Muslims about the greatness of HT as an international organization as it has a presence
in all parts of the Muslim World. HTM also features a significant number of articles
about the atrocities of the Uzbekistan government perpetuated on members of HT in
Uzbekistan. Several articles on the situation in Uzbekistan and letters from HT activists
in the country were posted on the HTM website. The focus on Uzbekistan could be due
to the fact that it is a means for HTM to differentiate themselves from the other Is-
lamic groups in Malaysia who tend to focus their attention on the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The choice of Uzbekistan could be due to the fact that the Uzbek chapter has one of
the largest memberships and HTM sees a need for news about HT in Uzbekistan to be
known.
Two articles on Muslims in Southern Thailand and Myanmar focus on the historical
linkages between the Muslims in the two regions and Muslims in Malaysia. The arti-
cles then gave accounts of Muslim history in the two regions. Quoting the example of
how the Ottoman Empire sent troops to fight alongside Muslims in India and Aceh, In-
donesia, HTM claimed that Muslims in these two regions would not be prosecuted if a
Caliphate exists today.56 In another article, HTM addresses the diplomatic row between
Malaysian and Indonesian ties. The row was caused by an incident when a Malaysian
police officer had beaten up an Indonesian karate judge. This resulted in mass protests
in Indonesia over the incident. In addressing the row, HTM brought forth the view that
nationalism is un-Islamic and criticized both Malaysians and Indonesians for imbibing the
spirit of nationalism. HTM argued that Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia were one peo-
ple and nation who were separated by Western colonial powers. Instead of fighting against
each other, the two countries should focus its energy on uniting the two countries as one
state.57
 656 M. N. M. Osman

Transnational Network of HTM

One of the most important themes that must be explored in any discussion on HTM is
its transnational linkages.58 These linkages are important in shaping HTM’s strategies and
ideology. At the same time, HTM is also responsible for the emergence of other chapters
of HT around the region.

The Indonesian Link. The origins of HTM as noted earlier could be traced back to graduates
from the U.K. universities. These students were not ready to develop a strong party chapter
in Malaysia. All of them were not full party members and were still considered to be students
or supporters of HT. This difficulty was realized by HT’s central leadership in the late 1990s
as the chapter did not seem to grow in numbers of influence.59 Some HT figures from the
Middle East traveled to the region.60 In 1997, Ismail Yusanto, the current spokesman of
HTI and Muhammad al-Khaththath, one of the leaders of HTI, had gone to Malaysia to
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meet the leaders of HTM. They noted the fact that the leaders in Malaysia were not familiar
with how to organize their activities and da’awah (propagation of the group’s message).61
They had gone to Malaysia on the instruction of the HT leadership in the Middle East.
Muhammad al Khaththath had stayed behind in Malaysia for two weeks to assist in the
development of HT in the country. He guided HTM leaders in reading two of HT’s primary
texts, the Mafahim As Shariah (Systems of Islam) and Takaful Siyasah (Political System
of Islam). He was also responsible for confirming the status of the members in Malaysia
from students to members. After he left, a decision was made for Hafidz Abdurrahman to
assist in the development of the party in Malaysia. A decision was made that members of
HTI should travel to Malaysia to assist in the development of HTM. It was later decided
that Hafidz Abdurrahman, one of the HTI leaders, would go to Malaysia. Hafidz had gone
to Malaysia between 1998 and 2001 to pursue a Master’s degree in Islamic Studies at the
University of Malaya.62 Although Hafidz did have intentions to pursue a second degree, his
studies served as a convenient cover for his real intention of helping HTM leaders to build
a strong party chapter.63 Malaysia was then seen as part of the same wilayah. Hafidz’s role
was that of a mentor to HTM members. He guided them in the halaqahs that were organized
and shared his organizational experience in building the chapter of HT in Indonesia. He
also introduced them to the various books recommended on HT and developed a syllabus
for them. They were also instilled with strong values and beliefs about HT. Hafidz noted
that in the three and the half years that he was in Malaysia, he had helped established HT
cells in all the different states of Malaysia except for Kelantan. In my interview with him,
Hafidz noted that the expansion and growth of HTM is faster than HTI.

The Singaporean Link. Hafidz Abdurrahman and members of HTM were also responsible
for the development of a HT chapter in Singapore. The chapter in Singapore was also started
by Singaporean Muslim students studying in the United Kingdom. Sources in HT Britain
informed that they had targeted two Singaporean students, Sallehuddin Abdul Aziz and
Abdul Wahab Allapitchay, to become members of HT. Sallehuddin had gone to Imperial
College under a scholarship sponsored by the Singapore Armed Forces. He was the first
Singaporean Muslim to qualify for the scholarship and rose to the rank of Major at the
young age of 30. Abdul Wahab had also studied in Imperial College under the Singapore
Airlines scholarship. They were in the United Kingdom between 1992 and 1997.64 Their
initial contact point in the United Kingdom was with Azree and they continued to maintain
links with HTM members when they came back to Singapore. The Singaporean chapter
was designated to be part of the Malaysian and Indonesian wilayah. HTM leaders such
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 657

as Dr. Sharifuddin traveled to Singapore on a weekly or fortnightly basis to assist in the

development of the Singaporean chapter. Hafidz also traveled to Singapore at the same
frequency. The longest period of time that he was in Singapore was for two weeks. His
last visit in Singapore was in December 2001. Leaders of HT in Singapore also traveled
frequently to attend halaqahs in Johor Bahru and Kuala Lumpur. HTM and HTI leaders
noted the climate of fear in Singapore made it difficult for HT to gain a following and
influence. The number of members in Singapore were limited to only a handful of young
professionals. Around late 2003, members of HTM found out that the existence of a
Singapore chapter had been discovered by the Singaporean authorities. It was believed that
around late 2001, several members of HT Singapore had been in touch with members of the
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror network. The HT members were trying to persuade these JI
members to abandon their violent methods and adopt the methodology of HT, which they
believe is the methodology of the Prophet.65 The JI members refused to heed their advice. In
the process, HT Singapore members came under surveillance of the Singaporean authorities.
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HT Singapore members were detained and subsequently released after JI members were
arrested in August 2002. HTM members informed that they lost contact with HT Singapore
members in early 2003 and did not know about the situation until a HTI leader, Harris Salleh,
went to Singapore in late 2003 and found out about the developments.66 The international
linkages of HTM go beyond Indonesia and Singapore. HTM members based in the northern
state of Kelantan, bordering Thailand, are also attempting to start a chapter in Southern
Thailand. It is not known whether this attempt has been successful.

Links to Other Chapters. Beyond the region, HTM also maintains ties with HT chapters in
other parts of the world. In particular, its linkages with the chapter in the United Kingdom are
extremely strong. Several leaders of HT Britain have been involved with the development
of HTM. In April 2005, when the first copy of Al-Afkar was published, Dr. Imran Waheed,
the spokesman for HT Britain, was named as the project director. In August 2007, when Dr.
Waheed was deported from Indonesia, where he was due to speak at the HTI, he traveled
to Malaysia and spent two weeks in various parts of Malaysia, including Kuala Lumpur
and Langkawi Islands.67 Although he did not give speeches or talks, he met members of
HTM to brief them about the development of HT worldwide.68 Several members of HT
Britain also went to Malaysia after the International Khilafah Conference held in Jakarta
in August 2007 to meet HTM leaders. The extensive transnational network of HTM and
its parent organization HT as well as the secretive manner in which they operate have led
many observers to conclude that HT has a militant side to it and will pursue violence.

HTM and Violence

The question of HT’s affinity to violence and its supposed role as a conveyor belt for
terrorism has been addressed in several academic works.69 These works show a thorough
lack of understanding of HT’s ideology and methodology and have failed to capture the
thinking and methodology of the group. Both authors attempt to draw similarities between
Al Qaeda and HT despite stark differences between the two. First, HT does not see the
concept of jihad in the same light as Al Qaeda. One of the leading scholars on HT, Suha
Taji-Farouki, noted that while HT members have advocated for jihad, they see such a call
as simply calling for action by the Muslim states, the Muslim masses, and the armies of
Muslim countries and not the party itself organizing the jihad. HT believes that only an
Islamic state can call for jihad.70 Secondly, HT never subscribes to the concept of takfir,
which condemns Muslims not following the group’s ideology as apostates, and thus could
 658 M. N. M. Osman

be killed. This is in stark contrast to Al Qaeda, which subscribes to this belief. These works,
in the words of Jean Francois Meyer, exemplify how outsiders listening to HT’s discourses,
but not necessarily familiar with all the nuances of the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir, might
only pay attention to its virulent denunciations of the West and rulers in countries with
a Muslim majority, resulting in the assumption that HT has a violent ideology.71 HTM
has also come under scrutiny for their alleged posting of a YouTube video under the
title “Oh Muslims—How Much Longer Can We Wait?” The author made a bizarre claim
that Al Qaeda and HT are linked simply due to the supposed expertise that HT possess
when it comes to utilizing the Web for its purposes.72 A Sautun Nahdah article in July
2005 succinctly countered the view that HTM espoused violence. The article had begun
with a description of sufferings the Uzbek people go through being prosecuted by the
regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. HTM began to discuss the issue of violence and
whether a Muslim can use violence to counter such intense prosecution. HTM argued that
the methodology of building an Islamic state or Caliphate should not be a violent one.73
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They cited verses from the Qur’an and the history of Prophet Muhammad to justify their
position.74 They concluded the article by calling leaders of Islamic groups to cease any
violent actions as these actions contradict Islamic teachings. They noted that the true way to
establish the Caliphate is through an intellectual approach.75 HTM members and members
of HT Singapore exemplify their position when they called on members of the Jemaah
Islamiyah to cease violent actions. HTM also steered clear of getting itself embroiled with
conflicts involving Muslims in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines to ensure that
the party would not be proscribed. As such one can assume that HTM is unlikely to evolve to
become a violent jihadist organization. The nonviolent approach of HTM does not indicate
that their message is not radical. HTM’s radical message of rejecting the whole political and
economic system is a double-edged sword that is drawing support for HTM and inviting
criticism and opposition to them.

Positioning HTM in Malaysian Politics

Although it may be too premature to estimate the impact of HTM on Malaysian politics,
HTM seems to be growing in numbers and has become successful in highlighting important
issues of concern for the Muslims in Malaysia. The extraordinary rate at which the group
is expanding and the highly educated groups of people they are able to attract are signs
that HTM is a group to watch. Its radical yet nonviolent message strikes a chord with
the younger segments of Malaysian society who are growing increasingly disillusioned
with mainstream political parties like UMNO and PAS, which are seen to be too slow and
reluctant to Islamize the society.

Relations with PAS

HTM’s relationship with Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) is indeed an interesting relation-
ship. In the earlier days of HTM’s emergence into the public fora, PAS seemed to welcome
its emergence. In a seminar titled “America Post Sept 11: Ally or Adversary” organized
by HTM, Nazry Chik, a PAS Youth leader, emphasized the similarities between the two
groups. He said that PAS’s aim of establishing an Islamic state is simply a short-term plan.
In the long run, PAS, similar to Hizbut Tahrir, wants to establish the Caliphate. He said that
PAS is part of the global Islamic movement and worked closely with other groups such as
the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle East and Jamaat-E-Islami in South Asia.76 However,
more recently, PAS is beginning to feel the heat of HTM’s emergence. Some of its members
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 659

have already left the party to become members of HTM.77 One of these members informed
that his decision to quit PAS is due to the fact that he was never really comfortable with
PAS’s support for democracy and felt that the approach that HTM advocates is a more
Islamic approach.78 HTM is making a significant impact among students in various insti-
tutions and has been able to draw support from former members of Islamic student groups
affiliated with PAS.79 Some members of PAS even believe that UMNO allow groups like
HTM to operate freely, partly due to the fact that HTM is more likely to dent support for
PAS rather the UMNO. This could explain PAS’s reluctance to allow HTM leaders to be
among the feature speakers at the demonstration PAS coordinated during the height of the
Arab–Israeli conflict.80 This is indicative of the problems brewing between the two groups.

Relations with the Malaysian Government

HTM being a part of a global Islamic party would definitely be a major source of concern for
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the Malaysian government. HTM had attempted to convinced many leaders of the current
ruling United Malaysian National Organization (UMNO) to join the party. These leaders
include Khairy Jamaluddin, the influential Deputy Youth Head of UMNO and son-in-law of
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Khairy had known some leaders of HTM during his study
at Oxford University in London.81 However, none of these leaders have been influenced.
HTM leaders are also trying to influence as many police and military officers as possible
to buy into their ideology. Yet, these attempts have been unsuccessful. In fact, HTM claims
that they are now under the surveillance of the Malaysian security outfit. This was openly
acknowledged by a HTM speaker at a HTM seminar organized in Kuala Lumpur when he
included the Malaysian Special Branch officers in his list of salutation.82 A HTM leader
was also detained in December 2006 in Temerloh, Pahang for distributing copies of Sautun
Nahdah at a local mosque. This leader was subsequently released. However, HTM has
made in-roads with people within the Malaysian government religious bureaucracy. They
were able to get two state Muftis to speak at their seminars.83 One of these Muftis held
high regard for HTM and felt that they are among the few Islamic groups that are sincerely
trying to revive Islam.84
In dealing with HTM, the Malaysian government has adopted a pragmatic stance. The
Malaysian government did not attempt to ban the party or clamp down its members. This
has to do with HTM’s nonviolent stance. At the same time HTM possesses little threat to
the Malaysian government especially in light of the current challenge it is facing from the
Malaysian opposition parties. Most importantly, HTM’s anti-democratic stance and radical
discourse works to the government’s advantage. Supporters of PAS, disillusioned with
PAS’s more moderate political position, may see HTM as a real alternative to PAS.85 This
would weaken PAS and work to the Malaysian government’s advantage. This pragmatic
stance is not likely to change unless HTM becomes a bigger political threat or resorts to
violence to further its cause.

Conclusion
The prospect for HTM to attain its aim of reviving a Caliphate state in Malaysia is bleak
at this point in time. This is due to the fact that it has a small membership pool and little
support from Malaysian Muslims. Nevertheless, in the long run HTM may pose a bigger
problem for the Malaysian government. Its ability to attract support from top professionals
with overseas degrees means that they are likely to influence more educated people to join
the party. At the same time, HTM may begin to exert some influence in the military and
 660 M. N. M. Osman

police of Malaysia if it adopts a strategy of infiltrating these institutions. The development

of HT in Indonesia will also have a major impact on Malaysia. HT’s ability to gain ground
in Indonesia may have a ripple effect of increasing support for HTM. This scenario would
have an impact on Malaysia and the region.

Notes
1. Conversation with a member of UMNO in June 2007.
2. The author has utilized interviews and personal communications with members of the HTM
between 2005 and 2007 for the purposes of this article. He also attended several seminars and forums
conducted by the HTM in Kuala Lumpur, Melaka, and Johor Bahru. Due to the secretive nature of
the party in Malaysia, the author will keep the names of some of the HTM members anonymous.
3. Sheikh Talib Awdallah, The Beloved by Allah: Emergence of Light from Al-Aqsa Mosque
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Launch of Hizb ut-Tahrir March (London: Khilafah Publications, 2006), p. 23.

4. For his criticism of the Muslim modernist thinkers Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani, and Rashid Rida, see Al-Qasidat Al-Raiyya Al Sughrafi Dhamm Al-Bidati Wa-Ahliha Wa-
Madhi Al-Sunnati Al Gharra (The Minor Rhyming Poem on the Blame of Innovation and the Praise
of the Radiant Sunna) (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmeyah, 2001).
5. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic
Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), pp. 64–65.
6. Vicenzo Olivetti, Terror’s Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences
(Birmingham: Amadeus Books, 2002), pp. 22–29.
7. Taji-Farouki, Fundamental Quest, pp. 65–66.
8. Available at http://www.mykhilafah.com/hizbut tahrir/index.htm
9. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, The Method to Re-Establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic
Way of Life (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), pp. 88–110.
10. Interview with Burhan Haniff, member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, June 2007.
11. The movement activities in Central Asia were captured in Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir:
Islam’s Political Insurgency (Washington: Nixon Center Monograph. December 2004) and Ahmed
Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2002), pp. 115–137.
12. Interview with Maajid Nawaz, former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, October 2007.
13. Es Husain, The Islamist (London: Penguin, 2007), pp. 92–93.
14. For more on criticism of the book, see Noman Haniff, “Ed Hussein: A British Conservative
in Sufi Clothing,” available at http://liberationparty.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2007–01-
01T00%3A00%3A00–08%3A00&updated-max=2008–01-01T00%3A00%3A00–08%3A00&max-
results=7 (accessed 10 July 2008) and Inayat Bungawala, “Review of The Islamists,” available at
http://www.mcb.org.uk/library/article 24–05-07.php (accessed 10 July 2008).
15. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2004), p. 238.
16. Personal communications with Hizb ut-Tahrir Malaysia members.
17. Available at http://www.mykhilafah.com/hizbut tahrir/index.htm. The Hizbut Tahrir In-
donesia is now a prominent Islamic group in the country with its membership estimated at a few
hundred thousand. They have also establish chapters in various parts of the country incuding Java,
Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Aceh.
18. For more on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, see A. Maftuh Abegebriel, A. Yani Abeveiro, and
SR-Ins Team, Negara Tuhan: The Thematic Encyclopedia (Jakarta: SR-Ins Pub., 2004), chap 8.
19. Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, HTI Leader, August 2007, Jakarta.
20. Interview with Dr. Sharifuddin, HTM Leader, December 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, Chairman of HTI, August 2007, Jakarta.
23. Conversation with members of HTM, October 2005, Johor Bahru.
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 661

24. Conversation with Hakim Osman and Ahmad Mustafa, leaders of HTM, June 2006, Kuala
Lumpur
25. Hafidz Abdurrahman, chairman of HTI, noted that the growth of HT in Malaysia is faster
than its growth in Indonesia during the formative years.
26. Author’s personal acquaintance with these members.
27. Interview with Dr. Sharifuddin, December 2006.
28. Mohamed Azree was a well-known HT figure in the United Kingdom. Virtually all the
senior members of HT in the United Kingdom knew Azree personally. Interviews with Burhan Haniff
and Abu Ismael, members of HT Britain in June and October 2007 confirmed this.
29. Personal observation of author at the Malaysian House in June and October 2007.
30. Personal communication with Mohamed Azree in June 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
31. For more on the leadership structure of HT, see Taji-Farouki, Fundamental Quest, p. 116.
32. Interview with Muhammad Al-Khathath.
33. Interview with Maajid Nawaz.
34. Hadi Hanif, ed., Al-Afkar: Penyatu Fikrah Umat (Batu Caves: IKIN Publishers, 2005).
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35. For examples of these papers, see IKIN, Seminar Agenda & Masa Depan Umat Islam (Batu
Caves: IKIN Publishers, 2006).
36. The book was published under the author’s Dr. Sallehuddin’s pseudonym, Idris Syafie. See
Idris Syafie, Menggilap Potensi Pemuda-Pemudi Muslim Berfikir Islami (Johor Bahru: IKIN, 2005).
37. For examples of these postings, see http://www.geocities.com/ummahonline/suratpembaca/
suratpembaca05.htm and http://www.melayu.com/v2/sembang2/mesej.php?thread=15184 (accessed
30 December 2007).
38. For examples of these clips, see http://youtube.com/user/sufyan01 (accessed 30 December
2007).
39. Personal observation of author on the Facebook website.
40. The author personally attended these seminars held in Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru.
41. Examples of such seminars are Khilafah Dan Alam Melayu (Sejarah Yang Disembunyikan)
held on 3 September 2006 at Hotel Pontian, Pusat Perindustrian Pontian, Johor and Sempena Hari
Kemerdekaan (Merdeka Menjadi Sekular Atau Merdeka Menjadi Islam) held on 11 June 2006 at
Audiotorium, Muzium Negeri Sultan Alam Shah. However, HTM also capitalize on international
issues such as the Israeli–Lebanese conflict in 2006 to galvanize support for the group. For instance,
they held a seminar Selamatkan Pelestin Dan Lubnan (Isu-Isu Sejagat Kaum Muslimin) on 10
September 2006 at Wisma Darul Manar Al-Islamiyyah, Parit Sakai, Jalan Temenggung Ahmad,
Muar, Johor.
42. Conversation with Dr. Sharifuddin, August 2007. For more on the seminar, see
http://www.mykhilafah.com/modules.php?name=Media&pa=papar&cid=9 (accessed on 30 De-
cember 2007).
43. HTM members are secretive about these student organizations. The author discovered the
existence of these groups from sources in PAS and UMNO.
44. A video of HTM’s demonstration can be found at http://youtube.com/results?search query=
seruan%20hizb%20ut&search=Search&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&spell=1 (accessed 30 Dece
mber 2007).
45. For more on the demonstration, see http://www.mykhilafah.com/modules.php?name=
Media&pa=papar&cid=1 (accessed on 30 December 2007).
46. Nikki Keddie, “Islam and Society in Minangkabau and in the Middle East: Comparative
Reflections,” Sojourn, 2(1) (1987), pp. 3–4.
47. Jacob Cornelis van Leur; translated by James S. Holmes and A. van Marle, Indonesian
Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955).
48. The seminar was held on 3 September 2006 at Hotel Pontian, Pusat Perindustrian Pontian,
Johor.
49. See Anthony Reid, “The Ottomans in Southeast Asia,” Asia Research Institute Working
Paper Series; T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1924), pp. 173–177;
 662 M. N. M. Osman

C. Snouck Hurgronje, The Holy War “Made in Germany,” translated by J. E. Gillet (New York: Putnam
and Sons, 1915), pp. 23–27.
50. For more on the British–Johore relations, see K. Sinclair, “The British Advance in Johore,
1885–1914,” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XL(Pt. 1) (1967).
51. For more on the history of Johore, see R. O. Winstedt, with a final chapter by Khoo Kay
Kim, A History of Johore, 1365–1941 (Kuala Lumpur Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
by Academe Art & Printing Services Sdn. Bhd, 1992), pp. 93–110.
52. Personal observation at seminar.
53. Sautun Nahdah, “Kemiskinan atau Pemikisnan,” Vol. 7, 25 February 2005, pp. 1–2.
54. For more on this case see The Star, 25 June 2007.
55. Sautun Nahdah, “Sijil Mati Untuk Lina Joy,” “All Eyes on Lina Joy Case”, Vol. 125, June
2006.
56. See Sautun Nahdah, “Air Mata Darah di Myanmar,” Vol. 143, October 2007 and Sautun
Nahdah, “Rintihan Umat Islam di Selatan Thailand,” Vol. 43, September 2005.
57. Satun Nahdah, “Assabiyah dan Wathaniyah: Pencetus Malapetaka dan Perpecahan,” Vol.
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138, September 2007,.

58. For a more detailed analysis of HT’s transnational linkages see Mohamed Nawab Mohamed
Osman, “Transnational Network of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,” paper presented at the Asian Studies
Association Conference, Atlanta, 3–6 June 2008.
59. Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, Jakarta, August 2007.
60. Muhammad Al-Khaththath had mentioned this in passing but did not elaborate who these
leaders were or when exactly they had come.
61. Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath.
62. Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, Jakarta, August 2007.
63. Ibid.
64. Interview with HTM and HTI leaders.
65. Ibid.
66. Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman.
67. See http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/40318F5A-64B7-44D4-BFC0-EF523266BCDF
.htm for details of the deportation (accessed 27 December 2007).
68. Interview with Dr. Imran Waheed, London, United Kingdom, 27 October 2007.
69. Ariel Cohen, Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia. Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1656 (30 May 2003) and Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s
Political Insurgency (Washington: Nixon Centre, 2004).
70. Suha Taji Farouki, “Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun on
Israel and the Jews,” Middle Eastern Studies, 36(4) (October 2000), p. 29.
71. Jean Francois Meyer, “Hizb ut-Tahrir—The Next al-Qaeda Really?” PSIO Occasional Paper
2004/4 (Geneva: PSIO, 2004), p. 23.
72. Frank Hyland, “Source Compromise Exposes Probable Connection Between Al Qa’ida and
Hizb ut-Tahrir,” available at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/11/source compromise exposes
prob.php (accessed 2 December 2007).
73. Sautun Nahdah, “Kita Belum DiPerintahkan Berperang,” Vol. 10, July 2005, p. 1.
74. Ibid., p. 2.
75. Ibid., p. 4.
76. Seminar organized by HTM titled “America Post Sept 11: Ally or Adversary,” session held
on the 11 September 2005.
77. Conversation with former PAS Deputy President Ustaz Hassan Shukri and former PAS
Youth Chief Ustaz Abu Bakar Chik, March 2008.
78. Conversation of HTM member who was a former PAS member.
79. Conversation with former PAS Deputy President Ustaz Hassan Shukri.
80. HTM leaders had approached PAS Deputy President Nasharuddin Mat Isa to request a slot
to speak during the demonstrations. Other Malaysian Islamic groups were allowed to speak. However,
PAS did not agree to allow HTM leaders to speak.
 Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia 663

81. Interview with HTM members.

82. Hizbut Tahrir Seminar on HIJRAH: Titik Mula Islam Sebagai Tamadun Baru Dunia, 20
January 2007, Malaysian Islamic College Mosque, Seksyen 16, Petaling Jaya. In his address, Esa
Abdullah, an HTM member, openly gave his salaam to members of the Malaysian Security Branch,
even waving his hands at two gentlemen who were filming the whole seminar.
83. These Muftis are the Mufti of Johor, Dato’ Nooh Gadut and Mufti of Perak, Dato’ Harrun-
sani.
84. Conversation with Dato’ Harrunsani, June 2006.
85. For more on PAS’s moderating stance, see Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, “PAS:
From Islamism to Post-Islamism,” Jakarta Post, 17 March 2008.
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