Austria v.
CA
GR No. L-29640 | June 10, 1971 | Reyes, J.B.L., J.
SUMMARY: Abad received from Austria one pendant with
diamonds to be sold on commission basis or to be returned on
demand. The pendant was stolen from Abad. Since Abad failed
to return the jewelry or pay for its value, Austria sued her and
her husband. The Abad spouses argued that they were not
liable because of robbery which was a fortuitous event. SC
ruled in favor of Abad.
SC held that prior conviction for robbery is not necessary to
exempt the defendants from liability. To avail of the exemption
under Art. 1174, it is not necessary that the persons
responsible for the occurrence should be found or punished; it
would only be sufficient to establish that the enforceable
event, the robbery in this case, did take place without any
concurrent fault on the debtor's part (Art. 1170), and this can
be done by preponderant evidence.
FACTS
 In a receipt, Maria Abad acknowledged that she
received from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with
diamonds valued at P4,500 to be sold on commission
basis or to be returned on demand.
 In 1961, Abad, while on her way home in
Mandaluyong, Rizal, was accosted by two men who
snatched her purse containing jewelry and cash.
Among the jewelry taken was the consigned pendant.
The incident became the subject of a criminal case
filed in CFI.
 As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its
value notwithstanding demands, Austria brought
before CFI an action against her and her husband for
recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages.
 Defendant spouses set up the defense that the
alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation.
 CFI ruled in favor of petitioner – defendants failed to
prove the fact of robbery or if indeed it was
committed, that Abad was guilty of negligence when
she went home without any companion, although it
was already getting dark and she was carrying a large
amount of cash and valuables.
 CA reversed CFI – respondents were not responsible
for the loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous
event.
 Hence this petition for review. Petitioner argued that
occurrence of robbery should be proved by final
judgment of conviction in a criminal case. He added
that to adopt a different view would be to encourage
persons accountable for goods or properties received
in trust or consignment to connive with others, who
would be willing to be accused in court for the
robbery, in order to be absolved from civil liability for
the loss or disappearance of the entrusted articles.
ISSUES
WON prior conviction for robbery is necessary to exempt the
consignee from liability for the loss – NO
 To avail of the exemption granted in the law (Art.
1174), it is not necessary that the persons responsible
for the occurrence should be found or punished; it
would only be sufficient to establish that the
enforceable event, the robbery in this case, did take
place without any concurrent fault on the debtor's
part (Art. 1170), and this can be done by
preponderant evidence.
 To require in the present action for recovery the prior
conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order
to establish the robbery as a fact, would be to
demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a
fact in a civil case.
 Moreover, a court finding that robbery has happened
would not necessarily mean that those accused in the
criminal action should be found guilty of the crime;
nor would a ruling that those actually accused did not
commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding
that a robbery did take place. The evidence to
establish these facts would not necessarily be the
same.
WON Abad was negligent – NO
 Considering the high incidence of crimes against
persons and property in the City of Manila, Abad may
be faulted for negligence per se when she returned
alone to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of
considerable value. However, this is not the case in
1961, when the robbery took place, as criminality
had not by far reached the levels attained in (1971).
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED.
NOTES
To constitute fortuitous event, it is necessary that:
(1) the event must be independent of the human will (or
rather, of the debtor's or obligor's);
(2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation, in a normal manner; and that
(3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation
of, the injury to the creditor.
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall
be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.