Crim Law I Cases

CRIMINAL LAW I (CASE DIGEST)
US v PABLO, 35 PHIL 97 (1916)
[No. 11676. October 17, 1916.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ANDRES PABLO, defendant and appellant.
DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Sovereign Power of the State (US v. Pablo)
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign
power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the necessity for its existence has been recognized
even by the most backward peoples. At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and
atrocious; at others, that they are light and inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment
is admitted to be just by the whole human race, guided by their natural perception of right and wrong, and even barbarians
and savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception.
Additional note: The power of the State to punish crimes is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations provided by
the Constitution.
JURISPRUDENCE:
FALSE TESTIMONY; REPEAL OF ACT No. 1697; LAW NOW APPLICABLE.—By the mere interpretation of this court
in various decisions, Act No. 1697 was deemed to have repealed certain articles of the Penal Code relative to false testimony,
notwithstanding that the said Act did not expressly repeal them; and as the final article and section of the Administrative Code
(Act No. 2657), paragraph 2, has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697, without stating that the articles of the Penal Code
relating to false testimony comprised within the term of perjury were likewise repealed; and if it is undeniable that the
community must necessarily punish perjury or false testimony, and if it is impossible to conceive that crimes of, this kind
may go immune and be freely committed without any punishment at all, because the liberty to pervert the truth, in sworn
testimony for the very reason that it might save a guilty party from punishment, might also determine the conviction and
punishment of an innocent party, the conclusion is inevitable that there must be some previous and preexisting law which
punishes perjury or false testimony—a punishment required by good morals and by the law, even in a society of mediocre
culture, in order to avoid incalculable harm and resultant disturbances which might affect public order.
ID. ; ID.; ID.—For the reasons above stated and in view of the provisions of Law 2, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novísima
Recopilación,the needs of society demand that articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as
the said Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act on perjury, did not explicitly declare that the said articles of the Penal
Code were likewise repealed.
FACTS:
● Andres Pablo went by order of his chief to raid a jueteng game in Barrio Tuyo.
● Before Andres could make an arrest, the players ran away because they were allegedly warned.
● His memorandum to the Chief of Police Jose Reyes, contained that he seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the
cabecillas Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. Only the latter was arrested.
● As a consequence, the Chief of Police filed a complaint in the court of the justice of the peace charging the said
Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result,
the accused were arrested, but were afterwards admitted to bail.
● At the hearing, Dato pleaded guilty while Malicsi and Rodrigo pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the chief of police
presented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that when they arrived
in the place they saw Dato and a low table that made them suspect that a jueteng game was being held; that they did
find a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi on the scene nor did they see them
scamper. Also, they learned after the incident that Rodrigo and Malicsi was the ringleaders of the said jueteng game
according to a source. This testimony was acted upon by the court acquitting Rodrigo and Malicsi, sentencing only
Dato.
● The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that before the case came to trial in the justice of
the peace court, the policeman Pablo had conference with the accused Malicsi and Rodrigo and agreed that he would
exclude the involvement of the two in the case in exchange of a bribe of fifteen pesos.
● The provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury
in violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697 declaring that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously affirmed and swore
under oath in legal form before the justice of the peace during the hearing of the case of Rodrigo and Malicsi for
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga when he excluded the two accused from
involvement in the incident despite being utterly false and material to the decision of the case.
● The court found him guilty and sentenced to suffer years of imprisonment, a fine, and disqualification to hold public
office as well as from testifying in Philippine courts, he appealed for such judgment.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of crime of perjury or of false testimony, noting that Act 1697 repealed the provisions
contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false testimony.
HELD:
The respondent was guilty of perjury.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been punished under the said articles of the
said Code, which the Court said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but, since its enactment, have
not been applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by the Court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was
repealed by the Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be
deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly
provided that the said articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO, 43 PHIL (1922)

[No. 17584. March 8, 1922]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant
and appellant.
Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

Sovereign Power: Delegation to the Philippine Government

The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty which resides in the Federal Government, but for the
purpose of punishing crimes, this power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. This
delegation may be either express, as in the case of the several States of the Union and incorporated territories, like Porto Rico
and Hawaii, or implied, as in the case of the Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated with the
Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 181—205.)
JURISPRUDENCE:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 1, ACT No. 2886, CONSTRUED.—Section 1 of Act No. 2886 which provides that
"All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the person charged
with the offense," held valid and constitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO AMEND LAWS.—The procedural law in

criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitution of the States, but is left in the hands of the legislatures, and pursuant
to the Constitution of the United States each State has authority to define and punish crimes and to establish the rules of
criminal procedure. This power of the different States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as
the Philippine Islands.
ID. ; ID. ; DEVELOPMENT OF POWERS OF LEGISLATURE REVIEWED.—In accordance with international law and
practice, the military government of the army of occupation was vested with legislative functions and in fact did legislate;
afterwards, complying with the instructions of President McKinley, which were later ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of Act of
July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military Government were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then under
the provisions of section 7 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it functioned as a
colegislative body with the Philippine Commission; finally, by virtue of the provisions of section 12 of the Act of Congress
of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine
Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed the present Legislature composed of two houses which
enacted Act No. 2886. The Philippine Commission and the Philippine Legislature are the successors of the Military
Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
ID. ; ID.—The Philippine Legislature is empowered to legislate on matters relating to criminal procedure by virtue of section
7 of the Jones Law which provides as follows: "That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not
inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force
by this Act as it may from time to time see fit." (See also U. S. V8. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Even before the passage by Congress of
the Jones Law (August 29, 1916) the Philippine Commission had enacted Acts Nos. 194, 440, and 590 which amend General
Orders No. 58.
SOVEREIGN POWER; DELEGATION TO PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT.—The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attribute of sovereignty which resides in the Federal Government, but for the purpose of punishing crimes, this power is
delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. This delegation may be either express, as in the case of
the several States of the Union and incorporated territories, like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or implied, as in the case of the
Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law,
181—205.)
LAW RELATING TO PLAINTIFF IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.—There is not a single constitutional provision

applicable to the Philippines prescribing the name to be employed as party plaintiff in criminal cases. The Philippine
Government is autonomous and acts under its delegated powers in the prosecution and punishment of crimes, and Act No.
2886 was not expressly repealed by Congress and it neither contravenes any provision of the Federal Constitution nor of the
Philippine Organic Act. Therefore, its provision that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense is valid and constitutional.
FACTS:
● Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and
one day of prisión correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial for the murder of a 7 year old boy, Porfirio Parondo,
striking the boy with his automobile.
● As the fact were so well established in the record that there cannot be a shade of doubt about them.
● The PH Commission enacted Act No. 2886 stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the
People of the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense.
● The Respondent argued that he was prosecuted in conformity with the foregoing of the Philippine Legislature and that
the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case. Also, Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized
to amend General Orders No. 581, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of
a constitutional law.
ISSUE(S):
● Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
● Act No. 2886 was valid. It was not violative of any constitutional provision.
● The PH Commission was legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.
● The procedure in criminal matters was not incorporated in the Constitutions of the US, but is left in the hands of the
legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
● General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the
question is considered only on principle.
● The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also true that
by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the suppression of crimes, such power is delegated to
subordinate government subdivisions such as territories legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes,
a power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of section 7, already quoted, of the
Jones Law. These territorial governments are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides;
and when the territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of
the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
TAÑADA v TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
1
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
NCC, Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the enforcement of a public duty (e.g. the publication in the Official
Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real parties in interest in mandamus case.—The reasons given by the Court in
recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the
right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people,
has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in
the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present situation where the President may
on his own issue laws.—The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same.—Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance than at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la denoroinación genérica de leyes, se comprenden también los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso
de su potestad.”
Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the words “shall
be
published.”—The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in the Official
Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders and those which affect only a particular class of persons need not
be published.—The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees and issuances of general application is a matter of due
process.—It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability”
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances of general application which have not been published shall have
no force and effect.—The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during
the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which
had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank.
Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential Decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette may have
consequences which cannot be ignored.—Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”
Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278 and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been published. It is
undisputed that none of them has been implemented.—From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears
that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive. 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the
texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
FACTS:
● Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
● The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring
this petition.
● Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public
duty, they need not show any specific interest.
● Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs,
general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.
HELD:
YES. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973
Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The
fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important
legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of
due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one man—Marcos—are in fact laws of general
application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The
generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the
publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not
even mitigate the crime.
PESIGAN v ANGELES, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)
No. L-64279. April 30, 1984.*

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA
ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines
Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO
V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
1987 Constitution, Art. 3 Bill of Rights
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
RULE 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth
in his bail bond, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the
accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his
right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he
shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel;
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him;
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself;
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the
testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him;
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf;
(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial; and

(i) To have the right of appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
New Civil Code

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Statutes; Criminal Law; An Executive Order (Exec. Order No. 626-A dated Oct. 25, 1980), prohibiting and penalizing
transportation of carabaos from one province to another cannot be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.—
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted,
it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective
only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Same; Same; Same.—That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision
by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
Same; Same; Same.—Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau “regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved
by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated”. (See Commissioner of Civil
Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
Damages; Public Officers; The public officers who confiscated the carabaos acted in good faith enforcing Exec. Order 626-
A. The carabaos, however, have to be returned.—It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos.
The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they
cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover
damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Notes used under jurisprudence:

● Statutes generally have no retroactive effect. Only laws existing at the time of the execution of contract are applicable
to transactions executed at that time. (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172.)
● The legal requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for effectivity of laws cannot be disregarded by the
contention that copies of election decree have been published and distributed. (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30.)
● The purpose why penal statutes are construed strictly against the state is not to enable a guilty person to escape
punishment through a technicality, but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. (People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA
542.)
● A statute operates prospectively and never retroactively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest
either by express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 619.)
FACTS:
● On 2 April 1982, The defendant transported 26 carabao bound to Batangas.

● They were provided with health certificate, permit to transport large cattle and certificate of inspection attesting the
subject animals were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals.
● In spite of the presentation of the above documentation, Lieutenant Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda ordered the
confiscation of the carabaos, in accordance with EO 626 (A), which states that no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.
● The Pesigans filed an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos. The case was heard at Daet and was later
transferred to Caloocan City. The presiding judge dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not EO 626-A has the force and effect of the law
HELD:
The Pesigans were entitled for the return of their carabaos or the value of each carabao. They were also entitled to a reasonable
rental for each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense
of the Pesigans.
The SC held that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The word “laws” in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil.
573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction
makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication
in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
US v SWEET, 1 PHIL 18 (1901)
[No. 448. September 20, 1901.]

THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant and appellant.
Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 1

Civil Code, Art. 14

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
General Rule: Jurisdiction of civil courts is not affected by the military characted of the accused.
RP-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

Art. 5 Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the
Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.
b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary
jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including
offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the
United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including
offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of
the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security means:
1. treason;
2. sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States
personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to
the military law of the United States in relation to:
1. offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the property or person of
United States personnel; and
2. offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive their primary right to
exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their
forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in
cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular
importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine
authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against
United States personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a
certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines
and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those
cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate,
United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the
Philippine position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders
in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government
as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which both
the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall assist each other in
the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction
in accordance with the provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United States
personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United
States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside
with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay,
make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense
with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the
United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event
Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under
this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any
time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by
Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of
all necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this article and have been acquitted or
have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have
been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall
prevent United States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from
the act or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded
all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;

(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have reasonable time to prepare
a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have such authorities present
at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine law, excludes
persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on
by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have
the right to visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to
the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
JURISPRUDENCE:
CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION.—An assault committed by a military employee upon a prisoner of war is a violation of
the general penal law, and as such it imposes criminal responsibility.
ID.; ID.—Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their
territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused.
ID.; ID.—The fact that the alleged offense was committed in the execution of orders of a military superior is a matter of defense
and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
Per COOPER, J., concurring:

ID.; ID.—An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an order of his superior
in good faith, unless the illegality of the order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.
FACTS:
● Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense (Assault) against a Prisoner of War.
● His case is filed with the Court of First Instance, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a
penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was
“acting in the line of duty.”
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war was not an offense under the
Penal Code;
Supposing that the offense was subject to the Code, the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at
the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the court.
HELD:
The case is open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the
military or other special character of the person brought before them for trial. Unless, controlled by express legislation
to the contrary.
An assault by military officer against a Prisoner of Waw is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the
RPC.
Court of First Instance (CFI) has jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial
limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI
because he failed to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.
Assuming that the physical assault by military offer is included in the RPC, the military character sustained by the person charged
with the offence at the time of its commission will not exempt him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals. The
application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character brought before them for trial. The Defendant claims that the act was service connected. If this were established, it may
be used as a defense, but this cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take jurisdiction of the case.
LIANG v PEOPLE, 355 SCRA 125
[G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec 1
Civil Code, Art 14

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. 5 (see US v Sweet, 1Phil 18 (1901)
JURISPRUDENCE:
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations; Asian Development Bank; The slander of a person, by
any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel -
slander cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. - After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised
in petitioner’s and intervenor’s Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28,
2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of
the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the
criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander,
in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner’s utterances
constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations: Words and Phrases; “International Organization,”
Defined. - The term “international organizations”-“is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between
two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international
legal personality such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a
means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “International Public Officials,” Defined. - International public officials have been defined as: “x x
x persons who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular international community, are appointed by this
international community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the
interest of this particular international community, and who are subject to a particular personal status.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Specialized Agencies,” Defined.

- “Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as posts,
telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade,
education and culture, health and refugees.
Same; Same; Same; The nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is. - A perusal of the immunities
provisions in various international conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary
depending on who the recipient is.
Same; Same: Same; “Diplomatic Immunities” and “International Immunities,” Distinguished. - There are three major
differences between diplomatic and international immunities. Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity
is that members of the diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State only
with the express consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts
performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the
receiving State. International immunities may be especially important in relation to the State of which the official is a national.
Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the
jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent for the
jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or
judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of
reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar protection.
Same; Same; Same; Methods of Granting Privileges and Immunities to Personnel of International Organizations. - Positive
international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of international
organizations. The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The
second is by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to
carry out its functions, recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain
privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation,
treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the
Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this
third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its
personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms
are determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League
of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations. The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under
this third category.
Same; Same; Same; The legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different
from the relationship between the international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions -
the privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. - There is a
connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to international officials. The connection consists
in the granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively well-established body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to
international functionaries. This connection is purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special status in
the necessity of retaining functional independence and freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the legal
relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship between
the international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions. The privileges and immunities
of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. Whereas those immunities awarded to
diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state based on customary international law, those granted to international officials
are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a special
status of an international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from specific
treaty provisions.
Same; Same; Same; The present tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to
a minimum. - Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of international
organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their functions - The Rhine
Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France which provided “all the rights of neutrality” to persons employed in
regulating navigation in the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European Commission of the
Danube “complete independence of territorial authorities” in the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which
granted “diplomatic immunities and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of protection narrowed.
The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The
tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on the privileges and
immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives
to international functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents in that the special
status of each agent is granted in the interest of function. The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of
practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its
officials. While the current direction of the law seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international
organizations, the reverse is true with respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities.
Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to organizations than they have to the
personnel of these organizations.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts
performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity. - On the other hand,
international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations states that officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken
or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the
same provision. The Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune
from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives immunity.
Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can
be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity,
unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity.
Same; Same; Same; The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international
officials for acts of their private lives. - Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of
the specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private life and empowers local courts to
assume jurisdiction in such cases without the necessity of waiver. It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international
officials were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune for both private and official
acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper
functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current status of the law
does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives. This much is
explicit from the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar provisions to that of the
General Convention.
Same; Same; Same; The inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or official in the
courts of the state concerned. - It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as
private or official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems to be to leave to the local courts
determination of whether or not a given act is official or private does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If
the United Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes between the
organization and the member states as provided in Section 30 of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a
given act is official or private is made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the
international level if questioned by the United Nations.
Same; Same; Same; Asian Development Bank; Officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is,
only those necessary for the exercise of their functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes; Officials and
employees of the Asian Development Bank are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts,
notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity. - Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic
envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot
be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the
functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters
Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by
them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB
are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The immunity of the Asian Development Bank is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and
employees is restricted only to official acts. - Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of “immunity from every form
of legal process” accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity
of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law
which seeks to narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to personnel of international
organizations, while at the same time aims to increase the prerogatives of international organizations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs, or even the Asian Development Bank for that
matter, to certify that the Bank’s officials and employees are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official
capacity. - Considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for their official acts, the necessary
inference is that the authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled
to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as
the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign relations, nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with
the right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of bank officials and employees, since no such prerogative
exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify.
FACTS:
● Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation.
● Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.
● After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB.
● The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
● Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.
● The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
● When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued.
● After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court viaa petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement
HELD:
NO. The petition is not impressed with merit. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's
right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a
matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. he rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides the absence of preliminary investigation
does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
US v AH SING, 36 PHIL 978 (1917)
[G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
RPC, Art. 2
Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this
Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime
zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands; chan robles virtual law library
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in
the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code.
Constitution (1987), Art 1
NATIONAL TERRITORY. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V (see US v Sweet)
JURISPRUDENCE:
1. OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION, WHEN EXISTS.—Section 4, Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law)
construed as follows: Any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from
a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is
guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910],Phil., 573), and United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840),
distinguished.
2. ID: ID.—Defendant purchased opium in Saigon, brought it on ' 'board a foreign vessel, and had it under his
control when that vessel arrived after direct voyage in the port of Cebu. Held: To constitute illegal
importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4
of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
● The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang.
● The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from
the port of Saigon.
● The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them
in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
● When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight
cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine.
● The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon.
● He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import
the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands.
● Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the intimation that there exists
inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent on
the facts before us.
● In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw in the opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found — That, although
the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine
soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal
law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net
● A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the present instance is readily observable.
In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as
illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the foreign
vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil —in the
present case the opium was not landed by the defendant.
● In the case of United States vs. Jose the one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal
importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a
presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with
the drug on board.
● In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium was imported from a foreign
country; in the present case there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.
HELD:
YES. It is criminally liable. As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person’s control on a vessel which has
come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. No better explanation being
possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We
accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate
any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not
present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court
being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
MIQUIBAS v COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 PHIL 262 (1948)
[G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948]

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
RPC, Art. 2 (see US v Ah Sing)
Constitution (1987), Art 1 (see US v Ah Sing)
Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V (see US v Sweet)
JURISPRUDENCE:
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF PHILIPPINES OVER ALL OFFENSES COMMITTED

WlTHIN ITS TERRITORY; JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES OR OTHER FOREIGN NATIONS
OVER CERTAIN OFFENSES COMMITTED WlTHIN CERTAIN PORTIONS.—The Philippines, being a
sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by
agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain
offenses committed within certain portions of said territory
2. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; AGREEMENT WITH UNITED STATES.—The agreement of March 14, 1947, between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States concerning military bases, enumerates in
Article XIII the offenses over which theUnited States, by consent of the Philippines, shall have the right to
exercise jurisdiction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POET OF MANILA AREA NOT A BASE OF UNITED STATES.—The Port of Manila
Area is not one of the bases of the United States under the Agreement of March 14, 1947.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE NOT MEMBER OF ARMED FORCES OF UNITED
STATES.—Under the terms of the Agreement of March 14, 1947, a civilian employee cannot be considered
as a member of the armed forces the United States.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION, WHEN NOT WAIVABLE.—Respondent maintains that
petitioner has no cause of action because the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer holding the
petitioner in custody whether or not the Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph
3, of the Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to state that in cases where the offender is a civilian employee
and not a member of the United States armed forces, no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney
or by the Secretary of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of
Article XXI, of the agreement.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—Petitioner a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the
United States armed forces, allegedly committed an offense by disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things
belonging to the United States Army in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States. Held, That
the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly
committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years'
imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
● Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines, who has
been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in
violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States.
● He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him
guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
● This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
● As a rule, that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its
territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall
exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the case has been committed within a US base thus giving US the jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not, the petitioner is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States
HELD:
1. Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those areas named in Annex A and Annex B and such
additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas
specified in Annexes A and B, there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has
allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that "army communications system" is included,
but with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila Area."
Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a base, since it has been
committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement
and is merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of Manila.
2. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the armed forces of the
United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from
members of the armed forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed
forces do not include civilian employees.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by
said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any criminal action which may
be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.
GUMABON v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
[G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971]

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO
PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C.
Abaya for respondent.
RPC, Art. 21
Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
RPC, Art. 22
Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Civil Code, Art. 4

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Remedial law; Special proceedings; Habeas corpus; When habeas corpus proper. – Once a deprivation of a constitutional
right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.
Constitutional law; Equal protection of law; When applied at the case at bar. – What is required under the equal protection of
law is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
ORIGINAL PETITION IN THE SUPREME COURT. HABEAS CORPUS.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
● Along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and
the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each
of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.
● Each of them has served more than 13 years.
● Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, this Court ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no such complex offense.
● Hernandez was only entitled to 10 years imprisonment and was thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being
illegal.
● Petitioners seeks for retroactivity application of Hernandez’s doctrine
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case
HELD:
YES. Petitioners properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of the RPC - Retroactive effect of penal laws.—
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at bar presents a clear case of an excess in
penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that
the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground, as well as on the further and more
fundamental ground that to hold them liable to continue serving life sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their
conviction as well as now—punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would be to deny them
their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.
Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and unconstitutional and the petition for habeas
corpus should be granted and petitioners forthwith set at liberty.
BERNARDO v PEOPLE, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)
G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983

ISIDRO BERNARDO and CAYETANO BERNARDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RPC Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is a fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
RPC Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior
to its commission.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Land Titles; Squatting; P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands, but only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions.—Indeed, in the case of People vs. Echaves, supra, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino,
held that Presidential Decree No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands. x x x The intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The Solicitor General in his comment to
the petition manifests that “the intent and purpose of PD 772 is to prohibit and penalize squatting or similar acts on public
and private lands located in. urban communities. x x x [T]hat no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute (US
vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243). x x x Consequently, the decision of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 3022-M, convicting
herein petitioners of the offense of violation of PD No. 772, is null and void and should, therefore, be set aside.”
FACTS:
● Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from October 1972 to August
1974. At the time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his family's dwelling. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano
Bernardo, was staying with him in said house as his helper in tilling the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the
landholding and transferred to San Nicolas, Bulacan without the knowledge of the landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa.
Before leaving the landholding, however, Isidro transferred his tenancy rights to his son, co-petitioner Cayetano
Bernardo, who continued to reside in subject house. Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole
riceland, through her overseer Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.
● A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against herein petitioners, Isidro Bernardo and Cayetano
Bernardo, before the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost before the inferior court as well as in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Likewise, petitioners lost in their petition for certiorari and mandamus before
the Court of Appeals.
● Thereafter, Ledda Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate the house and the land.
When the latter failed to leave, a criminal complaint was filed against them for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 with the fiscal's office.
● Upon arraignment, herein petitioners, father and son, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits of the case
proceeded and, after both parties have submitted their cases, herein petitioners, through counsel, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a case for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772, inasmuch as the same applies to squatters in urban communities only and not to agricultural lands.
● The motion to dismiss was denied and the trial court rendered judgment convicting herein petitioners of the crime
charged and sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,500.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 772 substantiate the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, since it only covers
urban communities and not agricultural lands.
HELD:
● Yes. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any
act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. The intent of the Presidential Decree No.
772 is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.
PEOPLE v PIMENTEL, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
G.R. No. 100210 April 1, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A.
TUJAN, respondents.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
RPC Article 3. (see Bernardo v People)
Article 21. (see Bernardo v People)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Presidential Decree 1866; Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. 1866, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and the third paragraph of the same Section makes the use
of said firearm and ammunition “in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection
or subversion” a circumstance to increase the penalty to death.—The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain
and simple. Under the first paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime
itselfwhich carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of
the same Section makes the useof said firearm and ammunition “in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion” a circumstance to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in the
Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, “a member of
the communist party of the Philippines and its front organization,” was used “in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion” does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same
Information, but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed
so as to qualify the penalty to death.
Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or
by implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being penalized.—There is,
therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
qualified by its being used in furtherance of subversion. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof,
which decrees categorically or by implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that
are being penalized. This is clear from the title of the law itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it:
“CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION
OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE
MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.”
FACTS:
● As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law) as amended before
the RTC Manila.
● A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found.
● Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested, an
unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition was found in his possession.
● On June 1990, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion
under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati.
● Tujan filed a motion to quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that
alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA. The above Information
recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which recommendation was approved by the trial court in an Order dated
June 19, 1990.7 The same order also directed the continued detention of Antonio Tujan at MIG 15 of the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the respondent can be still retroactively held liable with the repealed law R.A no. 1700.
HELD:
● No. it would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no
longer exists. With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent
has no more legal basis and should be dismissed. The charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
qualified by subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no longer a crime.
PASCUAL v BOARD OF EXAMINERS, 28 SCRA 344

G.R. No. L-25018
May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Rights of accused; Rights against self-incrimination; Applies to administrative
proceedings.—The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess
a criminal or penal aspect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Applies to administrative hearing against a doctor.—In an administrative hearing
against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, x x x the x x x Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with
the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason.—A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal or penal aspect
in the sense that the respondent would suffer the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extends to right not to take the witness stand.—The right against self-incrimination extends
not only to the right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on the witness stand, but also to forego testimony,
to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called as a witness by the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason.— The reason is that, the right against self-incrimination, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality.
FACTS:
● Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the
daughters of his older brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-
G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-
G.5All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances
over a span of six (6) years.
● Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
During trial, their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically
examined them were entered as documentary evidence.
● AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had
shared with her grandmother. She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the
house. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant
threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped
sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house,
yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.
● AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at the house of
her grandmother. The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant.
This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables.
While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As
she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.
● It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC, the brutish acts appellant had done to
her. Her mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as
documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.
● The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external sign of physical
injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping,
her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3)
o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded
that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times.
● AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical injuries apparent on
her body. AAA's labia majora and minora were well coapted and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination,
Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person
having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also the
possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA.
ISSUE(S):
W/N the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of
attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces.
HELD:
● The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act
No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended. By reasons of R.A no. 9346, he is spared
from the death penalty, and downgraded the penalty to, for the 6 counts of raped to reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole in pursuant to R.A no. 9346, for 2 counts of attempted rape was downgraded to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, the appellant is ORDERED to
indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts of 30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, 25,000.00 as moral damages and 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
PEOPLE v BON, G.R. NO. 166401, OCT. 30, 1996
G.R. No. 166401

October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
ART 3. BILL OF RIGHTS (see Pascual v Board of Examiners)
Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code
ART. 51. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Rape; Witnesses; Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic
experience too painful to recall; Inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can
affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions.—It must be observed though that
BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of
Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v.
Perez, 270 SCRA 526 (1997), on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who happen
to be minors are instructive, thus: We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and
insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee’s Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about
by confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim’s direct examination and cannot possibly affect her
credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to
recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which,
more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was
less than letter-perfect. “Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere
can affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions.”
Same; Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; A categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing
of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.—Well-settled is the rule
that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when
the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. In this case, both BBB
and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found
no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
Same; Same; Same; It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating
experience of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-
in-law as lazy.—Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards
his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience
of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as
lazy. In addition, CCC’s father-in-law had died several years before the criminal charges against appellant were ever
instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when
the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim’s family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the
dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact
committed.
Same; Same; Same; Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.—No sane woman, least of all
a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or
ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of
child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. The weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or
indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such countervailing proof, these
testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
Same; Same; Same; Delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.—The delay
in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant
repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and
again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Such intimidation must be
viewed in light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and
fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the
accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.
FACTS:
● Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.for alleged
immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his
first witness.
● Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
● The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
● Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners.
● The lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain
from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the
matter.
● Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.
ISSUE(S):
W/N the Arsenio Pascual charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to
be a witness against himself.
HELD:
● Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative in character
possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the
respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while
on the witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called
as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self-incrimination, along with the other rights
granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objective should not be accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded to the human personality.
MANUEL V PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461 (2005
MANUEL V PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461 (2005)
Article 3 Revised Penal Code

Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by laws are felonies (delitos)
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is a fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, and lack of skill.
Article 19, 20, 21 Civil Code of the Philippines - Human Relations

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Articles 2219 Civil Code of the Philippines - Moral Damages

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article, in the order named.
Article 2220 Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Criminal Law; Bigamy; The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve
and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.—The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve
and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that “in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriageshould be a justification for bigamy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; Family Code; Declaration of Nullity; Bigamy is consummated on the celebration
of the second or subsequent marriage; Under the Family Code, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is a defense.—For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has
been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage. Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must
be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo. On the
other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has
not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is
void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Mercado v. Tan, under the Family Code of the Philippines, the
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For one to be criminallyFACTS:liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an
evil act and an evil intent—actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.—As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the
petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words “with malice” do not appear in
● Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in 1996. Eduardo proposed on
several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They were
married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was
“single”. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or
thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. In January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. In August 2001,
Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been
previously married.
● For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a GRO. He fell in
love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless
agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a
“love-bite” on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was “single” in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know
that he had to go to court to seek the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He insisted that he
married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more
than 20 years.
● The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and ten (10) months, as a minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private
complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo
appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married
the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time
that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. The
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral damage when it has no
basis in fact and in law.
HELD:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages
requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth,
the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed,
bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered
to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith;
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought
his parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to
marry him, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully performed
her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly
abandoned her, Tina had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consists not of a single
act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private
complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support
of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it
turned out was not her lawful husband.
The Court rules that Eduardo's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with Tina were
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar
to an award for moral damages. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine
and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
PEOPLE V DELOS SANTOS 403 SCRA 153 (2003)
PEOPLE V DELOS SANTOS 403 SCRA 153 (2003)
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
RPC ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusión temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at
his person or corpse.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Settled is the rule that when it comes to the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts.—The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do
not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in
court.
Same; Same; Motive; Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively
identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established.—Appellant argues that since the prosecution
witnesses testified that there was no altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed
to him. This is an inconsequential argument. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the
accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In People vs. Galano, we
ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In the case before us, no
such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate positively identified appellant.
Same; Same; Two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story—it is but natural for witnesses to avoid
being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of
the perpetrator.—In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant questions
why their statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when the incident happened on November 6, 1997. The two-
month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal
proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of
human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Thus, in People vs. Dacibar, we
held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case is of common knowledge and
has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility, especially when a valid reason exists for such hesitance.
Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any
doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.—As
earlier mentioned, appellant’s defenses are mere alibi and denial. He testified that at the time the crime took place, he was
in his aunt's house in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. When probed by the trial court, he categorically stated that the
house is only 40 meters away from the scene of the crime and may be traveled in about three or five minutes. For the
defense of alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence
of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. Certainly, the required impossibility does not exist here.
Same; Same; Same; Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.—Weighing the evidence of
the prosecution vis-à-vis that of the defense, the scale of justice must tilt in favor of the former. Time and again, we ruled
that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. With marked relevance is the fact that appellant
did not present any evidence to show that the prosecution witnesses, in testifying against him, have improper motive.
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected
attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous.—The prosecution was
able to establish that appellant’s attack on Flores was from behind without any slightest provocation on his part and that it
was sudden and unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected
attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous. There being treachery,
appellant’s conviction for murder is in order.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, every Information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.—In the imposition
of penalty, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of cruelty considered by the trial court. Pursuant to the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, every information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances. This rule may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
The aggravating circumstance of cruelty, not having been alleged in the Information, may not be appreciated to enhance
the liability of appellant.
FACTS:
● Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores drinking gin with
Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the latters house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.4 As he was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he approached them and borrowed Flores cart. 5
While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores who was then seated and conversing with the group.6 Suddenly,
appellant emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him with a knife,7 making an upward and downward thrust.8
Flores ran after he was stabbed twice. Appellant pursued him and stabbed him many times. 10 As a result, Flores
intestines bulged out of his stomach. Appellant ceased stabbing Flores only after he saw him dead. Thereafter, he
turned his ire against Jayvee Rainier and chased him. Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid himself and later
reported the incident to the police.
● Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leons testimony. On cross-examination, Tablate testified that he tried to help
Flores by separating him from the appellant who ran away. He also testified that the latter joined his group at about
11:00 a.m. and kept on coming back and forth.
● Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores suffered twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the frontal,
posterior and lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which were fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was possible that
appellant was behind Flores considering the stab wounds inflicted at his back. 14 According to the doctor, Flores
died because of massive external/internal hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in the thorax and abdomen
penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen and intestines.
● Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then working at Vitarich, Marilao, Bulacan, earning P600.00
every 15th day of the month;that he spent P100,000.00 for his sons burial and wake; that he has receipts in the
amount of P19,110.00 spent for the funeral services and the cost of the cemetery lot and a list of other expenses in
the amount of P35,960.00; and that his family has been grieving for the loss of a loved one.
● Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and declared that on November 6, 1997
at 8:00 p.m, he was in his aunties house in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, forty (40) meters away from the
scene of the crime. He was then fetching water. Earlier, at about 5:30 p.m., he and Flores met but they did not greet
each other. There was no altercation between them. Hence, he could not understand why De Leon and Tablate
testified against him.
● Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time, he and appellant were in their aunties house in San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan. They watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and then went home. At about 10:00 p.m.,
appellant was arrested. Bautista did not inform the policemen that they were watching television in their aunties
house at the time the crime took place. Neither did he accompany appellant to the police station.
● On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
All premises considered, this Court resolves and so holds that the prosecution has been able to establish
the criminal culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny delos Santos is
hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
● In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby takes into account the brutality in the manner by which the life
of the victim was taken, and if only to serve as deterrent to others who might be similarly obsessed, it is believed
that the higher of the two penalties provided should be meted to the accused herein. Absent any circumstance that
would mitigate the severity of his criminal act and pursuant to Articles 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 6, Republic Act no. 7659, the accused Danny delos Santos y Fernandez is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Death by lethal injection.
ISSUE(S):
WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after the two-month period.
HELD:
YES. It is natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is
as such gravity as to show the cruelty of perpetrator, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses.
Besides, settled is the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial. Decision is affirmed with modification.
GUIYAB V PEOPLE 473 SCRA 533 (2005)
GUIYAB V PEOPLE 473 SCRA 533 (2005)

RPC Art. 3 (see Manuel v People)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Appeals; As a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in passing upon the credibility of a witness, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted or misapprehended.—As
a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of a witness,
unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted or misapprehended. That general rule holds true in this case.
Same; Witnesses; There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a
positive identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally.—
We do not doubt Joseph’s identification of Joey Guiyab. Even if he did not know the name of the petitioner prior to the
incident, he was able to identify him in open court. Besides, Joseph maintained that although he did not know the name of
the petitioner, he knew him by his face. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua
non, that, for a positive identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former
personally. The witness need not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face. We ruled
that “knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name. Hence, the positive identification of the
malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The weight of the eyewitness
account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because he knew his
name.”
FACTS:
● On December 12, 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., victim Rafael Bacani and witness Joseph Madriaga were in front of
the Community Center in Tumauini. Juan Sanchez kicked them. They posed for a fight but Joey Guiyab said “You
try and you will see” while holding a knife. Madriaga hit Sanchez with a stone, and so Guiyab chased him.
According to Madriaga, Guiyab failed to catch him so Guiyab instead attacked Bacani, stabbing him once on the
right chest. Bacani was brought to the hospital and died a day after. SP04 Romeo Tumolava also testified that he
saw Guiyab near the Community Center at the night of the incident.
● According to Guiyab, he was not at Tumauini Cultural and Sports Center at the time the incident happened. He
was farming until 5:00 p.m. at Sitio Bayabo, Camasi, and slept at around 9:00 p.m. in their house. This was
corroborated by his neighbor Domingo Gumaru, and his parents, Silvino and Vicenta Guiyab.
● Both the TC and CA found Guiyab guilty. Guiyab appealed to the SC, alleging his identification was tainted, since
his name was only fed to the witness Madriaga.
ISSUE(S):
WON the identification of the petitioner was tainted with conjecture and speculation
HELD:
NO. The SC found Madriaga’s identification of Joey Guiyab credible. Even if he did not know the name of Guiyab prior
to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court when he was asked to point out the person responsible for the
stabbing. Besides, Madriaga maintained that although he did not know Guiyab by name, he knew him by his face as part
of the community. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive
identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally. The witness
need not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face. “Knowing the identity of an accused
is different from knowing his name. Hence, the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just
because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The weight of the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the
said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because he knew his name.
PEOPLE v TEMBLOR, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)
[No. 66884, May 28, 1988.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, VS. VICENTE TEMBLOR ALIAS "RONALD."'
defendant-appellant.
Doctrines/Principles Involved
RPC, Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
RPC, Art. 3. (see Manuel v People)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Evidence; Murder; Witnesses; Rule that the trial court’s assessment of credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court; Reason.—The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively
identified as the killer of Cagampang? The settled rule is that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses
while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and
demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed
on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness did not diminish her
credibility; Reason.—The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not
diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively identified the accused as her husband’s assailant, and her
testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with human
experience.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution, witnesses; Rule
for alibi to be acceptable as a defense.—Appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. Furthermore,
the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else
when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol’s house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao
in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who
had positively identified him could not be overcome by the defendant’s alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People
vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258,)
Same; Same; Same; Motive; Lack of motive for the killing by appellant, rejected; Proof of motive, not essential when
the culprit was positively identified.—Appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial
court which opined that the defendant’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as
killings perpetrated by members of the New People’s Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition
for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA’s “agaw
armas” campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified (People vs.
Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; Flight of the accused was an implied admission of guilt—The records further show that the
accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del
Norte. Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA
422).
FACTS:
● 7:30 in the evening of December, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store
adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, the accused Vicente Temblor, asked to buy a half-pack of Hope
cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang
instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband
had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later Identified as the accused,
barged into the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm.
The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase)
where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents,
took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
● Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December
30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol where they spent the night drinking over a
slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
● Trial Court - defendant was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
● He appealed.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the court a qou erred:

1. In finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased Julius
Cagampang;
2. In rejecting his defense of alibi.
HELD:
The appeal deserves no merit. The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and
demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed
on appeal.
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that the
defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by
members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are
prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign.
Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified.
PEOPLE v HASSAN, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.

RPC Article 12
ARTICLE 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such
minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions of this
and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with
his surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person
mentioned in said article 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable
cause.
RPC Article 80
ARTICLE 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minor Delinquents. — Whenever a minor under eighteen years of age, of
either sex, be accused of a crime, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of
pronouncing judgment, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a
public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law for the care, correction or education of
orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any
other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Public Welfare Commissioner or any of his agents or
representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to
such conditions as are prescribed hereinbelow, until such minor shall have reached his majority or for such less period
as the court may deem proper.
The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his
parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision
of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong.
The Public Welfare Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools
or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the Court
every two months or as often as required, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and
intellectual progress made by him.
The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation
of the Public Welfare Commissioner or his authorized representatives or agents, or the superintendent of public schools
or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has
complied with the conditions imposed upon him. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however,
be affected by those contained herein.
If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this
article, with the approval of the Public Welfare Commissioner and subject to such conditions as this official in
accordance with the law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a
responsible person.
If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in
accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final
release.
In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been
committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in
case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned
to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him.
The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed,
shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do
so, in the discretion of the court.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Guilt of the accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.—We hold
that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proofbeyond reasonable doubt—
required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused person. The said evidence denies
us the moral certainty which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun
guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning
him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger. In evaluating the worth
of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment
must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. When the evidence for the
prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because
of the constitutional presumption of innocence the accused enjoys as a counterfoil to the awesome authority of the State
that is prosecuting him. The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the
prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement
of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect.
Same; Same; Prosecution’s evidence weak and unconvincing.—The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness,
is weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover,
for example, that the expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin
Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jose
Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased “from behind on his
chest” only once, the NBI medicolegal officer identified two stab wounds one “at the front portion of the chest at the
level and third rib, (sic) and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect.” The same medical expert also
concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause of death, that the same was “inflicted
on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him.”
Same; Same; Same; Investigation conducted by police investigator not satisfactory.—The investigation of this case
by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Section, at Zamboanga City, particularly by Police
Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the
police investigators in the identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was
“presented” alone to Jose Samson by the police investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his
police companions, at the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes on Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very
evidence of the prosecution, the procedure adopted by the police investigators was a “confrontation” between Jose
Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was
brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by
saying that the accused was identified by Samson in a “police line-up”; this tergiversation, we daresay, was an
afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the leading questions of the trial
judge rather than a fastidiousness, if not sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous
statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocally that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as the police
investigator claimed on second thought.
Same; Same; Same; Confrontation and identification of the accused at the funeral parlor by the lone eyewitness
improper and is as tainted as an uncounselled confession.—The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront
and identify the accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was “pointedly suggestive,
generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subverted his reliability as
eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against the accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor
acceptance.” Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness
and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of
a crime especially at its most crucial stage—the identification of the accused. As it turned out, the method of identification
became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young,
poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to
witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an
uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this
infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Same; Same; Motive; Motive essential when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.—And now as a
penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon,
a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because,
after all, motive is a state of mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment
of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal
role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit as when “the
identification is extremely tenuous,” as in this case.
FACTS:
● Respondent was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro. At the time of his death on
July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other
hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador.
● In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six
times. His existence in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the
Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births
and deaths.
● Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation
conducted by the police investigator, Police Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section, who also testified for
the prosecution.
● The sole eyewitness, Jose Samson, recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the
motorcycle with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from
behind on his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see the
assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these
happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Respondent guilty of murder
HELD:
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing.
Also, the element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the prosecution
would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the
two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect. We hold that the evidence for the
prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof — beyond reasonable doubt. The decision is
hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Crim Law I Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Crim Law I Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRIMINAL LAW I (CASE DIGEST)

US v PABLO, 35 PHIL 97 (1916)

[No. 11676. October 17, 1916.]

Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

Sovereign Power of the State (US v. Pablo)

The respondent was guilty of perjury.

PEOPLE v SANTIAGO, 43 PHIL (1922)

Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

Sovereign Power: Delegation to the Philippine Government

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO AMEND LAWS.—The procedural law in

LAW RELATING TO PLAINTIFF IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.—There is not a single constitutional provision

TAÑADA v TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

PESIGAN v ANGELES, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

No. L-64279. April 30, 1984.*

1987 Constitution, Art. 3 Bill of Rights

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself;

(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial; and

New Civil Code

Notes used under jurisprudence:

● On 2 April 1982, The defendant transported 26 carabao bound to Batangas.

US v SWEET, 1 PHIL 18 (1901)

[No. 448. September 20, 1901.]

Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 1

Civil Code, Art. 14

RP-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

1. Subject to the provisions of this article:

(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;

(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;

Per COOPER, J., concurring:

LIANG v PEOPLE, 355 SCRA 125

[G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000]

Civil Code, Art 14

Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. 5 (see US v Sweet, 1Phil 18 (1901)

PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Specialized Agencies,” Defined.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

US v AH SING, 36 PHIL 978 (1917)

[G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917]

MIQUIBAS v COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 PHIL 262 (1948)

[G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948]

1. INTERNATIONAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF PHILIPPINES OVER ALL OFFENSES COMMITTED

GUMABON v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

[G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971]

Civil Code, Art. 4

BERNARDO v PEOPLE, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)

G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983

PEOPLE v PIMENTEL, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

G.R. No. 100210 April 1, 1998

RPC Article 3. (see Bernardo v People)

Article 21. (see Bernardo v People)

PASCUAL v BOARD OF EXAMINERS, 28 SCRA 344

ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

PEOPLE v BON, G.R. NO. 166401, OCT. 30, 1996

G.R. No. 166401

Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code

MANUEL V PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461 (2005

MANUEL V PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461 (2005)

Article 3 Revised Penal Code

Article 19, 20, 21 Civil Code of the Philippines - Human Relations