Agency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis Agency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis 3 Jarrod Hayes Subject: World Politics Online Publication Date: Aug 2018 DOI: 10.1093/acrofore/9780190228637.013.523 Summary and Keywords For much ofthe history ofthe stay of ntmtionl relatos, and of frig Polly Srircove sible scholars ave debated te rlave weight of agency and structure in Ee or. the significance of agency versus struc- os to ent broed petro sock interac “Stoo tote oe ara! hts theo lta nocd hh oma agency to the fore : Seem 22'0809 5 Geno thet the question o agency versus stuctore im nermeional outcomes settled in FPA in favor of agency. An assessment of the literature in FPA shows such a suggestion to be wide of the nari (NGUSOIPRBBSRPABruggle with the question of agency versus struc- ture that pervades the study of international relations general byes rather than resolving the debate ‘nnn, ‘agency and structure, the iterature. shows that ‘and structure occupi Im both cases, the significance of structure in the actual analysis of foreign policy is far greater than common conception recognizes. This reality means that FPA represents the cutting edge for theoretical and. analytical efforts to understand the relationship between structure and agency in interna- tonal outcomes. Keywords: agency, structuse, psychology, rationals, constructivism foreign pally analysis Introduction For as long as it has been, In Politics Among Nations, CS TMOFSEHEUISED) 2 qued that enlightened policymakers should resist the popular inclination to see the world ‘in moral terms, pursuing instead foreign policies that truly advance the nationalAgency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis ‘Although Morgenthau did not frame the problem in terms of agency and structure, he clearly articulated an argument that{S6G66iS{the prBatcH or eniightenealageney supe {BIHKs—in which we might observe the idiosyncratic effects of ag ‘vant to the fate of states. It Told ic Foreign policy outcomes and the policymakers who pro- duce them, Wie some scholars in PA expiciy argu th focus sand should neon agents and thir ners of agony tefl of FPA a a whoo largaly aos he queson of gency tnd stature tat hve played prominent lin her. nde SEE exci en address he det of agency an strate dates tothe ery (SGC ect sractt tt ene res important or PAG they age of asa whole. Aso consoquenco ASA SGCESESSNGRBED Structure quston hs introduced substantial tension ito FPA tat rod ts itntve Contribution to the std of Defining Structure and Agency In 1987, Alexander Wenat posited that all social scientific theories embody an implicit so- lution to the agent-structure problem (Wendt, 1987, p. 337). The agent-structure problem iocte in two “tral of soe eA oa rs is a AR veut yc Se EEE onc 2007. "sh lam rogues tht thoory revere wheter tito properties € ages OF ‘se properties of social structures (or some combination of the two) that drive outcomes. ‘Understood in ideal-typical terms, coming down on the side of agency points to the pur-Agency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis poseful manifestation of the unique €GSieSiGs/Giiie|SetSeasle\s)basis ior Sxplainingl (SuUOMIeSHGonerscly4etrUCtURR points io the maniiestationlos the characteristics thetde fine relations between actors as the basis for explaining outcomes Axis 1: FPA and IR Theory If, as Wendt argued, every social scientific theory is predicated on a claim about the rela- tionship between structure and agency, then there can be(§itEISRUGUBElE SE AGEh SE IREES ory has come down on tne , there is much variability. Waltz and offer so-called #ERu speCHHUB locating the bass of behavior firmly in the mandates OPENE-anaFebic structure ofthe intornational system (Mearsheimer, 1994; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). (5GES/SS5RSS¢H5S SES ISSsaSenEIE>, ‘making room for an element of state agency (Moravcsik, 1997), but on the whole they too look to a Wkeobane & Mar- tin, 1905%¢ Marxist and related thy but ‘capitalism (Wallerstein, 2011). Constructivist approaches vary more widely and—In |:eory —generally take greater account of agency through their reliance on the concept of struc- ‘on 20051900. agua con identity) the Drought renewed focus on agency (Corut, ‘2018; Pouliot, 2008) st IR's orientation that FPA is positioned. As Dessier ucted. “human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the Social world” (Desster, 1989). Its generally this perspective that provides the point of de- ;Parture for FPA. Scholars in FPA see the study of foreign policy as laying the empirical ‘and analytical foundations for the study of IR. hu ‘man decision makers whose actions are the basis f (Say- der, Bruck, & Sapin, 2002, p. 35). Indeed, sofme position ®-eoncern With Human agency as the defining characteristic of FPA (Hudson, 2005, p. 3). IMGHsforey/RPArServestssis" Couns fexweighttowREieoryp‘Tering analytical and empirical insights on agency to a discipline far more accomplished in structure (Hudson, 2008, p. 4). ‘AOWNOES PALM AyENCYRINIONEANAIYHCRNNAD Usually through careful analysis of a particular event, e set of events, or ioreign policy with a focus on the processes of de ClsionemakingasThe subsequent discussion demonstrates, however, that the focus on agency that some scholars in FPA emphasize Is nobas unambiguous as they claim ($66 structure continues to play an important role in foreign policy analysis and empirics. Great Figures Occasionally, scholars in IR call for a renewed effort to account for the influence of (GaigUelyjSIgnIInCaREPONECRNIESUETSY\Eyman & Pollack, 2001). While the analytical impor- tance of leaders ebbs and flows in [RUE PAGStSCOnSIStenEVeCIoRDRaRsIys\s. The great figures approach assess@SlfarBign policy and tie resulting international FElstioNs,Agency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis ‘Through a deep analysis of particularly powerful or prominent political leaders (Dailo. 1995; Walker & Schafer, 2007). Usually, the goal is taddentify Specific atinibutesoREhe? (IESHGENERAL resulted in a particular outcome or policy. Analysis might focus op the impact ich as perceptucl tendencies, the need for power. or difficulty with (Conceptual complexity (Dyson, 7006-SeUrcers, 2011), ManageMeREBHPle (Mitchell & ‘Massoud, 2009), @EielpeiSonallERBEMeNESUESPSCMiGeABers (Saunders, 2017), These Investigations assess the impact of great figures at{SA0GAUTOREHIS—ofton crisis or con- flict—on foreign policy when taeageney of creat figures ia/ENeCOnSEGUEHEES of their docision-making aEBaNaxaze, Generalized Models of Decision-Making Studies of specific leaders in times of crisis epitomize the claim that FPA has resolved the {@genbstnucture problem in favor ofagencysThese studies often rely on theoretical tools have been developed to understand foreign policy decision-making generally. Thus ¢gey- ‘eralized models of decision-making serve as a complement to the great figures model Rather than focus in depth on a specific leader, scholarship in this category seeks to make ‘some broad claims about how various factors'influence foreign poliey agency. The rance of this type of scholarship is substantial. Some seek to propose wide-ranging models that 100k systematically at how (ERSORSUERBEREHEES (gender, military service, or childhood physical abuse, for example) ¢hape personality hd Belesjsid NeW EBSselI5 turnirelatatrn GEEINGHETSIGN policy prectibes,tuch as war (Horowite, Stam) Fils, 2015). Otners look to more specitic tactors, such a€SBQGRSIBEE) Ie (Kaarho, 1997; Keller, 20034, 20058; Shannon & Keller, 2007) ((OW\DOMEYINEKerSattalnediMvSinpOsiLIony(M nda, 2012), op- (SEAUOMALICOURS (George, 1969), Beli (Hurwitz & Polley, 1987; Holsti & Rosenau, 1988), ‘sonemas\(Larson, 1994) qgalgeB (Angell, Dunham, & Singer, 1964), @ESOHGCOmBiaHOn Hheteot Hermann, 1980). ‘The relationship between generalized models of decision-making and the problem of agency versus structure is a mixed one. The generalized models of decision-making offer _great insight into how various factors shape the exercise of agency in the foreign policy er ‘powers of agency. Scholars have identified elements pe de ‘sion-making in diséemable patiers® c.g. individuals wig shars'the same socially in- formed belief systems will make similar kinds of foreign policy decisions. The role of be- liols shared across individuals what constructivists would call intersubjectivity—sug- costs thatiJSEBHGS\BE meaning making SPSBBIRG individuals inform policy outcomes. ‘These findingwbear More than a passing similaribet stmluspas developed in IR theory. ‘This in turn prompts questions neqarding the relative weight of agency in shaping foreign ppolicyjouteon}es—the same kinds of questions that have long occupied IR more broadly. “These questions are mQ{aleWby/ WOFKiIN|FPATOH teiroleiot GoRIEStc POLES)Agency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis Domestic Politics and Decision-Making Ifa thread of study has come to define FPA, n, this work has focused on the: (ComextsmIndeed, Kearbo argued that itis in sud ' are plentiful. Bueno de Mesquita held in his 2002 International Studies Asso- clation Presidential Address that only a renewed focus on leaders and their domestic poli- tics could produce progress in understanding the behavior of states (De Mesquita, 2002), Robert Putnam famously argued that policymakers play policy games at two levels—the domestic and the international (Putnam, 1988). The intersection of the two allows policy: ‘makers to exercise agency by leveraging pressures at one level against interlocutors at the other level. Morgan and Bickers claimed that leaders confronting the erosion of politi- cal support in key domestic constituencies purposefully use adventurous foreign policies. including war—to distract from domestic political crisis (Morgan & Bickers, 1992), ‘Saunders held that democratic leaders must manage and maneuver within the policymak- ing elite to enact policy (Saunders, 2015, p. 137). Baum asserted that political leaders consciously evaluate the chances of success in foreign conflicts in their calculations of whether to make threats publically or privately (Baum, 2004). Subotié argued that policy- ‘makers selectively activate narratives to maintain a sense of ontological continuity even 4s policy changes to confront threats (Subotié, 2015, p. 104), and the list goes on in sub- stantial v raphic focus end theoretical argumentation, CESS SUEBSETE® ‘There can be little doubt that agency plays an important role in how scholars have ana- lyzed the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics. Somewhat ironically, however, domestic politics also does much to throw into doubt strong claims that FPA is, of the examples provided above, the ‘agents hypothesized by scholars are in one way or another constrained by, or reacting to, structures that limit and may even define agency. The ability of policy leaders to act is de- fined by the offices they hold, which are in turn defined hy the political structures that to we poe RRS revel unos enpintes ere ef eqn rp ann ones ite EE EE 2 150Agency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis ‘The second level is the role of social structures in shaping domestic polities i, os Paum ‘argued, political leaders actively evaluate the domestic political costs of threats, what is it ‘within domestic politics that creates domestic political. costs or benefits {Ox@ensor sis (ielfjaqeentury (\imond. 1950; Caspary, 1970)\gisbholars in PPA have tumed to public opin= a ieaeaaimnMM Car re nas unsourced bor >. Slane arpeent over th slgnicance and influence of public opinion but its algo un- deaily So ens fe ur apnoea comin ea ee au prt diver of foeign 7 TD 3 tars ta bout publ opinion, they ae aking abo. ASSP ED QUEM oe re ciomonts of reader srutares that create identi abe petters of order within societies and trough which societies interpret political vas Scholars have examined, and found substantial effects from, @iiGS1SiSEeIaISEUCHE: (niShapIng fOreigMPONCOUICOMeS, These include MaMuHayes, 2012 /KGSHTSI TITS {Gispositions=Isolationist: versus{cosmOpoltaRnGrexample=>(Horrmann, Isernia, & Segat ti, 2009)ss06iah values ofelites| Angell, 1964; Singer, 1964), SGHENS)Sienis Bsmationeline SUSE ols, 1962), SEMA AAGIEORSTORFONEGAIRNOUGHEWalcer & Schafer, 2007). ‘These factors shape public responsos to international political events, but since policy elites are part of socictyiiGre#is good TeEson!to elleverthat broadly/sharedisocialistrucs (GefeeinATURHeeSrsIoN policy-and diminleh-ageneyeindeed, scholars have found that so- cioculturally shared personal values structure the foreign policy orientations of individu- als (Rathbun, Kertzer, Reifler, Goren, & Scotto, 2016, p. 124). These tindings, taken to: other, suggost thaviStRuStie|playsia/SUbstaitial Pole nnshaping foreigi polley and that agency can often be substantially circumscribed. Ageney/Structure, IR Theory, and FPA If FPA as a self-conceived field charts a path analytically prior and in contradistinction to IR theory/SemanSitneieaseRtNatIRUeoryiniusncEssEP, This influence is particularly SHOLRIGlin the case of questions of agency and structure. Not surprisingly given IR theory's preoccupation with the causal force of structures, (S]EOERBWSGHSRIRIEESED ‘\GIRPATERpNESIZSSSEISERELONERSEHEP So-called neoclassical realism, with Its efforts to take into account unlt or state-level influences, is perhaps the most explicitly foreign policy analytical theory of the realist IR theory stable (Caverley, 2010; Rose, 1998; Talia~ ferro, 2006). Yet, Colin Elman argued that Waltz’s structural realism can and does fanc ton as a theory of foreign policy and thus imported the structural imperatives of Waltz’s theory and its descendants into FPA. Regardless of the flavor, @pi¢ahonsutiTeSiiseles ‘theory to FPA carry over structural reaiism's central claim that the anarchic structure of GREInESMALOHEIGISIEAUGnd the power dynamics it generates) {S/ABIpimany Causal TORSSREVNGRCIALORSLENSEMSHEEIYomes, 2002, p. 110). Realism is far from the only IR theoretical approach to make its way into FPA. CORSERHS tivism, like realism, @Q0BI@ Sea iAIGIaSi=istructural epproach CONmaerStanelintera- slonsyinetherinternationsisyster: (Wendt, 1999). Rather than focus on anarchy as a natuAgency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis rulistic phenomenon, as in realism, cpnstructivists study i as GGG pGHoneoOniaD ‘This approach has more zeadily allowed constru (Houghton, 2007), in ‘some ‘cases, authors have focused on how domestic social structures like identity or norms shape the behavior of policy makers and states (Hopf, 2012), Others address the ways in which language in the form of discourses or narratives interacts with domestic social structures to create political and social space for foreign policy (Subotié, 2015)—that is, to make some policies thinkable and others unthinkable (Holland, 2013). Some scholars do attempt to take a more nuanced approach to the question of agency and structure by building theories that account for both (Hayes, 2013). For example, Cantir and Kaarho ar- ued that roles—social structures that shape expectations of the states that fll them and that are often shared across policy elites as well as the general public~shape the deci- sions of policymakers and are tools for policymakers to oxo} re Kaarbo, 2012). Axis 2: The Agent-Structure Tension at the Lev- el of Individuals The unresolved tension within FPA between agency ad structures evident even when (quasi fuses exclusively onthe psyeholonyofindivialssHudbon inher erounent that agency is at the heart of FPA (uGSOn= 00S; PEAENOeAha gency eqw ETS Gamat Description of an act of agency, or assertion that natural law was operative in a particular case of the use of agency, cannot fully satisfy, for we know that agency ‘means the agent could have acted [emphasis added] otherwise. ‘This seems a reasonable, and commonsense, conception of agency. An issue arises, how- lever, with the relationship between alternative courses of action and agency, GSH Inthe abstract, very little prevents actors from choosing alternative courses of action. Ci @iSarSa=> eg ETE: are not, so far as we can tell, im- ‘mutably governed in their socal context as electrons aro inthe physical. Howover, just ‘because an alternative course of action is possible does not mean that the actor. considers or is even aware , botween what is possible in theory and what occurs in practice is born outAgency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis, (GRRSUAMMSUNERIEGEMIERT Tiree examples, analogical reasoning, prospect theory, and ‘eybernotic theory, make the case. ‘Take the case oR@RSIOQICaIBaSORING (Houghton, 2001; Khong, 1992). Authors drawing ‘on analogical reasoning argue that polisyiniakers liselpeisonal iid Shared istonealiexpes GRCSESSHAIOGUCE SIO MAKG|SSNSG|GECORLEMPEEATY problems For foreign policy, enalo- These in turn are translated into ye proscgdestone gamed rom the oer ue faction or poral gangs hey pathways by contrasting analogies against each other while redicng cognitive load and ‘enhancing the ebilty to persuade others of their preferred policy agenda. On the other hand the nao ey plo aac ccc ccc xperienceggan funtion like structures anid limit the agency of polleymakers, Ths is be- cause the purported Tetons of history and expetfORe® are offen seen as selfevident or commonsense (Hopf, 2013)—think, for example, ofthe commonly accepted lessons emerging from Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler (Record, 2007). The ability of analo- ies to prescribe commonsense interpretations of the past limits the scope of agency by limiting the scope of action that might be imagined by the policymakers. (OMeetthe=ts easement analogy is invoked, alternative policy avenues are foreclosed as policymakers ‘implement the commonly understood lessons of history Analogical reasoning is far from unique (Stee SIG MEGA y nN Soruceure! PEOSBESHUNGOAHAAB found cubstantial success in FPA (McDermott, 1998). It has done so, however, by proposingithworeticalreformmulations oT EXpESteal ELE EREBIVOhe of the ‘most common forms of rational choice theOry in FPA~-alaieidge: the agenieyofidividus ISQTEORS so by holding that decision-making, ralhen'than being aisystematic weighing ‘tloptionsijo determine which offers the greatest benefit for the least costs brumeated In egular waVSIJAt the core of prospect theory is theypropositionsthatsindividualssane: sensi {ive to Ghanges{iassers hs they relate to's ference pointe (Levy, 1997). From this, prospect theory works out a series of propositions about how reference dependence sys- tomatically shifts decision-making One of the most notable ofthese isthe claim that individuals generally treat losses as nore significant taaz goissthat inividuals are willing to go to greater lenaths to avoid SSUGSSIEHaH TS eoheve > sitnilargain This s\stematiounfluemcmos cecision-making sug- cgsts that decision makers oporato within cognitive structures that constrain how they understand and engace with the world, Those in turn interact with another structural ele tment of the socia!world-sdiseotrses, How tho world is framed through language changes how agents assess risk, A“90 pEFEEnt chance of success" has effects on decision-making distinct from a "10 percent chance of failure.” even though both framings identify the same situation, The combined effectis one im Which, While it remains possible for poticy- 2 agency of individuals 1s com ee eames ear eeAgency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis Coley foreign policy take these structural abbreviations of agency a step further (Stembrufer, 2002). On the whole, these approaches hold that agents in in ‘ternational relation: Instead, actors make decisions , oF as Ostrom and Job put it, “simple and manageable decision algorithms” (Ostrom & Job, 1986, p. 543). In this context, While it may appear that policymakers exercise agenc] ‘This perspective meshes with work on the role of habit, which also points to the cognitive shortcomings of human beings and the role of structure (habit) in allowing actors to navi- gate complex societal relations (Hopf, 2010). Conclusion What is the significance of the question of agency versus structure in FPA? If FPA's self ‘conception is taken seriously, a focus on agency allows FPA to position itself against tradi- tional IR theory by counterbalancing the latter’s preoccupation with structure. This posi- tion, however, overiooks substantial tensions within FPA over the relationship between structure and agency. It also undermines FPA's effort to provide the empirical and analyti- cal foundations for IR theory. The concluding paragraphs of this article offer a summary and analysis of these challenges before offering assessment of how FPA can overcome the challenges and embrace a crucial position in the study of IR. "The problem with an analytical nd empirical focus on agency is that providos tile _ foundation fore systematic study of foreign policy decision-making. ts 1a: ex: ‘treme, analysis predicated on agency would not assume any constraints on the decision ‘ker STOR OES ISCUEERRNSARIMGWAD! Cerisnaos, 1992). Ths, action would be a product of only the interaction of autonomous indi nalytical focus on agency isn ‘an analytical focus on chaos, Rather, in the context of a pure focus on agency, studies of for- eign policy would be largely empirical and thus analytical islands. Tmade but would offer little understanding fever this raises a problem, How can such a field say anything meaningful about foreign policy decision-making? And, more broadly, (1G S5s se iiicingsintOiereaiaisep aD GC ROHSESHASIG LY EPA aS oA Rel aENLLAT MOMENOM NaS cholars regularly rely on structures to situate agental ation, As a consequence, structures—poiticl, so cial, and psychological—interweave throughout studies of foreign poliySGH6RERNE) for example, the constraints placed on policymakers by domestic polities. as the work on narratives and thelr acceptabil- ty shows. AniAgency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis . as exemplified by work on analogical reasoning, pol heuristic theory, and prospect theory. These structures enable analysts and scholars to draw generalized conclusions about the processes of foreign policy decision-making. In- deed, such is the prominence of structure in studies of FPA thajjS SHS SESE hi FR if structure plays an important role in enabling FPA to make genera} claims about foreign ‘toe often overlooked (Houghton, 2007). If FPA is to provide the analytical and empirical foundations for IR, it must overcome the levels-of-analysis problem—the ability of schol- ars studying individuals to say something about social collectives or general patterns of behavior among the collectives. A purely agential approach provides little to make such a If structure is so central to FPA, why keep agency in the mix? That is, why not just adopt the structural predisposition of IR theory, albeit at a lower—c., individual—level of analy- sis? There are several interrelated reasons why agency should tthe heart of FPA. aa fy unpredicted end of the Cold War, for ee io, cannot bo understood apart from the particular ideas held by the Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev (English, 2000). A re- lated point lies in the particular nature of For exam- ple, major-power war occurs rarely, but when it does, it has outsized effects on the subse. quent patterns of relations among states—as demonstrated by the 20th century. In cases Like great-power war, the agency of key decision makers comes to the forefront—would ‘World War II have occurred as it did if Chamberlain held more Churchillian beliefs about Hitler? Thus, events crucial for explaining the ebb and flow of IR cannot be understood. apart from agency: a tec ‘GayatemisReommnaturalaystemigt later of which ae purely structural, While philosophers and scientists do not quite understand why (Wendt, 2015), humans are not Jjust electrons trapped in magnetic Fields, all behaving the same way because the same structural forces govern them all. Human consciousness and the resulting agency enter je doubt that IR and the foreignAgency and Structure in Foreign Policy Analysis policies that interweave to create it are massively complex. Even from a purely structural perspective, scholars are incapable of identifying, much less developing a unified model of, all of the structural forces that shape international outcomes. onsequently, scholars need some way of accounting for the for example, Mukunda’s argument that how leaders come to their position—through normal channels (Hitered) or as outsiders (unfiltered)—plays an important role in their success or fallure (Mukunda, 2012). In moments of crisis, when radical change is often required, outsiders can be crucial to charting a new path, But in ‘umes of stability, outsiders often fail as their novel approaches run up against systems that do not need—or are functioning well enough to resist—change {i252 )wever, FPA has neglected questions of the relationship between agency and structure even as they have persisted in the broader study of IR. For FPA to claim its foundational place within IR, these questions must be confronted directly in an ongoing discussion. While not every scholar need delve into a philosophical treatment of the agency-structure problématique, it should be incumbent on @ (SCHOO Gs. Doing so will bring important intellectual clarity to FPA and allow its crucially impor- tant contributions to IR to be fully realized. References Almond, G. A. (1950). The American people and foreign policy (1st ed.). New York, NY; Harcourt, Brace. Alons, G. C. (2007). 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